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MacKay, Niall James orcid.org/0000-0003-3279-4717, Price, Christopher and Wood, Andrew James orcid.org/0000-0002-6119-852X (2016) Weight of Shell Must Tell : A Lanchestrian reappraisal of the Battle of Jutland. History. pp. 536-563. ISSN 1468-229X

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12241

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1

WeightofShellMustTell:ALanchestrianreappraisaloftheBattleofJutland

NiallMacKay

DepartmentofMathematics,UniversityofYork,YorkYO105DD,UK

niall.mackay@york.ac.uk

ChristopherPrice

HistoryandAmericanStudies,YorkStJohnUniversity,YorkYO317EX

c.price@yorksj.ac.uk

A.JamieWood

DepartmentsofMathematicsandBiology,UniversityofYork,YorkYO105DD

jamie.wood@york.ac.uk

ABSTRACT:Were-analysethe1916BattleofJutland(German:Skagerrak),themajornaval

engagementoftheFirstWorldWar,inthelightoftheunderstandingofdreadnoughtfleettactics

developedoverthedecadeleadinguptoit.Inparticular,weconsidertheinteractionofthecalculus

ofLanchester’sSquareLawwithfleetgeometryandthecommanders’decisionsthatdeterminedit,

andwiththeshipbuildingdecisionsassociatedwiththeLanchestriantrade-offbetweenqualityand

quantity.Were-examinethebehaviourofthecommandersinthelightofthistacticalanalysis,and

concludethattheoutcomeofJutland,inspiteofapparentBritishtacticalandtechnologicalfailings,

wastheculminationofadecadeofconsistentandprofessionallyinsightfuldecision-makingbythe

RoyalNavy,whichbuiltandcorrectlywieldeditsdecisiveweapon,theGrandFleet,toachievethe

requiredstrategicvictory.

2

The1916BattleofJutlandremainsasubjectofundiminishedcontroversyasitscentenary

approaches.1Muchofthisdebaterevolvesaroundthequestionofvictoryanddefeat,andthe

performanceoftheBritishcommanders,AdmiralJellicoeandViceAdmiralBeatty.Thelogical

tensioncreatedbyararecombinationofstrategicvictoryandapparenttacticaldefeatnaturally

defiesconsensus.OntheonehandJellicoe,famouslytheonlymanoneithersidewhocouldlosethe

warinanafternoon,wasequallyawarethathecouldnotwinitinthesametimespanandreceives

praiseforacalculatedperformancethatmaintainedBritain’snavalsupremacydespiteanegative

anddispiritingexchangeofhumanandmateriallosses.Conversely,Jellicoe’sapparentlyun-British

playingofthepercentagesiscontrastedwithhissubordinateBeatty’sembraceoftheNelsonian

traditionofdashanddaring,which,criticsargue,couldhavedeliveredacrushingandunequivocal

victorytoBritainatapivotalpointinthewar.Theemotionaledgetothisdebateisfuelledfurtherby

theadditionofadeclinistnarrative,whichplacesBritain’sdramaticlossesofcapitalshipsinthe

1TheearlycontroversybeganwithJ.E.T.Harper’sNavalStaffAppreciation(latermoderatedintoK.G.B.and

A.Dewar,NarrativeoftheBattleofJutland(London,1924)),which,followinginterventionsbyBeatty,was

highlycriticalofJellicoe(seealsoJ.E.T.Harper,ThetruthaboutJutland(London,1927)andJ.E.T.Harperand

L.Gibson,TheRiddleofJutland(LondonandNewYork,1934)).Thewrittenbattleragedthereafter,

exemplifiedbythepro-BeattyC.Bellairs,TheBattleofJutland:thesowingandthereaping(London,1920)and

thepro-JellicoeAdm.SirReginaldBacon,TheJutlandScandal(London,1924.ThedefinitivehistoryisA.J.

Marder,FromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow:TheRoyalNavyintheFisherera,1904-1919,5vols(Oxford,

1961-1970).ForaccessiblemodernsummariesseeP.HartandN.Steel,Jutland1916─DeathintheGrey

Wastes(London,2003)andEricGrove,‘ThememoryoftheBattleofJutlandinBritain’,inM.Epkenhans,J.

Hillmann,F.Nägler,Skagerrakschlacht:Vorgeschichte─Ereignis─Verarbeitung(Munich,2009),translatedas

Jutland:WorldWarI’sgreatestnavalbattle(Lexington,2015),whichalsogivescurrentGermanperspectives.

RegardingourtitlewenotethatJellicoewrotetoChurchillon14/7/1914that‘TheGermanswouldarguethat

theirgunsareofsufficientpowertocarrytheirprojectilesthroughourcomparativelyweakarmour[and]ithas

notbeennecessarytohaveheaviergunshitherto.IdonotagreewiththembecauseIattachsomuch

importancetoweightofburstingshell’.A.TemplePattersoned.,TheJellicoePapers:selectionsfromthe

privateandofficialcorrespondenceofAdmiraloftheFleetEarlJellicoeofScapa(NavyRecordsSoc.,vols108

and111,1966and1968),vol.I,item31.Fisherwastypicallymoreexclamatory:‘Afterall,theimmense

superiorityofour13.5“gunsMUSTtell’(FishertoJellicoe,21/1/1915,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item103).

3

contextofaperceivedongoingandacceleratingindustrialandinstitutionalfailure,particularly

relativetoGermany.2

Recentworkhastendedtoemphasizeeithertechnicalissuesorcommandandcontrolwithinthe

widercontextoftheRoyalNavy’sorganizationalculture.3However,fromonecrucialperspective

Jutlandhasyettobeaddressed.Fiftyyearsoftechnicaldevelopmentofcapitalshipshadbeen

accompaniedbyscanthardevidenceconcerninghowbesttousethem:yetfleettacticshadtobe

developed,andthereisalargebodyofwritingonthetopicfromthetwentyyearsprecedingJutland,

almostentirelyneglectedintherecentresurgenceofpre-FirstWorldWarnavalhistory.4Itscentral

2See,forexample,C.Barnett,TheSwordbearers:SupremeCommandintheFirstWorldWar(London,1963).

Thesecondofthefourcasestudiesinthebookis‘Sailorwithaflawedcutlass:AdmiralSirJohnJellicoe’.The

thesisiscritiquedinE.Grove,‘HowflawedreallywasBritain’scutlass?AcritiqueoftheBarnettthesis’,inA.

ClesseandC.Coker,TheVitalityofBritain(Luxembourg,1993).ForarecentperspectiveseeShawnT.Grimes,

StrategyandWarPlanningintheBritishNavy,1887-1918(London,2012).

3AsubstantialbodyofworkbySumidaexploresvariousaspectsoftheuseofthisrapidly-changingtechnology,

rangingfromtheproblemoffirecontrol(J.T.Sumida,‘BritishCapitalShipDesignandFireControlinthe

DreadnoughtEra:SirJohnFisher,ArthurHungerfordPollen,andtheBattleCruiser’,JournalofModernHistory,

51(1979),pp.205-230)tothatoftheoptimalrangeatwhichtofight(J.T.Sumida,‘AMatterofTiming:The

RoyalNavyandtheTacticsofDefensiveBattle,1912-1916’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,67(2003),pp.85-136),

althoughhisconclusionsaredisputed(M.Seligmann,‘AGermanpreferenceforamedium-rangebattle?British

assumptionsaboutGermannavalgunnery,1914-1915’,WarinHistory,19(2012),pp.33-48;J.Brooks,

‘PreparingforArmageddon:GunneryPracticesandExercisesintheGrandFleetPriortoJutland’,Journalof

StrategicStudies36(2015)pp.1006-1023;StephenMcLaughlin,‘BattlelinesandFastWings:BattlefleetTactics

intheRoyalNavy,1900-1914’,JournalofStrategicStudies38(2015),pp.985-1005.).Thetechnicalaspectsof

gunnerycontrolaredealtwithbyJohnBrooks,DreadnoughtGunneryandtheBattleofJutland:TheQuestion

ofFireControl(Abingdon,2005),causticallyreviewedinJ.T.Sumida,‘Gunnery,Procurement,andStrategyin

theDreadnoughtera’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,69(2005),pp.1179-1187;responsebyJ.Brooks,Journalof

MilitaryHistory,70(2006),pp.195-200).Lanchestrianthinkingisneverdiscussedexplicitlyinthisliterature,

butSumidanotesthedynamicnatureofBritishtacticalthinking,andtheRoyalNavy’s`Intelligent

considerationof…fleetfireandmovement–thatis,thenavalhistoricalequivalentof“inherentmilitary

probability”’.TheRoyalNavy’sorganizationalcultureanditseffectoncommandandcontrolareexploredina

landmarkworkbyAndrewGordon,TheRulesoftheGame:JutlandandBritishNavalCommand(Annapolis,

1997).However,Gordondoesnotdiscussfleettactics.Thepointthattheyshouldnotbeneglectedaftera

periodofrapidtechnologicalchangeismadeinM.Allen,‘TheDeploymentofUntriedTechnology:British

NavalTacticsintheIroncladEra’,WarinHistory,15(2008),pp.269-293.

4Themostcomprehensivebibliographyandmostthoroughdiscussionofthefleettacticsofthisoranyother

eraisWayneP.Hughes,FleetTactics(Annapolis,1986).Invariousotherarticles,whichweshallrefertolater,

Hughesexplorestherelationsamongtechnology,tacticsandtheoperationallevelofnavalwarfare.Fora

4

themeisofthequantificationandmathematizationoftheroleofthe‘biggun’.Intheearly

twentiethcentury,theoristsinmanycountrieswereexploringmeansofpredictingvictoryordefeat

inbattlethroughtheuseofgeometryandcalculus.ThemostfamousexampleistheBritishengineer

andscientistF.W.Lanchester’s‘squarelaw’,whichprovidedarevolutionaryunderstandingofthe

effectsofmodernweaponry,andpredictedthatanoutgunnedforcewaslikelytosufferan

acceleratingrateoflossrelativetoitsopponentuntilitwascompletelydestroyed.5Evenmilitary

analysts,however,areoftenunawarethattheessentialconclusionsoftheSquareLawwere

independentlyarrivedatintheUSA(twice),RussiaandFrance,thoughapparentlynotinGermany.6

Thisbodyofworkwarnedagainstacceptingbattleifevenslightlyoutnumbered,andstressedthe

desirabilityofaninitialunopposedperiodoffire,howeverbrief,andofdividinganenemyforceand

destroyingitindetail.

TheeffectofsuchthinkingonthecontestbetweenBritishandGermanbattlefleetswasprofound.

JellicoeinformedLanchesterthat‘yourN-squarelawhasbecomefamousintheGrandFleet’,7andat

thestrategiclevelthehighGermanconceptofthenavalwaragainstBritain,theriskfleet

[Risikoflotte],evolvedintoaclassicLanchestrianplanofdetachinganddestroyingaportionofthe

summaryofrecentworkbyhistoriansseeM.S.Seligmann,‘Therenaissanceofpre-FirstWorldWarnaval

history’,JournalofStrategicStudies,36(2013),pp.454-479.

5F.W.Lanchester,AircraftinWarfare:theDawnoftheFourthArm(London,1916),basedonarticlesin

Engineering,98(1914),pp.422-423andpp.452-453.

6J.V.Chase,‘AMathematicalInvestigationoftheEffectofSuperiorityofForceinCombatsUpontheSea’,

unpublishedsecretpaper,1902(reprintedinAppendixCofFiske,FightingMachine,below);BradleyA.Fiske,

‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,USNIPrizeEssay,ProceedingsoftheUnitedStatesNavalInstitute[PUSNI]31(1905),

pp.1-80;BradleyA.Fiske,TheNavyasaFightingMachine(NewYork,1916;reissuedintheClassicsofSea

Powerseries,NavalInstitutePress,Annapolis,1988;LtA.Baudry(FrenchNavy),TheNavalBattle:studiesof

tacticalfactors(London,1914);M.Osipov,‘Theinfluenceofthenumericalstrengthofengagedforcesontheir

casualties’(1915),translatedbyR.HelmboldandA.S.Rahm,NavalResearchLogistics,42(1995),pp.435-490.

7LetterfromJellicoetoLanchester,15thJune1916,heldasB3/18,Lanchesterarchive,UniversityofCoventry.

5

largerGrandFleetandthenengagingtheremainderonequalornumericallyfavourableterms

[Kraftausgleich].8

FromtheLanchestrianperspective,apparentcertaintiesrelatingtoJutlandbecomeproblematical.

TheGermanconcentrationonarmourprotectionattheexpenseofgun-power,forexample,wasnot

necessarilymorerationalthantheBritishaimofproducingalargernumberofhullswithgreater

numbersofhighercalibregunswhilecuttingexpensivecornerswithlighterandlessintricately

arrangedarmour.NordoesthiscontrastinpreparationinevitablypaintapictureofBritishtechnical

andindustrialdecline,insteadsuggestingamorenuancedquantitativeunderstandingofthe

mechanicsoffleetactionthanthatofthepotentialenemy.Similarly,wecannowprovideaclearer

picturethanbeforeoftheintellectualmilieuinwhichthetacticalviewsofthecommanderswere

formed,andoftheroleofchanceandofthedilemmasfacingthem,inthecontextofwhatWayne

Hugheshascalledthe‘strategy-tacticsdialectic’.9DidthecatastrophicexplosionsonBritish

battlecruisersindicatethatagreaterdisasterhadbeenavoidedfortuitously,orweretheytheresult

ofaparticularandunlikelycombinationofcircumstancesfavouringtheGermans?WhentheBritish

commander,AdmiralJellicoe,turnedawayfromtheGermanfleet,wasthisbecausehelackeddrive

anddaring,orwashesimplyunwillingtofightthemeleebattlehisenemyneededandcravedas

theironlypathtoameaningfulvictory?

8ThepointofdepartureforGermantacticswasthat‘victoryispossibleonlyiftheenemymakesmistakes’

(ViceAdmW.Wegener,TheNavalStrategyoftheWorldWar(Berlin,1929;trans.H.H.Herwig,Annapolis,

1989)).ForasurveyofGermanpre-wartacticalthinkingseeFrankNägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlansin

theKaiser’sNavypriortoWorldWarI’,inEpkenhans,Skagerrakschlacht/Jutland..Forcontemporaryviewssee

AdmR.Scheer,Germany’sHighSeaFleetintheWorldWar(London,1920);OttoGroos,DerKrieginder

Nordsee(Berlin,1922,theofficialhistory);FritzOttoBusch,DieschlachtamSkagerrak(Berlin,1933);Walter

Gladisch,Skagerrak:DieSchlachtam31.Mai1916(Berlin,1936);GeorgvonHase,DerSiegderdeutschen

Hochseeflotteam31.Mai1916.DieSkagerrak-SchlachtnachdenamtlichendeutschenundenglischenQuellen

dargestellt(Leipzig,1934).

9WayneP.Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’,NavalWarCollegeReview39(1986),pp.

2-17.ThatmodernnavieshavelessonstolearnfromsuchhistoryisemphasizedbyLtCdrB.Armstrong,`Now

HearThis–“IfWeAretoRemainaWorldPower"',PUSNI,139/5/1(2013),p.323.SeealsoJamesR.Holmes

andToshiYoshihara,‘Historyrhymes:theGermanprecedentforChineseseapower’,Orbis54(2010)14-34.

6

I

ItisatruismthatalmostallofthetechnicaldevelopmentsinlandwarfarebeforetheFirstWorld

War,forexamplebarbedwire,railwaysandfixedmachineguns,favoureddefence.Innavalwarfare,

therehadbeenacomparableperiodof40yearsorsoafterthedevelopmentoftheironcladduring

whichdefencewassuperiorandcapitalships’abilitytodamageeachotherwithgunnerywasmostly

limited.10Further,veryfewmajornavalengagementstookplaceduringthisperiod,limiting

empiricalevidencefromwhichtolearn.TheironcladerafamouslyopensatHamptonRoadsinthe

Americancivilwar,withMonitorandVirginia(theconvertedMerrimack)bouncingshotsoffeach

other.Consequently,theancienttacticoframmingwasrediscovered,andsankshipsatthe

Austrian-ItalianbattleofLissa.11Butdevelopmentofgunnerycontinuedinparalleltoarmour:for

example,therifledmuzzle-loadersofthe1870scould,inprinciple,penetratethecompoundarmour

oftheday.12TheRussian-JapanesebattleofTsushima(1905)wasfoughtusingbatteriesofmixed

calibre,andofferedlimitedlessons.13However,somecrucialelementswerenowapparent.The

significanceoftheadventanddevelopmentofthetorpedo,anditspotentialdeadlinesstocapital

10Fortheparalleldevelopmentsinguns,armourandpropulsionfromtheearlyironcladstotheFirstWorld

WarseeK.Lautenschlager,‘Technologyandtheevolutionofnavalwarfare’,InternationalSecurity,8(1983),

pp.3-51.

11ForthisstageofnavaltacticsseeforexampleG.H.U.Noel,TheGun,Ram,andTorpedo:Manoeuvresand

TacticsofaNavalBattleinthePresentDay(London,1874)andW.Bainbridge-Hoff,Examples,conclusions,and

maximsofModernNavalTactics(Washington,DC,1884).RammingwasstillconsideredanoptioninLtA.P.

Niblack,USN,‘TheTacticsofShipsintheLineofBattle’,USNIPrizeEssay,PUSNI,22(1896),pp.1-28.

Interestingly,AdmDovetonSturdee,bestknownforhissuccessattheFalklandIslands,claimedinhis1893

NavalPrizeEssaytohavebeenthefirstwriter,in1886,tohavedecisivelyrejectedtheram(CdrD.Sturdee,

‘TheTacticsBestAdaptedforDevelopingthePowerofExistingShipsandWeapons(Gun,Ram,andTorpedo)

WhichShouldRegulateFleets,GroupsandSingleVesselsinAction',1893,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitution

NavalPrizeEssay,inSDEE1/8,ChurchillArchiveCentre,Cambridge).

12Lautenschläger,Technology.

13Fiske,forexample,attributestheJapanesevictorymainlytosuperiortrainingandgunnery.BradleyA.Fiske,

‘WhyTogoWon’,PUSNI31(Dec.1905)807-809.

7

ships,wereconfirmedatTsushima.Beltandturretarmour,“cemented”(carbonized,andthus

hardened)ontheoutsidewhileremainingflexibleontheinside,waspenetrableonlybyhigh-

velocityarmour-piercingheavyshells.Finally,thesteamturbineofferedarevolutionaryand

superiornewformofpropulsion.

ThelaunchingofHMSDreadnoughtin1906thusrepresentedtheculminationofanerain

strategicandtacticalthinkingjustasitintroducedanewoneinwarshipdesign.Concentrationon

clustersofpowerful,quick-firingmaingunsinbattleshipssettledtheissuebetweenproponentsof

thissolutionandadvocatesofmixedmediumandlarge-calibrearmament,andthusbetweenshort

andlongrangeengagements,thoughthisacrimoniousdebatewouldreachapeakofintensitywith

thearrivalofthenewvessels.Therewasnolongeranyprospectofcapitalshipsdemolishingeach

otherwithnumeroussecondaryguns14orofclosingtowithinrammingdistanceofmodern

opponents,andtheneedforcloselycontrolledtacticalevolutionstobringaboutsuchasituation

wasalsogone.Buttherewasnowarangeoffreshproblems.Whatwasthenewlyoptimalcapital

ship,withwhatdisplacementandcombinationofarmour,propulsionandarmament?Andwhat

werethecorrecttacticsforsuchafleetinthisneweraofgunneryaccurateatincreasinglylong

ranges?

Atitssimplest,theSquareLawstatesthat,inattritionalcombatwithlong-rangeaimedweapons

againstwhichthereisnoeffectivedefence,theoutcomedependsonwhichsidepossessesthe

greater`fightingstrength’,definedtobetheweapons’individualeffectivenessmultipliedbythe

squareoftheirnumbers.15The20

thcenturyconventionwasthatthisprocessmustbedescribed

14Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,considerscarefullythescalingrelationbetweenmedium(6”)andlarge(12”)

calibreguns,concludingthatashiparmedwithmorenumerous6”gunsfireseighttimestheweightofshell,

butthat`ifthegunsaretoosmalltodestroy[theenemy’s]turretsandwater-line,thisenergyiswhollywasted’

(Fiske’semphasis).Thisisthecrucialpointonwhichthenewunderstandingsupersedesthatof,inparticular,

the1905battleofTsushima.

15TheSquareLaw,normallyexclusivelyattributedtoLanchester,isalsoclearlystatedinBaudry,TheNaval

Battle.

8

usingcalculus;LanchesterinBritain,OsipovinRussiaandChaseintheUSAdidthisindependently.16

ItsimplicationsfornavalwarfarearemostfullyexploredintheUSNIPrizeEssayof1905byFiske.17

Inkeepingwith20thcenturyusage,however,wewillcallthisbodyofthought‘Lanchestrian’.

Fiske’sessaycontainednocalculus,butrathermodelledbig-gunnavalcombatasaseriesof

discretesalvos,withtheimplicationsbeingdrawnfromasetoftables–nowadayswemightwellcall

them‘spreadsheets’–asopposedtoequations.Hisconclusionswerestark:thesidewiththegreater

numberofbiggunsbroughttobearwouldrealiseadisproportionateandacceleratingadvantage,

eventuallyannihilatingitsopponentwithafinalremainingforcemuchgreaterthantheinitial

imbalance.18Further,thesidewhichcouldbeginfiringfirstwouldenjoyafurtheradvantage,again

outofallproportiontonaïveexpectations,asworkedoutbyBaudryinanexampleinwhichhegives

onefleetamerefourminutes’initialunopposedfire.19

Complementingthiscalculus-basedinsightwasanother,basedongeometry.Incontrasttothe

Nelsonianera,thebiggunwaseffectiveatlongrangerelativetodistancestravelledbyshipson

16Lanchester,AircraftinWarfare;Osipov,‘Influence’;Chase,‘MathematicalInvestigation’.Thecruxofthe

squarelawisapointmadeinBaudry,TheNavalBattle.Iftwoshipsfightone,thennotonlydoestheloneship

receivedoubletherateoffire,butitsownfireisdivided.Thustheproportionalratesofattritionareinthe

ratio1:4,not1:2.Thefullimplicationofthisinstantaneoustruthonlyemergeswhenonesumsitseffectsover

thefullbattle.

17Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’.

18“Bigguns”heremeansthoseof11”calibreorgreater.Fiskenotesthatwhilesmallergunsmaybeableto

produce(throughnumberandrateoffire)agreateroverallweightoffire,thisisunproductiveiftheyare

unabletopenetratearmourordestroyturrets.AtJutland,theprobabilitythatabig-gunhitwoulddestroya

turretwassimilarforthetwoopposingforces,despitedifferencesincalibre.

19Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’.Thepointaboutinitialadvantage(Fiske,‘FightingMachine’,p291;Baudry,

TheNavalBattle,p116)waswellunderstoodbyJellicoe:forexample,intheGrandFleetBattleOrdersinforce

ontheeveofJutland,hestates‘Iattachthegreatestimportancetomakingfulluseofthefireofourheavier

gunsintheearlystagesatlongrange…[this]maygiveustheinitialadvantageingunfirewhichitisso

importanttoobtain’(JellicoePapers,vol.I,item226).SeealsoTheodoreC.Taylor,‘TacticalConcentrationand

Surprise─inTheory’,NavalWarCollegeReview38(1985),pp.41-51;andHughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheir

influenceonstrategy’.

9

battletimescales,sothatconcentratingweaponsnolongerrequiredmassingofships.20Instead

‘appliedgeometry’wasneeded,thefleetcommander’sgoalbeingtoarriveatageometrical

configurationinwhichallofhisbiggunscouldbeconcentratedonhisenemywhiledenyingenemy

attemptstodothereverse.ItisintheRoyalNavythatwefindthecaseputmoststrongly,with

ReginaldPlunkett-Drax,writingafterJutlandwhileonBeatty’sstaff,assertingthat:`Itis“Applied

Geometry"thatmustensureforusthecrushingeffecttobeobtainedbybringingallourforcesinto

actionatthesamemoment.Geometry...Geometry...Geometry...Theleaderofalargefleetshould

diligentlycultivateinhimselfa“geometricsense”’.21Wecanseehowthisdictationofcalculusby

geometryplayedoutatJutlandinFigure1,whichplots(onalogarithmicscale,overtime)theratio

ofBritishtoGermanbiggunsinaction.FortheBritish,Lanchestrianadvantageisachievedwhenthis

ratioismaximized(andviceversafortheGermans).

Thusthetacticalimperativewastousefleetgeometrytodictatecalculus,givingacogentreason,

beyondthefleetcommander’snaturaldesiretokeephisforceundercontrol,forasinglebattleline

ratherthandivisionaltactics.22Theconclusionisthatfleetor‘operational’tactics,asopposedto

20Indeed,‘themorewidelyseparatedthepointsfromwhichthefireoriginates,themoreeffectivetacticallyis

theconcentration,becausethemoredifficultitistocounter’(Capt.E.W.Harding,RMA,‘StudiesintheTheory

ofNavalTacticsIII’,NavalReview,4(1913),pp.208-222);‘inamodernfleetowingtothegreatdistanceat

whichthegunscandeveloptheirmaximumhittingcapacity…theprincipleofCONCENTRATIONcanbe

effectedbytheconvergenceoffirefromwidelydispersedpositions(R.Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax,‘Noteson

GrandFleetBattleTactics’,16/12/1916(writtenforDavidBeatty),inDRAX1/18,ChurchillArchivecentre,

Cambridge).

21Drax,‘NotesonGrandFleetBattleTactics’,DRAX1/18;seealso‘GrandFleetBattletactics’,1/1/17,in

BTY/7/2,CairdLibrary,Greenwich).Inthelightofthis,hispublicassertionafterJutlandthat`whatwerequired

was…lessgeometryandmoreginger’isblatanthypocrisy(R.Plunkett-…-Drax,‘JutlandorTrafalgar?’,Naval

Review13(1925)238-243).Manypre-warauthorstreatnavaltacticsasageometricalproblem,forexample

Baudry,TheNavalBattle,andR.Bernotti,TheFundamentalsofNavalTactics(Annapolis,1912).Evenwhere

planegeometryisnotexplicitlytheparadigm,itslanguagepervadestacticalwritings(forexampleCapt.E.J.

W.Slade,‘BattleshipsandBattleshipTactics’,RoyalNavalWarCollegereportno.3,11/1906,inHTN/116/B,

CairdLibrary,Greenwich).

22ForthedevelopmentofthecontrastingtacticsseeMcLaughlin,Battlelines.Draxconsidersdivisionaltactics

inanessayforBeattyof9thAugust1917,heldinBTY/7/2,CairdLibrary,Greenwich.Hisgoverningprincipleis

concentration:henotesthatthebattle-lineprincipleof‘”fireatyouroppositenumber”[will]neglectpriceless

10

smaller-scaleshipordivisiontactics,becameakeydeterminantofsuccess.23Thesidewiththe

numericaladvantageinweaponswasguaranteedasuccessfuloutcomeifitcouldcreatethe

conditionsdescribedabove.Sothesedevelopmentsimpliedmoreorderlyfleetactionsthanhad

hithertobeenenvisaged.Difficultiesinsurprisinganopponentincreasedthelikelihoodthatwell-

matchedfleetswouldmeetbroadsidetobroadsidewiththeirentirestrengthincapitalships

deployedinlineofbattle.Insuchasituation,withgoodvisibilityandsufficienttimeforthe

engagementtobeconcluded,analmosttextbookemploymentofLanchester’sequationscouldbe

playedoutinwhichtheadvantagesofconcentrationcouldberealised.‘Symmetrical’conditionsof

thistype,inwhichneithersideenjoyedanadvantagebeyondsuperiorityinmateriel,wouldcertainly

endinthedestructionoftheweakerforce,atalesserabsolutecosttothelarger.Thethoughtfuland

well-readcommanderofthesuperiorforcewouldbeawareofthesubtlevariationsinachievement

oftheseconditions.Insuchcircumstancesafleetwhichknewitselftobeoutgunnedwouldrefuse

battle,anditsopponentwouldenjoytheeffectivefruitsofvictorywithouthavingtofight.Thepoint

isperhapsbestmadebyWayneHughes,who,quotingClausewitzon‘engagementsthatdidnottake

placebuthadmerelybeenoffered',notesthatthereisnodefenceinnavalwar,andthattheinferior

opportunitiesforconcentratedfireatanearertarget’.Butofcoursesuchconcentrationcanalsobeeffected

byabattleline.Anintermediatepossibilityistofightenechelon,asadvocatedinLtA.P.Niblack,‘Thetactics

ofshipsinthelineofbattle’,PUSNI,22(1896),pp.1-28:‘theadvantagewillalwaysbe[to]echelon,ifcorrectly

manoeuvredagainstafleetformedinline,[for]itis[then]difficulttodoubleuponanyofthem.YetBacon,a

staunchJellicoesupporter,wasabletowritethat`in1900attheWarCourseatGreenwichIusedtoworkthe

tacticalboard…againstallcomers,andnevercouldanyopponentsobtainatacticaladvantagebyassuming

anyotherformationthanlineahead'.AdmSirReginaldBacon,ANavalScrap-Book,1877-1906(London,1925).

Jellicoesimplysaysthat‘todividethefleetistocourtdisaster’.JellicoePapers,vol.1,item206.

23Thereisnoexplicitlyoperationalleveloftacticalthoughtinpre-FirstWorldWarwritingonnavalmatters.

OnehasthecalculusofFiske,Chase,BaudryandLanchester,andtheclearlygeometricalreasoningneededto

exploitit,but,aswesawabove,noclearconsensusaboutfleettacticshademerged.Foramodern

perspective,seeWayneP.Hughes,‘NavalOperations:acloselookattheoperationallevelofwaratsea’,Naval

WarCollegeReview,65(2012),pp.23-47.

11

forcealwaysloses(anddoessodisproportionatelybadly):‘[since]Scheerknewhisfleetwas

decisivelyinferior,therewasneverafighttothefinish'.24

Lanchester’sequationsenjoyedgreatpopularityamongmilitaryanalystsinthe20thcentury,when

theywereoftenusedtomodellandbattlesandcampaigns,albeitwithonlypartialsuccess.25But

landwarfarewasknowntobegreatlysubjecttothefogofwar,andthecommanderofinferior

forcescouldoftenhopetoengineerapartialvictorythroughwell-chosentacticsexploitingvariable

factorssuchasconcealmentofforces,superiorcommunicationsordifficultterrain.TheJutland-era

navalbattle,however,apparentlycarriedthemathematicalinevitabilityoftheSquareLaw.26This

waswellcapturedinthemilitarytheoristJ.F.C.Fuller’sassessmentofthenavaldefeatatCoronel:

`Cradock’s[ships]wenttothebottom,notthroughanactofGod,butthroughanactof

mathematicalcertainty’.27Theonlyhopeforanoutmatchedbattlefleetwastoengineerasituation

inwhichitcouldengageitswholeforceagainstadetachedandinferiorportionoftheenemy’s

24Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’.FortheGermanperspective,seeWegener,Naval

StrategyoftheWorldWar.Onthestronger,BritishsideSumidanotesadivisionofviewsbetweenwhathe

calls“agnosticopportunists”and“clandestinepre-empters”(includingJellicoe),withthelattertakingclearly

thepositionthatbattlemustonlybesoughtunderthecorrect,favourableconditions(J.T.Sumida,

‘Expectation,Adaptation,andResignation:BritishBattleFleetTacticalPlanning,August1914-April1916’,

NavalWarCollegeReview,60(2007),pp.101-122).

25ForabriefintroductionseeN.J.MacKay,‘Lanchestercombatmodels’,MathematicsToday,42(2006),pp.

170-173.Foranintroductiontomathematicalmodellinginthebroadsenseofilluminatingcoredynamics(as

opposedtodetailed,calibratedmodellingforpreciseprediction)seeJ.M.Epstein,‘Whymodel?’,Journalof

ArtificialSocietiesandSimulation11(2008)12.

26Atleastinfairweatherandintheabsenceofrealfog.Weknowoftwopublishedattemptstoapply

Fiske/LanchestermodelstoJutland.JosephCzarnecki,‘N-squaredlaw:Anexaminationofoneofthe

mathematicaltheoriesbehindtheDreadnoughtbattleship’,www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-076.htm,

accessed29June2012,usesFisketablesforfivecasesofsmallbattlesbetweenDreadnoughts,andconcludes

that‘Britainsawtheopportunitytostackthedeckandtookit.’ColinLyle,‘ANelsonianJutland?’,Journalofthe

RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute[JRUSI],140(1995),pp.56-60,invokesLanchester(butwithoutcrunchingthe

numbers)tosupporthisclaimthatamoreNelsoniancommanderwould‘eschewthetoo-unwieldysingleline’

andtherebyhaveexploitedthesquarelawtoachieveacrushingvictory–andisrebukedbyMaj.J.D.Harris,

lettertoJRUSI140(1995),p68,fornotconsideringJellicoe’sknowledgeofhistechnologicaldeficiencies.

Indeed,itcouldbeseenasoneoftheimplicationsofthepresentpaperthatitwastheGermanswhoneededa

NelsonforstrategicvictoryatJutland,nottheBritish.

27J.F.C.Fuller,TheFoundationsoftheScienceofWar(London,1926),ch.13,section8.

12

superiorfleet,butoneofsufficientsizetoguaranteeanoverallnumericalsuperiorityafterthisfirst

andlesservictory.ForGermanybeforethelaunchingofDreadnought,thisseemedaforlornhope

givenBritain’svastnumericalsuperiorityincapitalships.In1899theGermanAdmiraltystaffnoted

anadverseratioincapitalshipsof22:8or2.75:1.Inearly1904theratioforthewinterof1904-5

wasexpectedtobe61:26or2.35:1.28

Insuchconditionsofbattlefleetinferioritytheriskfleetconceptcouldonlyfunctionincertain

circumstances.FormanyyearsitwasassumedthattheBritishwouldattacktheGermancoast,and

attritionoftheRoyalNavybycoastaldefenceswashopedfor.Thisscenarioenvisagedcoastal

artillery,minesandtorpedoesinflictingdeeplossesontheRoyalNavywhiletheGermanbattlefleet

washeldinreserveforacoupdegrâceonceKraftausgleichhadbeenachieved.TheultimateBritish

decisionforadistantblockaderestingonthefleetbasedatScapaFlowintheOrkneysnullifiedsuch

thinking.Jellicoewasalsoacutelyconsciousofthedangerofhisshipssufferingunderwaterdamage

closetotheGermancoastorforthatmatterinafleetaction,29thoughperhapsnotquitetosuchan

extentthathis‘sleepnessnightswerevisitedbyafearfularrayofunderwaterweapons’.30The

GermanswouldthusbeforcedtodeploytheirfleetwellintotheNorthSeatoalterthestrategic

situationrelativetotheRoyalNavy.

ItwasalsoassumedthatthesacrificeoftheGermanfleetwouldweakentheBritishunacceptably

inthecontextofasubsequentstrugglewithathirdpower,aprospectwhichmightdeterBritish

navalattackandmakeLondonpoliticallymoreamenableinpeacetime.ThepossibilityofBritain

beingdeterredbypotentiallossesagainstGermanyinthefaceofotherhostilepowersalsofaded,

however,astheBritishengagedinablizzardofeffectivediplomaticactivitytowootraditionalrivals,

aidedunconsciouslybytheKaiserreichitself.TheaggressiveGermanposturethatproducedthe

28Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.34.

29See,forexample,Jellicoe’smemorandumof12/4/16totheFirstSeaLord.JellicoePapers,vol.1,item213.

30Gordon,TheRulesoftheGame,pp.466-7.

13

navalchallengetoBritainwasreplicatedinotherareasanddrewherpotentialenemiescloser

together.TheTripleEntenteneutralised,atleastforthepresent,potentialnavalrivalrybetween

Britain,RussiaandFrance,andthisfactorcoupledwiththeAnglo-JapaneseallianceandBritish

appeasementofUSinterestsinthewesternhemisphereenabledarapidandneartotal

concentrationofBritishcapitalshipsintheNorthSea.ThisdisastrousoutcomeforGermany

worsenedtheLanchestrianarithmeticfortheHighSeasFleetandremoved,fortheforeseeable

future,anotherpillaroftheriskfleet’sintellectualfoundations.

II

ThelogicofLanchestrianmodellinghadprofoundimplicationsfornationalpolicybeforeWorldWar

One.ItswiftlybecameapparentthatDreadnoughtpresentedalevelplayingfieldbyrendering

Britain’spreviousoverwhelmingnumericaladvantageincapitalshipsnullandvoid,butitislesswell

rememberedthatdecisionsonfuturebuildingprogrammessuddenlycarriedanincreasedand

enormousweightofresponsibility.Germany’sriskfleetideawasinstantlymorecredible,thoughthe

pointwasmorequicklygraspedinBritainthaninGermany.Thebuildingofdreadnoughts‘was

imitatedbytheGermans’ascriticsofthetypeinBritainfeared,althoughinGermaneyesit‘stilldid

notovercomethesuperiorityoftheRoyalNavy,onlynarrowingitsomewhat’.31

Insquare-lawtermsanarrownumericalinferioritywasnomorecauseforoptimismthanalarge

oneinaclashoffullfleetsandtheKaiser’snavywasunlikelytomatchmassiveBritishbuilding

capacityintheshortterm,especiallygiventhecallonresourcescommandedbythearmy.

31Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.44.

14

Nevertheless,thepossibilityofdividinganddefeatingtheRoyalNavyintheLanchestrianmanner

byconstructingasufficientlylargeforceofdreadnoughtsandsettingtrapsforadetachedpartofthe

GrandFleetremained,andtheBritishhadanabsoluteneedtocreateandmaintainamarginof

superioritysufficienttoprecludeanyprospectofaclashoffullbattlefleetsandwhichcouldsurvive

attritionthroughmines,submarineattackoraccident.TheGermansbegantoperceivethe

possibilityofadistantBritishblockadeintheNorthSeathroughtheiranalysisofRoyalNavy

manoeuvres,particularlythoseof1912,andrealisedthatsuchadeploymentwouldleavetheBritish

EastCoastuncovered.ItwouldalsobeverydifficultforBritishlightforcestotrackGermansorties;

destroyersweretoofewinnumbertoscreentheNorthSeaatdistancefromtheGermancoastand

submarineslackedthecommunicationrangetoreportmovement.Aggressiveactiontowardthe

BritishcoastmightwellresultinafleetactiononGermany’stermsastheGrandFleetmovedsouth

tomeetsuchaGermanattack.Thislineofthinking‘paintedafuturefortheGermannavalwarthat

wasinnorespectsbleak’.32

TheGermansretreatedfromsuchaggressivepossibilitiesaftertheirmanoeuvresof1913-14,

however.Amongreasonsforthiswere‘fearoftheunknown’33andthefactthat‘Germanexperience

offleetoperationsatanydistancefromtheGermancoastwaslimited’.34Ultimately,theHighSeas

Fleet‘existedverymuchwithinacoastaldefencemindset’:35thepatternofGermanactionpursued

atJutlandandonotheroccasionsbeforeandafterhadbeenset.Nevertheless,possibilitieshadbeen

revealedthatmoreforwardleadershipcouldexploit.

32Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.50.

33JamesGoldrick,BeforeJutland:TheNavalWarinNorthernEuropeanWaters,August1914-February1915

(Annapolis,2015)p.73.

34Goldrick,BeforeJutland,p.71.

35Goldrick,BeforeJutland.

15

ItwasalsotruethattheSquareLawwasscalable,sotherewasatheoreticalpossibilityofan

outnumberedfleetbreakinguptheenemylineandcreatingalocalsuperioritywithinthebattleat

thelevelofsquadronsanddivisions.ThishadaNelsonianring,anddivisionaltacticswerethus

dangerouslyappealingtosomeinthenumericallydominantRoyalNavy.IntheDreadnoughtage,

however,suchasituationwouldrepresentGermany’sbesthopeofsuccessinfleetaction.36

Jellicoe’sinsistenceondeployingtheGrandFleetinbattleasasingleforceunderhispersonal

commandsothat‘Inallcasestherulingprincipleisthatthefleetasawholekeepstogether’37

seemedtoprecludethedangerofhisfleetbeingsubdividedintopotentiallyoutnumbered

components,butafter1906theBritishinvestmentinthenewideaofthebattlecruiserwouldchange

thissituationandmakeadangerousdivisionalclashmorelikely.

Thefirstbattlecruiser,HMSInvincible,resembledDreadnoughtbutwasmuchfaster,speedbeing

gainedattheexpenseofarmouredprotectionandthuswithnocompromiseingunpower.Sucha

vesselcouldoverwhelmanysmalleropponentandeasilyescapeanordinarydreadnought.The

battlecruiserconceptwasappealingtoaNavywithglobalpolicingresponsibilities,buttheships

wouldalsobeexpectedtoperformreconnaissanceforthefleet.Inthelightofthis,andingrave

tensionwiththeirdesignpurposeashuntersofoceanraiders,theybecameexpectedtojointheline

ofbattleaftertheirreconnaissancemissionwascompletedinafleetaction.Regardlessofthe

capabilitiesoftheshipsthiscreateddangerfortheRoyalNavyinanumberofways.First,theidea

receivedheavyinvestment:by1916,tenbattlecruiserswereinservice.Theywerebasedseparately

36ThebeliefthattheBritishwouldhavebenefitedfromamoremanoeuvre-based,Nelsonianapproachechoed

throughtheinter-waryears.CdrRussellGrenfell,TheArtoftheAdmiral(London,1937),basedonhislectures

attheRoyalNavalStaffCollege,Greenwich;CaptainRichard,FrenchNavy,‘JutlandandthePrinciplesofWar’,

trans.fromRevueMaritimeinJRUSI,67no.465(1922),pp.128-139.Nooneseemstohaveunderstoodthe

randomizingeffectofthemeleeontheLanchestriancertaintyofthebattleline,whichwequantifylater.

37Gordon,TheRulesoftheGame,p.397.

16

fromthebattleshipsoftheGrandFleetandofficiallyandmisleadinglydescribedastheBattleCruiser

Fleet[BCF].AstheGermanswereaware,thismeantthatnearlyathirdoftheRoyalNavy’scapital

shipgunpowerwasseatedinvesselswhichmustsailseparatelyfromtheirbaseatRosythto

rendezvouswiththeGrandFleetbeforeacontinuouslineofbattlecouldbeformed,andwhich

wouldactuallyseekouttheGermanfleetseparatelybeforesuchaunioncouldbeestablished.The

CommanderoftheBCF,RearAdmiralSirDavidBeatty,wasalsoknowntobeanaggressivefigure,

keentoassertindependentleadershipandwho‘wantedtograspthebigpictureandseehisrolein

thelargercontext’.38FromtheGermanperspectivehewas,inthecontextoftheirplans,theideal

opponent.

Thedecisiontocompromiseinarmourratherthanfirepowerorspeedalsohadobviousdangers,

thoughtherewerecountervailingadvantages.Aspartoftheline,Britishbattlecruiserscould

contributeeffectivelytoafleetengagementwiththeirheavyarmamentwhiletheriskcreatedby

theirlighterarmourwouldbemitigatedbytheGermanneedtodividetheirfireagainstthemore

numerousBritishfleet.Intheirreconnaissancerole,however,numericalsuperiorityfortheBCFwas

notguaranteed,andherethethinarmourofthevesselswasespeciallydangerous.Beatty’srolewas

toforcehiswaythroughanenemyscreenofsimilarvesselsandfindtheenemybattlefleet.The

perceivedneedtogetinclosewouldnullifytheadvantageofhisheaviergunsrelativetomorelightly

armedbutmoreheavilyarmouredGermanbattlecruisersandexposehislighterarmour.Therewas

alsoanincreasedprospectofmeleesituationsdevelopinginwhichtheBritishbattlecruisersmight

suddenlyfaceagraveLanchestriandisadavantage.

ButthisdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatBritishtechnologyorattitudetotechnologywasatfault.

Indeed,InvinciblerepresentedadvancedthinkingthattheGermansattemptedtocopybeforethe

truenatureoftheBritishvesselwasrevealed.Germanknowledgeofherconfigurationwas

38AndrewLambert,Admirals:TheNavalCommanderswhoMadeBritainGreat(London,2008),p.363.

17

necessarilylimited.Tirpitzthereforepursuedadesigninlinewithhisownprioritiesforavesselof

limitedcostthatcouldnotbeequatedwithabattleshipsoasnottothreatenhiscampaigntogain

fundsforthenewdreadnoughtsintheReichstag39.ThusthelaterBlücherwasconceptuallyprimitive

andnomatchfortheBritishvessel.ThefirsttrueGermanbattlecruiser,VonderTann,wassuperior

toInvincibleinallrespectsexceptarmament,butitofferednodesigninnovationandreflected

thinkingtheBritishhadundertakenwhentheDreadnoughtconceptwasnew.WhenVonderTann

waslaunchedinMarch1910,nearlythreeyearsafterInvincible,threeBritishbattlecruiserswere

alreadyinserviceandthemuchlargerandmoreheavilyarmedLionwouldbelaiddownin

Novemberofthatyearandlaunchedtenmonthslater.

TheBritishdilemmawasineffectthebasiceconomicproblemofpossessinglimitedresourcesto

satisfyunlimitedwants,whichwasconstantlyintensionwithFisher’sdesirethatBritainleadthe

navalarmsraceonallmeasures.Dreadnoughtbattleshipswerethesinglemostexpensiveand

technologicallyadvanceditemsthatastatecouldpurchase,andoncedecisionshadbeenmade

mistakescouldnotberedeemed.Havingdecidedonall-big-gunships,adecisionhadthentobe

madeaboutthetrade-offbetweennumberandquality,aquestiontowhichLanchestrianthinking

hadaclearanswer,withfightingstrengthgivenbyqualityofunitsmultipliedbythesquareoftheir

numbers.TheAdmiraltywaswellawareofthegraveissuesithadtoconsiderandin1906,whilethe

implicationsofthenewDreadnoughtdesignwerebeingexplored,40acommitteewasformedunder

thechairmanshipofCaptainC.L.Ottley,theDirectorofNavalIntelligence,comprisingtechnical

expertsincludingJellicoe.41Itwasinvitedtoconsider,amongothermatters,theintroductionofa

39ThecontentionthataBritishdisinformationcampaigndisguisingInvincible’sradicaldesignwasbelieved,

hasbeendisputed.NormanFriedman,FightingtheGreatWaratSea:StrategyTacticsandTechnology

(Barnsley,2014)pp.198-199.

40SuchanalysiswasalreadyunderwayevenbeforeDreadnought’sseatrialshadbegun(‘HMShips

DreadnoughtandInvincible’,24thMay1906,AL252/4/8,ALHRB).

41Thisisusuallyknownasthe‘FusionCommittee’,althoughthebattlecruiser/battleshipfusionwasoneof

threemattersthecommitteewasformedtoconsider.ItcomprisedC.R.Ottley(DirectorofNavalIntelligence,

18

‘fusion’classofcapitalshipcombiningthepowerandprotectionofthedreadnoughtbattleshipand

thespeedofthebattlecruiser(stillreferredtoasan‘armouredcruiser’bythecommittee).This

wouldineffectbeafastbattleshipwithheavyarmour,powerfularmamentandgreatspeed.Sucha

vesselwoulddominatefutureengagementsbetweendreadnoughts,butitspreciseconfiguration,

beyondsuperiorityoverallexistingdesigns,wasstillamatterofconjecture.Theonecertaintywas

thatitwouldbeveryexpensiverelativetoexistingdreadnoughts.Thecommitteebelievedthatif

Britain’snewvesselsweretobe‘ofthe“Fusion”class,forthesameexpenditurewecanbuildonly

threeasagainstfour“Dreadnoughts”…andthereforein1909weshallhaveonlyabarenumerical

superiorityoverGermanyinnewArmouredVessels.’42

Thiswasunacceptable,especiallyasGermany’sresponse‘shouldbeandprobablywouldbe’to

buildsimilarvesselsemphasizinggreatergunpowerattheexpenseof‘speedorcoalendurance’.

TheBritishfleetwouldthusfaceasituationinwhich‘ourshipsaredecidedlyinferiortotheirsin

gunfire’.IntermsoftheSquareLawthismeantdoom,andthecommitteewasclearthat‘speed,

thoughdesirable,cannotbeassessedatsohighavalueasasuperiornumberofguns’.The

committeeagreedthatthefusionconcepthadmerit,asadivisionofsuchvessels‘wouldbeofgreat

value,owingtotheirgreatspeedallowingthemtobeusedasafast“FlankingDivision”’forthe

battlefleet’.Itwasargued,however,that‘thisfunctionisnon-existentuntilwehaveasufficient

superiorityinmodernArmouredVesselsoverothercountries’.Interestingly,thissuperioritywas

interpreted,incloseconformitywithLanchester,strictlyintermsofbig-gunfirepowerratherthan

numberofships.Thecommitteeconcluded‘thatitshouldbeourfirstaimtoaddgun-firetoour

inthechair),J.R.Jellicoe(DirectorofNavalOrdnance),R.H.S.Bacon,C.Madden,S.Nicholson,H.Jones,H.

Orpen,T.E.CreaseandGrahamGreene.InNavalNecessitiesIV,heldbyALHRB,Portsmouth.

42TheFusionCommittee’sreportisheldas‘II-FusionDesignofArmouredDesign’(sic),inreportofNavy

EstimatesCommittee,1906-7,AL253/28,AdmiraltyLibraryNavalHistoricalBranch,Portsmouth[ALHRB].

19

Fleetbeforemovinginthedirectionofgreatlyincreasedspeed,andthattheproposed“Fusion”

shipsare,forthemoment,premature’.43

Amomentousdecisionwasthustakennottoconstructsuchvesselsuntilasufficientquantityof

lesscapablecapitalshipshadbeencreatedtomakethefusionvessels’appearancedecisive.This

resolutionwasacceptedbytheAdmiralty,thoughitrancountertotheexpectationsofFisherwhen

asFirstSeaLordwhenheestablishedtheFusionCommittee.44Indeed,thedecisionwasaclear

checktoFisher’sprogrammeofconstant,‘plunging’innovation,andconstitutedanexemplarycase

ofprofessionalpolicyformulationanddecision-makingbyalearningorganisation.45Thedecisionto

postponethe‘fusion’shipswasprescientinbothtechnicalandstrategicterms.In1906,thepaceof

developmentwassuchthattheCommittee’sideaofafusionship,involvingwingturretsandthe

new13.5”gun,wouldresemblethefirstsuper-dreadnoughtsoftheOrionclass,andthoughcapable

thesevesselswouldhavebeendatedby1914.Waitingforthemwouldhaveservedlittletechnical

purposeandresultedinamoreexpensiveandthussmallerfleetwhenwarbrokeout.Itcouldeven

43FusionCommitteereport.

44AtthemeetingoftheSeaLordswhichinstigatedtheFusionCommittee,itwasstatedthat‘Itwasdesiredto

bringaboutafusionofthetwodesigns’(i.e.battleshipsandbattlecruisers)‘bynextyear;itseemedpossible

forthistobedone,anditwouldbeagreatassistanceifthecommitteewouldlookintothismatter.’InNaval

NecessitiesIV.

45InthiswedisagreewithAngusK.Ross,FourlessonsthattheUSNavymustlearnfromthe'Dreadnought'

revolution,NavalCollegeWarReview63no.4(2010),pp.119-143,whicharguesthatFisherwantedan

innovativerevolutionandtheFusionCommitteethwartedthis.Rossconsidersthisoutcometobefailure,and

thelesson(forthe21stcenturyUSNavy)theimportanceofbeinga'learningorganization'.Weinsteadclaim

thattheFusionCommittee'spositionwasaconscious,technocraticdecisionwhichguaranteedBritishnaval

supremacythroughbig-gunfirepower.TheRoyalNavy’squalitiesasalearningorganizationaredemonstrated

throughoutthearchivematerialoftheperiod.Forexample,in‘TheBuildingProgrammeoftheBritishNavy:

ThelessonsoftheRusso-Japanesewarintheirapplicationtotheprogrammeofarmoured-shipbuildingof

Britain,Germany,andFrance’(AL252/3/8,15thFebruary1906,ALHRB)wefindabalancedandthorough

analysisofFrench,ItalianandUScommentaryonTsushima(thewriterisclearlyanattentivereaderofPUSNI).

Similarly‘AdmiraltyPolicy:Repliestocriticism’(AL252/5/8,15thOctober1906,ALHRB)isathoroughand

balanced140-pageresponsetocriticismoftheDreadnoughtconcept.

20

havecreatedfortheGermansawindowofopportunityduringthefirstfewmonthsofthewar

duringwhichtheymighthaveachievedparityorevenasmalladvantageinbig-gunfire.46

Thedesignoftheactualfusionships,theQueenElizabethClass,wasnotfinaliseduntil1912.Their

newconfiguration,witheightnew15’’gunsofunprecedentedpowerinfourturrets,ratherthanten

13.5’’weaponsinfive,providedgreaterfirepowerandasavinginweightwhichwastranslatedinto

bothheavierarmourandnearlytwicethepropulsivepowerofthepreviousclassofsuper-

dreadnoughts.Theyalsopromisedtomakeredundanttheconceptofconstructingseparate

battleshipsandbattlecruisers,asthenewvesselswereexpectedtoperformbothrolescapably.Even

atthisstage,however,technicalcapabilityfellslightlyshortofthetruefastbattleship,andthe

battlecruisersurvived.ThetopspeedoftheQueenElizabethclassfellbetweenthemaximaof

typicalbattleshipsandbattlecruisers,andtheapparentsuccessofbattlecruisersintheearlyclashes

attheFalklandIslandsandHeligolandBightcoupledwiththereturnofFisherasFirstSeaLord

shortlyaftertheoutbreakofwarledtothecommissioningoftwonewvesselsofthetype,Renown

andRepulse.IndeedRepulsereplacedabattleshipofthesamenameoftheRoyalSovereignclass

alreadyintheearlystagesofconstruction,thecontractforwhichwascancelled.47TheRoyal

Sovereignclassvesselsthemselves,thoughsucceedingtheQueenElizabeths,alsorevertedtothe

lowerspeedofexistingbattleships.

Despitewartimereversiontothebattlecruiserconcept,thenewQueenElizabethsasfusionships

wereagenuineadvanceontheoriginalDreadnoughtdesignand,likeDreadnought,outclassedall

46AfascinatingepisodeinthedevelopmentoftheseideasistheSimsvsMahancontroversyintheUSA,which

pitchedtheUSInspectorofTargetPracticeagainstthegreatnavalhistorianMahaninthepagesofPUSNI.Sims

madetellingargumentsinfavourofall-big-gunships,buttheinterestforourpurposesisintheUS-UK

interchangeofideas.Sims’paperforRoosevelt,‘BigBattleshipsofHighSpeed’,wassentinconfidenceto

Fisheron3rdNovember2007(beforeRoosevelt’sJanuary1907speechtocongressonthetopic),andformsthe

basisoftheargumentoftheDirectorofNavalIntelligenceC.L.Ottley’s‘TheStrategicAspectsofOurBuilding

Programme,1907’(AL253/68,ALHRB),senttotheKing’sprivatesecretary.Simsrestatedhisargumentin‘The

TacticalQualitiesoftheDreadnoughtTypeofBattleship’,Brassey’sNavalAnnual1907,pp.391-409.

47I.Johnston,ClydebankBattlecruisers(Barnsley,2011),p.92.

21

previousvesselsafloatwhentheyenteredservice.Theten15”shipsofthisandthesimilarly-

configuredbutslowerandmoreheavilyarmouredRoyalSovereignclassdidnotjointhefleetuntil

aftertheoutbreakofwar.Theirarrival,however,addedmassivelytothegunpoweroftheexisting

GrandFleet,transformedwhatforJellicoewasaworryinglynarrowmarginofsuperiorityintoa

decisiveadvantage,andremovedanyprospectofaGermanchallengetothefullGrandFleet.Only

twocomparablevesselsoftheGermanBayernclasswerecompleted.

Inadoptingaquantitativeapproachtotheirsituation,theBritishhadimplicitlytakenaviewona

mathematicalissue,ofwhatistheunitofoffensiveanddefensiveforceconcentration.Asimplistic

viewwouldassertthatthiswasthecapitalship,butinLanchestrianwardestructioniswroughtin

proportiontothenumberofeffectiveweapons,biggunsinthecontextof1916.48TheBritishhad

thusdeterminedtoplacegunsonthewaterasquicklyaspossible.Bythetimethelastshipofthe

fourNassauclassvesselswascommissionedinMay1910,theRoyalNavyhadcommissionedseven

dreadnoughtbattleshipsandthreebattlecruisers.Thevalueofthisapproachbecamestillmore

apparentwhenthecharacteristicsoftheNassauclassbecameknown.Despitetheirheavyarmour

andhighbuildqualitytheGermanvesselswere,aswithBlücher,backwardinimportantrespects.

TheNassaushadobsoletereciprocatingenginesratherthantheturbinesofallBritishdreadnoughts.

ThevesselscarriedanimposingtwelvegunscomparedtothestandardBritishten,buthadfour

wingturrets,twooneachsideofthevessel,whichcouldnotfireacrossdeck.Thusonlyeightguns

couldbefiredinbroadsideandathirdoftheships’firepowerwaswasted.Thegunswereof11”

calibre,whentheBritishwerealreadymovingto13.5”allalongthecentreline.

48Thebeliefthattheshipistheunitcanleadtoviewssuchas‘seabattlesbasedon[bigguns]wereboundto

beindecisivebecauseheavygunshardlyeversankships’(R.GarciayRobertson,‘Failureoftheheavygunat

sea,1898-1922’,TechnologyandCulture,28(1987),pp.539-557).Incontrastwearguenotonlythatsuch

battlescanbewon,bydestroyingturrets,butthatLanchestriancertaintyofoutcomecanleadtostrategic

victoryafterinconclusivefighting.

22

Ashipwithitsmainarmamentunabletobearinbroadside,orcompletelywreckedinbattle,

contributesnothingintheLanchesterequationsexcepttotheextenttowhichitdeflectsfireaway

fromstill-activeships.Theunit,rather,isthesetofweaponswhichstandsandfallstogether.Fiske

reachedtheunambiguous,definitiveconclusionthattheappropriateunitwasthebig-gunturret,

andthisviewremainspersuasive.49GermanturretsenjoyednospecialadvantageoverBritishin

termsofprotectionandwerenolesslikelytobedisabledordestroyedinaction.50Theyalso

containedgunsoflessercalibrethantheirBritishopponents,thoughthisdeficiencywouldtellonly

atlongranges,giventhegreateraccuracyofthesmallerGermangunsandthelimitedeffectiveness

ofBritishshellsbefore1916.Fromthisperspective,thatofabattleofgunturrets,theBritish

advantageingunpowerfullyjustifiedpre-warpolicyiftheirweaponswereemployedtofulleffect.

However,iftheexplosionsontheBritishbattlecruisersrepresentedagenericfaultinRoyalNavy

dreadnoughtdesign,sothatthedestructionofaturretentailedthedestructionoftheship,thenthe

wholeshipwouldhavetobeconsideredtherelevantunitofmass,withradicaleffectsonthe

LanchestrianbalanceinGermany’sfavour.51

AcomplicatingfactorinaddressingthisissueisagaintheseparatecommandoftheGrandFleet

underJellicoeandtheBCFunderBeatty.Thelatter’saggressivestyleofcommandhasbeen

identifiedbysomeashavinganeffectonthevulnerabilityofhisvessels,bothinthemanneroftheir

deploymentandintheirgunnerytrainingandtheprocedurestheyemployedinaction.Jellicoe,by

contrast,hasbeencharacterisedbyhiscriticsasacautioustechnocrat,lackingthefightingspirit

49‘each[big-gun]turretwithitsgunsshouldberegardedasaunit.Thereseemstobenoescapewhatever

fromtheconclusionthatweshouldrecognizethecombinationasourunitofoffensiveanddefensivepower...'

(Fiske’sitalics),Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,p.28.

50J.Campbell,Jutland:ananalysisofthefighting(London,1986).

51ForarecenttreatmentseeN.A.Lambert,‘‘OurBloodyShips'or‘OurBloodySystem'?Jutlandandthelossof

thebattlecruisers,1916’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,62(1998),pp.29-55.

23

necessaryinafleetcommander.TheAdmiralty’sassiduouspre-warplanningtoprovideafleet

suitableforwarwasthusatthemercyofthoseemployedtouseit.52

III

HavingbuiltafleetcalculatedtoguaranteestrategicvictoryunderLanchestrianconditions,itthen

becameessentialtoasuccessfuloutcomethatthisfleetbecommandedsoastobringsuch

conditionsabout.ThecontrastbetweenJellicoe,commanderin1916oftheGrandFleet,andBeatty,

commanderoftheBCF,wasinmanywaysrepresentativeoftheirintellectualenvironment.The

impactofnewtechnologyandnewthinkingcreatedafastmovingdebateinwhichaconsiderable

degreeoferuditionwasrequiredtokeepup.53Jellicoewasjustsuchatechnocrat,andmadeithis

businesstokeepabreastofdevelopmentsandexploretheirimplications.Beattyrepresentedthe

oppositeendofthespectrum.Self-consciouslyNelsonian,heinterpretedthistraditionintermsof

aggressive,thrustingleadershipandanoverridingrequirementtoclosewiththeenemyandimpose

hiswill.Beattydidnotconsiderhisstyleofleadershiptobeunintelligentorignorant,andhis

reflectiveprofessionalismhasbeennoted.54Hewas,however,overtlyanti-intellectualandwasnot

aloneinsobeing.HMSDreadnoughtattractedthehostilityofthisfaction,whichdidnotacceptthe

52Awide-rangingrecentsourceisJamesA.Yates,TheJutlandControversy:Acasestudyinintra-servicepolitics,

withparticularreferencetothepresentationoftheBattlecruiserFleet'straining,conductandcommand,PhD

thesis,UniversityofHull,1998.

53IntheRoyalNavy,acentralfigureintheDreadnought-erainvestigationofship(asopposedtofleet)tacticsis

AdmiralSirWilliamMay,commanderoftheHomeFleet1909-11and(whileC-in-CatPlymouth)umpireofits

exercisesin1912-13.PapersinMAY/10,CairdLibrary,Greenwich,showdetailedunderstandingofhowbig

gunsandincreasingrangesemphasizetheimportanceofplotting,spottingandratechange.Thiscanbe

contrastedwiththewritingsofold-schoolerssuchasAdmSirCyprianBridge,TheArtofNavalWarfare:

introductoryobservations(London,1907),orAdmSirR.N.Custance(writinganonymouslyas‘Barfleur'),Naval

Policy:apleaforthestudyofwar(London,1907),whostressestheneedforconcentration,butfailsto

understandthatthelongrangeofbiggunschangesthewaythisisbestachieved.

54Lambert,Admirals,p.346.

24

suddenstrategicandtacticalshiftsitnecessitated.Jellicoethusrepresentedanewanduntested

rationality,andinhiscommandrolefacedtheadditionalburdenthathishardthinkingaboutthe

fleetactionofthefuturewouldbecontestedandinsomepowerfulquartersdisregarded.

Jellicoe’swritingsbeforeJutlandmakeclearhiscarefulconsiderationofthetacticsnecessaryto

bringaboutLanchestrianvictory.Hiscommitmenttoanundividedfleethasalreadybeennoted.

Despitehiswell-knownapprehensionsconcerningthedangerposedbytorpedoes,heintendedto

openfireatmediumtolongrangesandcontinuedoingsoforseveralminutesevenafterheknew

thattorpedoeshadbeenlaunchedagainsthim,takingadvantageoftheirslowrunningtocreatethe

crucialfewminutesofunopposedfirebeforeevasiveactionbecamenecessary.55Healso

appreciatedthatlongrangesandhighspeedsmadefullcontrolofhisfleetessential,bothto

engineerLanchestrianconditionsofforceconcentration,andtoextricatethefleetintactfroman

55Sumida,in‘AMatterofTiming’and‘Expectation’,believesthatJellicoesoughtamedium-rangebattle,while

Seligmann,‘AGermanpreference?’,contendsthatJellicoewaswellawareoftheGermanexcellenceatlong-

rangeshootingandsoughttomatchit.Ofcourseimprovementingunnerywasrapid,andJellicoewouldhave

wellunderstoodthatneithersidecouldexpecttohaveperfectknowledgeoftheother’sstateofdevelopment.

Hisviewsthereforehadtobefluid.Heclearlyunderstoodtheimportanceofopeningfireatthelongest

possiblerangesasearlyas1906:‘Thefunctionofartilleryisnotonlytodestroytheenemy...butalsoto

preventthedevelopmentofhispowerbydoingsoatrangesatwhichheisunabletomakeaneffectivereply

[Jellicoe'semphasis].…Itiscurioustonotethatalthoughthisfacthasbeenlongrecognisedinshorefighting...

ithasneveruntilrecentlybeensufficientlyrecognizedinnavalwarfare....Therecentdevelopmentofthe

prospectofhittingfrequentlyatlongrangesistheall-importantfact...'(Jellicoe,‘ConsiderationsoftheDesign

ofaBattleship’,AL252/4/8,ALHRB).DuringthewarwemaynotethesubtleshiftbetweenAugust1914,when

hewrotethat‘deploymentatlongrangemaygiveustheinitialadvantageingunfireitissoimportantto

obtain,buttherecanbenodoubtthatwemustgraduallyclosetherangetoobtaindecisiveresults’

(AddendumtoGrandFleetBattleInstructions,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item38),andMay1916,whichhas‘I

attachthegreatestimportancetomakingfulluseofthefireofourheaviergunsintheearlystagesatlong

range…therangeshouldbebetween15,000and10,000yards,thelatterbeingreachedastheenemy’sfireis

overcome;intheearlystagesofanactionIdonotdesiretoclosetherangemuchinside14,000yards’(Grand

FleetBattleOrders,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item225).Hisgoverningprinciple–naturallyenough,andperfectly

thatofFiske,BaudryandLanchester–wasthat‘oursystemmustbethatwhich…willenablethehighestrate

ofaccuratefire’(Jellicoe,18/1/15,`Remarksontheuseofdirectorfiringfromthemainarmament',heldin

ADM137/1995,NationalArchives,Kew,andcitedinSumida,‘Expectation’).

25

engagementwithoutdangerofdefeatindetail.56Asnotedearlier,concentrationoffirenow

requirednotmassingofshipsbutratherfleetdispositionswhichguaranteedconcentrationof

gunfire,averydifferentpropositionwhichmadeaNelsonianemphasisonthegrantingofgreat

latitudetosubordinates,nowknownas‘missioncommand’,peculiarlyinappropriate.

Indeed,theincreasedcertaintyofgeometricfirepowerconcentrationovermeleetacticscanbe

quantified.Wenotedearlierthatsymmetricrandomfragmentationoftheopposingfleetsinan

otherwise-deterministicLanchestrianbattlehastheeffectofrandomizingtheoutcome.For

example,splittingeachfleetintotwo(uniformlydistributed)randomfragments,whileitdoesnot

changetheaverageoutcome,hastheeffectofinjectingrandomnessequivalenttoastandard

deviation(i.e.typicalvariation)intheratioofthefleets’numbersof16%,andtherebyatypical

variationinsquare-lawfightingstrengthsof36%.Putsimply,allowingsuchdivisioncreatesahigh

degreeofrandomness,whichcaneasilyoverturnthecertaintyofaLanchestrianadvantage.Attheir

simplest,thetacticalimperativesfacingJellicoeandScheerare,assooften,bestcapturedby

Hughes:‘Amajorpartofskillandexpertiseisrecognizingandavoidingsituationsdominatedby

uncertaintywhensuperior,andcreatingopportunitiesforuncertaintyfortheenemywhen

inferior.’57ForJellicoe,ameleewouldhaverandomisedhisperfectLanchestrianbattle.ForScheer,

ameleeagainstpartoftheGrandFleetmighthavebeenideal.

Jellicoethereforefacedatensionbetweensomedegreeofcertaintyaboutthecorrecttacticsfor

employinghisbigguns,alongsidegreatuncertaintyaboutboththeireffectivenessandthepossible

56SeeGoldrick,BeforeJutland.Historianswhohaveservedasnavalofficerstendtoplacegreateremphasison

acommander’sremaininginfullcontrolofhisfleetthandocivilianhistorians(WayneHughes,private

communication).

57WayneP.Hughes,‘UncertaintyinCombat’,MilitaryOperationsResearch,1(1994),pp.45-57.Drax’sessay

inBTY/7/2,notedabove,remainsequivocalondivisionaltactics.HeunderstandsFiske’sprinciplethat

‘concentrationrequiresisolation’(Fiske,FightingMachine,p263)butfailstoreachaclearviewonwhether

suchconcentrationrequiresdeparturefromline-aheadtactics.Hewantsdivisionstobeabletoexploit

transientopportunitiesavailabletothem,butknowsthatdividingafleetcanleadtodefeatindetail,astark

conclusionofFiskeandLanchester.

26

importanceofthemineandtorpedo.58Theactualoutcomeofthebattlewouldnotnecessarilybe

themostprobableoutcome,andJellicoe’sheavyburdenofresponsibilityandreflective

temperamentdictatedacautiousappraisalofanactionlonganticipated.Blessedwithatelling

marginofsuperiorityingunpower,andahighprobabilityofvictoryinsymmetricalcircumstances,

Jellicoehadadutytobewaryofanyfactorthatmightmovethebalanceofprobabilityinfavourof

hisoppositenumber:andinthedeploymentofevermorepowerfulmodernweaponryinthe

crampedconfinesoftheNorthSea,suchdangersweremany.Inthislight,Jellicoe’sfamousturn

awayfromScheeraftercrossingthe‘T’makesgreatersense.ThestandardviewofJellicoe’scriticsis

thatheshouldhaveturnedtowardstheHighSeasFleet,perhapslosingafewbattleshipswounded

bytorpedoes,butacceptingsuchlossesinpursuitofvictory.Butthesewoundedshipscouldeasily

havecrippledtheGrandFleet’sperfectlineandtherebydeniedhimtheconditionsessentialforthat

victory.

IV

Despiteanumberofnavalactionsin1914,thetacticsofthedreadnoughtclashwerefirstputthe

testatDoggerBankinJanuary1915,whenBritishandGermanbattlecruisersmet.Thisskirmishisof

significantinterest,asitisonmanylevelsasmall-scaleprecursortotheopening‘RuntotheSouth’

oftheJutlandBattle.ItrevealstousboththetacticschosenbyBeattyandHipperandtherelative

meritsoftheships.

58UncertaindiscussionoftorpedotacticspervadestheliteraturebeforeJutland.Forexample,withinone

journal,theProceedingsoftheUSNavalInstitute,onehas:V.Cunibertitrans.T.WithersJr,‘Alltorpedoes!’,

PUSNI,40(1914),pp.27-31,advocatingafleetofsmallsemi-submersibletorpedoboats;LtR.A.Dawes,‘Battle

Tactics’,PUSNI,41(1915),pp.1873-1895,offeringaturnaway(butnottowards)asafleettacticwhenunder

torpedoattack;andH.H.Frost,‘Theproblemoffiringatafleetunderwaywithlong-rangetorpedoes’,PUSNI,

39(1913),pp.681-698.PerhapsthefinalwordshouldgotoLtChesterW.Nimitz,‘Militaryvalueandtacticsof

modernsubmarines’,PUSNI,38(1912),pp.1193-1211:‘Thesteadydevelopmentofthetorpedo[andthe]

submarine…willresultinamostdangerousoffensiveweapon,…whichwillhavealargepartindecidingfleet

actions.’

27

DoggerBankisusuallyconsideredtobeanopportunityfordecisiveBritishvictory,59lostonlyby

anuntimelysignalfromRalphSeymourinthedisabledLion.Thecontemporaryaccountsare

strikinglytriumphal,butthelaterexperienceofJutlandsuggeststhisattitudetobemisplaced.Had

thethreeengagedships–Tiger,PrincessRoyalandNewZealand–continuedagainstthethree

remainingGermanships,asuccessfulresultwasunlikelyforanumberofreasons.60

ThestandardofgunneryintheBCFwasknowntobewellbelowthatoftheGrandFleet.There

werenofacilitiesforgunnerytrainingatRosythandthesecouldonlybeprovidedwhenBCF

divisionsweresentinrotationtotheGrandFleetbaseatScapaFlow.NorwasBeattyinclinedto

emphasizeaccurategunnery.Hisviewwasthatrateoffirewasmoreimportant,andthussafety

featuresthatmighthavereducedthisweredisregarded,creatingthedanger,laterrevealedat

Jutland,ofaturretpenetrationtransmittingexplosivefiretotheships’magazineswithcatastrophic

results.61TheGermans,bycontrast,areconsideredtohavelearnedmuchfromthebattleinthis

respect,duetothefortuitousescapeofSeydlitzfromaflashexplosionnotunlikeLion’snear-miss16

monthslater.ItisalsonowacceptedthatBritishpowderwasmuchmorecombustiblethanGerman,

placingapremiumonstringentmeasurestolimitthetransmissionofflashexplosions.

EvenhadBritishammunitionhandlingproceduresbeenimpeccable,theolderBritish

battlecruiserswererenderedasobsolescentasthehaplessBlücherintheirscoutingrolebythe

appearanceofthenewGermanbattlecruiserswithheavierarmourandsimilararmament.Ofthe

59Hughes,FleetTactics,p75;CaptJ.Cresswell,RoyalNavalStaffCollegelecture(1932),ChurchillArchives

CentreCRES3/2

60AquantitativestudybytheauthorsusingmodernBayesianmethodsisNiallMacKay,ChristopherPriceand

A.JamieWood,‘WeighingtheFogofWar:IllustratingthepowerofBayesianmethodsforhistoricalanalysis

throughtheBattleoftheDoggerBank’,toappearinHistoricalMethods.

61TheexchangebetweenJellicoeandBeattyofNovember1915makesclearthedifferenceintheirviews:

Jellicoewrites‘Ifeartherapidityideawascarriedtoexcess’,Beattyreplies‘Ifeelverystrongly[that]we

shouldendeavourtoquickenupourfiring’,andJellicoeexplainsthat‘Iamallforrapiodityoffire,butmyonly

fearisthatshipsmaybreakintorapidfiretoosoon’.JellicoePapers,vol.1,items172-174.

28

threeshipspursuingtheGermanbattlecruisers,thearmourofNewZealandcouldnothave

withstoodtheconcentratedfireofGerman11”and12”gunsatmediumrange.Finallyall

shortcomingswerecompoundedbypoorfiredistribution,whichleftMoltkeunmolestedwhenTiger

mistakenlyconcentratedonSeydlitz.ThiswasadeadlymistakeasthegunneryofevenGerman

battlecruisersdeterioratedsharplywhenunderfire,incontrasttotheirexcellentperformancewhen

notengaged.ThiserrorwasrepeatedatJutland,whenDerfflingerwasnottakenunderfireand

doubledupwithSeydlitzonQueenMary.

Tactically,itisclearfromthisbattlethatBeattyhadfailedtocomprehendkeyideasfrompre-war

tactics:thesimultaneousengagementofthefleet,positioningofflagship,anduseofspeedand

greatergunrangetosecureunmolestedfiring,FiskeandBaudry’sfiveminutes.Thefirst,especially,

wouldcomebacktohaunttheBCFintheearlystagesoftheJutlandencounter.

TheoutcomeofDoggerBankmightseemtopresageacatastrophefortheRoyalNavy.The

chancesoftheGermanHighseasFleetencounteringtheoverconfidentBCFinisolationandexposing

itsweaknesseswerehighandtheGermansexecutedjustsuchaplanwhentheyputtoseaonMay

311916.Previousattemptstoachievethisresulthadbeenfrustratedbycircumstanceandthe

timidityofAdmiralsPohlandIngenohl,whowerereluctanttorisktheHighSeasFleetexceptin

overwhelminglyfavourableconditions,andhadreasontofearthewrathoftheKaiseriftheydid.

ThenewandaggressivecommanderoftheHighSeasFleet,Scheer,succeededinhisprimaryaimof

drawingtheBCFoutofRosyth,buttheinitialdispositionssuggestedaGermanratherthanaBritish

disaster.

JellicoewasawareoftheGermanplanthroughinterceptionofcrackedGermancommunications,

andputtoseatorendezvouswiththeBCFandsurpriseScheerwiththeconcentratedGrandFleet.A

chancefactoralsounhingedtheGermanplan,asthe3rdBattlecruiserSquadron[3BCS]hadbeen

detachedtoScapaFlowforgunnerypracticeandtemporarilyreplacedatRosythbythe5thBattle

29

Squadron,[5BS]consistingoffourofthefivenewQueenElizabethclassbattleships,easilythemost

powerfulwarshipsatseaontheday.ApartfromgenericfaultsinBritishshells,theypossessednone

oftheshortcomingsofthebattlecruiserstowhichtheywereattached,particularlyintermsof

accurategunnery.

TheGermanplanwastomeetBeattywiththeHighSeasFleet’sbattlecruisersunderHipperand

drawthemontotheapproachingHighSeasFleetfordestruction.TheunsuspectingHipper,

however,withfivebattlecruisersseemeddestinedtomeettenBritishcapitalships.Insuch

circumstancestheSquareLawpromisedaninevitableresult.Theencounterwouldbesymmetrical,

inLanchestrianterms,butofcoursethisdidnotmeananevencontest.Britishshipsarmedwith15”

and13.5”gunscouldengageHipper’s11”shipsbeyondeffectiverangeoftheirownmain

armamentsandhewouldhavenoprospectofconcentratinghis12”fireontheweakerBritish

vesselsbeforehisfightingpowerwaseliminated.NorwouldhehavetimetoretreatontotheHSF

beforebeingdestroyed,ashisshipswereslowerthantheenemybattlecruisers,andalmostmatched

by5BS

However,thedifferentphasesofthebattleproducedaspectsoftheextremesdesiredbyboth

sides.TheweaknessesinBeatty’ssignallingdisplayedatDoggerBankwererepeatedand,inhis

eagernesstogetatHipper,heleft5BSbehind.Hispoordeploymentof5BSfartohisrearcreateda

thirdsubdivisionoftheGrandFleet.ThismadepossibleHipper’ssurvivalandpresentedhimwithan

opportunity.ThoughHipperwasunabletoavoidbattle,andevenwithout5BStheSquareLaw

suggestedanegativeoutcomeforhisfivebattecruisersagainstBeatty’ssix,circumstancesfavoured

him.Beatty’sshipsclosedtowithintheeffectiverangeofGermangunsbeforeopeningfire,and

thoughthisresultedfrompoorvisibilityratherthancalculation,theeffectwastoplacehislong-

armedbutthin-skinnedforceofbattlecruisersinunnecessarydanger.Poorfiredistributionleft

DerfflingerunmolestedandenabledHippertoachievemomentsofeffectivenumericalsuperiorityin

theraggedrunningfightwhichdevelopedwhenthebattlecruisersmet.Thesecircumstances

30

suggestedtheeliminationofBeatty’sforce,inthefirstplacebecausetheSquareLawwouldnot

functiontohisadvantage,andthenaftertheimmediatelossofIndefatigable(Fig.1,pointA)because

itwouldstarttoworkagainsthim.However,unlikeHipper,thespeedofhisvesselsgavehimthe

optionofdisengagement.

ThedynamicsofthisprocessareclearfromFigure1,withBeattyfailingtoachieveconcentration,

andtherebyafavourablegunfireratio,duringthefirsttwentyminutes.When5BSclosedtherange

sufficientlytoengage(Fig.1,B),theBCFfinallyachievedconcentrationandHipperwasplacedin

apparentlymortalperil.Beattywasabletoopentherangebetweenhisbattlecruisersandthoseof

theenemy,reducingtheeffectivenessoftheirsmallermainarmament,while5BSengagedHipper’s

forceeffectivelyatsuchrangethattheyhadnomeansofreply.However,5BSatthisstagecould

onlyengagetherearofHipper’slineand,unpleasantthoughthiswasforMoltkeandVonderTann,

Hipper’snewestandmostpowerfulvesselsLützowandDerfflinger,with12”gunsalongthe

centreline,werestillinactionwithBeatty.

ThelossofQueenMarytoanexplosionoccurredatthispointofthebattle(Fig.1,C).The

importanceofDerfflinger'sescapefromBritishfireattheoutsetofthebattlehasbeendismissedon

thegroundsoftheGermanship'spoorinitialshooting,62butshehadstillnotbeenhitwhencredited

withthefatalsalvoagainstQueenMary,firinginconjunctionwithSeydlitz,andhadnotsufferedthe

sharplydegradingeffectsofbattledamageonherfirecontrol.Evenwithouttheexplosion,the

SquareLawsuggestedacatastrophicresultfortheBritishbattlecruiserinthisunequalexchange.

With5BSinaction,however,theundergunningoftheGerman11”shipspromisedtobethedecisive

weaknessoneithersideifthisactionweretocontinue.VonderTannparticularlybegantosuffer

immediateandseveredamage.Infact,thearrivalofScheerandtherestoftheHighSeasFleet

(Fig.1,D)broughtthe‘RuntotheSouth’phaseofthebattletoacloseandturnedthetablesagain.

62Campbell,Jutland,p.39.

31

Beattywasnowdecisivelyoutnumberedandhisonlyoptionwastoreversecourseandseekunion

withtheGrandFleet.Thiswasalsohisdutyashehadineffectsucceededinhisscoutingroleand

locatedtheenemyfleet.Thephaseofthebattleknownasthe‘RuntotheNorth’thusbegan,

thoughnotquiteyetfortheQueenElizabethsof5BS,whichstillonasouthwardcoursepassed

Beatty’sshipsheadingnorth,waitinganxiouslyfortheordertoexecuteadelayedsignaltoturn

(Fig.1,E).Whenthisarrivedeachshipof5BSturnedinsequenceandfacedtheconcentratedfire

alonewhileturning,creatingasituationwhichtheseuniquelyvaluablevesselsshouldneverhave

facedandinwhichtheGermansmightagainhaveachievedtheirdesiredrisk-fleetresult.Onceagain

Beatty’sfailuretounderstandtheLanchestriandynamicisstarklyvisibleinFigure1,wherebetween

pointsDandFweobserveareversalofthegunfireratiointheGermans’favour,theonlyperiodof

thebattleduringwhichthiswasachieved.Catastrophewasavoided,however,and5BSwasableto

stayaheadofthepursuingenemy,absorbanumberofhitsanddamageenemyvesselswith

effectivegunnery,beforeactionwasbrokenoff(Fig.1,F).

Inbothphasesofthescoutingduel,theGermansenjoyedavisibilityadvantage,withtheBritish

shipsoutlinedagainstthesettingsunwhiletheirownwereconcealedinthemurktotheEast.

However,intheRuntotheNorth,theduelbetweenHipperandBeattycontinuedandinstark

contrasttotheRuntotheSouthBeattyhadthebetterofit.Beattywasnowmuchmorecarefulto

usehissuperiorspeed,increasinglyapparentastheGermans’inferiorbrowncoaltookitstoll,to

dictatetherangeofengagementforhisbattlecruisers,whileValiantandBarhamof5BSscored

repeatedlyagainstHipper’sships.Thoughtheresultsofthiscontinuingengagementwere

undramatic,theysuggestthelikelyoutcomehadBeattydeployedwiselyintheruntothesouthwith

hisfullforce.Beatty,however,nowachievedsuccessbydeliveringtheunsuspectingHighSeasFleet

ontoJellicoe’sguns,againreversingtheadvantage.

Whenthebattlefleetsmet(Fig.1,G),Jellicoehavingsuccessfullydeployedinbattlelinetoport,an

idealLanchestrianpositionalsituationwascreatedinwhichtheHighSeasFleetwouldnormallybe

32

destroyed(Fig.1,H,at1830).AgainpoorvisibilityfavouredtheGermansenoughtosavethem,for

althoughtheorientationofthefleetsrelativetothesettingsunwasreversedinfavouroftheBritish,

generalvisibilitybythistimewaspatchyandinplacesreducedalmosttozero,negatingJellicoe’s

numericaladvantageandmomentarilyreversingitwhenInvincible,rangingwith3BCSaheadof

Jellicoewassuddenlyexposedbyachangeinthelight.Thismisfortuneled,aswithQueenMary,to

adverseSquareLawconcentrationinwhichshewasexposed(afewminutesafterFig.1,G)tothefire

oftwoGermanships,LützowfiringthesalvoresultinginInvincible’sfatalexplosion(atpointHin

Fig.1).Nevertheless,theaccuracyoftheshootingof3BCSwasclearlyimprovedbytheirtrainingat

ScapaFlow,andInvincibleiscreditedwithinflictingfataldamageonLützowbeforeherdemise.Thus

theoldestbattlecruiserandthenewestpresentatthebattleeffectivelysankeachother.

ConfrontedwiththeconcentratedGrandFleet,Scheerhadnooptionbutflight.Hesuccessfully

executedthebattleturnawaypractisedforsuchanoccasion(Fig.1,I),aidedbypoorvisibilitywhich

preventedatleasthalfoftheGrandFleet’sbattleshipsfromengaging,63andvanishedintothemurk

beforeturningandblunderingintoJellicoeagain(Fig.1,J,at1900).Theturnawaythenhadtobe

repeated,butwas‘ashambles’comparedtothefirstattempt:onthissecondoccasion,visibilitywas

betterfortheBritish,manymoreofJellicoe’sshipsfoundtargets,andthemanoeuvrewaspoorly

executedunderheavyfire(Fig.1,K,notsharplydefined).Atthispoint,theSquareLaw‘was

beginningtotiptheHighSeasFleetdownasteepeningslopetooblivion’,64butthedisarrayof

Scheer’sshipswasultimatelymaskedbythelayingofsmoke,awell-executeddestroyerattackon

theGrandFleetforcingaturnaway,andasacrificialchargebyhisbattlecruisers.Inthis‘death

charge’ontheBritishfleet,furtherpoorvisibilitysavedHipper’sshipsfromextendedpunishment

andenabledthemtoescape,butinarareclashofthenewestvesselsDerfflingerwas‘shattered’,

primarilybythenew15”battleshipRevenge,losingtwoofherfourturretsinamatterof

63Campbell,Jutland,p.155.

64Gordon,RulesoftheGame,p.461.

33

moments.65Inbetterconditions,neitherofScheer’saboutturnswouldhavesavedhimifconducted

infullviewoftheconcentratedGrandFleet.Nevertheless,thepointofdecisionhadbeenreached

andJellicoehad,instrategicterms,won.66Nobrightprospectotherthanescaperemainedto

Scheer,andhelatercreptpastJellicoeinthedark.

V

TheBritishcapitalshipslostatJutlandwereallbattlecruisers.Twoofthethreelostwereamong

Britain’soldestvesselsofthistype,lesswellprotectedandarmedthanlaterships:therealshock

wasthelossofthenewQueenMary,whichcanneverthelessbematchedagainsttheequally

valuableLützowdespitemuchheavierlossoflifeontheBritishship.Thereislittleevidencetopoint

tosystemicweaknessinBritishshipdesignanddoctrineinthecontextofdreadnoughtencounters.

ShortcomingsrelatemoretothehabitsoftheBCFandBeatty’sidiosyncraticleadership,allofwhich

hadbeenondisplayatDoggerBank.

Apartfromthis,sourcesagreethatBritishcorditewasmuchmorelikelytoexplodethanGerman,

andthatifbothfleetshadbeenequippedwiththeBritishpropellantatleastoneGermancapital

shipwouldhavemetthesamefate.However,catastrophicexplosionrequiredafireorcordite

detonationreachingamainmagazine,andtheevidenceofthebattlewasthatsuchafatewasbyno

meansoverwhelminglyprobableinBritishships.AlltheBritishlossesinvolvedashellpenetratinga

gunturret,causingacorditefirewhichtransmitteditselftoamainmagazineandtriggereda

65Gordon,RulesoftheGame,p.459.

66Jellicoehadatleasttwicepreviouslystatedhisattentionnottobedrawnintoafleetengagementdeepin

theGermanBightlateintheday.LetterfromJellicoetoCaptFredericDreyer,9thJuly1915,ChurchillArchives

Centre,DRYR3/1;memorandumfromJellicoetoAdmSirHenryJackson,12thApril1916,JellicoePapers,vol.1

item213.

34

catastrophicexplosion.OnlyafractionofGermanhitscouldbeexpectedtohitaturret,anda

smallerfractiontopenetrate.Lionwashit13timesbythe12”shellsofLützowinadditiontothe

near-fatalturrethit,andTigerwashit13timeswithoutseeminglikelytosink.Amongturrethits,not

allwouldcausecatastrophe,whichwaspreventablebyalertfirecontrolandfloodingofmagazines

asonLion.QueenMaryexplodedsometimeafterbeinghit,implying,forwhateverreason,

unsuccessfulfirefightinganddamagecontrol.

Iftheprobabilityofacatastrophichitfromasingleshellwasverylow,Germanchancesof

inflictingsuchablowwouldobviouslybeincreasedifmoregunscouldbebroughttobearonthe

target.Whenoutnumbered,GermangunswerelesslikelytoscoreaturrethitthanBritish,butthe

differentphasesofthefightingatJutlandprovidedoccasionswhenthiswasnotso.QueenMaryand

IndefatigablewerelostwhentheformerwasfiredonexclusivelybymorethanoneGermanshipfor

aperiodoftimeandthelatterwhenshebecamedetachedfromtheline.Similarly,Invincible,though

inthevanoftheGrandFleet,wastwomilesaheadofitwhenfatallyhitfacingoddsof2-1inchance

conditionsofsuddenlyimprovedvisibilityfortheGermans.

Itisusuallyassumedthatthebattlecruisers’adoptedroleasafastwingoftheGrandFleetwasa

mistakewhichplacedtheminmortaldanger.However,iftheyhadmettheGermansaspartofthe

GrandFleetinlineofbattletheirchancesofsurvivalwouldhavebeengreaterthanwhenskirmishing

withGermanbattlecruisers.AheavilyoutnumberedGermanfleetcouldnothaveexpectedto

concentratetheweightoffireonanyonebattlecruiserthattheyactuallyachievedatJutland,andat

theoutsetofactionanumberofBritishshipswouldhavereceivednofireatall,mostlikelythose

whichoverlappedtheGermanlineateitherend,wherethebattlecruisersexpectedtobestationed.

AfurtherfactorworkingagainsttheGermanswasthattheirprospectsofachievingcatastrophic

hits,althoughslim,weregreatestattheoutsetofbattle.Jellicoewasconsistentinhisviewthatthe

firstfiveminutesoffirewerelikelytobedecisive,nodoubtinfluencedbyhisreadingofpre-war

35

material.67ThoughGermanshipscouldremainafloataftersustainingenormousdamagetheirutility

inafleetencounterwouldceasewhenthelastoftheirmainarmamentwassilenced.Thiswould

occuratanincreasingrateasthebattleprogressedwithaconcomitantreductionintheircapacityto

inflictequivalentdamageontheBritish.TherateandeffectivenessofthefireofGerman

battlecruisersalsodegradedrapidlyasthevesselsreceivedhits,whetherornottheypenetratedthe

armour:thekineticenergyimpartedbytheimpactofthelargeBritishshellswasconsiderable,

producingashockeffectonthecrewanddegradingtheeffectivenessofsensitivefirecontrol

equipment.68Inthiscontext,thefailureoftheBCFtoengagethenewanddangerousDerfflinger

earlyinthebattlewasagraveerror.GenerallyinaccurateshootingbytheBCFalsohandedHipper

theearlyinitiative,stressingagainthevalueofthe‘firstfiveminutes’.

ThusnoneoftheapparentweaknessesofBritishshipsrelativetoGermanwaslikelytoaffect

decisivelyabroadside-to-broadsideencounterofthebattlefleets.Thestrengthsresultingfrom

earlierdecisions,chieflyintermsofnumericalsuperiorityinships,gunsandguncalibre,weremuch

moreimportant.InLanchestrianterms,Germansuccesswouldhavetobeachievedthroughtheir

longed-forKraftausgleich.Theyputtoseaon31stMay1916withpreciselythisintention,andduring

thatdayandthefollowingnighttheLanchestrianbalanceshiftedfluidlybetweentheopposingsides,

morethanoncechangingradicallywithinsecondsaseachsoughttoachieveaClausewitzianpointof

decision[Schwerpunkt].

67Fiske,AmericanNavalPolicy;Baudry,TheNavalBattle.

68ThecapacityofburstingBritishshelltodegradeGermanfightingcapacityiswelldocumentedinYates,The

JutlandControversy.

36

VI

FromaLanchestrianperspectivebothsidesflirtedwithdisasteratvariousstagesoftheBattleof

Jutland.However,theGermansachievedathreetooneadvantageindreadnoughtssunk,andmore

importantlyescapedextermination.ThisresultseemedtodefyLanchestrianprobabilityasitwas

understoodatthetime.EachofScheer’smassiveblunderswasanunforcederrorwhichwouldhave

costhimhisfleethadnotrandomfactorsinvolvingweatherandcircumstantialBritishdeployments

developedexactlyastheydidontheday.

Whenthefleetssetsail,theforewarnedBritishinadvanceofScheer,themostprobableoutcome

wasthedestructionofHipper’sbattlecruisersbythereinforcedBCF,possiblyforthelossofoneor

twoBritishbattlecruisers,butwiththefirepowerof5BSensuringBritishpredominance.Afterthis,

ScheerwouldnecessarilyhavereturnedtoportwithallhopeofafuturechallengetotheGrand

Fleetabandoned.Beatty’sweaknesses,andthosehetoleratedinhissubordinates,threwawaythis

favourablesituationandforatimeofferedtheGermansexactlythelimitedyetportentousvictory

theysought.However,Beatty’sunstabledynamicproducedastilllessprobableevent:aclashofthe

fleetsinwhichScheercouldnotprevail.Takenasawhole,however,thebattleproducedatthe

strategiclevelexactlytheoutcomethatLanchester’slogicwouldpredict.ThefullLanchestrian

battle,withitscertaindefeat,mustalwaysbedeclinedbythenumerically-inferiorforce.69

The25Britishdreadnoughtbattleshipsoflessthan15"mainarmamentwerenoteverythingthat

couldbedesiredbut,inmounting127turretsoftwingunsofatleast12”calibre,theynevertheless

providedafleet-in-beinglargeenough,byanarrowmargin,todeteranyGermanthoughtof

engaginginafullfleetactionwithoutpreviousattemptsatpartialattrition.Thiswasinitselfa

decisivestrategicresult,butmustbeconsideredabluffifBritishshipsweremarkedlyinferiorto

theirGermanequivalents.Evidencesuggeststhatthiswasnotthecase.Britishbuildqualityperunit

69Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’,asnotedabove.

37

whichwasdeliberatelylessthanoptimal,especiallyinspeedandarmour,wasoffsetbyincremental

improvement,superiornumbersandgunpower:theculminatingvesselsintheBritishproduction

process,theQueenElizabeths,wereoutstandingvesselsbyanystandard.

JudgementsofthetechnicalqualitiesofopposingshipsshouldalsorecognisethattheBritishand

Germanfleetswereengagedinaprocessoftechnologicalleapfrogduringaperiodofextraordinarily

swiftdevelopment,andonoccasionssuchasJutlandvesselsproducedintheearlypartoftheperiod

couldfindthemselvesoutclassedwhenencounteringnewervessels.AtJutlandtheBritishfieldedsix

battleshipsintheultimatedreadnoughtconfigurationofforeandaftturretsalongthecentreline,to

twoGermanbattlecruisersofthesametype,oneofwhichwaslost.Asmightbeexpected,Lützow

andDerfflingerweredeadlyopponentstootherbattlecruisersandolderdreadnoughtbattleships,

butwhenDerfflingerencounteredRevenge,thebattleshipoverpoweredthebattlecruiserinamatch

ofgenerationally-compatiblevesselsinwhichDerfflinger’slimitedmainarmamentwasnot

effectivelyoffsetbyenhancedarmour.Insum,theGermanswereoutnumberedandatleast

matchedintechnologicaltermsbytheGrandFleet,andthisbeingthecasetacticsbecameof

paramountimportance.

ThustheadversebalanceofBritishlossesindicatednotoverallweaknessbutratherthatJutland

wasthegreatLanchestrianbattlethatneverquitehappened,asScheerwastwiceabletodeclineits

culminationwhenheknewhimselftobemomentsfromdestruction.Nevertheless,atthe

operationalandtacticallevelsthebattlestillrespectedaLanchestriandynamic,astheshiftingfight

betweensquadronsandshipsproducedmomentsofbattlewhenconcentrationwasrealizedandthe

resultingadvantagesaccrued,broadlyfavouringtheGermans.ThecostlyBritishvictoryatJutlandis,

therefore,bestunderstoodinLanchestriantermsasaraceforconcentrationwhichJellicoe

ultimatelywon.AlthoughthiswasnotconvertedintoGermanshipssunk,andcriticsonbothsides

werequicktocontrastJutlandwithTrafalgar,theeffectontheenemy’swilltofightwasmuchthe

sameandJellicoe’sactionsandhisunderstandingofhissituationmustbeconsideredsound.

38

Jutlandshouldthereforebeseenasavictoryshapedfrom1905to1916byadevelopingbut

integratedvisionoffleetpolicyandtacticswhichenabledFisher’sprogrammeofperpetual

technologicaladvancetobecarriedthroughtostrategicsuccess.Essentialtothiswasnumerical

superiority,dictatedbythecruxofLanchester’sargument,thequantificationofthetrade-off

betweennumbersandquality.70TheRoyalNavy,forallitsflaws,wasalearningorganization,in

whichreformingdrivewasbalancedbytechnocraticexpertsmakingfinely-balanceddecisionsina

rationalmannerthroughaperiodofintensetechnologicalandtacticalchange.Itgotthebig

decisionsright,buildingandcorrectlywieldingitsdecisiveweapon,theGrandFleet,toachievethe

requiredstrategicvictory.

Acknowledgments.WeshouldliketothankMatthewSeligmannforastimulatingseminar(andfor

pointingouttheexchangebetweenBrooksandSumida),andJamesGoldrickandBrianMcCuefor

helpfuldiscussions.NJMshouldliketothanktheUSNavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,forits

hospitalityandfinancialsupportwhilethisworkwasbegun.Inparticular,hewouldliketothank

WayneHughesforextensivediscussionsoffleettacticsandtheirhistory,andGlenKoueforhelp

withreferences.WeshouldalsoliketothankthestaffoftheChurchillArchiveCentre,Cambridge;

theCairdLibrary,NationalMaritimeMuseum,Greenwich;andespeciallytheAdmiraltyLibraryNaval

HistoricalBranchandNationalMuseumoftheRoyalNavy,Portsmouth,fortheirhelp.

70IronicallyLanchester’santicipatorBradleyFiskemissedthispointwhenhewrotein1920that‘theGerman

navywasthebetter,andwasvanquishedmerelybecauseitwasthesmaller’.B.A.Fiske,reviewofJellicoe,

‘TheGrandFleet’,AmericanHistoricalReview25(1920)280-282.

39