a new beat: options for more accountable policing
TRANSCRIPT
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policingbyRickMuirandGuyLodge
June2008
ippr2008
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy
WWW.IPPR.ORG
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ContentsContentsContentsContentsAboutippr 2Abouttheauthors 2Acknowledgements 2
Executivesummary 31.Thegenieisoutofthebottle 62.Theproblem 83.Optionsforreform 154.Strategyforreform 235.Conclusion 24References 25
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AboutipprAboutipprAboutipprAboutipprTheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible.Ourinternationalandmigrationteams,andclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhigh-qualityresearch.
ippr,3032SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RATel.:+44(0)2074706100E-mail:[email protected]:www.ippr.orgRegisteredCharityNo.:800065ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinJune2008.ippr2008
AbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsAbouttheauthorsRickMuirisSeniorResearchFellowintheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.HehasadoctorateinPoliticsfromtheUniversityofOxford,whereheworkedasadepartmentallecturerinLatinAmericanpolitics.Heworksacrossarangeofareasincludingidentity
andculture,democraticrenewal,communitycohesionandpublicservicereform.HispublicationsincludeThePowerofBelonging(withBenRogers),TheNewIdentityPoliticsandWhoRunsBritain?(withEmilyThornberryandIanKearns)inPoliticsforaNewGeneration:Theprogressivemoment(NickPearceandJuliaMargo[editors]).GuyLodgeisHeadoftheDemocracyandPowerteamatippr.Hespecialisesingovernanceandconstitutionalreformandhaspublishedwidelyinthisarea.HeisalsoaVisitingResearchFellowintheDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalRelations,UniversityofOxford.
AcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsAcknowledgements
WewouldliketothankTomGash,MikeKenny,AndyHull,CareyOppenheim,GeorginaKyriacou,LiamONeill,CatherineBithellandHollyAndrewfortheiradviceandsupport.WewouldalsoliketothankCableandWireless,LogicaandtheLocalGovernmentAssociationfortheirgeneroussupportinfundingipprsFutureofPolicingproject,withoutwhichitwouldnothavebeenpossible.Thefindingsofourresearch,however,areourownanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofourfundingpartners.
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ExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryExecutivesummaryAllpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryouttheirdutiesonourbehalf.Robustaccountabilitymechanismsensurethatorganisationsperformtoahighstandardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.
ThisreportarguesthatthepoliceserviceinEnglandandWalessuffersfromanaccountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevelfragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactorinthesystemhasthepowertoeffectivelyincentiviseperformanceimprovementordrivethroughchangeandreform.RecentattemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrolfromthecentrethroughtargetsettingandtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimitedsuccessandhavemadepolicingevenlessresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Atthelocallevelthereisnorealdemocraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,unaccountableandremote,whileelectedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayoverlocalpolicingpriorities.
Thisreportsetsouttheconsequencesofthislocalaccountabilitydeficitforpoliceperformanceandidentifiessixoptionsforreform.Ourargumentcomesinfourparts.1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.Thegenieisoutofthebottle1.ThegenieisoutofthebottlePolicereformisnowamajorpriorityforallofthemainpoliticalparties.TheGovernmentisduetopublishagreenpaperonpolicereformthissummerandhasannouncedthatitwilllookatoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.TheGovernmenthasnowconcededtwoimportantprinciples:thatthereisanaccountabilitydeficitatthelocallevelandthatpeopleshouldhavemoredemocraticcontrolover
policingprioritiesintheirarea.Thedemocraticgeniehasbeenletoutofthebottleinthepolicereformdebateanditwillbedifficultforanypartytoputitbackinagain.2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.TheproblemDespitesignificantincreasesinfunding,policeperformanceonkeyindicatorshasnotimproved.Thereisalsoclearevidencethatthepublicbelievethatthepolicehavebecomeunresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Thereareanumberoffactorsthataccountfortheseproblemsbutonecauseofbothistheaccountabilitydeficitthatexistswithinpolicing.Policeforcesareinsufficientlyaccountabletonationalpolicymakersbecauseoffragmentedgovernance.EffortstoincreaseforceaccountabilitytotheHomeOfficethroughcentraltargetshavenotraisedperformanceinkeyareasandhaveskewedlocalpolicingpriorities.Anevengreateraccountabilitydeficitexistsatthelocallevelwherepoliceauthoritiesareweakandremotefromthepublic,andwherethereisnoeffectiveroleforlocalgovernmentinsettinglocalpolicingstrategy.Asaresultthereareinsufficientpressurestodrivechangethroughthesystemandpoliceforcesareinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneeds.3.3.3.3.OptionsforreformOptionsforreformOptionsforreformOptionsforreformWeidentifytwoimportantwaysofimprovingresponsivenessandraisingperformance.1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing1.Citizenfocusedpolicing
Therearemeasuresthatcanbetakentomakethestyleofpolicingmoreresponsiveandcitizen-focused.Theseincludethedevelopmentofacustomercarecultureinthepolice
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service,areductionintimespentonunnecessaryprocessesandpaperwork,embeddingneighbourhoodpolicingandprovidingresidentswithclearinformationaboutlocalcrimepatterns.2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability2.Increasedlocalaccountability
Whileitisnomagicbullet,makingdecision-makingmoreaccountabletocommunitiesiscrucialtodeliveringimprovedperformanceandmoreresponsivepolicing.Weidentifysixmainoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability.Itshouldbenotedthateachoftheseoptionswillonlybemeaningfuliftheycomewithsomepowersto:
setlocalpolicingpriorities allocatefinancialresourcesforpolicing havearoleintheappointmentofseniorpoliceofficers.
Thesesixoptionsare:
ForceForceForceForce----levelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilitylevelaccountabilityOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOption1.Adirectlyelectedpolicecommissioner.Thisprovidesaclearanddirectmeansofholdingchiefconstablestoaccount,whichshouldhelpdrivethroughchangeandperformanceimprovement.However,holdingthepolicetoaccountattheforcelevelwouldstillleavedecision-makingatalevelremotefromlocalcircumstances.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority.Thismodelpreventspowerfrombecomingconcentratedinthehandsofonepersonbutsuffersfromlessvisibilityandremainsremotefromlocalneeds.SubSubSubSub----forcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountability
Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Option3.Givelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicing.Thismodelwouldseecouncilsperformtherolescurrentlycarriedoutbypoliceauthorities.Councilleaderswouldsetbudgetsandprioritiesandappointlocalpolicecommanders.Thiswouldimprovedemocraticaccountability,deliverlocalresponsivenessandenablepolicingandcommunitysafetytobeeffectivelyjoined-up.Butitisaradicalstepthatwouldrequiremajororganisationalchangeandhavesignificantimplicationsfornationalpolicestructures.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Option4.Givelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicing.Councilswouldapprovelocalpolicingstrategiesandretainthepolicepreceptelementofthecounciltaxenablingthemtopurchaseservicesfromthelocalpolice.Councilscouldalsobeconsultedontheappointmentofpolicecommanders.Thiswoulddelivergreaterlocalresponsivenessandjoined-upservicesbutmayriskcreatingconfusedlinesofaccountabilitybetweentheforceandBasicCommandUnit.Thisoptioncouldbecombinedwithreformingtherole,andimprovingtheeffectiveness,ofpoliceauthorities.Option5.ThemayoralmoOption5.ThemayoralmoOption5.ThemayoralmoOption5.Themayoralmodel.del.del.del.GovernmentcouldcombinepolicereformwithamovetorolloutdirectlyelectedmayorsacrossEngland.MayorscouldbegivensimilarpowerstothoseidentifiedinOptions3and4,butwouldprovideamuchclearerandmoreaccountablelocalvoicetosetpolicepriorities.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Option6.Alocalpoliceboard.Thiswouldbuildonexistingcrimeanddisorderreduction
partnershipsbutbringaboutgreaterpublicinvolvementthroughdirectelections.
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However,itwouldseparatepolicingfromlocalgovernmentandwouldbetoothlesswithoutitsownresources.4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.StrategyforreformThesedifferentoptionseachhavetheirownmeritsandbringtheirownchallenges.
Thereisnoperfectsystemofpoliceaccountability.Twoconsiderationsinformourstrategyfordeliveringchange.First,theevidencebaseontherelationshipbetweenthedifferentreformoptionsandperformanceisthin,principallybecausetheyhavenotbeentestedintherealworld.Ministersarethereforewaryofmajorreformwhensuchchangefeelslikealeapinthedark.Second,therearesignificantregionalvariationswhichmeanthataonesizefitsallmodelisinappropriate.ForthesereasonswerecommendthattheGovernmentshouldfirstpilotbespokemodelsofpoliceaccountabilityindifferentareas.
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1.1.1.1.ThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottleThegenieisoutofthebottlePoliceaccountabilityisbackonthepoliticalagenda.InitsDraftLegislativeProgrammetheGovernmenthaspledgedtobringforwardanewPoliceReformBillthat,amongotherthings,willcreateaclearandpowerfulpublicvoicein[police]decision-making
throughdirectlyelectedrepresentatives(OfficeoftheLeaderoftheHouseofCommons2008:19).ThisrepresentsasignificantchangeinGovernmentpolicytowardspolicegovernance.UntilnowtheLabourGovernmenthasopposedplanstoallowdirectlyelectedrepresentativestooverseelocalpolicing,arguingthattheyriskpoliticisingpoliceworkandcouldleadtopolicingbeinginfluencedbycrudepopulistcalculations.WiththisnewpledgetheGovernmenthasconcededtwoimportantpoints:
Thatthereisalocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing Thatlocalpeopleshouldhavemuchmoredirectdemocraticcontroloverthepolicyandprioritiesofthepoliceserviceintheirarea.
TheGovernmentspledgecouldbeinterpretedinanumberofdifferentwaysandwedonotyetknowwhatproposalswillemergeintheforthcomingpolicingGreenPaper.However,byfavouringdirectelection,theGovernmenthasletthedemocraticgenieoutofthebottleanditwillbeveryhardforpoliticiansofanypartytoputitbackinagain.ThisconcernwiththeaccountabilityofthepoliceservicehasemergedfromagrowingconcernthatpolicinginBritainhasbecomefartooremotefromtheneedsandprioritiesoflocalcommunities.BritishpoliticianshavelonglookedenviouslyacrosstheAtlantic
attheabilityofpowerfullocalmayors,likeNewYorksRudyGuiliani,torespondeffectivelytopublicconcernaboutcrimeandbringaboutimpressivereductionsincrimeratesthroughinnovativeactionatthelocallevel.OneofDavidCameronsearliestinitiativesasConservativeleaderwastosetupataskforceonpolicereform,headedbytheConservativeMPNickHerbert.Amongotherthings,thetaskforcereportcalledfortheintroductionofdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerstooverseethestrategyoflocalpoliceforcesandmoreeffectivelyholdchiefconstablestoaccount.TheGovernmentitselfhasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedwiththequestionofpolice
reform.In2007,theformerHomeSecretary,JohnReid,commissionedHerMajestysChiefInspectorofConstabulary,SirRonnieFlanagan,toconductanindependentreviewofpolicing.Oneoftheaimsofthereviewwastoexplorehowlocalaccountabilitycouldbeenhanced.Flanaganreportedearlierthisyearand,withoutfavouringanyparticularoption,setoutanumberofpossiblereforms,rangingfromestablishingpolicecommissionersatforcelevelthroughtooptionsdesignedtogiveagreaterroletolocalauthorities.ThispaperisintendedtocontributetothedebateleadinguptothepublicationoftheGovernmentsgreenpaper.WhiletheGovernmenthasmadeitclearitintendstoconsultontheproposals,itappearsthatsomeformofdirectelectionatthepoliceforcelevelisitsfavouredoption.Wearguethatwhiletherearebenefitstobegainedfromdirectelectionattheforcelevel,alternativeandadditionaloptionsmustbeconsideredtoo.
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Mostimportantlytheroleoflocalgovernmentinholdingthepolicetoaccountshouldberevisited.WewelcometheGovernmentsdecisiontopublishanearlydraftoftheQueensSpeech.Wehopeitwillnowstickwiththespiritofthisprocessandgiveseriousconsiderationto
allofthedifferentoptionsavailableforimprovingpoliceaccountability.Thispapercomesinthreeparts:
1. Itarguesthatthereisanaccountabilitydeficitinpolicing,especiallyatthelocallevel,andshowsthatthisisanimportantfactorunderminingpoliceperformanceandresponsiveness.
2. Itsetsouttwowaysofimprovingpoliceperformanceandresponsiveness.First,therearechangesatthelevelofworkforcestructureandorganisationalculturetodelivermorecitizen-focusedpolicing.Second,therearechangestopolicegovernanceatthelocalleveltodelivergreateraccountability.Thepaperidentifiessixoptionsforincreasinglocal
accountabilityandsetsoutthepotentialbenefitsanddrawbacksofeach.3. Itbrieflysetsoutastrategyforachievingreforminthisareaand
recommendsthattheGovernmentfirstpilotsbespokemodelsofpoliceaccountabilityindifferentpartsofthecountry,ratherthanproceedingwithasinglenation-wideapproach.
ThispaperisthesecondoutputfromtheipprswiderprojectontheFutureofPolicing.ThefirstpaperfromthisprojectwaspublishedinFebruary2008andlookedatthemodernisationofthepoliceworkforce(seeTheNewBillbyTomGash).Thefinalreportfromtheprojectwillbepublishedlaterthisyearandwilladdressthewiderchallengeofhowtodeliverpolicereform.
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2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.Theproblem2.TheproblemTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitTheaccountabilitydeficitAllpublicorganisationsneedtobeheldtoaccountforthewaysinwhichtheycarryouttheirdutiesonourbehalf.Accountabilityensuresthatorganisationsperformtoahigh
standardandareresponsivetotheneedsofthepublictheyserve.ThepoliceserviceinEnglandandWalessuffersfromanaccountabilitydeficit.Atthenationallevelfragmentedgovernancemeansthatnoactorinthesystemhasthepowertoeffectivelyincentiviseperformanceimprovementordrivethroughchangeandreform.RecentattemptsbytheGovernmenttoincreasecontrolfromthecentrethroughtargetsettingandtop-downinitiativeshavehadlimitedsuccessandhavemadepolicingevenlessresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Atthelocallevelthereisnorealdemocraticaccountability:policeauthoritiesareweak,unaccountableandremote,whileelectedlocalgovernmenthasnoeffectivesayoverlocalpolicingpriorities.Inthissectionwearguethat:
thepoliceservicefacestwoimportantchallenges:thechallengeofimprovingits
performanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbecomingmoreresponsivetotheordinarycitizen
thereareanumberoffactorsbehindpoorperformanceandalackofresponsiveness,includingissuesaroundworkforcemodernisationandorganisationalculture,butthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingplaysanimportantroleinbothandthereforeneedstobeaddressed.
TheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeTheperformancechallengeAtfirstglance,itmightbereasonabletoaskwhypolicereformisrequiredatall.Overall
crime,asmeasuredbytheBritishCrimeSurvey,hasfallenby42percentsince1997andfearofcrimehasfallensignificantlyoverthesameperiod(Gash2008).However,mostoftherecentfallincrimecannotbeattributedtochangesinpolicing.MostcriminologistsandtheGovernmentsownStrategyUnitbelievethatthebulkofthefallinso-calledvolumecrimes(burglary,theftandnon-seriousviolentcrime)hasbeenduetoBritainsbuoyanteconomyinrecentyears,ratherthantheimpactofpolicework(Solomonetal2007,Pearce2007).Thatisnottosuggestthatthepolicedonothaveanimpactoncrimelevels,buttopointoutthatweneedtogobeyondheadlinecrimefigurestoassesspoliceperformance.
So,howwellarethepoliceperforming?Itisdifficulttofindholisticmeasuresofpoliceperformance,simplybecauseofthediverserangeoffunctionsthepoliceareexpectedtoperform.However,keycrimereductionindicatorsappeartoindicatethatperformancehaseitherremainedflatordecreasedinrecentyears.Detectionrates,forexample,fellbetween1998and2002andareonlyrecentlyapproaching1998levels,witharound24percentofrecordedcrimesbeingclearedupin2007comparedto29percentin1998/99(Walkeretal2006).Performanceonthisindicatorisalsopatchyacrossthecountry,withdetectionratesvaryingtoahighdegreebetweendifferentpoliceforces.Forinstance,detectionratesforviolenceagainstthepersonvaryfromjust26percentinonepoliceforceto59percentinanother(ibid).Detectionsperofficerarethesametodayastheywerein2001/02,buteachpolicedetectionin2007costthepublicpursemoreinrealtermsthanitdidin2000(Walkeret
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al2007).Oneexplanationforthisriseindetectioncostsmaybethatmuchoftheincreasedinvestmentinrecentyearshasgoneintoreassurancepolicing(theneighbourhoodpolicingprogramme),whichsomewithinthepoliceservicearguehasmoreimpactonthefearofcrimethanitdoesoncatchingcriminals.
Whiletherehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofoffencesbroughttojustice(OBTJ),thishasnotbeenduetomorecrimesbeingclearedupandmoreoffendersbeingbroughtbeforethecourts.Rather,ithasbeenaconsequenceoftheintroductionofnewformsofdiscretionarypunishment,suchasPenaltyNoticesforDisorderandonthespotfines(Solomonetal2007,Gash2008).Incomparativeterms,officerperformancelookspoor:whereaspoliceofficersintheUSAmakeanaverageof21arrestsperyear,policeofficersinEnglandandWalesmakejustnine(LovedayandMcClory2007).So,despiteheadlinefallsincrimelevels,keymeasuresofpoliceperformancehavenot
improvedoverthelastdecade.Thisisdespiterecordincreasesinpublicspendingonthepoliceandpoliceofficernumbersstandingatanalltimehigh:spendingonthepolicehasincreasedby21percentinrealtermssince1997andmostofthismoneyhasbeenspentonmorepoliceofficers(up11percentorby14,000officersbetween1997and2007)(Solomonetal2007).Ifthepolicearetoreducecrimefurtherintheyearsaheadtheywillhavetodosoinaclimateofmuchtighterpublicspendingandmakebetteruseofthesamepotofresources.Theywill,inshort,havetodothingsdifferently.TheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeTheresponsivenesschallengeOpinionsurveysshowthatpublicsatisfactionwiththepoliceservicehasfallensincethe1980s,linkedtoaperceptionthatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetotheviewsandprioritiesoflocalcommunities.Weshouldnotethatthesefiguresprecedetherecentrolloutofthenewneighbourhoodpolicingteams,whoaretaskedwith,amongotherthings,raisingpublicconfidence.Theproportionofpeopleexpressingconfidenceinthepolice,althoughstillrelativelyhigh,fellfromover90percentin1982to75percentin2001/02(Rogers2004).Theproportionsayingthatthepolicedoagoodorexcellentjobfellfrom64percentin1996tojust48percentin2004/05(Allenetal2006).Satisfactionwiththepoliceisalsonegativelyrelatedtopersonalexperience.In2004/05,thosepeoplewhohadcontactwiththeirlocalpolicewithinthepreviousyearratedthemmorenegativelythanthosewhohadnothadcontact(51percentofthose
whohadnocontactratedthemtobegoodorexcellent,comparedtojust45percentofthosewithrecentcontact).Thisisnotsimplybecauseoffendersratethepolicenegatively.Peoplewhohavebeenvictimsofcrimeinthelastyearratethepolicelowerthanthosewhohavenotbeenavictimofcrimeinthelastyear(41percentofvictimsratedthemgoodorexcellentcomparedto52percentofnon-victims)(Herbert2007).Thesefindingscontrastwiththosefromotherpublicservices:forexample,directusersofschoolsandhospitalstendtoratethoseserviceshigherthanthepublicasawhole.Moreprolongedcontactwiththepoliceleadstomorenegativeattitudes:accordingtoone2005survey,while89percentofpeoplesaytheyaresatisfiedwithinitialcontact,only58percentsaytheyaresatisfiedwithfollowupcontact(Herbert2007).
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Decliningsatisfactionwiththepoliceisrelatedtoaperceiveddeclineintraditionalcommunitypolicingandthelossofbobbiesonthebeat.Whenaskedwhatthepoliceshoulddomoreof,59percentsaymorefootpatrols,followedby36percentsayingcommunitypolicing.Only26percentsaytheywantmorepatrolsbycarandjust19percentsaymorecrimedetection(FitzGeraldetal2002).A2007ICMpollfoundthat73
percentofthepublicfeltthatthepolicedonotspendenoughtimeoutonthebeat(Herbert2007).Relatedtothisisafallinsustainedcontactwithindividualofficers.Thesamesurveyfoundthat73percentofthepublicdidnotknowanyofthepoliceofficersintheirlocalareaandafurther13percentdidnotknowmany(ibid).RaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessRaisingperformanceandincreasingresponsivenessWehavesetouttwosignificantchallengesforthepoliceservice:thechallengeofraisingpoliceperformanceinreducingcrimeandthechallengeofbeingresponsivetotheneedsofthecitizen.Inwhatfollowswearguethat,whileitisbynomeansamagicbullet,reducingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitiscriticaltotacklingbothofthesechallenges.
PerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityPerformanceandaccountabilityThereareanumberofwaystoenhancepoliceperformanceandthesearethesubjectofipprswiderreportonpolicereform,tobepublishedlaterintheyear.Thesemeasuresinclude:
modernisingthepoliceworkforce improvinginformationsystemsandprocesses reformingorganisationalstructurestoenhancecapacityatdifferentlevels changingorganisationalculture.
However,inadditiontothesemeasures,raisingperformancewillrequiresignificantchangesinthewaythepoliceserviceisgoverned,andthewaysinwhichthepoliceareheldtoaccount.Thisisbecauseeffectiveformsofaccountabilitycandriveupperformancebycreatingthenecessarypressurestoimprove.Undercurrentarrangements,however,thepolicearenoteffectivelyheldtoaccountateitherthelocalornationallevel.EnglandandWalescurrentlyhave43policeforces,eachheadedbyachiefconstable.Theseniormanagementofeachpoliceforceismadeupofachiefconstableandachiefofficerteamandisresponsiblefor:
settingtheforcebudget drawingupandimplementingthelocalpolicingplan monitoringandensuringcompliancewithnationalperformancetargets.
Underwhatisknownasthetripartitesystemofpolicegovernance,whichwasintroducedwiththe1964PoliceAct,achiefconstableisaccountablebothtolocalpoliceauthoritiesandtheHomeSecretary.However,neitheroftheselinesofaccountabilityfunctionseffectively.Welookatbothinturn.NationalaccountabilityandperformanceOnthefaceofitthepoweroftheHomeSecretarytoholdthepolicetoaccounthasincreasedsignificantlyinrecentyears.Indeedmanycommentatorshaveexpressed
concernaboutthedegreetowhichtheHomeOfficehasbecomedirectlyinvolvedinthedeliveryofpolicingatthelocallevel(Flanagan2008).However,whilethereisnodoubt
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thatthepowerofthecentrehasgrowninrecentyears,itisfarfromclearthatthishasdeliveredthemosteffectiveformofaccountability.TheHomeSecretaryhasthepowertocallonapoliceauthoritytosuspendorretireachiefconstableifheorshebelievesthechiefconstableisnotperformingdutiestothe
requiredstandard,butthispowerhasrarelybeenused.ItwasusedtwicebytheformerHomeSecretary,DavidBlunkett,inthecasesofPaulWhitehouseofSussexPoliceandDavidWestwoodofHumbersidePolice,butonlyfollowinghigh-profileinvestigationsintospecificcrimesthatuncoveredseriouspolicingfailures.Moreover,theHomeSecretarystillhastogettheagreementofthepoliceauthoritytoact.IntheWestwoodcase,HumbersidePoliceAuthorityinitiallyresistedtheHomeSecretaryscallforittosuspendtheChiefConstable,sothematterendedupincourt(thejudgeultimatelysidedwithBlunkett).Itis,perhaps,forthisreasonthattheGovernmentisrumouredtobeexploringgivingtheHomeSecretarythepowertodirectlydischargechiefconstables(TheTimes,25May2008).Reflectingonthetripartiterelationship,Blunkettquipped:theChiefConstablegetsallthepower,thePoliceAuthoritygetsallthemoneyandthe
HomeSecretarygetsalltheblame(BBCNewsOnline,2July2004).Intheabsenceofsuchhardlevers,centralGovernment,andparticularlytheLabourGovernmentsince1997,hassoughttoexercisegreaternationalcontrolthroughaperformancemanagementsystembasedongovernmenttargets.Whilethereisnodoubtthattheuseoftargetshasimprovedpoliceperformanceinsomeareas,andthatpoliceforceshavebecomemoreaccountabletoWhitehallasaresultoftheirintroduction,itisneverthelessincreasinglyclearthatthissystemprovidesacrudeandincreasinglyineffectivewayofmanagingpoliceperformance:
Centrallyimposedperformancetargetsareinflexibletochangingdemandsandneedsatalocallevel.Inarecentsurvey,71percentofBasicCommandUnit(BCU)commanderssaidthatnationalreportingrequirementswerehavinganegativeimpactonthequalityofpolicingintheirarea(LovedayandMcClory2007).NationaltargetsthatchangeinresponsetopoliticalprioritiesinWhitehallleavepoliceonthegroundunabletoremainfocusedonprioritiessetatthelocallevel.Ahigh41percentofBCUcommandersdisagreedwiththestatementthatstafffeelabletochallengethewaythingsaredone,showinghowinflexiblethecurrentsystemisfelttobe(ibid:19).OneBCUcommandertoldipprhowthebiggestrecentpublicconcerninhisareawasthenumberofyoungchildrendrivingmopedsinarecklessandanti-socialmanner.Despitethis,hefacedcounter-veilingpressurefromforceheadquarterstofocusonthosecrimesforwhichtherewerenationalperformancetargets.Thisisthe
familiarphenomenonofonlywhatgetsmeasuredgetsdone.
Assessingpoliceperformancebyaverynarrowlydefinedsetofcrimereductionoutputshascreatedperverseincentivesontheground.Forexample,whiletheGovernmenthasmetitstargettoincreasethenumberofoffencesbroughttojustice,thishasbeenachievedlargelybyincreasingthenumberofpeoplethathavebeencautionedforrelativelyminoroffencesandbecausethepolicehavemadeuseofnewsummarypowerstopunishpeopleonthespot,againforrelativelyminormatters(Solomonetal2007).Ratherthanfocusingonthemostharmfulcrimes,thepolicehavetargetedyouthsforpettyoffencessimplytomeettheirperformancetargets,effectivelypickingthelowhangingfruit
insteadoftacklingthecrimesthatreallymattertopeople.
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Noneofthismeansthatnationalaccountabilityinitselfisundesirableonthecontrary,insomeareasitiscrucial.Forinstance,therewillalwaysbetheneedforsomecentralgovernmenttargetstoensurethatminimumfloorstandardsaremet.Beyondtargetsthereisaclearroleformuchgreaternationalcoordinationwhenitcomestotacklingseriousandorganisedcrimeandcounter-terrorism.Anotherexamplewouldbeinthe
areaofdevelopingstandardinformationsystemsandprocessesacrossthepoliceservice.Currentlyforcestendtohavetheirowndatabasesanddeveloptheirowntechnologicalsolutions,aproblemthatleadstopoorinformationsharingandduplicationofresources.Workforcemodernisationisalsoanareathatwouldbenefitfrombeingdrivennationally.Intheseimportantareasdevelopingnation-widesolutionsrequiresnationalleadershipand,therefore,greaternationalpoliticalaccountability.WheretheGovernmenthasgonewrongisinseekingtoholdpoliceforcestoaccountnationallyforlocalcommunitypolicingmatters,whichfromthepointofviewofresponsivenessarebetterdesignedandheldaccountableatthelocallevel.
LocalaccountabilityandperformanceIfnationalaccountabilityisconfusedandineffective,localaccountabilityisalmostnon-existent.Policeauthorities,madeupoflocalcouncillors,magistratesandotherappointedfigures,lackrealpoweroverpolicechiefs.Whiletheyhavethepowertoappointanddischargeachiefconstable,theycanonlydosowiththeapprovaloftheHomeSecretary.Inreality,veryfewchiefconstableshaveeverbeendischargedbytheirpoliceauthoritiesforunsatisfactoryperformance.Policeauthoritiesalsohaveverylittleimpactonpolicingprioritiesintheirarea.Undertheill-defineddoctrineofoperationalindependence(craftedpreciselytokeepthepolicefreefrompoliticalcontrol)policeauthoritiesmainlyleavestrategicpolicingdecisionsandthedevelopmentoflocalplansandbudgetstotheirchiefconstables.Policeauthoritiesprovideforaveryweaklinkbetweenthepoliceandlocalcommunities.Theyarenotdirectlyelected,sotheirabilitytoincreasepartofthelocalcounciltaxthroughthepolicingpreceptraisesseriouslegitimacyquestions.Moreover,theindirectlyelectedmembersofpoliceauthoritiesareoftennotleadingmembersofthelocalauthoritiesthatappointthemandtheycovergeographicallydispersedareas,whichmeanstheyareremotefromtheviewsoflocalresidents(LovedayandMcClory2007).Asfarasthepublicisconcernedtheyarebarelyvisible.AccordingtofocusgroupscarriedoutfortheHomeOfficein2003,hardlyanyparticipatingmembersofthepublichadheardofpoliceauthoritiesorwereawareoftheroletheyplayedin
theoreticallyholdingthepolicetoaccount(Docking2003).So,wehaveanaccountabilitydeficitatboththenationalandlocallevels,makingitdifficulttodrivechangeandincentiviseperformanceimprovementthroughthesystem.Atthelocallevel,accountabilityisweakbecausepoliceauthoritiesareremoteandlacklegitimacy.Atthenationallevel,theHomeOfficehassoughttoincreaseaccountabilitythroughaperformancemanagementsystemthathasimpededeffectivepolicing.Worryingly,thereisaviciouscycleatplay.IntheabsenceofanyeffectivelocalaccountabilityitisHomeOfficeministerswhoareheldresponsibleforthequalityofpolicingatboththenationalandlocallevel.Knowingtheywillbeblamedwhenthings
gowrong,ministersareencouragedtotrytoenhancepoliceperformanceusingleversliketarget-setting,whichaswehaveseenhavelimited,andevenperverse,impactson
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policing.Butbyintervening,ministersreinforcetheviewthattheyare,indeed,responsibleforallaspectsofpolicing,whichlocksthemintoaviciouscycleinwhichtheyhavetotrytomanagelocalpoliceperformancecentrally.Breakingthiscycleiscrucialtoimprovingpolicing,andstrengtheninglocalaccountabilityiscriticaltothat.
ResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityResponsivenessandaccountabilityThereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthewidelysharedviewthatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetothecitizeninthewaytheygoabouttheirwork.ChangingpolicerolesTherewereanumberofchangestopolicerolesandfunctionsinthesecondhalfofthe20thcentury,eachofwhichreducedtheday-to-daycontactbetweenthepoliceandthepublic:
Therewasareducedemphasisoncrimepreventionbystreetpatrol(bobbiesonthebeat)andagreateremphasisoncatchingcriminalsbyresponding(usuallybycar)tocallsfromthepublic.In1967,policeforcesintroducedanewsystemofUnitBeatPolicing,whichessentiallytookofficersoffwalkingpatrolsandputthemintovehicles.Thesecoveredwiderareasandmeanttheycouldrespondmorerapidlytourgentincidentsasandwhentheyoccurred.However,thisnewfirebrigadeservicemeantthatthepolicehadmuchlessday-to-daycontactwiththegeneralpublicandmeantthatthereassuringfigureoftheBritishbobbyonregularfootpatrolwaslost.WeshouldnotethattherecentintroductionofneighbourhoodpolicingbytheGovernmentismeantspecificallytorestorethiskindofDixonofDockGreenpolicing.
Therewasagreaterandnecessaryemphasisondetectivework,whichreinforcedtheshiftawayfromdeterrence-orientatedfootpatrols.Agrowing
numberofofficerswentintoCriminalInvestigationDepartments(CID),alongsideanumberofotherspecialistcrimedetectionunits,suchasseriouscrimesquadsanddrugssquads(Maguire2003).
Theprimaryobjectiveofpolicingshiftedtofightingcrime,whichreducedtheamountoftimepolicededicatedtotheirbroaderservicefunction.Theswitchfromfoottomotorisedpatrolswaspartlyresponsibleforthisconstableswerenolongerfamiliarfigureswalkingthestreets,abletohelpcitizenswithgeneralenquiries.
Risingpublicexpectations
Thepolicefacethechallengeofrisingpublicexpectations,asdoallpublicservices.Deferencetoauthorityhasdeclinedandtrustinallpublicinstitutions,includingthepolice,hasfallen.Inaddition,weareamuchmoreaffluentsocietyinwhichcitizensexpecthighstandardsasconsumersofgoodsandservices,includingthoseprovidedbythestate.Inordertomeetpublicexpectations,publicservicescannotstandstill:evenifthequalityoftheservicesuppliedbythepolicehadremainedthesameoverthelast40years,thepolicewouldhaveneededtouptheirgame.LackofacustomercareculturePublicsatisfactionwiththepoliceamongwitnessesandvictimsislowerthanamongthegeneralpublic,indicatingthatdirectcontactwiththepoliceleadstoincreasingly
negativeviewsoftheirperformance.Thisislikelytobeduetoalackofacustomercarecultureinthepoliceforce,itselfrootedinalackofworkforcemodernisation(seeGash
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2008).TheBritishCrimeSurveyhasfoundthatnearlyafifthofadultscouldrecallbeingreallyannoyedwithapoliceofficerinthelastfiveyears,and43percentofthosesaidthiswasduetotheofficersmanner(Docking2003).FocusgroupsconductedfortheHomeOfficehighlightedmanyinstancesofpoliceofficersbeingrudeorabruptoraskingwhatweredeemedtobeunnecessaryquestions(ibid).
AmorediversepopulationSurveysandfocusgroupscontinuetoshowthatpeoplefromminorityethniccommunitiesbelievethatthepolicediscriminateagainstandstereotypepeoplefromblackandminorityethnic(BME)groups.Anumberofindependentinquirieshaveraisedseriousconcernsaboutthetreatmentofminoritycommunitiesbythepolice.ThemostprominentrecentinquirywastheMacPhersonReportintothemurderoftheblackteenagerStephenLawrence,whichconcludedthattheMetropolitanPoliceServicewasinstitutionallyracist.Sincethentherehavebeenimprovementsacrossthecountry:hatecrimehasreceivedamuchgreaterpriority(racistcrimeinLondonhasbeencutsignificantly,forexample)andtherehasbeenasustainedefforttorecruitmorepolice
officersfromBMEgroups.Thepoliceneedtocontinuethisworkandensurethattheyareequallyresponsivetotheconcernsofdifferentcommunities.ThepolicehavebecomedecreasinglyaccountabletolocalcommunitiesOnefinalandsignificantreasonforthissensethatthepolicehavebecomelessresponsivetolocalcommunities,isthelocalaccountabilitydeficit.Originally,Britainspoliceservicewashighlydecentralised:madeupofhundredsofsmallpoliceforcesaccountabletolocalauthoritiesthroughtheirelectedwatchcommittees.However,overthecourseofthe19thand20thcenturies,nationalgovernmentintroducedanumberofchangesthatcutthelinksbetweenelectedlocalgovernmentandthepolice:
Policingwasnotmadeastatutorydutyoflocalgovernmentwhencountycouncilswereestablishedin1888
Forcesincreasinglyreceivedtheirfundingdirectlyfromcentralgovernment Chiefconstablesweredeclaredtobeaccountabletothelawratherthanlocal
politicians
In1964thenewtripartitesystemofpolicegovernancewassetup,ongroundsofreducingpolicecorruption.
(Williams2003)Underthetripartitesystem,43policeforceswereestablished(cutfromtheprevious
106),withchiefconstablesbeingaccountabletolargerpoliceauthoritiesandtheHomeOffice.After1964,thepowerofchiefconstablestocontrolforcefinanceswasincreasedand,morerecently,theestablishmentofcentralperformancetargetshaseffectivelymadechiefconstablesmoreaccountabletotheHomeOfficethantotheirlocalpoliceauthorities(LovedayandMcClory2007).Andaswehaveseen,policeauthorities,ascurrentlyconstituted,donotprovideaneffectivelinktothepublic.Underthissystemthereisnoformalstructurethroughwhichlocalcommunitiescansettheprioritiesforthelocalpolicingthatthey,toasignificantextent,payfor.Inthenextsectionwesetoutsomeofthewayswemightchangethis.
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3.Optionsforreform3.Optionsforreform3.Optionsforreform3.OptionsforreformWehavearguedthatthepolicearecurrentlyunder-performingonanumberofkeycrime-reductionindicatorsandthattheyareinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.Thereareanumberoffactorslyingbehindthesechallenges,butwe
havearguedthattheaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingisanimportantdeterminantofboth.Therelationshipbetweenthecentreandthepoliceiscurrentlydysfunctionalandrequiresreform.Therelationshipbetweenlocalpoliceforcesandthecommunitiestheyserveisalsobrokenanditistimetointroducenewwaysofholdingthepolicetoaccountlocally.Itisthislatterchallengewithwhichweareconcernedhere(wewillreturntotheissueofnationalaccountabilityandleadershipinourfinalreport).Inthissectionwesetoutanumberofoptionsforreformthatwouldputthecitizen,onceagain,attheheartofpolicing.Theseoptionsfallundertwoverygeneralheadings:
Changestothewaypolicingisdoneday-to-daythatwouldmaketheservicemoreresponsivetoandfocusedontheconcernsofthecitizen.
Changestodecision-makingstructuresthatwouldmakethepolicemoreaccountabletolocalcommunitiesinthesettingofstrategicpriorities.
CitizenCitizenCitizenCitizen----focusedpolicingfocusedpolicingfocusedpolicingfocusedpolicingThereareanumberofreformsthatcouldbeundertakentotacklepublicdissatisfactionwithpoliceperformanceandmakepolicingmorecitizen-focusedthatdonotrequirechangestotheformalproceduresforholdingthepolicetoaccount.Weoutlinethesebelow.However,itisourbeliefthatthesereforms,tobetrulyeffective,wouldneedtobeaccompaniedbywiderreformstopolicegovernance.Weturntothewayswemightdothatinthefinalsectionofthispaper.
Developmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,interDevelopmentofcustomercare,inter----personalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskpersonalandcommunicationskillsillsillsillsPublicconfidenceinthepoliceisdrivenlargelybycontactandcommunicationwithitsoffices.So,forexample,93percentofwitnessestreatedinacourteousmanneraresatisfiedwiththepolice,comparedto27percentforthosewhoarenottreatedinsuchamanner(Flanagan2008).Improvingcustomercarerequiresextensiveworkforcemodernisation.Muchgreaterspecialisationofroleswithinthepoliceserviceisadvocatedelsewherebyippr.Thiswouldallowconstableswhoenjoytheinterfacewiththepublictospecialiseinoutwardfacingroles.Morecivilianspecialistscouldalsobeemployedtocarryouttasks,suchasvictimsupport,anddealingwithreportsfromthepublic(Gash2008).Inevitably,promotingacustomercareculturethroughoutthepoliceservicewillrequireimprovedtrainingforconstablesmoregenerallyandthepromotionofawidercultureofprofessionaldevelopmentthroughoutthepoliceservice,sothatmanagersareequippedtopromotethesekindsofskillsamongtheirofficers(ibid).
LesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkLesstimespentonpaperworkHomeOfficeresearchshowsthat,onaverage,officersspendalmostasmuchtimeinthestationasoutofitandlessthanafifthoftheirtimeonthebeat.Fourteenpercentoftheirtimeisspentonpatrol,while19percentisspentonpaperwork.InvestmentinITsystemsandnewhardware,suchasmobilehandsets(asrecentlyannouncedbytheGovernment),plusgreateruseofcivilianstafftocarryoutadministrativetasksandareductioninsomereportingrequirements,couldfreeupmoretimetobespentonthebeat.Ofcourse,anyreductionsinunnecessarypaperworkneedtobecarefullyweighed
upagainsttheneedtorecordmonitoringinformation:forexample,thereremain
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concernsaboutthedisproportionateuseofstopandsearchagainstpeoplefromminoritygroups(Flanagan2008).NeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicingNeighbourhoodpolicinghasnowbeenrolledoutacrossEnglandandWalesanditsmain
aimistoputmorebobbiesonthebeat.Itinvolvesvisiblefootpatrols,communityengagementandaproblem-solvingapproachtocrimeanddisorder,withofficersseekingtopreventcrimeslocallybyworkinginpartnershipwithlocalpeopleandotheragencies.Whileitistooearlytoassessthesuccessofthisnewapproachhere,ithasbeenfoundtodeliverimpressiveresultsinanumberofothercontexts.InChicago,asimilarcommunitypolicingapproachhasresultedinsignificantincreasesinpublicsatisfaction,reducedcrimerates(fasterthantheUSnationalaverage)andreducedfearofcrime(SkoganandSteiner2004).InBritain,reassurancepolicingalongtheselineswasfoundinanumberofpilotareastoleadtoreducedfearofcrime,higherlevelsofpublicsatisfaction,higherlevelsofofficerfamiliarityandreducedperceptionsofanti-socialbehaviour(Tuffinetal2006).
Aswellasmorevisiblelocalfootpatrols,neighbourhoodpolicinginvolvesnewwaysofempoweringthepublictoholdthepolicetoaccount.Forexample,aspartofthisnewprogramme,theGovernmenthaslaunchedaNationalPolicingPledgewhichprovideseveryareawithasetofstandardstheycanexpectandthatcanbeusedtoscrutinizetheirlocalpolicingteam.Moreover,therehasbeenthelaunchofSaferNeighbourhoodPanelstoensurethatlocalpeopleareconsultedonpolicingprioritiesandlocalresidentscanusethenewCommunityCallforActiontotriggeractiononissueslikeanti-socialbehaviour.Thepriorityforforcesshouldbetoembedneighbourhoodpolicingand,inparticular,topreventcompetingprioritiescorrodingitovertime.InformationInformationInformationInformationEnsuringthatresidentshavestatisticalinformationoncrimelevelsshouldimprovetheanswerabilityoflocalforcesfortheirperformanceandmayhelpreducetheperceptiongapbetweenthefearofcrimeandactuallevelsofcrime(Flanagan2007,Duffyetal2008).Someforceshaveusednewtechnologytomapoutwherecrimehotspotsare,forexample,andthenewmayorofLondonBorisJohnsonhaspromisedtomakesuchcrimemapsavailabletothepublic.Toconcludethissectionwenotethatmanyoftheunderlyingcausesofdecliningsatisfactionwiththepolice(thelackofacustomercareculture,thedeclineoffoot
patrolsandademandformorecommunitypolicing)arerootedinworkforceandorganisationalculturequestions.Weargue,however,thatweareunlikelytowitnessafundamentalshiftinresponsivenessandperformanceunlessweaddressthefactthatpolicegovernanceisfragmentedandthatlocalaccountabilityisextremelyweak.Whilelinesofaccountabilityareweakandfragmented,stakeholderswillnotbeabletoholdchiefconstablestoaccountforperformance.Whileresourceallocationandstrategicpolicingdecisionscontinuetobemadeatforcelevel,alignedlargelytotargetssetinWhitehall,policingwillcontinuetoignorethespecificneedsoflocalneighbourhoodsandforce-levelprioritiesarelikelytotakeprecedenceovercommunitypolicingpriorities.Itisforthesereasonsthatchangestostrategicgovernanceare
requiredandthatthelocalaccountabilitydeficitmustbetackled.
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IncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityIncreasinglocalaccountabilityInthissectionweexploresixdifferentoptionsforenhancingtheaccountabilityofthepoliceserviceatthelocallevel.Thesecanbedistinguishedbetweenthosebringinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,andthosewhichenhanceaccountabilityatthelevelofthebasiccommandunit,themainoperatingunitforthedeliveryofcommunity
policing.Theimportantissueofneighbourhoodaccountabilityhasbeenbrieflyexploredabove(weshallsaymoreaboutthisinourfinalreport).Inthispaperwedonotargueinfavourofonesingleoptionforincreasingtheaccountabilityofthepolicetolocalpeoplebutrathersetoutthebenefitsandchallengesthatcomewitheach.Weshouldnotethatwhetheranyofthesemodelscangenuinelyholdthepolicetoaccountdependsonthedegreetowhichtheyhavethepowertodothreethings:
Setpolicepriorities Controlallorpartofthepolicebudget Appointandappraisechiefpoliceofficersorlocalpolicecommanders.
IftheGovernmentistointroducenewelectedbodiestoholdthepolicetoaccountthenitmustensurethattheyaregiventhenecessarypowers,forinstanceoverresourcesandpriority-setting,tocarryoutthisfunction.Ifthecentredeprivesthemofthesepowersthenlocalaccountabilitywillbenofurtheradvanced.Weshouldnotethatsomecommentatorsareconcernedthatincreasinglocalaccountabilityriskspoliticisingpolicing(seeFlanagan2008).Inevitably,givingagreaterroletoelectedrepresentativesmeansthatpolicingprioritieswouldbesubjecttothepressuresofpoliticalcontestation.However,therealdangersofpoliticisationwouldcomeifelectedfiguresweretakingday-to-daypolicingdecisions,whichmaywellopen
policinguptocorruptionandpartisanbias.Onthecontraryunderalloftheoptionsbelowthedoctrineofoperationalindependenceisleftintact:thedirectlyorindirectlyelectedrepresentativessetthepolicyframework,whichisthenappliedonaday-to-dayoperationalbasisbythechiefconstable.ThisisnomorepoliticalthanthecurrentsystemunderwhichnationalprioritiesaresetbytheHomeOffice,alsoheadedbyelectedpoliticians.ForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityForcelevelaccountabilityOption1.AdirectlyelectedpolicecommissionerOnerelativelysimplewayofintroducinggreateraccountabilityofthepolicetolocalcommunitieswouldbetoelectapersonorbodytooverseetheirwork.Thishasthebenefitsofsimplicity:itwouldcreateasinglelineofaccountabilityfromthechiefconstablewhomakesthestrategicdecisionsfortheforcetoapersonorbodyelectedbylocalpeople.TheConservativePartysPoliceReformTaskforceconcludedthatthebestwayofdoingthiswouldbetoabolishpoliceauthoritiesandintroduceadirectly-electedpolicecommissionerforeveryforce.Thecommissionerwould:
Appointthechiefconstable Setpolicingpriorities Approvetheforcebudget.
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Thereareanumberofadvantagestothismodel.Thecombinationofaclearelectoralmandatewitheffectivepowerstoholdthechiefconstabletoaccountcouldsignificantlyhelptransformpoliceperformance.Moreover,givingthesepowerstoasinglevisibleleaderwouldensurethepublicknowwhoisresponsibleforpolicingandholdthemtoaccountaccordingly.Thismightalsohelptopersuadecentralgovernmenttoletgoof
itscurrentlyhighlyprescriptiveperformancemanagementframework.Thisisbecauseministersneedtobeassuredthatoncetheyletgo,thebuckwillstopwiththecommissionerandnotgetpassedbacktotheminWhitehall.TherearealreadysignsthattheintroductionofanelectedmayorinLondon,forexample,evenwithoutfullresponsibilitiesforsettingpolicepriorities,hasmeantthatresponsibilityfordealingwithissuessuchasrisingknifeandguncrimeisatleastseenassharedbetweenthemayor,theMetropolitanPoliceCommissionerandtheHomeOffice.Therearesomedrawbackstothecommissionermodel,althoughtheyarenot
insurmountable.First,weknowthatpoliceauthoritiesastheystandarebarelyvisibletothepublic.Democratisinganexistingtierofgovernanceofwhichmostofthepopulationareunawarerisksgeneratingverylowlevelsofinterestandparticipation.Second,theproblemwithintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevel,whichcoverslargeanddiverseareas,isthatthislevelistoodistantfromthedistinctiveneedsoflocalneighbourhoods.Weknowthatpeopletendtobemostconcernedaboutcrimeintheirownstreetorlocaltowncentre:votingforaforcecommissionerwouldnotenablelocalpeopletohaveasayonhowtheirimmediatelocalcommunityispoliced.Inotherwordsthisoptionmightstruggletodeliveramorelocallyresponsiveformofpolicing.Third,thereareconcernsaboutthenarrownessoftherolesfocus.Havingasinglecrime-focusedpositiondoesriskseparatingpolicingoutfromotherrelatedservices,inparticularthecommunitysafetyworkcarriedoutbylocalgovernmentbutalsothewiderworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystem.Thisrunsagainstthegrainofjoined-upservicedelivery,whichmostseniorpoliceofficersandpolicymakersbelieveisessentialtoreducingcrime(LovedayandMcClory2007).Havinganelectionsolelyfocusedoncrimealsoposestheriskofencouragingpopulistcampaigns,leadingtoanarmsraceinhardlinelawandorderinitiatives,cutofffromanymoreconsideredprocessofdeliberationastotheireffectiveness.Bycontrast,moreholisticelections(formayorsandcouncillors,forexample)mighthelptakesomeofthe
heatoutoflawandorderdebate.Thisisastrongargumentforenhancingtheroleoflocalgovernmentinpolicing,whichwediscussindetailbelow.Fourth,thereareconcernsthatthismodelwouldputtoomuchpowerinthehandsofoneperson.Awayofmitigatingthiswouldbetoensurethatanelectedpolicecommissionerweresubjecttoastrongdegreeofdemocraticscrutiny.Onemightthereforedecidetoretainapoliceauthoritytoscrutinisethecommissionersdecisions.Ifwedidthis,however,wewouldhavetoenhancethelegitimacyandqualityofpoliceauthoritymembership.TodothistheGovernmentcouldrequirethatthemembersontheauthorityshouldbetheleadersorthecommunitysafetyportfolioholdersfromthe
differentlocalauthoritieswithintheforcearea.Thiswouldensurethatthecommissionerwerescrutinisedbyseniorandpowerfullocalpoliticalfigures.Thisdeals
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withacommoncriticismofpoliceauthoritiesastheycurrentlystand,whichisthatmanyoftheirelectedmembersdonotcarrythepoliticalweightnordotheyhavetherightskillstoholdthepoliceeffectivelytoaccount.Option2.Adirectlyelectedpoliceauthority
Onewayofensuringthatpowerisnotconcentratedinthehandsofasingleindividualwouldbetoholddirectelectionsforthewholepoliceauthority.Directelectionwouldenhancethedemocraticaccountabilityofpoliceauthoritiesandprovideimpetusforimprovingpoliceperformance.Itmightalsoprovideforalessremoteformofaccountabilityifeachofthememberswereelectedforageographicalareawithintheforcesboundaries.Ifthishappened,localpeoplewouldhaveageographicallyrootedrepresentativewhowouldbetterunderstandspecificlocalneedsthanacommissionerfortheentireforce.However,afullyelectedpoliceauthoritybringswithititsownproblems.Thismodelprovidesformuchlessaccountabilitythanthepolicecommissionermodelbecausethe
authoritysmemberswouldinevitablybelessvisibletothepublic.Indeedelectingthewholepoliceauthoritymaysimplyservetoconfusethepublicoverwhoisincharge.Moreover,whereasanelectionforasinglepostmightattractlocalattentionandgeneratepoliticalinterest,holdinganewsetofelectionsforademocraticbodyataremotelevelwouldverylikelyresultinconsiderableapathyandalowturnout.Anelectedpoliceauthoritywithrepresentativesfordifferentareaswithintheforcemightalsoleadtoasituationofclashingmandates,forexamplebetweenthepoliceauthorityrepresentativeandalocalcouncilleaderforthesamearea.Thisriskscomplicatinglinesofaccountabilityforpolicecommandersontheground.SubSubSubSub----forcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityforcelevelaccountabilityOnecriticismofintroducinggreateraccountabilityattheforcelevelisthatthisremainstooremotefromresidentsverylocalconcernsaroundcrimeanddisorder.Inadditiontolookingatforce-levelgovernance,then,itisvitalthataccountabilityisalsoaddressedatamorelocallevel.Thiswouldgenerallybethelevelofthebasiccommandunit(BCU).Option3.GivelocalauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicingTherearetwomainadvantagesofgivingfirsttier(districtorunitary)localauthoritiescontrolofcommunitypolicingfunctions:
Asthemainestablisheddemocraticbodyatthelocalleveltheycanprovidethebenefitsoflegitimacyandaccountabilitywithouttheneedforadditional
elections. Becausesomuchlocalauthorityworkiscrucialtopreventingandreducingcrime
anddisorder,givingcouncilsagreaterroleopensupthescopeformorejoined-upinterventionsontheground.
Underthismodeloperationalcontrolfordeliveringcommunitypolicing(todealwithso-calledlevel1issuessuchasburglary,theft,violenceandanti-socialbehaviour)wouldpasstotheBCUcommander.Policeauthoritieswouldbeabolishedandfundingforlevel1functionswouldgotothelocalauthority.Thelocalauthoritywouldbegiventhelegalpowertosetthepolicingprioritiesfortheirlocalcommander,justasnowpoliceauthoritieshavethepowertoapproveorotherwisethechiefconstablesstrategicplan.
Thelocalcouncilleadercouldbegiventhepowertoappointthelocalpolicecommander.
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Thisisaradicalplanthatwouldgenuinelydelivermuchmorelocallytailoredandaccountablepolicingofthekindwelackatpresent.However,itwouldrequiretheorganisationaltransformationofpolicing.Forcescouldcontinuetoexistunderthismodelbuttheywouldbelimitedtoprovidingprotectiveservicestodealwithserious
crimesandcross-borderissues,aswellasprovidingbackroomandadministrativesupportforlocalcommunitypolicingunits(humanresourcesfunctions,forexample).Infactitislikelythatashifttothismorelocalisedmodelwouldputtheexistenceofthecurrent43forcestructureinseriousdoubt.Strippedoftheircommunitypolicingfunctionstherationalefor43forcesisextremelyweakandtheargumentsformovingtolargerregionalforcesorevenanationalseriouscrimeforcesuchastheAmericanFBIwouldlookirresistible(seeHerbert2007andOConnor2005).Weshouldalsonotethatempoweringlocalgovernmentwillnotonitsownresolvetheaccountabilityproblem,especiallygivenlowturnoutsinmanylocalelections.Forthisreason,workatthislevelshouldbebuttressedbyneighbourhoodlevelengagementas
well.Option4.GivelocalauthoritiesgreaterinfluenceovercommunitypolicingAlessradicaloptionwouldbetoincreasetheaccountabilityoflocalpolicecommanderstolocalauthorities.Asafirststeplocalauthoritiescouldbegiventhelegalpowertoagreelocalpolicingprioritieswiththechiefconstable,throughthelocalpolicecommanderfortheirarea.Thiswouldtaketheformofalocalpolicingplanthatbothsideswouldhavetoapprove,ensuringthattherewasbalancestruckbetweenlevel1communitypolicingneedsandotherpriorities.Tounderpinthesepowerswithresources,thelocalauthoritycouldretainthepoliceprecept:thepartofthecounciltaxitcurrentlycollectsandpassestothepoliceauthority.Althoughtheproportionofthepolicebudgetmadeupbythepreceptvariesaroundthecountry,thiswouldmeanthatthelocalauthoritywouldhavethepowertocommissionsomecommunitysafetyservicesfromthepolice(oreven,iftheysochose,anotherprovider).Becausetheauthoritycouldchoosetospendsomeofthepreceptfundingonotherinitiatives(morecrimepreventionwork,forinstance)itwouldintroduceanelementofcontestability,withthepolicehavingtoprovetheywereprovidingvalueformoney.Ifthecurrentforce/BCUstructureistoberetaineditwouldnotmakesensetogivelocalcouncilleaderssolecontrolovertheappointmentoflocalBCUcommanderssincethiswouldbreakthechainofcommandbetweenthechiefconstableandtheBCU.
Insteadotheroptionswouldneedtobeconsidered.Ataminimumthechiefconstableshouldconsultthecouncilleader(assomealreadydo)ontheappointmentofthelocalcommander.Thecouncilcouldalsoplayaroleinappraisingthecommandersperformance.Othermoreradicalmeasuresmightincludesomerolefortheleaderorotherseniormembersofthelocalauthorityinappointingthecommander,suchasbyholdingasubsequentconfirmationhearing.Thelocalauthoritymightalsobegiventhepowertoexpressavoteofnoconfidenceinthelocalcommander,witharequirementonthechiefconstabletoappointareplacement.Thereare,however,somechallengestobeovercometomakethisenhancedlocalgovernmentoptionviable.Firstofall,introducinggreateraccountabilityatthislevel
makesthemostsenseifthereisgreatermanagerialandresourcedelegationdowntotheBCUfromforceHQ.
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Thereisalsothechallengeofcreatingmultiplelinesofaccountability.WhereasunderthecurrentsystemitisclearwhoBCUcommandersareaccountableto(chiefconstables),underthissystemtheywouldbeaccountabletoboththechiefconstableandthelocalauthority.However,whileanultimatelineofaccountabilityisnecessary
(essentiallywhohiresandfires),BCUcommandersalreadyhavetodealwithmultiplelinesofaccountability.TheyhavetoworkbothtoforceleveltargetsandtotheirLocalAreaAgreementtargetsagreedwiththerestoftheLocalStrategicPartnershipandtheGovernment.Indeedinmanyotherareasofpublicservices,notleastlocalgovernmentitself,serviceprovidersaretosomeextentaccountabletobothlocalandnationalmasters.ThemostimportantthingistoensurethatasinglepolicingplancanbeagreedforeachBCUthatincorporatesbothforcelevelprioritiesandlocalprioritiesasexpressedbythelocalcouncil.Afurtherconsequenceofthismodelisthatitwoulddemandamorerefinedroleforthepoliceauthority.Withthedecisiontosetlocalpolicingprioritiestransferredtolocal
authorities,thepoliceauthoritiescouldinsteadconcentrateoninfluencingforcestrategyandholdingthechiefconstabletoaccount.Option5.Themayoralmodel1ElsewhereipprhasarguedthatdirectlyelectedmayorsshouldbeintroducedacrossEngland(seeKennyandLodge2008).Byvirtueofbeingdirectlyelected,mayorsensuregreaterpoliticalaccountabilitythanisachievedundertheordinarycouncilmodel.Mayorstendtobewellknown,enablingthemtodevelopaconnectionwithlocalvotersthatindirectlyelectedcouncilleadersoftenfailtodo.AsurveyconductedintheLondonBoroughofNewham,forexample,revealedthat67percentofresidentscouldidentifySirRobinWalesastheirmayor.AndastheLondonelectioncampaignproved,mayoralelectionscangalvaniseandreinvigoratepoliticaldebateinameaningfulway.Mayorshaveprovedcapableleaders,havingoverseenanimprovementintheperformanceoftheircouncils.TheintroductionofamayorinHackney,forinstance,hascoincidedwithacompleteturnaroundintheLondonboroughsfortunes.MayorshavealsopushedthrougharangeofinnovativepoliciessuchasthecongestionchargeinLondon.WehavealreadyseenoneexampleofanelectedmayortakingaprominentroleinpolicinginthecaseofLondon.AlthoughtheLondonmayordoesnothavethepowertohireorfiretheMetropolitanPoliceCommissioner(thisremainstheresponsibilityoftheMetropolitanPoliceAuthorityandtheHomeSecretary),themayorsetsthepolicebudget.InrecentyearsthisenabledtheformermayorKenLivingstonetousehiselementofthecounciltaxtofundamajorroll-outofneighbourhoodpolicingacross
London,muchearlierthanintherestofthecountry.So,introducingmoredirectlyelectedmayorscouldbringconsiderablebenefitsfromtheperspectiveofenhancingtheaccountabilityandperformanceofdemocraticlocalgovernment.Givingmayorscontrolorgreaterinfluenceoverpolicingprioritiesfortheirlocalareas,assetoutinoptions3and4,couldalsobringconsiderablebenefits.Aswiththecaseforgivingdistrictandunitarylocalgovernmentagreaterroleinpolicing,adoptingamayoralmodelwouldmeantherewasnoneedforadditionalelections,riskingvoterfatigue,anditwouldalsohelpensurejoined-upworkingoncommunitysafety.
1Herewefocusondirectly-electedmayorsatlocalauthoritylevel.Wedonotexploretheoptionofcity-regionalmayorsthoughrecognisethattheymaywellbeanappropriatereformoptionforsomeareas.
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However,whatthemayoralmodelwouldaddisamuchclearerlineofaccountability:themayorwouldbemuchmorevisiblethanacouncilleader,wouldpossessapersonalmandatethatcouldnotbeignoredandwouldlikelyengagethepublictoamuchgreaterdegreeinsettingpolicingprioritiesbyvirtueoftheirhigherprofile.Aswitha
directlyelectedcommissioneratforcelevel,havingaclearlyaccountableindividualatlocallevelwhothepublicknowisinchargeandthatthebuckstopswiththemandnotWhitehallministersmightalsopersuadecentralgovernmenttogiveupseekingtomicro-managepolicingfromthecentre.Forthesereasonswebelievethatmayorswouldencouragethecentretodevolvepowersandfunctiontothelocalityinawaythattheyarecurrentlyreluctanttodo.IndeedwenotethatwhenitcomestopolicingtheGovernmentappearsmoreinterestedindemocratisingpoliceauthoritiesthanitdoesinempoweringlocalauthoritieswithagreatersayoverpolicing.Hadmoremayorsbeeninplacewebelievethatthecentrewouldbemorewillingtoconsidergoingdownthelocalgovernmentroute.Wetherefore
recommendthattheGovernmentconsidercombiningpolicereformwiththeintroductionofdirectly-electedmayors.However,weshouldnotethatamayoralmodelwouldsufferfromsomeoftheshortcomingsofthetwootherlocalgovernmentoptionsdiscussedabove:aradicalmovetogivemayorscompletecontrolovercommunitypolicingwouldleadtomajororganisationalupheaval,andalessradicaldevolutionofpowersmightleadtomultipleandconfusedlinesofaccountability.Option6.AlocalpoliceboardCrimeandDisorderReductionPartnerships(CDRPs)alreadyexistaspartnershipbodiesatboroughanddistrictlevel.Theycurrentlyhaveadutytoreflecttheviewsoflocalresidentsinsettingcommunitysafetypriorities,althoughtherealityisthattheyare(likepoliceauthorities)barelyvisibletothepublic.ItmightbepossibletoincreaselocalcommunityinputbyhavingdirectelectionsforpartoftheCDRPmembership.MoreradicallytheycouldbetransformedintowhollyelectedLocalPoliceBoards.Essentiallythesewouldbepoliceauthoritiesatamuchlessremoteandmorelocallevel.However,thefactisthatCDRPsarecurrentlymoreinvisibletothepublicthanpoliceauthoritiesare.Democratisingthistierofgovernancemaygeneratelittleinterestandtheelectionsarelikelytosufferfromalowturnout.Thisisespeciallylikelyifthebodies
weregivenfewpowers:onlyrealpowerinareassuchasappointments,budgetsandprioritysettingwouldpreventthemfrombecomingtalkingshops.However,evenifelectedpolicingboardsormoredemocraticCDRPsweregivensuchpowersthisoptionwouldestablishaparallelstructuretodealwithcommunitysafetyissues,detachedfromtheexistingworkoflocalgovernment.Fromtheperspectiveofjoint-workingandaproblem-focusedapproachtocrimeitmightbebettertooptforoneofthelocalgovernmentoptionssetoutabove.
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4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.Strategyforreform4.StrategyforreformPolicereformhasalwaysbeendifficult,withcountlessreportssupportingchangebeinglefttogatherdustovertheyears(Gash2008).ProposalsforworkforcemodernisationhavetypicallyfallenfoulofoppositionfromthePoliceFederation,whileproposalsto
changeorganisationalstructures(suchasforcemergers)havetypicallyrunintooppositionfrompolicechiefs.Butonereasonwhyitissodifficulttoadvancereformintheareaofaccountabilityissimplybecausetheevidencebaseisverythin.Thereissomeinternationalevidencethatwecanlearnfrom.LovedayandReid,forexample,pointtotheabilityofamorelocallyaccountablesystemintheUnitedStatestomeetgrowingpublicconcernaboutcrimethroughnewlocallyinitiatedpoliciessuchastheCompstatdatacollectionandpolicemanagementsysteminNewYork.TheycontrastthiswiththehighlycentralisedandmuchmorerigidFrenchpoliceforcewhichhasstruggledtoinnovateortomovequicklyenoughtoassuagepublicanxietyaboutcrime(LovedayandReid2003).
However,thereisinsufficientevidenceonhowdifferentlocalaccountabilitymodelsmightaffectpolicingperformanceinaUKcontext.Ministersarethereforewaryofmajorchangewhensuchchangefeelslikealeapinthedark.Itwouldbebetterthereforetopilotanumberofdifferentoptionsbeforerollingoutasingleapproachacrossthewholecountry.Thereisalsoastrongcaseforbespokesolutionstailoredtotheneedsofdifferentareas.So,forexample,amayoralmodelmightbebestsuitedtoalargetownorcitylikeBirminghamorLiverpool,whereasanelectedforcecommissionermodelmightworkbetterinasmallerruralforce,suchasWarwickshire.Withitsmayoralsystem,theLondonMetropolitanPoliceServicealready
hasadegreeofdirectpoliticalaccountabilityattheforcelevelthatmostforceslackandshouldenhancethatmodelratherthanadoptsomethingentirelynew.TheGovernmentshouldthereforepilotthemodelofaccountabilitythatismostappropriatetotheparticulargovernancearrangementsinindividuallocalities.Aspartofanydeal,theycouldoffergreaterlocalautonomyandfewercentraltargets.Oncethosepilotshavebeenevaluated,policeforcesandlocalauthoritiesaroundthecountrycouldbeaskedtochoosefromanumberofoptionsforenhancinglocalaccountability.
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5.5.5.5.ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionThisreporthasexploredhowwemightachieveamorelocallyaccountablepoliceserviceinEnglandandWales.Itcomesatanearlystageinourresearchintothesequestionsanditsconclusionsarethereforetentative.
However,therearesomeconclusionswecandrawatthisstage.
Despitefallingcrimerates,policeperformancestillneedstoimproveandthepolicecontinuetobeinsufficientlyresponsivetolocalneedsandcircumstances.
Thereareanumberofthingsthatneedtobedonetoimprovepoliceperformance,includingworkforcemodernisationandreformstooperationalstructures.Thereareanumberofwaysofincreasingresponsiveness,suchasbyembeddingneighbourhoodpolicingandcreatingacustomercarecultureinthepoliceservice.However,addressingthelocalaccountabilitydeficitinpolicingiscrucialtodeliveringbothbetterperformanceandgreaterresponsiveness.
Therearearangeofdifferentoptionsforincreasinglocalaccountability,whichvaryinthebenefitstheybringandthechallengestheypose.TheGovernmentshouldgiveseriousconsiderationtothemall.Whilesome,suchasdirectelectionsattheforcelevel,bringclearlinesofdemocraticaccountabilityatamorestrategiclevel,theyalsotendtoretaindecision-makingataremotedistancefromlocaltownsandneighbourhoods.Others,suchasgivinglocalauthoritiesamuchgreaterrole,provideformorelocalresponsiveness,butmayintroducemorecomplexlinesofaccountability.Thereisnoperfectsystemandtherearesomecleartrade-offs:choicesneedtobemadedependingontheobjectivesthatareprioritised.
Whateveroptionischosen,itwillbemeaninglessunlessgenuinepowersaredevolvedtosetpolicingpriorities,controlbudgetsandinfluenceseniorappointments.Electingnewbodieswithnoneofthesepowerswilltakeusnofurtherforwardandwillnotbetakenseriouslybythepublic.
Werecognisethattheevidencebaseinthisarearemainsthinandthatdifferentoptionsmaybebettersuitedtodifferentlocalareas.WerecommendthattheGovernmentpilotaccountabilitymodelsfirstandthenrolloutbespokesolutionsindifferentpartsofthecountry.Whateverparticularmodelslocalareasadopt,itisclearthattacklingtheaccountabilitydeficitisessentialifwearetodeliverthekindofresponsiveandeffectivepolicinglocalcommunitieswant.
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