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iiii_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

CMC Vision:

To be a powerful agent for protecting Queenslanders from major crime and promoting atrustworthy public sector.

CMC Mission:

To combat crime and improve public sector integrity.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright

Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher, the

Crime and Misconduct Commission.

ISBN: 1 876986 06 9

© Crime and Misconduct Commission 2003

Crime and Misconduct Commission

140 Creek Street, Brisbane, Australia

GPO Box 3123

Brisbane Qld 4001

Tel.: (07) 3360 6060

Fax: (07) 3360 6333

E-mail: [email protected]

List of tables and figures iv

Preface ix

Summary xi

Glossary xiv

Chapter 1: The development ofbeat policing 11.1 What is beat policing? 1

1.2 Beat policing in Queensland 2

1.3 Beat-policing models 2

1.4 The current status of beat policing inQueensland 4

1.5 Previous beat-policing evaluations 5

Summary 8

Chapter 2: Methodology 92.1 Key evaluation questions 9

2.2 Methodological strategy 9

2.3 Site selection and description 10

2.4 Beats and comparison sites 10

2.5 Data sources 11

2.6 Data constraints 19

2.7 Data analysis 20

Chapter 3: Impact on crime andcalls for service 23

3.1 Rate of reported crime: neighbourhoodbeats and comparison areas 24

3.2 Rate of reported crime: shopfronts and comparison centres 28

3.3 Rate of calls for service: neighbourhoodbeats and comparison areas 31

3.4 Analysis of rates of calls for service at the Toowoomba Beat: 1994, 2002 34

Summary of findings 38

Chapter 4: Perceptions of crime and personal safety 394.1 Perceptions of crime and personal

safety in neighbourhood beats 39

4.2 Perceptions of personal safety in shopping centres 44


Chapter 5: Client satisfaction with police services 47

5.1 Neighbourhood beats: visibility,contact and satisfaction 47

5.2 Residents’ perceptions of police performance 50

5.3 Satisfaction with how police handle a reported incident 52

5.4 Shopfronts: visibility and contact 54

5.5 Satisfaction with shopfront services 58


Chapter 6: Workload performance and costs of police beats 616.1 Workload performance of police beats 61

6.2 Costs of police beats 65


Chapter 7: Delivery of servicesand job satisfaction 717.1 Site selection and establishment of

beats 71

7.2 Role and rostering of beat officers 74

7.3 Proactive problem-solving 76

7.4 Organisational support for beat policing 78

7.5 Beat officer job satisfaction 80


Chapter 8: Conclusion 838.1 Key findings 83

8.2 Issues that had an impact on the findings 86

8.3 Issues for the future 87

Appendixes 911 Police Beat Inventory: Neighbourhood Beats 91

2 Police Beat Inventory: Shopfronts 99

3 Community Survey 111

4 Retailers Survey: Beat Centre 124

5 Retailers Survey: Comparison Centre 127

6 Shoppers Survey: Beat Centre 128

7 Shoppers Survey: Comparison Centre 130

8 Beat Officers Statewide Survey 135

References 141

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______iiiiii

Contents

CChhaapptteerr 11::Table 1.1. Comparison of the characteristics of general duties patrols, neighbourhood beats and shopfronts 3

CChhaapptteerr 22::Tables

Table 2.1. Selected beats and their respective comparison area/centre 11

Table 2.2. Demographic characteristics of residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas 13

Table 2.3.Demographic characteristics of residents in the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 15

Table 2.4. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Regional Beat and comparison area 16

Table 2.5. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Toowoomba Beatand comparison area 17

Table 2.6. Demographic characteristics of residents in the Outer Urban Beat 18

Table 2.7. Key evaluation questions 21

Figure

Figure 2.1. Map of selected beats 11


Table 3.1. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 24

Table 3.2. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and

comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 25

Table 3.3. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 25

Table 3.4. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat,January to June 2001 and 2002 26

Table 3.5. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 26

Table 3.6. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 27

Table 3.7. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area,January to June 2001 and 2002 28

Table 3.8. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat,January to June 2001 and 2002 28

Table 3.9. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002 29

Table 3.10. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002 29

iivv_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

List of tables and figures

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______vv

Table 3.11. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre,January to June 2001 and 2002 30

Table 3.12. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre, January to June 2001 and 2002 31

Table 3.13. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 31

Table 3.14. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 32

Table 3.15. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 32

Table 3.16. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat,January to June 2001 and 2002 33

Table 3.17. Longitudinal comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area, January to June 2001 and 2002 35

Figures

Figure 3.1. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 24

Figure 3.2. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area 25

Figure 3.3. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 25

Figure 3.4. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat 26

Figure 3.5. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 27

Figure 3.6. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area 27

Figure 3.7. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 28

Figure 3.8. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat 28

Figure 3.9. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre 29

Figure 3.10. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre 29

Figure 3.11. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Metropolitan Shopfront and comparison shopping centre 30

Figure 3.12. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of reported property crime/100 000 for the Regional Shopfront and comparison shopping centre 31

Figure 3.13. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 32

Figure 3.14. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Regional Beat and comparison area 32

Figure 3.15. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 33

Figure 3.16. Comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Outer Urban Beat 33

Figure 3.17. Longitudinal comparison of changes in average monthly rate of calls for service/100 000 for the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 35

Figure 3.18. Comparative hot-spot analysis for calls for service in the Toowoomba Beatand comparison area, 1994 and 2002 36

Figure 3.19. Differences in the number of repeat addresses, January to June 1994 and 2002 37


Table 4.1. Perceived disorder problems at the Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 40

Table 4.2. Perceived disorder problems at the Regional Beat and comparison area 40

Table 4.3. Perceived disorder problems at the Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 41

Table 4.4. Perceived disorder problems at the Outer Urban Beat 41

Table 4.5. Perceptions of changes in crime and disorder 41

Table 4.6. Percentage of residents reporting criminal victimisation and reporting the incident to police 42

Table 4.7. Perceived safety between theMetropolitan Beat and comparison area 43

Table 4.8. Perceived safety between the Regional Beat and comparison area 43

Table 4.9. Perceived safety between theToowoomba Beat and comparison area 43

Table 4.10. Perceived safety at the Outer Urban Beat 43

Table 4.11. Perceived safety at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre 44

Table 4.12. Perceived safety at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre 45

Figure

Figure 4.1. Percentage of shoppers who feel safe while shopping: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre, Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre 44


Table 5.1. Helpfulness of the beat officer:residents in beat areas 49

Table 5.2. Satisfaction with how the beat officer handled the matter: residents in beat areas 50

Table 5.3. Overall satisfaction with beat-policing program: residents in beat areas 50

Table 5.4. Satisfaction with handling a reported incident: residents in neighbour-hood beats and comparison areas 54

Figures

Figure 5.1. Awareness of the beat area:comparison of selected areas 48

Figure 5.2. Awareness of the beat area:comparison of the Toowoomba Beat,2002 and 1995 48

Figure 5.3. Reasons for contact with the beat officer: comparison of selected areas 49

Figure 5.4. Residents’ perceptions of police performance: Metropolitan Beat and comparison area 51

Figure 5.5. Residents’ perceptions of policeperformance: Regional Beat and comparison area 52

Figure 5.6. Residents’ perceptions of police performance: Toowoomba Beat and comparison area 53

Figure 5.7. Residents’ perceptions of police performance at the Outer Urban Beat 54

Figure 5.8. Percentage of shoppers at theMetropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre who had seen a police officer in the centre 55

vvii_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______vviiii

Figure 5.9. Percentage of shoppers at theRegional shopfront centre and comparison centre who had seen a police officer in the centre 55

Figure 5.10. Percentage of shoppers at the Metropolitan and Regional shopfrontcentres who were aware of the shopfront operating in their centre 55

Figure 5.11. Number of times retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre had seen their beat officer in the last month 56

Figure 5.12. Number of times retailers at the Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre had seen a police officer in the last month 56

Figure 5.13. Awareness of the shopfront:comparison of selected sites 56

Figure 5.14. Reasons for shopper contact with police: Metropolitan shopfront centreand comparison centre 57

Figure 5.15. Reasons for shopper contact with police: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre 57

Figure 5.16. Reasons for retailer contactwith police: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre 57

Figure 5.17. Reasons for retailer contact with police: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre 58

Figure 5.18. Percentage of shoppers at Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre satisfied with policeservices 58

Figure 5.19. Percentage of shoppers at Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre satisfied with police services 58

Figure 5.20. Retailers’ level of satisfaction with police service: Metropolitan shopfront centre and comparison centre 59

Figure 5.21. Retailers’ level of satisfaction with police service: Regional shopfront centre and comparison centre 59

Figure 5.22. Percentage of retailers at selected sites ‘somewhat satisfied’ or ‘verysatisfied’ with the shopfront program 59


Table 6.1. Average number of CRISP reports: beat officers v. general duties police (average 28-day roster period) 62

Table 6.2. Average number of calls forservice: beat officers v. general duties police (average 28-day roster period) 62

Table 6.3. Estimated cost per minute of first response by police 66

Table 6.4. Total cost of first response by police 67

Table 6.5. Estimated costs of establishing a neighbourhood beat 67

Table 6.6. Estimated costs of establishing a shopfront 68

Table 6.7. Estimated maintenance costs of a neighbourhood beat 68

Table 6.8. Estimated maintenance costs of a shopfront 69

Figures

Figure 6.1. Types of incidents undertaken:beat officers and general duties police 63

Figure 6.2. Types of other duties undertaken:beat officers and general duties police 64


Table 7.1. Percentage of time spent by beat officers on proactive problem-solving 76

Table 7.2. Percentage of beat officers responding who did not have the necessary equipment or facilities 80

Figures

Figure 7.1. Percentage of time spent on nature of duties: neighbourhood beat officers and shopfront beat officers 74

Figure 7.2. Officers’ satisfaction with position as beat officer 81

vviiiiii_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______iixx

Beat policing constitutes an important shift in the nature of operational policing. Inrecent years, there has been much interest expressed in expanding this form of policingthroughout Queensland. Consequently, it is important that rigorous evaluations areconducted to allow policy makers to make informed decisions.

In June 2002, Crime Prevention Queensland (CPQ) was asked by the Department ofPremier and Cabinet to evaluate beat policing in this State. CPQ is responsible forimplementing the Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy — Building Safer Communities.It provides leadership and support to develop innovative, evidence-based and targetedcrime-prevention initiatives across both government and the local community.

CPQ asked us to conduct the evaluation of beat policing in recognition of the Crime andMisconduct Commission’s extensive experience and expertise in evaluating beat-policinginitiatives. It was the Commission — then known as the Criminal Justice Commission(CJC) — that in 1993, in conjunction with the Queensland Police Service (QPS),established a pilot beat-policing project in Toowoomba as a means of encouraging theQPS to implement information-driven, proactive policing strategies. At the time of thisevaluation, there were 28 similar initiatives (neighbourhood police beats) acrossQueensland with a further five beats to be established by the end of this financial year. Inaddition, 43 police beat shopfronts were operating in many shopping centres throughoutQueensland with four additional shopfronts to be established by the end of June 2003.

A reference committee, comprising representatives from the CMC, Department ofPremier and Cabinet, CPQ, QPS and the Department of Treasury was formed to adviseus on the conduct of the evaluation.

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The report is divided into eight chapters, with supporting documentation contained inthe appendixes.

Chapter 1 gives the background to beat policing, describes the models operating inQueensland, and highlights previous evaluations of beat policing in this State.

Chapter 2 describes the methodological approach employed in the evaluation, includingthe key evaluation questions, methods of data collection and measures used.

Chapter 3 presents calls-for-service rates and the findings in relation to the impact ofbeat policing on official reported crime rates. It also compares the rate of calls for servicein one neighbourhood beat in 1994 to the rate in the same beat in 2002. This analysisassesses whether long-term declines in calls for service are evident in beats.

Chapter 4 examines the impact of neighbourhood beats and shopfronts on perceptionsof crime and perceptions of personal safety. The chapter includes information drawnfrom a series of surveys and offers a systematic comparison of beats and comparison siteson several indicators of perceptions of crime, disorder and personal safety.

Preface

xx_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

Chapter 5 focuses on community satisfaction with policing services. The first sectionprovides information on residents’ awareness of their neighbourhood beat, their reasonsfor contacting a beat officer, and their satisfaction with the services provided. This isfollowed by an analysis of the level of satisfaction with police services expressed byresidents of beats and comparison areas. Finally, shopfronts and comparison centres areexamined in terms of visibility and awareness of police as well as shopper and retailersatisfaction with police services.

Chapter 6 assesses the cost of establishing and maintaining a police beat, and comparesthe workload and cost-effectiveness of beat officers and general duties officers. It alsoexamines the cost of attending calls for service and the differences between the role ofbeat officers and general duties officers.

Chapter 7 considers challenges associated with the implementation and management ofneighbourhood beats and shopfronts, such as site selection, the role and rostering of beatofficers, organisational support for beat officers and the job satisfaction of beat officers.

Chapter 8 sums up the key findings of the evaluation, discusses issues that had animpact on the findings, and identifies issues and challenges that should be considered bypolicy makers in planning the future for beat policing in Queensland.

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This evaluation represents the product of four months’ intensive work by a small team ofresearchers from the CMC’s Research and Prevention area. The research team designedand administered several major surveys, conducted over fifty interviews with police andcommunity members, analysed all the data collected during the course of the evaluation,including several thousand records of crime and calls for service, and prepared the finalreport. The members of the research team are to be commended for their efforts underchallenging circumstances.

Special thanks are owed to Dr Mark Lynch, Dr Gabi Hoffmann, Maggie Blyth, CharlotteSibley and Elena Miceski for their assistance with data collection and to Lisa Evans, JodieBoland and Cathy Tregea for providing administrative support to the project.

The CMC wishes to acknowledge the involvement of a number of police personnel,whose insight, experience or point of view made an important contribution to this report.Community members and key stakeholders in the beat locations also willingly providedtheir time and personal experiences to assist us in our understanding of beat policing.

Finally, the CMC would like to thank Dr Nancy Spencer from the Office of Economicand Statistical Research for providing assistance with the community survey. The variousmembers of the project’s reference group are owed special thanks for their advicethroughout the duration of the project. In particular, we wish to acknowledge theassistance of David Melville, Rob Gillam, Diana Beere, Ann Dalton, Jackie Martin, SoniaCaton, Mary Burgess, Sue Bell, Tracy O’Carroll, Kim Lazenby, Peter Crawford andespecially Lindy Creighton. The Commission also appreciates the support provided to theevaluation by Michael Hogan, Paul Friedman and Peter Crawford from the Departmentof the Premier and Cabinet.

The report was prepared for publication by the CMC’s Publications Unit. Cover designby Rene Graphics.

Dr Paul Mazerolle

Director, Research and Prevention

Crime and Misconduct Commission

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______xxii

Summary

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of beatpolicing in Queensland conducted by the Crime andMisconduct Commission, in response to a request fromCrime Prevention Queensland.

Beat policing is a community policing strategy designed to make an individual policeofficer responsible for the community’s policing needs in a defined geographical area (thebeat). Beat officers are encouraged to take ‘ownership’ of their area and employ proactivestrategies to address the underlying causes of crime and community problems withintheir beat.

Two primary models of beat policing currently operate in Queensland. The first is aneighbourhood police beat model in which a police officer resides within the designatedbeat area and operates from an office attached to the residence. The second model is thepolice beat shopfront in which a police office is established in a shopping centre or malland provides services to retailers and shoppers. At the time of the evaluation, there were28 neighbourhood beats and 43 police shopfronts operating throughout Queensland. Fivemore neighbourhood beats and four more shopfronts will be established by the end ofJune 2003.

The current evaluation brings together a range of methodological strategies and datasources to provide a comprehensive analysis of beat policing. The evaluation is framedaround three key questions.

1) Is beat policing effective?

2) Is beat policing cost-effective?

3) Are community members satisfied with, and do they support, beat policing?

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The effectiveness of beat policing is addressed by examining the rate of reported crime inconjunction with measuring perceptions of crime and personal safety. The results revealthat the presence of a neighbourhood beat is associated with a reduction in the overallrate of reported crime, including property crime, within the beat area. Althoughneighbourhood beats do not seem to be associated with a significant change in the rate ofcalls for service received by police when measured over a short period (i.e. 12 months),they do appear to be associated with a reduction in the rate of calls for service over alonger period. Importantly, and consistent with one of the primary objectives of beatpolicing, neighbourhood beats are also associated with a decrease in chronic repeat callsfor service over a longer period.

Shopfronts are effective in raising awareness and visibility of police but do not appear tobe associated with a decrease in the overall rate of reported crime, including reportedproperty crime, within their area of responsibility.

xxiiii_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

After analysing reported crime rates, the evaluation focuses on measuring the effect ofbeat policing on citizens’ perceptions of crime and personal safety. The higher visibility ofpolice and increased police activity in an area could be expected to reduce citizens’perceptions of crime in the area, increase feelings of personal safety, and also increasewillingness to report crime. However, the evaluation reveals that police beats are notassociated with a reduction in perceptions of crime levels, increased feelings of safety, orincreases in the public’s willingness to report crime.

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The evaluation of cost-effectiveness is based on Queensland Police Service (QPS) costingdata and analysis of the workloads of beat officers and general duties officers. The resultsreveal that the workload of beat officers is at least equal to, and in some cases greaterthan, their general duties counterparts. As expected, beat officers tend to be moreinvolved in community-based activities than is the case with general duties officers. It wasgenerally found that the response provided by the beat officer is more cost-effective thanthe response provided by a general duties crew to the same type of call. However, thiscost saving is largely due to the difference between the cost of a single officer versus atwo-officer response.

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Community satisfaction and support are assessed using data collected from surveys andinterviews. Analyses reveal that residents in neighbourhood beats strongly support thebeat-policing model and express praise for the work of the beat officer. While thepresence of a neighbourhood beat raises awareness and knowledge of police activity, thereis no significant difference between residents in beat and non-beat areas in terms of theirlevel of satisfaction with policing services. Similarly, while the visibility of police is high inshopping centres with a shopfront, this is not associated with an increase in the level ofsatisfaction with police services expressed by shoppers and retailers.

Several procedural aspects of delivering beat services are also examined. Some of the keyelements of effective delivery are:

flexible working arrangements over which the beat officer has autonomy, together with an equitable allowance scheme to compensate beat officers for working eveningand weekend shifts

formal training in problem-oriented policing and access to timely and accurate data for the purpose of identifying local policing problems (the QPS is examiningways to improve training of beat officers and increase their accessibility to data)

support and encouragement from managers for beat officers to engage in community partnerships and proactive policing.

The evaluation reveals that police beats, particularly neighbourhood beats, are aworthwhile investment of police resources. In general, police beats are effective inaddressing crime and disorder problems and provide a cost-effective means of deliveringpolice services. In addition, the public are very satisfied with, and supportive of, policebeats. There are, however, several issues that are identified by the evaluation as beingimportant for the ongoing development of beat policing.

OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND_______xxiiiiii

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The process for selecting police beats — community demands and operational policing requirements need to be carefully balanced on the basis of clearly defined criteria.

Tenure arrangements for new beats — police beats need to be able to adapt to changing contextual needs in order to remain effective. Consideration should be given to reviewing a beat every three to five years to ensure that it meets the needs of beat-area residents.

Performance management — police beats should be subject to regular assessments to ensure they are achieving the goals and aims of beat policing.

Marketing — the level of awareness and knowledge about the beat by beat-area residents or shoppers could be improved.

Training — training courses need to be provided for new beat officers and ongoing training needs to be regularly conducted with existing beat officers.

Access to information — beat officers’ access to information systems to allow timely identification of local crime trends and community problems needs to be improved.

Alternative models of beat policing — it may be useful for the QPS to explore some alternative styles of beat policing such as mobile police beats, zone police beats or non-residential neighbourhood beats.

Police beats are likely to continue as an essential part of police service delivery inQueensland for the foreseeable future. As this study has shown, such innovativepolicing initiatives need to be comprehensively evaluated to assess theireffectiveness.

Ultimately, the goal of delivering effective police services to all communities isbest achieved by a commitment to police innovation, community satisfaction andprogram evaluation.

xxiivv_______OONN TTHHEE BBEEAATT:: AN EVALUATION OF BEAT POLICING IN QUEENSLAND

ANCO Australian National Classification of Offences

CA Comparison area

CAD Computer Aided Dispatch

CJC Criminal Justice Commission (now the Crime and MisconductCommission)

CMC Crime and Misconduct CommissionThe CMC was established in January2002 by the Crime and Misconduct Act2001 (Qld), which merged the functionsof the CJC and the Queensland CrimeCommission. In addition to itsinvestigatory and oversight functions, theCMC conducts research into mattersrelating to the administration of criminaljustice. Section 52 of the Act allows theCMC to research:a) QPS methods of operationb) police powers and the use of police

powersc) law enforcement by police, andd) the continuous improvement of the

QPS.

CPQ Crime Prevention QueenslandCPQ is responsible for implementing theQueensland Crime Prevention Strategy —Building Safer Communities. It providesleadership and support to developinnovative, evidence-based and targetedcrime-prevention initiatives across bothgovernment and the local community.

CRISP Crime Reporting Information System forPolice — the system that records officialinformation on reported crime.

CSC Comparison shopping centre

Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry into PossibleInquiry Illegal Activities and Associated Police

Misconduct 1987–89, conducted by TonyFitzgerald QC

Hot spot For this report, a hot spot is a locationgenerating five or more calls for serviceover the observation period.

IMS Incident Management System, QPS

Metro Metropolitan

NPB Neighbourhood Police Beats

NUD*IST Non-numerical Unstructured DataIndexing Searching and Theorising

OESR Office of Economic and StatisticalResearch

POP Problem-oriented policing

POPP Problem-oriented and partnershippolicing

Problem- Problem-solving is a practicalsolving application of Professor Herman

Goldstein’s original concept of problem-oriented policing (POP). As the term isused in this report, it is a structuredmethod of inquiry that can be used tohelp resolve particular policing problems.

QPS Queensland Police Service

Repeat Addresses generating between three addresses and five calls for service during the study

period. The term ‘chronic repeataddresses’ refers to addresses generatingsix or more calls for service.

SWAS Statewide Activity Survey, QPSThe SWAS is a regular assessment of theamount of policing time directed to 35core policing activities. The data includedin the analysis were collected by the QPSbetween 27 May and 2 June 2002. Over7500 operational police and staffmembers were involved in the survey; ofthis number, 116 responses were receivedfrom 58 of the 74 police beats.

WAR Work activity reportThe work activity report is a measuredeveloped by the project team on thisevaluation to gather information aboutthe number and type of communitycontacts by beat officers.

WEPB West End Police BeatThe WEPB was established in 1995 asthe first inner-city police beat. It wasevaluated by the CJC in 1996.

Glossary

11..11 WWhhaatt iiss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg??

Beat policing is an operational strategy designed tomake individual police officers responsible for thecommunity’s policing needs in a defined geographicalarea called ‘the beat’. Beat officers are encouraged totake ownership of their area and employ proactivestrategies to address the underlying causes of crimeand community problems within their beat.

Beat policing has been part of the policing landscapefor well over a century. The traditional EnglishBobby walked the beat, talked to communitymembers and was known by everyone. The advent of car patrols and sophisticated communicationtechnology, combined with urban sprawl, led topolicing becoming, primarily, a reactive response tocrime — an approach that has been criticised astreating the symptoms rather than the causes ofcrime (Bayley 1998). Escalating violence in theUnited States and scepticism about the effectivenessof emergency responses and criminal-investigationstrategies have resulted in academics andpractitioners considering alternative policing models(Bayley 1998), including a return to community orbeat policing.

Policing evaluations conducted in the 1970s and1980s highlighted four basic lessons:

1 Increasing the numbers of police does not reducecrime.

2 Police cannot do their job effectively without theassistance of the community.

3 Reactive strategies do not address the reasons forcrime.

4 Police strategies are not responsive to theparticular needs of individual communities.(Bayley 1998)

In response to these identified problems withtraditional, reactive policing, the concept of

community policing emerged as a prominent policingphilosophy during the 1990s through to the currentday. In 1994, Trojanowicz (p. 6) defined communitypolicing as:

a philosophy of full-service, personalised policingwhere the same officer patrols and works in thesame area on a permanent basis, from a de-centralised place, working in a proactive partner-ship with citizens to identify and solve problems.

These central tenets of community policing havebeen adopted by the Queensland Police Service(QPS).

Modern-day beat policing involves the permanentassignment of a small number of officers to adesignated geographical area. Under this model,usually one or two officers are required, dependingon the hours of service that the beat operates.Officers are required to take responsibility for theirbeat and build strong relationships within thecommunity. In addition to the traditional role ofresponding to calls for service, they are expected touse problem-solving strategies and communitypartnerships to target the underlying causes ofproblems.

The primary aspects of beat policing are:

problem-solving

crime prevention

effective responses to calls for service

focused patrolling.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 11: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEAT POLICING_______11

NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss bbrriinngg tthhee ssttrreennggtthh ooff ccoouunnttrryy ppoolliicciinngg —— ppeerrssoonnaall iinntteerraaccttiioonn,, ccoommmmuunniittyyiinnvvoollvveemmeenntt aanndd pprrooaaccttiivvee eennffoorrcceemmeenntt —— ttoo uurrbbaann aarreeaass..

Chapter 1: The development of beat policing

22_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 11: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEAT POLICING

11..22 BBeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg iinn QQuueeeennssllaanndd

The decision to adopt beat policing as a majorpolicing strategy in Queensland followed arecommendation of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, whichcriticised the reactive style of policing then in favour(Fitzgerald 1989).

After the release of the Fitzgerald report, the QPSmoved quickly to embrace the concept of communitypolicing. A special State Government grant funded atwo-year trial, which commenced in Toowoomba in1993 (the Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project).The pilot, based on a concept of beat policingoriginally developed in the 1980s in Edmonton,Canada, provided a useful reference point for policewho were interested in designing community-based,problem-oriented initiatives in other police districtsand regions.

The operational management of the Toowoombaproject was the responsibility of the Southern PoliceRegion with considerable support from the CriminalJustice Commission (CJC) in terms of design,implementation and evaluation. The project was fullyevaluated by the CJC and a formal report publishedin 1995 (CJC 1995a). The report concluded thatcommunity beat policing was a success inToowoomba and should be extended throughout theState. In the nine years since the commencement ofthe original Toowoomba project, the QPS hasestablished beats in over 70 locations statewide.

11..33 BBeeaatt--ppoolliicciinngg mmooddeellss

There are two primary models of police beatsoperating in Queensland:

1 the neighbourhood police beat (referred to inthis report as ‘neighbourhood beat’ or ‘beat’)

2 the police beat shopfront (referred to in thisreport as ‘shopfront’ and the more common of thetwo in Queensland).

Under the neighbourhood beat model, a policeofficer resides within the beat area and operates froman office attached to their residence. The officer takesownership of policing issues in their neighbourhood.Under the shopfront model, a police office isestablished in a shopping centre or mall and providesservices to retailers and shoppers in the centre.Under both models, an increased police presence isexpected to have a material impact on crime.

Table 1.1 compares the traditional model of generalduties policing with the two primary models of beatpolicing.

The following sections provide a more detaileddescription of each beat-policing model.

11..33..11 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

Neighbourhood beat officers undertake normaloperational duties within a defined geographical areaand are expected to use traditional law enforcementstrategies when necessary. One of the explicitcomponents of this model is to instil a more ‘country’style of policing into suburban or urban areas, asstated in a QPS report:

Neighbourhood police beats are an integral partof the problem-oriented approach to policing andfocus on individual communities … NPBs, ineffect, bring the strength of ‘country policing’ —personal interaction, community involvement andproactive enforcement — to urban areas. (QPS2001a)

These objectives are achieved through establishing aresidential or non-residential office in a relativelysmall geographical area staffed by police officers whotake individual responsibility for their area. Themajor focus of neighbourhood beat officers is onimplementing locally generated solutions to local

Neighbourhood beats aim to:

reduce repeat calls for service

encourage problem-solving

develop problem-oriented and partnershippolicing (POPP) strategies, targetingpolicing and community problems

increase police–community interactionand information flow

reduce the incidence of certain types ofoffending and undesirable behaviour

increase community satisfaction with thepolice

increase the public’s sense of safety

increase job satisfaction for beat officers

win acceptance of beat policing from otherpolice

contribute to the Police Service StrategicPlan (QPS 2001b).


GGeenneerraall dduuttiieess ppaattrroollss NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss SShhooppffrroonnttss

BBaassee uunniitt the ‘division’ the designated area the shopping centre/mall within a residential and usually attached suburb car parking area

SSiizzee ooff bbaassee uunniitt town or suburb small enough area for small enough area for a single officer to patrol two officers to patrol

PPaattrrooll mmeetthhoodd motorised patrols by foot, motorcycle or foot patrols by pairs ofpairs of officers vehicle patrol by a single officers

officer

DDuuttyy aassssiiggnnmmeenntt required to work within assigned to work assigned to the the division or, if tasked, exclusively in the beat shopping centreto respond to any call in area on a long-term proximity basis to promote a

sense of ownership

OOppeerraattiinngg bbaassee police station office or residence office within the within the beat area shopping centre

RRoosstteerriinngg determined by the officer beat officer determines determined by officer inin charge of the station when they work, based on charge of the beat

their perception of the needs of the area

PPoolliicciinngg eemmpphhaassiiss responding to calls for problem-solving, working problem-solving, service, general patrolling with the community, patrolling, working with

crime prevention, shop owners and shopping centremanagement, responding to calls for service

IInnffoorrmmaattiioonn ssoouurrcceess reliance on division and access to standard police access to standard policedistrict level analysis of information sources, but information sources andcrime via the CRISP also a special emphasis also local knowledge andsystem and police placed on the officer’s information gatheredintelligence reports local knowledge and from shop owners and

‘intelligence’ provided private security providersby the community in shopping centre

PPeerrffoorrmmaannccee mmeeaassuurreess response times, successful problem- successful problem-clearance rates solving initiatives, solving activities, public

increased community safety and increasedinvolvement and public public satisfactionsatisfaction

Source: Adapted from CJC 1995a.

TTaabbllee 11..11 CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff tthhee cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff ggeenneerraall dduuttiieess ppaattrroollss,, nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss aanndd sshhooppffrroonnttss

Information presented in the table is provided as a simple comparison between policing models — much overlap occurs in terms of the role definitions of general duties police officers and beat officers.

problems within this defined geographical area. Theydo so by concentrating on monitoring calls forservice, identifying and targeting problem areas andimplementing solutions in cooperation with otheragencies and the community.

11..33..22 SShhooppffrroonnttss

The Shopfront Program was launched in December1992 as a result of the Government Shopping CentreSecurity Policy. In accordance with the FitzgeraldInquiry’s emphasis on community policing, theshopfront initiative is aimed at placing an effectivepolicing presence in shopping centres and centralbusiness areas. The clients of a shopfront areprimarily owners, managers and staff of commercialpremises, and shoppers.

Shopfronts provide an operational policing presencein areas that have a high flow-through of people andconsequently ongoing potential for crime anddisorder problems. They are usually located withinthe hub of a community with centralisedentertainment facilities (e.g. cinemas, hotels) andtransit centres (e.g. bus terminals). Shopfront beatofficers provide a visible police presence andopportunity for frequent interaction with shopowners and personnel, which allow them to gathertimely and accurate information that can informpreventive and reactive responses.

11..44 TThhee ccuurrrreenntt ssttaattuuss ooff bbeeaattppoolliicciinngg iinn QQuueeeennssllaanndd

At the time of the evaluation, there were 28neighbourhood beats and 43 shopfronts operating inQueensland. A further five neighbourhood beats and

four shopfronts will be established this financial year.See Appendixes 1 and 2 for a summary ofcharacteristics of all neighbourhood beats andshopfronts currently operating in Queensland. Anexamination of this information reveals the varietyacross police beats. Many beats have both residentialand shopping centres within their borders, or mayservice a popular tourist area that has dramaticincreases in population during holiday seasons.

While most police beats are classified as either aneighbourhood beat or a shopfront, few conformcompletely with the standard description. Variationsoccur depending on the requirements of theparticular area. Consequently, there is considerableheterogeneity in the beats currently operating inQueensland.

QPS documentation acknowledges that no one strictmodel of police beats is suitable for all locations,particularly as the focus of the program is on localownership, negotiated response and proactiveproblem-solving aimed at dealing with local needs.For example, in cases where a number of businessesare in the neighbourhood beat it may be moredesirable to situate the beat officer in a shopfrontwhere high visibility can be achieved and contactwith the residents of the beat can be optimised. Inother instances it may be desirable for the beatofficer to work alongside general duties officers andoperate from an office situated in the police station.In the latter case, it is necessary to ensure that therole of the beat officer is clearly distinguished fromthat of general duties officers.

In addition to contextual needs determining the typeof beat established in an area, another reason fordifferences between beats is that each region hasbeen responsible for establishing its own beats. Therewere no standard guidelines or operating proceduresto ensure consistency and quality of beat offices.Thus, the level and quality of resources andequipment provided to officers were different in eachregion, and sometimes even between districts. Thishad the potential to reduce the effectiveness of thebeat and the ability of the QPS to attract the mostsuitable applicants for beat-officer positions.

In July 2001, the position of State Beat Coordinatorwas created. This has resolved many of the problemsassociated with the regional-based process forestablishing beat offices.

Shopfronts aim to:

improve the community’s sense ofpersonal safety

reduce the community’s fear of crime

satisfy the need for people tocommunicate more easily with police

raise the perception that offences will bedetected

contribute to the QPS Strategic Plan(QPS 2001c).



There are now:

statewide standing operating procedures

a standard schedule for allocating resources

a nationally accredited five-day training coursefocusing on the core roles and functions of eachbeat model with a strong emphasis on problem-oriented partnership policing (POPP)

a marketing plan.

In addition, there are now beat-proposal guidelinesfor establishing a new beat, and proposal documentscontaining instructions for completing acomprehensive environmental scan. New beat officersreceive a comprehensive report detailing hot spotsand other crime-related information.

An evaluation plan and tools are currently underdevelopment to facilitate ongoing evaluation of theprogram at both operational and strategic levels.

Operational support and effective supervision areessential for the beat program to succeed. At thestart of each new beat, supervisors and officers incharge are now given information sessions and beat-specific introductory booklets.

11..55 PPrreevviioouuss bbeeaatt--ppoolliicciinnggeevvaalluuaattiioonnss

This section summarises the methodologies andfindings of several published evaluations of variousbeat-policing projects. International research ismentioned briefly, followed by several Queenslandevaluations that are described in more detail.

Evaluations of the effect of community-policingprograms on crime levels provide mixed results, withsome showing a reduction in crime and othersshowing no impact on crime trends (Trojanowicz &Bucqueroux 1994).

However, most evaluations reveal that communityperceptions of safety are generally improved bycommunity-policing initiatives (such as footpatrolling) and that community police officersgenerally have more job satisfaction. For example,research by Hornick, Burrows, Tjosvold & Phillips(n.d.) revealed that the Edmonton NeighbourhoodFoot Patrol Program was associated with higherlevels of community satisfaction with police andgreater problem-solving by police officers.

Similarly, Mastrofski, Parks, Reiss & Worden (1998;1999) found that community satisfaction with policewas high and community police officers spent moretime on self-generated activities such as problem-solving than did general patrol officers.

11..55..11 TToooowwoooommbbaa eevvaalluuaattiioonn

The CJC conducted the first major evaluation of beatpolicing in Queensland when it evaluated the originalbeat police sites established in Toowoomba in 1993.The key evaluation questions were:

How aware were beat-area residents of the beat-policing project? Were they able to easily get incontact with the beat officers?

Were significant community-policing problemsidentified and solved by the beat officers?

Did the project make beat-area residents moresatisfied with the service provided by police?

Were beat-area residents more willing to reportoffences?

Was there any impact on the level of crime in thebeat areas?

Did the establishment of the project makeresidents in the beat areas feel safer?

Did the project promote job satisfaction amongthe beat officers?

To ensure that outcomes could be attributed to theinitiatives generated by the beats, two comparisonareas were selected based on census and calls-for-service data. The evaluation used several differentsources of information including pre-beat and post-beat community surveys, analysis of calls-for-servicedata, a service users survey, interviews with police,and an analysis of activity logs and rosters.

For a detailed discussion of the results of theevaluation, see Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project:Main Evaluation Report (CJC 1995a). The keyfindings were that:

problem-solving strategies were successfullyidentified and developed

there was significant increase in satisfaction withpolice among residents of beat areas

there was some reduction in property-relatedoffences and stealing offences

there was no significant effect on residents’feelings of personal safety, and

beat officers experienced increased jobsatisfaction in their new role.

The conclusion was that the pilot project wassuccessful and should be continued and expandedacross the State. Its success was attributed to:

appropriate resourcing and careful planning thatensured the beat was located in a suitable area

the commitment of beat officers who had goodcommunity and problem-solving skills

all levels of police management recognising beatpolicing as a model of operational policing andnot simply a public relations exercise.

In 1995, the CJC published a kit to help other areasestablish beats (CJC 1995b). The kit drew heavily onthe Toowoomba project and described the variousstages in planning, implementing and evaluatingbeat-style projects. It also listed criteria that could beused to identify a suitable site for a police beat:

a) The area should impose a high demand on police,as demonstrated by an analysis of calls for service,but not so high a demand as to be beyond thebeat officer to handle: ideally, the beat officershould be seen as the major provider of policingservices.

b) The beat area should exist within the confines ofan existing police divisional boundary and containa stable mix of residential and businessproperties.

c) The beat area should be no larger than an officercan patrol by foot or bicycle, as there is evidenceto suggest that this style of patrolling encouragesresidents to share information, which gives theofficer a better understanding of local issues andmakes it easier to target localised crime anddisorder problems.

d) Preference should be given to areas that contain anumber of ‘repeat calls for service’ so that thebeat officer will have ample opportunity to applytheir problem-solving skills.

e) The beat should be located in an area that allowsthe officer to have easy access to calls-for-serviceinformation.

11..55..22 SShhooppffrroonntt eevvaalluuaattiioonnss

The first evaluation of shopfronts was conducted bythe QPS and the Queensland University ofTechnology in 1993 and covered the three trial sitesof Garden City (Mt Gravatt), Chermside Shopping

Centre (Chermside) and K-Mart Plaza(Rockhampton). This report was quickly followed byanother in 1993, covering the three new sites ofMooloolaba Shopping District (Mooloolaba),Westfield Shopping Centre (Strathpine) and PacificFair Shopping Centre (Gold Coast) (QPS 1993).

The data sources used for these evaluations includeda survey of shoppers conducted before and afterestablishing the shopfront, interviews with police,interviews with shop managers and shopping centremanagers, and analysis of offences.

Both these evaluations demonstrated overwhelmingsupport from the community and shop managers forthe implementation of permanent policing services inshopping areas.

More recently, the QPS Review and Evaluation Unitconducted two evaluations of the Shopfront BeatProgram. The first evaluation used a survey of 32shopfronts to gather information on thecharacteristics of shopfronts and any specificchallenges (QPS 2001d). Beat officers reported thattheir greatest challenges came from:

resource restrictions

dealing with the unlawful use of motor vehicles

limited time to do proactive policing due to theoverwhelming reactive workload

a reluctance by retailers and shop security staff towork with relief officers.

Resource restrictions were perceived as primarily theresult of regions not passing on the total shopfrontfunds allocated, which prevented beat officers fromoperating over all core shopping hours. Officerssuggested that:

the number of reactive policing tasks should bereduced

beat officers should be eligible for an operationalshift allowance

the officer in charge should be a sergeant

more training, particularly in administrativeduties and proactive policing, should be provided.

Yet, despite the challenges, shopfront beat officersreported that the program was a success and valuedby all stakeholders.

The second evaluation took the approach ofidentifying the factors that were essential to achievingbest practice in shopfront operation


(QPS 2001e). The methods used in this evaluationincluded a detailed analysis of four of the ‘best’shopfronts and four of the ‘worst’ shopfronts. Thereport pinpointed four sets of key characteristics of a model shopfront:

1 practices that effectively support the concept ofbeat policing — including building andmaintaining positive relationships with beatclients, POPP, exchanging information and ideaswith other shopfront officers and other police,and supportive supervision

2 highly motivated, committed staff who feel asense of ownership for the shopfront and who arecommitted to beat policing

3 location of the shopfront in a medium to largeshopping centre that has substantial, but notoverwhelming, policing problems

4 adequate funding to allow two-officer deploymentduring core shopping hours.

11..55..33 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt eevvaalluuaattiioonnss

The QPS Review and Evaluation Unit has recentlyreleased two evaluations on neighbourhood beatpolicing. The first was based on a survey of allneighbourhood beats operating as of January 2000. Itreported on the characteristics of these beats andexamined barriers to their effectiveness as well assome positive factors (QPS 2001f). The evaluationfound that the most demanding tasks for theneighbourhood beat officers were:

managing their time in order to perform a diverse range of tasks

working with particular groups within thecommunity such as juveniles and Indigenouspeople.

Neighbourhood beat officers believed that it wasbeneficial to have the beat office located close totrouble spots and close to the division police station,and for the beat to have clearly defined boundaries.They also believed that the distinction between therole of general duties police and beat officers neededto be more clearly defined while at the same timeliaison and cooperation between beat officers andgeneral duties officers needed to be improved.

The second evaluation identified the factorsnecessary for achieving best practice in neighbour-hood beat policing and used the same methodologyas the shopfront evaluation by comparing three of the‘worst’ and three of the ‘best’ neighbourhood beats

(QPS 2002). It pinpointed five essential elements ofbest practice:

1 effective service delivery

2 the right beat officer

3 effective supervision

4 suitable beat area

5 appropriate infrastructure.

The QPS advises that they are working towardsaddressing many of the issues raised from theseprevious evaluations of neighbourhood beats.

11..55..44 WWeesstt EEnndd PPoolliiccee BBeeaatt eevvaalluuaattiioonn

Another model of beat policing is the ‘beat policestation’ or split-force model of beat policing in whichseveral beat officers operate from one location buteach retains responsibility and ownership fordesignated geographical areas. All officers working ina beat police station are beat officers. An example ofsuch a beat police station is West End Police Beat(WEPB), which was established in 1995 as the firstinner-city police beat.

In 1996, the CJC evaluated the WEPB. Theevaluation focused on four key questions:

1 To what extent did the WEPB pilot projectincrease community satisfaction with policingservices?

In short …

The central characteristic of beat policing is aneffective service-delivery model that uses a problem-oriented approach and builds partnerships with thecommunities to address local problems. Theprovision of effective service delivery is supported byhaving a beat officer who is committed, able to workautonomously and preferably at the rank of SeniorConstable. The beat officer must be supported by aneffective supervisor who understands beat policingand ensures the officer undertakes a balance ofreactive and proactive activities while allowing theofficer sufficient autonomy. The beat area should besituated in a neighbourhood with natural boundariesto assist the officer in building a sense of communityand must be small enough to be patrolled easily bythe officer. Finally, the house, office and equipmentmust be sufficient for the job and of a standard thatwill attract and retain officers.



3 Were community-based solutions to problemsdeveloped and applied by the beat officers?

3 To what extent has the WEPB improved the levelof job satisfaction for beat officers?

4 Has the WEPB increased the acceptance of beatpolicing by other police?

The WEPB evaluation used various data sourcesincluding community surveys, a service users survey,calls-for-service data, interviews with police, andactivity logs. It found that the integration of the beatofficers into the West End police station facilitatedcommunication between beat officers and generalduties police and assisted in the effectiveness of thepilot project. The beat officers did engage in the typeof work proposed by the pilot proposal, but the sizeof the beat area was too large for the beat officers tobe the main providers of policing services as wasdesired. While the WEPB did make progress inidentifying community problems and developingappropriate solutions, there was no differencebetween community satisfaction with either beatofficers or general duties officers. However, at thetime of the evaluation, the WEPB had not beenoperating long.

SSuummmmaarryy

Beat policing in Queensland began in theearly 1990s in response to an emergingphilosophy of community policing and to arecommendation by the Fitzgerald Inquiry.Neighbourhood beats and shopfronts are theprimary models of beat policing in this State,though there is considerable variance in theapplication of these models in the field. Anumber of evaluations have been conductedon beat policing in Queensland. Some of theevaluations have included comparisons withsimilar areas that do not have a police beat,and most of the studies have used a widevariety of data sources. The currentevaluation brings together a range ofmethodological strategies in providing acomprehensive study of beat policing inQueensland.

The next chapter provides information on themethodology employed in this study.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 22: METHODOLOGY_______99

This evaluation is based on a detailed analysisof six police beats: four neighbourhood beatsand two shopfronts. Three of the neighbourhoodbeats and the two shopfronts were matched witha comparison location that did not have theservices of a beat officer. Differences betweenbeats and comparison locations on a range ofoutcome measures helped evaluate the overalleffectiveness of beat policing.

22..11 KKeeyy eevvaalluuaattiioonn qquueessttiioonnss

1. Is beat policing effective?

In other words, is it having any impact on crimetrends and community perceptions of crime andsafety?

2. Is beat policing cost-effective?

Does it make good use of finite police resources?We examined how beat policing was beingimplemented and managed, and looked at thecosts of providing a specific community with abeat office. This is particularly important giventhe increasing demand for beat-policing servicesthroughout the State.

3. Are community members satisfied with, anddo they support, the beat-policing program?

Without community support, beat policingcannot be a success.

22..22 MMeetthhooddoollooggiiccaall ssttrraatteeggyy

Essentially, the strategy involved identifying andselecting a sample of police beats from whichquantitative and qualitative data were collected,analysed and compared to matched comparisonlocations. We:

1 used information gathered through a series of in-depth interviews with key communitystakeholders and police personnel to identifythemes relevant to beat policing and to constructvarious surveys

2 identified a set of beat areas and comparisonlocations for in-depth analysis

Specific beat-policing sites were selected to cover variations in beat locations, beat modelsand beat histories. For example, some chosensites had been established for a long time, othersquite recently. Comparison locations wereselected because of their similarity to the selectedbeats — apart from not having a beat operating inthe area. Areas were matched on key demo-graphic criteria using census data. We adopted arigorous methodological approach that involvedthe use of a matched-pair research design toassess and compare the impact of beat policing inthe selected beats to the impact of general dutiespolicing in non-beat locations.

3 undertook a longitudinal analysis of one of theselected beats and comparison locations.

This analysis examined significant changes in thenumber of calls for service since the beat wasestablished. Issues such as citizens’ perceptions ofcommunity safety in a beat and comparisonlocation in 2002 could be compared with citizens’perceptions in the same locations in 1994. Thisapproach allowed for a powerful assessment ofthe impact of beat policing in that particularjurisdiction. Depending on the representativenessof the beat selected, the results would be relevantto other beat-policing sites throughout the State.

TThhrreeee kkeeyy qquueessttiioonnss::

11 IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg eeffffeeccttiivvee??

22 IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg ccoosstt--eeffffeeccttiivvee??

33 AArree ccoommmmuunniittyy mmeemmbbeerrss ssaattiissffiieeddwwiitthh,, aanndd ddoo tthheeyy ssuuppppoorrtt,, tthhee bbeeaatt--ppoolliicciinngg pprrooggrraamm??

Chapter 2: Methodology

1100_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 22: METHODOLOGY

22..33 SSiittee sseelleeccttiioonn aanndd ddeessccrriippttiioonn

Specific criteria were used to select the locations andcare was taken to ensure that the sample reflected arange of beats.

Selection criteria for the sample beats were:

the beat must have been operating for at least 12months

the beat officer must have been in the position forat least 12 months

the beats chosen must represent geographicdiversity, including a mix of regional/metropolitanand southern/northern sites

data for the beat were readily available, reliableand accurate, and

identifiable comparison locations were available.

Due to commercial and community sensitivities, for thepurpose of this report the name and location of eachneighbourhood beat and shopfront will be identified by aregional or geographic designation only. One of the twoToowoomba Neighbourhood Beats has been included in theevaluation to allow for comparisons with informationcollected during previous evaluations.

The following beats were chosen for analysis:

1 Regional Neighbourhood Beat (Far NorthernRegion). This beat, established in 1999, isprobably most representative of the pureneighbourhood beat model because it is staffedby a single officer who resides and works out of ahouse located in a defined residential suburb. Thebeat is situated north of Cairns with a populationof under 5000 people. The population fluctuatesduring the holiday season as it is a popularholiday destination offering resorts and motels.The area is also popular with youth fromsurrounding districts who congregate along theesplanade, particularly on weekend nights.

2 Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat(Metropolitan North Region). Established in1999 in a Northern Brisbane suburban area, thisbeat is staffed by two senior constables. Oneofficer lives with his family at the beat residencewhile the other lives a short distance away inanother Service-provided house. The beat hasunder 7000 people and includes a small shoppingcomplex, two primary schools and a high school.The initial boundaries of the beat did not include

the high school, but after lobbying by the localcommunity the beat area was expanded toincorporate the school and surrounds in 2000.

3 Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beat (SouthernRegion). This site was chosen for this evaluationbecause it is the original neighbourhood beatestablished in Toowoomba in 1993 and thereforecould provide data to help assess changes in theeffectiveness of beat policing. The beat remains asingle-officer residential beat with a population ofabout 5000.

4 Outer Urban Neighbourhood Beat (SouthEastern Region). This beat was established in1999 and is an example of a police beat stationthat operates out of a shopfront site. There arefour officers stationed at the beat, which has apopulation of about 8000. There are about 20shops and two primary schools within the beat.

5 Regional Police Beat Shopfront (NorthernRegion). This shopfront, established in 1995, issituated in a large shopping centre and is staffedby two senior constables and one civilianadministrative officer.

6 Metropolitan Police Beat Shopfront(Metropolitan South Region). Established in2000, this shopfront is situated at one of theentrances to a large Brisbane suburban shoppingcentre. The beat is staffed by one full-time seniorconstable, a rotating constable position, and onecivilian administrative officer.

Figure 2.1 shows the location of each of the beatsassessed in this evaluation. (See also Appendix 1.)

22..44 BBeeaattss aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn ssiitteess

To gain a more thorough understanding of thesebeats, we analysed beat policing using a matched-pairdesign. This approach allowed us to compareoutcomes of beat policing with outcomes oftraditional policing in similar neighbourhoods orshopping centres. The use of a matched-pair designallowed some of the confounding factors such asdemographic variables (e.g. gender, income) to becontrolled. Thus, it helped us see whether thepresence of beat policing in a community wassystematically affecting outcomes.

Comparison areas were selected for all neighbourhoodbeats, except one, and for both shopfronts. (Acomparison area was not selected for the Outer Urban


Beat because of the heterogeneous mix of shops andresidential homes and the limited time frame of theevaluation period.) Using census data, comparisonareas were matched to neighbourhood beats ondemographic characteristics: age, gender, income,unemployment and ratings from the SocioeconomicIndex for Areas. Because most larger shopping centresin Queensland have a shopfront, it was difficult to findcomparison shopping centres that matched on everydimension. However, suitable comparison sites werefound for both shopfronts. Table 2.1 shows the beatsand their comparison area or centre.

22..55 DDaattaa ssoouurrcceess

Measuring the effectiveness of policing is notoriouslydifficult. The task is even more daunting whenevaluating a model of policing that seeks to combinereactive and community-policing objectives. Relianceon an analysis of crime rates alone can give rise tomisleading conclusions regarding overall programeffectiveness. Therefore, this evaluation draws ondata that were collected from various sources,including interviews, surveys, detailed activityschedules, reported crime and calls for service. Thereport provides a comprehensive analysis throughcollating information from internal police sources,the community and key stakeholders.

22..55..11 IInntteerrvviieewwss

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 34key police personnel, comprising 10 beat officers,6 district officers, 6 divisional officers in charge,5 regional assistant commissioners, the police beatState Coordinator, and a further 6 police officersassociated with the early development of beatpolicing.1 Questions related to the daily work of beatofficers, resource requirements, problem-solvinginitiatives, partnership building, and management.

As part of the evaluation of shopfronts, weinterviewed shopping centre managers at beat centresand comparison shopping centres. We asked themwhat they thought of shopfronts and, in the case ofcomparison shopping centres, general police services.

As part of the evaluation of neighbourhood beats, weinterviewed key stakeholders such as the policeminister and shadow police minister, local and statepoliticians, school principals and local business-promotion organisations. Approximately 60 hours ofinterviews were conducted and analysed.2

FFiigguurree 22..11.. MMaapp ooff sseelleecctteedd bbeeaattss

Source: QPS organisational units mapping data 2002.

TTaabbllee 22..11.. SSeelleecctteedd bbeeaattss aanndd tthheeiirr rreessppeeccttiivveeccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa//cceennttrree

BBeeaatt CCoommppaarriissoonn

Regional Regional comparison areaNeighbourhood Beat

Metropolitan Metropolitan comparison areaNeighbourhood Beat

Toowoomba Toowoomba comparison areaNeighbourhood Beat

Regional Shopfront Regional comparison shoppingcentre

Metropolitan Shopfront Metropolitan comparison shopping centre

Regional Beat

Regional Shopfront

Metro Beat

Metro Shopfront

Outer Urban Beat

Toowoomba Beat

1 The opinions expressed by individual officers duringinterviews may not necessarily represent the officialposition or opinion of the QPS.

2 For the analysis we used NUD*IST (Non-numericalUnstructured Data Indexing Searching andTheorising) software.


22..55..22 SSuurrvveeyyss ooff kkeeyy cclliieenntt ggrroouuppss

We surveyed key stakeholders, including communitymembers, retailers, and shoppers. Appendixes 4–8contain copies of all surveys used for the evaluation.

CCoommmmuunniittyy ssuurrvveeyy

We engaged the Office of Economic and StatisticalResearch (OESR) to survey by telephone 200randomly selected community members in eachneighbourhood beat and comparison area. About1400 people aged 18 years or over who wereresidents in private dwellings and who were listed in the electronic White Pages provided information to gauge the perception of community members on a range of policing issues. The telephone surveyincluded measures of:

perceptions of the neighbourhood in terms ofcrime and disorder problems

perceptions of police

perceptions of crime

experiences reporting crime

knowledge of, and experience and satisfactionwith, beat officers (beat areas only).

See Appendix 3 for the precise measures included inthe analysis.

The response rates for each area ranged from 40 to61 per cent, with an average response rate across allareas of 52 per cent. The average time taken tocomplete each telephone interview was 9 minutes forbeats and 8 minutes for comparison areas.

The survey was well received and respondentsappeared comfortable talking about police in theirlocal area. (See Table 2.2 for a detailed summary ofdemographic characteristics of the residents whoparticipated in the survey.) Respondents in beats andcomparison sites did not differ in age, gender, or thelength of time living in the community. There was asignificant difference between residents in terms ofeducation levels, with more respondents incomparison areas having a degree or higher degreethan respondents in neighbourhood beats.3 There wasalso a significant difference between the maritalstatus of respondents in beats and comparison areas.4

Respondents from a neighbourhood beat were morelikely to have never married (19 per cent) comparedwith respondents in the comparison area (13 percent).5

Demographic information for each of the neighbour-hood beats and their respective comparison areas isreported in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 (pages 15–17).Table 2.6 (page 18) presents demographiccharacteristics for the Outer Urban Beat.

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.3 showmarked similarity in the demographic characteristicsacross the Metropolitan Neighbourhood Beat and itscomparison area; however, there was a significantdifference in the marital status of respondents,6 withthere being more respondents at the MetropolitanNeighbourhood Beat (20 per cent) who had neverbeen married than in the comparison area (10 percent).

Despite the similarity in demographic criteria in theRegional Neighbourhood Beat and its comparisonarea (see Table 2.4, page 16), two significantdifferences were observed:

1 The age category of respondents between the twodiffered significantly,7 with more 18- to 34-year-old respondents at Regional Neighbourhood Beat(21 per cent) than at its comparison area (11 percent).

2 Regional Neighbourhood Beat also differed inrelation to respondents’ highest education level,8

with fewer respondents having a degree or higherdegree (20 per cent compared to 32 per cent).

Analysis of the demographic information of residentssurveyed in the the Toowoomba Neighbourhood Beatand its comparison area revealed no significantdifferences. Compared with the RegionalNeighbourhood Beat and its comparison area, thepopulation of these areas tends to be older withalmost half of residents being in the over 55-year agebracket.

3 chi2 = 14.68, p < .05

4 chi2 = 9.48, p < .05

5 Beats and comparison areas were originally matchedusing census data. Demographic information on the200 residents randomly selected for the telephonesurvey in each location may not necessarily representthe views of all residents in the area, which is evidentfrom the response rates.

6 chi2 = 8.88, p < .056

7 chi2 = 8.92, p < .05

8 chi2 = 14.65, p < .05


TTaabbllee 22..22.. DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff rreessiiddeennttss iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaass

DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc vvaarriiaabblleess NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt CCoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa%% ((nn)) %% ((nn))

AAggee18–34 years 22 (183) 18 (112)35–54 years 45 (372) 46 (281)> 55 years 33 (278) 36 (221)

GGeennddeerrMale 42 (350) 41 (254)Female 58 (483) 59 (360)

IInnddiiggeennoouuss 1 (11) 1 (7)

YYeeaarrss lliivveedd iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd< 1 year 3 (27) 5 (30)1–2 years 13 (110) 12 (71)3–5 years 20 (170) 19 (116)6–10 years 21 (175) 20 (120)> 10 years 42 (351) 45 (277)

TTyyppee ooff ddwweelllliinnggDetached house 87 (728) 92 (564)Semi-detached/unit/townhouse 12 (105) 8 (50)

DDwweelllliinngg tteennuurreeOwn/mortgage 74 (614) 79 (485)Rented/other 27 (219) 21 (129)

EEmmppllooyymmeennttFull-time work 32 (269) 33 (202)Part-time work 12 (97) 13 (77)Casual work 6 (49) 7 (45)Self-employed 6 (52) 6 (38)Unemployed 1 (11) 1 (8)Student 3 (23) 3 (17)Home duties 11 (89) 11 (65)Retired 24 (199) 24 (145)Sick/disability pension 4 (36) 2 (11)Other 1 (7) 1 (3)

EEdduuccaattiioonnNo formal education 1 (5) 0.3 (2)Primary 12 (101) 11 (68)Junior secondary 25 (204) 25 (153)Senior secondary 19 (161) 16 (98)Certificate/trade 31 (261) 29 (177)Degree or higher degree 12 (101) 19 (116)

MMaarriittaall ssttaattuussMarried/de facto 57 (476) 64 (390)Separated/divorced 15 (122) 15 (90)Widowed 9 (78) 9 (53)Never married 19 (157) 13 (81)

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: Community Survey 2002, OESR.


RReettaaiilleerrss ssuurrvveeyyss

Surveys were distributed by hand to all retailers inthe Metropolitan and Regional Shopfront shoppingcentres, and also to retailers in comparison shoppingcentres (i.e. centres without a shopfront). Retailerswere able to remain anonymous and were asked toreturn the completed survey to the CMC in a reply-paid envelope.

The survey for the shopfront centres includedquestions on perceptions of safety, awareness of theshopfront, recognition of the beat officers, use ofshopfront services, and satisfaction with thoseservices. The survey of the comparison centresincluded questions about perceptions of safety,contact with police, satisfaction with police, andwhether they were aware of and supported theconcept of beat policing.

Approximately 40 per cent of retailers in shopfrontcentres returned surveys, providing a total of 155responses. The response rate for retailers incomparison shopping centres was approximately 31per cent, providing 54 returned surveys. The majority(74 per cent) of retailers responding to the surveyhad been operating the business for more than oneyear in both the shopfront centres and comparisoncentres.

SShhooppppeerrss ssuurrvveeyyss

In each of the four shopping centres, 200 people (atotal of 800 shoppers) were approached while theywere shopping and asked to fill out a survey onpolicing and safety issues.

In the shopfront centres the survey included questionsassessing respondents’ perceptions of safety whileshopping, their awareness of the shopfront, whetherthey had ever used the shopfront, and their satisfactionwith the service they received from the officer. In thecomparison shopping centres the survey includedquestions assessing respondents’ perceptions of safetywhile shopping, whether they had contact with thepolice in the last 12 months, and whether they weresatisfied with the service they received.

The Metropolitan survey was conducted on 9 and 14September 2002, and its comparison centre on 17and 18 September 2002.

The Regional survey was conducted on 23 and 24September 2002, and its comparison centre on 24and 25 September 2002.

The data collection at the Metropolitan shopfrontcentre was conducted over one weekday and oneweekend day to ensure representativeness of the typeof respondents. Preliminary analysis of the datarevealed no difference between respondents on theweekday and weekend day. Consequently, it wasconsidered acceptable to conduct the survey onweekdays for the other three sites.

Approximately 60 per cent of shoppers at theMetropolitan shopfront centre were female andapproximately 75 per cent shopped at the centreregularly. A similar proportion of shoppers atshopfront centres (4.3 per cent) and comparisonshopping centres (3.3 per cent) indicated that theyhad been a victim of crime while shopping at thatparticular shopping centre.

22..55..33 CCaallllss--ffoorr--sseerrvviiccee ddaattaa

Calls from the public for police assistance are routedthrough Police Communications and police are thendispatched to jobs using a computer dispatch system.The calls-for-service data used in this evaluationwere collected from 1 January to 30 June in 2001and 2002, which allowed for an analysis acrossmultiple periods. About 140 000 calls were availablefor analysis across beats and comparison locations.

Because the QPS has two distinct systems for storingcalls-for-service information, we could not compareareas directly. However, regardless of the system, it ispossible to extract the type of job (both how it isreported by the complainant and how it is verified bythe officer), the officers or unit attending the job,and the time spent by the unit on the scene.

22..55..44 CCRRIISSPP ddaattaa

The QPS supplied 420 000 records from the CrimeReporting Information System for Police (CRISP). ACRISP report provides official information regardingreported crime. A CRISP report often, but notexclusively, results from a call for service. The datasupplied cover the first six months of both 2001 and2002, for both the beats and comparison areas.


TTaabbllee 22..33.. DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff rreessiiddeennttss iinn tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc vvaarriiaabblleess MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt CCoommppaarriissoonn AArreeaa

%% ((nn)) %% ((nn))








EEdduuccaattiioonnNo formal education 0 (0) 1 (1)Primary 7 (15) 8 (15)Junior secondary 27 (57) 27 (54)Senior secondary 24 (52) 20 (40)Certificate/trade 36 (77) 31 (62)Degree or higher degree 6 (12) 14 (29)





TTaabbllee 22..44.. DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff rreessiiddeennttss iinn tthhee RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaattaanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc vvaarriiaabblleess RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt CCoommppaarriissoonn AArreeaa

%% ((nn)) %% ((nn))













TTaabbllee 22..55.. DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff rreessiiddeennttss iinn tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaattaanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc vvaarriiaabblleess TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt CCoommppaarriissoonn AArreeaa

%% ((nn)) %% ((nn))













Crime-report counting rules used throughout thisreport are based on the Australian National Class-ification of Offences (ANCO). However, for officerworkloads (see Chapter 6), the total number ofCRISPs has been used rather than the ANCOcounting rules.

22..55..55 SSuurrvveeyyss ooff ppoolliiccee aaccttiivviittyy

We conducted a series of surveys designed to gaugeaspects of beat policing, including officer attitudesand the time devoted to specific work activities.

WWoorrkk aaccttiivviittyy rreeppoorrttss aanndd ooccccuurrrreennccee sshheeeettss

Some jobs an officer attends are not recorded as aCRISP report, as the job may be generated fromdirect community contact or self-generated by theofficer. Therefore, it is important to use anothersource of information to ensure that all of the beatofficer’s workload is accounted for.

The first source for this type of information isoccurrence sheets, which are completed by alloperational police officers and record significantevents that the officers engage in. Each of the beatofficers from the six sample sites was asked toprovide their occurrence sheets for June 2002. Acomparison between a beat officer’s occurrencesheets and calls-for-service data should capture someof those activities that are not identified within theusual police-recording system.

An additional source of information was the WorkActivity Report (WAR), a measure we developed togather information about the number and type ofcommunity contacts by beat officers. All the officersfrom the six sample beats were required to completea WAR over five shifts during October 2002.

SSttaatteewwiiddee AAccttiivviittyy SSuurrvveeyy

Another source of workload data used was theStatewide Activity Survey, or SWAS. The SWAS is aregular assessment of the amount of policing timedirected to 35 core policing activities. The dataincluded in the analysis were collected by the QPSbetween 27 May and 2 June 2002.

SWAS provides an indication of the length of timeofficers spend on particular tasks, enabling us toevaluate how a typical beat officer’s day differs fromthat of a general duties officer. SWAS data were alsoused to obtain the actual numbers (as opposed tomodel staffing numbers) of officers at constable and

TTaabbllee 22..66.. DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc cchhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss ooff rreessiiddeennttss iinntthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

DDeemmooggrraapphhiicc vvaarriiaabblleess OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

%% ((nn))

AAggee18–34 years 24 (53)35–54 years 41 (89)> 55 years 35 (77)

GGeennddeerrMale 44 (97)Female 56 (122)

IInnddiiggeennoouuss 1 (2)

YYeeaarrss lliivveedd iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd< 1 year 2 (5)1–2 years 17 (37)3–5 years 21 (45)6–10 years 27 (60)> 10 years 33 (72)

TTyyppee ooff ddwweelllliinnggDetached house 83 (182)Semi-detached/unit/townhouse 17 (37)

DDwweelllliinngg tteennuurreeOwn/mortgage 62 (136)Rented/other 38 (83)

EEmmppllooyymmeennttFull-time work 28 (60)Part-time work 11 (25)Casual work 6 (13)Self-employed 5 (11)Unemployed 3 (6)Student 1 (3)Home duties 13 (29)Retired 25 (54)Sick/disability pension 7 (15)Other 1 (3)

EEdduuccaattiioonnNo formal education 1 (3)Primary 14 (31)Junior secondary 26 (56)Senior secondary 16 (36)Certificate/trade 31 (67)Degree or higher degree 12 (26)

MMaarriittaall ssttaattuussMarried/de facto 53 (115)Separated/divorced 19 (42)Widowed 8 (17)Never married 21 (45)




senior constable rank at divisional stations. Thisinformation was used to calculate workload levels interms of CRISP reports and calls for service for thesegeneral duties officers.

The response rate for SWAS was 95 per cent. About20 per cent of beats were not represented and so theanalysis was based on data from 90 constables andsenior constables from beats, along with about 2000general duties officers of similar ranks. SWAS datainclude information on rank, officer type (i.e. generalduties, Criminal Investigation Branch etc.) andlocation of the employee. Unless otherwise specified,all analyses performed on SWAS data were for swornofficers at constable and senior constable rank.

SSttaatteewwiiddee BBeeaatt OOffffiicceerr SSuurrvveeyy

In October 2002, we surveyed all officers in chargeof shopfronts and neighbourhood beats acrossQueensland (see Appendix 8), asking them to report:

their reasons for becoming a beat officer

their main roles and functions

their job satisfaction

their equipment/facility needs

any suggestions they might have for improvingbeat policing in Queensland.

Sixty surveys were returned from the 68 beats. Twoof the returned surveys were not included in theanalysis because both officers had been at the beatfor one month or less. The response rate was: 68 percent for neighbourhood beats (17 of 25) and 95 percent for shopfronts (41 of 43). Seventy-two per centof the respondents were senior constables, 23 percent were constables, and 5 per cent were sergeants.The average time served in the QPS was 9.5 years.

22..55..66 DDooccuummeennttss

We also examined the Standing OperatingProcedures and Guidelines for Police Beat Proposals.

22..66 DDaattaa ccoonnssttrraaiinnttss

22..66..11 CCaallllss--ffoorr--sseerrvviiccee ddaattaa

Calls-for-service data are an extremely valuablesource of information; however, reliability remains amajor challenge. Generally, a call must be entered bythe communications room of the relevant area inorder to appear on the calls-for-service database

(sometimes referred to as the CFS database).Activities initiated by the officer, or ‘flag downs’initiated by the complainant, often do not appear onthe system. While this may be a problem for generalduties police, it is a bigger problem for beat officersbecause of the higher levels of autonomy. To correctfor this potential problem, occurrence sheets andwork activity reports were used to provide a morecomplete picture of workloads.

A further limitation of calls-for-service data is theaccuracy of geographical analysis. However, mappedinformation is considered to be 95 per cent accurate.9

22..66..22 CCRRIISSPP ddaattaa

A problem with CRISP data is that the reporting ratefor offences can vary according to both the type ofthe offence and the victim’s characteristics. Also,having a highly visible and approachable policeofficer can increase the reporting rate. Officers withhigh levels of autonomy and ownership of problemsmay choose to use informal resolution fordiscretionary offences. Such use of discretion coulddecrease the number of CRISP reports within thebeat. Similarly, it is possible that increasedproactivity may decrease the number of CRISPreports — particularly for repeat addresses orvictims.

Hence, we took particular care during thegeographical analysis of data to ensure that allCRISP reports with a valid address were mapped.CRISP reports without information on an address orprecise location could not be identified and mapped.However, as with data on calls for service, themapped information was considered to be 95 percent accurate.

9 The mapped information used in this report wasmapped using standard street network base maps,which means information can only be consideredaccurate to the individual street segment. In somecases, addresses in the database are consideredcomplete enough to fix a point only somewhere on thestreet. In all cases, mapped information has beenexamined for inaccuracies and corrections have beenmade. About 3.5 per cent of the information was notable to be mapped due to deficiencies in the data. Ahigh proportion of this information was probably notwithin the beat or comparison area, as these recordsusually refer to unusual addresses, such as a beach orhead-land. In sum, all records with sufficientgeographical information to approximately identify alocation within the beat or comparison area weremapped.


22..77 DDaattaa aannaallyyssiiss

For all quantitative data, each selected beat wascompared to its respective comparison site.Descriptive statistics were used to examine thefrequency of responses to survey questions. Statisticalcomparisons between beats and comparison locationswere made to assess possible differences acrosslocations on measures of central significance.Statistical procedures employed included chi square

tests and independent sample t-tests, depending onthe type of data examined (e.g. nominal, interval).

Crime and calls-for-service data were converted torate per 100 000 population and comparisons madebetween each selected beat and its respectivecomparison location. Crime data were separated intotwo categories: all crime and property crime. To assistin statistical analyses, crime and calls-for-service datacollected for six-monthly periods were converted forpart of the analysis into monthly averages. For thelongitudinal analysis, data from the Toowoomba Beatwere compared to data from the original ToowoombaBeat evaluation in order to identify significantchanges in community perceptions of safety and callsfor service over time.

Qualitative data collected through taped interviewswere transcribed and entered into NUD*ISTsoftware for analysis. Other qualitative data collectedfrom surveys were summarised to allow theidentification of the main themes being expressed byrespondents.

See Table 2.7 for a summary of the main elements ofthe evaluation.

The official crime data used in thisevaluation are based on crime reported to, ordiscovered by, the police. Reported crimerepresents a subset of the total number ofcrimes occurring in an area.

It is important to acknowledge that increasesin reported crime in an area may reflectpositive aspects of police activity. Forexample, citizens may have easier access topolice or may have more confidence inreporting an incident to police.


TTaabbllee 22..77.. KKeeyy eevvaalluuaattiioonn qquueessttiioonnss

QQuueessttiioonn 11:: IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg eeffffeeccttiivvee??

Impact evaluation

— The rate of crimes reported in beat and non-beat areas

— The number of crimes reported in beat and non-beat areas

— The number of personal, property or other crime in beat and non-beat areas

— The rate of personal, property or other crime in beat and non-beat areas

— Perceptions of crime in beat and non-beat areas

— Perceptions of safety in beat and non-beat areas

Process evaluation

— Site selection

— Role and rostering of beat officers

— Proactive problem-solving

— Organisational support for beat policing

— Overall beat officer job satisfaction

QQuueessttiioonn 22:: IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg ccoosstt--eeffffeeccttiivvee??

— Average number of calls for service for beat officers and general duties officers

— Average number of CRISPs for beat officers and general duties officers

— Time spent undertaking problem-oriented policing activities by beat officers

and general duties officers

— Cost per call for service by a beat officer and general duties officer

QQuueessttiioonn 33:: AArree ccoommmmuunniittyy mmeemmbbeerrss ssaattiissffiieedd wwiitthh,, aanndd//oorr ssuuppppoorrttiivvee ooff,, tthhee bbeeaatt--ppoolliicciinngg pprrooggrraamm??

— Satisfaction with neighbourhood beat policing

— Satisfaction with shopfront beat policing

— Awareness of beat policing

— Recognition of, and contact with, beat officers

SSoouurrcceess ooff ddaattaa• CRISP

• Interviews with beat officers andsupervisors

• Community survey

• Shoppers survey

• Retailers survey

• Interviews with key stakeholders

SSoouurrcceess ooff ddaattaa• Interviews with beat officers and

supervisors


• QPS policies and procedures

SSoouurrcceess ooff ddaattaa

• Calls for service


• QPS policies and procedures

• CRISP

• Weekly activity report

• SWAS

• Occurrence sheets

SSoouurrcceess ooff ddaattaa

• Community survey


• Shoppers survey

• CRISP

• Retailers survey

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 33: IMPACT ON CRIME AND CALLS FOR SERVICE_______2233

The central question examined in this chapteris: does beat policing reduce crime acrosscommunities and in shopping centres?

While beat policing is certainly about reducing repeatcalls for service and improving police–communityinteraction, at its core it is about reducing crime.Beat policing is expected to have an impact on crime,in part because officers embark on proactive,preventive strategies, and in part because officersprovide a visible police presence in the community orshopping centre. In this chapter, we:

1 report on the average monthly rate of overallreported crime and reported property crime ineach neighbourhood beat and comparison area —we did not conduct a separate analysis of crimesagainst the person, because of the low number ofthis type of crime occurring within the areasunder study

2 examine the average monthly rate of overallreported crime and reported property crime inshopfronts and comparison sites — once again,we did not examine crimes against the personbecause of their relatively low rate of occurrence

3 examine the rate of calls for service — not allcalls for service relate to crime, and, therefore, donot result in a CRISP report; thus, measuringcalls for service provides additional informationon police activity that is not captured bymeasuring reported crime. An analysis of calls-for-service data is provided only for neighbour-hood beats and comparison areas. An analysis ofcalls for service at shopfronts was not conductedbecause an initial analysis of data revealed that asignificant number of calls for service toshopfronts were not appearing on the QPS

database. Accordingly, it was not possible toperform meaningful analyses of calls for service atshopfronts for the periods under examination.10

4 examine and compare the average monthly rate ofcalls for service in Toowoomba in the periodsJanuary–June 1994 and January–June 2002, andpresent results from an examination of changes inthe number of crime hot spots over time.

The majority of the analyses presented in thischapter assesses change across two periods, separatedby 12 months. The inclusion of one of the originalToowoomba beat-policing pilot sites allowed us toexamine changes in calls for service across a muchlonger period.

MMaaiinn ffiinnddiinnggss::

• rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee ffeellll aaccrroossss aallll nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

• sshhooppffrroonnttss hhaadd nnoo aappppaarreenntt iimmppaaccttoonn tthhee rraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee

•• ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee aanndd tthhee nnuummbbeerr ooffcchhrroonniicc rreeppeeaatt aaddddrreesssseess aattTToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt ddeeccrreeaasseedd..

10 See Chapter 6 for an examination of the workload ofbeat officers over the month of June 2002.

Chapter 3: Impact on crime and calls for service

2244_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 33: IMPACT ON CRIME AND CALLS FOR SERVICE

It should be noted at this point that various factorscan affect trends in reported crime rates, such aspolice initiatives that may increase crime reporting,increased offender activity, school holiday periods,and peak tourist times. The selection of comparisonsites limits to a large extent the impact of thoseinfluences on reported crime rates.

33..11 RRaattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee:: nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss aannddccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaass

We gathered CRISP data on the type and place ofoffence for each police district that contained theselected beat or comparison area. These data werethen mapped, and offences that fell within the beator comparison area were analysed to determine theimpact of beat policing on reported crime across twosix-month periods. The analysis was broken into twocomponents: all crime and property crime.

33..11..11 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss:: oovveerraallll rreeppoorrtteeddccrriimmee

The first series of analyses was of all CRISP reportstaken by officers, excluding those that were largelydiscretionary or generated by the officer.11 The actualnumber of crime reports was converted to mean ratesper 100 000 population so that comparisons could bemade between neighbourhood beats and theircomparison areas. The average monthly rate ofCRISP reports at each neighbourhood beat forJanuary to June 2001 was compared to the averagemonthly rate of CRISP reports for January to June2002. The same periods were used for eachcomparison area.

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

As can be seen in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, theMetropolitan Beat had a higher rate of reported crimethan its comparison area. Additionally, a reduction inreported crime was observed in the beat area, but notin the comparison area. Although these changes are notstatistically significant, they are substantiallyinteresting. For example, between 2001 and 2002, theaverage monthly rate of reported crime declined in theMetropolitan Beat by 5 per cent, whereas it increasedby 40 per cent in the comparison area. In raw figures,they equate to a decrease of 7 crime reports in theMetropolitan Beat and an increase of 26 reports in thecomparison area.

RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

Results reported in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 showthat over the study period, the average monthly rateof reported crime fell in the Regional Beat by 43 percent, which equates to 50 fewer crime reports in thefirst six months of 2002 compared to the first sixmonths of 2001. In contrast, the comparison areaexperienced a statistically significant increase of 79per cent in the average monthly rate of reportedcrime, which equates to 48 more crime reports in thesix-month period.

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BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

�

��

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11 Discretionary or officer-generated CRISP reports werenot included because they could have skewed theoverall picture of crime rates. For example, an officermay set up several roadside RBTs (random breathtests) over the course of a week and generate a largenumber of CRISP reports for drink-driving.

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.

TTaabbllee 33..11.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaann

BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022

22000011 22000022 %% tt--tteesstt mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) cchhaannggee

Metropolitan 379 (157.13) 361 (57.79) – 5 0.27

Comparison 176 (82.03) 247 (102.71) 40 1.32

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

As can be seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3, theoverall reported crime trends for the ToowoombaBeat and its comparison area decreased over thestudy period.

Despite the large reductions, only the decline inToowoomba was statistically significant. In terms ofactual crime reports, the Toowoomba Beatexperienced a decline of 85 crime reports over thetwo periods while its comparison area dropped by 46crime reports.

OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

As previously mentioned, a comparison area was notselected for the Outer Urban Beat. Table 3.4 andFigure 3.4 (next page) show that there was a slightdecrease (3 per cent) in reported crime over thestudy period for this beat, equating to a decrease of12 crime reports between the 2001 and 2002 Januaryto June periods.


FFiigguurree 33..33.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt

aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa


TTaabbllee 33..22.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt

aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022

22000011 22000022 %% tt--tteesstt

mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) cchhaannggee

Regional 451 (129.12) 259 (152.47) – 43 2.37*

Comparison 200 (83.97) 358 (95.23) 79 3.04*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002,QPS.

TTaabbllee 33..33 CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaattaanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022

22000011 22000022 %% tt--tteessttmmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) cchhaannggee

Toowoomba 647 (209.15) 377 (87.96) – 42 2.91*

Comparison 662 (200.05) 467 (137.36) – 29 1.96

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


FFiigguurree 33..22.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd

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33..11..22 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss:: rreeppoorrtteedd pprrooppeerrttyyooffffeenncceess

The following analyses used CRISP reports foroffences against property. Property crime representsapproximately 70 per cent of reported crime.


In both periods under study, the Metropolitan Beatexperienced greater levels of reported property crimethan its comparison area (see Table 3.5 and Figure 3.5). However, the Metropolitan Beatexperienced a decrease of 11 per cent in propertycrime, which equates to 14 fewer reported propertyoffences in 2002 compared to 2001.

By contrast, the average monthly reported propertycrime rate in the comparison area increased by 47per cent, which equates to an increase in 27 reportedproperty offences. However, the changes over timewere not statistically significant.

Collectively, some of these processes reflectimportant aspects of beat policing. The consistenttrend across all beats suggests that the presence of aneighbourhood beat may reduce reported crime.

TTaabbllee 33..55.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd pprrooppeerrttyy ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,,JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022

22000011 22000022 %% tt--tteesstt

mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) cchhaannggee

Metropolitan 332 (129.20) 295 (44.35) – 11 0.66

Comparison 157 (74.04) 231 (110.18) 47 1.35

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 33..44 CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann

BBeeaatt,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Outer Urban 839 (275.79) 815 (94.45) – 3 0.20

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


FFiigguurree 33..44.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

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In short ...

Reductions in reported crime were observed across all neighbourhood beats, ranging from 3 to 43 percent. Only in Regional and Toowoomba beats werethe reductions statistically significant. In contrast, areduction in reported crime was observed in only oneof the comparison areas (which was not as marked asin the neighbourhood beats and was not statisticallysignificant), while increases in crime were observedin two of the comparison areas.

Factors that could have reduced reported crime in thestudy areas were:

• the introduction of proactive policing strategies(e.g. targeted problem-solving)

• changing neighbourhood demographics (e.g. age)

• the addition of extra policing services (beat officersand general duties officers), which raised thevisibility of police.



Results reported in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.6 revealquite different trends in reported property crime inthe Regional Beat and its comparison area. Theaverage monthly reported property crime rate at theRegional Beat was higher in 2001. However, this hadchanged dramatically by 2002 with reported propertycrime down by 38 per cent in the Regional Beat andup by 86 per cent in its comparison area. It shouldbe noted that only the change in the comparison areais statistically significant.


Similar to the results for all crime, reported property crime declined in the Toowoomba Beat andits comparison area over the study period (see Table3.7 and Figure 3.7). Between 2001 and 2002, it fellin the Toowoomba Beat by 53 per cent and in thecomparison area by 34 per cent, equating in rawfigures to 97 fewer property crime reports in theToowoomba Beat and 45 fewer in the comparisonarea. These decreases were statistically significant.


RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,,JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Regional 332 (114.06) 205 (140.01) – 38 1.73

Comparison 164 (77.48) 305 (94.69) 86 2.83*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


FFiigguurree 33..55.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd pprrooppeerrttyy ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee


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TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Toowoomba 577 (210.76) 270 (51.65) – 53 3.47**

Comparison 560 (177.70) 371 (81.04) – 34 2.38*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001




The Outer Urban Beat experienced a 13 per centincrease in reported property crime over the period,equating to an increase of 36 reported propertyoffences.This increase was not statisticallysignificant. See Table 3.8 and Figure 3.8.

33..22 RRaattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee:: sshhooppffrroonnttss aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonncceennttrreess

The next series of analyses examines CRISP data inshopfronts and comparison centres. We compared theaverage monthly rate of CRISP reports at eachshopfront for the period January to June 2001 to theaverage monthly rate of CRISP reports duringJanuary to June 2002, and did the same for thecomparison centres.

In short …

There were decreases in reported property crime inall neighbourhood beats (except Outer Urban Beat)during the study period. In two beats, the decreaseoccurred against substantial increases in reportedproperty crime in comparison areas. One comparisonarea demonstrated a fall in reported property crime;however, this was not as marked as the reduction inthe respective neighbourhood beat. On the whole,results from the analysis suggest that neighbourhoodbeats were effective in reducing the rate of reportedproperty offences over the study period.

TTaabbllee 33..88.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd pprrooppeerrttyy ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee OOuutteerr

UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Outer Urban 559 (189.02) 630 (83.15) 13 0.85

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001




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33..22..11 SShhooppffrroonnttss:: oovveerraallll ccrriimmee

This section reports on all CRISP reports taken inshopping centres (excluding those that were largelydiscretionary or officer-generated). Average monthlycrime report rates were calculated on the flow ofshoppers per month.

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonncceennttrree

Figure 3.9 shows that the Metropolitan shopfrontcentre had a higher rate of overall reported crimeduring both periods than did its comparisonshopping centre. However, there were slightdifferences in the trend over time between the twosites (see Table 3.9). At the Metropolitan Shopfront,there was a small increase in reported crime of 5 percent, while the comparison centre experienced a 10per cent decrease. The changes experienced by eachshopping centre were not statistically significant andin raw figures equate to 25 more crime reports at theMetropolitan Shopfront and 11 fewer at thecomparison centre during the study period.

RReeggiioonnaall sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

From January to June 2001 there was very littledifference in the rate of reported crime in theRegional Shopfront and comparison centre.However, by 2002 this situation had changed. SeeFigure 3.10 and Table 3.10. For example, between2001 and 2002 the average monthly rate of reportedcrime at the Regional Shopfront increased by 45 percent, whereas the average monthly rate of reported

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SShhooppffrroonntt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn sshhooppppiinngg cceennttrree,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Metropolitan 8.00 (1.40) 8.44 (1.80) 5 0.47

Comparison 4.86 (1.29) 4.35 (0.96) – 10 0.78

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 33..1100.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff rreeppoorrtteedd ccrriimmee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee RReeggiioonnaall

SShhooppffrroonntt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn sshhooppppiinngg cceennttrree,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Regional 5.79 (1.07) 8.42 (3.67) 45 1.68

Comparison 4.86 (1.01) 5.07 (1.45) 4 0.29

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


crime at the comparison shopping centre hadincreased by 4 per cent. Although the change at theRegional Shopfront was quite large and represents anincrease of 63 actual crime reports, it was notstatistically significant. The increase was due toincreased criminal activity in the shopping centreduring one month of the period of study.

33..22..22 SShhooppffrroonnttss:: pprrooppeerrttyy ooffffeenncceess

The following analyses were conducted on CRISPreports for offences against property. Property crimerepresents about 80 per cent of crime reported toshopfronts.

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann SShhooppffrroonntt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn sshhooppppiinnggcceennttrree

As can be seen in Figure 3.11 and Table 3.11, thereis proportionally a higher number of reportedproperty offences occurring at the MetropolitanShopfront than at the comparison shopping centre.From 2001 to 2002 a small increase of 6 per centwas observed at the Metropolitan Shopfront with acorresponding 6 per cent reduction at the comparisonshopping centre. These changes were not statisticallysignificant. In raw figures, they equate to 26 moreproperty crime reports at the Metropolitan Shopfrontand 6 fewer property crime reports at thecomparison shopping centre.

RReeggiioonnaall SShhooppffrroonntt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

The Regional Shopfront and its comparison centreexperienced increases in reported property crimeover the study period. See Figure 3.12 and Table3.12. The results were marginal at the comparisonshopping centre (4 per cent) while, from 2001 to

2002, the Regional Shopfront experienced anincrease of 43 per cent, which in raw figures equatesto 59 more reports of property crime. However, thisdifference was not statistically significant. As with theoverall reported crime analysis, the increased ratewas due to one month of high crime activity in thecentre.

Increases in the average monthly rate of reportedproperty crime were observed in both shopfront sites,though neither of these increases was statisticallysignificant. One of the comparison sites alsoexperienced a slight increase in reported propertycrime, whereas, in contrast, the other comparison siteexperienced a slight decrease.

In short …

Changes in reported crime at these shopping centreswere quite small, with the exception of one shopfrontcentre where there was a large increase due to adisproportionate amount of criminal activity duringone month of the 2002 study period. None of thechanges in reported crime rates was statisticallysignificant.

There was no evidence that shopfronts had astatistically significant impact on reducing the rate ofreported crime.



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Metropolitan 7.76 (1.47) 8.21 (1.83) 6 0.47

Comparison 4,49 (1.20) 4.21 (0.90) – 6 0.45

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


33..33 RRaattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee::nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss aannddccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaass

For these analyses we used data extracted from eitherthe IMS (Incident Management System) orESCORT CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch system)calls-for-service databases. The analyses are based onall calls for service within the beat and comparisonareas, regardless of the officer attending.

Further analysis of this dataset revealed that mostcalls for service taken by beat officers had not beenentered into the police database. Therefore, theactual rate of calls for service within beat areas islikely to be greater than that shown below. Despitethis, an assessment of calls for service is still of greatbenefit as, unlike CRISP records, officers have littleroom for discretion in attending a call for service.


During the 2001 and 2002 study periods, theMetropolitan Beat received more calls for servicethan did the the comparison area. However, bothexperienced a slight reduction in the average monthlyrate of calls for service. Neither of the changes wassignificant and equated to 10 fewer calls in theMetropolitan Beat and 19 fewer calls in thecomparison area. See Table 3.13 (below) and Figure3.13 (next page).

In short ...

There was no evidence that shopfronts reduced thelevel of property crime in shopping centres. Onereason for this might be that the shopfronts selectedfor this evaluation were in very large shoppingcentres with many ‘crime attracting’ features, such asa large cinema complex, a public bar, and a busterminal through which about 1000 juveniles passthrough each afternoon. These features are situatednear each other and next to a food court providing agathering place frequented by groups of youngpeople. Also, shoppers in centres that have policeshopfronts may have more confidence in reportingcrime. By their very design, shopfronts may facilitatereporting of crime.



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Regional 5.75 (1.11) 8.21 (3.72) 43 1.55

Comparison 4.72 (0.86) 4.93 (1.40) 4 0.31

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished CRISP data 2002, QPS.TTaabbllee 33..1133.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyy

rraattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaannBBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,,

JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022


Metropolitan 1001 (120.25) 975 (169.27) – 3 0.31

Comparison 812 (220.78) 760 (69.61) – 6 0.55

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS.


Results in Table 3.14 and Figure 3.14 reveal that theaverage monthly rate of calls for service was higher inthe Regional Beat than in the comparison area in 2001and 2002. However, the trend appears to differ.Between 2001 and 2002, the calls-for-service rate inthe Regional Beat increased by 19 per cent, and in thecomparison area by 62 per cent. The change in thecomparison area is statistically significant. The trendacross sites equates to an increase of 63 calls at theRegional Beat and115 calls at the comparison area.


The Toowoomba Beat and its comparison areaexperienced slight decreases in the average monthlyrate of calls for service from 2001 to 2002. The 4 percent reduction of calls at the Toowoomba Beat equatesto 20 fewer calls for service received by police and the7 per cent decrease at the comparison area equates to39 fewer calls for service. Neither of these changes wasstatistically significant. See Table 3.15 and Figure 3.15.


TTaabbllee 33..1155.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa

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Toowoomba 1678 (372.01) 1614 (215.10) – 4 0.36

Comparison 2285 (705.73) 2120 (491.04) – 7 0.47

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


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TTaabbllee 33..1144.. CCoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinn aavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyyrraattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt

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Regional 1270 (132.13) 1513 (291.28) 19 1.86

Comparison 607 (122.98) 985 (230.08) 62 3.55**

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


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The rate of calls for service at the Outer Urban Beatincreased by 14 per cent over the study period,equating to an additional 161 calls for service to policein 2002 compared to the same period during 2002.Despite the increase, the changes over time were notstatistically significant. See Table 3.16 and Figure 3.16.

While a comparison of calls for service between beatsand comparison areas provides an interestingdescription of change over a relatively short period, itmay be more valuable to identify the impact thatneighbourhood police beats have on chronic repeataddresses. This is particularly important as one of theprimary aims of neighbourhood police beats is toreduce repeat calls for service.

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Outer Urban 2263 (437.34) 2583 (394.56) 14 1.33

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


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In short ...

Two of the neighbourhood beats and their comparisonareas exhibited a similar trend of small reductions incalls for service over the study period. In contrast, anincrease in the rate of calls for service was observedat the Regional Beat, its comparison area and theOuter Urban Beat. However, only at the comparisonarea were these increases statistically significant,which indicates that there was a substantial increasein crime and police activity in the area. Thecomparison area in question is a rapidly developingsuburb with marked growth in residentialdevelopment as well as tourist facilities. The RegionalBeat has a small level of residential development,which may be causing the slight, yet non-significant,increase in calls for service. In comparison, all otherlocations in the study are in relatively stable suburbswith little or no development.

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33..44 AAnnaallyyssiiss ooff rraatteess ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviicceeaatt tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt:: 11999944,, 22000022

This section focuses on changes in calls for servicesince 1994 at one neighbourhood beat. In particular,the impact of the neighbourhood beat on chronicrepeat calls is examined.

We conducted a longitudinal assessment of calls-for-service data for the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area. Calls-for-service data were originallyobtained during the CJC evaluation of the ToowoombaBeat in 1994 (CJC 1995a). These data for a six-monthperiod (January to June) in 1994 were compared todata taken from the current IMS system for the six-month period (January to June) in 2002.

Calls for service were made comparable between thebeat area and the comparison area by converting torates per 100 000 population. Census information forthe two areas was used to establish approximatepopulations in 1994 (1991 census) and 2002 (2001census). The calls-for-service data analysed here arebased upon either a job-card system entered duringthe 1995 project or the current version of the IMSdatabase. While data from these two systems haveremained largely compatible, we do not knowwhether local police procedures have remained stableover the period under observation (1994, 2002).12 Itis important to note, however, that any proceduralchanges similarly affect both areas. Overall, the mainissue of concern with these data is calls for servicetaken by the beat officer that are not recorded on theIMS system.13

The strength of the longitudinal analysis rests on theassumption that beat-policing practices are expectedto have a long-term positive impact on demands forpolice services. The longitudinal analysis isstrengthened considerably by including the samecomparison area across both periods. In doing this,differences in calls for service across areas may morereasonably be attributed to differing aspects of policeservice-delivery practices across the different areas.

Given that being proactive is one of the requirementsof beat policing, it is reasonable to assume thatneighbourhood beat police officers should workeffectively at targeting and responding proactively toproblematic crime locations within the beat. Theyshould be able to embrace a series of strategies —proactive and reactive — to target locations withinthe beat that present persistent crime and disorderproblems.

Thus, in the current analysis, we expected that eachneighbourhood police beat would have fewer crimehot spots and repeat-crime locations in comparisonto its control area. We also expected that the beatarea would have a diminishing number of crime hotspots and repeat-crime locations over time, asevidence of ongoing, effective neighbourhood beatpolicing activities.

The analysis below is organised into three sections.

1 A comparison of rates of calls for service for theToowoomba Beat and its comparison area. Thisanalysis assesses changes over time in the averagemonthly rate of calls for service between Januaryand July 1994 and January and July 2002.

2 A descriptive and geographical analysis of crimehot spots across the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area over time.

3 A descriptive analysis of repeat calls for serviceacross locations in the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area. The section examines a sub-setof calls for service whereby specific addresses canbe identified to assess possible changes in thenumber of repeat crime addresses over time.

33..44..11 RRaattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee iinn tthheeTToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt:: 11999944,, 22000022

Results in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.17 reveal changesover time in the average rate of calls for service per100 000 population for the Toowoomba Beat and thecomparison area. The findings reveal a reduction by17 per cent in the average monthly rate of calls forservice in the Toowoomba Beat between 1994 and2002.

By contrast, the comparison area experienced aminor reduction of 5 per cent over the same period.Although the comparisons are not statisticallysignificant, the change equates to a reduction in callsin the Toowoomba Beat of 87 calls for service.

12 For example, the 1995 calls-for-service data revealapproximately 150 calls emanating from the policebeat itself (e.g. ‘attending to officer duties’), while nosimilar calls for service can be found in the 2002 data.For this assessment, these 150 calls were removed fromthe analysis.

13 For example, an analysis of the beat officers 2002occurrence sheets for the month of July 2002 reveals inexcess of 60 calls for service, while fewer than five ofthese were present on the IMS database.


33..44..22 AAnnaallyyssiiss ooff hhoott ssppoottss iinn tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaaBBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa:: 11999944,, 22000022

Information reported in Figure 3.18 (next page)compares the number of calls-for-service hot spots inthe Toowoomba Beat and comparison area in 1994 andin 2002.The calculation of a hot spot depends on boththe number of repeat calls to an address and the densityof calls in the surrounding area.Therefore, a hot spotmay be due to one address receiving a large number ofcalls, a grouping of calls over a small area, or acombination of the two. For this analysis, a hot spot isdefined as an area generating five or more calls forservice over the observation period (i.e. six months).

The largest and most obvious hot spot includes anarea with several educational institutions (marked onFigure 3.18 as Area A). Most calls to this location

related to reporting trespassers, suspects loiteringand like activities.

In Area B, change in the intensity of hot spots betweenthe two periods is evident. In the first six months of1994, there were a number of addresses in Area Bidentified as hot spots. The majority of calls to thislocation related to noise abatement, mentally disturbedpeople and some repeat domestic-violence incidents.These problem areas are no longer present in the 2002data, which may indicate that police activities — eitherproactive or reactive — have reduced the problems inthat area. It may also be possible that the people whocaused the problems have since moved to a differentlocation outside the beat area.

Some new hot spots appeared in 2002 that were notpresent in 1994. Overall, the results of thisdescriptive analysis reveal that the number of hotspots increased in both the neighbourhood beat andcomparison area, although the increase was moremarked in the comparison area.

33..44..33 AAnnaallyyssiiss ooff rreeppeeaatt ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee iinntthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonnaarreeaa:: 11999944,, 22000022

Information used for the analysis of hot spots in theToowoomba Beat and its comparison area was alsoused for an analysis of repeat calls for service.Addresses generating repeat calls for service may beindicative of an emerging hot spot and so shouldwarrant police attention. At the same time, manylocations that generate repeat calls for service are notnecessarily chronic locations for crime and disorder.In the current analysis, repeat, but non-chronic, calladdresses represent locations generating betweenthree and five calls for service during the studyperiod. Addresses generating six or more calls aredefined as chronic repeat addresses.

The analysis reported here examines and comparesthe distribution of repeat-call locations in 1994 and2002 for the Toowoomba Beat and the comparisonarea. This analysis required very precise locations forcalls-for-service addresses. Thus, due to somelimitations in the data, the analysis was restricted toaccurate information for locations generating three ormore calls for service in each six-month period.14

TTaabbllee 33..1177.. LLoonnggiittuuddiinnaall ccoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinnaavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyy rraattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee//110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee

TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, JJaannuuaarryy ttoo JJuunnee 22000011 aanndd 22000022

22000011 22000022 %% cchhaannggee tt--tteessttmmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD))

Toowoomba 1942 (347.24) 1614 (215.10) – 17 1.97

Comparison 2227 (456.73) 2120 (491.04) – 5 0.39

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


FFiigguurree 33..1177.. LLoonnggiittuuddiinnaall ccoommppaarriissoonn ooff cchhaannggeess iinnaavveerraaggee mmoonntthhllyy rraattee ooff ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee//

110000 000000 ffoorr tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

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Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS

14 Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that theprecise position of about 40 per cent of mapped callsfor service could not be determined. These addresseswere not used for this portion of the analysis.


Differences between the numbers of addresses withrepeat calls between the two periods (January to June1994 and 2002) are displayed in Figure 3.19. Theresults show some decreases in the numbers of repeataddresses between the two periods, at least for thoseaddresses generating three, four and five calls forservice. These reductions were largely similar acrossbeat and comparison areas. For example, in bothbeat and comparison areas, a reduction by sevenaddresses generating three calls for service wasobserved over time.

Some differences between the neighbourhood beatand comparison area were also observed. Forexample, addresses within the beat generating six orseven repeat calls for service reduced between theperiods, while addresses generating six or sevenrepeat calls within the comparison area rose acrossthe period. This finding represents support for theneighbourhood police beat and suggests that it mightbe effective at targeting chronic repeat addresses.While other external conditions cannot necessarily beruled out, the evidence is consistent with the viewthat neighbourhood police beats are effective atreducing chronic crime and disorder locations.

In short …

After examining changes over time in calls for servicein the Toowoomba Beat and the comparison area, wefound support for the effectiveness of neighbourhoodbeats, although the findings do vary:

1 An analysis of changes in average monthly callsfor service over time across both locationsindicated stronger reductions for theneighbourhood police beat when compared to thecomparison area; however, the differences werenot statistically significant.

2 The hot-spots analysis revealed increases in thenumber of hot spots over time across bothlocations, although the increases were larger inthe comparison area. These results are somewhatinconsistent with earlier expectations.

3 The analysis of changes over time in repeat calls-for-service addresses revealed that chronic repeatlocations diminished in the beat but not in thecomparison area. We view this as evidence infavour of neighbourhood beat policing.

FFiigguurree 33..1188.. CCoommppaarraattiivvee hhoott--ssppoott aannaallyyssiiss ffoorr ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee iinn tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa,, 11999944 aanndd 22000022


yellow: hot spots for 1994

black: hot spots for 2002


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At first sight, this figure may seemdifficult to understand; however, itillustrates the impact that beatshave on reducing chronic repeatcalls for service.

As a guide to interpreting thefigure, it is important to know thatwhen a number in a column fallsbelow the ‘0’ line it means thatthere are fewer addressesgenerating a particular number ofrepeat calls for service (i.e.addresses generating 3, 4, 5 to 13calls for service).


SSuummmmaarryy ooff ffiinnddiinnggss

NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

Reductions in overall reported crime rates ranging from 3 to 43 per cent wereobserved across all neighbourhood beats.

Reductions in reported property crime rates ranging from 11 to 53 per cent wereobserved in three neighbourhood beats. One beat experienced a 13 per centincrease in property crime rates.

Increases of 40 and 79 per cent in the rate of reported crime were observed intwo of the comparison areas.

Increases of 47 and 86 per cent in reported property crime rates were observedin two of the comparison areas

Two neighbourhood beats and one comparison area experienced a smallreduction in calls for service over a 12-month period.

Two neighbourhood beats and one comparison area experienced an increase incalls for service over a 12-month period.

The average monthly rate of calls for service in the Toowoomba Beat decreasedby 17 per cent between 1994 and 2002.

The number of crime hot spots increased at the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area between 1994 and 2002.

Over this same period, the number of calls to chronic repeat addressesdecreased in the neighbourhood beat but not in the comparison area.

SShhooppffrroonnttss

There were increases in overall reported crime rates at both of the shopfrontsites.

There were increases in reported property crime at both shopfront sites.

One comparison shopping centre experienced a decrease in overall reportedcrime and reported property crime, while the other comparison shopping centreexperienced small increases in overall reported crime and reported propertycrime.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 44: PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND PERSONAL SAFETY_______3399

This chapter looks at citizens’ perceptions ofsafety, both at the personal level and at thebroader community level, as opposed to actualreported crime. It examines their willingness toreport crime and their feelings of personalsafety within the neighbourhood beats andcomparison areas. It also examines reportedlevels of personal safety among shoppers andretailers at shopping centres that have a policeshopfront and comparison centres that do not.

The level of crime reported in an area can influencecitizens’ perceptions of safety. The visibility of policeand their activity within an area can also affectperceptions. Beat policing aims to build communitypartnerships and improve the relationship betweenpolice and the public. Recognition and familiaritywith beat officers, in combination with perceptionsthat police are committed to dealing with local crimeand disorder problems, may increase the public’swillingness to report crime.

44..11 PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ccrriimmee aanndd ppeerrssoonnaallssaaffeettyy iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

The following section is based on an analysis of datafrom a telephone survey of residents in beat areasand comparison areas.

44..11..11 PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ccrriimmee iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

Residents were asked how common they believedeight categories of disorder problems were in theirneighbourhood. The response options were:

1 = very common 2 = fairly common

3 = not very common 4 = not at all common.

An independent sample t-test was conductedbetween each neighbourhood beat and its respectivecomparison area. (Note: lower mean scores indicatethat residents believe crime and disorder problemsare more common in their neighbourhood.)


As can be observed in Table 4.1 (next page),residents of the Metropolitan Beat and itscomparison area believed that most categories ofdisorder problems were not very common. Residentsin the two areas differed in their opinion of only twotypes of disorder: graffiti and vandalism.15 In bothinstances, residents of the Metropolitan Beatreported that these problems were more common intheir community than did residents of thecomparison area.

These findings are consistent with informationcollected through interviews with the MetropolitanBeat officers and local stakeholders. Graffiti wasnominated as a major problem in the area and hadreceived dedicated attention from the beat officers,who had previously received a POPP award for theirinitiatives targeting graffiti. The local council hadalso employed the services of a full-time graffiti

15 t = 3.72, p < .001 and t = 3.87, p < .001 respectively.


• RReessiiddeennttss iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattssppeerrcceeiivvee ddiissoorrddeerr pprroobblleemmss ttoo bbee mmoorreeccoommmmoonn iinn tthheeiirr ccoommmmuunniittyy tthhaann ddoorreessiiddeennttss iinn ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaass..

• BBeeaattss ddoo nnoott nneecceessssaarriillyy mmaakkeerreessiiddeennttss ffeeeell ssaaffeerr;; nnoorr ddoo sshhooppffrroonnttssnneecceessssaarriillyy mmaakkee sshhooppppeerrss aannddrreettaaiilleerrss ffeeeell mmoorree ssaaffee..

Chapter 4: Perceptions of crime and personal safety

4400_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 44: PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND PERSONAL SAFETY

removalist. While there appeared to be agreementthat graffiti was a major problem, residents surveyedwere perhaps not aware of the initiatives alreadyimplemented to deal with it.


The results of the analyses comparing the RegionalBeat and its comparison area revealed a verydifferent picture (see Table 4.2, below). Residents ofeach area differed in their opinion in all but onecategory of disorder. In all cases, residents of theRegional Beat reported that disorder problems weremore common in their area compared to residents ofthe comparison area.


The results of the Toowoomba Beat and comparisonarea revealed that residents had very similarperceptions of crime and disorder problems in theircommunities. Additionally, the findings revealed thatresidents did not believe the examples of crime anddisorder problems listed were very common in theirneighbourhoods (see Table 4.3).


Results examining the perceived levels of disorder inthe Outer Urban Beat are reported in Table 4.4. Theyshow that on several indicators of community dis-order, residents of the Outer Urban Beat reported

TTaabbllee 44..11.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ddiissoorrddeerr pprroobblleemmss aatt tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann CCoommppaarriissoonnCCrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

How common is ____ in your neighbourhood?

Graffiti on walls and buildings 2.43 (0.93) 2.77 (0.89) 3.72***

Drunks and vagrants 3.03 (0.82) 3.18 (0.77) 1.87

Rubbish and litter 3.00 (0.78) 3.01 (0.78) 0.13

Home/gardens in bad condition 3.22 (0.66) 3.14 (0.70) 1.17

Noisy neighbours/loud parties 3.13 (0.66) 3.09 (0.68) 0.49

Vandalism/damage to property 2.93 (0.76) 3.21 (0.69) 3.87***

Drug dealing 3.22 (0.82) 3.29 (0.83) 0.72

Discarded needles 3.63 (0.61) 3.62 (0.61) 0.18

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 44..22.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ddiissoorrddeerr pprroobblleemmss aatt tthhee RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

RReeggiioonnaall CCoommppaarriissoonnCCrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt


Graffiti on walls and buildings 3.24 (0.65) 3.65 (0.50) 7.07***

Drunks and vagrants 3.01 (0.90) 3.42 (0.73) 5.04***

Rubbish and litter 3.12 (0.76) 3.42 (0.65) 4.19***

Home/gardens in bad condition 3.26 (0.63) 3.52 (0.59) 4.24***

Noisy neighbours/loud parties 3.00 (0.69) 3.23 (0.78) 3.20**

Vandalism/damage to property 2.99 (0.83) 3.37 (0.69) 4.98***

Drug dealing 3.17 (0.87) 3.39 (0.78) 2.23*


Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


similar levels to residents in other beats. However, forconditions such as rubbish and litter, home/gardensin bad condition, and drug-dealing, residents in theOuter Urban Beat reported higher mean levels ofdisorder.

PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff cchhaannggeess iinn ccrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr

To further explore perceptions, respondents wereasked whether they believed crime and disorder wasincreasing, decreasing, or staying the same in theircommunity. Each beat was compared to its comparisonarea, with the exception of the Outer Urban Beat (seeTable 4.5).

The analyses revealed no significant differencebetween residents in the Metropolitan Beat andcomparison area or between residents in theToowoomba Beat and comparison area. However, asignificant difference was observed between theRegional Beat and its comparison area (chi2 = 24.47,p< .001). Three times as many Regional Beatresidents believed that crime was decreasingcompared to comparison area residents (16 versus 5per cent). In contrast, 25 per cent of comparison arearesidents believed that crime was on the increase,compared to 18 per cent in the Regional Beat.


TTaabbllee 44..33.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ddiissoorrddeerr pprroobblleemmss aatt tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

TToooowwoooommbbaa CCoommppaarriissoonnCCrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr mmeeaann ((SSDD)) mmeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt


Graffiti on walls and buildings 3.15 (0.85) 3.23 (0.81) 1.03

Drunks and vagrants 3.15 (0.82) 3.22 (0.80) 0.75

Rubbish and litter 3.15 (0.76) 3.08 (0.82) 0.85

Home/gardens in bad condition 3.28 (0.67) 3.30 (0.69) 0.40

Noisy neighbours/loud parties 3.40 (0.67) 3.30 (0.80) 1.46

Vandalism/damage to property 3.16 (0.81) 3.04 (0.79) 1.45

Drug dealing 3.43 (0.80) 3.32 (0.85) 1.16


Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 44..44.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ddiissoorrddeerr pprroobblleemmss aatt tthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

CCrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr mmeeaann ((SSDD))


Graffiti on walls and buildings 2.75 (0.89)

Drunks and vagrants 3.01 (0.84)

Rubbish and litter 2.84 (0.89)

Home/gardens in bad condition 2.87 (0.86)

Noisy neighbours/loud parties 3.14 (0.89)

Vandalism/damage to property 3.02 (0.84)

Drug dealing 2.65 (1.19)

Discarded needles 3.43 (0.79)


TTaabbllee 44..55.. PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff cchhaannggeessiinn ccrriimmee aanndd ddiissoorrddeerr

AArreeaa IInncc.. DDeecc,, NNoo cchhaannggee DDoonn''tt kknnooww%% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn))

Metropolitan 28.6 (61) 16.4 (35) 49.8 (106) 5.1 (11)Comparison 24.9 (50) 9.5 (19) 60.2 (121) 5.5 (11)

Regional 18.4 (37) 16.4 (33) 52.2 (105) 12.9 (26)Comparison 24.6 (49) 4.5 (9) 65.3 (130) 5.5 (11)

Toowoomba 24.5 (49) 19.5 (39) 49.5 (99) 6.5 (13)Comparison 30.8 (66) 13.1 (28) 49.1 (105) 7.0 (15)

Outer Urban 13.2 (29) 34.7 (76) 42.9 (94) 9.1 (20)



One of the more interesting results of this analysiswas the high proportion (one-third) of Outer UrbanBeat residents who reported that crime was on thedecrease. The Outer Urban Beat is traditionally anarea of social disadvantage with a high percentage ofresidents from low socioeconomic backgrounds.

However, it is currently a community renewal areaand so is undergoing dramatic change aimed atreducing problems such as crime. The informationreported in Table 4.5 indicates that residents perceivethere to be a reduction in crime and disorder, whichmay be a result of the community renewal program.

44..11..22 IImmppaacctt ooff nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss oonn ccrriimmeerreeppoorrttiinngg

To measure whether the presence of a neighbour-hood beat encourages people to report crime,residents were asked whether they had been a victimof crime in the last 12 months and, if so, whetherthey had reported the incident to police.

The results of this analysis, shown in Table 4.6,reveal that the willingness of victims of crime toreport the incident to police varied across locations,although statistically significant differences inreported rates between each neighbourhood beat andits comparison area were not observed. Over 80 percent of victims in the Metropolitan Beat andcomparison area reported the crime to police.Similarly, 84 per cent of victims at the ToowoombaBeat and 95 per cent of victims at its comparisonarea reported the crime to police. In contrast, only50 per cent of victims in the Regional Beat and 67per cent of victims in its comparison area did so.

The reasons for the low reporting rate in these areasare unknown, but may reflect a high tourist/transientpopulation together with an increased level ofdevelopment in these neighbourhoods, with newlyarriving residents/tourists having limited opportunityto develop linkages with local police. At the sametime, caution should be used in interpreting the resultsbecause of low cell frequencies.

In short …

Results from the analysis of victimisation andreporting rates showed no statistically significantdifferences between neighbourhood beats and theirrespective comparison areas. Neighbourhood beatpolicing does not appear to have any effect onpeople’s willingness to report crime.

In short …

Residents in neighbourhood beats perceive disorderproblems to be more common in their communitythan residents in comparison areas. It is important tonote that residents’ perceptions of crime in allneighbourhood beats and comparison areas werefairly low, with the majority of responses falling intothe ‘not very common’ and ‘not at all common’categories. The extent of these different perceptionsvaries across each selected beat, with Regional Beatdisplaying the highest level of perceived disorder.However, residents in Regional Neighbourhood Beatalso perceived that crime was decreasing.

As Regional Beat was established primarily inresponse to problems with public drunkenness,under-age drinking and wilful damage in the area, itcomes as no surprise that residents are aware ofthese problems. In some ways the findings reinforcethe selection of Regional Beat as a suitable candidatefor beat policing. The fact that residents now believethat crime and disorder problems are decreasing isevidence of the effectiveness of the beat officer inaddressing these problems. Similarly, Outer UrbanBeat is an area with relatively high levels of crime anddisorder, but residents also report that theseproblems are declining.

TTaabbllee 44..66.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff rreessiiddeennttss rreeppoorrttiinnggccrriimmiinnaall vviiccttiimmiissaattiioonn aanndd rreeppoorrttiinngg

tthhee iinncciiddeenntt ttoo ppoolliiccee

VViiccttiimmss ooff ccrriimmee RReeppoorrtteedd ttoo ppoolliiccee

AArreeaa YYeess NNoo YYeess NNoo%% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn))

Metropolitan 12.7 (27) 87.3 (186) 81.5 (22) 18.5 (5)Comparison 8.5 (17) 91.5 (184) 82.4 (14) 17.6 (3)

Regional 11.9 (24) 88.1 (177) 50.0 (12)) 50.0 (12)Comparison 10.6 (21) 89.4 (178) 66.7 (14) 33.3 (7)

Toowoomba 11.0 (22) 89.0 (178) 95.5 (21) 4.5 (1)Comparison 15.0 (32) 85.0 (182) 84.4 (27) 15.6 (5)



44..11..33 PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppeerrssoonnaall ssaaffeettyy iinnnneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

Citizens’ perceptions of personal safety were exploredin the survey of residents. Residents in beats andcomparison areas were asked how safe they feltwalking alone after dark and being alone at home atnight. These questions also gauge the perceivedvictimisation risks among residents. Response optionswere:

1 = very safe 2 = fairly safe

3 = not very safe 4 = not at all safe.

(Higher mean scores indicate lower levels ofperceived safety.)


Residents in the Metropolitan Beat and comparisonarea felt safer while in their homes than they didwhile walking alone after dark. Although feelings ofsafety in the home were similar between residents atboth locations, residents in the Metropolitan Beatfelt significantly less safe while walking alone afterdark than did residents in the comparison area. Theresults indicate a higher level of perceivedvictimisation risk among residents in the beat area.See Table 4.7.


Independent sample t-tests reveal that residents ofthe Regional Beat felt significantly less safe walkingalone after dark and while alone at home at nightthan did residents from the comparison area.Residents in the Regional Beat reported higher levelsof perceived victimisation risks than did residents inthe comparison area. See Table 4.8.


Results comparing citizens’ perceptions of perceivedvictimisation risks are reported in Table 4.9. Thefindings reveal no statistically significant differencesin reported perceptions of safety walking alone afterdark or being alone at home at night.


The mean ratings of perceived safety reported byOuter Urban Beat residents (see Table 4.10)demonstrate a similar pattern to that observed in theother neighbourhood beats. The findings indicatemoderate levels of perceived safety among residentsin the Outer Urban Beat.

TTaabbllee 44..99.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy bbeettwweeeenntthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

TToooowwoooommbbaa CCoommppaarriissoonnMMeeaann ((SSDD)) MMeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

Perceived safety walking alone after dark 2.72 (0.99) 2.63 (0.99) 0.82

Perceived safety alone in home at night 1.57 (0.68) 1.64 (0.68) 1.20

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 44..77.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy bbeettwweeeenntthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann CCoommppaarriissoonnMMeeaann ((SSDD)) MMeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

Perceived safety walking alone after dark 2.38 (0.88) 2.15 (0.89) 2.55*

Perceived safety alone in home at night 1.49 (0.53) 1.46 (0.57) 0.57

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001


TTaabbllee 44..1100.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy aatt tthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

MMeeaann ((SSDD))

Perceived safety walking alone after dark 2.55 (0.95)

Perceived safety alone in home at night 1.55 (0.69)


TTaabbllee 44..88.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy bbeettwweeeenntthhee RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

RReeggiioonnaall CCoommppaarriissoonnMMeeaann ((SSDD)) MMeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

Perceived safety walking alone after dark 1.80 (0.76) 1.61 (0.79) 2.46*

Perceived safety alone in home at night 1.46 (0.55) 1.35 (0.50) 2.12*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001



44..22 PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppeerrssoonnaall ssaaffeettyy iinnsshhooppppiinngg cceennttrreess

Increased visibility of police in shopping centrescould also be expected to increase the public’sperceptions of safety while in the shopping centre.We explored this concept from the perspective ofboth shoppers and retailers.

44..22..11 SShhooppppeerrss

People shopping in centres that have police shopfrontsand people shopping in centres that do not have policeshopfronts were asked if they felt safe while shopping.Analyses were conducted comparing each shopfront sitewith its comparison shopping centre (see Figure 4.1).

Results reveal that nearly all shoppers (90 per cent)felt safe while shopping. There were no significantdifferences between shopfront locations andcomparison sites. The very high proportion ofshoppers who reported feeling safe indicates that itwould be difficult for a shopfront to substantiallyincrease the perceptions of safety among shoppers.

44..22..22 RReettaaiilleerrss

Retailers were asked how safe they felt while:

• working in their shop

• walking around the mall

• walking to their car or public transport.

Response options were:

1 = very safe 2 = fairly safe

3 = not very safe 4 = not at all safe.

(Lower mean scores represent higher levels ofperceived safety.)

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonncceennttrree

From the mean scores shown in Table 4.11, it can beseen that retailers at Metropolitan shopfront centreand comparison centres reported similar feelings ofsafety while working in their shop or while walkingaround the mall. Retailers at both centres felt lesssafe while walking to their car. This analysis revealeda significant difference between Metropolitanshopfront centre and its comparison centre. Retailersin the shopfront reported feeling significantly saferwalking to their cars or to public transport than didretailers in the comparison centre.

In short ...

The results revealed no evidence that beats wereassociated with higher levels of perceived personalsafety and lower victimisation risks among residents.Statistically significant lower levels of perceivedpersonal safety were observed in two of the beats.While these findings may be related to an increasedlevel of police activity in the beat, which may increasecitizen awareness and fear of crime, the results arenot consistent with expectations that neighbourhoodbeat policing reduces the sense of victimisationamong residents living in beat areas.

FFiigguurree 44..11.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff sshhooppppeerrss wwhhoo ffeeeell ssaaffee wwhhiillee sshhooppppiinngg::

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree,,RReeggiioonnaall sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

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TTaabbllee 44..1111.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy aatt tthheeMMeettrrooppoolliittaann sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

MMeettrrooppoolliittaann CCoommppaarriissoonnMMeeaann ((SSDD)) MMeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

Safety working in shop 1.47 (0.52) 1.66 (0.55) 1.61

Safety walking aroundmall 1.45 (0.52) 1.66 (0.48) 1.86

Safety walking to car orpublic transport 2.07 (0.71) 2.41 (0.68) 2.31*

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001

Source: Retailers Survey 2002, CMC.

RReeggiioonnaall sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

Retailers at the Regional shopfront centre and thecomparison centre reported moderate levels offeeling safe across all three situations (see Table4.12). There were no statistically significantdifferences observed between the two shoppingcentres.

In short ...

The findings showed that retailers felt quite safe whilegoing about their daily business in their shoppingcentre. Despite some evidence that retailers at theMetropolitan shopfront centre felt safer than those atthe comparison centre while walking to their car or topublic transport, there was no consistent evidencethat shopfronts had a positive effect on retailers’perceptions of personal safety.

All shopping centres in the study employed privatesecurity guards and had taken steps, such asimproved car-park lighting and awareness-raising, toensure staff safety. In addition, shopfronts are staffedonly during core business hours and it is reasonableto assume that fear of crime while walking in the car-park or areas exterior to the centre would beexacerbated after dark. Consequently, it may beunreasonable to expect the presence of a policeshopfront to reduce fear among retailers acrossmultiple contexts.


TTaabbllee 44..1122.. PPeerrcceeiivveedd ssaaffeettyy aatt tthheeRReeggiioonnaall sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

RReeggiioonnaall CCoommppaarriissoonnMMeeaann ((SSDD)) MMeeaann ((SSDD)) tt--tteesstt

Safety working in shop 1.47 (0.66) 1.52 (0.59) 1.31

Safety walking aroundmall 1.64 (0.70) 1.48 (0.59) 1.97

Safety walking to car orpublic transport 2.17 (0.82) 1.96 (0.61) 1.12

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001




Residents in neighbourhood beats believed that a range of crime and disorderproblems were more common in their community.

Residents in areas with higher perceived levels of crime and disorder believedthat these problems were improving. This suggests that beat officers areresponsive and effective in addressing crime and disorder problems in theirneighbourhood.

There was no difference between residents in neighbourhood beats andcomparison areas in terms of their willingness to report a crime.

Residents in two of the neighbourhood beats reported lower levels of perceivedpersonal safety than did residents in comparison areas.


Most people said they felt safe while shopping at shopping centres with orwithout a police shopfront.

The presence of a shopfront was not associated with increased feelings ofpersonal safety among shoppers.

In general, retailers in shopping centres with a shopfront and those in centreswithout a shopfront had similar perceptions of safety while in their shop or otherareas within the centre. However, retailers in centres that had a shopfrontreported feeling safer when walking to their cars or public transport than didretailers in shopping centres without a police shopfront.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 55: CLIENT SATISFACTION WITH POLICE SERVICES_______4477

In this chapter, we:

1 examine data collected from neighbourhoodbeats to find out how aware residents are ofthe beat, their reasons for contact with beatofficers, and what they think of the servicereceived

2 assess data collected from residents inneighbourhood beats and comparison areasto compare community satisfaction withgeneral police performance and with howpolice handled a particular reported incident

3 compare shopfronts and comparison sites interms of visibility and awareness of police,reason for contact with police, andsatisfaction with policing services.

The primary source of information we used to assesscommunity satisfaction with beat policing was atelephone survey conducted by the OESR in beatsand comparison locations.

55..11 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss:: vviissiibbiilliittyy,,ccoonnttaacctt aanndd ssaattiissffaaccttiioonn

This section reports on the visibility of beats, reasonsfor contact with the beat officers, and satisfactionwith the beat officers.

55..11..11 VViissiibbiilliittyy:: rreessiiddeennttss

Residents in the Metropolitan, Outer Urban,Toowoomba and Regional Beats were asked fourquestions:

1) Have you heard of beat policing?

2) Is your residence in a beat-policing area?

3) Do you know where your local beat officer is?

4) Could you recognise your local beat officer?

Figure 5.1 (next page) shows that awareness of beatpolicing as a concept is quite high in all four beats,ranging from 80 per cent of residents in the OuterUrban Beat to 90 per cent in the Metropolitan Beat.About three-quarters of residents in theMetropolitan, Outer Urban and Regional Beats werealso aware that they lived in a beat area, whereas only65 per cent of residents in the Toowoomba Beatknew they lived in a beat area.

More than 80 per cent of residents knew where theirlocal beat office was situated, with almost allrespondents at the Outer Urban Beat (95 per cent)knowing it. This is probably because the OuterUrban Beat is situated in a shopping centre, andthereby has a higher profile in the community. Abouthalf (43 to 57 per cent) of the residents were able torecognise their local beat officer, with between 21and 28 per cent having been personally assisted bythe officer. Most people had been assisted once ortwice during the previous 12 months.


• MMoorree bbeeaatt rreessiiddeennttss bbeelliieevvee tthhaatt ppoolliicceeaarree ddooiinngg aa ‘‘ggoooodd’’ oorr ‘‘vveerryy ggoooodd’’ jjoobbtthhaann ddoo rreessiiddeennttss iinn ccoommppaarriissoonnaarreeaass..

• AAwwaarreenneessss ooff sshhooppffrroonnttss iiss vveerryy hhiigghhaammoonngg sshhooppppeerrss aanndd rreettaaiilleerrss..

• TThheerree iiss ssuubbssttaannttiiaall ssuuppppoorrtt aannddssaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattssaanndd sshhooppffrroonnttss..

Chapter 5: Client satisfaction with police services

4488_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 55: CLIENT SATISFACTION WITH POLICE SERVICES

Similar questions were asked of residents during the1995 evaluation of Toowoomba beat policing. As aresult, we can compare the current findings in theToowoomba Beat to the results of the previousevaluation (see Figure 5.2, below).

This comparison of awareness of beat policing overtime shows that awareness of the concept of beatpolicing and knowledge of living in a beat area is thesame as in 1995. However, current responses revealthat more residents know where the beat office islocated, and can recognise the beat officer than wasthe case seven years ago.

55..11..22 RReeaassoonn ffoorr ccoonnttaacctt:: rreessiiddeennttss

Residents were asked the reason for their last contact with a beat officer. They were given nineresponse options: assault, break and enter, stealing,unlawful use of a motor vehicle, disturbance, crimeprevention advice, community activities,neighbourhood dispute, and other.

The most common reason for contact was the ‘other’category (see Figure 5.3, next page). This was furtheranalysed and revealed that the responses were mainlywilful damage or related to vandalism.

FFiigguurree 55..11.. AAwwaarreenneessss ooff tthhee bbeeaatt aarreeaa:: ccoommppaarriissoonn ooff sseelleecctteedd aarreeaass

FFiigguurree 55..22.. AAwwaarreenneessss ooff tthhee bbeeaatt aarreeaa:: ccoommppaarriissoonn ooff tthhee TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt,, 22000022 aanndd 11999955

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Sources: Community Survey 2002, OESR; CJC 1995a.

55..11..33 SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh tthhee bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerr

Residents in the four neighbourhood beats who hadhad contact with the beat officer were also askedspecifically about the service provided by their beatofficer. Residents were asked to think of their lastinteraction with the beat officer and indicate howhelpful the officer was (see Table 5.1, below).

Residents overwhelmingly reported that their beatofficer was helpful. They were then asked howsatisfied they were with how the beat officer handledtheir problem (see Table 5.2, next page). Once again,nearly all respondents were ‘very satisfied’ or‘satisfied’ with the way the beat officer handled thematter.

Finally, residents were asked to indicate their overallsatisfaction with the beat-policing program in their

area (see Table 5.3, next page). Satisfaction was veryhigh in all selected areas. In the Metropolitan andToowoomba Beats, almost all (97 per cent) were‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’. About 91 per cent ofOuter Urban Beat residents and 88 per cent ofRegional Beat residents were ‘very satisfied’ or‘satisfied’.

We obtained the opinions of other key stakeholdersin the beat through interviews. Overwhelmingly, theysaw beat policing as an asset to the neighbourhood orshopping centre:

The [beat] officers go beyond doing their job,they are willing to come to all meetings and worktogether with the community.

… it’s like getting back to old country policing… They work really well and the communitytakes pride in their police officer.

In short …

Awareness of beat policing in neighbourhood beatsranged from 65 to 90 per cent. Among respondentswho were aware of the beat, more than 80 per centsaid they knew where their local beat office waslocated. However, only about half (43 to 57 per cent)said that they could recognise their local beat officer.

Residents were most likely to contact the beat officerfor vandalism or wilful damage problems. In nearly allinteractions with community members, the beatofficer was considered helpful and residents were‘very satisfied’ with how their problem was handled.


FFiigguurree 55..33.. RReeaassoonnss ffoorr ccoonnttaacctt wwiitthh tthhee bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerr:: ccoommppaarriissoonn ooff sseelleecctteedd aarreeaass

TTaabbllee 55..11.. HHeellppffuullnneessss ooff tthhee bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerr:: rreessiiddeennttss iinn bbeeaatt aarreeaass

VVeerryy HHeellppffuull NNoott aatt aallll DDoonn''tthheellppffuull hheellppffuull kknnooww%% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn))

Metropolitan 90.6 (29) 9.4 (3) – –

Outer Urban 76.5 (26) 20.6 (7) 2.9 (1) –

Toowoomba 83.9 (26) 16.1 (5) – –

Regional 81.3 (26) 15.6 (5) – 3.1 (1)


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Note: UUMV — unlawful use of a motor vehicle



55..22 RReessiiddeennttss’’ ppeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppoolliicceeppeerrffoorrmmaannccee

Residents were asked their opinion of how good a jobpolice were doing in relation to six categories ofpolice performance:

1 working together with residents to solve localproblems

2 dealing with the problems that really concernpeople

3 preventing crime

4 helping people out after they have been victims ofcrime

5 keeping order on the streets

6 treating people politely.

For some of the items there were a large number of‘don’t know’ responses, which may indicate that mostresidents do not have much contact with police.

The percentages of residents indicating that policewere doing a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ job are displayed

in Figure 5.4 for the Metropolitan Beat and itscomparison area, in Figure 5.5 (page 52) for theRegional Beat and its comparison area, and in Figure 5.6 (page 53) for the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area. Information for the Outer UrbanBeat is reported in Figure 5.7 (page 54).

It can be seen from these figures that, in general,more residents in neighbourhood beats believe thatpolice are doing a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ job than doresidents in comparison areas. The pattern of resultsis consistently in the direction of neighbourhoodbeats having a positive impact on citizens’perceptions of police effectiveness.

Statistically significant results were observed in somelocations for some measures. For example, residentsin the Metropolitan Beat and its comparison areadiffered significantly in their responses to one item:‘how good a job are police doing in working togetherwith residents to solve local problems?’ (chi2 = 13.52,p < .05). Almost twice as many residents at thecomparison area indicated that they did not knowhow police were performing, possibly indicating that

TTaabbllee 55..22.. SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh hhooww tthhee bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerr hhaannddlleedd tthhee mmaatttteerr:: rreessiiddeennttss iinn bbeeaatt aarreeaass

VVeerryy SSaattiissffiieedd NNeeiitthheerr DDiissssaattiissffiieedd VVeerryyssaattiissffiieedd ssaattiissffiieedd nnoorr ddiissssaattiissffiieedd

ddiissssaattiissffiieedd%% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn)) %% ((nn))

Metropolitan 75.0 (24) 25.0 (8) – – –

Outer Urban 70.6 (24) 23.5 (8) 2.9 (1) – 2.9 (1)

Toowoomba 80.6 (25) 19.4 (6) – – –

Regional 71.9 (23) 21.9 (7) 3.1 (1) 3.1 (1) –


TTaabbllee 55..33.. OOvveerraallll ssaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh bbeeaatt--ppoolliicciinngg pprrooggrraamm:: rreessiiddeennttss iinn bbeeaatt aarreeaass



Metropolitan 68.8 (22) 28.1 (9) – 3.1 (1) –

Outer Urban 64.7 (22) 26.5 (9) 5.9 (2) – 2.9 (1)

Toowoomba 67.7 (21) 29.0 (9) 3.2 (1) – –

Regional 68.8 (22) 18.8 (6) 3.1 (1) 6.2 (2) 3.1 (1)



they did not interact with police as often as residentsof the Metropolitan Beat.

Residents of the Regional Beat differed withresidents of its comparison area in their opinion ofthree performance indicators:

working together with residents to solve localproblems (chi2 = 18.49, p < .01)

addressing residents’ concerns (chi2 = 11.86, p < .05)

keeping order in the streets (chi2 = 13.22, p < .05).

In all instances, residents of the comparison areaindicated least awareness of how police wereperforming.

There were no significant differences between theresponses of the Toowoomba Beat residents and itscomparison area. Additionally, a lower proportion ofOuter Urban Beat residents reported that police wereperforming well compared to the other three beats.

Statistically significant differences across locationswere largely due to the high number of residents inthe comparison areas not knowing how police were

a) in working together withresidents of this neighbourhoodto solve local problems?

d) in helping people out after theyhave been victims of crime?

b) with the problems that reallyconcern people in thisneighbourhood?

e) in keeping order on the streetsof this neighbourhood?

c) to prevent crime?

f) at treating people politely in thisneighbourhood?

FFiigguurree 55..44.. RReessiiddeennttss’’ ppeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppoolliiccee ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee:: MMeettrrooppoolliittaann BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa

(Responses represent combined percentage of ‘very good’ and ‘good’ for each area.)

How good a job are police doing:

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performing in their community. This suggests thatwhile the presence of a beat may not change howpeople view police performance, the increasedcontact and interaction with a police officer that canresult from the presence of a neighbourhood beatimproves people’s knowledge of police activity.

55..33 SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh hhooww ppoolliicceehhaannddllee aa rreeppoorrtteedd iinncciiddeenntt

As part of the community telephone survey, residents

indicated whether they had been a victim of crime inthe past 12 months and whether they had reportedthe matter to police. Residents who answered in theaffirmative to these two questions were then askedwhether they were satisfied with the way policehandled the matter (see Table 5.4, page 54) and, ifthey were not satisfied, why they were not satisfied.Each selected site was compared to its respectivecomparison area.

The majority of residents in all areas except theOuter Urban Beat were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’


FFiigguurree 55..55.. RReessiiddeennttss’’ ppeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppoolliiccee ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee:: RReeggiioonnaall BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa









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with how police handled their problem. Satisfactionwas highest at the Metropolitan Beat and itscomparison area, with approximately 85 per cent ofresidents being ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with theirdealings with police.16

Approximately 60 per cent of residents at theRegional Beat and its comparison area, and 70 percent of residents in the Toowoomba Beat and itscomparison area were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’with how police handled a reported incident. Incontrast to the other six areas, residents at the Outer

Urban Beat reported a different pattern of responses,with less than half of residents indicating that theywere ‘satisfied’ with the service provided by police,and one-third indicating that they were ‘dissatisfied’or ‘very dissatisfied’ with how their problem washandled.


FFiigguurree 55..66.. RReessiiddeennttss’’ ppeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppoolliiccee ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee:: TToooowwoooommbbaa BBeeaatt aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaa



16 Specific tests for statistically significant differenceswere not conducted due to the small cell frequencies inthis analysis.







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55..44 SShhooppffrroonnttss:: vviissiibbiilliittyy aanndd ccoonnttaacctt

Data for this section of the evaluation were obtainedthrough surveying shoppers and retailers at each ofthe shopfronts and comparison sites. The visibilityand awareness of shopfronts were evaluated from theperspective of shoppers and retailers, followed by anassessment of the reasons for contact with police.

55..44..11 VViissiibbiilliittyy aanndd aawwaarreenneessss:: sshhooppppeerrss

Shoppers were asked whether they had ever seen apolice officer at the shopping centre. Analysis was

In short ...

The results indicate that beat policing has no effecton increasing the level of satisfaction amongcommunity members with how police handle reportedincidents. The fact that there are no differencesbetween each neighbourhood beat and its respectivecomparison area may be due, in part, to the largenumber of calls for service and policing services inthe area (see Chapter 6 for further discussion of theworkload of beat officers).


FFiigguurree 55..77.. RReessiiddeennttss’’ ppeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ppoolliiccee ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee aatt tthhee OOuutteerr UUrrbbaann BBeeaatt

(Responses represent combined percentage of ‘very good’ and ‘good’)

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TTaabbllee 55..44.. SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh hhaannddlliinngg aa rreeppoorrtteedd iinncciiddeenntt:: rreessiiddeennttss iinn nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss aannddccoommppaarriissoonn aarreeaass



Metropolitan Beat 50.0 (11) 31.8 (7) 9.1 (2) 9.1 (2) –Comparison area 50.0 (7) 28.6 (4) – 14.3 (2) 7.1 (1)

Regional Beat 33.3 (4) 25.0 (3) 16.7 (2) 8.3 (1) 16.7 (2)Comparison area 42.9 (6) 21.4 (3) 7.1 (1) 7.1 (1) 21.4 (3)

Toowoomba Beat 42.9 (9) 28.6 (6) 9.5 (2) 14.3 (3) 4.8 (1)Comparison area 33.3 (9) 37 (10) 7.4 (2) 14.8 (4) 7.4 (2)

Outer Urban Beat 17.9 (5) 28.6 (8) 17.9 (5) 10.7 (3) 25.0 (7)


conducted comparing the Metropolitan shopfrontcentre to its comparison centre, and comparing theRegional shopfront centre to its comparison centre.

Examination of Figure 5.8 shows that shoppers at theMetropolitan shopfront centre were more likely tohave seen a police officer in the centre than wereshoppers at the comparison centre (70 per centcompared to 45 per cent).17 Similarly, shoppers at theRegional shopfront centre were more likely to haveseen a police officer in the centre than were shoppersat the comparison centre (64 per cent compared to31 per cent (see Figure 5.9.).18 The results of theseanalyses suggest that the visibility of police issignificantly increased in shopping centres by thepresence of a shopfront.

Shoppers in the Metropolitan and Regionalshopfront centres were then asked about theirawareness of the shopfront and whether they hadused it (see Figure 5.10). About 47 per cent ofshoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre wereaware of the beat, and of those, only 10 per cent hadactually been to the shopfront or spoken to a beatofficer about an issue. In the Regional shopfrontcentre, 62 per cent of shoppers were aware of theshopfront, and, of those, only 20 per cent had usedthe services of the shopfront.

55..44..22 VViissiibbiilliittyy aanndd aawwaarreenneessss:: rreettaaiilleerrss

Retailers in the selected shopfront and comparisonsites were surveyed for their opinions of policing inthe shopping centre. Retailers at Metropolitan andRegional shopfront centres were asked specificquestions about the visibility of beat officers andtheir awareness and use of shopfronts. Retailers at

In short ...

These findings indicate that while the visibility ofpolice is increased by the presence of a shopfront,most shoppers do not use the services of theshopfront. While it could be that shoppers simply donot require police services during most of their visitsto shopping centres, the police may still need tomarket the shopfront and the services that can beaccessed by shoppers when a particular need arises.


17 chi² = 26.63, p < .01

18 chi² = 41.48, p < .01

FFiigguurree 55..88.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff sshhooppppeerrss aatt tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaannsshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree wwhhoo hhaadd sseeeenn

aa ppoolliiccee ooffffiicceerr iinn tthhee cceennttrree

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FFiigguurree 55..99.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff sshhooppppeerrss aatt tthhee RReeggiioonnaallsshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree wwhhoo hhaadd sseeeenn

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FFiigguurree 55..1100.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff sshhooppppeerrss aatt tthhee MMeettrrooppoolliittaannaanndd RReeggiioonnaall sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrreess wwhhoo wweerree aawwaarree ooff tthhee

sshhooppffrroonntt ooppeerraattiinngg iinn tthheeiirr cceennttrree

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the comparison centres were askedquestions about the visibility of policeand the services provided by generalduties police.

Retailers in shopfronts were asked thenumber of times they had seen a beatofficer in the last month. The questionused in comparison sites focused on thenumber of times retailers had seen anypolice officer in the shopping centre inthe last month.

It can be seen in Figures 5.11 and 5.12that retailers in shopfront sites weremore likely to have seen a police officermore than once than retailers incomparison centres. These differenceswere statistically significant for both theMetropolitan and Regional comparisoncentres: chi² = 29.76, p < .01(Metropolitan) and chi² = 37.41, p< .01(Regional).

Awareness of shopfronts was very high,with all retailers at the Regionalshopfront centre and 82 per cent ofretailers at the Metropolitan shopfrontcentre being aware of the shopfront (seeFigure 5.13). Only half (51 per cent) ofthe Metropolitan shopfront centreretailers who were aware of theshopfront knew the beat officer and 69per cent had used the services of thebeat. Approximately three-quarters (76per cent) of the Regional shopfrontcentre retailers said they knew the beat officer andhad used the services of the shopfront. The evidencesuggests that awareness of the shopfront is very highamong retailers, as is the use of shopfront services.

55..44..33 RReeaassoonn ffoorr ccoonnttaacctt:: sshhooppppeerrss

Shoppers at the Metropolitan and Regionalshopfront centres were asked to report their reasonfor contacting the beat officer, and shoppers at thecomparison centres were asked their reason forcontacting general duties police. The analysis revealsthat shoppers at the Metropolitan shopfront centrewere more likely to contact the beat officer to seekadvice, while shoppers at the comparison centre (seeFigure 5.14, next page) were more likely to contactpolice to report a crime.

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At the Regional shopfront centre, the most commonreason shoppers contacted the beat officer was toreport a crime or to find lost property (see Figure5.15). Similarly, shoppers at the comparison areawere more likely to contact police to report a crimeor some other problem.

55..44..44 RReeaassoonn ffoorr ccoonnttaacctt:: rreettaaiilleerrss

Retailers in shopfront centres were asked their reasonfor contact with beat officers, and retailers incomparison centres were asked their reason forcontact with general duties officers. The responseoptions were: reporting of crime, reporting suspiciousactivity, seeking advice, some other problem, andpolice-initiated contact.

Although the number of retailers who had used theservices of police was low, it can be generally seenthat reporting a crime was the main reason forcontacting police at the Metropolitan and Regionalshopfront centres (see Figure 5.16). The proportionof crime-related contact with police was much higherin the Metropolitan shopfront centre than at theRegional shopfront centre (50 per cent compared to25 per cent).19

The most common reasons for retailers at theRegional shopfront centre contacting the beat officerwere to report a crime, report suspicious activity orseek advice (see Figure 5.17, next page). Thesituation at the comparison centre was substantiallydifferent, with retailers most commonly contactingpolice to report a crime and were very unlikely tocontact police to seek advice.

In short ...

The reporting of crime was the most common reasonfor retailers contacting police at shopping centreswithout a shopfront beat. However, the presence of ashopfront seems to increase the propensity ofshoppers to contact police for advice and therebyallow more proactive steps to be taken to preventcrime.

FFiigguurree 55..1144.. RReeaassoonnss ffoorr sshhooppppeerr ccoonnttaacctt wwiitthh ppoolliiccee::MMeettrrooppoolliittaann sshhooppffrroonntt cceennttrree aanndd ccoommppaarriissoonn cceennttrree

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Source: Shoppers Survey 2002. CMC

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19 It was not possible to conduct statistical tests on thesedata due to the small number of respondents who hadactually had contact with police.


55..55 SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh sshhooppffrroonnttsseerrvviicceess

The following discussion is divided into three parts,each of which is based on data collected from one ofthe three main information sources: survey ofshoppers, survey of retailers, and interviews withshopping centre managers.

55..55..11 SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn:: sshhooppppeerrss

Shoppers in the shopfront centres who were aware ofthe shopfront and who had been in contact with thebeat officer were asked if they were satisfied with theservice provided by the officer. For the comparisonshopping centres, shoppers who had been in contactwith police in the last 12 months were asked if theywere satisfied with the service provided. Theresponses from shoppers at each shopfront centrewere compared to the responses of shoppers in therespective comparison centre. See Figures 5.18 and5.19 for details about the percentage of shopperswho indicated that they were satisfied with theservice that they had received.

In general, shoppers at all four shopping centresexpressed satisfaction with policing services, butsatisfaction was higher in centres that had ashopfront. Despite this, not all shoppers thought thatshopfronts were a good idea. Some of theircomments were:

Are there enough police resources to spend onminor crime that might happen in shoppingcentres? Focusing on more serious crime mightbe more useful use of police resources.

It’s no good for police to be sitting around in ashop — they need to be out and about.

The beat isn’t necessary. The constant policepresence is over the top.

55..55..22 SSaattiissffaaccttiioonn:: rreettaaiilleerrss

Retailers in the shopfront centres who were aware ofthe shopfront and had used it were asked about theirlevel of satisfaction with the service provided. Somecare should be taken in interpreting the results because ofthe small number of eligible respondents. For thecomparison shopping centres, retailers who had beenin contact with police in the last 12 months were alsoasked about their satisfaction with the serviceprovided.

It can be seen in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 that none ofthe retailers at the Metropolitan shopfront centre orits comparison centre was dissatisfied at all with the

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service that they had received from police. Only asmall proportion were dissatisfied with policeservices at the Regional shopfront centre andcomparison centre. Although the results appear toshow marked differences between each shopfront andits respective comparison centre, the very lownumber of retailers that had actually used policeservices meant that tests of statistical significancecould not be conducted.

Retailers in shopfront centres were also asked abouttheir overall satisfaction with the shopfront programoperating in their centre (Figure 5.22). Satisfactionwas high with virtually no retailers saying they weredissatisfied. Nearly 100 per cent of the Metropolitanshopfront centre retailers were ‘very satisfied’ or‘somewhat satisfied’ with the shopfront; 95 per centof comparison centre retailers were ‘very satisfied’ or‘somewhat satisfied’.

Finally, retailers were asked an open-ended questionas to what they believed were the main benefits ofhaving a shopfront in their shopping centre. Themain theme that emerged was that shopfrontsprovided a strong deterrent for crime, primarily dueto the increased presence and visibility of police inthe centre. Retailers also appreciated the goodrelationship they had with the shopfront officer, theconvenience and the quick response time incomparison to the local police station. Some of theircomments are provided below:

Without the high visibility of the shopfrontpolice beat I know we would be looking at ahigher crime/theft rate within our business. Theirassistance is greatly appreciated.

Makes people feel safe — makes criminals thinktwice. Gives police a much needed relationshipwith ordinary citizens that can't be had by havinga police station handy. These officers you havehere are really personable.

A police presence increases the safety justknowing they’re there. Knowing the policepersonally enables myself to put forward queriesthat I would not necessarily ring a station for.

Having the police in close proximity to the shopis the greatest benefit. We are able to quicklyreport crimes. Their constant presence doesdeter criminals to some extent.

Better security with a seen police presence.Quicker response time when required. Better PRfor police and their image. Has not stoppedjuvenile crime in the area, but has helped reduce it.


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We interviewed the manager of each shopping centrewith a shopfront and the managers of comparisoncentres. The former spoke highly of the shopfrontand believed that it was instrumental in deterringcrime. At the Metropolitan shopfront centre inparticular there has been a substantial reduction injuvenile crime problems since the shopfront opened.

A critical aspect to the success of both shopfronts wasconsidered to be the high standard of officer currentlyworking in the beats. Officers were motivated andworked well with private security personnel. The onlyimprovement in service provision that managers wouldlike to see is the ability of beat officers to cover allshopping-centre opening hours. The recent

introduction of Sunday trading in South-EasternQueensland will affect all shopfronts in the area andwill mean that in most cases shopfront officers will notbe able to cover all allowable trading hours.

The managers of both comparison centres weresatisfied with the service that they were receiving fromtheir local police station. They indicated that responsetimes were sometimes poor, but acknowledged the highworkload of general duties police in their area.Managers at both centres had knowledge andunderstanding of shopfront policing, having managedshopping centres with shopfronts in the past. Theystrongly supported the concept and would participatein the beat-policing program if they were given theopportunity to have a shopfront in their centres.




Awareness of beat policing in neighbourhood beats is quite high, ranging from 65 to 90per cent. Of those who were aware of the beat, more than 80 per cent said that they knewwhere the local beat office was situated. However, only about half (43 to 57 per cent) ofbeat-area residents said that they would be able to recognise their local beat officer.

Residents most often contacted their beat officer about wilful damage or vandalism.

Residents in neighbourhood beats overwhelmingly reported that their beat officer washelpful and that they were satisfied with the beat program in their area.

On the whole, more residents in neighbourhood beats believed that police were doing a goodjob on a range of performance measures. This is largely due to residents in beat areas beingmore aware of police activity and therefore able to comment on their performance.

Residents in neighbourhood beats and comparison areas were generally satisfied withhow police handled a reported incident.

Almost all of the community stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation supportedneighbourhood beat policing.


Awareness of the police shopfront among shoppers was moderate with about 50 per centsaying that they were aware that the shopping centre had a shopfront.

Shopfronts appeared to increase the visibility of police in centres.

No differences were observed between the satisfaction of shoppers with police servicesat shopfronts or comparison sites.

Awareness of the shopfront was extremely high among retailers (82 per cent and 100 percent); 51 to 76 per cent of retailers knew the officers and between 69 and 79 per cent ofretailers had used the services of the shopfront.

Shopfronts appeared to increase the likelihood of retailers contacting the police foradvice rather than to report a crime, which was the case in comparison sites.

Retailers in shopping centres with a shopfront were more satisfied with police servicesthan retailers in comparison shopping centres.

There was a high level of support for the concept of a police beat shopfront by shoppingcentre managers from both shopfronts and comparison centres.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 66: WORKLOAD PERFORMANCE AND COSTS OF POLICE BEATS_______6611

The focus of this chapter is on the performanceof beat officers and on the cost-effectiveness ofthis style of policing.

Since the establishment of the original beats in theearly 1990s, beat policing has been subject to severalevaluations (CJC 1995a, 1996; QPS 2001d, 2001e,2001f and 2002). However, for the most part theseevaluations focused on the implementation of beats,assessing their impact in terms of communitysatisfaction rather than cost and efficiency.

To assess the workload performance and cost ofpolice beats we used several data sources, inparticular, CRISP data and data from ESCORT(CAD) or the IMS.

Information on the amount of policing time (inminutes) directed toward particular types of policingactivities was also collected by the QPS during aSWAS (Statewide Activity Survey) conductedbetween 27 May and 2 June 2002. In addition, weobtained occurrence sheets from the beats for themonth of June 2002. These detail the daily workloadof beat officers and identify a range of tasksordinarily not recorded in electronic systems. Finally,the project team developed a WAR (Work ActivityReport) to be completed by beat officers. The reportrecords the types of contacts beat officers had withthe community. We also refer to comments made bybeat officers and other police during a series ofinterviews conducted for the evaluation.

66..11 WWoorrkkllooaadd ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee ooff ppoolliicceebbeeaattss

This section describes the workload of beat officersin terms of the number of crime reports taken by theofficer and the number of calls for service attendedby the officer. It then compares the workload of thebeat officer to an ‘average’ general duties officerstationed in the division encompassing the beat.

66..11..11 CCRRIISSPP rreeppoorrttss ttaakkeenn bbyy bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerrss

The number of CRISP reports taken by an officerdepends on several factors, including the seriousnessof the problem, the age of the offender and officerdiscretion. This analysis identifies the averagenumber of CRISP reports taken per 28-day rosterperiod by beat officers from the Regional andToowoomba Beats and the Regional Shopfront overtwo six-month periods (January to June 2001 and2002). This CRISP workload is then compared withthe workload of the ‘average’ general duties officerstationed in the same division as the beat officer.Unfortunately, an analysis of crime reports taken bygeneral duties officers could not be undertaken forthe Metropolitan Shopfront or the Metropolitan Beatdue to changes in the police district boundaries atMetropolitan North Region during the study periods.

Table 6.1 (next page) shows that the number ofCRISP reports taken by beat officers varies greatlyaccording to location, with the beat officer inRegional Beat taking only five over the period. Incontrast, the beat officers at the Regional Shopfrontwere averaging 15 each over the same period.


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Chapter 6: Workload performance and costs of police beats

6622_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 66: WORKLOAD PERFORMANCE AND COSTS OF POLICE BEATS

Some of the comments made by police regardingtheir ‘crime’ workload are:

We’ve been making a real effort to take a lotmore CRISP reports lately. (Beat officer)

I would say that they (generals) do more CRISPsthan we do because they are going all over theplace. We only take the ones here that need to betaken, so obviously they take a lot more. (Beatofficer)

Question: Would you do four or five CRISPS aweek? Answer: It varies; I put 45 CRISP reportson the other night when I charged a guy withgraffiti. (Beat officer)

Beat officers in the three beats took essentially thesame number of CRISP reports as general dutiesofficers. As a result, we conclude that there appearsto be no difference in the number of CRISP reportstaken by beat officers and general duties police.

The next section identifies the number of calls forservice attended by beat officers and compares itwith the number attended by general duties police.

66..11..22 CCaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee aatttteennddeedd bbyy bbeeaattooffffiicceerrss

The analysis that follows compares the number ofcalls for service attended by the beat officers with thenumber attended by the average general duties policefrom the Police Division encompassing the beat.

For this analysis, the number of calls for service forbeat officers was taken from information containedin occurrence sheets for the roster period in June2002. In most cases, these were requests for policeassistance made directly to the beat officer and, assuch, were rarely recorded by electronic means. Onthe other hand, due to reliance by general dutiespolice on mobile patrols, estimates of the number ofcalls for service are derived solely from informationcontained in the IMS or ESCORT CAD systems.

Table 6.2 presents the number of calls for servicetaken by beat officers in June 2002 and compares itwith the average number taken by general dutiespolice from the division encompassing the beat.

The numbers are highly variable depending on thearea and type of beat. For example, the analysisshows that beat officers in the Regional andToowoomba Beats were attending more calls thantheir general duties counterparts. In contrast, thebeat officers at the Regional Shopfront averaged 10

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Regional Beat 5 7

Toowoomba Beat 12 11

Regional Shopfront 15 13

Notes:

1 Estimate of the number of CRISP reports was calculated using ‘officer details’

information rather than the organisational unit over the two periods.

2 General duties officer information is based on the number of officers as

indicated by SWAS. Where available, the model staffing level has been used to

verify the information obtained by SWAS.


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Regional Beat 33 20

Toowoomba Beat 65 22

Metropolitan Beat 12 n/a3

Regional Shopfront 42 57

Metropolitan Shopfront 37 n/a3

Notes:

1 Twenty-eight days has been chosen as the standard

period for this analysis as it encompasses four week

days and four weekends. In addition, 28 days is the

standard rostering period in the Service.

2 General duties officer information is based on the

number of officers as indicated by SWAS. Where

available, the model staffing level has been used to verify

the information obtained by SWAS.

3 The analysis of CFS attended by general duties police in

metropolitan sites could not be conducted due to the ‘clustering’

structure in the Metropolitan North Region. In particular, it was

unclear as to the ‘organisational unit’ some of the police were

assigned to at the time of the evaluation.



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Source: QPS SWAS 2002.

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fewer calls per month than their general dutiescounterparts.

Some of the comments made by police regarding thecalls-for-service workload include:

Often COMS [Police Communications Centre]don’t call us about jobs in the beat area … theother crews [generals] usually get the job … if weare available we would like to get it (the job) …if there is a problem with an intersection orwhatever the job is, we would like to go and sortit out. (Beat officer)

I could show you a whole heap of stats when westarted here showing that there was a 110 to 120calls for service per month here (in the beat) …Now look at them. What can you attribute it (thedecline) to? I know, the police beat! (Beat officer)

Question: On a scale from one to ten, how busyare you? Answer: That's a difficult one. As far asresponding to jobs [calls for service] go, I wouldhave to say six, but I’ve always got [other thingsto do] Neighbourhood Watch stats. (Beat officer)

The next section identifies the types of activities (e.g.incident-related or other duty) performed by beatofficers and compares them with the types ofactivities undertaken by general duties police.

66..11..33 NNaattuurree ooff dduuttiieess ppeerrffoorrmmeedd bbyy bbeeaattooffffiicceerrss

The analysis that follows uses SWAS data to identifyand compare the time spent on various workactivities by neighbourhood and shopfront beatofficers. These activities are divided by the QPS intotwo broad categories: ‘incident activities’ and ‘otherduties’. Incident activities are core policing tasks,such as attending/investigating homicides, robberies,assaults etc. The ‘other duty’ category includesancillary policing tasks, such as operationaladministration, custodial duties, community liaisonand non-tasked general patrols.

IInncciiddeenntt aaccttiivviittiieess

Figure 6.1 compares the types of policing incidentsundertaken by general duties police with thoseattended to by officers from neighbourhood beatsand shopfronts.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the analysis reveals thatofficers working in shopfronts spend the largest

In short …

Beat officers attend slightly more calls for servicethan do general duties police, with some variationacross the sites.


proportion of their time dealing with stealing (13 percent) and good order incidents, such as having todeal with unruly individuals (5 per cent). On theother hand, general duties police report spendingmore time responding to break and enter, traffic,alcohol and domestic violence matters. The types ofincidents dealt with by neighbourhood beat officersare similar to general duties police. However,neighbourhood beat officers seem to be slightly moreinvolved in neighbourhood concerns, such as breakand enter (4 per cent), drugs (4 per cent), speedingvehicles (3 per cent) and wilful damage incidents (2 per cent).

Differences in the role and function of the officersare illustrated in comments made during theinterviews with police. Some of these commentsinclude:

The generals, they will send a crew out to aproblem in a particular street and may even takea CRISP. Our approach is different. As beatofficers we might go to the community and try toestablish a youth boredom project. (Beat officer)

They [beat officers] have much larger workloadsthan other police — it seems that the beat officersare expected to perform the duties of a generalduties officer [taking calls for service] as well asperforming community work. (Beat supervisor)

Overall, the types of policing incidents differ in anumber of ways depending on contextualcircumstances, such as the type of area the officerworks in and the types of calls that the officerroutinely deals with. In the main, beat officers seemto be more involved in typical neighbourhoodconcerns than are general duties police.

OOtthheerr dduuttiieess

Figure 6.2 compares the types of ‘other duties’undertaken by general duties police with thoseundertaken by officers from neighbourhood beatsand shopfronts. ‘Other duties’ include a range ofancillary functions, such as administration tasks,training, escorting prisoners and general (i.e. non-tasked) patrolling.

In terms of the nature of duties performed by beatofficers, the analysis revealed that the most commoncategories of other duties performed by general dutiespolice and beat officers have to do with generalpatrolling, administration (e.g. correspondence) andtraining.

Beat officers working in shopfronts were also foundto spend substantially more time on general patrol(22 per cent) than general duties police (14 per cent)

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Source: SWAS 2002, QPS.

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and neighbourhood beat officers (13 per cent). Thismay be due, in large part, to the importance that theService places on beat officers being highly visible inthe shopping centre. In addition, the percentage oftime spent by general duties police in the area of‘community’ was less than beat officers (8 per centfor neighbourhood and 7 per cent for shopfront beatofficers versus 2 per cent for general duties police).

The emphasis beat officers place on performinggeneral patrols is well represented by the followingcomment made by one of the beat officers duringinterviews:

Question: If you could spend more time doinganything, what would that be? Answer: Patrollingand letting them know that we’re out there. Thatwould be my primary focus. At the end of theday, you’re going to get your butt kicked if youdon’t get correspondence done but, what’s themotto of Shopfronts? It’s basically to get us backout there and with the community isn’t it — getus operating inside the community so, that’swhat we should be doing. By getting out there,walking around being seen and making a point ofcalling in and letting them know you’re there.(Beat officer)

66..22 CCoossttss ooff ppoolliiccee bbeeaattss

This section focuses on the cost of beat policing withan emphasis on comparing the cost of a beat officerresponse with the cost of a general duties response toa similar call for service. In addition, the costsassociated with establishing and maintaining policebeats are discussed.

Police organisations, like other units of publicadministration, are under increasing pressure bygovernments to deliver services in the most effectiveand efficient manner (i.e. provide best value formoney). This poses a challenge for police, in partbecause of the shortage of suitable measures ofefficiency and the lack of information about the truecost or benefit of providing policing services to thecommunity.

There are two parts to this section.

1 The first section focuses on the relative cost-effectiveness of police beats by identifying thecost of a beat officer responding to a call forservice using a costing model developed by theCJC (1997, 1998). Using this formula, the cost of sending a beat officer is estimated and thencompared to the cost of sending a general dutiesofficer to the same type of call. Although this typeof analysis falls short of being a true indicator ofthe cost-effectiveness of beats, it does allow for abasic cost comparison of the two styles of servicedelivery.

2 The second section identifies the cost ofestablishing and maintaining neighbourhoodbeats and shopfronts. The data used in thissection were provided by the QPS.

66..22..11 CCoosstt ooff rreessppoonnddiinngg ttoo ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee

This analysis compares the Toowoomba Beat onlywith Toowoomba Division. However, it is likely thatthe estimate of the cost of sending a beat officercompared with the cost of sending a general dutiesofficer to the same call will be similar for other beatareas (CJC 1998).

The costing model developed by the CJC in 1998 toestimate the cost of first response policing servicehad two main components:

1 estimate of the per minute cost of a policeofficer’s time, and

2 estimate of the time that officers spent attendingdifferent types of calls for service.

In short ...

The types of policing incidents attended to by beatofficers and general duties police differ in a numberof ways depending on contextual circumstances,such as the type of area the officer works in and thetypes of calls that the officer routinely deals with.However, the analysis revealed that beat officersworking in shopfronts spent substantially more timedealing with stealing and general patrol than didgeneral duties police or neighbourhood beat officers.In addition, the amount of time spent by generalduties police in the area of ‘community’ was found tobe less than the time that beat officers spent and isconsistent with the emphasis placed by the Serviceon beat officers working in partnership with thecommunity.

It can be seen that beat officers place a great deal ofemphasis on general patrolling and working with thecommunity, which is consistent with the role that wasenvisaged for them by the CJC and the QPS (CJC1995a).


The first part of the analysis identifies the cost perminute of a police officer’s time. Table 6.3 (above)shows an estimate of the cost of police responsepublished by the CJC in 1998. The estimate of thecost of police attending a call for service has beenadjusted to reflect changes in the rate of inflation andother labour costs over the four-year period since themodel was developed.

As is evident from Table 6.3 (below), the cost perminute of a single officer (the beat officer)responding to a call for service is $0.98, whereas thetraditional response by a general duties crew isestimated to be $2.00 per minute (two general dutiesofficers and a vehicle). The difference in the costsbetween the two types of responses is due entirely tothe fact that the typical general duties responseinvolves two officers travelling in a police vehicle.

The second part of the analysis identifies the timethe officer(s) spent dealing with the average call forservice. Given that beat policing emphasisesproblem-solving and community liaison, the ‘time atscene’ is used to estimate the time taken to‘complete’ the job. It should be noted that the ‘timeat scene’ does not include an estimate of the timetaken to travel to the job address or the time theofficer(s) spend processing prisoners or doing any ofthe paperwork associated with the job. However,‘time at scene’ does give a good estimate of the timethe officer actually spends with complainants orsuspects.

It should be stated that not all jobs within the beatarea are taken by the beat officer, nor are all calls forservice attended by the beat officer necessarily withinthe beat. While the costing model developed belowdoes not take this into account, it is necessary to takeinto account the proportion of calls for service takenby single or two-officer crews.

For the Toowoomba Beat, the vast majority (96 percent) of calls for service that the beat officer attendedwere taken by a single officer, and the average call forservice taken by a beat officer takes 45.6 minutes.See table 6.4, next page.

The average time at scene for a call for service takenby a typical general duties officer within ToowoombaDivision is 36.1 minutes, but only 16 per cent ofthese calls were taken by a single officer.

It has been assumed that a single general dutiesofficer who attends a call for service will be in avehicle, adding four cents to the cost per minute. Ithas also been assumed that two officers who attend acall will have a vehicle.

As the results in Table 6.4 reveal, the average timetaken to attend a call for service in the beat area wasapproximately 46 minutes. Based on the CJC’s 1998costing formula, which has been adjusted forincreases in labour costs for police, this equates to acost of about $47 for the average call for service inthe beat area. In contrast, the average time taken toattend a call for service outside of the beat area by ageneral duties response crew was only 36 minutes.The fact that a general duties response was normallytwo officers also means that the cost per call forservice for a general duties response wasapproximately 40 per cent higher at $67 per call.

Although the beat officer took longer to deal with theaverage call for service, the key finding of thisanalysis is that the response provided by the beatofficer was more ‘cost-effective’ than the responseprovided by a general duties crew to the same type ofcall. In the main, this is due to the absence of thesecond officer. However, it should be pointed outthat while many calls for service could be handled bya single officer, some calls involve certain physicalrisks to the officer and would necessarily require theattendance of more than one officer.

The next section identifies the estimated costs ofestablishing and maintaining police beats.

TTaabbllee 66..33.. EEssttiimmaatteedd ccoosstt ppeerr mmiinnuuttee ooff ffiirrsstt rreessppoonnssee bbyy ppoolliiccee

11999988 22000022‘‘AAddjjuusstteedd’’

Single officer on foot $0.82 $0.98

Single officer in a police motor vehicle $0.85 $1.02

Two officers in a police motor vehicle $1.67 $2.00

Note: The estimate of the cost of police time for 2002 has been

adjusted for inflation and the growth of labour costs (i.e. growth

in the hourly rate paid to police officers). The new ‘adjusted’

estimate (+20%) does not take changes in the cost of vehicle or

operating and capital costs into account, which are based on

1998 estimates.

Source: CJC 1998.

66..22..22 CCoosstt ooff eessttaabblliisshhiinngg aa ppoolliiccee bbeeaatt

In the nine years since the first beat was establishedin Queensland, there have been many changes incosts associated with the provision of beat services.Changing technology and work practices havesignificantly altered the equipment an officer isexpected to have access to, which has had aconsequential impact on the cost of establishing andmaintaining beats.

Funding for the initial set-up of the beats is managedcentrally by the State Coordinator. After the beat is

established, additional funding representing theongoing cost of the beat is provided to QPS Regionalmanagement to spend appropriately.

NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt

The initial costs of establishing a neighbourhood beatvary greatly. For instance, it may be appropriate inone area to lease a residence while in another theremay be no option but to purchase premises. Similarly,the cost of office fit-out (e.g. computer cablingnecessary for secure access to QPS informationsystems) may fluctuate depending on the area ordistance to the communication carrier. Accordingly,it is difficult to provide precise costs. However, theQPS has provided a conservative estimate of the costof establishing a typical beat. For this analysis, theestimate is presented in two categories: developmentcosts and fit-out costs. Development costs includeitems such as furniture, vehicle and stationery. Thefit-out costs include the costs of dividing walls, airconditioning, signage and so on.

Table 6.5 (below) shows that the estimated cost ofestablishing a neighbourhood beat was $90 500.

Obviously, factors such as whether a premises isrented or purchased, and the type of vehiclepurchased are factors that greatly affect the cost ofestablishing a neighbourhood beat. The followingcomment made during interviews of police provides agood example of the variable nature of the costsrequired to establish a neighbourhood beat:

… we [QPS] got $75 000 from communityrenewal last year. Now that covers the buildingand office … to fit out everything else cost usanother $75 000 and then there are the ongoingcosts. The annual recurrent costs are somewherearound $22 000 and that’s on top of salary ...that was a costly and expensive place to establishone because we really had to build something.


TTaabbllee 66..44.. TToottaall ccoosstt ooff ffiirrsstt rreessppoonnssee bbyy ppoolliiccee

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Single officer 96% 45.6 min. $0.98 42.90

Two officers 4% 45.6 min. $2.00 $3.65

TToottaall ccoosstt:: $$4466..5555

TTyyppiiccaall %% ooff ccaallll ffoorr AAvv.. ttiimmee CCoosstt ppeerr AAddjj..ggeenneerraall sseerrvviiccee aatt sscceennee mmiinnuuttee ccoosstt dduuttiieessooffffiicceerr

Single officer 16% 36,1 min. $1.02 $5.89

Two officers 84% 36.1 min. $2.00 $60.65

TToottaall ccoosstt:: $$6666..5544

Note: This analysis is based on IMS data and includes 9743 valid calls

for service attended to by general duties police from the

Toowoomba Division and 52 valid calls for service attended to by

the Toowoomba Beat Officer. The ‘adjusted cost’ is calculated by:

proportion of calls for service [0.96] x Average time at scene

[45.6 min.] x Cost per minute [$0.98]. The addition of the

adjusted costs for the single-officer and two-officer components

will give the total cost. The complete formula is as follows:

Beat officer: the average time at job [45.6 min.] x the cost per

minute (single officer) [$0.98] x proportion of jobs attended by

single officer [96%] + average time at job [45.6 min.] x cost per

minute (two officers) [$2.00] x proportion of jobs attended by two

officers [4%].

General duties officer: the average time at job [36.1 min.] x the

cost per minute (single officer) [$1.02] x the proportion of jobs

attended by single officer [16%]) + (the average time at job [36.1

min.] x the cost per minute (2 officers) [$2.00] x the proportion of

jobs attended by two officers [84%]

Source: Unpublished calls-for-service data 2002, QPS and CJC 1998, CJC.

TTaabbllee 66..55.. EEssttiimmaatteedd ccoossttss ooff eessttaabblliisshhiinngg aanneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt

Development costs $75 500

Fit-out cost $15 000

Total $90 500

Source: Unpublished QPS data 2002.

Given the substantial variations in fundingrequirements for establishing a neighbourhood beat,it should be noted that the projected fundingrequirements for any additional beats cannot bedetermined by a base schedule of average costs perlocation.

SShhooppffrroonntt

Like neighbourhood beats, there are clear reasonswhy the establishment cost of a shopfront may differfrom the ‘typical’ example, including the size of thepremises, the position in the centre and therequirements of the shopping centre managers.

Table 6.6 presents the estimate of the establishmentcosts for a shopfront provided by the QPS.

The cost of establishing a shopfront beat issubstantially higher than the cost of establishing aneighbourhood beat and is estimated to be about$155 000. Given the substantial variables in fundingrequirements for establishing shopfronts, it should benoted that the projected funding requirements forany additional shopfronts cannot be determined by abase schedule of average costs per location.

66..22..33 CCoosstt ooff mmaaiinnttaaiinniinngg aa ppoolliiccee bbeeaatt

For this analysis, maintenance consists of outgoingcosts (i.e. rent), labour costs and motor vehicle costs.As was the case with the previous chapter, the dataused to identify the ongoing costs of neighbourhoodbeats were provided by the QPS.

NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt

The following information represents an estimate ofthe annual cost to maintain a neighbourhood beat.The estimate includes ‘outgoing costs’ (e.g. costsassociated with rent, utilities, stationery etc.) and‘labour costs’ excluding the officer’s usual salary,but including the 18 per cent beat allowance, penaltypayments for work on some weekends and publicholidays, and payroll tax. In addition, the estimatealso includes the annual cost of a police motorvehicle.

Table 6.7 presents the estimate of the annual costs tomaintain a neighbourhood beat and assumes that thebeat is staffed by a single officer, although there areat least seven beats with more than one officer.18

Results in Table 6.7 reveal that the estimated annualcost to maintain a neighbourhood beat is around

$44 000. Including beat officer salaries, the actualexpenditure on neighbourhood beats was $1 562 000 in the 2001–02 financial year. The salarycomponent on this expenditure was $1 351 000 with$211 128 allocated for other costs.

Ongoing recurrent costs vary significantly betweenindividual locations and therefore these estimatesshould not be used for future funding allocations.

SShhooppffrroonntt

The following is an estimate of the annual cost tomaintain a shopfront. The estimate includes‘outgoing costs’ (e.g. costs associated with rent,utilities, stationery, etc.) and the ‘labour costs’associated with two officers excluding their salaries,but including their allowances. The estimate inrelation to shopfronts does not make provision for apolice motor vehicle.

Table 6.8 reveals that the estimated annual cost tomaintain a shopfront as $58 000. Including beat-officer salaries and the salary of an administrativeassistant (usually AO2), the actual expenditure onshopfronts was $3 110 000 in the 2001–02 financial


TTaabbllee 66..66.. EEssttiimmaatteedd ccoossttss ooff eessttaabblliisshhiinngg aa sshhooppffrroonntt

Development costs $55 000

Fit-out cost $100 000

Total $155 000


TTaabbllee 66..77.. EEssttiimmaatteedd mmaaiinntteennaannccee ccoossttss ooff aa nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt

Outgoing costs $20 340

Labour $14 460

Motor vehicle $9 000

Total $43 800


18 For example, the Outer Urban Beat, which has fourofficers.


year. The salary component was approximately $2500 000 with $628 000 allocated for other costs.Ongoing recurrent costs vary between individuallocations and therefore these estimates should not beused for future funding allocations.

In short ...

The workload performance of beat officers is at leastequal to, and in some cases better than, their generalduties counterparts. In addition, there is someevidence to suggest that the response provided bythe beat officer was more cost-effective than theresponse provided by a general duties crew to thesame type of call for service. However, for the mostpart, this cost saving was simply due to the differencebetween the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response to a call for service. The annualrecurring cost to maintain beats in Queensland isapproximately $5 million, which equates toapproximately 0.6 per cent of the total QPSoperational budget.


On average, beat officers complete a similar number of CRISPs per month as their generalduties counterparts.

The number of calls for service taken by officers varied across sites, although beatofficers tended to attend slightly more calls for service than did general duties police.

Shopfront officers spend most of their time dealing with stealing offences and good orderincidents.

Neighbourhood beat officers attend to similar types of incidents as general duties officersand these primarily concern break and enter offences, traffic offences, alcohol-relatedmatters, and domestic violence incidents.

Neighbourhood beat officers spent more time on community work and addressingneighbourhood concerns.

The average cost of a beat officer attending to a call for service is $47.

The average cost of a general duties crew attending to a call for service is $67.

A neighbourhood beat costs approximately $90 500 to establish and $44 000 a year tomaintain (excluding officer salaries).

A shopfront costs approximately $155 000 to establish and $58 000 in annual maintenancecosts (excluding officer salaries).

TTaabbllee 66..88.. EEssttiimmaatteedd mmaaiinntteennaannccee ccoossttss ooff aa sshhooppffrroonntt

Outgoing costs $25 500

Labour (2 officers) $32 500

Total $58 000


ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 77: DELIVERY OF SERVICES AND JOB SATISFACTION_______7711

Beat policing aims to improve the quality ofpolicing in the community by changing the styleand orientation of service delivery. In particular,beat policing seeks to narrow the distinctionbetween reactive and proactive policing byestablishing procedures and strategies that enablepolice to undertake both types of policing as partof their day-to-day duties. Beat policing alsoencourages beat officers to work with thecommunity to reduce crime and communityproblems, which may have the added benefit forpolice of improving their job satisfaction.

This chapter:

1 assesses how beats are selected by drawing onQPS policies and procedures, as well asinformation collected during interviews with keypersonnel and stakeholders

2 identifies the main role and functions of beatofficers by analysing data collected by the QPSduring the most recent SWAS

3 discusses the involvement of beat officers inproactive problem-solving, which is a majorcomponent of beat policing

4 assesses organisational support for beat policing

5 examines the job satisfaction of beat officers.

The main sources of data used to assess the deliveryof services and measure job satisfaction among beatofficers are:

SWAS 2002

CMC Survey of Officers in Charge of PoliceBeats 2002

Interviews with officers and stakeholders

QPS policies and procedures (e.g. StandingOrders)

Previous evaluations, such as of the ToowoombaBeat Policing Pilot and the West End Police Beat(CJC 1995a & 1996).

77..11 SSiittee sseelleeccttiioonn aanndd eessttaabblliisshhmmeenntt ooff bbeeaattss

77..11..11 NNeeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaattss

The criteria for establishing a neighbourhood beatare listed in the Service Operational Procedures. (SeeNeighbourhood Police Beat: Standing Orders, nextpage.) However, the neighbourhood beats examinedin this evaluation were established before thedevelopment of these Standing Orders.

The Toowoomba Neighbourhood Police Beat wasestablished during the Toowoomba Beat PolicingPilot Project in 1993. The criteria used to establishthe Toowoomba Beat were:

1) The area should impose a high demand on policeas demonstrated by an analysis of calls forservice. However, to enable the beat officer to beseen by residents as the major provider ofpolicing services in the area, the volume of callsfor service should not exceed the number of callsthat one officer can routinely accommodate.


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Chapter 7: Delivery of services and job satisfaction

7722_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 77: DELIVERY OF SERVICES AND JOB SATISFACTION

2) Ideally, the beat area should exist within theconfines of an existing police divisional boundaryand contain a stable mix of residential andbusiness properties.

3) The beat area should be no larger than an officercan patrol by foot or bicycle as there is evidenceto suggest that this style of patrolling encouragesresidents to share information, which gives theofficer a better understanding of local issues andmakes it easier to target localised crime anddisorder problems.

4) Preference should be given to areas that contain anumber of ‘repeat calls for service’ so that thebeat officer will have ample opportunity to applyproblem-solving skills.

5) The beat should be located in an area that allowsthe officer to have easy access to calls-for-serviceinformation.

It is not known what specific criteria were used tonominate and establish the Outer Urban,Metropolitan and Regional Beats used in this study.19

Beat officers interviewed for the evaluation seemedreasonably satisfied with the set-up and location ofthese three beats. However, a senior police officerinterviewed for the evaluation expressed concernabout the process for selecting beats. In fact, policeconcerns about the selection process was one of therecurring themes of this evaluation. For example:

I am concerned that the selection of the beatsites is a politically driven process that has beentaken out of the hands of the Service, which maynot be appropriate. Once established, police

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICE BEAT (NPB)

Standing Orders

7 December 2001

4.1 Nomination of an NPB for inclusion in the program

4.1.1 The nomination of an NPB for inclusion in theprogram is through application to the Officer inCharge of the Region for consideration havingregard to the proposed location of the NPB in theirarea of responsibility. The Commissioner of Policemust approve all potential applications.

4.1.2 The Officer in Charge of the Region should considerthe following criteria in the short listing process:

4.1.2.1 whether an area poses a high demand on police, asdemonstrated by an analysis of calls for service andcrime data. Additionally, the type of calls for serviceand reported crime is to be analysed;

4.1.2.2 whether an area imposes a high demand on variouswelfare agencies and how this demand relates topolicing;

4.1.2.3 community attitudes, including the level of supportand expressed need for a beat area officer;

4.1.2.4 the demographics of each location including themixture of social groups, proportion of youth, elderlyand unemployed;

4.1.2.5 the mix of residential/commercial areas at eachproposed site;

4.1.2.6 the range of other police/multi-agencyprograms/facilities in place or likely to be funded in

the near future (e.g. Police Beat Shopfront, Policingin Schools, other police presence in the form ofstations, establishments or specialist squads);

4.1.2.7 workplace health and safety, likelihood of suitablepolice applicants and other human resource issues;

4.1.2.8 where demands on police services indicate apossible site, the availability of sites already ownedor leased by the QPS, particularly those that lendthemselves to conversion;

4.1.2.9 whether the proposed site will be residential or non-residential;

4.1.2.10 the number of officers to be allocated to eachlocation;

4.1.2.11 regional and local police management demands,plans, priorities and policing methods;

4.1.2.12 expected capital and recurring costs for establishinga beat in the area;

4.1.2.13 the ability to collect data and evaluate the program;and

4.1.2.14 when determining the geographical area of a NPB,consultation with the Senior Geographic InformationOfficer, Information Management Division is requiredto ensure Service Policy is complied with.

4.1.3 The Officer in Charge of a Region should consultwith the State Coordinator in relation to theidentification and operation of sites forimplementation of the program in their area ofresponsibility.

19 Telephone conversation with QPS Beat Policing StateCoordinator on 8 November 2002.

Source: QPS Service Operational Procedures — Standing Orders — 7 December 2001.


POLICE BEAT SHOPFRONT

Standing Orders

9 January 2002

4.1 Nomination of a Police Beat Shopfront forinclusion in the program

4.1.1 The nomination of a Police Beat Shopfront forinclusion in the program is through application tothe Officer in Charge of the Region forconsideration having regard to the proposedlocation of the Police Beat Shopfront in their areaof responsibility. The Commissioner of Police mustapprove all potential applications.

4.1.2 The Officer in Charge of the Region shouldconsider the following criteria in the short listingprocess:

4.1.2.1 whether an area poses a high demand on police,as demonstrated by an analysis of calls forservice and crime data. Additionally, the type ofcalls for service and reported crime is to beanalysed;

4.1.2.2 consultation with the community and retailing/business industries, including levels of supportand expressed need;

4.1.2.3 demographics of each location including themixture of social groups, proportion of youth,elderly and unemployed;

4.1.2.4 canvass the existence of environment scansconducted by external agencies, i.e. shoppingcentre analysis;

4.1.2.5 site availability, the profile of the site position(include parking bay/s) and cost to the Service;

4.1.2.6 size of the space offered equals or exceeds 50square metres with a 5 metre frontage (inc. draftfloor plans);

4.1.2.7 definition of the area to be policed;

4.1.2.8 restrictions/limitations imposed by centremanagement;

4.1.2.9 hours of operation;

4.1.2.10 location with respect to other policingestablishments, shopfronts etc;

4.1.2.11 overview of existing public transportation systemsand parking facilities;

4.1.2.12 access for disabled persons;

4.1.2.13 involvement and support from external agencies;

4.1.2.14 level of compliance with Workplace Health andSafety requirements; and

4.1.2.15 availability of regional/district personnel to staffthe shopfront.

4.1.3 The Officer in Charge of a Region should consultwith the State Coordinator in relation to theidentification and operation of sites forimplementation of the program in their area ofresponsibility.

Source: QPS Service Operational Procedures — Standing Orders — 9 January 2002.

beats are near impossible to shut-down. In thecase of poorly sited beats this may mean that theRegion ends up getting stuck with theconsiderable financial and human resource costof maintaining the beat in perpetuity. (Seniormanager)

I think that the problem is that once a beat is inplace it can't be moved because of the politicaland public outcry that would come. (Supervisor)

I think that police should be given a greater sayin the placement of the beat. Political issues,including fear of crime, often drive decisionsabout where to place beats. (Senior manager)

Some police suggested that new beats should only beestablished after an area met certain set criteria:

I feel that a police beat should only beestablished when certain criteria are met … mostdecisions to establish beats are political ones notoperational ones. I for one am not happy withthe fact that the Service gets saddled with beatsin areas where they shouldn’t be. (Seniormanager)

I think it is critical to set up a beat according tosome set criteria and not simply becausesomebody thinks it is a good idea. (Seniormanager)

77..11..22 SShhooppffrroonnttss

The process for establishing shopfronts is similar tothe process used for neighbourhood beats. (SeePolice Beat Shopfront: Standing Orders, above.)

In short …

The themes embedded in these comments are:

• the perceived need to use evidence-based processes for establishing police beats

• the desire on the part of police to have more say in operational decisions affecting beats

• the need for police beats to be established according to set criteria.


The shopfronts examined in this evaluation wereestablished before the development of StandingOrders for Police Beat Shopfronts in January 2002.Police officers and community stakeholdersinterviewed for the evaluation did not raise anyconcerns about how the two shopfronts examinedwere nominated or selected.

77..22 RRoollee aanndd rroosstteerriinngg ooff bbeeaattooffffiicceerrss

The following section examines the activities of beatofficers and considers whether the work currentlybeing performed by these officers is consistent withthe role envisaged for them by the CJC and the QPS.We also look at the rostering of beat officers and howthey are paid.

During the establishment of the original ToowoombaBeat Policing Pilot Project, the CJC and QPS sawthe role and function of the beat officers asencompassing:

attending to all allocated calls for service in thebeat area when on duty and available

patrolling the beat area in a proactive and reactivemanner

initiating direct contact with the community

gathering criminal intelligence

maintaining a highly visible presence in the beatarea (CJC 1996).

The activities of beat officers are divided by the QPSinto two broad categories: ‘incident activities’ and‘other duties’. Incident activities are core policingtasks, such as attending/investigating homicides,robberies, assaults etc. The ‘other duties’ categoryincludes ancillary policing tasks, such as operationaladministration, custodial duties, community liaison andnon-tasked general patrols. See Figure 7.1 for acomparison across these two broad categories.

Our analysis found that:

neighbourhood beat officers spend the greatestamount of their day conducting inquiries (23 percent), attending to administration matters (16 percent)

beat officers working in shopfronts appear tospend much more time on general patrols than doneighbourhood beat officers (shopfront 23 percent v. neighbourhood 13 per cent).

The large amount of time devoted to administrationis probably because the paperwork required tooperate a beat is similar to that required to run asmall police station (CJC 1995a).

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Source: SWAS 2002, QPS

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One of the key features of beat policing is for thebeat officer to have ownership of the policingproblems in a defined area. One of the ways thatpolice beats promote that ownership is to give theofficer responsibility for setting their own roster. Inthat way, the officer is free to decide when and whereto patrol and to employ proactive strategies designedto address the underlying problems of their beats.

In the neighbourhood beats examined for theevaluation, beat officers managed their own rosters toensure that they were able to meet the needs of theirparticular beat. The evaluation also found that beatofficers working in shopfronts also looked after theirown rosters, but there was less flexibility as theoperating hours of the shopfront had to correspondwith the shopping centre’s core business hours.

In practice, officers in both types of beats tend towork during daylight hours on week days and laterhours on the weekends or during special events. Theimportance of flexible working arrangements for beatofficers is demonstrated by the following comments:

If we have any crime trends in the area we try toroster for those crime trends, so if we have a lotof break and enter offences occurring at the startof the week, or at night, or during the day that iswhen we try to roster ourselves. (Beat officer)

You’ve got to be flexible and you’ve got to beprepared to work a few nights. I had a spat[number] of wilful damages here about 18months ago happening in the wee hours of themorning, so I did a week of night work.You can’tjust rely on your outside guys to come in and doall your work … The roster is very much drivenby what’s happening at the time. (Beat officer)

The view expressed by beat officers that flexible workarrangements are critical to the success of the policebeat concept is also well supported by previousresearch (Bayley 1998; CJC 1995a).

Changes to Sunday trading laws also appear to havehad a financial impact on the Service with mostBrisbane-area shopfronts now expected to be openseven days a week. It is evident in the commentmade by the manager of the Metropolitan ShoppingCentre that the shopfront has already adjusted itsrosters to provide policing services on Sunday.

I was impressed with the beat so quicklyresponding to the issue of Sunday trading as wenow have the services of a beat officer on aSunday. (Retailer)

77..22..33 PPaayy aanndd aalllloowwaanncceess ffoorr bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerrss

Closely associated with the rostering of beat officersis the issue of pay and special allowances (e.g.Operational Shift Allowance, Beat OfficerAllowance). For example, over the course of theevaluation, a number of beat officers and other policeclaimed that beat officers are being financiallydisadvantaged simply by being a beat officer. On theother hand, a couple of the officers said that thecurrent system actually works in their favour.

Whether or not beat officers should have access tooperational shift allowances or other allowances is anissue that most beat officers cannot seem to agreeon.20 However, every officer spoken to during theevaluation expressed the view that whatever systemthe Service used to remunerate beat officers forworking evenings and on weekends should not, inany way, financially disadvantage one type of beatofficer over another beat officer or a general dutiesofficer.

The following comments represent the statementsmade by police on this matter:

The fact that some beat officers do not get theOSA [Operational Shift Allowance] is not fairand should be rectified as soon as possible.(Senior manager)

In short …

The key themes emerging out of this analysis are:

• there are few major differences in the types of policing activities undertaken by neighbourhood beat officers and shopfront officers, and

• beat officers are engaged in activities similar to those originally envisaged, and

• beat officers spend large amounts of time on administrative tasks (i.e. paperwork).

20 An operational shift allowance of 19 per cent of anofficer’s base salary is paid to ‘operational police’ inlieu of shift and weekend penalty rates, public holidayrates and annual leave loading.


For some beat officers to go to work and get lessmoney [than a general duties officer] issomething that the Service has got to look at …it’s a big Union issue you know! (Supervisor)

We don’t work many shifts, so that gets us out ofthe OSA, but we get penalties for workingweekends and afternoons. (Beat officer)

If we were on OSA I would not have theflexibility and the autonomy to change the rosterthe way we do because of the equity business. Ifsomething comes up and we are required to bethere … the staff here knows that the roster canbe changed at very short notice. We haveobligations from the schools, neighbourhoodwatch meetings and things like that … theofficers here usually get a weekend a fortnight.(Supervisor)

We get about six hours of penalty units … itactually works out to be about a 26 per centallowance when you take into account all of theweekends … I have [made] more money than theaverage general duties officer on OSA. (Beat officer)

This chapter now considers whether the currentmodel of beat policing retains an emphasis on beat-officer involvement in proactive problem-solving.

77..33 PPrrooaaccttiivvee pprroobblleemm--ssoollvviinngg

In the late 1970s, Professor Herman Goldsteinsuggested that police should embrace a ‘problem-oriented’ (POP) approach to policing. Using thisapproach, the police would collaborate with thecommunity to attack some of the underlying causesof crime and community problems (Goldstein 1979).

One of the main aims of the original ToowoombaBeat Policing Pilot Project was to incorporate POPinto the normal duties of a beat officer by asking theofficers to be proactive and engage in problem-solving (CJC 1995a). Consequently, an importantobjective of the Toowoomba pilot, and all beatsestablished since then, was to identify and solvecommunity problems.

The analysis that follows identifies the amount oftime that beat officers spend on problem-solving andprovides examples of the kind of problem-solvingactivities that the officers are involved in.

77..33..11 AAmmoouunntt ooff ttiimmee bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerrss ssppeenndd oonnpprrooaaccttiivvee pprroobblleemm--ssoollvviinngg

Results shown in Table 7.1 reveal that neighbour-hood beat officers are only slightly more involved inproactive policing (17 per cent) than theircounterparts in shopfronts (15 per cent). In eithercase, however, proactive problem-solvingencompasses a major part of their day, which isconsistent with the role that was originally envisagedfor beat officers.

In short ...

The key themes relating to the rostering and pay ofbeat officers are:

• flexible work arrangements, such as beat officers managing their own rosters, are critical to the success of the police beat concept

• changes to Sunday trading laws have had a financial impact on the Service with most Brisbane-area shopfronts now expected to be open seven days a week, and

• allowances used to remunerate beat officers for working evenings and on weekends should be equitable.

TTaabbllee 77..11.. PPeerrcceennttaaggee ooff ttiimmee ssppeenntt bbyy bbeeaatt ooffffiicceerrss oonnpprrooaaccttiivvee pprroobblleemm--ssoollvviinngg

PPOOPP CCoommmmuunniittyy TToottaalllliiaaiissoonn

%% %% %%

Neighbourhood beats 8.2 9.0 17.2

Shopfronts 7.7 6.9 14.6

Source: SWAS 2002, QPS.

77..33..22 EExxaammpplleess ooff pprrooaaccttiivvee pprroobblleemm--ssoollvviinngg

The following examples provided by theMetropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat illustratethe types of POP-related activities being undertakenby beat officers.

Some other examples of proactive problem-solving inthe beat areas include:

working with retailers to secure canisters of spraypaint in an effort to reduce theft and minimisegraffiti in and around the shopping centre

working with the local council to establish a SkatePark to give young people in the beat area some-where to go

providing free martial arts classes in an effort toteach self-discipline to young people in the beatarea

sponsoring a community forum and a drug forumfor parents aimed at reducing crime and drugabuse in the beat area, and

working with beat residents to digitally recordvaluable property so that beat area residentswould be able to identify it if it should ever bestolen.

Besides these creative and original examples ofproactive policing, comments from interviews ofpolice and key stakeholders also highlight theimportance of beat officers using problem-solvingapproaches in their day-to-day work:

It really all just gets back to POP. It’s POP inaction … that should be the focus of beats.(Supervisor)

I see that the Service has grown up considerablysince 1993. The number one output for theService is problem-oriented policing, which hasbeen taken on board by the QPS to a largeextent … I look back now and I see the beatswere a very important catalyst to market theconcept of problem-oriented policing.(Supervisor)

We do a lot of problem stuff here. We have beenrunning lots of different projects. We look atproblems and we try and fix them using all sortsof different ways. (Beat officer)

Overall, beat officers have a strong commitment toproactive problem-solving and consider beat policingto be particularly effective in delivering services.

EExxaammppllee 11 —— GGrraaffffiittii PPrreevveennttiioonn PPrroojjeecctt

The Graffiti Prevention Project, which was funded bythe QPS and the local council, focused on four mainareas:

1 establishing effective systems to report and recordgraffiti (e.g. digital camera)

2 creating a strategy for the rapid removal of graffiti

3 providing the community with education aboutways to minimise graffiti

4 supporting the Legal Arts Program (HolidayAerosol Art Program).

The project commenced on 1 January 2000. Duringthe first six months, there was an 87 per centreduction in the amount of graffiti tags in the beatarea.

The project was awarded a Silver Commissioner’sLantern award in 2000 for excellence in the area ofcommunity policing.

Source: Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat 2002.

EExxaammppllee 22 —— CCllaassssiiccaall MMuussiicc aatt LLooccaall RRaaiillwwaayySSttaattiioonn

Officers at the Metropolitan Neighbourhood PoliceBeat asked their local Community ConsultativeCommittee (CCC) for suggestions about how to dealwith ongoing problems (graffiti, assaults, drugtrafficking, etc.) at a local railway station. The CCCsubsequently recommended that classical music be‘piped-in’ to deter offenders from loitering.

Following consultations with residents near the railwaystation, the beat officers submitted a proposal toQueensland Rail for a six-month trial of classical musicbeing played in an effort to deter offending. Therequest was approved with the trial commencing inDecember 2001.

During the first six months of the project, crime at therailway station decreased by 39 per cent and calls forservice reduced by 44 per cent. In addition, 81 percent of residents in the area considered the initiative tobe a success with all of the residents saying that theywould be in favour of the project continuing.

Source: Metropolitan Neighbourhood Police Beat 2002.


77..33..33 BBaarrrriieerrss ttoo eeffffeeccttiivvee pprrooaaccttiivvee pprroobblleemm--ssoollvviinngg

Two concerns expressed by police interviewed for theevaluation related to the lack of suitable informationsystems for identifying local policing problems andthe lack of training for beat officers in POP. Somecomments were:

The QPS has come a long way in recognising theimportance of problem-solving. However, we’renot giving our managers the resources andinformation management systems where they caneasily obtain that data. (Supervisor)

We need the ability to look at the CAD systemsourselves without having to go and annoy PoliceCommunications. (Beat officer)

I’ve never been on the beat course … I’ve neverbeen formally trained in problem-solving, butI’ve read the POPP guide. (Beat officer)

I’ve never had any formal training (in problem-solving), but I have a lot of experience incommunity policing. (Beat officer)

There was broad agreement among policeinterviewed for the evaluation that it was importantfor beat officers to receive formal training inproactive policing and to have user-friendly access totimely and accurate data for the purposes ofproblem-solving. The reported lack of training forbeat officers in POP and the need to provide suchconsistent training may have a substantial impact interms of costs and would need to be furtherconsidered from a police resource availabilityperspective.

The need for well-structured and focused training isan essential requirement for all beat officers. Inrecognition of this, the QPS has developed a trainingpackage for beat officers and has declared itselfcommitted to its implementation.

77..44 OOrrggaanniissaattiioonnaall ssuuppppoorrtt ffoorr bbeeaattppoolliicciinngg

One factor critical to the operation of beat policingover the years has been the high level of supportprovided by the QPS (CJC 1995a). This section ofthe report examines the impact of three types oforganisational support: managerial support, supportfor beat policing by other police and materialsupport.

77..44..11 MMaannaaggeerriiaall ssuuppppoorrtt ffoorr bbeeaattss

Some supervisors and senior managers (e.g. DistrictOfficers and Regional Assistant Commissioners)expressed strong support for beat policing:

Initially, I did not favour beats and believed thatthey were an unreasonable drain on resourcesand not the most efficient use of police officers.However my viewpoint has changed in recentyears. I now firmly believe that we have to dopolicing differently because the traditionalreactive model is not working. (Senior manager)

The work that the beat officers do is invaluable.They provide the community and others with asense of safety and security. They have madesome remarkable achievements. (Senior manager)

I know we need more of them [beats]. Everysuburb would love one because they do such afantastic job and it’s not all just reactive policing.As I said before, it’s getting back to like the oldcountry policing.You’re taking an interest in yourcommunity and a lot of it is proactive where youmight be getting out there and doing protectivebehaviour training or mixing with the kids atschool and it’s breaking down those barriersbetween the police and the community and thecommunity love it so they work really well. I justcan’t say it enough. They work really well and thecommunity takes pride in their police officer … Ijust can’t say enough about how well they work.(Senior manager)

In contrast, there were those who did not support theconcept:

If I had a choice, I would absorb the beat officersback into general duties because from where Isit, I see my primary role is to provide anoperational response 24-hours a day, seven days aweek. (Senior manager)

I would rather have more general duties policethan beat officers as I feel that general dutiesofficers are far more productive. (Senior manager)

To be honest with you, I would rather have thesix officers and their three cars in as a reactiveresource in the District. (Senior manager)

Generally, the beat officers interviewed for theevaluation said that they were happy with the level ofmanagerial support given to them. For example:

Yeah, we’re getting good support … [on a scaleof one to ten] the level of support that we getfrom Region would be up around eight or nine.(Beat officer)


In terms of management support, on a scale ofone to ten I would probably give it an eight anda half or maybe a nine. (Beat officer)

One of the reasons beat officers were so positive intheir assessment of the level of managerial supportfor beat policing was because they felt that they werebeing strongly encouraged to try new ways of doingthings. In addition, beat officers reported that theyappreciated the fact that the Service seemed to trustthem to manage their own rosters and activities.

77..44..22 SSuuppppoorrtt ffoorr bbeeaattss bbyy ootthheerr ppoolliiccee

Having the support of ‘mainstream’ police is alsovery important if innovative or non-traditionalpolicing strategies, such as beat policing, are to bewidely accepted as a viable method of deliveringpolicing services.

Most of the beat officers interviewed for thisevaluation felt that to increase the level of support byother police they (the beat officers) would need totake on more of the reactive work or have greaterpresence in the beat areas. For example:

The relationship between us and our generalduties counterparts is very good as long as theycan see that we’re actually doing jobs … a lot ofcalls come via the mobile phone ... so the others[general duties officers] didn’t really know whatwe were doing … over the last couple of monthswe’ve really been getting on to the radio andhelping out with a lot of jobs and we’ve reallybeen sort of hammering home to the guys thatwe don’t just go to meetings. (Beat officer)

We’ve been making an effort to do a whole lotmore [calls for service] lately … not to try andjustify what we do, but just because in the pastwe hadn’t really been letting people know asmuch as we should about what we do … Others[general duties police] think that all they do isjust job to job to job to job. When they see usnot doing any [jobs] they think we’re notworking, but it’s just a different type of workingthat’s all. (Beat officer)

On the other hand, the view by beat supervisors wasthat other police, particularly general duties officers,already had a positive view of beat officers:

General duties and other officers know the beatofficers are approachable … the standard ofthese beat officers is very high. (Supervisor)

The interaction between the generals and beatofficers is great … the generals probably don’tunderstand what the beat officers do, but therespect is still there. (Supervisor)

77..44..33 MMaatteerriiaall ssuuppppoorrtt

The beat officers and beat supervisors interviewedfor the evaluation raised minimal concerns about theadequacy or lack of materials or facilities:

We’ve got everything we need … other than wewould like to get another computer. (Beatofficer)

There has been no extra need for extra resources… these beats are set up with everything thatthey need. (Supervisor)

However, one of the police officers interviewed raisedthe concern that some of the older beats weredisadvantaged in comparison to more recentlyestablished beats. Comments in that regard were:

We have a set schedule of equipment that coversabsolutely everything from tables to chairs. Weensure that we resource them all the same, butwe do have problems with the pre-July 2001beats. (Supervisor)

Question: Do you think it would be a desirableoutcome to actually bring those other beats up toat least the minimum standard? Answer: It wouldbe ideal, but the issue we have is budget ... weare only provided with enough money toestablish additional locations, but not for thepurposes of addressing any previous inequities.(Supervisor)

During the recent statewide survey of beat officers,Officers in Charge were asked if they had the necessaryequipment or facilities to complete their role.

Table 7.2 shows their responses to this question.

In short ...

Beat officers felt that other police generally supportedtheir efforts, particularly if the beat officers wereperceived by other police to be pulling their ownweight.

In short ...

We found the level of support for the concept ofpolice beats by supervisors and senior managers tobe mixed, with some officers strongly supportingbeats and others much less enthusiastic about theconcept. Beat officers themselves, however, appearedto believe they were getting very good managerialsupport.


Approximately 70 per cent of officers working inshopfronts and 40 per cent of officers working inneighbourhood beats believed that they did not havethe necessary equipment. In contrast, duringinterviews, officers in the six selected beats expressedsatisfaction with the equipment and facilities thatthey had. Many of the items beat officers did requesthad not been provided by the QPS due to legislativerestrictions on the beat model or restrictions imposedby the commercial nature of lease arrangement (i.e.secure holding area, toilet facilities, triple-deck taperecorder). Other resource needs have, in fact, beenalready addressed by the QPS, including about $250 000 spent over 2001–02 and 2002–03upgrading security at shopfronts.

77..55 BBeeaatt ooffffiicceerr jjoobb ssaattiissffaaccttiioonn

One of the objectives for the Toowoomba BeatPolicing Pilot Project was to provide the police witha more satisfying work environment and theopportunity to develop and use a variety of new skills(CJC 1995a). The following analysis identifies thelevel of job satisfaction among beat officers using

data obtained from the CMC’s 2002 statewidesurvey of officers in charge of police beats.Comments made by the beat officers from the sixsites selected for the evaluation are also included inthe discussion.

During a recent survey of officers in charge of beats,respondents were asked if they were satisfied in theirposition as a beat officer. Figure 7.2 shows theresults of this analysis. More than 70 per cent ofofficers in charge of neighbourhood beats and 78 percent of officers in charge of shopfronts said that theywere either ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with their roleas beat officers. The finding that officers in chargeare generally satisfied in their role is consistent withcomments made by beat officers during interviewsconducted for the evaluation.

I like the community aspect of beats. I like theidea that we can instigate and implement thingsand see them through to fruition. On a scale ofone to ten in terms of my happiness here at thebeat, I would have to say nine. (Beat officer)

Of course there is the offer of a house as well. Soit was, you know, a perfect opportunity to dowith the type of job that I like, which iscommunity policing, in an area that I like to doit. (Beat officer)

Interestingly, some beat officers felt that working at abeat actually enhanced their résumé and improvedtheir opportunity for promotion:

I’ve only been around [the beats] for a shortwhile, but what I have found is that whenever Ihave put an application for a job and I’ve beenaddressing those KSCs [key selection criteria] Ican find something to fill that hole … It’samazing, but when I was out there trying to getsergeant positions I wasn’t getting anywhere …now I’m getting short listed and getting offeredpositions. (Beat officer)

Despite the overall positive finding, approximately 30 per cent of officers in charge of beats surveyed forthe evaluation said that they were planning to leavetheir positions over the next 12 months (neighbour-hood beats 24 per cent and shopfronts 33 per cent).The main reasons for wanting to leave were the lackof promotional opportunities and the need for newchallenges and experiences.

In short ...

Beat officers surveyed or interviewed for theevaluation expressed high levels of job satisfaction.

In short ...

Few concerns were raised about materials or facilitiesat the beats by beat officers from the sites selectedfor the evaluation. However, one of the officersinterviewed suggested that some of the older beatswere disadvantaged in terms of facilities andequipment when compared to the newer beats. Inaddition, information from beat officers surveyed forthe evaluation revealed that several officers in chargeof beats did not feel that they had the necessaryequipment to do the job.


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Neighbourhood beats 41 (7)

Shopfronts 70 (28)

Source: CMC statewide survey of officers in charge of police beats 2002.


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Source: CMC statewide survey of officers in charge of police beats 2002.

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Concerns were raised about the selection of new neighbourhood beats and the need tobalance community needs with the operational requirements of police.

There were no concerns with the selection and establishment of shopfronts.

Neighbourhood beat officers spend a high proportion of their time conducting inquiriesand attending to administrative matters.

Shopfront officers spend a large part of their shift engaged in general patrolling.

It is important for beat officers to have responsibility for managing their own time in orderto respond to the needs of their beat area.

Beat officers should be equitably compensated for weekend and night work.

Neighbourhood beat officers are slightly more involved in proactive policing than areshopfront officers.

There was concern raised by beat officers that insufficient training and inability to accesstimely data were barriers to effective problem-solving.

Beat officers feel supported by management and general duties officers.

Approximately 70 per cent of beat officers are satisfied or very satisfied with their job.

Approximately 30 per cent of beat officers are planning to leave the position in the next12 months.

ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 88: KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE_______8833

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This section summarises the key findings for each ofthe measures of beat policing, namely:

impact on crime and calls for service

perceptions of crime and personal safety

client satisfaction with police services

workload performance and costs of beats

delivery of services and job satisfaction.

88..11..11 IImmppaacctt oonn ccrriimmee aanndd ccaallllss ffoorr sseerrvviiccee

One of the objectives of the evaluation was to assessthe overall impact of beat policing on crime. Ingeneral, we observed a reduction in reported crimein all neighbourhood beats. In contrast, crimeincreased in two of the three comparison sites.Similarly, property crime fell in all neighbourhoodbeats, compared to a substantial rise observed in twoof the comparison areas. These results suggest thatneighbourhood beats are effective in reducingreported crime.

Neighbourhood beats did not have an impact on therate of calls for service over the short term. However,we then compared the rate of calls for service in theToowoomba Beat and its comparison area during theJanuary to June 1994 period to the rate of callsduring the January to June 2002 period.Comparatively large reductions in calls for servicewere observed in Toowoomba Beat, as well as a fall inthe number of chronic repeat locations. In contrast,the number of hot spots increased over time in bothToowoomba Beat and its comparison area. Thefindings suggest that proactive policing initiatives bybeat officers are able to affect positively the rate ofcalls for service and locations generating chronicrepeat calls for service.

In contrast to these findings, there appears to be nopersuasive evidence that shopfronts have a positiveimpact on the rate of reported crime. Three of theshopping centres recorded slight changes in overallcrime and property crime during the study period,while one centre recorded significant increases.

88..11..22 PPeerrcceeppttiioonnss ooff ccrriimmee aanndd ppeerrssoonnaall ssaaffeettyy

We expected that the presence of a neighbourhood beator shopfront would reduce citizens’ perceptions ofcrime and increase perceptions of personal safety andwillingness to report an offence to police. In general,the results from surveys of residents, shoppers andretailers did not support this expectation. Residents inneighbourhood beats perceived disorder problems tobe more common in their community than didresidents in comparison areas. Neighbourhood beatswere also not associated with increases in citizens’feelings of personal safety, with residents in two beatareas experiencing significantly lower levels ofperceived safety than residents in comparison areas.Additionally, statistically significant differences werenot observed between each neighbourhood beat andits respective comparison area in terms of thepublic’s willingness to report crime.

The proportion of shoppers and retailers reportingfeeling safe while in the shopping centre was veryhigh for all sites. There is no consistent evidence thatshopfronts increase perceptions of safety of shoppersor retailers. However, given the high levels of safetyexpressed by these groups, it would be unrealistic toexpect that one or two beat officers could have asubstantial impact on perceptions of personal safety.

In short …

There is no evidence that neighbourhood beats orshopfronts reduce citizens’ perceptions of crime orincrease perceptions of personal safety.

In short …

Neighbourhood beats appear effective in reducingoverall crime and property crime, but not calls forservice, at least in the short term. Over the longerterm, they do seem to be effective in reducing callsfor service and in reducing chronic repeat calls. Incontrast, shopfronts do not appear to be effective inreducing reported crime in shopping centres.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

8844_______ON THE BEAT_______CCHHAAPPTTEERR 88: KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

88..11..33 CClliieenntt ssaattiissffaaccttiioonn wwiitthh ppoolliiccee sseerrvviicceess

Awareness of beat policing and the location of theneighbourhood beat office was found to be quitehigh among community members. However, onlyabout half of the residents could recognise their localbeat officer. Residents who did report contact withtheir beat officer expressed satisfaction with theservice they received.

More residents in neighbourhood beats reported thatpolice were doing a good or very good job in dealingwith a range of community crime and disorderproblems. Residents in neighbourhood beats andcomparison areas were very happy with the servicethat they were receiving from police. Residents andvarious community stakeholders were positive aboutand supportive of beat policing and very happy withthe service that they received from their beat officer.But this did not translate into increased communitysatisfaction with policing services more generally.

Possible reasons for this finding are:

1 Community members indicated they were alreadysatisfied with police and therefore changes inservice provision would have to be dramatic tohave any impact on their level of satisfaction.

2 The workload analysis of beat officers showedthat a high proportion of calls for service in thebeat area was attended by general duties officersfrom the local station, and not the beat officer. Ifthe beat officer was to become the primary service provider in the beat there may be anincrease in community satisfaction.

88..11..44 WWoorrkkllooaadd ppeerrffoorrmmaannccee aanndd ccoossttss ooffppoolliiccee bbeeaattss

In general, beat officers take a similar number ofcrime reports as do general duties officers. Incontrast, beat officers attend slightly more calls forservice than do general duties officers. However, thetypes of policing incidents that beat officers deal with

differ in a number of ways to incidents dealt with bygeneral duties officers. This depended oncircumstances such as the type of area the officerworks in and the types of call the officer routinelydeals with. In the main, beat officers appear to bemore involved in typical neighbourhood concerns.

In terms of the cost of providing police responses,the response provided by the beat officer appears tobe more cost-effective than that provided by a generalduties crew. The cost of establishing a shopfront isestimated at $155 000, with maintenance costs about$58 000 a year. The estimated cost of establishing aneighbourhood beat is $90 500, with annualmaintenance costs of about $43 800. The annualrecurring cost to maintain beats in Queensland isapproximately $5 million, which equates toapproximately 0.6 per cent of the total QPSoperational budget.

88..11..55 DDeelliivveerryy ooff sseerrvviicceess aanndd jjoobb ssaattiissffaaccttiioonn

There are few differences in the types of activitiesundertaken by neighbourhood beat officers andshopfront officers. Both spend the greatest amount oftheir day conducting inquiries and attending tocorrespondence or administration matters, althoughshopfront officers also spend a large proportion oftheir time engaged in general patrolling.

Beat officers need to have flexible workingarrangements over which they have autonomy and itis therefore important that an equitable allowancescheme is used to compensate them for workingevening and weekend shifts. The QPS also should torespond to the changing contextual needs of beats,such as recent changes to Sunday trading laws, andprovide the necessary overtime or penalty allowancesfor shopfront officers.

In short …

The workload performance of beat officers is at leastequal to, and in some cases better than, their generalduties counterparts. In addition, there is someevidence to suggest that the response provided bythe beat officer is more cost-effective than theresponse provided by a general duties crew to thesame type of call for service — although, for the mostpart, this ‘cost saving’ may be due to the differencebetween the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response to a call for service.

In short …

The presence of a shopfront increases the visibility ofpolice and provides opportunity for shoppers andretailers to contact police for advice, as opposed tosimply reporting an offence. However, shopfronts arenot associated with increased client satisfaction withpolice services.

Beat officers spend a major part of the day onproactive problem-solving. For officers to engageeffectively in proactive policing activities they need toreceive formal training and access to timely andaccurate data for the purposes of identifying localpolicing problems.

Beat officers feel supported by managers andencouraged to address problems through buildingcommunity partnerships and engaging in proactivepolicing. Overall, beat officers are very satisfied withtheir role.

Most beats are well resourced; however, some of theolder beats were not established under the newguidelines and have not been provided with the samelevel of resources in comparison to more recentlyestablished beats.

In short …

The types of activities undertaken by beat officers aresimilar to those originally envisaged by the Serviceand the CJC. This includes general patrolling,problem-solving and working with the community.The analysis also reveals that beat officers enjoyconsiderable job satisfaction and believe that they arewell supported by the Service. However, one concernexpressed by some police related to the site-selectionprocess. They suggested that any decision toestablish new neighbourhood beats should havepolice input and use evidence-based selectionprocesses.


IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg eeffffeeccttiivvee??The evidence for the general effectiveness of beatpolicing is mixed. Neighbourhood beats areassociated with decreases in all crime and propertyoffences; however, shopfronts were not found to haveany impact on reported crime.

Neighbourhood beats did not have an impact on therate of calls for service over the short term, althoughin the longer term there was a substantial decrease incalls for service in Toowoomba Beat. Results revealedthat the beat was particularly effective in reducing thenumber of chronic repeat-call addresses.

Neither neighbourhood beats nor shopfronts reducedperceptions of crime or increased perceptions ofpersonal safety. Neighbourhood beats were notassociated with increases in citizens’ willingness toreport crime.

IIss bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg ccoosstt--eeffffeeccttiivvee??The performance of beat officers is at least equalto and in some cases better than their generalduties counterparts. There is also some evidence

that the response provided by a beat officer ismore cost-effective than provided by a generalduties crew to the same type of call; however, thiscost saving was largely due to the differencebetween the cost of a single-officer versus a two-officer response.

AArree ccoommmmuunniittyy mmeemmbbeerrss ssaattiissffiieeddwwiitthh,, aanndd ddoo tthheeyy ssuuppppoorrtt,, bbeeaattppoolliicciinngg??Residents of beat areas expressed very high levels ofsupport for, and satisfaction with, beat policing.Residents in neighbourhood beats had a greaterawareness of police activity than residents incomparison areas and were very happy with theservices they received from their beat officer.

The presence of a police shopfront increased policevisibility and provided opportunity for shoppers andretailers to contact police for advice. Retailers andshoppers alike reported satisfaction with policeservices and support for the shopfront.

88..22 IIssssuueess tthhaatt hhaadd aann iimmppaacctt oonn tthheeffiinnddiinnggss

88..22..11 DDuupplliiccaattiioonn ooff ppoolliiccee sseerrvviicceess

It could be argued that neighbourhood beat policingsimply reflects a duplication or double servicing ofpolice services to specific neighbourhood locations.Consistent with this line of thinking, it could beargued that resources might be more efficientlyallocated if neighbourhood beat officers were simplytransferred to general duties rostering for an area. Inessence, adding neighbourhood police beat officers tothe pool of general duties officers would provide thesame level of coverage, presence and overall serviceto an area at a lower cost. For the following reasons,we strongly assert that such a viewpoint is notaccurate:

1 Neighbourhood beat policing provides a policeresponse in specific locations that is distinct fromgeneral duties policing. Beat officers areencouraged to undertake direct communityengagement and liaison, and problem-orientedpolicing initiatives as part of their core business.While such initiatives are also important togeneral duties policing, it is clearly the case thatrapid response to calls for service, as well asgeneral patrolling, remain core business forgeneral duties policing. Results reported inChapter 6 reveal that neighbourhood beat officersgenerally spend less time undertaking generalpatrol activities and responding to crimeincidents, and much more time on communityliaison activities than do general duties policeofficers. Additionally, results indicate that beatofficers spend more time on specific calls forservice in their neighbourhoods than do generalduties police, which reflects the capacity of beatofficers to provide additional service andassistance to citizens requesting police serviceswithout the need to rush off to another call. Thesefindings reflect the fact that neighbourhood beatofficers undertake different functions fromgeneral duties policing, which would not beadequately addressed if beat officers were divertedto general duties service.

2 Diverting neighbourhood beat officers to generalduties policing would lead to a reduction inpolicing services to a previously identified area ofneed (i.e. the beat). Officers diverted from theirbeat duty would have responsibility for a muchlarger geographic area. Their general patrolling

activities, as well as responses to calls for service,would divert them from beat areas. In short, theresponse to crime and disorder problems in theneighbourhood beat, as well as the opportunitiesfor community liaison and community-basedcrime prevention efforts, would be minimised.

3 There is evidence that diverting one or twoofficers from neighbourhood beats to generalduties policing would have no impact on policepresence and capacity for service provision in thearea. Simply adding a few more officers to generalduties policing would do little to enhance overallpolice presence in an area. In fact, availableevidence suggests that as many as ten officerswould need to be hired to increase policepresence by one officer over a 24-hour period,seven days a week, 365 days a year (Bayley 1994).Bayley’s (1994) analysis of police organisations inCanada, America, Britain, Japan, and Australiarevealed that increasing police presence on thestreet by even one officer is difficult because ofvarious issues including the number of workingdays available per officer on an annual basis, themix of general duties police versus police assignedto administrative tasks, and the amount ofrecreation and holiday leave taken among otherissues. Taking into consideration the level ofadministrative burdens placed upon contemporarypolice officers, Bayley asserts that the ten for onerule is ‘generous to the police’ (p. 53).

In

88..22 ..22 DDiissppllaacceemmeenntt aanndd ddiiffffuussiioonn eeffffeeccttss ooffbbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg

It might be argued that the activities of neighbour-hood beat officers do not effectively reduce crimeoverall, but rather displace crime or certain forms ofcrime to adjacent locations. In essence, when sucheffects are occurring, observed reductions in crime in

In short ...

There are good reasons to believe that divertingneighbourhood beat officers to general dutiespolicing would lead to a reduction of policingservices in an area of previously identified need, aswell as a reduced opportunity to provide proactive,community-based crime prevention activities. Forthese reasons, it is our contention that neighbour-hoods with police beats would not be similarly servedby the police if officers were diverted toward generalduties.


a study location mask a larger transference ordisplacement process. The overall net effect is thatthe intervention may not reduce crime across thelarger geographic area.

Empirical evidence on this issue suggests that while itis important to consider crime displacement whenassessing targeted policing activities, it is far from aninevitable occurrence. For example, studies of crimehot spots have increasingly supported the view thatcrime displacement effects are overstated (Braga,Weisburd, Waring, Mazerolle, Spelman & Gajewski1999; Braga 2001; Green 1995; Weisburd & Green1995) and a review by Hessling (1994) suggests thatcrime displacement effects are inconsequential.

Moreover, the most comprehensive and systematicreview conducted to date on this issue also identifiesthat focused crime prevention activities of the policedo not inevitably lead to displacement. The review byBraga et al. (1999) of available randomised experi-ments and quasi-experiments that have examinedpolice responses to crime hot spots and crimedisplacement reveals that spatial crime displacementeffects were limited and, in some cases, crimeprevention spill-over benefits to adjacent locationswere observed. In short, the diffusion of crimeprevention gains, as opposed to crime displacementeffects, appears related to targeted police actions inhigh crime locations.

In light of the available evidence on spatial crimedisplacement, it is expected that the reductions inreported crime observed in the various neighbour-hood beat locations are real and do not reflectdisplacement effects.

88..33 IIssssuueess ffoorr tthhee ffuuttuurree

On the basis of evidence collected through the courseof this evaluation, the following suggestions arepresented as being important to the development ofbeat policing. They relate to:

the process for selecting police beats

tenure arrangements for new beats

performance management

marketing

training

access to information

alternative models of beat policing.

88..33..11 TThhee pprroocceessss ffoorr sseelleeccttiinngg ppoolliiccee bbeeaattss

One of the major concerns expressed by some policeduring the evaluation was the process of selectingnew beat sites. In particular, some of the officers feltthat there was little consultation between keystakeholders and the QPS regarding the selection ofpotential beat sites. The result of this is that there is apossibility of beats being placed in areas of lowdemand for police services or in areas where there isalready adequate police coverage. Key stakeholderssuch as local councillors and Members of Parliamenthave a different view of this situation and report thatit is the government’s responsibility to respond to thecommunity’s demand for beats by establishing beatsin as many areas as possible that require them.

Both of these points of view may well be correct. It isentirely proper for the government to respond tocommunity demand for beats, while at the same timeit is equally correct for the Service to be concernedabout possible inefficient methods of service delivery.Some of the ways to better manage these competinginterests would be to consider:

giving police greater involvement and say in theidentification of potential beat sites

developing and adhering to evidence-basedcriteria for establishing new police beats.

88..33..22 TTeennuurree aarrrraannggeemmeennttss ffoorr nneeww bbeeaattss

Police and key stakeholders raised the concern thatonce a beat has been established it is nearlyimpossible to close, due to the difficulty of removingservices from a community. This issue poses aparticular challenge for the police in situations wherethere are large-scale demographic shifts or changes inthe level of crime or disorder in the beat area. Forexample, in a beat area where the crime rate hasfallen over the years, the beat officer may losemotivation due to the low demand for policingservices, which may then reduce communitysatisfaction with the beat.

Although this is a difficult issue to resolve in existingbeats, especially in areas where there is a communityexpectation that the beat is permanent, it may bepossible to modify the terms of establishment forfuture beats. Consideration should be given toestablishing new beats with a renewable fixed term ofthree to five years. At the end of the term, the beatshould be assessed to see if it is achieving itsobjectives and if the demand for policing services still


exists. This would ensure that the level of policingbeing provided to a beat area is capable of reflectingchanging priorities or community circumstances.

88..33..33 PPeerrffoorrmmaannccee mmaannaaggeemmeenntt

NNeeggoottiiaatteedd rreessppoonnssee

One of the key requirements of beat policing is forthe beat officer to be seen by beat-area residents asthe primary focus of policing activity in the area. Forthe beat officer, this means assuming responsibilityfor both the reactive and proactive work in the area.However, an analysis of CRISP reports and calls forservice demonstrates that most reactive calls forservice in the beat area are dealt with by generalduties police rather than the beat officer. Accordingto beat officers, this occurs because PoliceCommunications generally dispatch requests forservice to mobile patrols, even if the call originates inthe beat area. Ensuring that an effective ‘negotiatedresponse strategy’ was in place would enable the beatofficers to respond to more matters in their area andhelp them to manage their workloads moreeffectively.

PPeerriiooddiicc rreevviieeww aanndd eevvaalluuaattiioonn

One of the findings of the evaluation of theToowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project was that thegoals and strategies of a particular beat need to bere-visited periodically to ensure that they remainfocused and relevant (CJC 1995a). This finding holdsequally true for this evaluation and continues to bean issue for the future. As beats change or matureover time, it is critical that the beat be reviewed everythree to five years to ensure that they continue tomeet the needs of beat-area residents. The QPS hasadvised that evaluation plans and tools are availablefor beat officers within their training package.Consideration should be given to including anassessment of the workload of the officer in thereview in an effort to maintain a balanced andappropriate work environment for the officer.

88..33..44 MMaarrkkeettiinngg

The QPS Crime Prevention Unit is presentlydeveloping a marketing kit for neighbourhood beats,which will help police regions market their own beatsfrom the pre-establishment stage through to thelaunch, and then through the first year of the life ofthe beat. This kit will include examples of whatmarketing strategies may be appropriate and media

guidelines. Plans are under way for a similar kitdesigned for shopfronts.

In addition to marketing beats to the Service’sexternal clients, it is equally important that theService markets the concept to its own staff.Currently, the QPS Crime Prevention Unit isdeveloping an internal marketing proposal forneighbourhood beats, which is aimed at non-commissioned officers and beat supervisors. Thismarketing tool aims to highlight why there has beena beat set up in their local area, the statisticssupporting the establishment of the beat, and whatpart community members will play in the beat.Ideally, the Service should develop a similar proposalfor shopfronts.

88..33..55 TTrraaiinniinngg

It is essential that all beat officers are provided withtraining for their role, with particular emphasis onPOP. The QPS advises that they have established afive-day training course for beat officers, have offeredthis course once in 2002 and future courses areplanned. Consideration needs to be given to regulartraining courses for new beat officers and also toprovide up-to-date information and networkingopportunities for continuing beat officers.

88..33..66 AAcccceessss ttoo iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn

To give beat officers the ability to engage inproactive, intelligence-led policing, beat officers needaccurate and timely information. For an officer todeal with repeat addresses and identify patterns ofcrime or calls for service in the community, theyshould be able to easily interrogate CRISP and calls-for-service databases. At the present time this is notpossible, although the QPS has advised that they areaddressing this issue by developing the ability foreach beat officer to be able to download CRISP datafor their individual beat area directly from themainframe and analyse such data easily. Ideally, itshould be possible for beat officers to easily generateup-to-date information, such as the top ten problemaddresses in their beat area. Monitoring is requiredof the needs of beat officers in relation to access toinformation and information-system tools.

88..33..77 AAlltteerrnnaattiivvee mmooddeellss ooff bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg

Beat policing is based on the philosophy ofownership. The beat officer resides in the communityand takes ownership of, and responsibility for,


policing problems within the community. Currentlythe neighbourhood beat model of policing employedby the QPS uses residency to help instil a sense ofownership in the beat officer. Other elements of beatpolicing that seem to be important to their effective-ness are the ability of beat officers to be flexible interms of rostering and in how they apply problem-solving strategies in their community.

Given the inflexibility and the costs associated withthe current models of beat policing, it may be usefulfor the QPS to explore some alternative models thatretain the essential elements of beat policing (e.g.follow-up and ownership) without the need toestablish the beat on a permanent basis. Somealternative beat-policing models that the QPS mightconsider trialling are:

MMoobbiillee ppoolliiccee bbeeaatt

The idea behind a mobile beat is for the Service tobe able to provide additional temporary policeresources (i.e. beat officer and mobile facility) aimedat dealing with a specific local crime or communityproblem. For example, a rash of break and enters in aparticular area might result in the QPS using themobile beat as a base of operations until theoffenders are apprehended. The focus of the mobilebeat would be on the beat officer owning the‘problem’ rather than the officer taking responsibilityfor an area, as is the case with traditional beats.

ZZoonnee bbeeaatt ppoolliicciinngg

Zone beat policing is designed to encourage generalduties police to take responsibility for the problemsoccurring in a particular area or zone while, at thesame time, providing the traditional division-wideresponse to crime and community problems. Thisapproach is currently being trialled in the SouthernRegion. Here, the emphasis is on establishing newmanagement structures aimed at fostering an officer’s‘commitment’ to solving crime and communityproblems in their particular zone. To accomplish this,the division has been subdivided into several ‘zones’with responsibility for each of the zones given to asupervisor (sergeant). The zones are then furthersubdivided and assigned to a constable or seniorconstable who is then assigned various tasks in their

particular zone (e.g. establish a neighbourhood watchor visit students at a local school) or deal with a localcrime or community problem. Their efforts areclosely monitored and managed by their supervisor aspart of the Service’s 28-day performancemanagement process.

Although the concept is still in the trial phase, itseems to provide many of the advantages of beatpolicing, such as encouraging the officer to takeownership of a local problem while, at the same time,attending to the policing needs of the widercommunity.

NNoonn--rreessiiddeennttiiaall nneeiigghhbboouurrhhoooodd bbeeaatt

The non-residential police beat was originally trialledat West End in 1994 and later evaluated by the CJCin 1996. The idea behind a non-residentialneighbourhood beat is to establish a beat office in anarea without the necessity of locating it in residentialpremises. In the case of West End, the beat office waslocated in West End Police Station.

There are two main advantages to this approach.

1 It is more cost-effective for the Service because itavoids the need to acquire and maintain a beat.

2 Because the officers are not required to reside inthe beat residence, relieving staff can be allocatedto the beat without the need to displace theofficer or their family.

The disadvantage to this model is that the beatofficer may not be seen by the community as themain provider of policing services in the beat.

Police beats are likely to continue as anessential part of police service delivery inQueensland for the foreseeable future. As thisstudy has shown, such innovative policinginitiatives need to be comprehensively evaluatedto assess their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the goal of delivering effective policeservices to all communities is best achieved by acommitment to police innovation, communitysatisfaction and program evaluation.


ON THE BEAT_______AAPPPPEENNDDIIXXEESS_______9911

The following is an inventory of neighbourhood police beats.

All police beats were sent a survey in August 2002 requiring backgroundinformation regarding the police beats.

Note that information provided by the beat officers has not been verified by theresearchers. Follow-up calls have been made to complete missing detail;however, some information has not been available or has not been provided todate.

The new Goodna Neighbourhood Police Beat (Southern Region, Ipswich District)and Marsden Neighbourhood Police Beat (South Eastern Region, Logan District)have not been included in this inventory as the beats started during theevaluation report phase.

Appendix 1Police Beat Inventory: Neighbourhood Beats

9922_______ON THE BEAT_______AAPPPPEENNDDIIXXEESS


The following is an inventory of police beat shopfronts.

All police beats were sent a survey in August 2002 requiring backgroundinformation regarding the police beats.

Note that information provided by the beat officers has not been verified by theresearchers. Follow-up calls have been made to complete missing details;however, some information has not been available or has not been provided todate.

Appendix 2Police Beat Inventory: Shopfronts


Appendix 3Community Survey


Appendix 4Retailers Survey: Beat Centre


Appendix 5Retailers Survey: Comparison Centre


Appendix 6Shoppers Survey: Beat Centre


Appendix 7Shoppers Survey: Comparison Centre


Appendix 8Beat Officers Statewide Survey

ON THE BEAT_______RREEFFEERREENNCCEESS_______114411

Bayley, D.H. 1998, What works in policing, Oxford University Press, New York.

Bayley, D.H. 1994, Police for the future, Oxford University Press, New York.

Braga, A.A. 2001, ‘The effects of hot spots policing on crime’, in What works in preventingcrime? Systematic Reviews of Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Research, The Annals ofthe American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by David P. Farrington andBrandon C. Welsh, 578, 104–125.

Braga, A.A., Weisburd, D.L., Waring, E.J., Mazerolle, L.G., Spelman, W. & Gajewski, F.1999, ‘Problem-oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomised ControlledExperiment’, Criminology, 37, 541–580.

Criminal Justice Commission 1995a, Toowoomba Beat Policing Pilot Project: MainEvaluation Report, Brisbane.

Criminal Justice Commission 1995b, Beat Policing Resource Kit, Brisbane.

Criminal Justice Commission 1996, The West End Police Beat: An Evaluation, Brisbane.

Criminal Justice Commission 1997, The Cost of First Response Policing, Brisbane.

Criminal Justice Commission 1998, Beenleigh Calls for Service Project: Evaluation Report,Brisbane.

Fitzgerald 1989, Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council.Government Printer, Brisbane.

Goldstein, H. 1979, ‘Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach’, Crime andDelinquency, 25, 236–258.

Green, L. 1995, ‘Cleaning up Drug Hot Spots in Oakland, California: The Displacementand Diffusion Effects’, Justice Quarterly, 12, 737–754.

Hessling, R. 1994, ‘Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature’, CrimePrevention Studies 3, 197–230.

Hornick, J.P., Burrows, B.A., Tjosvold, I. & Phillips, D.M. (n.d.), An evaluation of theneighbourhood foot patrol program of Edmonton Police Service, Canadian Research Instituteof Law and the Family.

Lake, T. 1995, Beats and Shopfront Policing, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.

Mastrofski, S.D., Parks, R.B., Reiss, A.J. & Worden, R.E. 1998, Policing neighborhoods: Areport from Indianapolis. National Institute of Justice, Research Preview. U.S. Departmentof Justice.

References

114422_______ON THE BEAT_______RREEFFEERREENNCCEESS

Mastrofski, S.D., Parks, R.B., Reiss, A.J. & Worden, R.E. 1999, Policing neighborhoods: Areport from St. Petersburg, National Institute of Justice, Research Preview. U.S. Departmentof Justice.

Queensland Police Service 2001a, Neighbourhood Police Beat — Foreword, viewed October2002, <http://www.police.qld.gov.au/pr/program/p_beat/foreword.htm>.

Queensland Police Service 2001b, Neighbourhood Police Beat — Definition, viewed October2002, <http://www.police.qld.gov.au/pr/program/p_beat/obj_def.htm>.

Queensland Police Service 2001c, Police Beat Shopfront — Objectives, viewed October2002, <http://www.police.qld.gov.au/pr/program/polshop/obj_def.htm>.

Queensland Police Service 2001d, Shopfront beats: A practitioner’s perspective, Brisbane.

Queensland Police Service 2001e, Shopfront beats: A guide to best practice in Queensland,Brisbane.

Queensland Police Service 2001f, Neighbourhood beats: A practitioner's perspective,Brisbane.

Queensland Police Service, 2002, Neighbourhood beats: A guide to best practice inQueensland, Brisbane.

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Queensland Police Service, 1993, Report on an evaluation of Police Beat (Easter 1993),Brisbane.

Trojanowicz, R. 1994, Community policing: A survey of police departments in the UnitedStates, National Center for Community Policing, Michigan.

Trojanowicz, R. & Bucqueroux, B. 1994, Community policing: How to get started, AndersonPublishing, Cincinnati.

Weisburd, D.L. & Green, L. 1995, ‘Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City DrugMarket Analysis Experiment’, Justice Quarterly, 12, 711–735.

on the beat - cccon the beat: an evaluation of beat policing in queensland_____v table 3.11....

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