July 31,1915 THE NEW REPUBLIC 327

A New Kind of WarMUST America either lamely accept with rupture of diplomatic negotiations between America

humiliating inertia a gross violation of her and Germany, be so handled as to become not mere-own right and dignity and of the common ly a means of solving the special and present Ameri-

interest, or else take part in a war which, however cari difficulties concerning neutral rights and in-successful, will not necessarily advance in the least terests, but of achieving the larger purpose of de-degree the objects for which she fights—the future veloping a really civilized international law andsafety of her citizens and respect of their rights in finding some means of enforcing it more efficientw a r time, a better international law and its more than the very clumsy instrument military force hasscrupulous future observance—and which conceive- proven itself so far to be.ab ly might even render those objects more remote Out of the Anglo-American negotiations mightt h a n ever ? Is there no third course ? Events have develop an understanding affording means of avoid-already pointed to a possible one. ing the absurd stultification which mere military co-

Great Britain is at this moment engaged in ne- operation with the Allies would involve for Americagotiating with the merchants of neutral countries as —the position, that is, of fighting a war to assuret o the conditions upon which they shall be allowed the victory of one side, to find after the war, per-t o trade with one another, the object of course be- haps, that that side is as much opposed to any formi n g to prevent Germany securing supplies of any of international law at sea which will really protectk i n d through neutral sources. This amounts ob- American and neutral right and interest as is theviously to an attempt to control the international beaten side.t r a d e of the world in such a way as to serve Great For, if the suggestion which follows ^ provesBritain's military purposes. feasible, the constructive development of interna-

The United States government—as apart from tional law and of some sanction enabling the com-certain of her merchants—has of course refused to munity of nations to enforce it, would not awaitt a k e part in these negotiations, for obvious reasons, the end of war nor be dependent upon a definiteT h i s claim to dictate the conditions of trade be- victory of one side, but would take place during thet-ween neutrals, irrespective of blockade and contra- war and would later still be operative even thoughb a n d as heretofore understood, constitutes a very the Allies were not decisively victorious in a mili-pregnant development of belligerent rights at sea. tary sense.However much the American people may approve Let us assume a rupture of diplomatic relationsEngland's general cause in this war, the Ameri- between America and Germany—a contingencyc a n government could not allow such development which recent events seem to render altogether prob-t o become by precedent an accepted part of sea law, able. America would in such an event in any casebecause in some future war such functions might put her defences in as thorough order as possible,b e exercised by a power other than England on though the likelihood of Germany sending an armybehalf of a cause of quite other character than across the Atlantic at this juncture is, to say the

, t h a t now being supported by England. Moreover, least, small. But American naval force would prob-i t is freely alleged by American merchants that ably prepare to be in a position to convoy ships.British control of neutral trade is not exercised im- America should certainly make it plain to Ger-partially; that, while on the ground of preventing many—and to the Allies, for that matter—that thesupplies reaching Germany Britain has excluded absence of American military cooperation with theAmerican merchandise from neutral ports, British armies now fighting Germany was not due to meregoods of the same kind have been going to those indifference to the causes involved, still less to a de-por t s in increasing quantities. Whatever of truth sire selfishly to avoid the cost and suffering of warthere may be in this allegation, it is evident that if in the achievement of her purpose, but because bothever belligef-ent right expanded into the formal her own and the larger and ultimate general in-recognition of the kind of control over neutral trade terest could be more effectively achieved by anotheraimed at by Great Britain, it is just such abuses form of cooperation, which would be as follows:a s these that neutrals would in future suffer. The America would offer to settle the whole contra-whole matter is at this moment the subject of very band and blockade dispute with England on theserious negotiation between Washington and Lon- basis of making international that virtual control ofd o n and the cause of some ill feeling between sec- overseas trade of the world which England nowtions of the two countries. exercises. That is to say, all that international

Yet this very situation might, in the event of trade now affected by British action should still be

h

328 THE NEW REPUBLIC July 31,

subject to control for the definite purpose of pre- If the United States were to assume the responstbil-venting Germany securing supplies; but that control ity of furnishing munitions and material upon suchshould be exercised not arbitrarily by Great Britain, terms as to sustain British credit and liberate anbut by all the Allies plus the United States, and increasing proportion of the European manufactur-with the unofficial cooperation of the remaining ing population for military service, this countryneutrals as well. Prize courts and courts of control could by purely economic cooperation make a de-should not be British but representative of all these cisive contribution to the coercion of Germany,powers. The arrangement would in the circum- But though America's economic position wouldstances amount to an international control of the be dominant at such juncture, she should deliberate-world's supplies for the purpose of withholding ly internationalize the control it would imply, notthem from Germany, and in such a way as to avoid using it to impose an American view, but for thedifficulty between the combatants and between them purpose of securing adherence to the common rulesand the neutrals, and as to render the blockade or drawn up for the common good,seige of Germany effective not merely by sea power. Let us see how far the general niethod here in-but by cooperation between the nations of the world dicated might apply to a later situation of the war.as a whole. I^ Europe is to crush Germany within her own

Such an international body made up of repre- borders, and keep her crushed, it will be at thesentatives of America, Britain and her colonies, price of the Prussianization of the whole ofFrance, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Japan and, less of- Europe. To exact indemnities from Germany wiUficially, of the Scandinavian and Balkan states, mean the military occupation of her territories andHolland, Switzerland and Greece, would not deal that means the maintenance perhaps for manymerely with matters of exports and imports, with years of large armies by the Allies. To break uptrade between them, but with financial arrange- the German Empire would mean the annexationments as well—with exchange and credit difficulties, of some of her territory and the turning of theloans, censorship of mails and all the thorny prob- Allies into conquerors and military rulers of alienlems that have arisen during the war. From these —German—populations. And yet the alternativematters it might perhaps proceed to deal with such for Europe is to allow Germany after the peaceproblems as the disposal of German property—in- to build up her strength and wealth, so involvingterned ships, businesses of various kinds, royalties the possibility, five or ten or fifteen years hence,on patents, bank balances and so forth—and, it of a recuperated Germany still dreaming of worldmay be, more remote arrangements as to the future domination. That is to say, that would be thecontrol of German action in the world: tariff ar- alternative if the action of the western world wererangements; the conditions upon which Germany limited to military action. But if we can assunieshould at the peace be once more admitted to the the international control of the world's wealth incommunity of nations, whether on equal terms or some such a way as that above indicated, well es-not; whether the most efficient means of exacting tablished, having gone on for some time, theresome indemnification for damage done might not be would be a situation in which the channels of tradeby sequestration of German property throughout would for prolonged periods have been turnedthe world and possibly some surtax by tariff, ship away from Germany and a situation also in which,and mail dues, all of course subject to due legal for instance, Germany's enemies would controljudgment of an international court. virtually every pound of cotton grown in the world.

In short, there would be in the bodies so created. And the needs of the war would have engenderedthe beginnings of the world organization of our between those enemies much mutual hopefulness mcommon resources, social, economical and political, the way of loans, credit arrangements, etc., withfor the purpose of dealing with a recalcitrant mem- their resources organized and their action coor-ber of international society, by other than purely dinated by central international organs. If such amilitary means—a starting point whence interna- situation really existed, German aggression wouldtionai law might be made a reality, a code, that be faced by forces that mere military power couldis, not merely expressing the general interest but not meet. ^ , . . .„ , •,sanctioning processes which furnish means of en- Two or three obvious objections will be urgedforcing respect for it. to the course just outlined. It will be said that

This control would center at first mainly in by the proposed action America would have sacri-America, since during the course of the war the ficed her neutrality and created a state of war withactivities and resources of the existing belligerent Germany. Of course; and if Germany cared tonations would more and more be absorbed by mili- avail herself of existing international law to insisttary operations, thus making America the largest on that point it would simplify America's action,single source of supplies, money and ammunition. But it would be an academic point raised by Ger-

July 3r, rgi5 THE NEW REPUBLIC 329

many. She could hardly oblige America to sendtroops to Europe, and just for the moment she isn o t in a position to send troops here. The mean-i n g which America shall give to a "state of war"is in the actual circumstances mainly America's af-fa i r ; and if she cares to put the emphasis of her ef-fo r t upon the development of other than militaryforces, how can Germany prevent that? And whyshould America worry as to the precise meaningwhich Germany may attach to "a state of war" ?

It will also be urged that in cooperating in thesuggested control over neutral trade America wouldb e guilt}' of the very violation of international lawo f which she is now accusing England. But therewould be no violation of law on America's part.America would have no right to dictate to Britainju s t what the latter should or should not sell toHolland—which is the counterpart of what Britainis trying to do to America; but America and Eng-l and have a perfect right to agree together justw^hat they will and will not export to Holland—which is the character of the world control em-bodied in the suggestion. And if, in arranging fort h e control of, their exports, those nations andothers desire to put Holland to as little incon-venience as possible and for that purpose offer toconsult with her, they do violence neither toHolland's rights nor to international law. It ist rue that the ultimate outcome, and the one definite-ly aimed at by America, would be a radical changeo f international law, especially with reference tot h e future nature of neutrality, but that again wouldb e by consent of the community of nations as awhole. The obligation of the individual to obeyt h e law of the community does not exclude theright of the community to change the law, nor ofindividuals to work towards such change by generalconsent. An act which is absolutely inadmissiblea s the right of an individual acting with no refer-ence to the community may be perfectly admissiblea s the act of the community sanctioned by the com-mon will. It is these distinctions indeed whichalone make society possible.

And a final objection: "Why not declare war int h e ordinary way and aid in the military defeat ofGermany by sending troops to Europe?" Becauset o do so would be to identify this country with themilitary policy of the Allies, and that means ulti-mately with the political policy as well; it wouldniean adhesion to the arrangement by which noAlly makes a separate peace, and would thus tieAmerican action to the political complications ofEurope; it would prevent America's leaving thedoor open for the reestablishment at a later dateo f diplomatic relations with Germany, and so serv-ing as mediator; it would, by dividing American en-ergies between military and economic cooperation.

prevent her putting all the emphasis of effort uponthat international economic organization which maybe effective where, at least so far in history, meremilitary victory has been ludicrously ineffective. Andfinally the Allies need munitions, material andmoney, more than they need men.

But the major point is that America can at thisjuncture give what none of the combatants cangive: a lead in the organization of at present unor-ganized forces that may lay the foundations of anew society of the nations. To that end she shoulddirect her efforts.

NORMAN ANGELL.

Arithmetic of the ArmiesTHE Swiss military writers have so far as pos-

sible compiled figures on all the armies ex-cept the Russian, and the average of these figuresis interesting. The accepted unit is a battalion ofi,ooo men.

WEST FRONTGermans i,iooFrench i,iooEnglish ' 185Belgians . 65

(giving the Allies 250 superiority.)

EAST FRONTGermans 700Austrians 650Russians 1,500 (?)

SOUTHWEST FRONTAustrians 160Italians 5^5

The Servian and Montenegrin forces are not con-sidered, being practically inactive; but the Servianscan probably still advance 100 battalions. I haveas yet seen no figures of any value on the forces atthe Dardanelles, nor those on the Caucasus front.

The above figures include only the infantry andthe immediate infantry reserves. Thus a Britishforce in camp near Boulogne would not be included.The western front is 600 kilometers, say 375 mileslong, giving an average of 3.6 battalions to themile along the whole front from Switzerland tothe Channel. Of course, these forces are not dis-tributed evenly, but generally speaking, thestrengthening of one sector of the line means theweakening of another sector somewhere else, andin Swiss military circles it is not believed that morethan 75 German battalions were withdrawn fromthe west to take part in the Galician campaign.

Now it is evident that this numerical superiorityof the Allies—1,350 to 1,100—is not sufficient towarrant a general frontal attack on a front, say, of