a processual reconsideration of organizational knowledge

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Mind the Gap? A Processual

Reconsideration of OrganizationalKnowledge

Martin WoodUniversity of Exeter, UK

Abstract. On Henri Bergsons view, the flux of time is reality itself andthe things we study are the things that flow. Unfortunately, popularliteratures on organizational knowledge are accustomed to seeing themoving by means of the immobile. They perceive knowledge as analready organizedstate that can be transferred between spatially distinctpoints. Drawing on Bergsons theory of continual movement (Duration)

and Deleuzes concept of transversal communication, I challenge theontological concern for knowledge production and use between thediscrete parts of an organized system. Instead of seeing knowledge as theintegration of derived points or positions, I advocate a threefold methodof creative involution in which production and use are considered as aliving interpenetration of foldings and movements that connect allthings at all places and times. Key words. creativity; involution;knowledge; process; time

The creation and management of knowledge has undoubtedly emerged asa significant focus in academic and business practice in recent years (see,for example, IKON, 2000, 2001). Enthusiasm for the field is clearlyidentifiable by the sheer number of approaches and techniques available,ranging from individual cognition, organizational learning and creativity,to information management, data retrieval and intelligent systems, toname but a few. Whether these current frameworks are at all adequate for

better apprehending organizational knowledge is, however, a matter forconjecture.

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While popular knowledge management literatures continue to discusssimple, techno-fix solutions to the creation, dissemination, acquisition,access and application of organizational knowledge (see, for example,Davenport and Prusak, 1998), recent UK economic and social research

policy has defined knowledge as a more complex mixture of experience,values, contextual information and expertise, embodied and embeddedin language, organizational processes and behaviour norms (Economicand Social Research Council, 2000). Evidently, knowledge is not only aset of codified statements, but also includes performative elements ofsavoir-faire or know how (Lyotard, 1984).

Although mainstream strategic thinking suggests that the most success-ful organizations are those that are best placed to utilize their explicitandtacit knowledge assets (Boisot, 1998, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), itis the creation of explicit organizational knowledge that is emphasized

as the key competitive advantage in the global economy (Nonaka, 1994).Similarly, in information systems, it is the meaning and relevance ofinformation for the system that is underlined (Ciborra, 1998). Informationis seen as a commodity with functional value (Cooper, 1987). Its value isin its additive quantitythe extent to which a piece of information addssomething to a previous stock of information (Eco, 1989). Such a produc-tion bias is also evident in the way social science research generation isstill delineated from its instrumental exploitation (Ferlie et al., 1998).The literature on the diffusion of innovations (see, for example, Brown,1981; Rogers, 1983) is replete with accounts of the processes by which

knowledge, ideas, or research findings are implemented into practice.Despite this increased attention, current frameworks continue to be

misled by the idea that a knowledge productionuse gap exists and thatthere is a need for linking these two separate domainsa problem ofputting theory into practice in the hackneyed sense of the phrase. Thedeficiency lies in the focus on so-called information creation, classifica-tion, communication and use, ahead of any analysis of the nature ofknowledge itself. This tendency is illustrated in a recent Academy ofManagement Journalcall for papers in which it is noted how both sideslose when knowledge is not transferred across academic and practitioner

lines. In strategic management research, the need to develop a betterunderstanding of the relationship between strategy and change in orderto achieve a close integration of the two is pointed out (Bettis and Hitt,1995). In corporate finance, Trahan and Gitman (1995) advocate bettercommunication and articulation of the research needs of practitioners,whilst in organizational learning it is argued that practice-centred views,emphasizing the tricky interpolations between abstracted accountsand situated demands, can lead to improvements (Brown and Duguid,1991; Lave and Wenger, 1991). In sociology, Bryant (1996) discusses thedeficiencies of several models in favour of examples promoting inter-

active applications. In health care, where evidence-based practice modelsaim to democratize access to data, the management of this knowledge

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into practice continues to be a problem (Haines and Donald, 1998;Sackett et al., 1996; Sheldon et al., 1998; Straus and Sackett, 1998).

The frustration in all of these examples is with the need to develop amore sophisticated understanding of the interaction between the pro-

duction and use of organizational knowledge. All of the examples share aconceptual concern for communication, dissemination, acquisition, acces-sibility and application between discrete things in a world thought to befundamentally static and immobile. One result has been the habitualconception of movement as a succession of start and finish points andinstants along a spatialized trajectory. What knowledge is has beentreated as the flow of messages in, at best, a two-way dialogue or, moretypically, a simple input/output matrix. Moreover, the nature of knowl-edge has become ever more objectifiedviewed instrumentally for itsexchange or use valueand increasingly embedded in relations of

economic production and consumptionjudged in terms of short-termperformance and as property. Overall, knowledge in the form of aninformational commodity (Lyotard, 1984) has become valorized as theprinciple force of production in the global markets of the informationsociety (Munro, forthcoming). Its conception as a continuous and unfin-ished process that goes beyond the simple determination and applicationof the criterion of truth (Lyotard, 1984: 18) appears completely forgotten.

It is the purpose of this paper to offer a radical underscoring ofLyotards view by discussing knowledge as an open-ended, ambivalentand foundationless process. The paper will argue that knowledge is not a

commodity existing out there, nor is its movement a question of thestarting or finishing of use or production. Rather it is the elusive subjectof what happens in-between. The paper opens by reflecting on theapparent certainties in contemporary approaches to organizational knowl-edge. It will then contrast two different ways of thinking about knowledgeproduction and use. The first conceives of production and use as pre-established forms in space and treats knowledge as if it were funda-mentally static and immobile (Gibbons et al., 1994). The second draws onpost-structural ideas of process, complexity and de-differentiation to sug-gest that production and use are simply labels we derive to arrest,

locate, regularize and stabilizein other words managethe intrins-ically fluxing and transforming tendencies of knowledge (Chia, 1999).Subsequently, the paper illustrates a threefold method for apprehendingorganizational knowledge in its living reality as a continuous, changingprocess (Bergson, 1912).

Contemporary Understandings of Organizational KnowledgeProduction and Use

Although there have been many theoretical approaches and practical

tools developed for apprehending knowledge in organizations, all remaincircumscribed by the opposing epistemological traditions of rationalism

Mind the Gap?Martin Wood

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and empiricism. Rationalists have a tendency to explain knowledge as auniversalized resource or commodity that is disembodied and extern-alized from particular end users. In contrast, empiricists allude to a morepractical understanding of knowledge as situational and shaped by the

social context of a particular community. In both cases, there is anassumed need for a more complete integration of knowledge productionand its use than is the case at present.

For rationalists, knowledge production is scientific: essentially factual,lawlike and systematic with no doubts being expressed about its range ofapplication (Whitley, 1984b). This basic belief arose from attempts by19th-century science to provide rigorous criteria for validation andjustification. Deriving from the inductive methods of logical positivism,this universal system of theories held the denotative statements ofscience to be identical with the inference of universal hypotheses or

theories (Popper, 1989). Altman (1987) argues that contemporary societyshows a tolerance for the continuing division of the field of knowledgeaccording to scientific theories. Of particular note is his assertion thatpractical reasoning and problem solving are presumed inferior to thecumulative body of knowledge generated by academe. Gibbons et al.(1994) label this model as Mode 1 research, in which knowledgeproduction occurs largely as a result of the academic agenda, is categorizedby disciplines and guarded by elite gatekeepers. Distribution occursdownstream of production, often with scant attention to appropriation byusers. According to Whitley (1984a), one explanation for the sustained

hegemony of Mode 1 knowledge production is the need for academics tobuild scholarly repute so as to access a distinct labour market andcompete for permanent jobs in the major schools. Increasingly, thisreputational system is mediated by academic journalsconsider, forexample, how the UK universities Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)measures, evaluates and ranks publications. But, as Whitley points out,top-rated journals, which determine international reputations and normsof scientific status, cater for knowledge producers (academics) rather thanusers (practitioners). In Mode 1 knowledge production, there is a highdegree of internal governance and mutual dependence, and a correspond-

ingly low need for approval from lay audiences.Claims for the continued legitimacy of the scientific method have been

seriously challenged for over 25 years. Studies in the UK, for example,have been concerned to show that scientific knowledge production wasnot as disinterested, communicable and universal as Merton (1973)had first argued, but was determined more by the political commitments,structural arrangements and institutional interests of social practice.These classic studies were exemplified by the strong programme (Bloor,1976) in the sociology of scientific knowledge associated with the Edin-burgh School (Barnes, 1977). These and other works (see, for example,

Collins, 1985; Mulkay, 1972) proposed a reversal in the traditionalrelationship between science and nature towards a view of their social


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and historical construction. They point out how ideologies of rationalismand scientific truth are increasingly seen as bad guides to how scientificknowledge is actually made.

More recently, Gibbons et al. (1994) claim that science policy and

university research are now characterized by a radically different Mode2 model of knowledge production. In contrast to the production ofscientific knowledge by scientists, knowledge is now produced morecollaboratively and based on looser patterns of transdisciplinarity (Huff,2000). The implication of this move for organizational knowledge is thatproduction should occupy a nexus position (Tranfield and Starkey,1998) between practice and contributing disciplines. Following Gibbonset al., Tranfield and Starkey characterize Mode 2 as a more sociallydistributed form of production, where knowledge is validated in use.

Brown and Duguid (1991) recognize this when they point out howknowledge is never limited to the incorporeal, for this would give onlya thin account. Knowledge is also constituted in the far thickerintricacies of the day-to-day activities and behaviour of practitionersthemselves. Dougherty (1992), in a study of organizational renewalthrough product innovation, shows how articulating visceral knowledgeis a practical skill that calls for new roles and responsibilities fromresearchers and a fundamentally new contract between research andpractice beyond the current instrumental view. On her model, if theoriesare to be useful they have to speak to everyday realities. Similarly, for

Hoshmand and Polkinghorne (1992: 58), the test of knowledge is notwhether it corresponds exactly to an external reality (such a directcorrespondence being impossible to ascertain) but whether it serves toguide purposive human action in an interactive system of inquiry:

Practice is no longer the mere application of scientific findings, but thelocale for knowledge development through practical reasoning processesand for the pragmatic test of knowledge claims.

In other words, on the traditional rationalist model of knowledge the

material, cultural, or historical conditions of production are lacking(Jacques, 1992).There are two problems with Mode 2 knowledge production, however.

The first is epistemic and contains two interrelated aspects. To beginwith, commentators advocating a new contract between production anduse tend to overlook the possibility that knowledge production, and notsimply validation, may well take place beyond the boundaries of theacademy. Despite the reported shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2, universitiesare still the main centres for broad and advanced knowledge production(Hemlin, 2000). Anne Sigismund Huff shares this observation in her

presidential address to the 1999 Academy of Management. Her belief isthat, influenced by the strength of the Mode 1 infrastructure, universities


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will make few gestures towards Mode 2, even though they will increas-ingly have to prove their ability to convey the importance of the workthey do (Huff, 2000).

This leads to a further aspect and the implicit legitimation provided by

Gibbons et al. (1994) that a more socially accountable mode of knowl-edge production would somehow produce more relevant knowledge.What Mode 2 commentators fail to recognize is the differential power ofthose involved to shape what counts as knowledge and particularly theenduring power of knowledge producers to act as legislators (Bauman,1987). In his critique of the role of intellectuals and the state, Baumanargues how, historically, the increasing legislative role of intellectuals hasto be seen as an extension of state power. This does not lead to a nobledream of bringing the light of wisdom to the confused and oppressed,but inexorably towards the creation of an entirely new, and consciously

designed, social mechanism of disciplining action aimed at regulatingand regularizing the socially relevant lives of the subjects of the teachingand managing state (Bauman, 1987: 80). The recent enthusiasm forknowledge management and knowledge engineering are two cases inpoint. In Huffs view (2000: 292):

Few of the productivity gains first promised appear to have been realized.An amazing number of companies followed prescriptions based on com-pelling stories. The human, and organizational, costs appear to be large incomparison to achievement.

The second problem is metaphysical and concerns the individualisticconception of a one-to-one relation between production and use. LikeMode 1, Mode 2 still treats production and use as ontologically discrete,atomistic and isolatable points. It is here that Huffs (2000) pragmaticsuggestion of Mode 1.5 knowledge production, aimed at integrating andsynthesizing the rigour of Mode 1 with the relevance of Mode 2, also fallsshort. Such one-to-one relationships are inadequate because we cannotsay once and for all that each point or part exists in parallel to the other,or that one is like or not like the other. Moreover, for things to needintegrating or synthesizing, they must be different; they must be at least

two things. According to the process philosopher Henri Bergson (1911/1983), such a being ontology introduces a counterfeit movement inwhich terms like theory, production, goods, individuals, practiceand use are only snapshots extracted from the heterogeneous continu-ity of real movement. They are simply labels we derive for differingcontexts and communities of practice, in order to describe a complexrelationship that is transformative and involving a living interpenetrationthat connects all things at all places and times, rather than a derivedside-by-sideness. On this view, theory is not added to or put into practice,nor can practitioners overlay or reflect on theory (cf. Schon, 1995), as the

two were not separate in the first place. By locating theory outside (andover) practice, the scientific Mode 1 approach prevented us from seeing


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the extent to which production and use already enjoy an interpene-trative otherness. Similarly, however, in Mode 2, practitioners reflec-tions in the midst of action are simply experience translated intolanguagean intellectual convention, a certain notation, an already

ordered code or symbolic representation of that experience, and notactually the lived experience itself.

Following Bergson and his contemporary successor Gilles Deleuze, thepaper now pursues an alternative becomingontology, in which theorybecomes part of practice at the same time as practice becomes part oftheory. There is a practice-becoming of theory and a theory-becoming ofpractice, a double capture since what each becomes changes no lessthan that which becomes (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987). The productionuse relationship is therefore not one of integration between extrinsicallydistinct entities, but one of internal difference with a focus on differ-

entiation and division.

The Integration and Differentiation of Production and Use

This section discusses the supposition that organizational knowledgeis dependent upon the integration of the abstracted terms productionand use. It then goes on to present a temporal critique in which thecentral question for organizational knowledge is one of division anddifferentiation.

Minding the Gap: The Correspondence ModelDominant conceptualizations of organizational knowledge premise arepresentational epistemology in which production is separate from usein the same way that science is understood as separate from nature.Scientific knowledge is taken as an explicit, precise and coherent rep-resentation of the natural or social world. The isolate terms productionand use are seen as prior to any relationship. Furthermore, theindividual-to-individual, production-to-use relationship is seen asnatural: culture mediates to press home its necessity, whilst sciencemediates to press home its true nature (Strathern, 1995). The challenge

for the creators and managers of organizational knowledge working withthese premises is to stem the apparent degradation suffered in movingproductive information along the knowledge chain to the consumptivecontexts of the market. Stated differently, the aim is to maintain theaccuracy of the correspondence of theory to practice, thus allowing thedominant productiveconsumptive relationship between the two to beestablished. This is the ideology of communicational transparency,which goes hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledgealready outlined by Lyotard (1984: 5).

The antecedents to this fundamentally individualistic position can be

traced over the centuries of western philosophy. The cosmology ofParmenides taught that the world was an undivided whole, without


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parts, homogeneous and motionless (Popper, 1989: 145). Platos hier-archical relationship, between the true forms of intelligence and theirpotentially fallible appearances prefigured the hierarchical Enlighten-ment split between the doctrines of natural and intellectual truth. For the

later atomists, reality came to be seen as an aggregate of circumscribedentities described by Chia (1999) as a metaphysics of presence. InParmenidean-inspired classical and quantum mechanics, for example,the ultimate constituents of the universe are atomized moments, pointsor parts; fundamental and indivisible building blocks (Bohm, 1980: 9),whose relative motion and relation to one another is governed byuniversal and predictable laws.

One of the better examples of the correspondence approach can befound in the recent literature on the application of evidence-based healthcare (EBHC) to the UK National Health Service (NHS). This is an active

area of research that has impacted to at least a limited degree on practice,given the strong focus on clinical effectiveness through the introductionof new evidence-based national service frameworks, now apparent in UKhealth policy (Department of Health, 1997). Over the past decade inparticular, EBHC has pursued the implementation of scientific researchevidence into clinical practice (Sackett et al., 1996; Wood et al., 1998a).In 1991, following a House of Lords Select Committee on Science andTechnology report, an NHS R&D national strategy was launched with theaim of assisting in the systematic transfer of reliable and relevant infor-mation for health policy, clinical practice and service management deci-

sions (Central Research and Development Committee, 1995; Departmentof Health, 1995). It is evident from this that the integration of researchand practice is seen as a continuing problem (Haines and Donald, 1998;Sheldon et al., 1998; Straus and Sackett, 1998). Why does this situationpersist?

Western health care systems continue to be driven by a being ontologyand instrumental epistemology of research production as separate fromresearch use (see, for example, Whitehead, 1998), one in which the stopsresearch and practice are seen as prior to any relationship. Theprevalence of this kind of spatialized thinking is such that health care

policy and clinical decision-making inevitably start from the positionthat stasis is the natural order of things, that change is viewed astroublesome and that movement is believed to need some inertia applied.Informed by this stasis, commentators routinely draw attention to theproblematic integration of clinical practice and the findings of research(Haines and Donald, 1998; Sheldon et al., 1998; Straus and Sackett,1998). Haines and Donald (1998), for example, rightly point out thatpassive diffusion models are doomed to failure, yet they retain anontological commitment to (mis)understanding change as, an often irk-some, transitory phase between the two separate domains. From a wider

social science point of view, such arguments can be seen as overlyfunctionalist and mechanistic (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Wood et al.,


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1998b): a linearized technology transfer model which assumes a hier-archical inputprocessoutput relationship between the research baseand practical change.

Dissolving the Gap: Creative InvolutionBy aiming at the outcome of activity, the correspondence model con-denses organizational knowledge into a series of space-states that simplymaintain the gap between the various points and instants along anidealized trajectory. A fundamental criticism, however, is that the struc-ture of this knowledge should not be taken as a collection of full anddiscrete things in space. Instead, it becomes necessary to think ofknowledge non-spatially; as the continual becomingof things, having tobe seized from the continuing experience of movement, as a successionof qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another

(Bergson, 1910: 104).This counter-view can be traced back to the pre-Socratic stories of

Heraclitus. Unlike Parmenidean-based theories of an unchanging reality,in the Heraclitean-inspired world everything is in flux, and nothing is atrest (Popper, 1989: 144). The apparent stability of things is replaced bythe realization that we are living in a world of change whose processesare imperceptible: there is change but there are no things that change. Wecan take from this that what is stable, paradoxically, is movementbutnot just any movement. According to process thinkers such as Bergsonand Whitehead (1926: 72), the simple location of things has led to a

fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1926: 85), whereinabstract constructions are incorrectly taken as a given world of settled,distinct states pre-existing in space. For Bergson (1911/1983), the suppo-sition that reality can only be analysed in terms of such spatialized andlocalized end-states is protested to be illusory. On his view, informationand communication do not merely convey representational contents thatbridge the various stages of an evolutionary process but also contribute tothe fabrication of new assemblages of movement, flows, stimulation andconnections that cannot be simply located (Taylor, 1995).

Practitioners, more than theorists, are, of course, predisposed to seek a

(presumably desirable) change in their theories, debates, teaching andlanguage, and this is why they like to emphasize knowledges better,quicker, easier to access and increasingly electronic transmission. Themanagement of organizational knowledge, however, should not be seenas a trajectory of stepwise change proceeding alonga Darwinian evolu-tionary lineage. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) argue, for example, thatthere is no such transmission through a homogenous, unilinear series.For them, the complex ligatures that span across different entities andspecies can neither be slackened far enough to facilitate a unilinearevolutionism nor reduced sufficiently to produce a convenient resem-

blance or simple correspondence. Deleuze and Guattari introduce thenotion of creative involution to express a relaxation of natural, obvious


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and reified forms, and the creation instead of heterogeneous combina-tions and novel alliances, which cut across and beneath any suchassignable relations.

Creative involution places emphasis on modes of transversal com-

munication or side communication that scramble simple, genealogicallineages and allow heterogeneous assemblages to develop and break outacross closed thresholds and species. An assemblage is a rhizomic web ofcontinual, transversal communication that involves unnatural combina-tions, mergers, incorporations and associations. Such aggregations do notresemble what Talcott Parsons originally labelled as a special marriagebetween two different points. This is because, strictly speaking, thepoints are not real positions (Bergson, 1912). More accurately, they are anon-localizable line ofbecoming, a middle, an in-between that recognizesthe continual participation of points within each other, even though in

reality one does not become the other, or achieve any necessary corres-pondence with it:

A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by pointsthat compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points . . . a line of

becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nordestination . . . A line of becoming is only a middle. The middle is not anaverage; it is fast motion, it is the absolute speed of movement. A becomingis always in the middle; one can only get at it from the middle; it is the in-

between, the border . . . no mans land, a nonlocalisable relation sweepingup the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of

the other. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 293)Why is involution creative? Because the conception of transversal move-ment has to do with communications that cut across distinct lineages, sogiving rise to an unending flow of forms that have a tendency to break outof fixed or stable determinations. As such involution proceeds withoutend, its inventions do not exist in advance but involve rhizomic modesof becoming. Its creative processes are bound up with invention, thecreation of forms . . . [and] the continual elaboration of the absolutelynew (Bergson, 1911/1983: 259).

We can now see production and use as abstractions from an ideal-

ized space foreign to real movement. This, as Chia (1999) reminds us, isthe confusion between lived time (continuing experience) and clocktime (computed trajectory). Examples of clock time abound if we glancearound the hurry-up world (Huff, 2000) of popular literature. Indeed,how we cope with, divide, buy, value and beat time seems to havereplaced the self-help relationship book as the latest publishing money-spinner (Raymond, 1999). Terms like linear-time, flexi-time, fulcrum-time and time-windows have entered general conversation. The onset ofa worldwide web that never sleeps and the interconnectedness offered byphones that permit us to take calls whilst sending a fax all have a

profound effect on how we plough-, work- commodify-time (Raymond,1999).


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Despite these current fascinations, Bergson (1911/1983) makes it clearthat the flux of lived time is reality itself and the things we study are thethings that flow. It follows, therefore, that there is more to organizationalknowledge than a succession of idealized moments and points. Experi-

ence in creative involution is a case of transition, a becoming; anenduring change that is substance itself (Deleuze, 1988). The physicist/philosopher David Bohm (1980: 48) captures the point thus:

Not only is everything changing, but all is flux. That is to say what is is theprocess of becoming itself, while all objects, events, entities, structures,etc., are forms that can be abstracted from this process.

On this view, the stops production and use cant be seen as atomizedmoments, points or parts in space. The maxim all is flux rules out thepresupposition that the ultimate constituents of reality can ever fully

become. As Bohm (1980) insists, what it is is flux. Its substance does notconsist of isolable units, determinate things and self-identical objects;these impositions simply reflect the need to impose a uniform andregular order upon the flux of becoming (Ansell Pearson, 1999). Realknowledge involves movement, it is movement, an indivisible continuityinvolving indeterminate relations and processes that arent the propertyof things but which belong to knowledge and through which it con-tinually transforms and creates itself.

A Method of Creative Involution

By illustrating a method for creative involution, emphasis is put onrelations as things in their own right, rather than on the separateobjectivity of individuals considered as isolate units. What this means isthat we do not move from one actual term to another actual term along asingle line, but from a virtual term to the heterogeneous terms thatactualize it along lines of divergence. Bergson describes this process interms of a fully developed method he calls intuition. The method ofintuition is not one of addition or association but of division: the cuttingup of a given virtuality according to lines of different natures. From theperspective of Bergsons creative evolution, intuition proceeds according

to three methodological rules.

ProblematizationThe Labyrinth

For Bergson, true invention lies in raising questions and creating theterms in which they are stated. In other words, our attention should be onproblem setting as opposed to problem solving. This is because, accord-ing to Bergson, there is limited freedom in only seeking solutions toproblems that already exist (we may expend energy and effort on thewrong problem). Munro (forthcoming) offers a useful distinction betweenthe acceptance of already existing problems and the restless discovery of

new problems when he conceives of the model and the labyrinth. Amodel is a symbolic representation of reality, but can also be seen as part


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of a wider political struggle, in the sense that representing, naming andfixing have always been the prerogative of the powerful. By contrast, thelabyrinth is not a representational or a regulative model of movement,instead it is movement, flow, stimulation and connection that ceaselessly

resists and undermines such regulative modes.Umberto Eco (1998) superbly illustrates this contrast in his neo-classic

novel The Name of the Rose. The novel describes a late medievalBenedictine abbey where, after several bizarre deaths amongst the monks,a learned Franciscan, William of Baskerville, is sent to solve the mystery.The abbeys ageing blind librarian, Jorges of Burgos, has, for 40 years,been using a secret labyrinth within the abbeys library to keep Aristotlesheretic second treatise of the Poetics concealed. Towards the end of thestory, William confronts the venerable Jorges in the hidden finis Africae.The old monk superciliously explains how he had wanted to censor that

book above all others because the philosopher wrote it. Here Ecoemploys a physical labyrinth to subsume a literary one. Aristotle hadsought to undermine the Divine orthodoxy that Christianity had accumu-lated over the centuries with comedy. Whereas the Christian modelgenerated an ideological structure from which to exert ecclesiasticalpower, the labyrinthine Poetics, through its witty riddles, unexpectedmetaphors and keen syllogisms, threatened a closer examination of itsself-proclaimed divinity.

The labyrinth is clearly a way of talking about creative involution as apolycentric and contemporaneous structure, the events of which branch

out in every direction, continually intersecting and diverging. This ishow Calvino (1997: 163) describes movement in the verse OrlandoFurioso: a poem that refuses to begin and refuses to end. It refuses tobegin because it is presented as the continuation of another poem and itrefuses to end because the author never stopped working on it. Thepoems construction enables it to leave one character or situation andpass on to another. Sometimes this is done without breaking the continu-ity of the narrative and at other times by means of a clear break thatinterrupts the action right in the middle of a stanza. While these breaksare placed in the middle of the stanzas, the end of each promises that the

story will continue to the next one. This process of expanding from theinside, making episodes proliferate from other episodes, creating newsymmetries and new contrasts, seems to capture the assembly of alabyrinth rather well.

However, popular organizational knowledge literature continues to bemisled by ideas expressing a model path. On the one hand, organiza-tional knowledge proceeds via predictability and control through theproduction and use of mechanisms for reporting, external scrutiny andinformation collection: a place for everything and everything in its place.Here, the model evolves into a system of general rules with centralized

control and coordination. Knowledge codification, information flows andstrategic planning are concentrated within discrete specialities and meth-


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odologies. The measurement of quality output and separation of knowl-edge production from its use are all donefrom above. On the other hand,organizational knowledge presents a highly complex labyrinth of polit-ical direction, managerial authority, professional power and consumer

demand. Individual managers, professionalized workers and consumersall experience knowledge as a continuous and unfinished process whoseintrinsic nature resists the regulative model. Its self-organizing, non-linear and multi-stranded. It grows from the bottom up and not from topdown (Cooper, 1998: 143, authors original emphasis).

It follows that organizational knowledge does not possess any stableequilibrium, within which no transformation is possible. Rather, whatknowledge is is the ceaseless transformation or becoming of being. Thequestion is not one of distinguishing where production and use start andfinish, nor is it the relation between them. It is the transversal com-

munication that runs parallel to both as it extends itself outwards invarious directions from its centre.

DifferentiationThinking Beyond the Human Condition

Human experience is one of composites. This leads us to think in termsof subjectobject dualities and the separation of knower and known. Thisis not the real problem, however. The key issue is that we have forgottenhow to look beyond that experience to where there is nothing butmovement or lines of force, which brings us back to the virtual relationsof universal change and becomings that are actualized according to

divergent lines that differ in kind. We must treat all composites anddualities as transient abstractions, differentiations, or divisions of thatexperience. There is always a virtuality being actualized, a simplicity inthe process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing up:Proceeding by dissociation and division, by dichotomy, is theessence of life (Deleuze, 1988: 94). On Bergsons view, the true problemis to discover the divergent processes through which organizationalknowledge is actualized, differentiated and divided, and not how theterms of any originary composite or dualism are associated, integrated orotherwise made coterminous. This is as much as to say that although we

give ourselves knowledge that is ready-made, pre-formed, pre-existent, inwhich everything is already completely given, this is a false notion. InBergsonism, thinking beyond the dualistic human condition is not anoriginary state nor the final word, but part of the movement of thought, asa means of posing problems.

As an example of this view, the human condition is necessarily boundup with an originary technicity (Ansell Pearson, 1997; Clark, 1997;Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). Putting brain, body and world togetheragain is the sub-title to a recent book on cognitive science in artificialintelligence by Clark (1997). In it, he reviews the classic perception of a

disembodied mind, independent of its physical world, which sets itselfup as the central planner (CPU) of an information system. Such images,


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he tells us, are dominated by the methodological vision of developmentas a linear, stage-like progression through a sequence driven by a grandplan. According to Clark (1997), however, information processingaccounts that identify inner states or processes as having legislative roles

may be illusory. Such systems, he argues, concentrate on the search forfeatures whose inner representational states reflect deeper, more agent-independent properties that oppose thought and action. He contends thatthis is an inappropriate model of the knowledge we actually use, on-line,real-time. In its place, he proposes a view of embodied cognition, inwhich complex phenomena only make sense as an assemblage of brain,body and world, wherein the brain is as much in the world as it is in thehead. In his words, the mind is a leaky organ that is forever escaping itsnatural confines and intermingling with body and world.

The explicit philosophical antecedents of Clarks non-representational

approach are Heideggers (1962) phenomenological understanding ofbeing and the organismbodyworld synergy of Merleau-Ponty (1962).Heidegger argues that the separation of body and world denies thefundamental mode of being-in-the-world (dasein). He points out thatbeing-in-the-world should not be interpreted as the relationship betweentwo independent, present-at-hand entities: there can be no side-by-sideness of neutral or detached subject called dasein and an object calledworld. Rather, the being of dasein is always grounded in being-with; its Iis always a relational being-with another. In this way, the constitution ofbeing-in-the-world can be understood as a middle in which mind, body

and world are immanently situated.If we place ourselves in this midst, we are unable to define an

individual human being simply by the form it takes, the organs it con-tains or the functions they perform. Human being is no longer localizedin the body but is treated as a complex arrangement of transversalconnections and relations that cut across and beneath individuals. Onthis model, there is no centre formally controlling behaviour, no top-down subject or originating agent, only a complex assemblage of brains,bodies and worlds held together in-tension to constitute a particularindividual. Thus, in creative involution, form is replaced by in-formation

(Cooper, 1987). Not that of signals, supports or vehicles of informationconstructed by the communication sciences, but a labyrinthine move-ment of engagement, intervention and intersection, in which the bound-aries of individuals, artifacts and machines are constantly being formedand deformed. Creative involution is thus the practice of disassemblyand reassembly in which the body is now nothing more than a set ofvalves, locks, floodgates, bowls, or communicating vessels (Deleuze andGuattari, 1988: 153).

Simondon (1992) continues this line of thought in the essay Genesis ofthe Individual. For Simondon, what is required is a complete change in

mental habit, one in which the rhizomic process of individuation isconsidered primordial. As he puts it: [to] grasp firmly the nature of


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individuation, we must consider the being not as a substance, or matter,or form, but as a tautly extended and supersaturated system (Simondon,1992: 301). Despite this, the problem of individuation, according toSimondon, continues to be formulated in either substantialist terms

of the already constituted individual, or, the hylomorphic operation ofindividuation. Both views assume we can discover a principle of indi-viduation that would explain the individual. The first posits the prin-ciple of individuation as an eternal and elementary fact: each individualis already given in nature. The second considers that which individu-ation requires before it can exist and so merely puts the principle intoeffect. Simondon argues, however, that, in both cases, the tendency is tounderstand the process of individuation by means of the individual,rather than the need to understand the individual from the perspectiveof the process of individuation. It is this point that commentaries on

organizational knowledge often miss. They typically see production anduse as substances, because both appear to enjoy what amounts to anindependent existence, so that the relation between them is a connection,before any questions about their individuation have been asked.

TemporalizationLiving in Duration

Bergson defines actual and virtual multiplicities as dividing elementsthat differ in kind and, as these elements or parts only exist insofar as thedivision is carried out, it is clear that there is only a single time that

endlessly subdivides into two parts: one that is always definite the othereternally infinite (Deleuze, 1990). The fact that the division is subject toactually being carried out implies that both parts must be lived, orcapable of being lived, and that this is only possible in the interval of asingle overarching temporality (Bergson, 1999). This sort of internalresonance of determinations, magnitudes and directions is the continualinvention of newness and novelty characteristic of duration. In contrastto the spatialized and homogenous moments of clock time, duration hastwo fundamental characteristics: continuity and heterogeneity. Its con-tinuity denotes an unceasing capacity for processes and movement, whilst

its heterogeneity expresses the tendency of these movements to break outof any fixed determinations. This leads Deleuze (1986) to conclude thatduration is the whole of immanent relations that change and dont stopchanging, sweeping one and other up and into one another.

Defined in this way duration is a virtual multiplicity of relationsbeyond rational experience. Such experience always gives us an exterior-ity without succession (Deleuze, 1988). That is it juxtaposes extrinsicallydistinct entities which are homogenous (self-identical) and discontin-uous, and between which regular and orderly relations can be imposed.Duration, on the other hand, gives succession that is purely internal and

is both heterogeneous and continual. Whilst we insist on supplanting theinstantaneous entities of space, we decompose the internal difference of


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duration into a series of external points and align them in homogenoustime. The important point is that duration involves continual livinginterpenetrations whose complex ligatures can neither be slackened farenough to produce multiple entities, nor reduced sufficiently to produce

a singular unity (Deleuze, 1988). How then does the virtual whole ofduration actualize?

When the virtuality is actualized, differentiated, when it develops itsparts into the familiar forms we come to know so well, it does soaccording to lines of flux that are divergent, absolutely different in kind,but which relate, in some particular degree, to the virtual whole fromwhich each emanated and in which each ultimately coexisted in thevirtual. Development thus takes place from the virtual to the actual andnot in terms of the possible that is realized. This mistake is due to theway in which we construe a negative as containing less than its positive

counterpart, such as is found in the pairs possiblereal, nothingsomething, disorderorder (Ansell Pearson, 1999). The principle is main-tained that, apart from something that is actual, manifest and ordered,there is nothing. The possible is opposed to the real as somethingabstracted. Equally, nothingness is experienced as a pure lack, just asdisorder denotes an absence of order. It is the realization of the real that issufficient to separate it from a closed list of possibilities.

Conversely, however, in duration, virtuality differs from the possible inthat the virtual and the actual are both real, the one being the ideality ofthe other but both are real and therefore are not in opposition (Carrier,1998). According to Carrier, possibility is realized in the real, it is theimage of the real. Realization is the process of coming to resemble thepossible, through a selection from the possible closed list of options. Incontrast, virtuality is not possibility but potentiality. Virtuality of a being,he notes, is in its potentiality to posses the actual affections that con-stitute the being. Unlike possibility, potentiality does not predeterminethe actual; it is not a closed range of possibilities. The actual does notresemble the virtual, because the latter comes to be at the same time asthe actual comes to be actual. Both are real, but the virtual does not exist

(remains virtual) until it is actualized: it exists in the way that it isactualized.Duration is thus a zone of indiscernibility (Ansell Pearson, 1999) in

which units, things and objects are grasped according to the immanentrelations they enter into. A zone of indiscernibility is a territory ofindetermination or uncertainty, a hesitation of things (Ansell Pearson,1999) in which the localized forms they possess can no longer define theparts or the independent functions they fulfil. Instead, they are dis-tinguished solely by the composition of the relations into which theyenter. Duration, therefore, actualizes by differentiation, through divergent

lines that create divisions and never by way of an associative relationshipbetween extrinsically distinct entities.


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Concluding Remarks

Organizational knowledge is always a mixture. Its apparent homogeneity,as something created, disseminated, acquired and applied, is always a

composite of results, evidence, systems, skills and interests. This point isnow recognized. What is more often missed, however, is that, in order tobe known, such mixtures must always be divided. Di-vision is theprocess of making the invisible visible (Cooper, 1989). Knowledge isexpressed on the one hand by the totality of elements of different naturesbut also in the interval that is established along a particular line whoseterms are only different by degrees (e.g. of more or less). This is duration:the zone of indetermination. In duration, things, products and results donot differ from something else external to themselves. Duration is definedas what differs from itself. Internal difference must, therefore, be dis-

tinguished from relations of association (theory is put into practice) andnegation (production is not use). There is no longer a relation betweentwo things, rather the relation must be something in its own right: therelation itself is grasped as a thing. In this way, creative involution is seenas a method of division, of cutting out. When organizational knowledge isdivided, when it is said to evolve, it does so polyphonically. In creativeinvolution, production can no longer impact on use because this wouldneed some solidity and inertia in which the concern is with the ends ofthe intervals and not with the intervals themselves (Bergson, 1911/1983:9). Drawing on Jorge Louis Borges (1970: 117), we might say that creative

involution is the most complex labyrinth consisting of a single linewhich is invisible and unceasing. It is the open system par excellence.

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Martin Wood lectures on leadership and organization in the Centre for Leadership Studies,at the University of Exeter. Prior to this, he held a research fellowship at WarwickBusiness School, where he was involved in work on service delivery research andthe impact of scientific, organizational and behavioural factors in achieving changein the UK National Health Service. Published in international social science,organization studies and applied health care journals, his research interests focuson the philosophy of organization, particularly the relations between the human,the social and the technical. He is currently working on a post-structural under-standing of the production and use of knowledge in health services research.Address: Centre for Leadership Studies, University of Exeter, Crossmead, Barley

Lane, Dunsford Hill, Exeter EX4 1TF, UK. [email: [email protected]]


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