a study on the muslim world's and great powers’ approaches
TRANSCRIPT
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A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD’S AND GREAT
POWERS’ APPROACHES TOWARDS IRAN’S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE EFFECTS
ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
BY
MR. SAKHANAN RATTANARUNGSUN
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2016
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
Ref. code: 25595403040230BCXRef. code: 25595403040230BCX
A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD’S AND GREAT
POWERS’ APPROACHES TOWARDS IRAN’S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE EFFECTS
ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
BY
MR. SAKHANAN RATTANARUNGSUN
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2016
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
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Thesis Title A STUDY ON THE MUSLIM WORLD‘S AND
GREAT POWERS‘ APPROACHES TOWARDS
IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE
EFFECTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
Author Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun
Degree Master of Arts
Major Field/Faculty/University International Relations
Faculty of Political Science
Thammasat University
Thesis Advisor Professor Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D
Academic Years 2016
ABSTRACT
The Islamic Republic of Iran‘s (or Iran) nuclear program is one of the
most significant subjects in contemporary international relations, one which has
significant impacts on our contemporary world. Whether its nuclear program is used
for the generation of potential energy for civilian proposes or a move towards the
development of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depends
on inherent political and economic (politico-economic power) benefits and the
individual actors‘ aims.
The study illustrates the Muslim World‘s and the Great Powers‘
approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear program in order to understand their motives in
international relations. Recently, a nuclear deal was signed on 14 July 2015 which
resulted in the lifting of a majority of sanctions against Iran on ‗Implementation Day‘.
Nevertheless, the study in this paper examines the issue from the realists and balance
of power perspectives together with the Muslim Ummah and Liberal
Intergovernmentalism schools of thought. The Muslim World‘s approach to the issue
is also taken into consideration in order to gain solidarity among Islamic countries and
to ensure the survival of the regime.
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The balance of power study confirms the existence of a concealed power
matching move. Iran is using their nuke capabilities in an attempt to become a
formidable voice on the international platform and even to inferior states. In the
Muslim World‘s case, Iran‘s move was to deter the influence of the Great Powers in
the region. Based on studies from realism, states will do what is necessary to
guarantee their own survival in an international system. However, when the study of
the balance of power is also considered, it is quite clear that states remain suspicious
of one another and will cooperate only when they have to. Therefore, the Great
Powers may seem to approach Iran‘s nuclear issue to avert terrorism. Nevertheless, in
a region with large power resources and a country located on the main marine route,
there is evidence that individual countries of the Great Powers want to extend their
power over the region for their own political and economic benefits.
Keywords: The Great Power, Nuclear Program, Iran, International Policy,
International Relations, JCPOA, Balance of Power, Muslim Ummah, Muslim World,
Realist, Middle East, WMD, IAEA, Organization of the Islamic Conference, OIC.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor,
Professor Dr. Jaran Maluleem, for his support and insightful guidance on my paper. In
addition, I am thankful to my thesis committees: Assistant Professor Dr. Pisanu
Sunthraraks and Dr. Pichai Israbhakdi for their invaluable guidance and advice.
Secondly, I would also like to thank my family for all their support
throughout my Master‘s study.
Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT (1)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (3)
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background and Significance of the Study 1
1.1.1 History of Iran‘s Nuclear Program 1
1.1.2 The Importance of Middle East and Muslim World 3
1.1.3 The Importance of Great Powers 3
1.1.4 Driving forces behind Iran‘s nuclear issue 4
1.1.5 Significance of this study 7
1.2 Research Objectives 7
1.3 Research Questions 8
1.4 Hypothesis 8
1.5 Theoretical Framework 9
1.6 Scope of the study 10
1.7 Research Methodology 10
1.7.1 Data Collection 10
1.7.2 Data Analysis 11
1.8 Literature Review 11
CHAPTER 2 IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND AFFECTS: PERSPECTIVE 17
FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
2.1 The Background of Nuclear Evolution in the Middle East 17
2.2 Balance of Power in the Middle East 19
2.2.1 Iran in Perspective 20
2.2.2 Iran Nuclear Activities and the Middle East 21
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2.2.3 Iran‘s Nuclear Program and the Balance of Power 22
2.3 Israel 23
2.3.1 Israel in Perspective 23
2.3.2 Israel‘s Nuclear Concern 24
2.3.3 Israel and Iran Relations 26
2.4 Saudi Arabia 28
2.4.1 Saudi Arabia in Perspective 28
2.4.2 Saudi Arabia‘s Nuclear Concern 29
2.4.3 Saudi Arabia and Iran Relations 31
2.5 Turkey 31
2.5.1 Turkey in Perspective 31
2.5.2 Turkey‘s Nuclear Concern 32
2.5.3 Turkey and Iran Relations 35
2.6 Egypt 36
2.6.1 Egypt in Perspective 36
2.6.2 Egypt‘s Nuclear Concern 37
2.6.3 Egypt and Iran Relations 39
2.7 Overall Conclusion on the Balance of Power in the Middle East 39
CHAPTER 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN‘S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 41
3.1 The history of Iran before Islamic conquest and Islamization 41
3.2 Sunni/Shiite division 43
3.3 The Early stages of Iran‘s Nuclear Program 44
3.3.1 Atoms for Peace 44
3.3.2 The Shah‘s Nuclear Program 47
3.4 The Islamic Republic Iran‘s Nuclear Program 50
CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF OIC ON IRAN‘S NUCLEAR ISSUE 53
4.1 Theoretical Framework 53
4.1.1 Muslim Ummah approach 54
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4.1.2 Intergovernmentalism approach 58
4.2 The two Islamic Republic of Iran‘s Presidents 2005- present 62
4.3 The OIC Significance 64
4.4 The Role of OIC on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue 67
CHAPTER 5 THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS ON IRAN‘S NUCLEAR 69
ISSUE
5.1 Theoretical Framework 69
5.1.1 Realist Approach 70
5.1.2 Balance of Power Approach 80
5.2 Multilateral Relations 84
CHAPTER 6 THE MUSLIM WORLD‘S VS THE GREAT POWERS‘ 89
RESPONSE TO IRAN‘S NUCLEAR POWER
6.1 International Level 89
6.1.1 Power Struggle 90
6.1.2 Key Players 92
6.2 Regional Level 93
6.2.1 Power Struggle 95
6.2.2 Key Players 97
6.3 Domestic Level 98
6.3.1 Power Struggle 98
6.3.2 Key Players 100
6.4 The Muslim World‘s vs the Great Powers‘ Response to 101
Iran‘s Nuclear Power
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 103
7.1 Summary 103
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7.1.1 What are the Muslim World‘s Approaches towards 104
Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?
7.1.2 What are the Great Powers‘ Approaches towards 105
Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?
7.1.3 What are Different Approaches between the Muslim 106
World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s Nuclear Issue?
7.2 Recommendation 108
REFERENCES 110
BIOGRAPHY 121
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Significance of the Study
1.1.1 History of Iran’s Nuclear Program
It has been assumed that the nuclear issue of Iran has been the most
controversial subjects of the world affairs, one which greatly impacts the world today.
Tehran points out that its nuclear program is to generate necessary energy for civilian
proposes including for electricity, fuel, and medical facilities in order to substitute
their traditional dependencies. Nevertheless, other countries, especially Western and
European ones, perceive their nuclear ambitions as an attempt to move towards the
nuclear expansions that tend to be a series of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction).
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) (2014), Iran has been
interested in a nuclear program since the 1950s. In 1953, due to the support from the
US, a nuclear non-proliferation scheme with the Atoms for Peace Program was
initiated (Cirincione, 2007). However, Iran had to notify and agree on NPT (the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) together with 190 States and
declare itself as a country with non-nuclear weapons in 1970. The main objective of
this agreement is that all states should have a right to benefit from nuclear power for
civilian usage, whereas they must not use it for the military reasons. There were five
countries that donated nuclear devices for this program, which are, the United States
of America (USA), United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The regulator and
authentication that established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
ensures that NPT member states comply with the agreement (Cirincione, 2007).
The NPT has faced a rigid crisis since the Conference in 2005. The US
and European Union (EU) and the US demanded members‘ dedication to non-
proliferation and non-nuclear warhead countries to demobilize their nuclear military
warehouses owned by the five states with nuclear weapons (Pilat, 2007). Müller
(2005) also stated that Articles III and IV NPT state that each member has an
opportunity to use the nuclear power for peaceful means, as well as the right to
develop a capability of domestic nuclear enhancement.
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Iran is at the centre of international attention due to its nuclear program.
There are many motivations for the increased interest in its foreign and security
policies since Iran has shown their support for ‗political militant groups‘ in Lebanon
and the Palestinian Territory as well as in the conflict areas of its neighbours,
Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to these reasons, there is cause for concern (Zimmermann,
2004). Besides, Iran has caused on-going and intense debates about its nuclear
program for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation goals. This debate has caused
Iran to declare its nuclear activities to the IAEA, according to Iran‘s IAEA Safeguards
Agreement (Zimmermann, 2004). However, the limitations of their nuclear program‘s
expansion was limited by the revolution in Iran as well as the Iran-Iraq war in the
1990s (NTI, 2014).
So far, the situation concerning Iran's nuclear program is hanging in the
balance. While the so called ‗carrot and stick‘ actions in the form of economic
sanctions and diplomatic dialogues such as the P5+1 have been initiated with Tehran,
Iran‘s nuclear program is still ongoing. On the other hand, the countries in the Middle
East region are definitely affected by this nuclear issue. Therefore, Middle East
countries are responding strongly to this inevitable issue. The Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) is a large organization in the Muslim World (including Iran
as a member) that aims to maintain peace, common interests, and unify the efforts of
the Member States (NTI, 2014). Therefore, it is interesting to examine their response
to Iran‘s nuclear pursuits.
1.1.2 The Importance of the Middle East and Muslim World
During the course of the history of the Middle East, ample valuable
resources, e.g. fossil fuel energy, oil, freshwater, and natural gas have been
discovered. Ejjeh (2007) claimed that there are over 15,233 working desalination
stations in the Middle East region, with a capability of around 32.4 million m3/day of
portable water. In addition, 60% of the total globe stations are found in this region. On
the contrary, only approximately 19.7% of the globe‘s seawater desalination
capability is found in the Caribbean and North America.
Asculai (2012) pointed out that alternative renewable energy resources
will not be able to replace existing nuclear electrical supplies, at least not in an
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economically viable manner in the near future. Furthermore, these alternative
technologies are very geographical-dependent, not suitable for all countries, and most
methods of production still bear higher costs than the production of nuclear
electricity. The factors that will drive future electrical supply trends include future
economic growth, growing demands for electrical power, and demands for the drastic
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
As for economic considerations, Iran is an energy-rich state with huge gas
and oil supplies. Therefore it is why nuclear power programs are distinctly
uneconomical, even today. However, another reason to create a nuclear program is to
withhold oil reserves for the future, when prices would be higher. Besides, when
carbon-based fuel is more costly and a carbon tax has to be considered, nuclear
energy will be economically advantageous.
The huge financial resources are required in order to establish the nuclear
power in the Middle East, and they are already available to some for example in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and modestly available in other countries
such as Egypt, Libya and Algeria. Nevertheless, the nuclear power possibility is turn
out to be an issue of requirement in order to meet future freshwater and energy needs
in the region, since the natural gas and oil resources are estimated to be drained
around the following 50 years. Moreover, the shared costs of the operation and
construction of nuclear plants are more attractive than those of fossil fuel electrical
power plants. Therefore, through public and private partnerships, it could be
achievable to start and maintain a moderate nuclear program in the Arab countries of
Asia and North Africa beginning within the following 10-15 years (El-Genk, 2008).
Therefore, the Middle East and the Muslim World continue to be an
important region due to the fact that the countries in the region are energy rich.
However, these countries acknowledge that nuclear power is also crucial for their
future use. They attempt to generate power themselves by maintaining energy
resources along with the use of nuclear power.
1.1.3 The Importance of Great Powers
Many international relations academics believe that ‗Great Powers‘ is a
group of states which have big effects on the political world instead of the
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combination of many small states. Many scholars emphasize on the outcomes of the
expansion and weakening of this group of states.
Gilpin (1981, p. 30) stated that the countries are named as the Great
Powers, also called ‗superpowers‘, found and apply the principal regulations and
rights influencing their individual countries as well as those of other countries. Great
Powers are assumed to appreciate several benefits without the permission from many
countries.
According to Waltz, for instance, ―States are placed in the top rank
because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on
all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment,
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence‖ (Waltz
1979, p. 131).
In this research, Great Powers refers to the United States (US), EU-3
(United Kingdom, France, Germany,) and China.
1.1.4 Driving Forces behind Iran’s Nuclear Issue
This part of the study is represented by a ‗timeline‘ table which is found
below. It clearly depicts the driving forces behind Iran‘s nuclear issues and the
consequences of Iran‘s recent negotiations with group P5+1 that took place.
Table 1.1
Timeline of Iranian Nuclear Program
1950s Shah of Iran began receiving support from the US through its „Atoms
for Peace‘ program.
1968 Iran signed the Treaty on the NPT (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons).
1970s Iran ratified NPT; nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution quickly ensued
and was followed by the Iran-War which limited the expansion of the
nuclear program.
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Table 1.1 Continued
1990‘s Iran‘s nuclear program grew its capacity throughout the expansion of
uranium mining infrastructure and the engagement of its enrichment
and conversion.
1989-
2003
From the years 1989 to 2003, under the radar of the international
community, there were acceleration activities.
2003-
2010
During this period, the nuclear conversion and enrichment activities
were suspended by Iran.
2003 The negotiations between EU-3 (France, Germany, UK) and Iran
2003 Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) which involved an agreement to suspend its nuclear
conversion and enrichment activities on a temporary-basis.
2004 The Paris Agreement between Iran and EU-3 was reached on a
consensus
2005 Iran resumed Nuclear conversion and enrichment operations leading to
almost a 20% increase of the amount reported in 2010.
2006 A series of diplomatic incidents from both parties, Iran and EU-3 were
recognized.
2009 Iran brought its construction of a second pilot enrichment facility to the
attention of IAEA.
2009 Iran and the P5+1 resumed their talks in Geneva and Vienna
respectively during which time representatives from the P5+1 and Iran
tentatively agreed to a fuel swap arrangement.
2010 Another set of sanctions under UNSCR 1929 aimed at Iranian nuclear
and investment activities were also approved by the UN Security
Council.
2010 Iran attempted to renegotiate with P5+1 through IAEA, but it was not
successful.
2010-
2011
There have been increased P5+1 talk from 2010 up until the present
day.
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Table 1.1 Continued
2011 US put more pressure on several companies which were charged with
falsified operations through nine major banks located in New York.
2011 The subsequent talk in Turkey was scheduled but failed to achieve
anything given that the pre-conditions for the talk that was set up by
Iran involved the lifting of economic sanctions against the country.
2011 The Russian Foreign Minister proposed an approach based on five
stages to address the nuclear conflict issue through Iran‘s cooperation
with IAEA, including limiting Iran‘s nuclear enrichment activities. In
return, P5+1 would need to lift sanctions imposed unilaterally and
through the UN Security Council.
2011 The November 2011, a report by IAEA were released, detailing in
particular Iran‘s engagement in activities that were connected with the
development of ‗nuclear explosive devices‘.
2012 President Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act, expanding sanctions against Iran. The European
Union tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran, prohibiting the
import, financing, insurance, and brokering of Iranian natural gas, and
banning the supply of vessels to transport or store Iranian oil.
2012 An IAEA team headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards,
Herman Nackaerts, visited Iran to discuss ways to resolve outstanding
issues.
2012 Iran and the P5+1 countries met in Istanbul to re-open discussions
about Iran's nuclear program.
2012 The second round of new P5+1 talk with Iran was held in the ‗Green
Zone‘ of Baghdad, Iraq.
2013 A US Congressional committee approved legislation to further limit
Iran's oil exports and access to foreign currency reserves.
2013 The Iranian presidential election of Hassan Rouhani.
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Table 1.1 Continued
2013 President Obama and President Rouhani held the first direct talks
between the US and Iranian leaders since the 1979 revolution.
2013 After intensive negotiations in Geneva, Iran and P5+1 announced that
they had reached an agreement on a joint plan of action, including
interim steps over the next six months and elements of a longer-term,
comprehensive solution.
Source: Adapted from ―Nuclear‖ by Nuclear Threat Initiative (2016, March).
Retrieved from http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/
1.1.5 Significance of This Study
Whether Iran can build nuclear weapons has not been fully determined,
but the issue has been seriously raised among the Great Power countries on the
international stage. There have been many studies from Western scholars attempting
to elevate Iran‘s nuclear program to a weaponized stage. The achievement of Iranian
scientists on indigenous nuclear capability development, the existing Iranian nuclear
infrastructure, the uranium enrichment, nuclear arms race, and its non-cooperative
effort to the enhanced safeguards system contained in the IAEA‘s were used to justify
the concern. However, for more than 30 years since 1983, their theories have not been
prominent proof of nuclear weaponization. The study in this paper will prove that
Iran‘s nuclear issue is only a political excuse for the Great Powers to gain advantage
in the resource-rich region and for the Muslim World to obtain security and
international influence.
1.2 Research Objectives
This paper mainly aims to study the Muslim World‘s and the Great
Powers‘ perceptions towards the Iran nuclear program, to examine the multilateral
channels of the Muslim countries, and to explore the angle of responses and actions to
Iran‘s Nuclear Issues. It will study the background of Iran‘s nuclear program,
including the current situations as well as the disputed settlements.
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To have a clear understanding of the research objectives, the statements
below outline the purposes of this research:
1. To identify the Muslim World‘s approach(es) towards the Iran‘s
nuclear issue.
2. To identify the Great Powers‘ approach(es) towards the Iran‘s nuclear
issue.
3. To compare the different approaches between the Muslim World and
the Great Powers towards the Iran nuclear issue.
1.3 Research Questions
1. What is/are the Muslim World‘s approach(es) towards the Iran nuclear
issue?
2. What is/are the Great Powers‘ approach(es) towards the Iran nuclear
issue?
3. What is/are the different approaches between the Muslim World and the
Great Powers towards the Iran‘s nuclear issue?
In answering these questions, this study understands very well that the
approaches taken by both the Great Powers and the Muslim World towards the Iran
nuclear issue are not absolute. It is not possible in this real world to reach an absolute
consensus in politics. Therefore, the answers to these questions will be based on
collective approaches that have been presented to the world.
1.4 Hypothesis
This thesis paper hypothesizes that the nuclear weapon issue in Iran is
something which both the Muslim World and the Great Powers are concerned about
based on their realistic points of view; however, both sides take different courses of
action towards Iran according to their own benefits and hidden agendas.
The statements that follow are the clear hypotheses of this study:
1. There is/are some of the Muslim World‘s significant approach(es)
towards the Iran nuclear issue.
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2. There is/are some of the Great Powers‘ significant approach(es)
towards the Iran nuclear issue.
3. There is/are some significant different points of views about the Iran
nuclear issue between the Muslim World and the Great Powers.
1.5 Theoretical Framework
In explaining international relations theories and their relevance to this
study in terms of the Muslim World‘s and Great Powers‘ approaches towards Iran
nuclear program, varying international relations approaches and schools of thought
can be considered. One of which is the ‗realist‘ approach, which emphasizes the
state‘s self-interest when responding to issues on a relative-gain basis. However, by
taking the role of the Muslim World into consideration, a different school of thought
called the ‗Muslim Ummah‘ is used, which emphasizes the strengthening of the
Muslim community by forming a unity. Haas (2014, 732) pointed out that alliances
across ideological lines in ideological multipolarity are barely impossible; they are
just harder to attain than Realist interpretations of balance of power theory would
foresee. Realism undermined as dominant theory for failing to predict end Cold War
Role of non-material factors such as ideas, identities, values which increasingly
recognized as significant for understanding and analysing IR. Religion no longer
considered irrelevant to study of international relations, but when and how it matters
and how to study were and continue to be significantly challenged. Bringing religion
into existing theoretical frameworks in IR does not sufficiently address all limitations
influencing the study of religion in IR (Hurd, 2007).
Finally, the ‗Institutionalism Approach‘ or, to be specific ‗Liberal
Intergovernmentalism‘, which builds on an earlier approach, ‗Intergovernmental
Institutionalism‘, by refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional
compliance, and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation
grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence (Moravcsik, 1993).
More importantly, the traditional concept of ‗balance of power‘ will also
be considered throughout the study. A thorough theoretical review of all the above
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mentioned theories shall be conducted and presented accordingly in each part of the
analysis in the following sections.
1.6 Scope of the Study
As outlined in the above timeline and overview of Iran‘s nuclear
ambitions, it seems that Iran has hidden agendas vis-à-vis their nuclear program. This
is why Great Powers are against Iran. This research will shed light on the crucial
issues and approaches of the Muslim World and Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear
program. In particular, the evolution of nuclear power in the Middle East by
comparing four countries will be explored in Chapter 2; the development of Iranian
nuclear program since the Shah era will be presented in Chapter 3; the role of the OIC
on Iran‘s nuclear program will be examined in Chapter 4; the role of Great Powers on
Iran‘s nuclear issue will be explained in Chapter 5; the Muslim World‘s and the
Great Powers‘ responses to Iran‘s nuclear program will be compared and analyzed in
Chapter 6; and the conclusion and recommendations of this report‘s research findings
will be elucidated in Chapter 7.
1.7 Research Methodology
1.7.1 Data Collection
The thesis is developed by collecting data using a qualitative approach to
review the information via the internet (or secondary sources). Secondary sources
such as news websites, reports, articles, journals, press releases, and other official
government websites were used for data collection. According to Bryman and Bell
(2007), the qualitative method is flexible and more adaptable during the data
collecting process. Meanwhile, Perren and Ram (2004) suggested that the advantage
of the qualitative approach would allow the researcher to understand the complexity
of the whole process.
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1.7.2 Data Analysis
In order to answer the research questions, in-depth analysis of secondary
data is necessary. However, the major analytical part would be the connection and
comparison between the theories and the related political as well as nuclear situation
presented in the reports and news on the Muslim World and Great Powers in their
approaches towards the Iran nuclear program.
1.8 Literature Review
This section illustrates the main empirical literatures which the researcher
used as reference to carry out this academic research. The review of related literatures
encompasses various academic books, journal articles, and documents from many
scholars that provide information on Iran‘s nuclear issues and its implications on the
international political stage since its failure to declare the import of natural uranium
from 1991 until present. In addition, the related literatures explained the diplomatic
relations between Iran and the world, especially in terms of its nuclear program.
The first work to be reviewed is the that of Mustafa Kibaroglu (2006) in
his article entitled ‘Good for the Shah, banned for the Mullahs: The West and
Iran’s quest for nuclear power’, Middle East Journal, 60(2), 207-232, 26p.
Kibaroglu provides a comprehensive introduction to the issue of Iran‘s nuclear
program since August 2002, explaining some of the ambiguities that surrounded the
secretly- constructed Nuclear development capacity in Natanz and the heavy water
construction plant in Arak. The article then describes how the United States
administrators and specialists highlighted the fact that Iran had secret strategies to use
its nuclear abilities to acquire nuclear weapons. Iranian officials, on the other hand,
refused to accept such accusations and claimed that they would use their abilities
totally for nonviolent objectives. In spite of the official speech, some Iranian
academics, intellectuals, and even administrators argued that Iran should extremely
consider progressing nuclear weapons given that they have the essential abilities and
the reasons to do so. The secretarial leaders had apparently not yet determined about
their country‘s use of nuclear weapon given Iran‘s capability. However, the increasing
size of Iran‘s current nuclear plant, and the accomplishments of Iranian scientists who
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claim to have developed native abilities, can very well raise Iran to the status of a
nuclear power, even a de facto nuclear-weapon country.
Additional evidence about the political proof that Iran is finding to launch
a 'nuclear hedging‘ capability has progressively risen over the past. In the article by
Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer (2011). Iran's nuclear challenge: Nine
years and counting, International Affairs, 87(4), 923-943. 21p, the authors
describes how the Iran has remained to claim that its nuclear energy is merely
peaceful purpose. In addition, Iran has challenged the international community's
dual-track policy which encompasses both dialogues and sanctions, to influence Iran
to be wholly transparent about its nuclear capacities, and to suspend work associated
to uranium enhancement. Although the possibilities for a discussed solution presently
seem unlikely, Iran does not seem to have determined whether to construct nuclear
weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is important to
understand the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its purchasing of
technology and supplies for its nuclear power. Also it is essential for the international
community to sustain negotiations and also consider other diplomatic methods to
enhance the forecasts of continuing Iran focused merely on civil nuclear power, but in
the meantime determining questions associated to the potential military aspects of
Iran's nuclear power.
‘Iran’s foreign policy under President Rouhani: Pledges versus
reality’, Middle Eastern Analysis / OrtadoguAnaliz, 5(57), 64-71. 8p, appeared in
the working paper of Sermin Przeczek (2013) which analyzed Iran‘s foreign policy
under newly-elected president Hassan Rouhaniin. It discussed various subjects,
including the Iranian nuclear program. Even though when considering the ideologies
of Iranian foreign policy that are entrenched from the Islamic revolution, it appears
very challenging for President Rouhani to achieve an average level adequate to reduce
pressures on Iran‘s nuclear program and economy, the ideological basis upon which
the regime in Iran stands has already had to be abandoned more than once throughout
the lifetime of the Islamic revolution. Considering the recognized capability of
President Rouhani and his officers, as well as their promises for improvement in
Iran‘s position in the international arena, new Iranian foreign policies should be seen
across positive lenses.
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Przeczek (2013) also pointed out that President Rouhani is recognized to
be predisposed to practicality. He is also an appropriate speaker who is already
recognized to deliver assured concessions in suspending Iran‘s nuclear program
voluntarily during Khatami‘s presidency although, at the same time, he supported its
continuation. Accommodating strategies of an alliance policy might well be followed
by President Rouhani given that even until the end of President Rouhani‘s term, Iran
will continue to remain a middle-power within world politics. This fact would not
only restrict Iran, but also any other countries retaining the same level of power. It
does not mean that President Rouhani would continue to follow a reactionary foreign
policy. In contrast, his exact aim is to achieve a rather proactive foreign policy.
Therefore, it can be expected that Tehran will indeed actively seek ways to change
Iran‘s hostile and uncooperative image in the eyes of the West. Aside from President
Rouhani himself, Iran‘s new foreign minister, Zarif, who is now also the chief nuclear
negotiator of Iran, and Ali Akbar Salehi, the leader of Atomic Energy Agency of Iran,
are known to be pragmatic and moderate statesmen who are likely to provide
President Rouhani‘s term in office much support in the nuclear talks processes.
On the contrary, Kenneth N. Waltz (2012) who wrote a paper entitled
‗Why Iran should get the bomb’, Foreign Affairs. 91(4), 2-5. 4p, gave a different
opinion from many other writers who wrote about Iran‘s nuclear program. Waltz
(2012) reflected on nuclear power of Iran and suggested that its achievement of
nuclear power would be an optimistic progress accomplished of causing stability to
the Middle East region. Certain attention is given to US and Israeli reactions to the
probability of Iran‘s nuclear weapon or its facility. According to Waltz (2012), US
and Israeli politicians have mistakenly described Iranian governance as unreasonable
and vulnerable to bold aggressive moves. Nevertheless, it is recommended that if Iran
obtains nuclear weapons, it will be determined by self-defense and will lead to the
precautious behavior presented by other nuclear states for example India, China, and
Pakistan.
In ‗Iran: Resolving the nuclear crisis’, Journal of Public &
International Affairs, 23, 74-92, 18p, a paper written by Farzan Sabet (2013),
discussed the United States foreign policy towards the Iran nuclear program under
President Barack Obama and his cabinet. In the beginning year of Obama‘s second
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term, he had significant political capital and a great alliance of states following his
sanctions policy and nuclear talks overseas. Moreover, since 2012 the overwhelming
economic sanctions should have raised the readiness of the Iran to cooperate on its
nuclear power. This policy paper discusses that Obama should capitalize on this
significant issue of probability by admitting the right of Iran for a nonviolent nuclear
power and suggesting a roadmap for ending sanctions in return for Iran‘s nuclear
concessions. The US has not yet lifted the sanctions, and this might be the significant
issue to ending the deadlock in Iran and P5+1 nuclear talks. Nevertheless, the present
effective US negotiating policy will erode over time and therefore President Barack
Obama have to take conclusive act to settle the issue of Iranian nuclear program.
The relations between China and Iranian nuclear issue was studied by
Bernt Berger and Phillip Schell (2013) in an article which appeared in the China
Report, 49(1), 89-101 ‗Toeing the line, drawing the line: China and Iran’s nuclear
ambitions’. The author claimed that China decide not to interference is the best
option that Iran could wish for. Beside this political courage, China offered Iran a
little bit of substantive assistance that it can depend on. Adequately, the state is
subjected to a variety of tactical and planned perspectives that Beijing‘s policymakers
regard as crucial for stability in the region. China relies heavily on energy supplies
from Iran‘s long-time rival Saudi Arabia. However, Beijing has never sought direct
involvement in the region‘s security affairs. Therefore, China has employed a foreign
policy concerning Iran nuclear powers that fulfilled international interests and
demands, but abstaining from various kind of undermining containment strategies.
Generally, China showed obligation to global export control systems. Even though
export controls have not been adequately employed, China has attained great
development in creating practical actions and regulations. Due to the range of its own
international policy ideologies, China has followed European and the US plans that
were intended to bring Iran‘s suspected nuclear weapons program to a hold. In view
of its own foreign policy ideologies in addition to regional tactical considerations,
China‘s policymakers have limited their proactive and support of sanctions, and
therefore, interference in Iran‘s political environment.
As pointed out by Alon Ben-Meir (2009) who wrote an article entitled,
‗Nuclear Iran is not an option: A new negotiating strategy to prevent Iran from
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developing nuclear weapons’, Digest of Middle East Studies. 18(1), 74-89. 16p, the
talks among the P5+1 (US, U.K., China, Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran over
its nuclear weapon programs have not only unsuccessful to achieve an arrangement
but have effected Iran nearer to the line of understanding the expertise to create
nuclear powers. There are many aspects which lead to this failure, as well as the
West's incapability to comprehend and encounter with the Iran‘s mental disposition,
the unsuccessful to offering to Iran the cruelty of the disciplinary actions that can be
imposed because of their disobedience, and the US government's deceptive strategy
that allowed Iran to response. There is a serious requirement to change a particularly
new policy towards Iran involving the three separate ways but interrelated talks: The
first should address on the economic incentive package and the present talks on Iran's
nuclear issue; the second should focus on regional security and the results of sustained
Iranian disobedience; and the third should emphasis Iran's and the United States'
complaints in contradiction of each other. The US have to introduce all three tracks
exclusive of which future negotiation will be as indescribable as the earlier talks, but
this time Israel and the West will be confronting the upsetting viewpoint of the Iran‘s
nuclear.
Furthermore, the article entitled ‗Negotiating Iran’s nuclear populism’,
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 12(1), 255-268. 14p, written by Kaveh Afrasiabi
and Mustafa Kibaroglu (2005) analyzed the positions of Iran, the US, the European
Union, as well as Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the
area of nuclear power and proposes solution to the deadlock that would ensure Iran
remains a civilian nuclear power, therefore mitigating the fears of Iranian
proliferation. It describes the effects of the altering security situation of Iran on the
risk appraisals created by Iranian specialists. Policies that are likely to stimulate
nuclear arms races because they are seen as dramatically increasing the vulnerability
and insecurity of non-nuclear weapons countries. Plus, the article explains the
viewpoint of Iran regarding weapons expansion and a possible nuclear power.
It is interesting to note the work of Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem
Askar Karakir (2008) in their article entitled ‘Attitudes of the international
community toward Iran’s nuclear puzzle’, Journal of International and Area
Studies, 15(2), 1-19, focus on question the viewpoints of the US, the EU-3, Russia,
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and China, on Iran's nuclear program. The fundamental issue is that whether
international society can reach consensus for a complete settlement. In order to
answer this inquiry the article first concisely analyses Iran‘s purposes and foreign
support in the Iran's nuclear expansion. The article then concentrate on individual
states involving the US, the EU-3, China and Russia, a comparative study is applied
for explaining likenesses and dissimilarities of these countries standpoints since the
Iranian Revolution in 1979. The conclusion of this article is on the foundation that the
negotiation is probable to remain because the international society does not have a
common approach towards the Iranian nuclear program.
In conclusion, there are many perspectives from various scholars on Iran‘s
nuclear issues and the diplomatic relations between Iran and the world regarding its
nuclear program. However, it can be summarized that with Iran‘s necessary skills and
capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, the Great Powers see that it is essential,
therefore, for the international community to sustain and expand the pressure on Iran
and to attempts to disturb the purchase of nuclear technology and resources from Iran.
Nevertheless, with economic pressure and President Rouhani‘s pragmatism and an apt
negotiator who would like to seek ways to change Iran‘s hostile and uncooperative
image in the eyes of the West, the US President Obama should capitalize on this gap
of chance by recognizing the right of Iran to a enrich the nuclear energy for the
peaceful mean. This is unavoidable for Iran to bring stability to the Middle East.
Offering Iran a roadmap for releasing sanctions will in fact ease the present economic
tension in diversion for deep concerns on Iran nuclear program.
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CHAPTER 2
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND AFFECTS: PERSPECTIVE
FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
This chapter aims to explore the nuclear program‘s evolution in the
Middle East region. Countries that will be focused in this paper are Iran, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. These countries were chosen because they share mutual
interests in nuclear power. However, these countries have shown their interests in
nuclear during different periods of time (Acton & Bowen, 2008).
Therefore, these five countries are good for case studies. Iran, as
mentioned in the first chapter, seems to have a hidden agenda to the development of a
nuclear program. Israel is attempting to gain power within the region. Saudi Arabia,
an extremely rich country, has comparatively little extant nuclear expertise. Turkey
has a good fundamental development of nuclear power and an economic large scale,
which also describes Libya. Last but not least, Egypt is the state that does not have
enough financial resources, but it has general knowledge of nuclear program which is
unique to other Middle Eastern states (Acton & Bowen, 2008).
The structure of this chapter, first of all, will discuss the general
background of the evolution of nuclear power in the Middle East followed by the
balance of power in this region. It will commence with an overview of Iran and its
nuclear activities, as well as its perspective power, since Iran is the main state and
focus of this academic research. Secondly, the researcher will point out the balance of
power concerning Iran to other states (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) and
examine each case.
Finally, the overall conclusion of Middle East‘s balance of power will be
further discussed at the end of this chapter.
2.1 The Background of Nuclear Evolution in the Middle East
The Middle East has served as the central point for nuclear power and
conflicts for such a long time since they have had many wars in these regions which
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have affected world politics to today (Kuntay, 2014; Miller, 2006). As Millier (2006)
wrote: ‗The Middle East is one of the most war-prone regions in the international
system‘. The Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Arens said in October 1991 that the
Middle East entered the nuclear age in the 1990s (Sayign, 1992). For this reason,
there has been a need to balance the power strategically among players in the Middle
East for over the past decades.
In the mid-1950s, Arabs and Israel started launching their nuclear and
missile development programs, followed by Egypt a few years later (Sayign, 1992).
A more obvious arms race occurred in the 1973 War, with revenues from fuel and oil;
they had more strategic advantage to strengthen their conventional power. However, a
more non-conventional arms race emerged when Israel cooperated with South Africa
on its nuclear power and during the beginning of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
From the late 1970s onwards, extreme conflicts arose in the Middle East
with the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the rise and fall
of the Shah‘s military ambitions of Iran. It was then followed by the invasion of Iraq
to Iran, Israel‘s bombing of Iraq‘s Osirak reactor, invasion of Lebanon, and Syria‘s
acquisition of SS-21 missiles, among other events (Sayign, 1992). The countries in
the Middle East region had established these historical relationships. In 1970, Iran
was offered the capability to develop a nuclear warhead from Israeli. In 1980, on the
other hand, Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation occurred due to the development of ballistic
missile. All political conflicts occurred until 1990s.
The regional complexity, multiplicity, and diversity can be considered as
the ‗conflict areas‘. The population, administration, economy and infrastructure in
rival states are also critical factors to be considered. For an example, during 1990-
1991, Iraq efficiently applied the policy to affect the Arab-Israeli and Gulf risks.
While Israel used ballistic missile and satellite launches to attack Baghdad and Tunis
(Sayign, 1992). Israel‘s strategy involves using a monopoly of strategic power of a
nuclear-armed state with aims of survival under the restraining influence of the US. It
was believed that there would be stability and facilitation of Israeli territorial
concessions in a settlement with its Arab foes.
It is evident that the regional arms race had arisen as a war of survival due
to the social and economic factors. During the first Gulf war, Iraqi conducted war
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with Iran using chemical weapons and in the second war against Israel using ballistic
missiles. On the other hand, Israel was afraid to lose the dominance of technology and
convention above the Arabic military, and nuclear missile has been introduced to the
war since 1967 (Sayign, 1992).
2.2 Balance of Power in the Middle East
As pointed out by Miller (2006), the balance of power for Middle East
countries means the range of harmony concerning the divided states territory in the
region as well as the ambitions of nation and the identifications of politic of people in
the Middle East. The balance of power in this issue also denotes the measure to
maintain political equality among the powerful and weak countries in the Middle
East. As can be seen from the situations mentioned above, the continuous events of
imbalance of power in the Middle East can be considered as state incoherence, power
difference, and revisionism.
The Middle East countries attempted to build alliances in the region
during World War II (Geller & Singer, 1998, pp. 98-100; Halliday, 2005, p. 173;
Walt, 1987). They imported various kinds of weapons to finish the war (Halliday,
2005, p. 153). Miller (2006) illustrated that the greater the imbalance of power in the
Middle East, the more powerful the nationalist-revisionist forces became.
Leverett (2011) pointed out that the Soviet Union collapsed when World
War II ended, the US was forced from going for ‗all-out hegemony‘ in the region by
an outside force which is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as well as
two internal powers allied with Moscow, Iraq, and Egypt.
‗We were essentially unconstrained going into the 1990s in both our
ability and our determination to consolidate hegemony in the Middle East, and by this
I mean a greatly militarized, the Middle East was led by US in term of diplomatic
regulation. Today, that is disappearing right before our eyes,‘ Leverett explained.
Leverett also further mentioned that there had been a dramatic shift of balance of
power in the Middle East from US to Iran as well as its allies. This has occurred for
more than decades with the ‗Arab awakening‘ of 2011. This also brings the
advantages to Iran in the realm of ‗soft power‘, as opposed to hard military power.
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Leverett (2011) further discussed that the Middle East countries view
strategic cooperation with the US for a negotiated peace settlement with Israel for
both military power and legitimacy. However, US has an intention to acquire ‗buy-in‘
of Arab states for US hegemony since it can bring greater security as well as a
resolution to the ‗core dispute in the region – the Arab-Israeli conflict‘.
Since this research paper focuses on the Iran nuclear program as
mentioned in Chapter One, an explanation of the background of Iran‘s contentious
nuclear program should be provided to help solidify understanding about this issue
prior to further analysis. There will be more information in the next parts.
2.2.1 Iran in Perspective
From the beginning until 1935, Iran had been recognized as Persia. In
1979, it was established as an Islamic republic. Iran has a population of 80,840,713
which is ranked as the 19th
state of the world, and it has a whole area of 1,648,195 sq.
km, which is ranked as the 18th
biggest state of the world.
In November 1979, the US and Iran relationship was strained by Iranian
students who detained the US Embassy in the Iran‘s capital. For this reason, in April
1980 US government stop political collaboration with Iran. In 1980, Iran battled with
Iraq in the war to expand its power to the Persian Gulf. Thus, the United States, the
United Nations, and the European Union announced economic sanctions and export
controls fearing that Iran would possible gain military power through its nuclear
program. In July and October 2012, the economic deterioration was caused by word
sanctions and misconduct of government which drove two main protests relate to
economic. As a consequence, Dr. Hasan Fereidun RUHANI, the president of Iran,
announced societal reforms and Iran's international plan in June 2013. At that time,
the UN Security Council asked Iran to stop increasing the uranium and re-cooperating
actions in compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency‘s accountabilities
and regulations. To do so, P5+1 agree with Iran the cooperative plan which assisting
to release the pressure from the other countries in exchange for further works on its
nuclear program.
With the economic perspective, a major source of the Iran‘s income is oil
exports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Price controls, subsidies, and other
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distortions weigh down the economy, making it also known as an inefficient state
sector. ―New fiscal and monetary constraints on Tehran, following the expansion of
international sanctions in 2012 against Iran's Central Bank and oil exports,
significantly reduced Iran's oil revenue, forced government spending cuts, and fuelled
60% currency depreciation‖.
2.2.2 Iran Nuclear Activities and the Middle East
Windsor and Kessler (2007), with the help of David Sanger from New
York, mentioned that the emergence of nuclear interests in the Middle East is mainly
a response to Iran‘s nuclear capability which threatens neighbouring nations to a great
degree since Iran needs to stabilize the balance of power with the group of religion in
the Middle East. Below examine a summary of the nuclear activities in this region.
• There were various threats of the conflict of nuclear power in the region.
One of them involved bombs in Israel in the late 1960s. Several countries in this
region trusted that many Arab states prefer to react with their own defensive weapon.
The obvious evidence was Egypt and many other countries which still strongly
expressed their interests in nuclear weapons.
• Many diplomats and outside experts were convinced that Iran was far
more threatening to many countries in the Middle East because Iran stands for Shi‘a
state where positioning in Sunni Arab countries. Iranian is regarded as an uncertain
regime in this region. Besides, it also has ambitions to be the most powerful country
in the Middle East.
• There were some Arab leaders in the Middle East who attempted to
block Iran and other states from obtaining nuclear technology. However, these leaders
had their own interests in developing nuclear technologies. As a result, the nuclear
power capability led to the building of regional relationships.
• Many Arab countries agreed to apply for IAEA policies of nuclear
expansion for civil purposes, contrary to Iran. There have been developments in these
countries‘ nuclear programs as well as technical research involving knowledge,
technology and/or material usefulness.
• The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows
five countries that have nuclear weapons to assist others in developing nuclear power
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in a peaceful way. On the other hand, all technologies must be shared with all
members but not be fully transferred. Lastly, the United States and several other
countries disturbed about nuclear issues established new proposals to restrict the
spread of nuclear technologies.
In summary, several countries in the Middle East have gained benefits
from nuclear power with regard to economics, national growth, and development as
well as environmental protection. Egypt and Turkey are the top two countries in this
region which have gained the most advanced nuclear infrastructure. These two
countries can become leaders in the region‘s nuclear power projects (Windsor &
Kessler, 2007).
2.2.3 Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Balance of Power
According to Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen (2010), the rise of Iranian
power is unsustainable and less harmful if compared to other Middle East countries‘
power. Iran increased its own power as a result of various factors, i.e. uncontrollable
Tehran because of diverse ethnic groups, the failure US policies, the high price of oil,
and the Palestinian- Israeli dispute.
Iran‘s power determines the future outcome of the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf (Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen, 2010). Besides, Iran‘s power can create
difficulties for Tehran to perform according to proactive foreign and security policies
by reducing its political and economic growth. This is the balancing of power through
Tehran‘s active support for Hamas and Hizbullah.
Meanwhile, the US allied with the Middle East by supporting the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)‘s move to balance Iran as well as refuse assisting it with
any of its nuclear weapons capacity. As a result, this shows that the US had raised an
influence in the region in term of politic (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010).
However, Iran‘s power and the inflated threat are very critical since there was
depressing effect on any discussions that focused on convincing Iran to perform
positive role. However, these moves may embolden Tehran to act more aggressively,
which might affect the capability Iran nuclear arms and convert the country to become
Middle East hegemony. Perhaps it can be concluded that the US administration was
proposing excessively to Iran to eliminate the inflated risk. ‗This could make it easier
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for hawks in Tel Aviv and Washington to make the case for launching a preventive
attack against the Iranian nuclear program and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC)‘.
Rahigh-Aghsan and Jakobsen (2010) purposed that it would be a big
mistake to conclude that Iran is less powerful and less threatening than generally
thought. This proved that Iran is unlikely to stop the unproven wish of nuclear arms.
‗Although Iran is less powerful and less threatening than generally thought, the
regime in Tehran must still be taken seriously. Iran has increased its relative power,
played a destabilizing role in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, and it certainly has the
capacity to continue to do so‘.
Last but not least, Iran also benefited from the changes in the power
balance in Middle East (NCAFP Roundtable, 2008). ‗Iran is building a glacis–a
seemingly impregnable fortress represented by Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon–thus putting
itself on Israel‘s borders if conflict erupts‘. Iran tried to change its image as well as
obstruct its enemy, the United States, which cannot get along with the country.
2.3 Israel
2.3.1 Israel in Perspective
The State of Israel was established in 1948 by the Zionist, an ethnic
national liberation movement by the population of Jewish (Miller, 2006). Some minor
Israel‘s groups sustained to follow the belief of revisionist by starting the 1956 War
(Morris, 2001). In fact Arabs were consequently defeated by Israelis in many wars
between two sides.
Israel has a population of 7,821,850, and ranked as the 99th
country in
globe which has the most population. Israel has a technologically-advanced market
economy. The major income of Israel comes from diamond cutting, high-technology
equipment, and pharmaceuticals. However, Israel has to import other resources form
aboard, i.e. raw resources, grains, weapons and crude oil. Between 2004 and 2011, the
average export growth was nearly 5% annually. There was an economic recession in
2008-2009. The economy has recovered in the next decade and reached a 3% level of
growth. Fortunately in 2009, Israel found the natural gas resources locate on its coast
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which also enhanced its energy security viewpoint. It provided a one percentage point
boost to Israel's GDP in 2013 and was expected to contribute 0.5% growth in 2014.
Israel was said to be allied with Iran to start the wars against Iraq from
1980 to 1988 and Kuwait from 1990 to 1991 (Miller, 2006). This pointed out the
trans-border external incongruence that encouraged a revisionist-irredentist policy: a
significant Arab minority in south-western Iran. Israel and Iraq also claimed the
territory surrounding the Shat-al-Arab waterway.
According to Bergman, the Iraq-Iran war supported by Israel was used by
Israel to reach its 4 ambitious goals of reestablishing some influence in Iran which
was lost when the Shah was defeated in 1979; weakening both Iran and Iraq, both of
whom opposed the existence of Israel; preventing Iraq from conquering Iran as they
feared a victorious Saddam Hussein; and creating business for the Israeli weapons
industry (Bergman, 2008)
Ariel Sharon believed this is a strategic move of Israel to "leave a small
window open" to the prospect of good relations with Iran in the future (Parsi, 2007).
Despite the anti-Israeli rhetoric publicly exposed by Iran, in fact, some dependencies
between the two nations existed secretly at that time to support one another to face the
formidable opposition of both Iraq and the Soviet Union. Israel and Iran only truly
began to see each other as strategic rivals after the threat of Soviet Union fell away,
and after Iraq no longer could serve as a power check in the region. The concern of
Iran Nuclear Weaponization started to be a subject for Israel.
2.3.2 Israel’s Nuclear Concern
According to Krepinevich (2013), Iran could obtain nuclear weapons
capability while avoiding the blocking of its weapons by the Israeli or the US
military. However, other countries in the Middle East may be concerned that if Iran
can acquire nuclear weapons successfully, it would be far more problematic, costly
and dangerous for historical deterrence relationships in other regions.
When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Middle East history and cultural
differences between Israel and Iran are sufficient evidence to make US and Israeli
leaders consider making assumptions regarding the Iranian leadership‘s response to
nuclear use (Krepinevich, 2013).
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Also, ‗if Iran acquired a significant nuclear capability, it could achieve
Tehran‘s apparent goal of making the United States and Israel tread with far great
caution in the region‘ (Krepinevich, 2013). The Cold War of Israel and Iran was an
indirect competition through the use of representatives (Washington and Moscow) to
avoid a direct confrontation involving the employment of nuclear weapons.
In summary, an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition has several factors that
can harm the Middle East countries (Krepinevich, 2013). In the following section, the
dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition will be discussed.
Dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition
Looking back to historical records and circumstances of Iran and Israel in
a nuclear competition, there were no ‗absurd risks‘ as others believe. A variety of
evidence shows the miscalculations between these rivals regarding their nuclear
competition. ‗There is no compelling evidence that Iranian and Israeli leaders have a
clear sense of how the other side calculates cost, benefit, and risk‘ (Krepinevich,
2013).
If Iran and Israel both need to avoid using nuclear weapons, the
geographical realities, delivery-system speed and increasing accuracy may cause them
to undermine their efforts. According to Krepinevich (2013), ballistic missile flight
times between Iran and Israel are so short that it would not allow for any warning or
controlling systems to confirm the attack in a timely manner.
The chances of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use might be increased
since a nuclear attack would guarantee nuclear revenge between these two states. For
this reason, both sides might look to devolve nuclear release authority to lower
command elements (Krepinevich, 2013).
In conclusion, the dynamics of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition will
hardly be stable, especially during periods of crises. It requires the kind of deep
analysis and efforts of both diplomats and the military that would enable the United
States and the Soviet Union to wage a forty-year global competition to avoid a nuclear
disaster (Krepinevich, 2013).
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2.3.3 Israel and Iran Relations
As seen from the above that Israel and Iran have been long-term enemies.
It is also hard to predict when the nuclear competition will end since both countries
have their own reasons to acquire nuclear weapons. However, it is very clear that Iran
has attempted to use nuclear weapons to attack Israel for territory and power in the
Middle East area. They both are afraid of the other side gaining more power and
taking revenge. This is an interesting point that supports the idea that ‗their
competition will hardly end‘.
In fact, if we look at the issue more thoroughly, we would find that Iran
gains a greater competitive advantage regarding the nuclear issue. Having said that,
Ben Piven‘s article (24 April 2012) entitled ‗Politics, US & Canada, Israel, United
States‘ needs to be further evaluated.
While a military strike on Iranian nuclear sites is far from certain, the
possibility of a confrontation between Iran and Israel is unavoidable. If we compare
the strengths of the Iranian and Israeli forces, it would reveal that there are
discrepancies in equipment, capabilities, and numbers of enlisted troops between the
two countries.
Regarding the population, Iran has ten times more people than Israel. This
means that they can draw more of its armed forces. However, due to the arms
embargo in place in various forms since 1979, it is not clear if Iran‘s military
hardware is in good condition. David Roberts, deputy director at the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI), cited that many Iranian tanks and planes used older
technology with varying levels of maintenance. They were used in the war with Iraq a
decade ago in the 1980s. A ‗no first-strike doctrine‘ along with a code of ‗plausible
deniability‘ for irregular military actions are credible proofs. Roberts also stated that
Israel's military is the best-equipped and best-trained in the whole region. However,
the main concern in this respect is not Iran's conventional forces, the better-paid and
organised Revolutionary Guards with Quds Force and naval capabilities are big
unknowns. Bearing this in mind, the two countries may not enter direct army-to-army
combat any time soon but would square off via proxy forces in Gulf or Mediterranean
states.
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Geographically, the two countries may not be far from each other, but in
reality, they are too far from each other to be engaged in some sustained conflict.
Israel is believed to be a nuclear power, so it is impossible that nuclear power has ever
nuked another nuclear power even with the most ruthless dictators. The very real
threat, according to Israeli military historian Martin van Crevald, is if Israel attacked
Iran, Iran could respond with a constant stream of missiles for a very long time.
Consequently, Israel‘s economy could grind to a halt. Roberts, the security specialist
at RUSI, believes that ‗the Israelis don't have enough planes and enough of the right
bombs to significantly set back whatever is going on in Iran ... I don't think it's a very
sensible thing to do. There should be no [illusion] that Israel can unilaterally put an
end to the Iranian nuclear programme‘. Bokharialso believed that Iran's power lied in
its ‗ability to disrupt the global economy‘ and keep the other side from unleashing a
military campaign via associated costs that are too high. Thus, the critical issue was
Iran's asymmetric capabilities and future nuclear capabilities.
Nevertheless Israeli officials were mainly convinced Iran was committed
to developing a bomb. They believed and continue to believe that this is going to be
the case even Iran had made many obligations. Israel said that Iran could reach the
point to develop a bomb as early as spring 2013. Prime Minister Netanyahu told the
UN in September 2012 this would cross a ―red line‖ for Israel. Many people
considered that if no other nation acts, Israel will then feel compelled to use force to
remove the Iranian threat (Dahl, November 27, 2012). The Obama Administration
claimed at that time that the United States would know well in advance if Iran
developed a bomb and could take proper action. Israel and others raised doubts about
this and proposed at that point it may already be too late. They kept approaching US
and the P5+1 and expecting a fresh round of crippling sanctions against Iran to come
from the United States in response to a deal not being reached. Netanyahu felt that
economic sanctions were the route that needs to be taken when dealing with Iran
(Washington Post, November 24, 2014).
This believes was also supported by the 2 Arab Countries, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. Both countries considered Iran as a threat to the region and they shared the
belief that the nuclearization of Iran would undermine their security.
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2.4 Saudi Arabia
2.4.1 Saudi Arabia in Perspective
Based on Windsor and Kessler (2007)‘s research, Saudi Arabia is an
Islamic country which has two holy cities: Mecca and Medina. Most Saudis are Arabs
and Islamic due to its legal requirement that all peoples are Muslims. Saudi Arabia
has been known as the world‘s leading producer of petroleum and holds about 17% of
the world‘s proven oil reserves (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). With a
population of 27.6 million, including more than 30% consisting of foreign workers,
Saudi Arabia is ranked as the 47th most populous country in the world. More than
95% of its population has settled since 1960s due to the rapid economic and urban
growth.
Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economic country strictly controlled by the
government who has brought about rapid economic growth for the country,
particularly the people‘s standard of living. It was further mentioned in the Central
Intelligence Agency (2014) that ‗With a nominal GDP per capita of $31,300, Saudi
Arabia ranks 44th
in the world. Saudi Arabia‘s per capita energy consumption is about
190.9 billion kWh (latest research in 2010), which is much lower than 388 billion
kWh in the US, but it is considered high for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia depends
solely on oil revenues. The Saudi government has promoted private and foreign
investment in agriculture and industry, and also implemented other measures of
economic reform and diversification. In 2005, Saudi Arabia reached an agreement
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) to assist other neighbouring Arab
countries by spending billions of dollars on economic aid and welcoming over
240,000 Palestinian refugees‘ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014).
Saudi Arabia‘s main resources are energy while its water resources are
very limited (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Therefore, Saudi Arabia‘s nuclear program
is for environmentally-friendly and efficient nuclear desalination. This is the reason
Saudi Arabia needed to collaborate with Egypt for its professional infrastructure and
technology development. Since Saudi Arabia had less technical capabilities,
cooperation is necessary. Moreover, with the assistance of the other Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) members, Saudi Arabia has built relationships with other countries in
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the region for the research and development of nuclear energy and desalination for
peaceful purposes. However, Saudi Arabia does not currently have any nuclear power
or research reactors (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007).
From the above paragraph, Saudi Arabia government‘s main concerns
involve its population growth, minimal fresh water resources, terrorism,
desertification and depletion of underground water resources. The most critical one is
the development of extensive seawater desalination facilities (Windsor & Kessler,
2007).
Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons program. However,
over the years there had been reports of Saudi Arabia's intent to purchase a nuclear
weapon. There were three potential options for the Saudi government, a leaked
strategy paper laid out in 2003. The three options were to develop a nuclear deterrent,
to ally with and become protected by an existing nuclear nation, or to attempt to
achieve agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East. This was encouraged by a
distancing of relations with the US, concerns over Iran's nuclear program, and the lack
of international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons (The Guardian,
2003). The Sunni Arab governments were so anxious about Iran's nuclear progress
that many times they would support a United States military strike against Iran
although might not be so obvious.
2.4.2 Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Concern
According to Acton and Bowen (2008) and Shihab-Eldin (2012), Saudi
Arabia is the major motivator behind the announcement made by the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) in December 2006. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) is an organization that launched a joint program in nuclear technology for the
purpose of world peace and developed a first joint NPP in 2009, according to
international standards and arrangements.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has shown an interest in developing nuclear
power capability since the 1970s. Its main purpose is to apply it in the field of
desalination (Acton & Bowen, 2008). The major countries that assist Saudi Arabia in
developing a nuclear program are Russia, France, and the United States.
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Shihab-Eldin (2012) supported the above argument that ‗The future of a
GCC program for Saudi Arabia and the UAE‘s energy independent programs
corresponding to limited supply situation of all the member states to gain cooperation
on regional grid development other than nuclear emergencies for system security
under large reactor trip conditions is still uncertain.‘ In this particular nuclear
program, Saudi Arabia could be the nucleus and regulator whereas other Member
states participate in investments and manpower fulfillment as well as production
sharing. At the same time, the waste from GCC would be managed and located in
Saudi Arabia.
In May 2008, Saudi Arabia signed the US-Saudi Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation and stated its intention
to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel and not to pursue sensitive nuclear
technologies, which is a direct contrast to the actions of Iran (US State Department,
2008). This agreement did not allow Saudi Arabia to develop uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing capabilities if it accepted US assistance (Acton & Bowen,
2008).
In 2012, Shihab-Eldin pointed out that with Saudi Arabia current
availability of huge financial resources and absolute monarchy would certainly make
it the largest Middle East and North Africa (MENA) nuclear program. However, ‗it
was initiated only in 2009 with a royal decree establishing the King Abdullah Centre
for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) in 2010 as the responsible entity...
Statements were that generating capacity would double to over 100 GW by 2032, that
2 reactors would be built by 2022 and 16 by 2032. Intent of 40 GW of solar and 4 GW
from waste and geothermal is also stated. The remit of KACARE is an energy mix,
evidently of the order of 15:45:40, nuclear, fossil and RE‘. In 2009, Saudi officials
had clearly issued explicit warnings about Riyadh's purpose to develop nuclear
weapons in the event Iran did. According to a senior U.S. official, King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia warned in 2009 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, "we will get
nuclear weapons." (―King says,‖ 2012)
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2.4.3 Saudi Arabia and Iran Relations
It is apparent from the above that Saudi Arabia and Iran have no power
balancing relations in the Middle East since both of them have different objectives
towards the nuclear program. Iran has been perceived as having a hidden agenda on
acquiring nuclear program, while, Saudi Arabia wanted to use nuclear technologies
for peaceful and environmentally-friendly intentions to obtain water resources from
nuclear desalination. Saudi Arabia has no intention to fight against Iran for any
purpose. Therefore, these countries have no need to balance their power against each
other.
Saudi Arabia is not concerned only with Iran but also its standing among
other regional leaders. In this respect, the proliferation directions of Egypt, Turkey
and, more remotely, Iraq will also weigh heavily on Saudi Arabia‘s decision calculus.
American officials and many critics continued to warn of the Saudi possible for
proliferation. The Riyadh will proliferate in believing that not going down this path
will make it appear weak in the face of domestic audiences, regional peers like
Turkey and Egypt, and most important of all, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2.5 Turkey
2.5.1 Turkey in Perspective
According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), Turkey is a country that joins
the European and Asian continents together. It is a democratic Muslim country that is
governed by the Islamic party (NCAFP Roundtable, 2008). The major population is
99.8% Sunni Muslim from more than a total of 80 million people, and it is the 17th
most populous country in the world. Geographically, Turkey is the largest country in
the Middle East and was ranked as the 37th
largest country in the world (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2014).
In 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO and the United Nations.
Turkey joined the European Community in 1964. With its strong democracy and
economy, Turkey could gain membership in the European Union (Windsor & Kessler,
2007).
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Economically, Turkey has a nominal GDP per capita of $15,300 and is
ranked 90th
in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Its inflation rate is 7.6%
annually with a high current account deficit and high public debt. Turkey faced an
economy crisis in 2001, but with IMF support and tighter fiscal policy, its GDP grew
to 9% in 2004. Turkey‘s major spending is on military, and it was ranked 18th in the
world in 2007.
For energy resources, Turkey imports energy from other countries to
sustain and develop renewable energy resources. The energy consumption of Turkey
per capita is about 2,000 kWh, compared to 12,454 kWh in the US or 2,962 kWh for
the world average in 2007 (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). To meet demand for growth in
this country, Turkey imported 33% of its energy slate from Russian gas and 17% from
Iran. Since Turkey became an industrialized country with rapid growth, the demand
per capita has trebled in two decades (Shihab-Eldin, 2012). Turkey planned to use
nuclear energy as a minor option. The nuclear energy program of Turkey consists of
complex nuclear infrastructure, complete with a research reactor, fuel facilities, and
an extensive knowledge management capacity. The fuel cycle, i.e. waste disposal or
fuel fabrication for research reactors, has been in demand with personnel training in
disciplines such as radiation protection or chemistry. These people could be retrained
to work in an NPP (Acton & Bowen, 2008). These fuel cycle activities which were
conducted by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey consist of mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing, including irradiation experiments and
isotope facilities.
However, these attempts of developing nuclear program failed because of
the economic costs involved as well as environmental, safety, and proliferation
concerns (Acton & Bowen, 2008). Turkey, as a member of NATO and European
Union, has to work together with the European Union, the United States, and Israel to
fund and to develop a peaceful nuclear energy resource which meets the domestic
energy needs.
2.5.2 Turkey’s Nuclear Concern
Turkey, which has similar objective as Egypt, has tried on multiple
occasions to develop nuclear power (Acton & Bowen, 2008). As mentioned above at
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the end of the last section, the nuclear development in Turkey‘s case is based on a
peaceful program as well as research and regulation. The nuclear energy import is
average (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). In Turkey‘s point of view, nuclear power has
been considered a key component of economic growth since 1970; however, the
program was delayed and tenders were cancelled partly due to financial concerns
(Shihab-Eldin, 2012). In 2008, only Atomstory placed a bid for 4 x 1200 Mw reactors
for the Akkuyu site on the Mediterranean with chemical oxygen demand (COD)
2017-2009 requirements. This was cancelled after lengthy delays by the Government;
however, cooperation agreements with Russia were signed. Erdener‘s (2002)
empirical literature mentioned that Turkey, as an industrial nation, has had a high
demand for electricity since 2010. 50-60% of the total income earned by exports was
spent on importing fuel energy, i.e. crude oil and natural gas (Erdener, 2007). ‗As a
result, its dependence on imported energy, especially oil and gas, has increased
significantly over the last two decades‘ (Jan, 1996).
According to Shihab-Eldin (2012), Rosatom, as part of an aggressive
policy to establish Russia in the international nuclear industry, offered an agreement
for Turkey to sign as well as an intergovernmental agreement to build, own and
operate the Akkuyu plant using the AES 2006 reactor in 2010. It was able to provide
100% initial equity in a Turkish company established for the purpose. The licensing
process is on course for a code of conduct evaluation in 2020.
Turkey also imported small uranium resources and signed the Rosatom
Akkuyu agreement, including the possibility of fuel fabrication in the country.
Furthermore, Turkey has signed IAEA safeguards agreements and has adhered to the
additional protocols (Shihab-Eldin, 2012).
The Government of Turkey claimed that the country is one of the few
developing countries that possess the infrastructure to transfer and to develop nuclear
technology. Since then, Turkey announced plans to start a nuclear power plant
construction in 2007 (Broad, & Sanger, 2007).
According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), Turkey‘s energy policies aim
to promote the welfare and the development of its own economy. These policies can
be concluded within five categories:
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1. Liberalizing the segment, raised all efficiency and effectiveness, and
increased its transparency through building the competitive energy market;
2. Transporting the supplies of hydrocarbon from Eastern states to expand
in Western markets via ‗East-West Energy Corridor‘ throughout Turkey;
3. Diversifying its resources to ensure that Turkey‘s energy is secure as
well as to focus on raising demand and import dependency;
4. Aiming sustainable development in utilization of energy resources, and
considering the problems that may cause to the nature; and
5. Strengthening R&D educations involving energy expertise such as the
nuclear resources.
However, Turkey would like the Middle East region to become nuclear
arms free zone (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).
‗There is no evidence in available open sources that suggests Turkey has a
nuclear weapons program. Indeed, given the openness of Turkey‘s nuclear research
program, small uranium reserves, and lack of enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities, it is difficult to believe that Ankara could develop a weapons program in
the near future‘ (Bowen, & Kidd, 2005). Turkey is now an agency importer of nuclear
power, and again it appears to be an attractive option because when the energy price
increase the electricity consumption will also rise. The main technology suppliers for
Turkey are South Korea, Canada, Germany, and the United States (Acton & Bowen,
2008).
Nonetheless, discussions within the nuclear community about emerging
nuclear powers over the past two decades continuously focused on the "usual
suspects": Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Not surprisingly, opinions as to the
probability of a military nuclear program differed. While in Iran‘s case, the evidence
seemed solid, the case of Turkey was built on ambiguous indications. Simply put
Turkey was working both on nuclear weapon systems and on their means of delivery
using Iran as the model to follow, said the Western intelligence community. President
Abdullah Gül, in an interview with the journal Foreign Affairs, assured that Turkey
would not allow that a neighboring country (Iran) had weapons that Turkey itself did
not have.
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2.5.3 Turkey and Iran Relations
According to NCAFP (2008), the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) and
the Justice and Development Party of Turkey (AKP) are the sources of change in the
relationship between Turkey and Iran. Iran was afraid of the intimidation; therefore,
the leader of Iran terminated the support for the PKK since 2003. Besides, that year
Iran feared that US forces were not only on their border with Afghanistan but also in
all states nearby Iran. For this reason, Iran attempted to build a relationship with
Turkey and be friends with the enemy through harmonious relations. They later
bombed PKK camps and arrested PKK members.
Interestingly, Turkey adjusted the relation toward Iran according to its
neighbour‘s new method which considering the PKK as enemies (NCAFP
Roundtable, 2008). The Turkish government was of the opinion that Iran and Syria
had implemented the strategy towards terrorists.
Moreover, the developments of ‗a significant revision of Turkish foreign
policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbours is generally and a new era in Turkish-
Iranian relations in particular‘. Both Turkish and Iran have fostered closer
relationships through trade, diplomacy and strategic affairs, especially when Iran
desperately needs regional allies. When Iran suffered under international sanctions
aimed at halting its nuclear program, Iran tightened its relationship with Turkey
(Kuntay, 2014).
Therefore, it can be concluded that Turkish-Iranian relationship is on a
friendly basis, for mutual benefits, since Turkey will be of no harm to Iran. It only
requires nuclear power as a source of energy for its own country. Meanwhile, Iran
needs to ally with Turkey to become a more powerful state in this region.
Iran and the West conflict on the nuclear issue since 2006, Ankara has
pursued to do favor toward the guidance of Iran with the intention of acting as the role
of mediator in diplomacies on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, there have never been
true friends in politics, secretly; Turkish politician have planned to manage the
nuclear issue of Iran as the key security dangers. For short period, the conflict of
nuclear issue can cause a war between region including Turkey influencing massive
economic capitals. Additionally for long period, the balance of power would shift to
Tehran because of its nuclear status and threaten Turkey, even if Turkey were not a
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direct target of Iranian hostility. As a result, Ankara pursued a mixed policy aimed at
preventing military conflict as well as minimising Iranian hostility, a balancing act
that caused friction with its traditional Western allies. Nevertheless, for Turkish-
Iranian relations, the nuclear issue was an advantage to Turkey. It allowed Ankara to
elicit Iranian goodwill on bilateral issues, notably on opposition to Kurdish militancy
and the completion of favorable energy deals that should enable Turkey to become a
key energy transit corridor. Lastly, by ultimately accepting Turkish mediation on the
nuclear file and by virtue of the Turkish vote against the US in the UN Security
Council, Iran has reluctantly promoted Turkey‘s image as the leading regional power.
When there was reconciliation between Iran and Turkey‘s Atatürkists,
Egypt‘s Gamal Abdel Nasser was far from this convergence. With Anwar Sadat‘s
assumption of power in Egypt, all three countries came into one camp. These three
countries forming the gateway to the region in the three corners or pillars of the
region — if they huddle together, can close the gateway and prohibit the entry of
outsiders.
2.6 Egypt
2.6.1 Egypt in Perspective
Egypt is the most crowded country and the second largest country in the
Middle East and North Africa (Kuntay, 2014). Kuntay pointed out that Egypt has
been known as heading state in Middle East politics which engages in mediation
procedures, political crises, and armed disputes during the 20th
century since both Arab
nationalism and political Islam live in this country.
With evidence from the Central Intelligence Agency (2014), Egypt has
about 86 million people, making it ranked as the 16th
country in globe which has the
most population. The nominal GDP per capita of Egypt is about $6,600, and it is
ranked 144th
in the world. Egypt spent 1.72% (as of 2012) of its GDP on military
spending, making it ranked 49th
in the world. Most of the land in Egypt is for
agricultural purposes.
For electricity resources, as of 2011, Egypt produced 138.7 billion kWh
and consumed 122.4 billion kWh (as of 2010) annually (Central Intelligence Agency,
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2014). The electricity resources consist of 87.6% fossil fuels; 10.4% hydropower from
the Aswan Dam; and some wind power generated by a wind power unit near the Suez
Canal. However, Egypt does not use nuclear power to produce electricity.
On the other hand, Egypt is likely to have the most highly developed
nuclear technology, compared to other Arab states (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).
Nuclear infrastructure was well developed with controlling devices and two reactors
of nuclear technology; nevertheless, Egypt lacked any proven uranium resources.
Meanwhile, Egypt is the country that has a high local demand for electricity usage
and seeks for water desalination from nuclear energy. Fuel slate is primarily from
local gas that is estimated to be drained out within 20 years later. The nuclear energy
incentive is high in terms of demand, and Egypt has sought it for more than 40 years
(Shihab-Eldin, 2012). These are the reasons Egypt has been interested in developing a
nuclear power program. Egypt decided to decrease oil production and decrease
reserves since increasing oil consumption provides justification for R&D of substitute
resource.
Although Egypt signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the country is IAEA‘s membership, the legal structural framework of nuclear safety
and security is still not incomplete (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Besides, Windsor and
Kessler (2007) disclosed that Egypt was a main actor in the region that tried to create
a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. However, Egypt has been known for its
low-risk domestic nuclear weapons development program and its involvement with
international agreements and protocols as well as various projects of Technical
Cooperation in three levels interregional, regional and domestic. Egypt is mostly
involved with the nuclear development program by training and sharing technology
with many Arab countries in North Africa as well as the Middle East region.
2.6.2 Egypt’s Nuclear Concern
Egypt has had an interest in nuclear power development since the 1960s
(Acton & Bowen, 2008). ‗It entered into numerous sets of negotiations and even
signed contracts for the provision of nuclear reactors with, among others, Siemens and
Westinghouse, but without any significant results.‘ However, the Government of
Egypt has made plans for nuclear power plants to develop electricity generation and
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water desalination since the 1980s (Windsor & Kessler, 2007). Egypt‘s Energy
Minister announced in late September 2006 that the state will resume a nuclear power
program since it has been frozen for 20 years following the Chernobyl accident.
Therefore, the first nuclear power station would be constructed at El-Dabaa, along
Egypt‘s northern coast, within a decade. This nuclear power plant has a projected cost
of US$1.5 billion with the financial support of foreign investments (―Egypt unveils,‖
2006).
As a result of decreasing oil resources and small amount of natural gas,
the government of Egypt has declared that the country plans to seek the nuclear
energy resource for its needs. This is especially important at a time when there is
rapidly increasing demand, a need to replace oil and gas which are facing shortages, a
desire to sustain its growth and development with the assistance of Russia and China
to build and run nuclear reactors (Deena, 2006; Acton & Bowen, 2008). Moreover,
the US Ambassador to Egypt and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had also
attempted to support Egypt‘s nuclear energy program (Windsor & Kessler, 2007).
In March 2007, the Energy and Electricity Minister Hassan Younis stated
that under current projections, Egypt would build ‗10 nuclear-powered electricity-
generating stations across the country‘ (Acton & Bowen, 2008). Canada, China,
France, Germany, Russia, South Korea, and the United States were the countries
coordinating with Egypt to provide the technology and materials needed to launch a
nuclear program. According to Windsor and Kessler (2007), the IAEA‘s Department
of Nuclear Energy disclosed Egypt‘s nuclear power intentions: ‗The reasons which
led the country to promote launching a nuclear power program was basically the
following:
1. Steadily increasing demand for energy and electricity as well as the
standard of living of the people;
2. Inadequate and insufficient known national primary energy resources to
supply on a medium and long term the increasing demand for energy and electricity;
as well as limited potable water resources, which will require the utilization of energy
intensive desalination technology particularly in remote areas.
3. Perception of nuclear power as a convenient, economically competitive
and viable source of energy which, if introduced in the country, would not only
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complement the traditional energy sources, but would also promote technological
development and serve as an incentive for social and economic progress.‘
In summary, the rational for a nuclear program is in line with the
expectations of economic development. However, Egypt‘s future nuclear program
depends on newly-empowered public opinion and the availability of financial
resource, possibly via the partnering policies with Russia and China in Turkey and
Jordan (Shihab-Eldin, 2012).
2.6.3 Egypt and Iran Relations
There is few evidence that shows the relationship of the balance of power
between these two countries. It can be concluded that Egypt and Iran have no direct
relationship regarding nuclear issue since both of them have different objectives
towards the requirements of a nuclear program. Iran has always tried to acquire
nuclear weapon for wars against other countries in this region as mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter. On the other hand, the intention of acquiring nuclear
technology for Egypt is for the construction of a nuclear power plant to develop
electricity generation and water desalination capabilities. Egypt aimed to increase its
economic and energy growth rate. It can be understood that both Egypt and Iran have
no need to balance power against each other.
2.7 Overall Conclusion on the Balance of Power in the Middle East
Nuclear evolution in the Middle East began with Arab and Israel and then
Iraq. It started as a mission to gain power in the region in the 1960s. After reviewing
all the literature and evidence of Middle East‘s balance of power, it was found that
Iran is an active country that needs to gain power through a nuclear program and use
it against other conflicting countries. The cases of Israel and Iran are good examples
of high nuclear competition as per the above discussion. Obviously, Israel attempted
to fight back against Iran and protect the country and balance the power against Iran.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt have fewer interests in balancing the
power against Iran since all of them need nuclear program for the purpose of
generating energy. However, there are some political relations between Turkey and
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Iran since Iran requires a military alliance with other states like Turkey. Iran‘s move
to gain relative power in the region through its nuclear program and military alliances
leave the World wondering if Iran‘s nuclear program will proliferate and stimulate a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
This chapter aims to give some background on the history of Iran‘s
nuclear program development, from a gleam in the Shah‘s eye to its current state as a
self-proclaimed nuclear power. To best understand the scope of such a large time
frame, momentous seat change, and large technological leap in the region, one must
better understand the history of the situation as its roots are far in the past and extend
until today.
3.1 The History of Iran before Islamic Conquest and Islamization
The Islamic conquest of Persia (637-651), which in some circles is known
as the Arab conquest of Iran, led to the end of the Sasanian Empire. Even though the
Sasanian state was a well-established and powerful empire, there were a myriad of
reasons for its fall. As what may be perceived as eerie portents of what was to come
during the Shah‘s reign, much of the Sasanian‘s collapse was credited to class and
religious discord within their own social fabric; the absence of support for an elitist
and decadent regime; conflict among those elites; dynastic instability in the
leadership; and finally the cost of an unsuccessful, long and drawn-out war with one
of its neighbors (Encyclopædia Iranica, 2015).
Formerly, Iran‘s main religion was Zoroastrianism. After their defeat to
Arabs, Iranians slowly converted to Islam. Iranians were more rebellious than other
people conquered by the caliphate as demonstrated by the fact that some cities rose up
against the caliphate‘s government representatives (Malayeri, 1982). The Iranians
additionally kept their Farsi language as the day-to-day language as well as their
culture of art and sports such as wrestling and horse breeding. Bernard Lewis states
the Iranian/Arab as a cross pollination and describes the relationship as follows:
―Iran was indeed Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained
Persians. And after an interval of silence, Iran re-emerged as a separate,
different and distinctive element within Islam, eventually adding a new
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element even to Islam itself. Culturally, politically, and most remarkable
of all even religiously, the Iranian contribution to this new Islamic
civilization is of immense importance. The work of Iranians can be seen
in every field of cultural endeavour, including Arabic poetry, to which
poets of Iranian origin composing their poems in Arabic made a very
significant contribution. In a sense, Iranian Islam is a second advent of
Islam itself, a new Islam sometimes referred to as Islam-iAjam. It was this
Persian Islam, rather than the original Arab Islam, that was brought to new
areas and new peoples: to the Turks, first in Central Asia and then in the
Middle East in the country which came to be called Turkey, and of course
to India. The Ottoman Turks brought a form of Iranian civilization to the
walls of Vienna‖ (Lewis, 2001).
This however is not merely in the modern day, the earlier revisionist
history historians also expressed a view on the Persian influence of Islam and its
fostering of a community of scholars, scientists and philosophers. Persians have long
had a reputation as great contributors to the sciences. From algebra, geometry and
medicine, the Persians made their considerable mark as they picked up the remains of
Ancient Greece and Rome. They also made great contributions to language and arts;
here is how the famous historian Ibn Khaldun perceived them:
―It is a remarkable fact that, with few exceptions, most Muslim
scholars…in the intellectual sciences have been non-Arabs...All of them
were of Persian descent who invented the rules of (Arabic) grammar.
Great jurists were Persians. Only the Persians engaged in the task of
preserving knowledge and writing systematic scholarly works. Thus the
truth of the statement of the prophet (Muhammad) becomes apparent, ‗If
learning were suspended in the highest parts of heaven the Persians would
attain it‘…The intellectual sciences were also the preserve of the Persians,
left alone by the Arabs, who did not cultivate them...‖ (Khaldun, 2004).
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3.2 Sunni/Shiite Division
It is in the seventh century that we see a schism within Islam that divided
the people of the Quran into two separate camps, or in the words of Hillel Fradkin and
Lewis Libby, ‗the bloodiest and longest-running dispute in Muslim politics‘ (Fradkin,
2013). The schism was focused on the question of succession after Muhammad‘s
death and the legitimacy of the certain Islamic interpretations (Nasr, 2006). Augustus
Richard Norton puts the historical case as one that affects 1.3 billion followers of
Islam of which 15% are Shiite whose denomination is centered on succession:
―There are three major Shiite sects, but they all share a special regard
for the House of the Prophet Muhammad and the belief that the Prophet‘s
spiritual guidance was transmitted by divine ordination through his
descendants, especially through his son-in-law and cousin Ali. (The
Sunnis believed caliphs did not need to be descended from the Prophet.)
For Shiite Muslims, the holy day Ashura commemorates the martyrdom
of one Imam Hussein—the grandson of the Prophet and son of Ali—
whose demise in the seventh century, near the city of Karbala in modern-
day Iraq, has become a lodestone of modern identity for Shiites, much as
the crucifixion of Jesus is central to Christian identity‖ (Norton, 2007).
Shiites are found in quite a large number in the Middle East. Iran is the
largest Shiite state with a population over 70 million, 90% of which was identified as
being Shiite. Iraq also has a large number of Shiite adherents, including as many as
60% of Iraq‘s near 30 million citizens. Due to that inherent imbalance in the region, it
is no surprise that the two countries share a long, complex, and rather tumultuous
history. In addition, 20% of Pakistan‘s 166 million inhabitants and 19% of
Afghanistan‘s 31 million people practice Shiite Islam. Additionally, there is a Shiite
population of 1.3 million in Lebanon and another 2 million practitioners spread out
among Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Petrou,
2014).
To put it briefly, Michael Petrou states ‗Divisions between the Sunni and
Shia interpretations of Islam are almost as old as the faith itself‘ (Petrou, 2014). Due
to the perceived subterfuge and schemes that arose from the succession of the caliphs
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(Islamic community leaders) by Shiite practitioners and scholars, there was noticeable
tension within the early Islamic community that has led to bloody fitnas (civil wars)
over control and direction (Hinds, 2012) that influences modern friction between the
Sunni and Shiite denominations (Robinson, 2010). Such incidences include the
assassination of the Uthman, the suspected poisoning of HasanIbn Ali (grandson of
Muhammad) by one of his wives encouraged by his political rival Muawiyah, and the
suspected trap of Husaynibn Ali by the Umayyads which directly led to their
overthrow and the propagation of Shiite Islam in Iran (Robinson, 2010). Considering
that before Islam, the Middle East was home to the common rite of blood feuds and
long held grievances, it is not surprising that some of those earlier practices still echo
throughout the region with some measure of suspicion or hurt feelings.
3.3 The Early Stages of Iran’s Nuclear Program
3.3.1 Atoms for Peace
The ‗Atoms for Peace‘ program gets its name from the title of a speech
delivered by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 to the assembled
representatives of the world at the United Nations in New York City. It is important to
realize the importance and gravitas of this speech. In it, he denotes worry at the future
of warfare and the repercussions therein. This speech would set the tone during the
Cold War and shape Western policy throughout the world for years to come. He
stated:
―I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new one,
which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession,
would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of
atomic warfare.
The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of
the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms,
of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one
of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent
search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's
existence.
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My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United
States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know, I
need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is
global, not merely national in character.
On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic
explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has
conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs are more than twenty-
five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned,
while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent.
Today, the United States‘ stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of
course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the
total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun
in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single
air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable
target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on
Britain in all the Second World War.
In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no
less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons
have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In
the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine
Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.
But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not
ours alone.
In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the
United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous
contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.
The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has
informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to
atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a
series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear
reactions.
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If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called
a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years
ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate
what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today
comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge
now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others,
possibly all others.
Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a
consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself,
against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be
inflicted by surprise aggression‖ (Eisenhower, 1953).
The Atoms for Peace program was orchestrated as a two-prong campaign.
On one hand, the media rollout code named ‗Operation Candor‘ was meant as a
propaganda vehicle to bolster America‘s Cold War policy of ‗containment‘ (Chernus,
2002). Containment was intended to prevent the spread of the Soviet Union‘s
influence in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, and more specifically China, Korea, and
Vietnam. It was thought, at the time, that if the Soviets were left unchecked and
allowed free reign, they would eventually infiltrate all forms of government
throughout the world. The other side of the campaign was focused on assuaging the
fears of the world on the destructive powers of nuclear arms after the world had
witnessed the utter annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the US as its
masterstroke in their Pacific campaign to end the war. In particular, this marketing
campaign was aimed at diminishing the fears of America‘s European allies who held
an understandable apprehension at the idea of a nuclear battle in its own backyard that
would leave them even more devastated than they had been during the bombing runs
that had gone on during the most contentious and destructive moments of the Second
World War. In effect, Eisenhower‘s speech motioned towards the proliferation of
civilian nuclear energy in other countries and self-control in the use of nuclear arms in
possible future conflicts (Chernus, 2002).
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3.3.2 The Shah’s Nuclear Program
Iran‘s nuclear program was initiated in 1959 between the Shah of Iran,
Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979), and the United States Eisenhower
administration‘s Atoms for Peace project which helped to build the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) that was designed to act as a conduit between the US and Iran‘s
burgeoning nuclear interests (Milani, 2010).The Shah had a vision of constructing a
2,000-megawatts of electricity across 20 nuclear power stations by 2000, this nuclear
industry was envisioned within his country so as to not be completely reliant on his
own country‘s oil production (Sabet, 2013). That being said, as Farzan Sabet
states,‗While the Shah's nuclear program was, in theory, aimed at generating nuclear
energy, there were already nuclear proliferation concerns at this time‘ (Sabet, 2013).
Those in Washington and Britain perceived the Shah as an ally that kept the oil
flowing to the West (Tarock, 2006). The Shah states his relationship thusly, ‗If you‘re
asking me whom I consider our best friends, the answer is: The United States amongst
others. The United States understands us best for the simple reason they have many
interests here including economic as direct interests, and arid political, as indirect
interests‘ (Pahlevi, 1973). In his own country, the Shah was perceived by the clerics
as a puppet that cared more about his personal wealth and jewelry then his own
people or an iron-fisted tyrant.
Apparently, the answer lies somewhere in between. The Shah had the
international reputation of a playboy and celebrity as he was handsome, charming and
a natural schmoozer who threw banquets and parties to woo foreign interests. He also
had the reputation as being authoritarian in practice and contrastingly progressive
with some social reforms. For example, the Shah personally thought of women as a
hindrance in some respects and would be seen as a misogynist today, but in political
contrast he also promoted women‘s rights more so than his other Islamic monarch
contemporaries. To better illustrate this dichotomy, one can look at the Shah‘ own
words as he states his opinion on women in an interview with Oriana Fallaci, a well-
known female journalist and writer, in this manner:
―Look, let‘s put it this way. I don‘t underestimate them, as shown by
the fact that they have derived more advantages than anyone else from my
White Revolution. I have fought strenuously to obtain equal rights and
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responsibilities for them. I have even incorporated them in the Army,
where they get six months‘ military training before being sent to the
villages to fight the battle against illiteracy. Nor should one forget that I‘m
the son of the man who removed women‘s veils in Iran. But I wouldn‘t be
sincere if I asserted I‘d been influenced by a single one of them. Nobody
can influence me, nobody at all. And a woman still less. In a man‘s life,
women count only if they‘re beautiful and graceful and know how to stay
feminine and…This Women‘s Lib business, for instance. What do these
feminists want? What do you want? Equality, you say? Indeed! I don‘t
want to seem rude, but…You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not,
I beg your pardon for saying so, in ability‖ (Pahlevi, 1973).
An accusation against the Shah was that he was an authoritarian dictator.
Such accusations are well substantiated by the actions of the Organization of
Intelligence and National Security, or commonly known as SAVAK. SAVAK was an
organization that was the Iranian counterpart of the United States‘ CIA and Britain‘s
MI6. The intelligence unit oversaw the strict secret police actions, the torture of
political dissidents and enemies of the state. SAVAK was established by the Shah and
operated from 1957 to 1979 (Afkhami, 2009). When asked if he would deny that he
was too much of an authoritarian leader by Iranians, in the same interview he
responded:
―No, I wouldn‘t, because, in a sense, I am. But look: To go through
with reform, one can‘t help but be authoritarian. Especially when reform
takes place in a country like Iran, where only 25 percent of the inhabitants
can read and write. Believe me, when you have three-quarters of a nation
afflicted with illiteracy, only the most strict authoritarianism can ensure
reform; otherwise nothing can be achieved. If I hadn‘t been strict, I
couldn‘t have carried through even agricultural reform, and my whole
program would have been at a standstill. If that had happened, the extreme
left would have liquidated the extreme right within a few hours, and more
would have been lost than the White Revolution. I had to act as I did, for
instance, to order the troops to fire at those opposing land redistribution‖
(Pahveli, 1973).
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In the same distinctive and defined manner, the Shah himself saw nuclear
technology for Iran as a pragmatic solution to an apparent problem that would plague
his country in the future: his country would eventually run out of oil. Seeing the
writing on the wall, the Shah decided that it would be best if Iran diversified its
energy sector. Adam Tarock states it this way:
―Since the early 1990s, Iran‘s consumption of oil has increased eight
percent. If this trend continues, Iran will become a net oil importer by
2010, a gigantic catastrophe for a country which relies on oil for 80
percent of her foreign currency and 45 percent of her total annual budget.
If that happens, how will Iran be able to feed her population, estimated to
reach 100 million by 2025, and also spend on her development and
national security? ...It is estimated that Iran‘s known uranium ore reserves
can produce as much electricity as 45 billion barrels of oil‖ (Tarock,
2006).
It was thought that a nuclear program would thus be mutually beneficial to
both parties: the West continued to get large amounts of cheap oil and Iran would
have access to large amounts of electricity for its own people and continue to make
vast sums of money from petroleum exports. The Shah states it this way, in his own
words, ‗It‘s quite simple. I‘ve got this oil and I can‘t drink it. Libyan oil reserves will
be exhausted 10 years from now. My oil, on the other hand, will last at least 30 or 40
years. Maybe 50 or 60, even‘ (Pahveli, 1973). In addition, the Shah knew the value of
a nuclear deterrent. When asked how strong his country was militarily, he stated that
his people could not directly repulse a major invasion from a world power without
having an atom bomb; this is during the peak of the Cold War (Pahveli, 1973). Adam
Tarock drives home the point bluntly, ‗According to Asadollah Alam, the Minister of
the Imperial Court and confidant of the Shah, the monarch intended to make nuclear
weapons and, to that end, Alam says, Iran had in 1976 discussed with Gabon the
purchase of uranium‘ (Tarock, 2006). It is safe to assume that the Shah saw a nuclear
program in its future by fostering a goodwill partnership with the West that would
eventually lead to nuclear arms under his control.
Seeing the situation in such a way, the Shah invested his time into
cooperating with the United States and agreed to join the International Atomic Energy
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Agency on 16 September 1959 (IAEA) (Sabet, 2013).The IAEA oversaw inspections
of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that came online in 1967 and was managed by
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TRR was originally conceived
as a 5 megawatt-thermal (MWth) pool-type light water research reactor at Tehran
University for the production of medical isotopes. The United States and West
Germany supplied the TRR with weapon-grade uranium fuel for the reactor until the
Iranian Revolution on 1979 (Tarock, 2006). Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
one year later in 1968 and ratified it in 1970.Washington was particularly enthused
with the idea of a nuclear powered Iran with President Ford offering the Shah a full
nuclear cycle in 1976. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which ran
the Tehran Research Reactor, was tasked with converting the existing gas and oil
powered energy producing facilities within Iran into nuclear facilities (Amuzegar,
2006).
3.4 The Islamic Republic Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran's nuclear program was started in the 50s with considerable Western
resources, in large part due to the political machinations of the Shah who fostered
positive relations with the West and was viewed by some as a sentinel of American
policy in the region. This perceived goodwill between Iran and the West, however,
came to an abrupt ending in February 1979. The Iranian revolution that would
eventually force the Shah into exile and usher in the formation of an Islamic
government of that year completely changed the conversation about Iran‘s nuclear
ambitions. Those who opposed the manner in which the Shah ran the country and
emerged victorious with control of the nation had earlier criticized the Shah's nuclear
plans and scaled back Iran‘s nuclear program until the newly Islamic republic came
into conflict with its neighbor Iraq. In the midst of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
those in charge decided to reconstitute its nuclear program. On the world stage, under
the auspices of being purely non-military, Iran now presented itself as focusing on a
nuclear program for its own energy needs (Chubin, 2006). Successive leaders since
the revolution have insisted that the aim of Iran‘s nuclear program is purely for
peaceful, civilian purposes and that they have no interest in constructing a nuclear
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armament. Iran‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has gone so far as to issue
a fatwa, a religious decree, against nuclear weapons. Western representatives,
especially America and Israel, look upon such proclamations with some measure of
skepticism (Zarif, 2014).
The Iranian revolution had an immediate impact on Iran‘s nuclear
program as ties with the US were effectively severed with extreme prejudice.
Overnight, the Tehran Research Reactor was cut off from American supplies. The
TRR was the same small reactor, the nuclear zygote that Eisenhower and the Atoms
for Peace gave to the Shah and helped birth Iran‘s nuclear program. After the 1979
revolution, America was now the ‗Great Satan‘ and Iran could not rely on the
demonic state for its weapons grade uranium. This was perfectly fine with the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who in his ascension to power
ordered all work and progress on Iran's nuclear program be stopped as he found this
new technological development distasteful to his stringent and fundamentalist Islamic
interpretations, if not directly blasphemous. Khomeini, however, changed his mind
soon after, perhaps as he saw the relief that nuclear power could give to his country as
a balm to expedite the export of its oil or as a weapon against Iraq‘s chemical
weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, but by then the West would give no quarter to
Iran‘s desires and was much more weary of Iran's intentions (Milani, 2010). The Iran-
Iraq war made a sizable impression on the Ayatollah as Vali Nasr writes, ‗It
dominated the first decade of Khomeini's revolution, ravaged Iran's economy, and
scarred Iranian society‘ (Nasr, 2006). It is rather clear to see how a government (or
single leader) in such a predicament could be encouraged to change their minds.
Unable to solicit such material from either the ‗Great Satan‘ or Europe,
Iran had to look to other places for its nuclear fix. In 1987, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) looked south at Argentina‘s Applied Research Institute
(INVAP) to keep the TRR humming along. The AEOI compensated the INVAP
US$5.5 million to transmute Tehran‘s residual fuel from 90% enriched uranium to
just below 20%, barely short of the cutoff for highly enriched uranium (HEU). As a
consequence, the TRR has been working with LEU fuel since 1993 at 3 MWth, even
though it was designed with an output of 5 MWth, partially due to a shortage of fuel
caused by the political fallout following the Iran revolution and the lasting friction left
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behind. Of the original US-supplied uranium, about 15 pounds of irradiated HEU
remains stored at the reactor site (―Tehran research,‖ n.d.).
The subterfuge and shadow policies that happened since then has played
in the background of most people‘s lives with little effect on the average world
citizen‘s view or thoughts. It was not until some twenty years later that the ordinary
member of society was informed of the stakes which were quickly escalating. As
Farzan Sabet puts it,
―Despite concerns about the Iranian nuclear program since 1979, the
precise origins of the current nuclear crisis can be traced to August 2002
when the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahideen-e Khalgh
Organization (MKO), revealed the existence of the Natanz uranium
enrichment facility near Esfahan. Iran had failed to declare this facility to
the IAEA even though it was bound to do so under its safeguards
agreement‖ (Sabet, 2013).
These actions are not technically in and of themselves violations of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that Iran had signed in 1968 as the agreement states
that Iran must announce the existence of such facilities 180 days before introducing
any nuclear material. Iran had by then not introduced such materials at the Natanz
plant. What upset Western officials was that Iran had not declared these facilities‘
existence to the IAEA, and thus constituted a falsehood. This, however, was also the
same tactic employed by Israel, Pakistan and India who kept their nuclear programs
confidential. The difference between those nations and Iran is that at the time that this
report came out, Iran had been declared a member of the ‗Axis of Evil‘ alongside Iraq
and North Korea by President Bush (Tarock, 2006)
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF OIC ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR ISSUE
Iran‘s nuclear program is akin to a risk to US's partners in Middle East
region, particularly Israel, as Iran‘s aggressive leaders repeatedly declared their
intentions to wipe out Israel from the map (―The Iranian,‖ n.d.). In addition,
America's moderate Arab partners, for instance Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and others including the OIC members, are at present
terrified of aggressive regional policy of Iran. They sense progressively endangered
from Iran‘s nuclear program. Iran‘s neighbours country has raised their weapons
purchasing due to the military position of Iran, and this is not good for the region. The
Iran‘s nuclear program would possible stimulate the Middle East‘s arms race in which
lead to even more instability in this volatile and vital region. Whether Iran‘s nuclear
development is strictly civilian-oriented or whether the country is in pursuit of
weaponization will be investigated through the OIC‘s lens in this chapter.
4.1 Theoretical Framework
In order that the discussion reach a meaningful conclusion, we will study
the OIC‘s role from two theoretical frameworks: the Muslim Ummah approach and
the Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach. The contemporary IR realism theory is
inappropriate in this study since neither the idealism nor the realism of contemporary
international relations is in complete harmony with the politico-religious values and
natures of Islam as per Dr. Mohammad Mohibul Haque‘s presentation at the
European Conference on International Relations. Working within the traditional
confines of International Relations theory will more than likely make it difficult to
analyze Islam in isolation, as states in the Middle East have since their formation in
the post-colonial era acted, with a few exceptions, in their own self-interest. In
addition, abstract perceptions such as the Ummah (community of believers) and
assabiya (group feeling) are key components that constitute Islamic concepts of world
order and give it a unique perception. Interstate bargaining and institutional
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compliance along with the theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal
theories of international interdependence are the key parameters to this study.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory is used in this work instead of
Multilateral Theory recommended by many scholars because there are a few
differences between the two.
Multilateral Intergovernmental
Many countries from various regions
work in concert on a specific issue or
issues.
Selected group of like-minded
countries work in concert on a specific
issue or issues.
All the respective players have a say
(even small and weak players get to
participate in decision making, E.g. WTO
Doha Round of Negotiations 2008 were a
failure because of India).
Intergovernmental groups constitute
a unique set of players working towards
a common cause (they are mostly like-
minded).
Decisions are made mostly by
majority vote.
Decisions are made by consensus.
Multilateralism encourages members
to bury differences for the greater good.
Everything depends on the objectives
of the group.
From this perspective, it will be more applicable to use Liberal
Intergovernmentalism Theory to discuss the role of OIC as an intergovernmental
organization on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue.
4.1.1 Muslim Ummah Approach
Muslim Ummah is the viewpoint of Islamic on global community
developed from the principle that the Muslims establish an individual and diverse
society (Hasan, 2012). As a political community the Ummah is welcome to every
people who commit to its attitudes and ideologies and are willing to take on the
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possible responsibilities. The members are obliged to a Madinah Compact. Many
angles of Ummah are supposed to be understood. As a framework, the Ummah
describes distinct norms and political act (Ahmed, Ahsani, & Siddiqui, 2005). The
Ummah‘s Islamic political feature promotes the religious autonomy that link to the
choice of belief for everyone in the community. Ummah, as a Compact, stipulates
sovereignty. Adherents would not depend on the leaders or certain community except
on the regulation created on integrity, legitimacy and the maintenance of dignity of
all. In addition, they must condemn injustice and tyranny. For the Compact of
Madinah, it can be viewed as an Islamic approach to conflict resolution.
Based on the Ummah principle, the OIC was created. OIC, for its member
states, is an instrument to pursue and advance their own individual foreign policy
interests. The OIC in its Ten Year Program of Action which was launched in June
2006, promises concrete steps to confront ideologies that claim to use Islamic rulings
to justify extremism (The Organization of the Islamic Conference, n.d.). It requires
that the member states preserve Islamic values of peace, compassion, tolerance,
equality, justice, and human dignity and contribute to international peace and security,
understanding, and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions. They need to
promote and encourage friendly relations mutual respect and cooperation. In short,
OIC Charter‘s fundamental principles of the Muslim World aspire for good
governance, the rule of law, the promotion of human rights, fighting corruption and
the expansion of political participation and comprehensive development.
To meet its principle and charter, the OIC is required to play a significant
role as a religious-based organization to promote true information about Islam and
defend Muslim sat large (Ummah) from such a stigma, i.e., ‗the dangerous others‘ or
‗the potential enemy‘. ‗The OIC can play an active role in solving disputes in the
international arena and be effective in regional problems,‘ Organization for Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Dr. Iyad Madani said at a joint press conference
with the Iranian foreign minister (―OIC Secretary-general,‖ 2014).
This relates to Iranian Nuclear program. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy,
irrespective of whether or not an Islamic bomb can or cannot, or should or should not,
exist, the concept behind the term is of Muslim origin (Hoodbhoy, 1993). The idea of
a nuclear weapon was articulated and advocated by Muslim leaders for collective
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defence of the entire Muslim Ummah. Also Rana Banerji, Distinguished Fellow, IPCS
& Special Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat commented in No. 191, May 2012
IPCS Issue Brief (Banerji, 2012), while not overtly declaring their desire to acquire or
gain access to nuclear weapons as an essential step to eventual State power,
fundamentalist and ‗jehadi‘ organizations/ actors/ groups have been strong supporters
of acquiring a military nuclear capability so that the Ummah can counter Israel‘s
alleged nuclear capability. In this context, Iranian‘s nuclear arsenal could be justified
as an Islamic bomb, of which use should be available to the entire Ummah. However,
whether Iran could build a nuclear bomb if it chose to, requires further investigation.
On the inside, Iran appears to move to a hard line stance. However, Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani expressed under his policy of moderation and easing tensions with
the outside world that the very possession of nuclear weapons is a sin (―Iran stopped
nuclear,‖ 2014). Iran would not compromise on its rights to augment uranium to
produce nuclear fuel for power generation, as well as to produce radioisotopes to treat
cancer patients. This action was supported by OIC. OIC has shown trust on Iran
Nuclear Program that it is for the civilian purpose and will not become weapons. As
far as this study has explored, this bomb issue towards Iran has been raised for more
than 30 years since 1983, and there is no prominent proof of nuclear weaponization. It
is apparent that Nuclear bomb is not only a political excuse from the Great Powers but
also the Islamic World. Therefore, it is unavoidable for the OIC to stand firm on its
support.
According to the Muslim Ummah, Ayatollah Khamenei saw the nuclear
program of Iranian nation as an example for other nations in returning to the straight
path of God and to use the numerous political and geographical advantages in order to
resist against the enemies and achieve Islamic glory, power, and progress while
preserving unity and solidarity. He pointed out that the Iranian nation was the pioneer
of opposing the Zionist regime and proud of its resistance against the bullying of the
most insolent arrogant power in the world (―Leader rejects nuclear,‖ 2009).
The ex-chief of the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, said on the Voice of America (VOA) in London on 3
November 2006 that only through diplomacy can the West solve the Iran nuclear
program. This was to avoid a new conflict in the Middle East in order to achieve unity
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in Muslim Ummah. This OIC‘s statement represents the will not only of the political
leadership of these countries, but it is also a reflection of views in the Gulf Arab
states. OIC also actively asked the United States to end its economic sanctions against
three member states, Sudan, Iran, and Libya, explaining that they pose a ‗direct threat‘
to Islamic security. The new OIC Secretary General Iyad Madani named as A
Chairman Who Will Catalyze Tehran-Riyadh Détente (Nasseri, 2014) emphasized
that closer cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two
influential countries in the Islamic world, would further strengthen the Muslim
Ummah. He has also made efforts to establish a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction zone, a plan which Iran has also actively cooperated in. The OIC is now
recognized for its potential strength, second to only the largely dormant Non-Aligned
Movement, and is ‗poised to assume a paramount historical role in shaping the new
world order‘ (Richey, 1997).
In summation, the rationale for the OIC role towards Iran‘s nuclear
program is to support the Program in order to support its mission to invoke solidarity
within the Muslim Ummah and to make an impact in the international community.
There is a saying regarding the power that in tandem with fear is the want for power
and influence (Epstein, 1977), with nuclear capabilities even an inferior state could
become a formidable enemy.
Although to the world, Muslims are no different. However, in fact, there
are divisions inside the OIC originally due to their fight towards religious leadership
and the dispute over succession to Muhammad in the history. The conflicts exist in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Iraq,
Libya, Palestine and Syria. Internal conflicts-division is the Nationalism -Regionalism
(Arab, Non-Arab or Arab, African). The OIC, with its international weight, can take
effective steps to remedy the current state of division among the Islamic Ummah, the
most important challenge facing the Ummah. Without unity, the Islamic Ummah
would face a Common Threat of their survival. Inter and intra country economic
disparity, disparity between population and physical area and distributed political,
military and economic strengths make it impossible for each individual country to
fight against tyranny‘s coercion alone. In achieving this, OIC needs Iran to engage in
all-out cooperation with other member states of the OIC for the implementation of
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major developmental projects among member countries through the support of the
Islamic Development Bank. Existence of their common grounds between two Muslim
countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will make this quite possible despite differences that
Iran and Saudi Arabia have on certain issues.
According to the news on OIC in 2014, the secretary general of the OIC,
Iyad bin Amin Madani from Saudi Arabia paid his first visit to Iran soon after he took
office. This portrayed the profound relations that exist between Iran and the OIC.
Iranian influence in the OIC was founded on the principle of mutual benefits.
OIC thinks its role is to support Iran‘s nuclear program since Iran also
plays a significant role in regional political equations. On the present Syria crisis, OIC
seriously needed cooperation with Iran for its principle position after the participants
in the Geneva II conference did not achieve much resolution (United Nations, 2014).
Moreover, in finding a final solution to the Palestine sovereignty issue, Iran has also
possessed a strategic significance for certain Arab countries and the secretary general
of the OIC (Nasseri, 2014).
4.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach
From the IR theory studied by Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal
Intergovernmentalism describes interstate cooperation and particularly regional
integration (e.g. EU) as a function of the arrangement of state interests and
preferences combined with power. That is, opposing to the expectations of
functionalism and neofunctionalism, integration and cooperation are essentially
caused by rational self-interested states bargaining with one another. Furthermore, as
would be expected, those states with more ‗power‘ possible will have more of their
interests fulfilled. For instance, with regard to the EU, it is not surprising that many of
the agreed-upon institutional arrangements are in line with the preferences of France
and Germany, the so-called ‗Franco-German core‘ (Moravcsik, 1993).
Iran‘s importance to the OIC was not a gift from heaven. Iran‘s leaders,
like all heads of state, first and foremost valued regime survival, which they could not
take for granted as they were faced with credible threats to their sovereignty from
both external and internal forces (Tope, 2012). Iran‘s nuclear program is the result of
it being banished from the rest of the international community and its mistrust of
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western powers as the United States emerged as the unilateral world power after the
culmination of the Cold War (Diamond, 2012). Khomeini enshrined this general
attitude of distrust with the western world within the Iranian Constitution, as outlined
in Article 152:
“The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the
rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and
submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country
in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of
all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic
superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations
with all non-belligerent States” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Ch. X, Art. 152).
Originally, the OIC was seen as simply a platform against Israel that did
not focus on the need for internal Muslim reform, but on defending Muslim Diasporas
in the West from Islamophobia. In fact, the Palestinian issue is its ‗central cause‘ of
Islamophobia, and OIC member states have successfully lobbied UN agencies to
prohibit religious insult and discrimination. However, since 2005, the OIC‘s work has
seen a dramatic shift in its approach to international affairs with a markedly reformist
character. The man who drives this approach is Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who was
appointed OIC Secretary-General in 2005. He is a leading Turkish academic and
public figure. Ihsanoglu‘s entire career focused on generating a renewed vision of
Islam as co-extensive with a flexible culture of science, pluralism and dialogue, a
dynamic and progressive intergovernmental network. His landmark achievements
were the creation of an Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights in the
OIC — effectively the world‘s first Muslim human rights commission — to promote
internationally recognized civil, political, social and economic rights; the adoption of
a clear and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms; as well as official
recognition of the need for interfaith and intercultural dialogue, and perhaps more
radically, mutual acceptance and co-existence.
In analyzing OIC role towards Iran‘s nuclear program, interactions of
rational, self-interested states under anarchy; and the variation consisting in
assumptions about the nature of state preferences, the severity of the security
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dilemma, and the role of international institutions in OIC and world politics will be
assessed. The OIC Secretary-General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in supporting Iran‘s
Nuclear Program, addressed the nuclear program that ‗…the OIC‘s position on the
need to respect the inalienable right of developing countries, including that of Iran, to
engage in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty‘ (Jawetz,
2010). In the OIC‘s view, according to the international norms of non-interference the
sovereignty of the member states, the Iran‘s nuclear program is its own domestic
affairs, and the OIC would not interfere this. Furthermore, the OIC also supports
Iran‘s nuclear program as the right of a sovereign states since nuclear energy has
become potential alternative energy resources for states with green energy-oriented
aims. The Middle East States, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. also were
all interested and ‗…have proposed to operate nuclear power plants in their countries‘
with the reasoning that they wish to boost their clean energy supply to meet the never-
ending demand for energy.
On the other hand, the OIC approached the issue of nuclear program by
employing international regulations, principles, norms, and laws to regulate its
member states. In the Iran nuclear case, there are two connected issues: (1) the nuclear
power enrichment, and (2) the proliferation. The OIC, through several international
rules, treaties, and regulations kept an eye on the nuclear issue as well as directed the
behavior of Iran. On the one hand, the nuclear peaceful technology regulation,
initiated by the IAEA, is utilized by the OIC as a pathway to manage the enrichment
of uranium of its member states. On the other hand, the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Middle East of a Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone are also initiated and utilized by the OIC in order to manage the member
states on the issue of nuclear proliferation. By looking into the behavior of the OIC
through these lenses, it could be interpreted that the OIC approached the Iran‘s
nuclear program through the international organization theories of International
Regimes.
According to Stephen D. Krasner, the international regimes could be
defined as ―…sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors‘ expectation converge in a given area of international
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relation…‖ (Krasner, 1982). Thus, using the international regimes on the nuclear issue
would ease the intergovernmental organization like the OIC to manage certain issues
which not only Iran but also many other member states are also interested in. In other
words, for the OIC to work together on the issue under the same recognized rules, the
international regimes on the nuclear weapons and nuclear power must be adopted.
The nuclear program, for the OIC, is also to help balance external power.
The Israel-Saudi Arabia conflict is still ongoing. Through the OIC‘s limited support
of the Iran Nuclear Program, the OIC attempt to utilize the threat of military power as
a lever against Israel‘s secret nuclear power (shown in figure 4.1). The organization
also called on the corporation of international regimes on nuclear issues. The
Secretary General addresses several times the openness of Israel on the nuclear
program.
Figure 4.1
The World Nuclear States
Note. From ―Estimated number of warheads,‖ by Arms Control Association, 2004.
The OIC‘s stance on the balance of power is not only towards Israel, but
also towards external foreign powers. The OIC Secretary-General pointed out during
the Doha Conference in 2011, that western accusations on the Iran nuclear program
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lacked concrete evidence. Furthermore, the Secretary General also pointed out that the
interferences from foreign countries are unlikely to be effective ―…as the case of
[military operations in] Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan.‖ In other words, the
preemptive operation of the United States in Iraq is one of the reasons that influenced
the OIC‘s position. The OIC‘s role on Iran‘s nuclear issue is to deter external powers
from exercising military options, interfering in the Middle East region and influencing
the outcome of Israel‘s suspicious nuclear programs.
Overall, the OIC‘s stance on the Iran nuclear program indicates that the
OIC relies on the Liberal Intergovernmentalism approach to balance the external
powers in order to stabilize the region. The OIC‘s approach to the issue displays that
its intention as an Intergovernmental organization is not only to find resolutions to
certain issues, but also to protect the interests of its member states.
4.2 The Two Islamic Republic of Iran’s Presidents from 2005-Present
The OIC‘s role towards Iran‘s nuclear program was highly influenced
during the two Islamic Republic of Iran‘s Presidents. Iran‘s new president-elect
Hassan Rouhani and his cabinet have already promised that their moderate and
constructive foreign policy will be pursued throughout his term in office. Rouhani is
expected to pursue a foreign policy which may ultimately lead Iran‘s relations with
the United States (US) to be more cooperative (Przeczek, 2013). However, at the end
of the two presidential terms of Mohammad Khatami, no matter how much goodwill
there was towards the US, the long-standing distrust, divergent interests, and of
course, ideology between the two states prevented them from enhancing cooperation
in political and economic areas (Przeczek, 2013). He is currently assuming the
position of the rotating presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an
international organization with 120 member states that is not formally aligned with or
against any major power bloc. Also, in a meeting with the Secretary-General of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Ekmeledd Ihsanoglu, Rouhani stressed that Iran
should be prepared to boost cooperation with the OIC in different fields of education,
science, and technology as well as trade. Ihsanoglu, for his part, said that Iran is one
of the member states with preferential trade in OIC. This denotes the implication of
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OIC‘s support for Iranian in its nuclear program during Rouhani‘s term. The
organization stated that it is ‗the collective voice of the Muslim world‘ and works to
‗safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting
international peace and harmony‘. Hence, the President was firmed on his rejection to
sign a nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries that would allow foreign access to the
country‘s scientific and military secrets.
Rouhani is similar to the present President Ahmadinejad, but the latter
takes on a more belligerent approach. President Ahmadinejad‘s colourful rhetoric
tends to convey an Iranian drive for nuclear development that was rebellious,
belligerent, and hostile towards Israel and the west. The two aspects of the President
Ahmedinejad‘s foreign policy were ‗accommodating policy‘ and ‗alliance policy‘.
With the ‗accommodating policy‘, Ahmadinejad aimed at ‗expanding cooperation
after Saddam‘s fall with the main Arab world actor… and seeking direct talks with the
US‘ (Przeczek, 2013). Indeed, President Ahmadinejad‘s plans for regional relations
was aimed at making the Middle East, including Central Asia and Caucasus, self-
reliant and free of interference from extra-regional powers (such as the US) in the
region. On the other hand, with the ‗alliance policy, Ahmadinejad allied Tehran with
regional and extra-regional states to avert a possible US attack, and also to
‗regionalize‘ the nuclear issue so that Iran‘s nuclear program would be justified vis-à-
vis Israel‘s nuclear capabilities and the conflict with Palestinians. In addition to this
pragmatic policy, President Ahmadinejad‘s chanting ‗wipe Israel off the map‘ was
very radical, yet still far from materialization, as even the new right recognized that a
less belligerent approach was the best way to ensure Iran‘s ascendance in the Middle
East. President Ahmadinejad collaborative approach was publicized in his historic
first Egypt visit since the Islamic revolution in 1979 during his term on the occasion
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit. His influence in the OIC
no doubt makes the OIC‘s role on Iran‘s nuclear program favourable. The OIC, in
return, gained international recognition partly through Iran‘s nuclear program, an
unseen element of interaction in conflict resolution.
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4.3 The OIC Significance
An analytical examination of the political behaviour of the three key
players, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan,
within the OIC demonstrates a practical register of rationales, ideas, and ambitions in
keeping with the real politics in the OIC. The OIC was originally founded to
safeguard Islamic World interests which are to promote international peace and
harmony, and ensure security and progress demanded by the collective voices of the
Islamic world. Initially, there were some differences in Shia (represented by Iranian
majority) and Sunni (Saudi Arabian) beliefs. The international Saudi ‗Petro-Islam‘
influence has made the Saudi conflict of Shia and Sunni extends beyond the borders
of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia showed their opposition against Shia movements
through their support of Iraq‘s 1980–1988 war with Iran and militants sponsored in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan, with the second largest number of Shias after Iran
while populated with Sunnis majority, played global politics as an Islamic center due
to its geographical location on the Islamic edge, its non-Arab ethnicity, and its status
as a historical novice.
However, to assume that religious belief-structures immediately translate
into policy rationale would take more interpretation. Certainly, for the Saudi
establishment, the concept ‗over-the-horizon-power‘ has always implied (Sheikh,
2003) ‗beyond a heavenly Divine‘. In fact, the inception, consolidation and
development of the Saudi dynasty were based on big-power patronage. The very
nativity of the Saudi Kingdom was the result of inter-Islamic confrontation and extra-
Islamic alliances, involving both British, American and, until 1938, Soviet
connections. In principle, the extra-territorial arrangement has been the very motive of
Saudi foreign policy, since the 1915 Darea Treaty with the British and later the 1943
lease of the Dhahran airbase to the US.
In contrast, as Khomeinism put it in 1979, the Iranian transformation
amounted to no less than a ‗twin revolution‘, for its target was both the domestic
establishment and foreign politico-cultural penetration. The clerical Iran originally
just wanted to disconnect itself from both the Western block and, significantly, the
Islamic world. Naveed S. Sheikh put in his article that ‗In post-revolution Iran, the
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subservient Islam of the Saudi brand, prostrating to the idol of superpower patronage,
was represented as a perverted polytheism (shirk), anathematic to the pristine pact
with the Almighty‘ (Sheikh, 2002). In the eschatological (a part of theology
concerned with the final events of history, or the ultimate destiny of humanity) Shtite
‗Kingdom of God‘, there was no monarchy. Thus, the discourse of Iranian Islam,
faithful to its Manichaean (a major religion that was founded by the Iranian prophet
Mani) legacy, made it as a dualistic binary to the Saudi monarchy: the latter's
reactionary disposition was contrasted with its own revolutionary capacity, and the
latter's regression contrasted its own Islamic liberation.
The OIC‘s role for Pakistan is prevalent, the trauma of the 1971 Bengali
withdrawal and the constant Indo-Pakistani cold war confirmed an obsession with
national security. Pakistan, a key player in the OIC, has been able to attain an OlC-
resolution either in condemnation of the government of India or in the support of the
people of Kashmir since the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in
1972. Although security has thus been the constant theme of Pakistan's foreign policy
activism in the OIC, periodically the revelation has recurred that no ‗special
relationship‘ could be cultivated by virtue of religion alone (this is why Liberal
Intergovernmental Theory is essential to understand the countries‘ motive). In time,
initial pan-Islamic enthusiasm has turned to be clear and mature in its understanding
of the prospects of a pan-Islamic security community—illustrated so dramatically in
the nuclear solo.
The Saudi Kingdom, on the other hand, has been the depoliticization and
desecuritization of Islamic internationalism. Saudi Arabia tired of the US tyranny has
insisted on an institution building approach within the OIC and created a lot of organs
and agencies. The status quo of the Saudi regime, insisting on a de-politicization of
international Islam, has readily clashed with both the clerical Iran‘s ideal and the
Pakistan‘s security optimization. This is not to say that the OIC remains a non-
political forum for the host country, only that the strategy here is less intense. Pre-
1969, Saudi Arabia had in the period used pan-Islamism as a counter-discourse to
Nasserite pan-Arabism, but during an Iran-Iraq war, reversed its allegiances by
promoting pan-Arabism to counter an increase pan-Islamist outgrowth from the
pulpits of Persia. The overturn of loyalties was augmented by the fact that Egypt was
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readmitted at the Casablanca summit, January1984—long before it was invited back
in the Arab League (Sheikh, 2003). Likewise, the specialized Al-Quds Committee of
the OIC, with a permanent Moroccan chairmanship, came about as a Saudi-Moroccan
disengagement of terrorist agreement in the face of radical currents in the Islamic
world.
The deep-rooted state-centrism of the two key players in the OIC has
disallowed the formation of any synthetic pan-political rationale and has retarded the
development of a solitary pan-Islamic foreign policy. Whereas the Saudi aims with
the inception and expansion of the OIC was to create a framework which could
bestow legitimacy (domestically as well as internationally) to the regime, for Iran, the
OIC was no instrument of stabilization, but rather a potential venue for both political
subversion and ideological expansion. This was echoed in Khomeini's continued
declarations seeking a new synthesis of Islamic internationalism and the world of
states. A radical and political realist, Khomeini, was doing to Shitism exactly what
Lenin had done to Marxism (Sheikh, 2002). Thus, in the OIC Iran tended to remain
the ideological mobilization pertaining to its idiosyncratic liberation theology. It is
apparent in its early revolutionary zeal, or more recently in a self-projection as the
global Islamic superego. In the post-Khomeini Iranian Second Republic, President
Khatemi has kept Islamic internationalism, the dual policy of containment (of Tehran
by Riyadh and of Riyadh by Tehran) that was both self-defeating for the idealists, and
self-revealing for the realists.
The OIC to the Muslim minorities for its credential was so doubtful as the
minorities are being increasingly victimized in flashpoints like Bosnia, Chechnya,
Kashmir, Kosovo, and Palestine. Adopting a low-profile stance in world affairs, pan-
Islamic summits have routinely invoked the authority, and authenticity, of the U.N.
not the OIC as the normative guardian of the world community; thus, collapsing
entirely the notional peculiarity of the Ummah in an international society.
This trichotomy of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan must not be taken to
illustrate a confusion or uncertainty in OlC-policy, rather it illustrates the policy of the
OIC. In effect, the tripartite relationship is a triangle of neutralization. Not only that
their chief political concerns (legitimacy, ideological expansion and geo-strategic
balance, respectively) are different, but also their operation mode within the OIC (in
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the form of reactive, assertive, and defensive strategies) together with their typical
normal vision of the post-Caliphatic ummah (as an economic, political and security
community, respectively) are not in the same line. The absence of any pan-Islamic
rationale is striking, and at most cultural predilections have informed an otherwise
secular extension of financial rather than ideological markets.
OIC approach, in other words, involves a de-engagement in matters that
can adversely affect the interests of one of the crucial member-states. However, since
the OIC, as the incarnation of global Islam, cannot remain silent, it must utter words
deprived either of sense or, at least, of direction. This, then, expresses the honesty of
the OIC; that it remains an embryonic extension of the geo-political arena, providing
‗Islamic legitimacy‘, rather than being, as if convinced by any ‗Islamic rationale‘, the
benefits of the chief Islamic actor. Surely, the latter may require as prerequisite not
only a predefined identity and behavioural codex for pan-Islam, but also necessitate
the identification of pan-Islamic interests as more than random aggregates of state
interests. Understanding the OIC in terms of an arena rather than actor would provide
conceptual clarity both to the function and action (as well as limitation) of the regime.
As such, ‗The role of OIC on Iran‘s Nuclear Issue‘ in this perspective and the new
Secretary General‘s mission pronounces the significance of the OIC as the moderator
to lessen the challenges from external tyranny‘s and internal Ummah‘s drives and the
nonpolitical forum to assert the collective Islamic direction on the international arena.
4.4 The Role of OIC on Iran’s Nuclear Issue
There is still plenty of room for the OIC to assert its stance on the
international arena with its Iranian Nuclear Program issue, with its social capital-
Geostrategic importance, combined location of most Islamic states, universal religion,
99% literacy rate in CARs, 57 % in Pakistan, high scientific publication growth rate in
2009 in Iran, Civilizations in Muslim Countries-and its economic capital-1.6 billion
Collective population of member states, Combined GDP of $ 13 Trillion, OPEP: 34%
oil contribution comes from Muslim world, 575 B$ contribution of Arab world in
insurance banking and stock exchange in Euro Zone. Should the OIC be able to
implement collaboration and unity and eliminate underlying internal conflicts of
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nationalism and sectarian in the organization, it can attain a firm and influential stance
against tyrannical regimes in the political world., As for nuclear weapons, even when
they are not used as a weapon in conflict or resolution, they remain an unseen element
of the interaction in both conflicts and resolutions that influence outcomes (Goldman,
2010). Robert McNamara explained that nuclear weapons served no military purpose
but to deter one‘s opponent from using them (―Mcnamara calls,‖ 1983). Another
reason for supporting Iran‘s Nuclear Program is simply of international prestige
(Barnaby, 2004: pp. 4-5; Epstein, 1977, 17). Prestige offers influence, recognition and
diplomatic clout- important tools in any state's workshop. Developing nuclear
weapons and possessing them require large amounts of resources and a core of
highly-trained and educated scientists and technicians. In other words, they offer the
perfect way to show-off a nation's wealth and ability (Waltz, 1995: 9). The question
remains as to how the Great Powers would react to this Liberal Intergovernmentalism
organization if it exerted such a policy?
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR ISSUE
In order to understand the Iranian nuclear issue, the relationships between
Iran and other players will be analyzed. There are many parties, including both
international organization and states involved with the Iranian nuclear program
including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU)
3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the United Nations, China, Russia,
and the United States.
5.1 Theoretical Framework
There is no doubt that the US, EU/ EU-3, Russia and China (together
called P5+1) would each take a very different approach concerning the Iranian nuclear
issue. Meantime, this paper will examine each party‘s individual role on Iran‘s
nuclear issue. This research compares the US, EU/ EU-3, Russia and China and P5+1
policy towards Iran‘s nuclear issue through the realist theoretical approach, which is
considered to be the most suitable approach to explain their foreign policy decision-
making process.
According to realism, an international relations approach, realists tend to
highlight systemic factors when considering what holds the most influence on foreign
policy making. Such factors include the international system as well as the relative
amount of power a sovereign state has.
The first concept of realism is defensive. Offensive realists acknowledge
that anarchy dominates the form of international system, which refers to an absence of
any kind of centralized authority higher than states. This is in line with the second
concept that states are sovereign and are the main actors within the system. The
sovereignty that such states believe themselves to possess causes them to see
themselves as the only suitable authority to control its own domestic affairs in
whatever way they want. A third assumption, self-help, refers to the standard that
influences a state‘s behaviour. In other words, states will do what is necessary to
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guarantee their own survival in an international system that is anarchical. Since the
belief is that states will take appropriate steps to survive, the fourth assumption is that
the main currency in the international system is power. Thus, in order to better
understand any form of foreign policy of a state, one must consider its relative level of
power.
The realist approach will only lead us to an international system and
sovereign states, whilst the balance of power approach is derived from
realist/neorealist theories. Subscribers of the balance of power approach argue that in
this competitive world order, states remain suspicious of one another and will
cooperate only when they have to. Hence, after understanding the concept of the
realist approach, this research will then examine how the Great Powers‘ interests
influence their policies toward Iran according to the balance of power angle. The
international distribution of power is basically an independent force, which has a
direct impact on a state‘s behaviour.
5.1.1 Realist Approach
In the perspective of the US, Iran‘s activity of nuclear power is perceived
to have two negative effects on US‘s interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. The
first is that when Iran attains nuclear weapons, it is believed to use it as a deterrent
against others, especially the US, in the form of conventional military coercion and
so. Also, such weapons will allow Iran to increase its confidence and lead to the same
aggression it had in the early 1990s. The concept that geopolitics Liberal
Intergovernmentalismcs today is mostly dictated by energy security is at least true for
US foreign policy as the current US military presence in Afghanistan, Iraq and many
areas of the Gulf region gives some level of excuse. Nevertheless, if Iran manages to
attain a nuclear deterrent, it could counter the credibility of US‘s action in the Middle
East (Tam, 2010).
As mentioned in the above paragraph, there were two threats to US
interests if Iran attains nuclear weapons. The second threat is the activation of a
nuclear arms race, both in the Middle East and elsewhere. This is because many
neighbouring countries are frightened that Iran will apply an expansionist foreign
policy when it has nuclear weapons, especially Saudi Arabia who may choose to do
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the same to prevent an Iranian attack. The countries outside of the Middle East that
are considering whether or not to obtain nuclear weapons, for instance North Korea
and Pakistan, could learn from the Iranian circumstance that the consequences for
pursuing nuclear weapons are tolerable and far less threatening than what they
initially thought.
The US role towards the issue can be seen obviously as a big brother (All
countries, cutting across ethnic or cultural lines, seek resources, investment or military
aid either directly from US or through institution financed by it) to stop terrorism
from the Middle East and human rights abuses. Historically, the US relations with
Iran seemed to depend much on the status quo of the US economy and political
power. Presently, there is no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries
(US Department of State, 2011). During British and Russian colonialisms, Iran was
very wary and the United States was seen as a more trustworthy Western power, and
thus relations were strong. Until the Iranian Revolution, a dramatic reversal and
disagreements between the two countries were provoked due to US arrogance
(Sadjadpour, 2009). In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's oil revenues grew considerably and
weakened US influence which declined considerably in domestic Iranian politics and
policies. In 1979, the United States cut all diplomatic relations with Iran, ended all
nuclear agreements with Iran and imposed economic sanctions. While in 1986, there
was an American effort to sell arms to Iran as a way of raising funds for anti-
Communist fighters (known as Contras) in Nicaragua. This action of the US revealed
that the US sold weapons to its own enemy to fulfill another agenda. Yet, with the
election of reform-minded Iranian President Khatami in 1997, the US shifted its
policy from 'dual containment' to 'limited rapprochement.' (Freedman, 1999, 71; Katz
1998) Thus, there was more optimism about the improvement of relations between the
US and Iran. That was not long before G.W Bush took the office when the optimism
ended. Relations soured even more following the 9/11 attacks in New York City.
Thus, to the realist approach, one has to look at the US power and
economy to evaluate US role. As mentioned above, states will do what is necessary to
guarantee their own survival in an international system that is anarchical. In addition,
the main currency in the international system is power. Iran does not support the US
dollar as the world reserve currency, so it trades in Petrodollars. With Iran‘s nuclear
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program, it deters the US power over the flow of oil in the region. Therefore, the US
role on Iran‘s nuclear issue cannot be passive.
There are many options for the US to take regarding Iran‘s nuclear issue
in the international system. The US role to lead the war against Iran would involve the
launching of a military attack against Iran. Of course, such an attack may mean a war
with heavy costs and damage to US interests and stimulate the very development of
an Iranian nuclear weapon to a higher degree. Thus, there is strong need for proof of
Iran‘s nuclear energy program intention as a basis for developing nuclear weapons.
This, however, has been ambiguous for more than 50 years. The Iranian regime, as
assessed by the US intelligence community, has not even decided to build such a
weapon (Risen & Mazzetti, 2012). Although the United States would take action to
support its closest allies, like Israel, against those who violate the IAEA and
international nuclear agreements, military strikes are likely to cause a disruption of
the oil flow from the Persian Gulf and price increases. With the fragile economy of
the US and the world in general, and the dependence on oil from this region, war
would likely deter economic recovery or even spark another global economic crisis.
Cohen specifically cites the statement from the Iranian president in 2012:
―Let's even imagine that we have an atomic weapon, a nuclear
weapon. What would we do with it? What intelligent person would fight
5,000 American bombs with one bomb?‖ (Greenwald, 2012).
Another role the US should probably take is to overthrow Iran‘s
government as it was the case during the Shah‘s era. Furthermore, the US has a long
history of overthrowing democracies and any other forms of government (Guatemala-
1954, Congo-1960, Dominican Republic-1961, etc.). The justification for such actions
is to maintain international security since the US, as a world power, must take this
responsibility. To the international perspective, Iran‘s government is a danger to the
United States, Israel, and the rest of the Middle East, and democracy is the only
solution to stabilize the region. This role will protect US access to oil in the Persian
Gulf in the long-term and is believed to end a regime that abuses human rights and
supports terrorism. It will also lend US support to Iranian democratic protesters which
will give positive effects to US in the future. There is evidence by Carl Herman that
Abdolmalek Rigi, leader of the assassination/terrorist group captured by Iranian
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government, testified that the US was engaged in state-sponsored terrorism to
overthrow Iran‘s government through funding him to get weapons and providing him
assistance with logistical management (Herman, n.d.). However, in this economic
climate, the American public will not support military force since it creates a bulk of
deficit spending similar to the Iraq war under Bush's presidency.
The US, then, should probably take a positive and diplomatic approach
like normalizing relations with Iran. As a world superpower, the United States is
responsible for a more peaceful world and should engage more positively with friends
and foes alike. The last few years have shown that there has been a mix of informal
diplomacy and formal policy-level statements communication through second-track
diplomacy by various unofficial groups, informal contacts between officials on both
sides, and the efforts of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates, and various senior US commanders to clarify that the United States
prefer diplomacy to war (Cordesman, 2008). Not only is the United States able to
address the nuclear weapons issue through a broad diplomatic effort, but it can also
address the issues of human rights and sponsorship of terrorism. This way will bring
mutual benefits to both Iran and the US to avoid destructive war. Nevertheless, the
question is whether there can be enough trust between the two parties that will make
this maneuver work.
In contrast, China pursues its foreign policy towards Iran in favour of its
own national interest. The demand for energy and resources has dramatically risen
and directed China‘s foreign policy. The main goal of China‘s policy towards Iran is
to use diplomatic ways to improve their relationship for sustaining smooth trade
routes. During the 1990s, China pressured Iran for a chance to be part of founding oil
contracts. Such persistence resulted in a signing of a memorandum of understanding
in October 2004, which provided Sinopec a leading position to develop the new
Yadavaran area in the southwest of Iran. That site was expected to have oil reserves of
3 billion barrels, and the overall contract was expected to have a value of US$100
billion (Tam, 2010). Iran is ranked as the second largest in the world in terms of the
amount of oil and gas reserves it occupies (Berman, 2011). In 2006, Iran, as China‘s
third largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia and Angola, provided China with 11%
of its oil imports (Rakel, 2009).
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Furthermore, China‘s economic interests in Iran not only concern energy,
but also non-hydrocarbon industries. 13% of Iran‘s total imports are from China,
which contains huge amounts of steel and machine equipment. Trade numbers
between Iran and China demonstrate that there has been a steady increase in Iran‘s
non-oil exports as nearly two billion US dollars worth of goods have gone to China
throughout 2009, which is a 26% growth compared to the previous year. Chinese
firms have dramatically invested in Iran‘s non-hydrocarbon industries. For example,
Cherry, the Chinese automobile firm, and Majmoeh Mazi Toos from Iran were in a
joint venture and started producing as of 2007. China‘s largest steel firm, China
Metallurgical Group, since 2008 has constructed factories in Yazd province.
Iran to China is a bargaining chip with the US on Taiwan and the Middle
East oil supply since US needs China to support its policy towards the Iranian nuclear
program. China‘s policy on Iran‘s nuclear program must be evaluated whether it is
favourable to the US or not, therefore reflecting its relationship with the US (Djallil,
2011). This, in turn, is referred to as conflicting cooperation. China‘s role on the Iran
nuclear issue, hence, must maintain good relationships with Tehran, an important
component in Beijing‘s Middle Eastern policy. At the same time, China must balance
its economic ties with the US as the US is the leading importer of Chinese products.
Iran‘s nuclear issue has also been on the EU/ EU-3‘s radar. When the US
needs support from Great Powers like the EU, and the EU has an ambition to become
a global player, the coercive policy from the EU against the proliferation of Iran‘s
nuclear program is inevitable. In October 2003, the EU-3 took an initiative to have its
representatives make it clear to Tehran that they did not accept Iran as a nuclear
weapons state and later broke-up negotiations in August 2005 (Sauer, 2007). The
opportunity for the EU to step in as the main negotiator with Iran arose from the US
rejection for diplomatic talks with Iran. At that time, the EU was already negotiating
with Iran on trade and associations. Later, the EU suspended the bilateral negotiations
on trade and associations because Iran declined their offer to sign the Additional
Protocol of the IAEA. Many negotiations between Iran and the EU were conducted
and stumbled between 2003 and2005, and a few agreements were signed. However,
Iran learnt that it was only the carrot that the EU might turn back on Iran anytime
when the situation changed. For example, in 2004 when the US made claims that Iran
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was violating the October 2003 agreement, the EU did not help Iran convince the
world that its missing parts in the Iranian declarations were not significant. Hence, the
act of mistrust pushed the Iranians to resume uranium conversion and to build a heavy
water plant. Trust has been a failing in political capital. In both parties‘ perceptions,
trust is something that has to be adequately built and strengthened (Santini, 2010).
The EU has been playing as a mediator on the Iran nuclear issue when the situations
become grim between Iran and the US or IAEA, or Russia and China. Apparently,
being in that role, the EU has shaped negotiations framework, which has undergone
subsequent enlargements, consistent with its securitised but multilateral discourses.
Russia, in the Iranian‘s eyes, on the other hand, seems to be another tyrant
called small ‗Satan‘. Their relations have never been simple. Rather, they have been
in many conflicts. During the 19th
to 20th
century, Iran, Russia‘s important partner,
lost its territory to the Russian empire. Iran was intervened in its succession by Russia
and the neighbours were invaded. Between Iran and Russia, the latter always employs
the carrots and sticks approach with the former. The agreement to complete the
Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) was followed by momentous protocols on the
construction of a centrifuge plant in Iran using Russian technology. Massive
deportations of Iranian spies from Moscow soon gave way to another rapprochement,
which became especially obvious against the backdrop of the chill in Russian-
American relations under George W. Bush (Vladimir & Ivan, 2011). The selling of its
S-300 air defence system missile from Russia to Iran at the beginning of this year sent
the message to Iran the benefits of sticking with the nuclear negotiations (al-Jadeed,
2015). These few samples and the recent Russia‘s admission of Iran to the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which counter balances the US role in Asia exemplify
Russia‘s role towards Iran‘s nuclear program as to gain leverage in relations with the
US.
Besides their individual motives, collectively as the P5+1, these Great
Powers also moved to stop Iran‘s nuclear proliferation. In 2006, the E3 were joined
by Russia, China and the U.S. This group is also alternatively known as the E3+3 or
the P5+1, referring to the three European powers + Russia China and America, or the
five world powers plus Germany. They released a joint statement in 2006 reaffirming
the principles of peaceful nuclear technology under strict supervision by the
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international community. To force Iran to corporate with IAEA, they imposed
sanctions. Negotiations with the world powers, beginning in 2003 with the three
European powers (Great Britain, France and Germany) and later joined by the U.S.,
Russia and China (P5+1), aimed to reach a lasting settlement which would enable Iran
to pursue peaceful nuclear energy while preventing the development of nuclear
weapons (Arms Control Association, 2016).
An interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the group of six
countries mentioned above) was signed on November 2013. In it, Iran agreed to stop
the enrichment of uranium to 20% purity in exchange for limited relief of economic
sanctions. The deal came into effect on January 20, 2014 and was set to expire on
June 20, 2014. The agreement has a provision for renewal without change for a
further six months should the parties wish it (Arms Control Association, 2016).
In order to gain a better view of the P5+1 approach to Iran‘s Nuclear
Issue, a chronological recount of the most important developments in Iran‘s nuclear
program, international attempts to negotiate a settlement to address this controversial
issue, and implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 on July 14
will be explored (Arms Control Association, 2016).
From the day the P5+1 proposed a framework agreement to Iran offering
incentives for Iran to stop its enrichment program for an indefinite period of time in
2006, Iran did not completely reject the condition, declaring that the package
contained ―elements which may be useful for a constructive approach‖. Later in 2008,
the P5+1 offered a new comprehensive proposal to Iran, updating its 2006 incentives
package. Maintaining the same basic framework as the one in 2006, the proposal
emphasized an initial ―freeze-for-freeze‖ process wherein Iran would stop any
expansion of its enrichment activities while the UN Security Council agreed not to
impose further sanctions (Arms Control Association, 2016). Nothing happened.
During Obama‘s administration in 2009, another initiative to fuel Tehran Research
Reactor was proposed. The proposal from the US was backed by IAEA required Iran
to export the majority of its 3.5 percent enriched Uranium in return for 20 percent-
enriched uranium fuel for the TRR, which Iran had exhausted much of its supply. The
proposal was not met. In 2010, Iran began the procedure of producing 20 percent
enriched uranium, allegedly for the TRR (Arms Control Association, 2016).
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Other P5+1‘s efforts to work out with Iran in the meeting in Istanbul
failed to reach a substantive agreement. The P5+1 rejected Iran‘s preconditions of a
fuel-swap plan and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment along
with the lifting of sanctions. However, talks in Istanbul in 2012 with the P5+1 showed
positive signs. Both parties, the P5+1 and Iran, agreed on a framework to continue
negotiations with a step-by-step process and joint actions. Many meetings followed in
2012 until Iran and the P5+1 met again in Almaty for a second round of talks in 2013.
At the end of the meetings, negotiators announced that no further meetings were
scheduled and the sides remained far apart. However, after the new election of Iran‘s
President, Hasan Rouhani, the new president called for the resumption of significant
negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear program (Arms Control Association,
2016).
In early November 2013 at the Geneva talks, there was another failure to
reach an agreement on a first-phase deal of both parties. This time, both the P5+1 and
Iran announced that talks would continue on November 20 in Geneva with the belief
that the differences were narrowed . Early on November 24, Iranian Minister Javad
Zarif and Catherine Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiating team, signed an agreement
called the Joint Plan of Action. It laid out certain steps for each side in a six-month,
first-phase agreement, and the broad framework to guide negotiations for a
comprehensive solution. Iran needed to hold off on its nuclear program. In return, it
would receive limited sanctions relief, repatriation of limited assets frozen abroad,
and an obligation that no new nuclear-related sanctions would be imposed on Iran for
the duration of the agreement (Arms Control Association, 2016).
A few more meetings were held after that Joint Plan of Action agreement
to discuss technical implementation. The program became active a month later. After
its first successful action, in May 2014, Iran and the IAEA announced an additional
five actions for Iran to complete before August 25, 2014. Iran and the P5+1 continued
talks in Vienna on a comprehensive nuclear agreement (Arms Control Association,
2016). On June 19, the parties announced additional actions that Iran would take,
namely converting 25 kg of uranium powder enriched to 20 percent into fuel plates
and blending down about 3 tons of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent. In return,
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the P5+1 would also repatriate $2.8 billion in funds. Many talks between the P5+1
and Iran continued and exhibited positive progress (Arms Control Association, 2016).
In December 2014, U.S. State Department officials said the talks are
"good and substantive." Even in February 2015, a report by the Director General of
the IAEA confirmed that Iran upheld its commitments under the interim deal,
including additional provisions from the November 2014 extension. The report noted
―Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to centrifuge
assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.‖
Nevertheless, there was evidence of a minor clash in March 2015 when Prime
Minister Netanyahu delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress. His speech
claimed that the Iran deal would all but guarantee that Iran receives substantial
nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2016). This speech aroused the US
Senate; Senator Tom Cotton and 46 other senators signed an open letter to the
Parliament of Iran warning that any deal reached without legislative approval could be
revised by the next president ―with the stroke of a pen.‖ As a consequence, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed legislation authored by Senator
Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) that would require the President to submit the deal to Congress
for a vote of approval or disapproval, and the President would not be able to waive
sanctions during the 30-day Congressional review period.
On July 19,2015, after Iran and the P5+1 announced a comprehensive deal
on Iran‘s Nuclear program, the Obama administration sent the comprehensive deal
and supporting documents to Congress, beginning the 60-day review period mandated
by the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act. The 34th Senator announced support for the
nuclear deal with Iran, meaning that Congress would not have the support to overrule
a presidential veto on a resolution to disapprove the deal. This significant indicator
would prevent the Senate from reaching the 60-vote threshold required to end the
debate and move to vote on a resolution of disapproval. Nonetheless, a vote on a
resolution of approval failed in the House of Representatives, 269-162, with 25
Democrats joining the Republicans in voting against the measure. The congressional
review period ended without passage of a resolution of approval or a resolution of
disapproval (Arms Control Association, 2016). Everything in 2015 seemed to be
promising. The IAEA had no credible indication that nuclear material was diverted
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from Iran's declared program in the comprehensive deal or that any activities
continued after 2009. The IAEA verified that Iran met its nuclear related
commitments. After the announcement of the conclusion of Iran's nuclear deal on July
14, 2015, questions rose whether there was a theoretical explanation of the genuine
reasons that led to this agreement.
Attention should be paid to special words and subjects like reconciled
conception, the polical influence, statism, national interests, the diplomacy institute,
and great power‘s relationships. What are the existing and potential trends of the
agreement? From the chronological events above, there were many events that
confirmed the consequences of the decision-makers‘ human nature when it comes to
the deal between P5+1grop and the Iranian nuclear program. It can be seen in Iran's
suspicion of the intentions, objectives, measures and proposals of the member states
of the P5+1 group. Iran saw that all of the above items were in conflict with its own
structure, nature and goals and, obviously, member states of the P5+1 had already
provided grounds for the imposition of all kinds of sanctions against Iran. However,
the P5+1 group were uncertain about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
Moreover, during nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries, each
side moved along the lines of its own national interests, so Iran sought to obtain the
right to enrich uranium on its soil recognized by the P5+1 group, to have sanctions
removed, and to secure the right continue with its nuclear activities. However, the
P5+1 group sought to work out powerful and serious guiding mechanisms to oversee
Iran's nuclear program in order to make sure that there are no diversions in that
program regarding the production of nuclear weapons (Khoshandam, 2015). Yet,
given the fact that policies consist of negotiation approaches, the diplomatic subject
like the Iran agreement is appropriate ideal for this area. In spite of moral discussions
and local conflict in US and Iran, these two major aspects of the nuclear debates could
remain because of ethical reasons. The US and Iran foreign governors succeeded the
deal by spent long hours of negotiation (Khoshandam, 2015).
Hence, from a Realist perspective, it is unadvisable to analyze the Iran‘s
Nuclear issue on power and economics alone without additional tools of diplomacy,
national power, balance of power, international ethics, global public opinion, and
international law. Understanding the actions of Iran toward the world is complex and
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problematic due to its deep psychological and historical backgrounds. Future
viewpoint of the negotiation on Iran nuclear issue requires common respect, and
government‘s actions that give the realistic clarification on the causes and prospect of
Iran deal (Khoshandam, 2015). In addition to the consequence of Iran agreement,
Islamic state is going to make the new pattern for interactions toward Western state
and it different from the pattern toward Germany, Russia, Japan and Vietnam.
In summary, America wants to defend the hegemonic position and
integrity with many states and that will not let Iran a chance to develop the capacity of
nuclear program. China wants to sustain the energy and financial income, therefore,
merely benefit to its current economy. Despite the Great Powers‘ differences of their
interests, all states engaged their policies concerning the nuclear program of Iran
merely regarding their own survival and individual advantage. Therefore, the research
finds that motivation for the states to use the contradictory methods is due to their
own national material benefits. The national interest of the United States mainly
concerned with whether Iran can attain the nuclear deterrence or not. As for China,
however, its national interests are subjected to economic modernization and energy
security. Russia is to leverage its status quo with Washington and its relation with Iran
for oil. The EU uses a diplomatic approach just to secure its position in the world
power and to shape the framework of negotiations. Last but not least the P5+1, they
should take it seriously that the agreement will lift the sanctions as well as Iran can
incorporate with the economic world. Also Iran could possible increase both of its
international and regional power. Furthermore, the American competitors like China
and Russia, will probable gain from the agreement throughout trade with Iran in both
military and oil products. Among various circumstances, opponents are able to attain
their objective security from the strategy of collaboration thus they should take the
collaboration when these circumstances occur.
5.1.2 Balance of Power Approach
As mentioned above, the realists will approach Iran‘s nuclear weapon
international policy of the Great Powers in way that protects their own sovereignty
and interests. Further investigation into the issue via the balance of power approach
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will lead us to see that there is a concealed power matching move (the use or threat of
military force) in an individual policy.
The relationships of the US and Iran in the past era involved the economic
issue, the leader Shah mainly interested in the corporation from the United States,
especially the financial, aerospace and oil industry. In 1970 the Shah was the leading
buyer military good from the United States which involved selling oil in exchange for
buying armed products. While for Shah, he just wanted to maintain the support of the
monarchy from the US. During the Shah‘s period, the US relation with the Shah was
very supportive, even human rights issues were of no concern to US president Jimmy
Carter who was seen as the ‗champion of human rights‘ to the world. In 1978 during
the Shah‘s dictatorship, Carter said ‗Iran is an island of stability in one of the more
troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your
leadership and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.
There is no leader in the world for whom I feel such deep gratitude and personal
friendship as the deep gratitude and personal friendship as the Shah‘ (G. & J.T, 1978).
Their relationship turned sour because of Khomeini when the US invoked the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to freeze all Iranian
government assets and properties. The development of the relationship between the
US and Iran and its nuclear program must be examined after the Shah‘s collapse. The
imposing of the IEEPA was followed by the Algiers Accord in 1980 to settle the
financial claim between Iran and the US. Also in the same year, the US had a dual
containment policy to restrain military and economic of Iraq and Iran for the benefit
to the US‘s client countries in Middle East, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. However,
this policy was to use the stressed the Iran and Iraq conflict relationship and to start
the war. Iran perceived that US was behind the war between Iran and Iraqi. From
Robert Parry‘s document, ‗It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter
gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd‘(Parry,
2003), it is apparent that the US wanted to overthrow and weaken the Iranian
government. Although the US tried to prove to the world that it is neutral in this war,
there was ample evidence that the US supported both sides with military arsenals,
acting as a double agent. The US supplied much of what Saddam needed in building
chemical weapons, including anthrax (see, Denver Post, October10, 2001,
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Washington Post, December 30, 2002). Later, the US removed Iraq from the terrorist
nations list, but put Iran on it instead. This again illustrated that the US would like to
weaken Iran‘s power or government even it had to break its own Algiers Accord
agreement. The sanctions put on Iran by the US influenced by Israel were to bring
down the Iranian government and replace it with a US-Israeli friendly one. Numerous
sanctions passed against Iran, each tougher than the next. However, the intensity and
frequency of sanction bills slowed because the US sanction laws had become too
extreme and non-enforceable, and also the many US associations became active in
opposing the sanctions as the sanctions affected their economic benefits. During
Bush‘s administration, the Israelis and their ‗neoconservative‘ counterparts in the US
government changed the direction of the US foreign policy toward Iran using the
Nuclear program issue to do to Iran what had been done to Iraq. The news of the
nuclear program threat fabricated by the US and Israel was to create public security
concern, the psychological warfare and move against Iran to justify their further
aggressive action. Nevertheless, a military attack against Iran is difficult and could
have long term consequences. Therefore, such an attack has never been the first
option of the US-Israel, but they aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This
sense of power threat to invade Iran‘s administration from the Super Powers makes
the Iran nuclear program resolution far from possible. In reality, retrieve to the
military sites of Iran for inspection has not been a problem of numerous occasions,
both on the nuclear front and, even more frequently, as part of Iran‘s obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. However, the request must not be
excessive, but on an equal basis and not be purely based on interrogations. This
reaction from Iran is seen as its rejection to the US for trying to reduce the balance of
power from Iran. Having the ear of US Republicans controlling both houses of
Congress, Netanyahu being terrified of the shift of Middle East‘s power balance,
recently paused of the nuclear development deal between US and Iran, asking that the
states discussing with Iran to include a nonexchangeable requirement that Iran
recognizes the right of Israel (Lewis, 2015, April 3). This speech arose after the
agreement between America and Iran early this year to waive sanctions in Iran.
To the US hegemonic order, China and Russia pose long-term threats to
the global balance of power, strengthening Iran (and India, Japan, etc.) relations
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would then be its long-term strategy. Iran appeared to China to be a way of earning
foreign currency on nuclear and missile corporation, and also as a way to punish the
US for Taiwan transgressions while gaining political capital. Consequently, China
prefers that Iran-US relations be tense over its nuclear projects and that sanction
against Iran remain in place. The sanctions will deter Iran from its ability to rebuild its
naval power that would give them an edge over China. Inherently, China wants Iran to
remain as a weak state as well as limited Iran nuclear program to a certain level to
prevent Iran from the capability to determine India‘s power balance over Pakistan.
China concerns when Iran and the West harmonies and that would impede Asian‘s
power balance before it can presume hegemonic position in term of both military and
economy. Therefore, compare to the cooperation of military among Iran and India or
Iran and the West, China become more insecure to the possible settlement of Iran
nuclear (Shabaneh, 2015).
As an oil rich country in Europe, Russia is focusing the problem of energy
as ‗a changeable power resource‘ (Nye, 1990) to force the EU countries to grant or
deny particular resolutions on Iran, Ukraine, Syria, Georgia, and Chechnya. Super
power of Russia and aggression on European countries persuaded the EU countries to
find the substitute energy resourse (Wilson, 2014). Iran is viewed by the European
leaders as a reliable alternative. This competition is overwhelming to long run views
of Russia to become a leading of regional power. Keeping the unsettled disagreement
between Iran and the West on nuclear issue benefits the Russians. Therefore, Iran will
not be pressured by Russia, and this will not speed up any negotiation by Iranian and
Western nuclear issue. This rationale proves persistence of Russia to supply and
develop Iran nuclear capacities. Thus, Russia is insensitive to any reform in system of
balance of power in the Muslim world and can adapt much better than China. Iran to
Russia has no economical or military benefits to Russia. Russia gains a profit from
selling weapon to compensate for its reduced oil revenues. Moreover, Russia has been
a dominant power and can recover its status with the capacity which means much
more easily and faster than China can. Russia has massive caches of arms and
possesses many nuclear weapons. Russia is very assertive to engage in arm trading on
a global scale. Unlike China, Russia is prepared to fight the West, whereas China is so
cautious due to concerns over their supplies and enhancement. China would like to
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keep its status in traditional way as a rising power rather than assume an encountering
status on political conflict throughout the globe.
5.2 Multilateral Relations
There was recent news on the Iran nuclear issue. After 20-longmonths of
negotiations by President Obama, on 14 July 2015 Iran and P5+1, directed by US,
achieved a historical treaty to limit extensively Iranian nuclear capability for more
than 10 years in exchange to get rid of the sanction of financial issue and global oil
supply (Gordon & Sanger, 2015).
If we reflect back to history, this deal, to Iran, will lift crippling
international sanctions, which have seriously reduced its currency value. However,
whether this deal is going to materialize still depends largely on the reaction of the
key international players and the US Congress. It appears immediately after the
accord that Republican lawmakers may fight to derail this nuclear deal (Weisman &
Davis, 2015).
Iran‘s decision to enter into negotiations has directed outcome of the
international sanctions pressure which was built on economy in Iran. Many people did
not think it would be possible for Iran‘s leaders to agree to accept restrictions to their
nuclear program unless these pressure sanctions regimes were forced by UN, United
States, and EU. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran due to its
increasing of nuclear actions. United States imposed sanctions oppose companies
which finance in energy sector in Iran and have included them in the NDAA (National
Defense Authorization Acts) of 2012 and 2013, that directly affected the Iranian
Central Bank and oversea organizations having business with the Iranian Central
Bank. US intentionally attacked key purchaser of Iran‘s oil, pushing the buyer to
reduce extensively the oil quantities purchased from Iran.
The EU has prohibited all oil imports from Iran and any investments made
by EU-based business in energy sector in Iran since October 2010.
For a number of years, the leader global powers followed two policies:
supporting Iran to involve in diplomatic discussions, whereas forcing more intensive
sanctions oppose the financial and energy segments of Iran. Most active were both the
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United States and Israel. This final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
agreement was proposed on 2 April 2015 by P5+1 (with EU assistance). It is
important to note that the framework deal of both the US and Iran have discrepancies.
This include issues regarding the disposal of 9,700 kg decreased uranium by Iran; the
unequal expiration period of some aspects of the agreement that will last 10 years
while certain aspects will last 15 years; the centrifuges currently installed at Fordow;
the mechanisms of the international inspection; and the volume of retrieve of
information that will be permitted by IAEA.
Moreover, the differences of the versions between US and Iran also
involve the period for sanctions lifting. While US talks about contingency on Iran
having further actions to reverse its nuclear power, the sanctions in Iran will be
cancelled once the agreement is implemented. The discrepancies make the JCPOA
(The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) seen as an agreement that ‗kicks the can
down the road‘, meaning that the world will revisit the issue of Iran‘s unhindered
nuclear program in ten or fifteen years. The Great Powers were aware that Iran might
use this agreement to justify its rights to nuclear power for safety reasons toward the
related the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) issue while without the agreement,
the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not give Iran the right to enrich uranium or separate
plutonium (Blake, 2013).
There has been mixed reactions, including sharp criticisms from many key
country leaders on the JCPOA. While Obama saw this as the deal to restructure one of
the United States‘ deepest adversarial relationships, Israel‘s P.M. Benjamin
Netanyahu thinks Iran nuclear weapons as a potentially existential risk. The US
House Speaker, John A. Boehner, himself believed contrarily to P.M. Obama that
rather than creating the more peaceful world, this would just in sprit Iran, the globe‘s
biggest support of terror, by assisting steady its system (―What key players,‖ 2015).
The Russians, however, seemed to be very supportive of this agreement. President
Vladimir V. Putin, said that ‗We are confident that the world today breathed a sigh of
relief‘. His motive emphasized Russia‘s plans to be a major partner with Iran in the
development of its ‗exclusively peaceful‘ nuclear power. Even the P.M. Bashar Al-
Assad of Syria who is a proxy supported by Iran also said that ‗We have no doubt that
the coming days will see momentum for the constructive role of the Iranian Islamic
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republic to support the rights of the people and strengthen the bases of peace‘. He
believed the stressful US citizen interests in nuclear negotiation as a de facto
identification of Iranian power since the emerge of the Islamic country and Qaeda-
linked groups such as the Nusra Front in Syria had directed the US to view Iran as an
important alliance.
Was Obama aware of the gain Iran received is the loss Saudi Arabia may
perceive? Less than a week, not long after the announcement of the deal reached by
P5+1 and Iran, there was a meeting between Obama and Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia
Foreign Minister, requested by the Saudi‘s King Salman. The source said that the
discussion was raised by Al-Jubeir on how to boost security cooperation between the
US and Saudi Arabia, an important bilateral relationship that has long been in good
terms.
The realism may look at this as a good sign of international policy for
peace, but if we view it from the balance of power perspective, the firm stance of
President Obama on JCPOA came from his strategic move to ally with Iran as a
regional power. Obama also did not think that any European countries attempt to
prohibit nuclear development in Iran with power rather than ethical resolution, even
when taking into consideration Iran‘s assistance of terror and the development of
nuclear. However, Obama has a role to prove that he is not alienating allies while
romancing adversaries by having economic interests overriding security interests.
Nevertheless, the UNSC (UN Security Council) approves JCPOA which was
generally considered a formality, as all the five permanent members of the UN were
partners to the negotiations with Iran and the JCPOA.
From 2006 to 2010 all nations in the UN and P5+1 forced several UN
policies including sanction punishment. For more than a decade, international powers
have raised concerns that Tehran is using its nuclear enrichment program to build a
nuclear weapon (National Intelligence Council, 2007) (Kirgis, 2008) breaking the
terms outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 and
ratified it in 1970, which was subject to IAEA verification. Iran consequently allows
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect, but there has not been
confirm that Iran did not have the nuclear weapon development. mentioned Iran was
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mentioned by IAEA to the UNSC for not be able to follow the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) restriction in 2005.
In 2005 UNSC has implemented six policies acquiring Iran stopping
nuclear enrichment, some compelling sanctions (United Nations, 2012). In 2012,
United States and European Union started forcing more sanctions on oil export and
bank of Iran, pressing Iran to compromise.
The all five permanent members of the UNSC has nuclear power thus
UNSC was viewed as the political tool and it is used to predominately indicate the
interest policy and politic motivation of those countries who do what benefits them
most— such as, in 1991 protecting the Kuwait‘s oil even it rich in resources but in
1994 ignorance of protection in Rwandans‘s resources (Rajan, 2011). The former
Chair of United Nations Association Westminster, Titus Alexander, explained UNSC
as a main supporter of global apartheid (Alexander, 1996).
The relevance and effectiveness of UNSC has been questioned by some,
especially the Iran nuclear issue in which there was a lack of proof for not following
UNSC policy. The threat analysis of Iran nuclear program is considerably less urgent
regarding Iran‘s capabilities to deploy ballistic missiles, which could threaten the
international community more than the development of a nuclear device. In his
inaugural speech at the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in August 2012,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei criticized the United Nations Security Council as having an
‗illogical, unjust and completely undemocratic structure and mechanism‘ and called
for a complete reform of the body (―Supreme Leader‘s,‖ 2012).
While international consensus was being built for robust action at the UN,
the P5+1, especially the US in this JCPOA deal, pursued its own unilateral measures
and enforced it through the UN. As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to not see
that the Obama‘s motive may be economic interests over security interests that make
him overlook all the small issues that lie in the deal and even jeopardize his long-term
relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel. In fact, US and Israel relationships have
been uncomfortable for a few years. Israel‘s motion to back Romney and the
difference in their religious beliefs may have caused the deterioration in their
relationship. The Iran nuclear issues are all about power. The US wanted to convey a
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message to Israel. The real issues concerned the money in the Middle East region,
thus, all decisions made were based on politics.
In summary, the Great Powers‘ approach towards Iran‘s nuclear issue has
never been absolute. In fact, examining the issue from various angles or frameworks,
using either Realism or Balance of Power, the Great Powers regard Iran more in terms
of its economic value than a threat. In particular, the US strives to maintain a stable
economy while ensuring its hegemonic power is in place. The US has never exercised
any military force against Iran and prefers to use a diplomatic approach.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MUSLIM WORLD’S VS THE GREAT POWERS’
RESPONSE TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR POWER
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is noteworthy that the Muslim
World‘s response and the Great Powers‘ response to Iran‘s nuclear power are on the
same page, but for differing purposes. To really be able to compare their approaches
to Iran‘s nuclear power from the Muslim World‘s and the Great Powers‘ perspectives,
three levels of analysis to illustrate international concerns and reactions should be
used. According to Christopher Pang, it is necessary to analyze the case from the
international, regional, and domestic levels in order to be able to understand relevant
aspects regarding the response of individual groups on Iran‘s nuclear program and
nuclear intentions (Interview with Dr. Christopher Pang, 2008).
In order to analyze this issue, however, it is necessary to assess power
struggles and the key players. It is not merely Sunni and Shia conflict. This is a game
of the balance of power; however, it is not a game based on matching the different
states‘ military power on the battlefield. Linkages can be made among three
parameters: regional country ambitions, transnational affinities and internal wars,
(Salloukh, 2013). Only power struggle combination and the key players allow for an
assessment to help shed light on the distinct approaches between the Muslim World
and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear issue.
6.1 International Level
The Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the P5+1, and the UN
play an important role in the international community as inter-governmental
organizations. The OIC at the international level approach the Iran nuclear program as
a measure to illustrate solidarity with the Islamic nations to deal with the challenges
while pressing Israel signing in the NPT as well as allow the UN supervise
comprehensively the nuclear weapon. UN stance at the international level is that Iran
did not obtain nukes which is a positive development for world security; now, the UN
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approved the JCPOA. However, the question is: what is in it for the UN? It is,
therefore, obvious that the Great Powers approached the Iran nuclear program due to
their strategic interests instead of addressing their concerns over world security.
6.1.1 Power Struggle
The economic in China is the bigger scale than the economic in the US,
and it is something which the Chinese can use as political leverage on the
international stage. In other words, this is a geopolitical earthquake. After the post-
World War II period, the US with its leading role, could force the previous European
powers to agree with a multilateral economic system which were close to the UN
system. Since then, the US has shown that its hegemonic interests involved ensuring
the world‘s stability. The realist theory believed that for global stability to succeed,
the hegemonic power is necessary as it can impose specific regulation of behaviour in
global affairs. Since the hegemonic country in this case can achieve long-run benefits
(Nabudere, 2004). Until 9/11, the world systems of the international relations were
critically experimented. Currently, New World Order is prone to creating strategic
and political turbulence.
Samuel Huntington, in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order (1997), located the rise of radical Islamism (Huntington,
1997). This was mainly the discontent linked to western dominance in the local oil
business in the region, with the support of the original rule oppose many population
interests. Although 9/11 was probably a situation which was beyond US expectation
of oil interests in the region, it still linked to the situation remarkable (Onyango-Obbo,
2002). Geostrategic and geopolitical implications of the nuclear issue in Iran have
become obviously that the Great Powers aim to control energy-rich regions as well as
vibrant and dynamic economies. The US is now aware of the global power shift
resulting from Asia‘s economic and financial strengths. The nuclear accord is an
indication of the increasing issues that hegemonic country is facing because this
works its way to violence and conflict to destroy the economic relation power and to
encounter increasing challenges to US. Many of America‘s partners, UK as a leader,
challenged the United States and shifted their corporation from the US to China. For
instance, earlier this year many countries participated as establishing partners of the
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Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. The US now must find an
effective plan to cope with this change.
Iran positions among three regions, Asia, Africa and Europe, because it
produces 40 percent of oil globe exporting. This region possesses the natural gas as
the second and oil reserve as the fourth largest in the world. US now chose to be
diplomatic on the Iran nuclear issue, seeing that it can gain much leverage over Iran
and much strategic flexibility. To maintain its dominance in the Eurasia region, US
relations are involved with the world‘s major powers who are themselves principal
competitors in the zone. Two of these competitors are China and Japan, two countries
that obtain much of their oil supply from Iran. US prefer to abandon sanctions in
favour of all-out war instead of a military encounter with Russia or China. The
JCPOA accord helps prevent Iran from being drawn into closer partnerships with
China and Russia who are actively supporting Iran economically and militarily.
Should the Accord prove effective, the US would elevate its relations with Iran which
in turn would stabilize the Middle East region under Washington‘s leadership. Only a
day after a nuclear agreement with Iran, President Obama said that ‗it‘s important for
Tehran to be part of the conversation‘, commenting on the resolution of Syria‘s
conflict (Lucas, 2015). Hence the Iran deal gives the US a better position to withstand
challenges to its dominance, including through military means, from its more
formidable opponents, not only Russia and China, but also Germany, Japan and other
imperialist powers.
On the other hand, the Muslim World viewed the nuclear deal with mixed
reactions. Iran‘s allies may praise the deal while other countries are welcoming it.
Nevertheless, enemies of the Islamic Republic have expressed concerns. Although at
the international level, the OIC, which is the second largest inter-governmental
organization, may perform like the representative of the Muslim World as well as
support the deal. On the contrary, the world knows precisely well that the members
who make up the organization are divided into two major camps: Sunni and Shia. The
approach of the OIC to the Iran nuclear program at the international level may be seen
as its steadiness and the peaceful purpose throughout the world and the region to
support ‗the rights of people‘, but those not aligned with Iran were not convinced.
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The Muslim World to the Great Powers is a geostrategic ally. The Muslim World is
significant as it encompasses of the Muslim world in North Africa, South East Asia,
the Middle East and which are home to strategic international waterways. These
strategic routes in pursuing strategic goals are so serious which the Great Powers have
stressed its need to control them. The controlling of marine routes has played a vital
role in gaining global power within long cycles of world politics. The Middle East is
also the center of the Muslim religion. All these features and their oil reserves make
the Muslim World powerful according to the Great Powers‘ perception. The power
resources equate the economic power of the Muslim World which can be used as a
balance tool to enforce the opinions on others, such as the effect of oil crisis in 1973
and the OIC‘s ability to mobilize the Muslim population to support the resolution of
international problems, e.g. Iraq during the Gulf War. All Muslim countries are well
aware of this, and internationally they need to cooperate with the direction of the OIC.
The influencer in the OIC is obviously Iran. With the support of the US to placate its
allies who do not have alliances with Iran by offering the modern weapons
techniques, raising confidential military collaboration. The Muslim World‘s approach
to the Iran nuclear program as an Ummah will be to support the nuclear deal and its
nuclear program in order to benefit collectively from the politico-economic power.
6.1.2 Key Players
China, Russia and the US with some of the EU are the prominent players
in terms of the international geopolitical power at present based on the above study.
The EU has been looking to expand its own ideals by diplomatic way. As for the Iran
nuclear issue, its soft policies are being set successful in the world agenda. The EU is
strongly agreed with state-building after the conflict and recently after the deal, the
Vice-President/High Representative Federica Mogherini of the EU arrived in Tehran
on an official visit to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zariffor. Th
two discussed the implementation of the agreement, including bilateral relations with
Saudi Arabia and other regional issues (Mogherini, 2015).
As China does not have close relationship with Iran, its voice on the Iran
nuclear Issue is not strong. In addition, they do not have much joint activities.
However, Chinese petrol businesses could success in biding to develop large petrol
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industries in Iran during sanctions. After the agreement, China became more
interested by holding in-depth meetings, and Iran‘s new president, Hassan Rouhani,
and Chinese President, Xi Jinping, met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Summit. A few high-level exchanges occurred between Iran and China which signals
the positive nature of their bilateral relationship as well as Iran‘s approval of China‘s
position on the Iranian nuclear issue. China‘s anti-war stance supports Iran‘s good
relation approach towards China and increases their energy collaboration.
Accordingly, the recent deal of the nuclear issue of Iran has created China the good
outcomes. Whether the future of the Iran-China relationship will threaten the US and
lead to more positive influences on this issue is yet to be seen. In the meantime, China
is closely following the deal to ensure that Iran is able to limit their use of uranium
and that the Iran nuclear program will not create to war.
In contrast, Russian may lose its position on the global stage and become
more isolated internationally if there is an improvement in relationship between Iran
and US. Russia treats Iran as gateway to influence the politics and economy in the
Middle East region. Hence, it is Putin‘s priority to strengthen Iran-Russia bilateral
ties. To avoid being left out, Russian officials have made great efforts throughout the
nuclear talks to reveal themselves as being vital to the decision-making. Russia is
unable to go against the tide; it is also facing challenges due to the economic
consequences in Iran as its economy depends largely on oil exports. Therefore,
Russian international policy from now must ensure that there are economic gains from
logistical benefits and the selling of nuclear technology can help offset its loss from
oil exports.
6.2 Regional Level
In considering the issue of the Muslim World‘s response and the Great
Powers‘ response to the Iran nuclear power at the regional level, it is interesting to
summarize that it relates to the new balance of power in the Middle East challenge.
Regionally, the Middle East has no single dominant and acknowledged regional
power. However, Iran is the country where we can study to understand the Middle
East‘s future. Despite contenders who were not always united such as Egypt, Saudi
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Arabia, Iran, Israel, and Turkey, Iran is the winner in this region probably for the long
run. Take the US move to confirm this in light of the Iran deal to safeguard its
relationship with regional allies. Nevertheless, there is still turbulence in the region
due to intra-regional power struggles between regional powers like Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Iran.
Although an accord deal is on the way, in the new Middle East, it will be
premature to say that US and Iran are being the partner but this is not what they wish
for. However, they start their communication on their mutual benefits. In a next ten
years, they will increase cooperation for the same objectives using the nuke as
leverage. Iran will be a major player to change the new region, with much more
consent from the US than would have seemed possible a decade ago.
Figure 6.1
Complication of the Middle East Key Players and Notable Relationship
Note: Reprinted from ―The Middle East: Key players & notable relationship,‖ (n.d.) Retrieved
from http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/the-middle-east-key-players-
notable-relationships/
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6.2.1 Power Struggle
The major players in the Middle East have been Iran, Egypt, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia with Syria including Iraq as important regional determinants. From its
geopolitical and geostrategical position, Iran is now becoming a main player who has
a potential dominant power.
For the long time, there has not been only one major power in the Middle
East. In the past, it was Arab power politics — Egypt, Syria, and Iraq — but they
have now deteriorated, collapsed by policy failures and divisional societies and do not
have significant role. Saudi Arabia wants to lead and with Iran, they are playing a
balance of power game. Saudi Arabia had hoped to lead. However, with a raising
uncertainty domestic role and an approaching change leadership, it may gain power.
Nonetheless, the inability to stop their citizens from protesting is a vulnerability and
insufficient legitimacy signal which will lead to repression. This is not a sign of new
power. In addition, Saudi Arabia‘s failures in Syria, where all the regional players
have been drawn in, have already shown its limitations. Needless to say, its low
population, weak institutions and oil dependency make it seem not to have a leading
role in the region.
The non-Arab states in the region are also not likely to assume the role of
dominant power. Turkey is working to be a regional leader, but it collapsed and
damaged over Syria and internal conflict. Israel has minor dominant and works
behind the sense by keep an eye on Iran and the US carefully observes the perception
of their solutions with the Palestinians. For 21st century, Israel also sees that the
Middle East poses a real challenge. However Israel may have the army and weapons
capability to dominate this region, it lacks religion and identity bonds across borders,
making it difficult for it to reach such a status.
The changes in the region‘s strategic balance occurs when the two major
regional powers with military significance, Turkey and Iran, have combined in this
Turkey-Iran-Syria grouping of geopolitical and geostrategic significance. As highly-
militarized nations of the Middle East, the grouping imparts a strategic significance in
unsettling the balance of power in the Middle East region. Additionally, Iran-
Pakistan-Afghanistan group is another periphery of the Middle East; this triangular
configuration illustrates that both these politico-strategic regional configurations
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demonstrate how Iran emerges as the strategic magnet to which other participant
nations have been drawn to. Obviously, the member states of this alignment relate to
Israel. Politically, Pakistan has moved closer to Iran who gained more revenue from
the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline.
Besides the Syria issue, Turkey is not a major player in the Middle East
due to its geography and culture. Plus, Turkey does not have the thorough contact like
Iran has.
The regional power has also a religious element which is now the cause of
Middle East conflict. Islamic countries take seriously consideration to Islamic sharia
once creating a new political regulation (Kazmi, n.d.). Leaders of many Middle East
countries realize that the deployment of technology in Western side, but not Western
social structure, is important for success in the world community. Most communities
in the Middle East think there is the Western social system which creates a war from
their religious and traditional perspective. However, many of leaders in the Middle
East take benefit from their people by abusing this sentiment. It is unavoidable that in
the future religion is still keep playing a major position for the Middle East because
the fate of Palestinian/Israeli conflict, role of Persian nation of Iran, and position of
the region as a leader in international relation depends largely on it. Although ISIS
may try to abolish countries and found a new direction, Iran itself, similar to that of
high ranking Catholic clergy in Italy, the highly-sophisticated clergy Islamified the
current nation institutions who paved the way for new ends. Iran, with its nuclear
capacity, is exclusively prepared to support steady the Middle East in anything which
it begin after the rearrangement period. Iran has proved to the Muslim World in cases
like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah, Sunni militant. It assisted
Afghanistan in countering Pakistan‘s mischief. It helped Iraq and Syria from being
invaded by the Levant (ISIS) and Iraq. In Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, it exhibited
full security support.
Politically, Iran stands against Saudi Arabia in a power tussle for
leadership in the Middle East. US, before the JCPOA deal, used to strengthen the
support of its Sunni enemies, particularly Saudi Arabia in marginalizing Iran, but Iran
is very important as an oasis of solidity in a desert of weak nations due to its
consistency and point of naturalness like China to the East Asia. Hence, the US
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realized that it is wiser to go with the flow since Saudi Arabia and its Sunni partners
are a greater risk to Middle East solidity than Iran. The Arab states are vulnerable and
unsteady. Eventually, US and Iran have a similar situation when it comes to encounter
the risk. The fact is that the nuclear problem will not be the main issue for a certain
period.
6.2.2 Key Players
Besides Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia play leading roles in the regional
level within a group of player in the region, both states and non-state actors. However,
they will not encounter each other in the battle field. It is over simplified and distorted
to conclude that it is about Sunni and Shia. Their dispute is hardly sectarianism but
regional influence. Nevertheless, sectarianism is an essential element to gain regional
support. It is still playing the major role to determine the Middle East‘s future because
they determine the Palestinian/Israeli‘s fate, decide the role of Iran, and build the
leader position in the region of world.
Iran has its dependencies: the Iraqi regime (to a limited degree), Bashar al
Asad‘s regime in Syria, and Hizballah in Lebanon while Saudi Arabia‘s allies are in
the Gulf, Egypt under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria.
After the JCPOA accord, there is now increasing uncertainties within
other Arabs and Saudis regarding their alliances with the USA, concerning its
regional policy, and the American ability to commit itself in the Middle East and the
Gulf.
Regionally, key players that can influence the outcome of the Iran nuclear
issue are obviously using sectarianism to gain support. Different in belief from the
rest as a Jewish state, Israel may face the threat of not being able to keep Iran at a
relatively safe distance from a breakout point after the JCOPA. Its intention to act
militarily has been concealed by the consensus developed by the P5+1 and Iran. We
learn from the history that Jews similar to Christians and Muslims use the religion to
explain and the right of development in combat. (Kazmi, n.d.).
The Muslim World‘s approach and the Great Powers‘ approach now look
into the Iran nuclear issue as a strategic move to gain regional power since it is the
region home to some 20% of all world oil exports and 35% of all oil shipped by sea
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move through the Strait of Hormuz, along with substantial amounts of gas. Millions
more barrels move through the Red Sea and an increasing flow of oil moves through
Turkey, trans-shipment routes that are also affected by regional instability.
6.3 Domestic Level
Comparing the Muslim World‘s approach and the Great Powers‘ approach
towards the nuclear issue in the Middle East, one must understand the underlying
power of local disputes for that direct local player to search for assistants in the region
who are able to provide the budget, weapons, and political support to them. All those
domestic politics arose from institutional incompetence suffered by most of all the
states in the Middle East. The states look for regional allies whose political and
ideological positions are, in some way, in common on ideological or identity grounds.
The key to success in the region is that the power can assist these non-partner states in
their own political conflict.
6.3.1 Power Struggle
The power struggle in the domestic politics is even more graphically clear
because of their struggling from inability of country, struck in politic, and failed
govern. Libya, Yemen and Syria, are the case of the area where it must encounter the
trouble to other countries. Libya suffered from a kidnapping of the prime minister;
Yemen is facing rising southern separatism; and the Syrian government cannot
reassure the controlling over a crushed state controlled by rising established domestic
army.
Even in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, an internal enemy, makes it
difficult for Egypt to re-direct country control by an army. In addition, the state also
lacks capability for personal security, developed economy, and political agreement. It
is really Egypt‘s economy that would determine a country‘s course -- whether it can
regain its status as a player in the region and significantly bolster the Arab world.
Most of the countries in the region had trouble controlling their own
societies, and local players sought regional allies against their own domestic
opponents. Effective patronage of regional allies requires transnational ideological
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and political connections that make potential allies open to a relationship with the
patron. This phenomenon is now more important than conventional military strength
for the country in affecting the course of regional politics.
The direction of the Middle East‘s domestic politics is controlled by the
powerful states that play out in the domestic political systems of the region‘s weak
states. Israel is a good example of a country that tried to use its military strength to
gain political connection in Lebanon, but it proved ineffective. Israel does not have
natural allies. The best it can do is press the United States to take positions that it
prefers.
Turkey, although with a strong military, is a good case study to prove that
‗soft power‘ to be used as the new means for increasing a country‘s international
influence was not useful when it comes to civil wars. As a result, Turkey is not being
able to play very effectively.
With no military strength and a small population, Qatar on the other hand,
has an impact on the new Middle East. Its Al Jazeera and its joining Sunni Islamists,
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, are the key elements of its strategic influence.
However, Qatar is scaling down its regional strategy with a new leader and relies on
the United States as its ultimate security guarantor.
Although the inconsistency and the most insecure in Gulf leaders, such as
Bahrain‘s, are ordering more canisters of tear gas than they have citizens. They
cannot stop their citizen from protesting. The Muslim Brotherhood is facing its
existential crisis although it used to be the greatest strength in many Arab states.
Saudi Arabia, since 2003, experiences Al Qaeda with the threats in
Yemen. This threat is considered a rising in domestic security powers and new
attempts at a work establishment program and gaining other prospects. While the
UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar have sufficient capital to buy off increases in mature
populations that create unemployment pressures for the short period, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and Oman do not to support this regime. Most of them have to cope with an
increasing of income inequality, hyper-urbanization, fraud, governance failure, and
major obstacles to progress.
In the Gulf region, Yemen and Jordan are remaining low amid their
impending crisis as all are effectively facing serious threats to their internal stability.
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Sectarian threats present domestic security issues in each Gulf country, partly due to
the economic, religious, and political discrimination. Shi‘ite unrest in the Arab Gulf,
as well as particularly in Bahrain and Yemen, are proof of a motivating aspect in view
of the Arab states Iran is a risk.
The status and power pressures from younger fighters and seekers because
of the economic problems can fuel a challenge. Currently they have experience and
weapon because their loyalty is often as much to what people are ordered to pay
attention of the new position in their own ethnic group or their tribe. Political and
internal aggression stopped greatly of a country‘s improvement and worsens
economies, and driven many people away from their countries and peaceful life while
many people were pushing towards a slowly developing white-collar class. Ineffective
abilities and political framework to regulate and progress, the countries excluding
local actors would not be able to gain regional power without the proper conditions
for its success. The leader power in the region was considered their capacity to
influence the struggles in local political of nearby countries
6.3.2 Key Players
In the center of the Middle East, there are two groups of countries and
political forces with opposing objectives. First is the Islamic group in Iran, Qatar,
Turkey, and the Muslim Brotherhood, aiming for Muslim Ummah. The unifying
conviction of the group is that political Muslim is the unique structure for governing.
In the region, the members consider that together they are able to gain the assistance
from social groups and sustain it.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies supported by Egypt, Israel, and
Jordan, lead the other group is the Arab world for example the United Arab Emirates
and Kuwait. They think Ummah would create more conflict in some states, like Syria,
Iraq and Lebanon, and; political and social disagreement in others like Egypt; and the
solidarity of jihadist groups throughout the region. This group depends on financial
support, security devices, media, and militaries and other organizations to impose
national conservation.
The key local actor from the first group is Iran and from the second group
is Saudi Arabia with Israel at its back. Their power struggle is country and regime
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specific. Political Islam has already shaped Egypt‘s politics since the fall of President
Hosni Mubarak. The regime which can change political challenges in the countries
benefits, by rebounding disorder as well as imposing its result in other regimes, could
be winning in place.
6.4 The Muslim World’s vs the Great Powers’ Response to Iran’s Nuclear Power
From the international perspective to regional and domestic perspectives,
the response to the Iran nuclear power issue from the Muslim World and the Great
Powers are complicated by its complex relationships in the region in those three
different levels. All of this is making the order system in the Middle East less clear
and more complex.
USA‘s and Iran‘s relationship does not prove productive because not only
to the US alone, but also because of Iran‘s miscalculations in its foreign policy which
needs to be reviewed periodically. It failed because solidarity in the Islamic World
never gave up opposing to the Sunni-Shia enemy, particularly after the development
of Sunni military groups over the past decade and Saudi Arabia‘s policies. Blaming
Israel and the US is not the best strategies now internationally. The harmony and a
possibility of Persian nationalism revival, and the clear perception of which countries
are its enemies are more important to the Muslim World than anything else should
they want to gain global power. The tendency of Westernization and liberalism will
increase and will be powerless the Islamists. In addition, incompetent technological
development, quality of education and costs of energy together with water crises
threat in the Jordan and Nile River basins make most of major states in the region
experience with socioeconomic instability that will weaken a traditionalist regime,
which relies on structured authority.
It is the regional states in the Middle East that are increasingly setting the
tone, and it is the West that must redefine its relationship with these regional powers.
This is even truer since the battle against IS, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two
things at once: part of the problem and part of the solution.
While people in Europe continue to look to Obama hoping that he will
come up with a military or political solution to the crisis that has arisen with IS, in
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reality, it is the regional states that hold the key in their hands. The moment Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey reach agreement on how to solve the crisis in Syria and Iraq
by political and not military means, will it then be the beginning of the end of this
crisis.
Islamism is a religious not a political issue, thus it can be recognized
within the nation-state framework. The response to the Iran nuclear power
internationally for the Muslim World is to gain recognition for Ummah, while for the
Great Powers it is to prove their hegemony. Regionally, it is all about resources and
economic benefits to the Great Powers, but about regime and power to the Muslim
World. To achieve the regional power of the Muslim World, the allies and support
must be sought from neighbouring states. However, sectarianism and the rise of a new
youth rebellion from socioeconomic turbulence complicate the relationship and make
the region instable. The response of the Muslim World to the domestic population
needs to exhibit solidarity for the benefit of internal stability. The Great Powers also
need to go along this route in order to obtain regional and international benefits in the
end.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This study aims to understand the political events taking place between
the Muslim World and Great Powers, and to compare the approaches of both the
Muslim World and Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear program. The current
situations as well as the disputed settlements on Iran‘s nuclear program are more
complex and do not just simply that involve politics or national security. The
approaches of both the Muslim World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear
program possess both similar and different qualities.
It started from the states that were considering developing nuclear
weapons because of security reasons. Nuclear weapons would enhance these states‘
security. However, there have been situations where the intention to initiate a nuclear
program was to deter a US and Israeli engagement. This is due to the fact that Iran
still perceives a high risk to others benefits and the survivability of its regime. Iran‘s
nuclear program could deter a US or Israeli attack, and would further improve Iran‘s
regional and international power and prestige as the second Islamic nation with
nuclear power and the tenth nuclear armed state in the world. This prestige and power
could be utilized to gain public support at the domestic level. Iran‘s ambition of
regional predominance was understandable when Iran claimed to represent all
Muslims and to defend their interests.
7.1 Summary
So far, this work has provided a brief theoretical discussion on the Muslim
World‘s and the Great Powers‘ approaches towards the Iran‘s nuclear program. Two
frameworks, the realist and the balance of power where different schools of thought
including ‗Muslim Ummah‘ and ‗ Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach‘, were
taken into consideration for the Muslim World. Now, this conclusion will answer the
three questions raised in the introduction: 1). what is/are the Muslim World‘s
approach(es) towards Iran‘s nuclear issue?; 2). what is/are the Great Powers‘
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approach(es) towards Iran‘s nuclear issue?; and 3). what is/are the different
approaches between the Muslim World and the Great Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear
issue?
7.1.1 What Are the Muslim World’s Approaches towards Iran’s
Nuclear Issue?
The realist theory emphasizes the state‘s self-interest when responding to
an issue on a relative-gain basis. Muslim Ummah, in the form of the OIC, illustrates
to the Muslim World that Iran‘s nuclear issue is for collective defence, and its mission
is to invoke solidarity within the Muslim Ummah. The basic argument is that a
Muslim World will probably consider Iran‘s nuclear issue as a measure to counter
Israel‘s alleged nuclear capability and the US threat. It is a sign to oppose the Zionist
regime and show its pride in resisting against the bullying of the most insolent and
arrogant power in the world by preserving its unity and solidarity. The Muslim World
believes that with the strength of the OIC and the relationship between Saudi Arabia
and Iran, they can presume a potential task to shape the new global direction and
make an impact in the international community. Whether the unity and solidarity of
Muslim Ummah is warranted depends largely on the OIC‘s international weight.
Hence, the OIC engaged Iran in collaboration with the OIC member countries to
implement the major of project development among themselves through and with the
support of the Islamic Development Bank. The Muslim World, through the OIC,
approaches and considers Iran‘s nuclear issue as being significant in regional political
equations.
In the balance of power perspective, the OIC revealed to the world that
Iran‘s nuclear program was its own domestic affairs and that the OIC would not
interfere. The Muslim World and the OIC supported the Iran nuclear program. They
utilize the threat of military power as leverage against Israel‘s secret nuclear power
and call on the corporation of international regimes on nuclear issues. Their stance is
to deter interference in the Middle East region and to influence the outcome of Israel‘s
suspicious nuclear programs. However, if Iran wanted to develop nuclear weapons, in
the region of the Middle East, it would cause an imbalance of power and a change of
the status quo, which would increase the risk of preemptive strikes. In addition, its
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enhancement of the nuclear weapon programs exists in the region, as well as increases
dangers of nuclear arms races. In this case, in order to manage the member states on
the issue of nuclear proliferation and stabilize the region, the OIC approached the
Iran‘s nuclear program through IAEA regulations as well as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone in the Middle East of NPT‘s treaty. In reaching Muslim Ummah‘s solidity and
unity, OIC can attain the firm and influential stand against tyrannical regimes in the
political world with its Iranian nuclear program issue. This is the prestige the OIC and
the Muslim World can enjoy by supporting Iran‘s nuclear program for civil purposes
(Maluleem, 2012, p. 163).
7.1.2 What Are the Great Powers’ Approaches towards Iran’s Nuclear
Issue?
To the realists, states act to maximize their security in order to survive.
Economic and military terms are measures of the states‘ ability to be self-sustaining
and powerful. For US foreign policy, US relations with Iran depends much on the
status quo of the US economy and political power. Geopolitics is mostly dictated by
energy security. In military terms, the US needs to remain as a big brother to stop
terrorism. Hence, its actions towards Iran‘s nuclear issue would be to maintain the
credibility of American actions in the Middle East. However, to the Great Powers, a
military strike is not an option as it may interrupt the oil flow and price increases from
the Persian Gulf which can spark another global economic crisis.
The individual states of the Great Powers have not reached a consensus in
their policy towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. All states‘ foreign policies towards Iran‘s
nuclear issue are aimed merely at reaping benefits and ensuring their survival. China‘s
policy on Iran‘s nuclear program, whether it is favourable to the US or not, reflects its
relationship with the US on the Taiwan issue and its economic ties with the US as the
US is the leading importer of Chinese products. The EU, on the other hand, wanting
to be a global player, has been playing the role of a mediator on the Iran nuclear issue
and shaping the negotiation framework. On the contrary, Russia‘s policy towards
Iran‘s nuclear issue is to gain leverage in relations with the US. For example, Russia
sold its S-300 air defence system missile to Iran in order to maintain its relations with
Iran for oil.
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In the balance of power perspective, in order to maintain a relatively
powerful state among competitors, states are constantly trying to increase their
relative power with the aim of achieving regional or even world hegemony or trying
to maintain the status quo and balance of power. In this case, states have to be very
sensitive in order to reap relative gains. For a long time, the US has been trying to
reduce Iran‘s balance of power through sanctions. However, the intensity and
frequency of sanction bills affected the US economic benefits. As Iran senses threats
from the Super Powers‘ invasion into its administration, it put the development of the
nuclear deal between Iran and the US on hold. Seeing China and Russia as threats to
the global balance of power, the US prefers to strengthen its relations with Iran.
China, on the contrary, would prefer Iran-US relations to be tense over its nuclear
projects and the Iran sanctions to remain in place in order to keep Iran weak against
China‘s interests and goal to achieve hegemony in Asia. In fact, Russia also sees that
keeping the unresolved Iranian-Western dispute over nuclear and other regional issues
in place is beneficial. It would leverage Russia‘s power balance with the EU. Russia is
less sensitive to any changes in the balance of power system in the Middle East and
can adapt much better than China. The difference between China and Russia on Iran‘s
nuclear issue is that China prefers to continue its traditional role as an emerging
power in hiding while Russia is more confrontational.
In summary, the Great Powers‘ approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear issue
point to how power is leveraged among the states, and how Iran deals with the Great
Powers globally and in the region for economic benefits. Even in Obama‘s recent deal
with Iran to lift sanctions under the JCPOA deal, Obama‘s motive was focused on
economics rather than over security interests. Another factor for Obama‘s move also
stemmed from political pressure for America‘s deteriorated relationship with Israel.
7.1.3 What Are Different Approaches between the Muslim World and
the Great Powers towards Iran’s Nuclear Issue?
Differences in approaches between the Muslim World and the Great
Powers towards Iran‘s nuclear issue were examined in three dimensions: domestic
conflicts, regional state ambitions and international affinities. The OIC at an
international level approached the Iran nuclear program in order to show its solidarity
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with Islamic nations to deal with challenges, but the Great Powers‘ approach the issue
from the perspective of global security by ensuring the existence of a hegemonic
power which can use particular regulations of behaviour in international associations.
This is why the hegemonic country in this case can achieve long-run benefits. For the
Great Powers, geostrategic and geopolitical implications of Iran‘s nuclear issue is to
control energy-rich regions as well as vibrant and dynamic economies. However, the
global power shift to Asia has made the US pay more attention to the nuclear issue to
encounter various issues to its hegemonic role in the world. The current JCPOA
enables the US to maintain relations with the world‘s major powers who are its
principal competitors, including China and Japan. JCPOA is also advantageous to the
US as it prevents Iran from becoming partnerships between Russia and China.
Furthermore, the Great Powers need to control the strategic marine route which is
vital in gaining the status of Global Power. Between the Great Powers and the Muslim
World, the former views the later as economically powerful because their power
resources can be used as leverage to impose their views on others and the OIC‘s
capacity to move the populations in Muslim world assisting the resolutions of
international problems. Hence, internationally, Iran‘s nuclear issue to the Muslim
World helps them gain solidarity and leverage in international issues, while to the
Great Powers it is about hegemony and money.
Regionally, the study showed that the Middle East has no single dominant
and acknowledged power. There is still turbulence in the region due to intra-regional
power struggles and also economic conflicts. There is no consensus in the Muslim
World towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. In fact, there is a potential arms race in term of
proliferation in Iranian nuclear issue. However, Iran may be only country that can be a
major player in changing the new Middle East region. The Muslim World‘s
sentiments towards western culture is the key to counter the fragmentation in the
Muslim World by emphasizing religious structures and sectarianism. Iran has a
highly-sophisticated clergy whose power was placed in their hands after the Islamic
Revolution. The clergy has proven itself to be strong and influential to the new
Muslim World similar to that of high ranking Catholic clergy in Italy. Iran is also a
well-developed, strong, and cultured state. Hence, the Muslim World‘s and the Great
Powers‘ approaches towards Iran‘s nuclear issue are similar in a desert of weak states.
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A diverging approach between the Muslim World and the Great Powers
towards nuclear issue in Iran within the country is that Muslim World depends largely
on the political conditions of each Islamic country in the region. Islamic countries
have their own conflict of its community, as well as its actors seek the regional
cooperation fighting the local people who have different opinion. Religious,
economic, and political discrimination makes it difficult for the OIC, or the Muslim
World, to take an absolute stance towards Iran‘s nuclear issue. In fact, domestically,
people are ordered to pay attention to loyalty of the new position in their own ethnic
group or their tribe. Therefore, the regional leader‘s ability affects local political
conflict in nearby countries and divided into two camps: the Islamic group and the
Arab World. Iran seems to be a regime which may be able to change political
challenges for their benefits. Therefore, the Muslim World‘s approach at this level is
for political and security interests. As for the Great Powers who have been influenced
by the US, they focus on economic reasons.
In conclusion, the responses to the Iran nuclear power from the Muslim
World and the Great Powers are complicated by its complex relationships in the
region in those three different levels. Solidarity in the Islamic World never holds up.
The trends in Westernization and increased liberalism will not stop or weaken the
Islamists. Islamism is not a religious issue but it is a political issue. The response to
the Iran nuclear power internationally for the Muslim World is to gain recognition in
Ummah while for the Great Powers it is to prove their hegemony. Regionally, it is all
about resources and economic benefits to the Great Powers. However, for the Muslim
World, it is about regime and power. The response of the Muslim World to the
domestic population requires them to exhibit solidarity for the benefits of internal
stability. The Great Powers also need to proceed along this route to benefit regionally
and internationally in the end.
7.2 Recommendation
While conducting research for this paper, on July 14, 2015 a
comprehensive deal on the Iranian nuclear program has been signed. The Iranian
nuclear negotiations have been on and off since 2002. Therefore, further study is
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required to understand what changes the deal will generate in the domestic dynamics
of the individual actors, the Muslim World and the Great Powers, as well as the
international and regional balance of power. One should find out if the strategic
interests will arise as a consequence of the deal. In addition, studies should examine
the Great Powers‘ approach to Iran‘s nuclear issue. Finally, answers should be found
to shed light on whether the majority of sanctions will be lifted after the so-called
‗Implementation Day‘, which is anticipated to arrive sometime in mid-2016.
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BIOGRAPHY
Name Mr. Sakhanan Rattanarungsun
Date of Birth December 6, 1982
Educational Attainment
2008: Bachelor's Degree in Management Studies,
The University of Waikato, New Zealand
Double Major: Marketing and Economics
Work Position Finance Assistant
United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
Work Experiences August 2014 - Present: Finance Assistant
United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
March 2013 - August 2014: Finance Assistant
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO-UN)
Jul 2008 - Oct 2012: Export Manager
Great Family Garment Co., Ltd.