a320 emergency checklist.pdf

Airbus A320 FamilyNon-Normal Notes

Version 1.0

Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes

Airbus A320 Family Non-Normal Notes: Ver-sion 1.0


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Table of ContentsChange log ............................................................................. ix

1. Change highlighting ................................................... ix2. Changes since version 0.7.1 ......................................... ix

1. Operating techniques ............................................................. 11.1. Rejected Takeoff ...................................................... 11.2. Failures during takeoff when above V1 ......................... 21.3. EOSID ................................................................... 3

2. Miscellanneous ..................................................................... 52.1. Emergency descent (memory item) ............................... 52.2. Windshear (memory item) .......................................... 62.3. Unreliable airspeed (memory item) ............................... 72.4. Incapacitation (memory item) ...................................... 92.5. Ditching ................................................................. 92.6. Forced landing ....................................................... 102.7. Evacuation ............................................................. 112.8. Overweight landing ................................................. 122.9. Immediate VMC recovery with single engine ................ 122.10. Engine failure in cruise .......................................... 122.11. Single engine circling ............................................ 132.12. Bomb on board ..................................................... 132.13. Stall recovery (memory item) ................................... 132.14. Computer reset ..................................................... 14

3. Air conditioning, pressurisation and ventilation ......................... 153.1. Cabin overpressure .................................................. 153.2. Excess cabin altitude ............................................... 153.3. Pack fault .............................................................. 153.4. Pack overheat ......................................................... 163.5. Pack off ................................................................ 163.6. Pack regulator faults ................................................ 163.7. ACSC single lane failure .......................................... 173.8. Duct overheat ......................................................... 173.9. Hot air fault ........................................................... 173.10. Trim air faults ...................................................... 183.11. Cabin fan faults .................................................... 183.12. Lavatory and galley fan faults .................................. 18


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3.13. Pressure controller faults ........................................ 193.14. Low diff pressure .................................................. 193.15. Outflow valve closed on ground ............................... 193.16. Open safety valve ................................................. 193.17. Blower fault ......................................................... 203.18. Extract fault ......................................................... 203.19. Skin valve fault .................................................... 203.20. Avionics ventilation system vault ............................. 21

4. Electrical ........................................................................... 234.1. Emergency configuration .......................................... 234.2. Battery only ........................................................... 234.3. IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperature ................... 244.4. Generator fault ....................................................... 244.5. Battery fault ........................................................... 244.6. AC Bus 1 fault ....................................................... 244.7. AC Bus 2 fault ....................................................... 254.8. AC Ess Bus fault .................................................... 254.9. AC Essential Shed Bus lost ...................................... 254.10. DC Bus 1 fault ..................................................... 264.11. DC Bus 2 fault ..................................................... 264.12. DC Essential Bus fault ........................................... 264.13. DC Essential shed ................................................. 274.14. Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 .............................. 274.15. Generator overload ................................................ 274.16. Loss of TR .......................................................... 284.17. Battery bus fault ................................................... 284.18. DC Emergency configuration ................................... 284.19. Static inverter fault ................................................ 284.20. Generator 1 line off ............................................... 294.21. Tripped circuit breakers .......................................... 29

5. Flight controls .................................................................... 315.1. Elevator faults ........................................................ 315.2. Stabilizer jam ......................................................... 315.3. Aileron faults ......................................................... 325.4. Spoiler faults ......................................................... 325.5. Rudder Jam ........................................................... 325.6. Flaps and/or slats fault/locked ................................... 33


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5.7. SFCC faults ........................................................... 355.8. ELAC fault ............................................................ 355.9. SEC fault .............................................................. 365.10. FCDC faults ......................................................... 365.11. Direct Law ........................................................... 375.12. Alternate Law ....................................................... 375.13. Wingtip brake fault ............................................... 375.14. Flap attach sensor failure ........................................ 385.15. Flight control servo faults ....................................... 385.16. Speed brake disagree ............................................. 385.17. Speed brake fault .................................................. 385.18. Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals .................................... 385.19. Sidestick unannunciated transducer faults ................... 39

6. Fire .................................................................................. 416.1. Smoke and fumes ................................................... 416.2. Smoke/ fumes removal ............................................ 426.3. Engine fire ............................................................ 43

7. Fuel .................................................................................. 457.1. Fuel leak ............................................................... 457.2. Fuel imbalance ....................................................... 467.3. Gravity fuel feeding ................................................ 467.4. Wing tank pump(s) low pressure ................................ 477.5. Center tank pumps low pressure ................................ 477.6. Auto feed fault ....................................................... 477.7. Low fuel level ........................................................ 487.8. Outer tank transfer valves failed closed ....................... 487.9. Outer tank transfer valve open out of sequence .............. 487.10. Cross-feed valve fault ............................................ 487.11. Low fuel temperature ............................................. 497.12. High fuel temperature ............................................ 49

8. Landing gear ...................................................................... 518.1. Loss of braking (memory item) .................................. 518.2. Residual braking procedure ....................................... 518.3. Gravity extension .................................................... 518.4. Asymmetric braking ................................................ 528.5. Landing with abnormal landing gear ........................... 528.6. Flight with landing gear extended .............................. 53


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8.7. Gear shock absorber fault ......................................... 538.8. Gear not uplocked ................................................... 548.9. Gear not downlocked ............................................... 548.10. Gear doors not closed ............................................ 548.11. Uplock fault ......................................................... 548.12. LGCIU disagreement ............................................. 558.13. LGCIU fault ......................................................... 558.14. Gear not down ...................................................... 558.15. Park brake on ....................................................... 568.16. Nosewheel steering fault ......................................... 568.17. Antiskid nosewheel steering off ............................... 568.18. Antiskid nosewheel steering fault ............................. 568.19. Brake system fault ................................................. 578.20. Brakes hot ........................................................... 578.21. Auto brake fault .................................................... 578.22. Hydraulic selector valve fault .................................. 578.23. Failure of normal braking system ............................. 588.24. Failure of alternate braking system ........................... 588.25. Failure of normal and alternate braking systems ........... 588.26. Brake accumulator low pressure ............................... 588.27. Released brakes, normal system ............................... 598.28. Released brakes, alternate system ............................. 598.29. Minor nosewheel steering fault ................................ 598.30. Brake temperature limitations requiring mainte-nance action ................................................................. 59

9. Power plant ........................................................................ 619.1. Dual engine failure ................................................. 619.2. Single Engine failure ............................................... 629.3. Single engine operation ............................................ 639.4. Engine relight in flight ............................................. 649.5. Engine stall ........................................................... 659.6. Engine tailpipe fire ................................................. 659.7. High engine vibration .............................................. 669.8. Low oil pressure ..................................................... 679.9. High oil temperature ............................................... 679.10. Oil filter clog ....................................................... 679.11. Fuel filter clog ...................................................... 67


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9.12. Uncommanded reverser pressurisation ....................... 679.13. Reverser unlocked in flight ..................................... 689.14. EIU fault ............................................................. 689.15. N1/N2/EGT overlimit ............................................ 699.16. N1/N2/EGT/FF discrepancy .................................... 699.17. Start valve fault .................................................... 699.18. Start faults ........................................................... 709.19. Ignition faults ....................................................... 709.20. Thrust lever angle sensor faults ................................ 719.21. FADEC faults ....................................................... 71

10. Navigation ........................................................................ 7310.1. EGPWS alerts (memory item) .................................. 7310.2. TCAS warnings (memory item) ................................ 7310.3. RNAV downgrades ............................................... 7410.4. ADR faults .......................................................... 7510.5. ADR disagree ....................................................... 7510.6. RA faults ............................................................. 7610.7. IR faults .............................................................. 7610.8. IR disagree .......................................................... 7610.9. IR alignment in ATT mode ..................................... 7610.10. FM/GPS position disagree ..................................... 77

11. Auto-flight ....................................................................... 7911.1. FAC faults ........................................................... 7911.2. Yaw damper faults ................................................ 7911.3. Rudder trim faults ................................................. 7911.4. Rudder travel limiter faults ..................................... 8011.5. FCU faults ........................................................... 80

12. Hydraulics ........................................................................ 8112.1. Green + yellow systems low pressure ........................ 8112.2. Blue + yellow systems low pressure .......................... 8112.3. Green + blue systems low pressure ........................... 8212.4. Green system low pressure ...................................... 8312.5. Yellow system low pressure .................................... 8312.6. Blue system low pressure ....................................... 8412.7. Engine driven pump low pressure ............................. 8412.8. Electric pump low pressure or overheat ...................... 8412.9. Low reservoir air pressure ....................................... 84


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12.10. Reservoir overheat ............................................... 8512.11. Low reservoir fluid level ....................................... 8512.12. PTU fault ........................................................... 8512.13. RAT fault .......................................................... 85

13. Ice and rain protection ........................................................ 8713.1. Double AOA heat fail ............................................ 8713.2. Single pitot probe heat or static port heat fault ............. 8713.3. Multiple pitot heat failures ...................................... 8713.4. Single AOA or TAT heat fault ................................. 8813.5. Probe heat computer failure ..................................... 8813.6. Window heat fault ................................................. 8813.7. Engine anti-ice valve fault ...................................... 8813.8. Wing anti-ice valve open when commanded closed ....... 8813.9. Wing anti-ice valve closed when commanded open ....... 8913.10. Wing anti-ice valves fail to close after ground self-test ............................................................................. 8913.11. High pressure detected when wing anti-ice turnedon .............................................................................. 89

14. Indicating/ Recording ......................................................... 9114.1. Display unit failure ................................................ 91

15. Pneumatic ........................................................................ 9315.1. Dual bleed failure ................................................. 93

16. Communications ................................................................ 9516.1. Failure of two-way radio communication equipmentin UK airspace ............................................................. 95

Change log

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Change log

1.Change highlightingChange highlighting is only available in the online version. This may befound at:

http://www.hursts.eclipse.co.uk

Change bars will be incorporated into the printed version as soon as theyare supported by the Apache Formatting Objects Processor.

2.Changes since version 0.7.1 Added note regarding short duration of oxygen protection to Section6.1,

Smoke and fumes.

Added multiple new sections to Chapter3, Air conditioning, pressuri-sation and ventilation

Improved Section2.3, Unreliable airspeed (memory item) to expandon the method for levelling off at prescribed speed.

Added multiple new sections to Chapter9, Power plant. Also changed"Engine Shut Down" section to Section9.3, Single engine operationand updated it, including incorporation of single engine approach con-siderations. This renders the old section 2.10 redundant, so this has beenremoved.

Improved Section5.6, Flaps and/or slats fault/locked.

Improved dual hydraulic failures to make them standalone: Sec-tion12.1, Green + yellow systems low pressure, Section12.2, Blue+ yellow systems low pressure, Section12.3, Green + blue systemslow pressure

Updated electrical/avionics smoke part of Section 6.1, Smoke andfumes to incorporate Airbus changes (no incremental shedding of AC

Change log

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busses; go straight to Emergency Electrical Config) and Direct Lawlanding due IR loss gotcha.

Added note to Section10.4, ADR faults about gravity gear extensionnot being mentioned on ECAM for ADR 1+3 loss.

Updated Section5.4, Spoiler faults to incorporate OEB 208.

Expanded Section2.12, Bomb on board to incorporate actual methodfor achievement of 1 psi diff.

Added Section5.19, Sidestick unannunciated transducer faults.

Updated Section8.9, Gear not downlocked to incorporate two minutedelay after gear cycling recommended in OEB 209.

Chapter1.Operating techniques

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1.1.Rejected Takeoff

The decision to reject rests solely with CM1. This decision is communicat-ed with the words "Stop" or "Continue". "Stop" implies that CM1 is takingcontrol of the aircraft. Below 100kt the RTO is relatively risk free and adecision to stop should be made for any ECAM and most other problems.Above 100kt the RTO may be hazardous and stopping should only be con-sidered for loss of engine thrust, any fire warning, any uninhibited ECAMor anything which indicates the aircraft will be unsafe or unable to fly.

If a stop is required, CM1 calls "Stop" while simultaneously bringing thethrust levers to idle, then to max reverse. If the stop was commenced below72kt the ground spoilers will not automatically deploy and the autobrakewill therefore not engage. Monitor automatic braking, and if there is anydoubt, apply manual braking as required. If normal braking fails, announce"Loss of braking" and proceed with the loss of braking memory items (seeSection8.1, Loss of braking (memory item)). If the reason for the stopwas an engine fire on the upwind side, consider turning the aircraft to keepthe fire away from the fuselage. If there is any chance of requiring evac-uation, bring the aircraft to a complete halt, stow the reversers, apply theparking brake, and order "Attention, crew at stations" on the PA. If evac-uation will definitely not be required, once the aircraft's safety is assuredthe RTO can be discontinued and the runway cleared. In this case make aPA of "Cabin crew, normal operations".

During this initial phase, CM2 confirms reverse ("Reverse green"), con-firms deceleration ("Decel"), cancels any audio warnings, informs ATCand announces "70 knots" when appropriate. CM2 then locates the emer-gency evacuation checklist.

Once the aircraft has stopped, CM1 takes the radios and asks CM2 to carryout any required ECAM actions. Whilst the ECAM actions are being com-pleted, CM1 will build up a decision as to whether to evacuate. If an evac-uation is required see Section2.7, Evacuation. Otherwise order "Cabincrew, normal operations".


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If the aircraft has come to a complete halt using autobrake MAX, thebrakes can be released by disarming the spoilers.

[EOMB.3.2.10, FCOM3.2.10.1000]

1.2.Failures during takeoff when above V1

If an engine has lost thrust, apply rudder conventionally on the runway. AtVr rotate to 12 at a slightly reduced rate. When airborne, select TOGA(FLX may be used but this tends to allow speed to decay unless pitch isreduced), adjust and trim rudder to maintain target and request "pullheading". If the EOSID follows the track of the cleared SID, NAV maybe used, but this is very rare with easyJet EOSIDs. Bank angle shouldbe limited to 15 when more than 3kt below maneuvering speed for thecurrent configuration. Engage the autopilot once gear is up and rudder istrimmed.

Whilst below 400ft, the only failure related actions should be:

If applicable, PNF should announce "Engine failure" or "Engine fire"without specifying an engine.

Cancellation of master warning or master caution when both pilots con-firm they are aware of it.

Heightened awareness of the possibility of missing essential normal ac-tions, such as calling rotate or raising the gear due to the distraction ofthe failure.

Once above 400ft with safe flight path assured, decide on an initial strat-egy. In general, where a loss of thrust has occured or is anticipated, thestrategy will be to fly the EOSID with a level acceleration segment (seeSection1.3, EOSID). Otherwise, it will be to remain on the normal SIDand fly a normal climb profile. Any deviation from the cleared SID will re-quire ATC to be informed as a priority, usually as part of a PAN or MAY-DAY message. In rare cases where the cleared SID requires a very earlyturn it may be necessary to determine and action a strategy when below400ft. If this is the case, it must be thoroughly briefed.


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Once the flight path strategy has been agreed and actioned, the failure canbe diagnosed and dealt with. If the failure has resulted in an ECAM warn-ing, PF initiates this phase by asking PNF to "Read ECAM". Once theECAM is confirmed, PF will take the radios and request PNF to carry outECAM actions. When applying ECAM procedures, PF is responsible formoving the thrust levers once confirmed by PNF. PNF is responsible foreverything else, but movement of engine master switches, IR selectors andany guarded switch must be confirmed with PF.

[FCOM3.2.10.2000]

1.3.EOSIDBefore the divergence point (the last common point between the SID andthe EOSID), if the aircraft detects a loss of thrust the EOSID will be dis-played as a temporary flight plan. In this case the temporary flight plancan be inserted and NAV mode used. Otherwise it will be necessary topull heading and manually follow either the yellow line or bring up a pre-prepared secondary flight plan and follow the white line.

If beyond the divergence point, pull heading and make an immediate turnthe shortest way onto the EOSID. Airbus specifically recommends againstthis in FCOM 4.4.30, but easyJet states it as policy in EOMB 4.2.3.

Electing to fly the EOSID implies a level acceleration segment:

Initially fly a TOGA climb at the higher of V2 or current speed, up toa limit of V2+15kt. If a FLEX takeoff was carried out, a FLEX climbis permissable. This climb is continued until all high priority tasks arecomplete and the aircraft is at or above acceleration altitude. For the en-gine failure and the engine fire cases, EOMB 4.2.3 specifically definesthe high priority tasks. For an engine failure, all ECAM actions up toand including the master switch being turned off must be completed.For the engine fire case all ECAM actions up to and including firing thefirst squib must be completed. If the fire warning light does not extin-guish both squibs must be fired.

The next segment is a TOGA level acceleration and clean up, either toConf 1 and S speed if an immediate VMC return is desired or to Conf 0


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and green dot. Again FLEX may be used if a FLEX takeoff was carriedout. Level acceleration is usually acheived by pushing V/S. The phrases"Stop ECAM" and "Continue ECAM" can be used to interupt ECAMprocedures in order to initiate this segment.

The final segment is a MCT climb segment to MSA, either at S speedif in Conf 1 or at green dot speed if in Conf 0. This is usually acheivedin open climb.

TOGA may be used for a maximum of 10 minutes.

Chapter2.Miscellanneous

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2.1.Emergency descent (memory item)

If an emergency descent is required, the Captain should consider takingcontrol if not already PF.

Don oxygen masks, set them to the N position and establish communica-tion.

Descent with autopilot and autothrottle engaged is preferred. The config-uration is thrust idle, full speed brake and maximum appropriate speed,taking into account possible structural damage. Target altitude is FL100 orMORA if this is higher. If speed is low, allow speed to increase before de-ploying full speedbrake to prevent activation of the angle of attack protec-tion. Landing gear may be used below 25,000ft, but speed must be belowVLE when it is extended and remain below VLO. If on an airway, considerturning 90 to the left.

PNF should, from memory, turn seatbelt signs on, set continuous ignitionon the engines, set 7700 on the transponder and inform ATC of the de-scent. If cabin altitude will exceed 14,000ft, he should also deploy the cab-in oxygen masks.

Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraft is descending, PFshould finesse the target altitude, speed and heading. He should then takeover communications and call for the emergency descent checklist. Oncethis is complete, the Captain should make the following PA:

"Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the Captain. We have lostcabin pressure and are descending to a lower altitude.Put your oxygen masks on and obey the instructions ofthe cabin crew"

Once level, restore the aircraft to a normal configuration. When safe to doso, advise cabin crew and passengers that it is safe to remove their masks.

[EOMB.3.2.80, QRH1.25, FCOM3.2.80.4000]


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2.2.Windshear (memory item)

2.2.1.Reactive

The windshear detection system is a function of the Flight AugmentationComputer (FAC). It only operates during the takeoff and landing phaseswith at least CONF 1 selected. In the takeoff phase, warnings are providedfrom 3 seconds after lift off until 1300ft RA is acheived. In the landingphase warnings are provided between 1300ft RA and 50ft RA. A warningis indicated by a red "WINDSHEAR" flag on the PFD and a "WINDS-HEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural warning.

When on the ground, windshear is only indicated by significant airspeedvariations. It is possible that these fluctuations may cause V1 to occur sig-nificantly later in the takeoff run then it should. It therefore falls to theCaptain to make an assessment of whether sufficient runway remains toreject the takeoff, or whether getting airborne below Vr would be the bet-ter option. If the takeoff is to be continued in windshear conditions, call"Windshear, TOGA" and apply TOGA power. Rotate at Vr or with suffi-cient runway remaining and follow SRS orders. {TODO: This is Boeingadvice - Airbus offers no advice if there is insufficient runway availableto rotate at normal speeds}. SRS will maintain a minimum rate of climb,even if airspeed must be sacrificed.

If a warning occurs when airborne, call "Windshear, TOGA", apply TOGApower and maintain current configuration. The autopilot can fly the escapemaneuvre as long as req


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2.2.2.PredictiveWhen below 2300ft AGL, the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60 arcahead of the aircraft for returns indicating potential windshear.

Alerts are categorised as advisory, caution or warning, in increasing orderof severity. Severity is determined by range, position and phase of flight.Alerts are only provided when between 50ft and 1500ft, or on the groundwhen below 100kt.

All types of alert produce an indication of windshear position on the ND,providing the ND range is set to 10nm. A message on the ND instructsthe crew to change range to 10nm if not already set. Cautions also give anamber "W/S AHEAD" message on both PFDs and an aural "MONITORRADAR DISPLAY" warning. Warnings give a red "W/S AHEAD" mes-sage on the PFDs and either a "WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEARAHEAD" or "GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD" aural message.

If a warning alert occurs during the takeoff roll, reject the takeoff. If itoccurs during initial climb, call "Windshear, TOGA", apply TOGA thrustand follow SRS orders. Configuration may be changed as long as the wind-shear is not entered.

If a warning alert occurs during approach, carry out a normal go-around.If positive verification is made that no hazard exists, the crew may down-grade the warning to a caution. If a caution alert occurs during approach,consider use of CONF 3 and increasing VAPP to a maximum of VLS+15.

[FCOM3.2.80.14000, FCOM3.4.91]

2.3.Unreliable airspeed (memory item)Unreliable airspeed indications may result from radome damage and/orunserviceable probes or ports. Altitude indications may also be erroneousif static probes are affected.

The FMGCs normally reject erroneous ADR data by isolating a singlesource that has significant differences to the other two sources. It is possi-ble that a single remaining good source may be rejected if the other two


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sources are erroneous in a sufficiently similar way. In this case, it falls tothe pilots to identify and turn off the erroneous sources to recover gooddata.

The first problem is recognition of a failure, since the aircraft systems maybe unable to warn of a problem. The primary method of doing this is corre-lation of aircraft attitude and thrust to displayed performance. Correlationof radio altimeter and GPIRS derived data (available on GPS MONITORpage) may also aid identification. The stall warning (available in alternateor direct law) is based on alpha probes, so will likely be valid. Other cluesmay include fluctuations in readings, abnormal behavior of the automat-ics, high speed buffet or low aerodynamic noise.

If the aircraft flight path is in doubt, disconnect the automatics and fly thefollowing short term attitude and thrust settings to initiate a climb:

Condition Thrust PitchBelow Thrust Reduction Altitude TOGA 15Below FL100 Climb 10Above FL100 Climb 5

Flap configuration should be maintained except when a go-around is initi-ated with flap full, in which case CONF 3 should be selected. The gear andspeedbrake should be retracted. If there is any doubt over the validity ofaltitude information, the FPV must be disregarded. If altitude informationis definitely good, the FPV may be used.

Once the flight path is under control and a safe altitude is attained, the air-craft should be transitioned into level flight. Refer to QRH 2.15 to extracta ballpark thrust setting, a reference attitude and a reference speed for thecurrent configuration, bearing in mind that an auto-retraction of the flapmay have occurred. Set the ballpark thrust setting and adjust pitch attitudeto fly level; if barometric altitude data is considered accurate use the VSI,otherwise fly a constant GPS altitude. The thrust should then be adjusteduntil level flight is achieved with the reference attitude. Note that in theradome damage case, the required N1 may be as much as 5% greater thanthe ballpark figure. Once stable, the speed will be equal to the referencespeed.


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If there is insufficient data available to fly level (e.g. GPS data unavailableand barometric data unreliable), fly the reference attitude with the ballparkthrust setting. This will give approximately level flight at approximatelyreference speed.

With the speed now known, the ADRs can be checked to see if any aregiving accurate data. If at least one ADR is reliable, turn off the faultyADRs. GPS and IRS ground speeds may also be used for an approximatecross check.

If all ADRs are considered unreliable, turn off any two of them; one is kepton to provide stall warning from the alpha probes. Tables are provided onpage 2.17 and 2.18 of the QRH to enable all phases of flight to be flownusing just pitch and thrust settings. Acceleration and clean up are carriedout in level flight. Flap 1 can be selected as soon as climb thrust is selected,flap 0 once the S speed pitch attitudes in the table on QRH 2.15 are reached.Configuration for approach is also carried out in level flight, stabilising ineach configuration using the technique described above. The approach isflown in CONF 3 at an attitude that should result in VLS+10 when flyinga 3 glide. Landing distance will be increased.

[QRH2.15, FCOM3.2.34.30000]

2.4.Incapacitation (memory item)Take control, using the stick priority button if necessary. Contact cabincrew ASAP. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to his seat, movethe seat back, then recline the seat. If there are two members available, thebody can be moved. Medical help should be sought from passengers, andthe presence of any type rated company pilots on board ascertained.

[FCOM3.2.80.6000]

2.5.DitchingThe QRH 1.23 procedure applies if the engines are running. If the enginesare not running, refer to QRH 1.16 or QRH 1.20 which include ditching.

Preparation for ditching involves notifying ATC in order to expedite res-cue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact. The


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GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crew oxy-gen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerousleaks {TODO: this is an assumption}.

The engines operative ditching configuration is gear up, config full, 11pitch and minimal V/S. If both engines are inoperative, use config 3 (onlyslats available) and maintain at least 150kt. In strong winds, land into wind.In lighter winds, land parallel to swell. The bleeds are all turned off andditching button pushed (ensure pressurisation is in auto for this to work) inorder to close all openings below the waterline and reduce water ingress.At 2000ft, make a PA "Cabin crew, landing positions". At 500ft, make aPA "Brace, brace"

At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. After coming to astop, notify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft. {TODO: There is a dis-crepancy between engines operative/ inoperative regarding use of the firebuttons after stopping}

[QRH1.23, QRH1.16, QRH1.20, FCOM3.2.80]

2.6.Forced landingThe QRH 1.24 procedure applies if the engines are running. If the enginesare not running, refer to QRH 1.16 or QRH 1.20 which include forcedlanding.

Preparation for forced landing involves notifying ATC in order to expediterescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for impact.The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance warnings. The crewoxygen should be turned off below FL100 to prevent potentially dangerousleaks {TODO: this is an assumption}.

The engines operative forced landing configuration is gear down, configfull, spoilers armed. If the engines are inoperative, use config 3 (only slatsavailable) and maintain at least 150kt. The ram air button is used to ensurethat the aircraft will be completely depressurised at touchdown. At 2000ft,make a PA "Cabin crew, landing positions". At 500ft, make a PA "Brace,brace"


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At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. This will leave ac-cumulator braking only. After coming to a stop, set the parking brake, no-tify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents (engine agent 2 maynot be available) and evacuate the aircraft.{TODO: There is a discrepancybetween engines operative/ inoperative regarding use of the fire buttonsafter stopping}

[QRH1.24, QRH1.16&1.20, FCOM 3.2.80.3000]

2.7.EvacuationEvacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency evac-uation checklist. The easyJet procedure is for CM1 to call for the checklistand then send a Mayday message to ATC before commencing the check-list. {TODO: this strikes me as a bit of an odd order to do things - checkits correct}

The first two items confirm the RTO actions of stopping the aircraft, set-ting the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew. The next item confirmsATC has been alerted.

The next four items prepare the aircraft for evacuation. If manual cabinpressure has been used, CM2 checks cabin diff is zero, and if necessarymanually opens the outflow valve. CM2 then shuts the engines down withtheir master switches, and pushes all the fire buttons (including the APU).Confirmation is not required before carrying out these actions {TODO:This is not clear from EOM B, but incorporates the FCTM instruction}.CM1 does, however, respond "Confirmed" in response to the checklistitems once they have been actioned. In response to the next checklist item,"Agents", CM1 decides if any extinguishing agents should be dischargedand instructs CM2 to discharge them as required. Engine agent 2 will notbe available. Agents should only be discharged if there are positive signsof fire.

Finally, order the evacuation. This is primarily done with the PA "Evacu-ate, unfasten your seat belts and get out", with the evacuation alarm beingtriggered as a backup.

[EOMB.3.2.80, QRH7.01, FCOM3.2.80, FCTM03.020]


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2.8.Overweight landingA landing can be made at any weight, providing sufficient landing distanceis available. Automatic landings are certified up to MLW, but flight testshave demonstrated autoland capability to 69000kg in case of emergency.The preferred landing configuration is CONFFULL, but lower settingsmay be used if required by QRH/ECAM procedures or if aircraft weightexceeds the CONF3 go around limit (see QRH 2.25). Packs should beturned off to provide additional go around thrust. If planned landing con-figuration is less than FULL, use 1+F for go-around.

It is possible that S speed will be higher than VFEnext for CONF 2. In thiscase, a speed below VFEnext should be selected until CONF 2 is acheived,then managed speed can be re-engaged.

In the final stages of the approach, reduce speed to acheive VLS at runwaythreshold. Land as smoothly as possible, and apply max reverse as soonas the main gear touches down. Maximum braking can be used after nose-wheel touchdown. After landing, switch on the brake fans and monitorbrake temperatures carefully. If temperatures exceed 800C, tyre deflationmay occur.

[QRH2.25, FCOM3.2.80.5000]

2.9.Immediate VMC recovery with single engineFly circuit in CONF 1. Select CONF 2 at start of base turn. Gear willusually be extended once flaps have run to 2, but may be delayed until finalapproach if performance is an issue. Select CONF 3 once gear is down andCONF full when on final approach. {TODO: Check how climb gradient/flap decision is determined.}

[FCOM 3.2.10.3000]

2.10.Engine failure in cruiseSet MCT on live engine then disconnect the autothrust. Start ECAM ac-tions and notify ATC. Decide on strategy - standard strategy increas-es the chance of an engine relight, whilst obstacle strategy maintainsthe greatest possible obstacle clearance. If using standard strategy select


13

speed .78/300kt. If using obstacle strategy select green dot speed. Selectaltitude to LRC ceiling or green dot ceiling as appropriate to allow driftdown once speed is reached. If obstacles remain a problem, MCT andgreen dot speed can be maintained to give a shallow climbing profile. Onceobstacles are no longer a problem, descend to LRC ceiling (use V/S if


14

covery is therefore simply to pitch the nose down to break the stall and lev-el the wings. Once there are no longer any indications of the stall, smooth-ly apply thrust, check speedbrakes retracted and if appropriate (clean andbelow 20,000ft) deploy the slats by selecting flaps 1.

If a stall warner sounds on takeoff it is likely to be spurious since you arealmost certainly in normal law. The procedure in this case is essentially toinitially assume unreliable airspeed and fly TOGA, 15, wings level untilit can be confirmed that the warning is spurious.

A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that the aircraft isreaching buffet. In this case simply reduce the back pressure on the side-stick and/or reduce bank angle.

2.14.Computer resetAbnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interupting thepower supply of the affected computer. This can be done either with cock-pit controls or with circuit breakers. The general procedure is to interuptthe power supply, wait 3 seconds (5 seconds if a C/B was used), restorethe power, then wait another three seconds for the reset to complete. Spe-cific procedures are detailed in the computer reset tables on page 2.36 ofthe QRH.

On the ground, almost all computers can be reset. The exceptions are theECU and EIU while the associated engine is running and the BDCU whenthe aircraft is not stopped.

In flight, only the computers listed in the reset table should be consideredfor reset.

Chapter3.Air conditioning, pressurisation and ventilation

15

Chapter3.Air conditioning, pressurisationand ventilation

3.1.Cabin overpressure

There is no ECAM in the case of total loss of pressure control leadingto an overpressure, so apply the QRH procedure. The basic procedure isto reduce air inflow by turning off one of the packs and put the avionicsventilation system in its smoke removal configuration so that it dumpscabin air overboard. The P is monitored, and the remaining pack is turnedoff if it exceeds 9 psi. 10 minutes before landing, both packs are turnedoff and remain off, and the avionics ventilation is returned to its normalconfiguration.

[QRH2.01, FCOM3.2.21.27000]

3.2.Excess cabin altitude

An ECAM warning of excess (>9550ft) cabin altitude should be reliedupon, even if not backed up by other indications.

The initial response should be to protect yourself by getting an oxygenmask on. Initiate a descent; if above FL160, this should be according toSection2.1, Emergency descent (memory item). Once the descent is es-tablished and all relevant checklists are complete, check the position of theoutflow valve and, if it is not fully closed, use manual control to close it.

[CAB PREXCESSCAB_ALT, FCOM3.2.21.25000, FCOM1.21.20.5000]

3.3.Pack fault

The PACK FAULT ECAM indicates that the pack valve position disagreeswith the selected position or that the pack valve is closed. The affectedpack should be turned off. A possible reason for this failure is loss of bothchannels of an Air Conditioning System Controller (ACSC). If this occurs,the associated hot air trimming will also be lost (cockpit for ACSC 1, cabinfor ACSC 2).


16

If there are simultaneous faults with both packs, ram air must be used. Thiswill necessitate depressurisation of the aircraft, so a decent to FL100 (orMEA if higher) is required. If a PACK button FAULT light subsequentlyextinguishes, an attempt should be made to reinstate that pack.

[AIRPACK1(2)(1+2)FAULT, FCOM3.2.21.2000, FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.4.Pack overheat

The associated pack flow control valve closes automatically in the eventof a pack overheating (outlet temp>260C or outlet temp>230C fourtimes in one flight). The remaining pack will automatically go to high flow,and is capable of supplying all of the air conditioning requirement. Thissystem's automatic response is backed up by turning off the pack. TheFAULT light in the PACK button remains illuminated whilst the overheatcondition exists. The pack can be turned back on once it has cooled.

[AIRPACK1(2)OVHT, FCOM3.2.21.1000, FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.5.Pack off

A warning is generated if a functional pack is selected off in a phase offlight when it would be expected to be on. This is usually the result ofneglecting to re-instate the packs after a packs off takeoff. Unless there isa reason not to, turn the affected pack(s) on.

[AIRPACK1(2)OFF, FCOM3.2.21.3000, FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.6.Pack regulator faults

A regulator fault is defined as a failure of one of four devices: the bypassvalve, the ram air inlet, the compressor outlet temperature sensor or theflow control valve. The ECAM bleed page can be used to determine whichdevice is at fault.

Regardless of the device at fault, the ramification is the same; the packwill continue to operate but there may be a degradation in temperature


17

regulation. If temperatures become uncomfortable, consideration shouldbe given to turning off the affected pack.

[AIRPACK1(2)RECUL FAULT, FCOM3.2.21.5000, FCOM1.21.10.6000,FCOM1.21.10.5000]

3.7.ACSC single lane failureEach ACSC has two fully redundant "lanes", so loss of a single "lane"results in loss of redundancy only.

[AIRCONDCTL1(2)_A(B)FAULT, FCOM3.2.21.38000,FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.8.Duct overheatA duct overheat is defined as a duct reaching 88C or a duct reaching 80Cfour times in one flight. If this occurs, the hot air pressure regulating valveand trim air valves close automatically and the FAULT light illuminatesin the HOT AIR button. This light will extinguish when the temperaturedrops to 70C.

Once the duct has cooled, an attempt can be made to recover the hot airsystem by cycling the HOT AIR button. If recovery is not possible, basictemperature regulation will continue to be provided by the packs.

[CONDFWD CAB/AFTCAB/CKPTDUCTOVHT, FCOM3.2.21.6000,FCOM1.21.10.5000, FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.9.Hot air faultIf the hot air pressure regulating valve is not in it's commanded position,the effects will depend on it's actual position. If it is closed when com-manded open, the packs will provide basic temperature regulation. Moreserious is if it has been commanded closed in response to a duct overheatand it fails to close. Manual control may be effective, but if it is not theonly option is to turn off both packs and proceed as per Section3.3, Packfault.

[CONDHOTAIRFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.10000, FCOM1.21.10.6000]


18

3.10.Trim air faultsEither a fault with one of the trim air valves or an overpressure downstreamof the hot air valve. An associated message indicates which condition ex-ists.

Failure of a trim valve leads to loss of optimized temperature regulationfor the corresponding zone; basic temperature regulation is still available.

The TRIM AIR HIGH PR message may be disregarded if triggered whenall the trim air valves are closed. This occurs during the first 30 secondsafter the packs are selected on and in flight if all zone heating demandsare fulfilled. {TODO: FCOM is not very informative regarding responseto overpressure when this does not apply. Investigate further.}

[CONDTRIMAIRSYSFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.11000, FCOM1.21.10.3000,FCOM1.21.10.6000]

3.11.Cabin fan faultsIf both cabin fans fail, their flow should be replaced by increasing the packflow to HI.

[CONDL+RCABFANFAULT, FCOM3.1.21.22000]

3.12.Lavatory and galley fan faultsThe cabin zone temperature sensors are normally ventilated by air extract-ed by these fans. Loss of the fans therefore leads to loss of accurate zonetemperature indication.

On older aircraft, temperature control reverts to maintenance of a fixedcabin zone inlet duct temperature of 15C.

On newer aircraft the temperature controls for the cabin revert to control-ling temperature in the ducts. If ACSC 2 has also failed, the duct tempera-tures are maintained at the same level as the cockpit duct temperature, andmay therefore be controlled with the cockpit temperature selector.

[CONDL+RCABFANFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.23000]


19

3.13.Pressure controller faultsLoss of a single cabin pressure controller leads to loss of redundancy only.

If both pressure controllers are lost, use manual control. The outflow valvereacts slowly in manual mode, and it may be 10 seconds before positivecontrol of the outflow valve can be verified. It may also react too slowlyto prevent a temporary depressurization.

[CABPRSYS1(2)(1+2)FAULT, FCOM3.2.21.26000]

3.14.Low diff pressureHigh rates of descent may lead to the aircraft descending through the cab-in altitude when more than 3000ft above the landing altitude. An ECAMwarning indicates that this situation is projected to occur within the next1 minutes. If the rate of descent of the aircraft is not reduced, the pres-sure controllers will have to resort to high rates of change of cabin alti-tude, which may cause passenger discomfort. The aircraft's vertical speedshould be reduced unless there is a pressing reason not to.

[CABPRLODIFFPR, FCOM3.2.21.28000, FCOM1.21.20.5000]

3.15.Outflow valve closed on groundIf the outlow valve fails to automatically open on the ground, manual con-trol should be attempted. If that doesn't work, depressurise the aircraft byturning off both packs.

[CABPROFVNOTOPEN, FCOM3.2.21.30000]

3.16.Open safety valveThere are safety valves for both cabin overpressure and negative differen-tial pressure; the associated ECAM message does not distinguish betweenthe two.

If diff pressure is above 8psi, it is the overpressure valve that has opened.Attempt manual pressurisation control and if that fails, reduce aircraft al-titude.


20

If diff pressure is below zero, it is the negative differential valve. Reduceaircraft vertical speed or expect high cabin rates.

[CABPRSAFETYVALVEOPEN, FCOM 3.2.21.33000, FCOM1.21.20.5000]

3.17.Blower fault

Defined as low blowing pressure or duct overheat. Unless there is a DCESS Bus fault, the blower fan should be set to OVRD. This puts the avion-ics ventilation into closed configuration and adds cooling air from theair conditioning system.{TODO:investigate involvement of DC ESS BUSfault}

[VENTBLOWERFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.34000, FCOM1.21.30.7000]

3.18.Extract fault

Defined as low extract pressure. The extract fan should be put in OVRD.This puts the avionics ventilation into closed configuration and adds cool-ing air from the air conditioning system.

[VENTEXTRACTFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.35000, FCOM1.21.30.7000]

3.19.Skin valve fault

Defined as one of three faults: the inlet valve is not fully closed in flight,the extract valve is fully open in flight or the extract valve did not auto-matically close on application of take-off power. The ECAM Cab Presspage will differentiate.

If the fault is with the inlet valve, no action is required since it incorporatesa non-return valve.

If the extract valve is affected, the system should be put into smoke con-figuration; this sends additional close signals to the extract valve. If thisfails, the aircraft must be depressurized {TODO: find out why}.

[VENTSKINVALVEFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.36000, FCOM1.21.30.7000]


21

3.20.Avionics ventilation system vaultDefined as either a valve not in its commanded position or the AvionicsEquipment Ventilation Controller (AEVC) being either unpowered or fail-ing its power-up test. The system will automatically default to a safe con-figuration similar to smoke configuration. No crew action is required.

[VENTAVNCSSYSFAULT, FCOM3.2.21.37000, FCOM_1.21.30.7000]


22

Chapter4.Electrical

23

Chapter4.Electrical

4.1.Emergency configuration

Attempt to restore normal power by recycling the main generators. If thatfails, try again after splitting the systems with the BUS TIE button.

If normal power cannot be restored, ensure that the emergency generator ison line (deploy the RAT manually if required) and maintain speed >140ktto avoid RAT stall. Cycling FAC 1 will recover rudder trim. Once 45 sec-onds have elapsed and when below FL250, the APU can be started.

So much equipment is lost in the emergency configuration that QRH 1.01provides a table of surviving equipment. Notable losses are all the fuelpumps (so ignition on, avoid negative G, center tank fuel is unusable), theanti-skid and three fifths of the spoilers. Landing speeds and distances areincreased significantly.

QRH 1.05 provides a paper summary which should be applied once ECAMactions are complete.

[ELECEMERCONFIG, QRH1.01, QRH1.05, FCOM1.24.20.5000,FCOM3.2.24.17000]

4.2.Battery only

Power is available for approximately 30 minutes {TODO: Can't find a ref-erence for this - must have been part of CBT}. QRH 1.01 provides detailsof remaining equipment. This is very similar to the emergency electricalconfiguration (see Section4.1, Emergency configuration) with the addi-tional loss of FAC1 and FMGC1. An attempt should be made to bring theemergency generator on line by ensuring speed is >140kt and deployingthe RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR MAN ON button.

[ELECESSBUSESONBAT, QRH1.01, FCOM1.24.20.5000,FCOM3.2.24.19000]

Chapter4.Electrical

24

4.3.IDG low oil pressure/ high oil temperatureThe IDG should be disconnected. Assuming the associated engine is run-ning, press the IDG button until the GEN FAULT light comes on. Do notpress the button for more than 3 seconds.

The APU generator should be used if available.

[ELECIDG1(2)OILLOPR/OVHT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.1000]

4.4.Generator faultTry to reset the generator by turning it off, then after a short pause, turningit on again. If unsuccessful, turn it back off.

If an engine driven generator cannot be recovered, the APU generatorshould be used if available.

Single generator operation leads to shedding of the galley. Loss of an en-gine driven generator leads to loss of CAT III DUAL capability.

[ELEC(APU)GEN(1)(2)FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.{2,4}000]

4.5.Battery faultThe affected battery contactor opens automatically. APU battery start isunavailable with a single battery.

[ELECBAT1(2)FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.5000]

4.6.AC Bus 1 faultSome or all of the equipment on AC bus 1 becomes unavailable, includingTR1. DC Bus 2 is powered from DC Bus 1 via the battery bus. Powermust be re-routed to the Essential AC bus via AC bus 2. This is automaticon some aircraft. Manual re-routing is achieved with the AC ESS FEEDbutton. Once Essential AC is powered, the Essential TR powers the DCEssential bus.

Chapter4.Electrical

25

Notable lost equipment includes the blue hydraulic system and associatedservices (including spoiler 3), radio altimeter 1 (and hence Cat III capabil-ity), half the fuel pumps, the nose wheel steering, the avionics blower fanand p1 windshield heat. Landing distance will increase by up to 25% {TO-DO: There is a discrepancy between QRH 2.32 and FCOM 3.2.80.12000- check once new FCOM 3 is issued}.

[ELECACBUS1FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.8000]

4.7.AC Bus 2 fault

Some or all of the equipment on AC bus 2 becomes unavailable, includingTR2. DC bus 2 is powered from DC bus 1 via the battery bus. The majorityof this equipment has a redundant backup, the loss of the FO's PFD andND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issue. Landing distances areunchanged.

[ELECACBUS2FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.9000]

4.8.AC Ess Bus fault

It may be possible to recover the bus by transferring its power source toAC BUS 2 with the AC ESS FEED button. If this is unsuccessful, some orall of the equipment on the AC ESS bus will be lost. The majority of thisequipment has a redundant backup, with the loss of the Captain's PFD andND and a downgrade to Cat I being the major issues. Landing distancesare unchanged.

[ELECACESSBUSFAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.10000]

4.9.AC Essential Shed Bus lost

Some or all of the equipment on the AC ESS SHED bus is lost. The majorissue is the loss of the passenger oxygen masks. Landing distances areunchanged.

[ELECACESSBUSSHED, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.11000]

Chapter4.Electrical

26

4.10.DC Bus 1 faultSome or all of the equipment on DC Bus 1 is lost. Most of the equipmentloss causes loss of redundancy only. Landing distances are unchanged.

[ELECDCBUS1FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.12000]

4.11.DC Bus 2 faultSome or all of the equipment on DC Bus 2 is lost. The F/O's static probesensor is lost, so ADR3 should be selected on the F/O's side. FCU2 is lost,so check that the baro ref on the FCU and PFD agree. Landing distanceincreases by up to 35% due to the loss of 3 ground spoilers per side andone reverser. Autobrake is also unavailable. Due to the loss of SFCC2, theslats and flaps will be slow and the engines will remain in approach idle.FAC2 is lost, so the characteristic speeds on both PFDs are provided byFAC1. F/O window heat, wipers and rain repellant is lost.

The other lost systems either have redundant backups or are non-essential.It should be noted that the only flight computers remaining are ELAC 1,SEC 1 and FAC 1.

[ELECDCBUS2FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.13000]

4.12.DC Essential Bus faultSome or all of the equipment in the DC Essential Bus is lost. Of particu-lar note, the audio cards connecting VHF2 and VHF3 to the Audio Man-agement Unit are lost. Since VHF1 is also lost, the ECAM suggests usingVHF2 and VHF3, but this will not work, and all comms are lost. Airbusis working on a fix, apparently.

FCU1 is lost, so the baro refs should be checked. The GPWS is lost andshould be turned off.

Landing distances are increased due to the loss of reverser 2 and the lossof the blue hydraulic system (and hence spoiler 3). Wing anti-ice is alsolost, so landing distances will also increase significantly if ice is accretedand increased approach speeds are required.

Chapter4.Electrical

27

Slats and flaps are slow due to the loss of SFCC1. This also leads to theengines reverting to approach idle.

Landing capability is Cat 2 due to the loss of the auto-thrust. The ECAMstatus page incorrectly reports Cat 3 single.

[ELECDCESSBUSFAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.14000]

4.13.DC Essential shed

The only major issue is the loss of wing anti-ice. Therefore, avoid icingconditions, and apply landing distance procedure if ice accretes.

[ELECDCESSBUSSHED, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.15000]

4.14.Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2

Some or all of the systems supplied by DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 are lost.

Both channels of the BSCU are lost (leads to loss of anti-skid) along with3 spoilers from each side and both reversers. This significantly increaseslanding distances, particularly in the wet.

Also of note is that both center tank pumps are lost. As the center tankcannot gravity feed, the fuel in it becomes unusable.

Finally, loss of SFCC2 means that flaps and slats are slow, and engine idlecontrol reverts to approach idle.

All other systems are relatively insignificant or have redundant backups.

[ELECDCBUS1+2 FAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24]

4.15.Generator overload

Shed some load by switching off the galleys.

[ELECGEN1(2)OVERLOAD, ELECAPUGENOVERLOAD,FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.21000]

Chapter4.Electrical

28

4.16.Loss of TR

No systems are lost as a result of failure of a single TR. If the fault is withTR1 or TR2, only Cat 3 single will be available.

[ELECTR1(2), ELECESSTRFAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000,FCOM3.2.24.22000 ]

4.17.Battery bus fault

Some or all of the equipment on the Battery bus is lost. The only majoritems lost are APU fire detection and APU battery start.

[ELECDCBATBUSFAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.23000]

4.18.DC Emergency configuration

Defined as the loss of DC BUSSES 1 + 2, DC ESS BUS and DC BAT BUS.The check list assumes that DC ESS BUS can be recovered by deployingthe RAT with the EMER ELEC PWR button.

The lost equipment is the sum of loss of DC BUS 1, DC BUS 2 (see Sec-tion4.14, Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2) and the battery bus (seeSection4.17, Battery bus fault), so all comments regarding these failuresapply. In addition, a minimum of 140kt must be maintained to avoid RATstall. This combination leads to an extreme increase in landing distancerequirement.

[ELECDCEMERCONFIG, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.24000]

4.19.Static inverter fault

Normal operations are not affected.

[ELECSTATINVFAULT, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.25000]

Chapter4.Electrical

29

4.20.Generator 1 line offThe GEN 1 LINE button on the emergency electrical panel manually opensthe generator 1 line contactor, leaving generator 2 to supply GEN 2. It isused for the smoke drill. If it's not meant to be off, turn it on.

[ELECEMERGEN1LINEOFF, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.26000]

4.21.Tripped circuit breakersIt is generally not recommended to reset circuit breakers in flight. It is,however, acceptable to attempt a single reset if it is judged necessary forthe safe continuation of the flight.

On the ground, any circuit breakers other than those for the fuel pumpsmay be reset as long as the action is coordinated with MOC.

The ECAM warning will be triggered if a green circuit breaker trips.

[C/BTRIPPED, FCOM1.24.20.5000, FCOM3.2.24.27000 ]

Chapter4.Electrical

30

Chapter5.Flight controls

31


5.1.Elevator faults

If a single elevator fails, the SECs use the remaining elevator to providepitch control in alternate law (see Section5.12, Alternate Law). In addi-tion, speed brake should not be used and the autopilots are unserviceable{TODO: Find out why}.

If both elevators fail, the only mechanism for pitch control available ismanual pitch trim, so pitch reverts to mechanical back up and roll reverts todirect law. For the approach fly a long final, initiating the descent from atleast 5000ft AAL. Do not try to flare using trim and do not remove poweruntil after touchdown. From 1000ft AAL, try to keep power changes towithin 2% N1. In the event of a go-around, power must be applied veryslowly if control is not to be lost.{TODO: This is Boeing advice - checkif it is relevant to Airbus}

[F/CTLL(R)(L+R)ELEVFAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.23000,FCOM3.2.27.25000]

5.2.Stabilizer jam

Manual pitch trim is a mechanical connection to the stabilizer actuator. Itmay be possible to use manual pitch trim when the ELACs have detecteda stabilizer jam, although it may be heavier than normal. If it is useable,trim for neutral elevators.

The flight controls will revert to Alternate Law. If the stabilizer could notbe moved, gear extension should be delayed until CONF 3 and VAPP areacheived so that the elevators are properly trimmed.

If the jam is caused by the mechanical connection, it is possible that theELACs will not detect the problem. The procedure in this case is similar,but Normal Law will remain.

[F/CTLSTABILIZERJAM, QRH2.07, FCOM1.27.40.8000,FCOM3.2.27.32000, FCOM3.2.27.33000]


32

5.3.Aileron faults

The lateral aircraft handling is not adversely affected even if both aileronsfail, as the systems compensate by using the spoilers. Fuel consumptionwill, however, increase by approximately 6%.

[F/CTLL(R)AILFAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.22000]

5.4.Spoiler faults

The effect of a spoiler fault depends on whether the spoiler fails retractedor extended.

If the spoiler failes in the retracted position, handling should not be ad-versely affected. A CONF 3 landing may reduce any buffeting that is en-countered. Speed brake should not be used if spoilers 3 + 4 are affected.The loss of ground spoilers will increase landing distances by up to 55%(details in QRH 2.32).

Airbus have identified a failure scenario that leads to high pressure hy-draulic fluid reaching the extend chamber of a spoiler actuator via a failedo-ring. This has the effect of a spoiler failing in the fully extended position.In this case, the autopilot does not necessarily have sufficient authority tocontrol the aircraft, and it should be disconnected. Fuel burn will increasesignificantly; FMGC fuel predictions do not account for the failure andshould be disregarded. Green dot speed will minimize this increased fuelburn, but may not be viable if there is excessive buffet - attempt to find acompromise speed. Landing will be flap 3; VAPP and LDG DIST factorsare available in OEB208/1.

[F/CTL(GND)SPLR(1+2)(3+4)FAULT, OEB208/1, FCOM1.27.40.8000,FCOM3.2.27.26000, FCOM3.2.27.27000]

5.5.Rudder Jam

The main indication of jammed rudder is undue and adverse pedal move-ment during rolling maneuvers caused by the yaw damper orders being fedback to the pedals when they are no longer sent to the rudder.


33

Crosswinds from the side that the rudder is deflected should be avoided,and a cross wind limit of 15kt applies. Control on the ground will requiredifferential braking until the steering handle can be used (below 70kt), solanding distances are increased. Do not use autobrake.

[F/CTLRUDDERJAM, QRH2.06, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.34000]

5.6.Flaps and/or slats fault/lockedThe most pressing concern following a flap or slat problem is to establish amax operating speed that will avoid overspeeding the device in its lockedposition. A table is provided on page 2.05 of the QRH for this purpose, buta quick estimation can be made by establishing what flap lever positionwould be required to get the device into its current position and using VFEfor the configuration associated with that flap lever position as VMO. Indoing this, it must be remembered that slat deployment in CONF 2 andCONF 3 is the same (tip: think of available slat positions as being 0, 1,Intermediate or Full). This also affects use of the QRH table; the seconddot on the slat indicator on the E/WD should be considered slat 3 for thepurpose of this table, not slat 2 as might be expected. The barber's poledisplayed for VFE on the PFD is a function of the flap lever position, soit may be worth initially selecting the flap lever to the matching CONF tohave this reference available. For minimum speeds, the VLS displayed onthe PFD is calculated from actual flap and slat position and can be trusted.

Unless there is an obvious reason not to (e.g. wing tip brake on, alignmentfault or fault due to dual hydraulic failure), the flap lever can be recycled.

If normal operation cannot be restored, there are two major issues thatmust be quickly addressed. Firstly, fuel burn will be dramatically higherwhen flying with a locked device. With slats extended, fuel burn will in-crease by 60%. With flaps extended it will increase by 80%. With slats andflaps extended, fuel burn will double. The paragraph at the bottom of page2.05 of the QRH provides these figures. The second issue is that landingdistances are significantly increased, in the worst case by a factor of 2.2.Landing distance can be assessed using the tables on page 2.32 and 4.03 ofthe QRH. It may be that the combination of these factors requires a fairlyprompt diversion decision.


34

The flap and slat systems are largely independent, so the flap lever willcontinue to move the slats if the flaps are locked and vice versa. In general,flap 3 should be selected for landing. There are two exceptions. If flapsare locked at >3, flap full should be used. If both slats and flaps are lockedat 0, flap 1 should be used so that the AP/FD go-around is armed. Config-urations and VREF increments are available on page 2.32 of the QRH. Ifa flapless and slatless landing is required, the threshold speed in may bebelow VLS. This is necessary as the landing speeds in this configurationare very close to tyre limit speeds.

During configuration, VLS is computed from actual configuration andVFEnext is computed from flap lever position. F and S speeds are essen-tially meaningless. The deployment method is to reduce speed to slightly(5kt) below the limiting speed for a configuration before selecting it. IfVLS>VFEnext, prioritise VLS: fly VLS, select the next configuration, thentrack VLS as it reduces with the extension of the lift device. In most cases,overspeed warnings can be avoided.

It is worth noting that failure of the slat channels of both SFCCs appears toresult in the loss of characterisic speed display on both PFDs. This is notmentioned in the FCOM but occurs in the sim. The upshot of this is thatneither VLS nor VSW are available at all, since they are not displayed andthere is no way to calculate them. This is of particular concern when tryingto configure to flaps2 since the aircraft must be slowed to VFE(conf2)-5when still clean (remember conf1 is slats only when configuring fromconf0). It is highly likely that the stall warner will activate during thetransition, and if not anticipated, the subsequent recovery will overspeedthe flaps. The solution is to brief that speed will be reduced very slowlyand if the stall warning occurs the speed will be maintained whilst allowingthe deployment of the flaps to recover the stall margin.

The autopilot may be used down to 500ft AAL, but since it is not tunedfor the abnormal configuration it must be closely monitored.

For the go-around, initially maintain flap/ slat configuration. A speed 10ktlower than max operating speed should be flown. If it is the slats that arejammed or if the flaps are jammed at 0, clean configuration can be usedto transit to a diversion airfield.


35

Other issues include the possible loss of the automatic operation of thecentre tank pumps (which is sequenced to the slats) and possible reversionto Alternate Law.

[F/CTLFLAPS(SLATS)FAULT(LOCKED), QRH2.03, FCOM1.27.50.3000,FCOM3.2.27.1000, FCOM3.2.27.2000, FCOM3.2.27.3000,FCOM3.2.27.4000]

5.7.SFCC faults

Each SFCC has fully independent slat and flap channels. A failure of achannel in a single controller will lead to slow operation of the associatedsurfaces. In addition, the flap channel of SFCC1 provides input to the idlecontrol part of the FADECs and to the EGPWC.

Failure of both flap channels or failure of both slat channels is covered inSection5.6, Flaps and/or slats fault/locked.

[F/CTLFLAP(SLAT)SYS1(2)FAULT, FCOM1.27.50.3000,FCOM3.2.27.5000, FCOM3.2.27.6000]

5.8.ELAC fault

In normal operations, ELAC 1 controls the ailerons and ELAC 2 con-trols the elevators and stabiliser. Failure of a single ELAC will result infailover to the remaining computer. Provided no uncommanded maneu-vres occured, an attempt can be made to reset the failed ELAC.

Failure of both ELACs leads to loss of ailerons and hence Alternate Law.One of the SECs will take over control of the elevators and stabiliser.Again, an attempt can be made to reset the computers.

If the fault is designated a pitch fault, only the pitch function of the asso-ciated ELAC is lost.

[F/CTL ELAC1(2)FAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.11000,FCOM3.2.27.12000]


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5.9.SEC fault

Each SEC controls either 1 or 2 spoilers per wing. SEC 1 and 2 also pro-vide back up for the ELACs (see Section5.8, ELAC fault). Loss of aSEC leads to loss of its associated spoilers. SEC 1 provides spoiler posi-tion to the FACs. If speedbrakes are deployed with SEC 1 u/s and SEC 3operative, spoiler 2 will deploy without a corresponding increase in VLS.Therefore, do not use speedbrake if SEC 1 is affected (it won't do muchanyway!).

Pairs of SECs also provide the signal for reverse thrust lever angle to thereversers and spoiler deployment to the autobrake. A dual SEC failure willtherefore lead to a loss of a reverser and loss of autobraking.

If all SECs are lost, all the above holds true. Furthermore the flight controlsrevert to Alternate Law due to the complete loss of spoilers. Also, due torouting of LGCIU data to the ELACs via the SECs, Direct Law will occurat slat extension rather than gear extension.

An attempt should be made to reset the affected SEC(s).

[F/CTLSEC1(2)(3)FAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.14000]

5.10.FCDC faults

The two FCDCs are redundant, so a single failure has no immediate effect.

If both FCDCs fail, the ELACs and SECs can no longer supply data tothe EIS. The major effect of this is that F/CTL ECAM warnings are nolonger generated. The warning lights on the overhead panel continue togive valid information and should be monitored. The aircraft remains innormal law with all protections, but protection indications (bank and pitchlimits, Vprot and Vmax) are not shown and the stall warning system be-comes active.

[F/CTLFCDC1(2)(1+2)FAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.20000]


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5.11.Direct Law

In Direct Law, deflection of the control surfaces is a linear function of de-flection of the side-stick and trimming must be done manually. The con-trols are very sensitive at high speeds. Use of manual thrust is recommend-ed as power changes will result in pitch changes. Similarly, use of thespeed brake will result in nose up pitch changes so it should be used withcare. Protections are unavailable, so speed is limited to 320kt/0.77M andcare must be taken in GPWS or windshear maneuvres. Approach speed isincreased by 10kt and landing distances increase by a factor of 1.2.

[F/CTLDIRECTLAW, FCOM1.27.40.15000, FCOM3.2.27.000]

5.12.Alternate Law

In alternate law, pitch is as in normal law, but roll is as in direct law. Loadfactor protection is retained, but other protections are either replaced withstatic stability or are lost, depending on the nature of the failure. Stall warn-ings and overspeed warnings become active.

The main effects are that speed is limited to 320kt and stall warnings mustbe respected when carrying out EGPWS maneuvers.

Expect Direct Law after landing gear extension (see Section5.11, DirectLaw), and hence increased approach speeds and landing distances (seeQRH 2.32).

[F/CTLALTNLAW, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.18000]

5.13.Wingtip brake fault

The wingtip brakes activate in case of assymetry, mechanism overspeed,symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movements. This protection islost.

[F/CTLFLAP(SLAT)TIPBRKFAULT, FCOM1.27.50.3000,FCOM3.2.27.7000]


38

5.14.Flap attach sensor failureThe flap attach sensor detects excessive differential movement betweenthe inner and outer flaps which would indicate failure of a flap attachment.This protection is lost.

[F/CTLFLAPATTACHSENSOR, FCOM1.27.50.3000, FCOM3.2.27.9000]

5.15.Flight control servo faultsAll flight controls have redundant servos. In the case of an elevator servofault, a restriction to not use speedbrake above VMO/MMO applies.

[F/CTLAIL(ELEV)SERVOFAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000,FCOM3.2.27.21000, FCOM3.2.27.24000]

5.16.Speed brake disagreeThis indicates that the spoiler positions do not correspond with the speed-brake lever position. This may be as a result of automatic retraction (alphafloor activation or speed brakes deployed when full flap selected) or as aresult of spoiler malfunction. In both cases retract the speedbrake lever andin the case of spoiler malfunction consider the speedbrakes unserviceable.

[F/CTLSPDBRKDISAGREE, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.28000]

5.17.Speed brake faultThis indicates a failure of the speedbrake lever transducers rather thana problem with the spoilers. Ground spoiler activation may be expectedon selection of reverse, so providing reversers are used, landing distancesshould not be affected.

[F/CTLSPDBRK(2)(3+4)FAULT, FCOM1.27.40.8000, FCOM3.2.27.29000]

5.18.Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedalsThis may affect both sidesticks at the same time, but not the rudder pedalsor it may affect the rudder pedals and one sidestick. Control forces will


39

remain moderate and the aircraft remains responsive. Confirm autopilotdisengagement and consider transferring control if one of the sidesticks isunaffected.

[QRH2.07, FCOM3.2.27.42000]

5.19.Sidestick unannunciated transducer faultsIt is possible for a failed sidestick transducer to cause uncommanded con-trol inputs. If no fault is detected, the result is that the aircraft behaves as ifthat input had actually been made. Generally, the autopilot will disconnectand any attempt to control the aircraft with the failed sidestick will fail.The aircraft should be recovered with the other sidestick using the takeoverbutton. Keeping this button pressed for 40 seconds will lock out the failedsidestick, and the autopilot can then be re-engaged. The autopilot shouldnot be disconnected in the normal manner as pressing the takeover buttonwill re-introduce the failed sidestick and the uncommanded input; use theFCU instead.


40

Chapter6.Fire

41

Chapter6.Fire6.1.Smoke and fumes

The QRH procedure should be applied when smoke is detected and thecrew suspect the avionics, air conditioning or cabin equipment as thesource. The paper procedure includes all the steps of the avionics smokeECAM procedure, so if this caution is triggered, the paper procedureshould be applied after completing the immediate actions of the ECAMprocedure.

In the case of other smoke related ECAMs, the relevant ECAM procedureshould be applied first and then the use of the paper checklist considered.

Rain repellent fluid leaks are not covered. Orange peel smells are toxic,pine needle smells non-toxic.

The SMOKE/ FUMES/ AVNCS SMOKE checklist attempts to isolate thesource of the smoke. It is possible that it may become impossible to carryout this checklist due to smoke density. In this case, interrupt the checklistand carry out the smoke removal drill (see Section6.2, Smoke/ fumes re-moval). It is also possible that the situation may deteriorate to a level thatan immediate forced landing becomes the preferable option. In general,unless the source of the smoke is obvious and extinguishable, a diversionshould be initiated immediately. The smoke removal drill is most effectiveand adaptable at lower levels, so a descent to 10,000ft or MSA is also apriority.

The first priority is to protect yourself, so get an oxygen mask on. Themask must be set to 100% oxygen to exclude fumes; at minimum dispatchoxygen levels this will provide as little as 15 minutes of protection. Push-ing the "Emergency pressure selector" knob will provide a few seconds ofoverpressure, which can be used to clear any smoke trapped in the maskas it was donned.

The most likely sources are the avionics, the cabin fans and the galleys.Therefore immediate initial actions are to turn off the cabin fans and gal-leys and put the avionics ventilation in smoke removal mode by selectingboth fans to OVRD.

Chapter6.Fire

42

Where the smoke source is not immediately obvious and the initial actionshave not caused it to cease, the QRH provides drills for suspected air con-ditioning smoke, suspected cabin equipment smoke or suspected avionics/electrical smoke. In addition the avionics/ electrical smoke drill includesundetermined and continuing smoke sources.

Suspect air conditioning smoke if it initially comes out of the ventilationoutlets. Several ECAM warnings are also likely to occur as sensors de-tect the smoke in other areas. The displayed ECAM procedures must beapplied. Following an engine or APU failure, smoke may initially enterthe air conditioning system but should dissipate quickly once the failure iscontained. The air conditioning drill starts by turning the APU bleed offin case this is the source. The packs are then turned off one at a time todetermine if the source of the smoke is a pack.

The cabin equipment smoke drill involves selecting the commercial buttonoff and searching for faulty cabin equipment.

Suspect avionics smoke if the only triggered ECAM is AVIONICSSMOKE. If an item of electrical equipment fails immediately prior tothe appearance of the smoke, that equipment should be suspected as thesource. The avionics/ electrical drill (which includes the undeterminedsource drill) no longer involves systematic shedding of the AC busses dueto the negative interaction that this procedure had with the battery chargers.Instead, emergency electrical configuration (see Section4.1, Emergencyconfiguration) is adopted immediately. The electrical system should berestored just before deploying the gear. Note that since you will not be ableto restore the two IRs that were depowered, the landing will be in DirectLaw and hence CONF 3. Refer to QRH 2.32 for VApp and LDR factor.This is not mentioned in QRH 1.06, and is only mentioned on the ECAMonce gear is extended.

[AVIONICSSMOKE, QRH1.06, FCOM3.2.26.6000]

6.2.Smoke/ fumes removal

Smoke removal procedures initially use the pressurisation system to drawsmoke and fumes overboard by increasing the cabin altitude. If there are

Chapter6.Fire

43

no fuel vapours present, the packs are used to drive the smoke overboard.Otherwise it is driven overboard by residual pressure.

The final target configuration is packs off, outflow valve fully open andram air on. As this depressurises the aircraft, it can only be acheived atlower levels (preferably FL100). If in emergency configuration, turningthe APU master switch on connects the batteries for a maximum of 3 min-utes and allows manual control of the DC powered outflow valve motor.Once at a suitable level and below 200kt, as a last resort PNF's cockpitwindow can be opened.

[QRH1.06, FCOM3.2.26.7000]

6.3.Engine fireThe basic sequence is to bring the thrust lever of the affected engine to idle,turn off its engine master, push its fire button, wait 10 seconds then deployits first fire bottle. If the fire is not extinguished after 30 seconds, indicatedby the fire button remaining lit, deploy the second bottle. This sequence ismodified on the ground in that both fire bottles are fired immediately, andthe remaining engine is then also shut down.

Chapter6.Fire

44

Chapter7.Fuel

45

Chapter7.Fuel

7.1.Fuel leakWhenever a non-normal fuel event occurs, the possibility that the under-lying cause of the event is a fuel leak should be considered. Only when afuel leak has been categorically ruled out should the cross-feed valve beopened.[FCTM 3.28]

The primary method used to detect fuel leaks is a regular check that actualfuel remaining corresponds to expected fuel remaining and that fuel usedplus fuel remaining corresponds to fuel at engine start. The latter parameteris monitored on some aircraft and may trigger an ECAM warning. Otherindications of a leak include fuel imbalance or excessive fuel flow froman engine. It also possible that a fuel leak may be detected visually or bya smell of fuel in the cabin.

If a leak can be confirmed to be coming from an engine or pylon, the af-fected engine must be shut down. In this case, cross-feeding is allowable.Otherwise, the cross-feed must be kept closed.

If the leak cannot be confirmed to be originating from an engine or pylon,an attempt should be made to identify the source of the leak by monitoringthe inner tank depletion rates with the crossfeed valve closed and the centertank pumps off.

If depletion rates are similar, a leak from the center tank or from the APUfeeding line should be suspected. If there is a smell of fuel in the cabin, itis likely that the APU feeding line is at fault and the APU should be turnedoff. Fuel from the center tank should be used once one of the inner tankshas

Chapter7.Fuel

46

the leak then stops, an engine leak is confirmed and the cross feed can beused. If not, a leak from the wing is most likely. In this case, an enginerestart should be considered.

In an emergency, a landing may be carried out with maximum fuel imbal-ance.

[FUELFUSED/FOBDISAGREE, QRH2.08, FCOM3.2.28.24000,FCOM3.2.28.25000]

7.2.Fuel imbalanceAll fuel balancing must be carried out in accordance with QRH 2.09, pay-ing particular attention to the possibility of a fuel leak. Any action shouldbe delayed until sufficient time has passed for a fuel leak to become appar-ent. FCOM 3.2.28.26000 adds a note not found in the QRH that "there isno requirement to correct an imbalance until the ECAM fuel advisory lim-it is displayed", an event that occurs when one inner tank holds >1500kgmore than the other. The limitations for fuel imbalance in FCOM 3.1.28,however, show that the fuel advisory does not necessarily indicate that alimitation is likely to be breached. In particular, when the outer tanks arebalanced and the heavier inner tank contains 2250kg, there are no im-balance limitations. Furthermore, the aircraft handling is not significantlyimpaired even at maximum imbalance.

To balance the fuel, open the cross-feed valve and turn the lighter sidepumps and the center tank pumps off.

[QRH2.09, FCOM3.28.26000, FCOM3.1.28]

7.3.Gravity fuel feedingTurn on ignition in case of fuel interruption and avoid negative G. Theceiling at which fuel can be reliably gravity fed depends on whether thefuel has had time to deaerate. If the aircraft has been above FL300 for morethan 30 minutes, the fuel may be considered deaerated and the currentflight level maintained. Otherwise, the fuel must be considered aerated andthe gravity feed ceiling is FL300 if the aircraft exceeded FL300 or FL150 ifit didn't. If gravity feeding is required, descend to the gravity feed ceiling.

Chapter7.Fuel

47

It is also possible to gravity cross feed by side slipping the aircraft with abank angle of 2 to 3 should this become necessary.

[QRH2.09, FCOM3.2.28.28000]

7.4.Wing tank pump(s) low pressureFailed pumps should be turned off.

Failure of a single pump in either tank results in reduced redundancy only.

Failure of both pumps in a given tank means that the fuel in that tank isonly available by gravity feeding. Pressurized fuel may be available fromthe center tank (use manual mode if necessary) or by cross-feeding. Adescent to gravity feed ceiling may be required (see Section7.3, Gravityfuel feeding).

[FUELL(R)TKPUMP1(2)(1+2)LOPR, FCOM3.2.38.1000 ,FCOM3.2.38.2000, FCOM1.28.20.7000]

7.5.Center tank pumps low pressureFailed pumps should be turned off.

Failure of a single center tank pump results in a loss of redundancy. Thecrossfeed should be opened until the center tank fuel has been exhaustedso that the remaining pump can supply both engines.

Failure of both center tank pumps makes the fuel in the center tank unus-able.

[FUELCTRTKPUMP(S)(1(2))LOPR, FCOM3.2.28.21000,FCOM3.2.28.22000, FCOM1.28.20.7000]

7.6.Auto feed faultThe center tank pumps must be managed manually. They must be switchedoff whenever slats are extended, wing tank fuel >5000kg or center tankfuel is exhausted.

[FUELAUTOFEEDFAULT, FCOM3.2.28.23000, FCOM1.28.20.7000]

Chapter7.Fuel

48

7.7.Low fuel levelThe ECAM is triggered at approximately 750kg. The warning may be spu-rious if

a320 emergency checklist.pdf

Documents

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incapacitation memory

cabin fan faults

pack regulator faults

stall recovery memory

normal notesiv3

emergency descent memory

trim air faults