abortion (margolis)

7/28/2019 Abortion (Margolis)

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AbortionAuthor(s): Joseph MargolisReviewed work(s):Source: Ethics, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Oct., 1973), pp. 51-61Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379890 .

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ABORTION

Joseph MargolisTemple University

The defense of the practice of abortion taxes our moral sensibilities primarilybecause of the complexity of the ways in which our view of it is affected byother relatively independent social themes. For instance, if the world's popu-lation threatened to multiply dangerously within, say, a generation, then rou-tinized abortion might well be required in the interest of racial survival; andthat consideration might well be thought to take precedence over the savingof any random fetus-in any rationally defensible policy. Also, if women couldpractice abortion easily and effectively by themselves, say, by the use of apreparation available in the supermarket-possibly by a hair spray discoveredto have abortive powers-then the very privacy and ease of commission of theact, the difficulty of effective legal constraints, and widespread practice typi-cally without shame or a sense of guilt would probably conspire to make theissue a matter of a woman's right over her own body or a matter of conscienceto be decided between herself and her family or loved ones. Or, if fetuses wereproduced by artificial insemination or even entirely outside the body of awoman, then the recognized planning entailed would probably persuade usboth of the ease with which alternative fetuses could be provided and of thegeneral irrelevance of the usual claims of the rights of the fetus in assessingwhether the developing embryo is or is not intrinsically acceptable on anygiven scale; of course, abortion under such circumstances would not at all beopen to discussion in terms of women's rights as currently construed by wom-en's lib, that is, in terms of the use of a woman's body. Again, if abortion isseen as a problem because, on some religious view, the unborn fetus cannot bebaptized and yet, at some critical point in its development (whether at con-ception, quickening, birth, or when it is viable), it is said to have an immortalsoul and therefore to require baptism, then there is an end to the debate-inthe double sense that the faithful have no recourse without a change in theol-ogy and those outside the faith can find no common ground for dispute.

These considerations show that the currently heated debate about abortionis peculiarly affected by some comparatively temporary and highly change-

51


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52 Ethicsable featuresof populationdensity and growth, technology, and religious influ-ence. This is not to say that it is any the less serious for those features,butrather that it must be faced as an issue for a populationneither too large nortoo small to affect the form of the question decisively,whose relevant technol-ogy and socially endorsedpractices have significantlychanged in recent yearsbut have yet remainedcomparatively crude and not abruptly different fromwhat obtained in an earlier age, and whose ethical and religious convictionsremainrelevantly divided.

Having said this, we may conveniently note that the question of abortionis hardly conceptuallyinteresting n its own right unless we admit that the fetusis a living human being, as yet unborn-redundantly,in this sense, an innocentcreature, a creature that has a "right to life" in the sense that to take its lifecalls for defending reasons,not in the sense that defending reasons are alto-gether impossible o provide.This is not to say that there is no morallyrelevantdifference between an unborn fetus and a humaninfant or a human adult;northata fetus is human n every fair sense of the term;nor that a fetus is a personhuman or not), that is, a sentient creature capable of using language.' It isonly to say that, in taking the life of an unborn fetus, one must consider thePossibilityof defense in terms, minimally,of the fetus'sbelongingto the humanspecies; hat taking the life of another humanbeing calls for ethical defense.2Consequently, though it is obvious that there is~a good deal of debate aboutwhen, in the developmentalcycle of the fetus, it is appropriate o speak of itsbeing an unborn humanbeing, the issue is not really interesting except insofaras deciding where to draw the line signifies the point at which the importantconceptual issues obtain.If, for example, on some doctrinal grounds, it is con-ceded that the fertilized ovum during the first week following conception isnot yet a human being, then abortion cannot be construed in terms of the pos-sibly conflicting rightsof a woman and of the humanfetus she bears;it wouldthen haveto be subsumed, n whatever interestingway may obtain,under cate-gories concerned exclusively with the well-being of the woman or family orrace affected, without reference at all to the putative interests of the fetus. Itis well known that the most incredible disputes have developed in religiouscircles-chiefly though not exclusively Roman Catholic, in fact now evenamong scientists in the biological disciplines-about when precisely we maysay that the fetus is a humanbeing.3 But, of course,there is no purely scientific

1. See JonathanBennett, "Whatever the Consequences,"Analysis 26 (1966): 83-102;and Joseph Margolis,Knowledge and Existence (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1973), chap. 8.2. See Joseph Margolis, Values and Conduct (New York: Oxford UniversityPress; Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1971), chap. 10.3. See Joseph Fletcher, Medicine and Morals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1954), chap. 3; also, Paul Ramsey, "The Morality of Abortion," in Lifeor Death: Ethics and Options, ed. Daniel H. Labby (Seattle: University of WashingtonPress, 1968); Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Norman St. John-Stevas, The Right to Life (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart &Winston, 1964).


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53 Discussionbasis on which to determine when and when not the fetus is human-and re-ligiously dictated decisions are not open to debate in the usual sense. The ferti-lized egg, after all, is a fertilized egg produced by two human beings (or, suit-able surrogates, if we imagine our technology sufficiently advanced): anyself-consistent demarcation line will necessarily be consistent with whateverscientific data we may obtain about such an egg, as long as we do not beg thequestion. There is no point to the biologist's pronouncing that the fertilizedegg at this or that precise stage of development is an unborn human being;his definition is intended to have normative import, in the sense in which thequestion of the defense of abortion thereupon obtains, and nothing that he may--discern could not be admitted by another biologist who chose to draw the lineat a different point. We may concede that substantive findings regarding thedefensibility of abortion in particular cases will be affected by the admissionthat we are dealing with an unborn humanbeing, but that is simply to say thatthe range of relevant ethical reflections will be brought to bear on these orthose cases but not, perhaps, on those. Let us agree, then, that the fetus is anunborn humanbeing, in order to see what may be said about the ethically in-teresting featuresof the practiceof abortion.

One thing is perfectly plain: we cannot, as we now understandthe phe-nomenon, satisfactorily invoke the so-called Principle of Double Effect,4 thatis, the distinction, relative to justifying deliberate acts, between intended andmerely foreseen consequences. It cannot convincingly be maintained that, inabortion, the act is designed solely to promote the well-being or life of themother, when it is merely noted that, in so doing, the life of the fetus will beended. No, the causal connectionsare much too explicit and clear: one intendsto favor the mother's health or life by taking the life of the fetus. We maystill consider its defensibility, but there is no prospect of plausibly claimingthat Double Effect relevantly bearson the issue.5It is, of course, conceivablethat it could-for instance, if aborting the fetus at given stages of its unbornlife might regularly be possible without endangering the fetus at such points(say, through some technological development), then, for the establishedprac-tice, actually losing the fetus because of complications might be defended onthe basis of the Principleof Double Effect; but where it is merely a foregoneconclusion and the causallinkage is well-known, it is hopeless to pretendthatthe death of the fetus is not intended.

If, then, the defense of abortion is construed instrumentally,that is, interms of the well-being or life of the affected mother (conceivably, also, in4. See the article "Double Effect, Principle of," New Catholic Encyclopedia(New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1967), 4:1020-22.5. See the discussion in G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Phi-losophy 33 (1958): 1-19; Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrineof the Double Effect," Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5-15; Roger Wertheimer, "Under-standing the Abortion Argument," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 67-95;Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1971): 47-66; and Bennett.


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avoidthe questionof the ethical priority of the interestsor rights of the af-fectedparties-say,of the motherandthe fetus.It is in this connectionthatthemostimportantandthe moststrenuousclaimsaremadeaboutthe defensibilityor indefensibility f abortion tself. The centralthreadof all the adjustedargu-mentsconcerns he putative nnocenceof the fetus. On the most extremeanti-abortionview, given the innocenceof the fetus, the deliberateact of endingthe life of the fetus is simply murder.6In a word, the argumentis that thefetusis a humanbeing andcannotbe killedqua innocent.As it stands,on ourassumption,he argument s impeccable.But if so, how can abortionpossiblybe defended?One considerations that the principleof innocence is formallyvacuous-rather ike the presumptionof innocencein the law. One cannot, inan ethicallydefensibleway, take the life of an innocenthumanbeing insofaras that humanbeing is innocentand has not behavedin any way that wouldjustifythe act: the thesisis tautological.But since the fetus is, in the requiredsense,innocent,the defenseof abortionmustbe basedon considerations therthanof innocencethat takeprecedenceover (and in spiteof) innocence.Theissue,of course,arisesin other contexts. Imagine,for example,that a humaninfantor adultis affectedwith a deadly diseasethat threatens o wipe out anentirepopulationunlessthe creature s dispatched.Surely,it is an eligibleargu-ment to hold that the infantor adult affectedought to be killed to save thelivesof the community,withoutdenyingthe innocenceof the victim: it is notimportantherethatthe argumentbe decisive,only that it be eligible.For, if itis eligible,then we recognizethe possibilityof defendingthe deliberate akingof another's ife in spite of innocence, in the sense required.Hence, it is atleastpossible hatabortionbe instrumentallydefendedin spiteof the admittedinnocenceof the fetus.Second,apartfrom the act of abortion tself, it is notnormallyrelevant o the debate hatthe pregnantwomaninvolvedbe anythingbut innocent,in fact as innocent as the unbornfetus. So it may vervewell bethat the woman'srightsregarding ife andwell-beingare in some way threat-enedby the continuedexistenceof the fetus,in spiteof the fact that both areinnocent;here,the possibilityof a defensebeginsto take shape.

Recently, in Pennsvlvaniaan abortionbill that sought to specify defen-sible abortionsolely in termsof the continuedexistenceof the fetus'sposinga medicallyconfirmeddangerto the very life of the mother was defeated.The standing aw in Pennsylvania, ince the bill was vetoed by the governorand not overridden,holds only that illegal abortionscannot be legally per-formed!It providesno specificationof what is legal or illegal in abortion:theresult is that it has been construed n the most liberal terms possible.But theopponentsof existingPennsylvaniapracticewished to reject rape and incestandthe health,well-being,and mere desiresof the motheras possiblegroundsfor justifiedabortion.They do not hold that there are absolutelyno groundsfor defensibleabortion; hereis, in fact, hardlyanyonetoday who would deny6. See Bennett; homson.


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single case of ectop c pregnancyma est s qu te c ear. ut very ew spu-tantspay,attentionto the importof the concession.What it actuallymeans isthat the questionof innocence is largely irrelevant o the defenseof abortion.For, for the usualcases,both the fetus and the motherare innocentand theirrespectiveinterestsor rights, legitimate;also, if abortionis justifiedor con-demned, it will be, in terms of the comparativerankingand importanceofthose respectiverights, without attention to innocence (which may be pre-supposed). This means that the admissionof a right to abortion where themother's ife is in dangeraffectsall seriousdispute,so that abortioncannot beconstruedas murdersimply because he victim is an innocent humanbeing.

The thesis has larger implications.To hold that it is indefensibleto takethe life of an innocent humanbeing-whether in war, in abortion,in securingpublic health, or the like-is open to an importantequivocation.Formulatedsansphrase, it is, as we have seen, merely tautological; o deny it would beto contradictoneself,but to admit t would not be to preclude here beingsomejustifyingcircumstancesn which innocent lives may be defensiblytaken-thatis, precisely where some qualifyingphrasemay be supplied.Formulatedsansphraseand disallowingall qualifications,he thesissignifiesthat, wheneveraninnocentlife is taken,the act is ethicallyindefensibleand, perhaps, antamountto murder.In the second sense,but not the first, the judgmentof innocenceis ratherlike an overridingverdict and is taken to be incapableof being setaside for reason of any extenuatingcircumstancewhatsoever; o construed, hethesis would rule out even self-defense involving deliberatekilling (whereinnocence may be preserved). In the first sense, the judgmentof innocencemarksa considerationbearing on an ulterior verdict,what is sometimeschar-acterized as ceteris paribusconsiderations;hat is, "all things being equal,"taking the lives of innocent humans is indefensible,but whether all thingsare relevantlyequal in this or that instanceneeds still to be decided.Now then,if, in abortioncases, innocenceis admittedfor both the motherand the fetus,then if innocence is a ceteris paribusconsideration,both the defenseand con-demnationof abortionwill have to be undertakenn termsof the competingclaims and rightsof the motherand fetus.In that sense, supposing hat it can-not be defensibly argued that there are never, in principle, any legitimategroundsfor taking the life of an innocent human being, it is simply utterlyirrelevantto charge that abortionis murderor the like becausethe fetus isinnocent. What this means is that a good many-perhaps the preponderantshareof the-antiabortionistargumentsarethemselves rrelevant o the defenseor condemnationof abortion. So, for instance,if the Pennsylvaniaantiabor-tionistsadmit that the fetus'slife may be ended to save the mother's ife, thenthey cannot,on pain of contradiction, rguethat endingthe fetus's ife becausethe pregnancy in question involved rape or incest or becausethe mother'shealth and well-being (but not her life) were endangered s tantamounttomurder implybecause he fetus wasan innocenthuman ife: they have already


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there were no ulterior defendingreasons (as in killing a child in cold bloodin the street) could the act of abortion be construedas murder-but this isprecisely what is in dispute.

The argumenthere is a conditionalone, resting as it does on the admis-sion by the antiabortionistf some grounds for taking the life of the fetus. Itdoes not count at all againstthe seemingly categorical argument that therenever are legitimategroundsfor taking an innocent life-a view perhaps es-poused by Pope Pius XII: "The baby in the maternalbreast has the right tolife immediately rom God. Hence there is no man, no humanauthority, noscience, no medical,eugenic, social,economicor moral 'indication'which canestablishor grant a valid juridicalground for a direct deliberatedispositionof an innocenthuman ife, that is a dispositionwhich looks to its destructioneither as an end or as a meansto another end perhaps n itself not illicit. Thebaby,still not born, is a man in the same degree and for the same reason asthe mother."7Even this formulation,however,may not be quite as extremeasit appears o be. For one thing, it may (on the equivocationspecified) mini-mally signifythat, qua innocent, nnocent partiescannotbe deliberatelykilled-which is benignlytautological; or another, it claims that the "right to life"proceedsfrom God, which is simply a doctrinallyfavored way of sayingthatwe proceed,in ethical matters,from a presumptionof innocence, that actsdirected o takinga life call for specific ethicaldefense;andfinally,the Pope'sview may (argumentativelv)be taken to signify that, with respectto abortion,appealto the mother'shealthor life cannot adequatelyoverridethe right oflife of the fetus,that the innocenceof the fetus is too powerfula considerationto be overriddenby such circumstances.None of these interpretivemaneuvers,singlyor jointly,captures he categoricalview that the takingof an innocentlife is unconditionallyndefensible-notin the vacuous sense that the innocentqua innocentcannotbe defensiblykilled but in the substantive ensethat,withrespectto fetuses and perhapsother humanbeings, innocencealone overridesall putativedefenses for taking a life. The same equivocation nfects a well-known chargeof ElizabethAnscombe's:"If someonereallythinks,in advance,that it is open to questionwhether such an action as procuringthe judicialexecution of the innocent shouldbe quite excluded from consideration-Idonot want to argue with him; he shows a corruptmind."8There is reasontothink that Miss Anscombesimply does not believe that any overridingcon-siderationswould be morethanimplausible r fantastic,but that is not equiva-lent to saying that there could not, in principle, be any overriding groundsfor takingthe life of an innocent humanbeing. The Pennsylvaniaantiabor-tionists (as well as antiabortionistsso-called] throughout the world) have

7. Address to the Italian Catholic Society of Midwives, quoted in John T.Noonan, Jr., ed., The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1970).8. See Anscombe. The point has been discussed in detail by Bennett.


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reasonfor performingan abortion,and we have alreadynoted the plausibilityof taking the life of a fetus (or of an infantor adult, for that matter) wherethe continued life of the innocent party constituteda grave medical dangerto a given community.

The reason these quarrelsare important s just that they force would-bedebatersto change their strategy. The consistentantiabortionist,who baseshis argument on the innocence of the fetus, cannot admit endangering hemothers's ife as a justification or abortion; n fact, he cannot admit any in-strumentaluse of abortion. And the antiabortionistwho admitsthe danger-to-life argument cannot appeal to the innocence of the fetus as a decisivecounterargumentor any other case; it cannot, for him, be morethan a ceterisparibusconsideration; lso, he cannot precludethe possibilityof other instru-mentalistdefenses of abortion-if he wishes,he may hold only that particulardefensesfail for particularreasons.Here, we see the inescapabilityof com-peting moral convictions. For instance, f a human ife is justifiablyended be-cause a given creaturehas a disease that would destroy a given population,would such a life be justifiablyended if the disease n questiondid not utterlydestroy but "only"permanentlyand most seriously disabledthat population?Well, if the extension be allowed, is there or is there not a sufficientlycloseanalogybetween the diseasecase and that of the undesirability f a fetus, say,causally linked to incest or rape? Obviously,when we move on to mentalhealth, personalwell-being, personaldesires and convictions,and the like, theformalargumentsbecome increasingly entative and variable n force, simplybecausethere is no agreed-upon ormulaabout the importanceof humanhap-piness,what form it takes, and what its prerogativesare in the scheme ofthings.9The only point worth pressinghere-avoiding partisanviews-is thatthere are no conceptualconstraintscountingagainstdefendingabortionwhereconsiderationsess strenuousthan that of endangered ife are involved if en-dangered ife is alreadyadmittedto providea legitimatedefense.10

It is impossiblenot to take a partisanview on quarrelsof the sort indi-cated-which is not to deny the seriousnessof taking a view on such issues.But it is, also, extremelydifficultto see that one is, after all, takinga partisanview in supportingthis or that interpretationof the right of abortion. Forinstance,it is often arguedthat "the life of the mother alwaysprevailsoverthe life of the unbornwhen both equalsare in mortal conflict and she alonecan be saved."11But howeverpersuasivet may be in these restrictedcircum-stances,the thesis does not seem to dependon the preferentialrankingof themotherover the fetus but rather on the exclusiveprospectsof survival-evenin the contextof instrumental onsiderations.Certainly,we cannotcomfortably

9. See Margolis, Valuesand Conduct.10. See Thomson; also, Baruch Brody, "Thomson on Abortion,"Pbilosopby andPublic Affairs 1 (1972): 335-40.11. Ramsey.


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,of ranking"thelife of the mother"over "the life of the unborn"either doesnot ariseat all or does so only to confirm some antecedentlyfavored viewaboutabortion tself;that is, the maneuver s simply questionbegging.Again,it is often arguedthat "the mother and the unborn child are not like twotenantsin a small house which has, by an unfortunatemistake,been rentedto both: the motherowns the house.... We should really ask what it is thatsays 'no one may choose' [betweenmother and fetus] in the face of the factthat the body that housesthe child is the mother'sbody."''2But againstthis,thereareat least two fairobjections:one, that we cannotspeak of the fetus'sbody in quite the sameway in which we can speakof the body of an infantdelivered n birth (being in the mother'sbody is the naturallocus for a de-veloping fetus and perhapseven some of the organs of the fetus are eithersharedwith the motheror are to be locatedin the body of the mother); andtwo, that the conditionsunder which a woman intentionallycommitsherselfto havinga child (for instance,by contractingwith her husbandor the like)may, arguably, ake precedenceover the "right-to-one's ody" claim.In any case, it is an extraordinary hesis that holds that a woman'srightto her body alonejustifies he takingof the life of the fetus, for there is everyreason o thinkthat,even if ending the life of the fetus is sometimesjustified(for instance,where the life of the mother is endangered),it need not bealwaysandunconditionally ustified(for instance,where a mother arbitrarilydecides, perhapseven closer to term-assuming no dangerto her own life-that she does not want to bear her child). In short, the thesis,taken withoutqualification, uthorizesa woman to decide in her own right whetheror notor when or perhapseven how to disposeof the fetus "housed" n her body.The admission hat the fetus has a "right to life" sets a constrainton themother'sright to her body, as do also the rights of family, loved ones, andcommunityregarding he expected new memberof a given group. For, notonly is the fetus-on our assumption- a humanbeing, but also naturalpreg-nancyis at the presenttime (given a limitedtechnology) the exclusivemeansby which the race providesfor its survival.This is not to favor or disfavorthe allegedright of a woman to her own body-understood as justifying atleastwithin generous imits her authorizing akingthe life of the fetus if herhappiness,desires, nterests,or the like are seriously thwarted by the fetus'scontinuedexistence.It is only to say that such a right can only be construedas, so to say,a delegatedright,underthe circumstances f contemporary ife;and,thatwhethera proposedsuchdelegation s a fair one or not itself dependson the shiftingmoralconvictionsof the communityaffected-respectingboththe extent of such rightsand who may authorizethem. Even if one held thata woman had a right to defend her life and a right to the use of her body,

12.Thomson.


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others.13But if so, then no woman, understanding he sense of these distinc-tions and supposing he fetus to be a living humanbeing, could convincinglyclaim to have an undelegatedright to dispose of the fetus in the name of aright either of self-defenseor of the use of her body. And to admit that thatright, so fashionablydefendednowadaysby women'slib, is a delegatedright,that is, a right that effectively promotes ulterior moralvalues, simply obligesus to returnto the questions hat have alreadybeen posed.

We have considered the question of abortion instrumentally,n termsof the bearingof the life of the fetus on the life of the mother or on herhealth, well-being, happiness,and desires. And we have noted that, if an in-strumentaldefenseis allowed, then we must be prepared o considerthat therightsand interestsof the fetus or of other affected humanbeings (husbands,families,for instance)may well take precedenceover the rights and interestsof the mother in the use and defense of her own body. For example, t maybe arguedthat if the motheris to die shortly of causes other than her preg-nancy, then perhapseven if the continuedpregnancyposes an additionalorfatal danger,the right to life of the fetus or the rights of the father-to-be,under the circumstances,may take precedenceover the woman'sunderstand-able wish to abort. These complexitiescannot be eliminatedand cannot beresolvedin an exclusivelycorrect way. But it is also conceivable hat, in cer-tain cases at least, abortionmay be defended on the groundsthat the fetusis intrinsicallydefective or unacceptable. t is easy to see that the defense ofsuch a practice would be simplified if, in all relevantcases, the fetus werejudgednotto be a humanbeing.But for reasonsalreadygiven,such a maneuverwould be less than interesting-howeverconvenient. The most eligible casesare, clearly, those involving extraordinarymalformations,defective embryos,monsters,and-more controversially-fetusesdue to rape and incest, possiblyfetuseswith geneticallydetermined riminal raits,or the like.Here, the supportingargumentsare more difficult to provide; for, if theunborn fetus-admittedlyhuman-is innocent,hasa right to life, and posesnomerely instrumentalhreat (not even the threat of inconvenienceor expenseto a given community), it is hard to see what the defendinggroundsfor abor-tion couldbe. There are, in fact, no regularizedways of speakingof cases ofthese sorts.For instance,where the pregnancyis due to rape or incest, it isnormallythe mother'sprerogative o decide, in her own interests,whether toabort or not (assumingsuch considerations o be admissibleat all). That is,allor nearlyall forms of abortionaredefended n dyadicterms, nstrumentally,in terms of the effects of the fetus's continuedlife or of birth itself upon therights and interestsof other humanbeings. Where the putative defense isconstruedmonadically, o to say, in terms of the intrinsicdefects, deformities,

13. SeeThomson.


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60 Ethicsdeficiencies,or taintsof the fetus,we are obviously obliged (in orderto formu-late adequatelyour justifyingreasons)to providea governingtheory of humannatureitself in terms of norms of minimalphysical gifts and the like and ofculturallysignificantand admissibleconditionsof conception and development.It is possibleto hold, independentlyof the mother's wishes, that pregnanciesdue to incest are inherently unacceptableto the society and must be termi-nated. Similarly,one can imagine a fully planned society in which all preg-nanciesare authorizedin accord with public standards or mating or artificialinsemination,by reference to which particularpregnanciesare judged to beinadmissibleor defective and abortion required. It may well be that such apractice needs to be defended in terms of ulterior values, but particularactsof abortion could themselves be straightforwardlyappraisedin terms of aschedule of requirements.Alternatively, genetic and congenital freaks andmonsters of extreme sorts may well be judged to be sufficiently defective,though human,to justify abortion.In fact, there is every evidence that suchabortionis regularlyand quietly practicedby the medical profession,withoutreferenceto the mother'swishes or to the doctrine of innocence. There is oneother relatedstrategythat should be mentioned.It may be arguedthat, in theinterestsof the fetus, it is better at times that abortion be practicedthan thatthe fetus be allowed to live. For example,it may be known that a given fetuswould, on birth, have permanentand crippling defects in its heart and lungs.(The argument does not depend at all on considerationsof probability andcertainty,though it may be affected-as far as the interestsof would-be parentsare concerned-by the possibilityof a subsequent,relatively normalpregnancyand by the alleged seriousnessof the defects in question.) It is thought to bea peculiarview simply because the fetus is not a rational agent and not yetborn and becauseit is thought to be impossibleto be "in the interest"of thefetus not to be born. But it is not incoherentto attributeto the fetus intereststhoughtto be normalor characteristicor rationalfor the ordinaryrun of men-it is simply an applicationof the precept of fairnessto concede, to the fetus,interestsno poorer or weaker than what, independently,would be concededto fully competentand responsibleadults.Hence, if suicide may be rationallyundertakenand, in that sense, may be "in the interest" of a human agent(though of course it cannot serve any ulterior purposeof the agent that pre-supposes his continued survival), it would be entirely fair to entertain thepossibility that it may'be more rational to abort than to allow a seriouslydefective or monstrousbirth. So if it is construed in monadic terms, abortionmay be seen as an analogueof euthanasiaand of suicide. The trouble withthese monadic conceptions, however, is simply that there is no viable wayby which straightforwardly o discover the minimal conditions of acceptablefetal life-by way of analogy either with euthanasiaor with suicide; everyeffort merely reflectsthe normativeconvictionsof given populations.'4Hence,

14. See Margolis, Valuesand Conduct.


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61 Discussionwe can appreciate he doctrinalconvergenceand divergenceof views on abor-tion, in spite of the possibility that they be presented n such logically differentways as are here sketched. For, this is only to say that, within the limits ofrationaland responsibledebate,assuminga fair and nontendentiousknowledgeof relevantcircumstances, t is entirely possible for men and women of con-scienceto disagreeradically about the defensibility of the practice and of par-ticular acts of abortion.And that fact is itself as importantto the formationof publicpolicy asthe particularconvictionsof partisanson every side.

abortion (margolis)

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