a.c. pegis - some recent interpretations of ockham

7/23/2019 A.C. Pegis - Some Recent Interpretations of Ockham

1/13

Medieval Academy of America

Some Recent Interpretations of OckhamAuthor(s): Anton C. PegisSource: Speculum, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jul., 1948), pp. 452-463Published by: Medieval Academy of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2848431

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2/13

SOME RECENT

INTERPRETATIONS

OF

OCKHAM

BY

ANTON C. PEGIS

I

MANY

difficulties

face the

student

of

Ockham.

For

even

if

we leave aside

the

ob-

scurities in

our

knowledge

of

the

early

fourteenth

century,

the

present

state and

chronology

of

Ockham's

writings,

not to

mention the

question

of

the

supposed

inauthenticity

of

the

Centiloquium,

there are not

wanting

serious

problems

sur-

rounding

the Venerabilis

Inceptor.

It

has been both affirmed and

denied

that

Ockham is a

nominalist,

a

skeptic

and

a

fideist;

and

where

Mr

Ernest

Moody,

writing

some ten

years

ago,

saw in Ockham's work

an

effort

to

purify

Aristotle

of

every

trace

of

Platonism,

Father Robert

Guelluy recently

arrived

at

an Ockham

who

is,

in

the

main,

a conservative

Augustinian theologian,

and

who

rather re-

duces

the

Aristotelian

theory

of

knowledge

to Platonism.'

Nevertheless,

in

spite

of

such

variations,

it

remains a

fact

that the most

recent

histories

of

mediaeval

philosophy

-

those of Etienne Gilson

and the late Maurice

de Wulf

-

present

an Ockham who is

fundamentally

a

destroyer,

an

agnostic

and

a

fideist.2 The

judgment

of

Gilson,

who on occasion

disagreed

with

the

eminent

Belgian

historian,

is

strikingly

in

agreement.

The

proper

character

of

the fourteenth

century,

he

writes,

was to

despair

of the

work

done by the thirteenth.3Ockhamwas, in his own eyes, the first to succeed in

denying

to

universals

any

real existence

whatever;

and the

corollary

of

this

reduc-

tion

of

things

to

impervious

singulars

is the

metaphysical

valuelessness

of

knowl-

edge.4

Of

course,

a

universe

of

such

singulars

fits in well with a

God who

is

omnip-

otent

in

the

Ockhamist

sense.

For

the God

of

Ockham

is

all-powerful

in the sense

that

He

has

no rule

of

action other than

His

power;

that is to

say,

there

are

no

divine ideas:

or,

rather,

they

are

simply

things

themselves

producible

by

God.5

In

the

perspective

of

history,

this

systematic

removal

from

God's

power,

from

things

and

from

human

knowledge

of

any

internal

intelligibility

is

Ockham's

rejoinder to Greco-Arabian necessity. The Ockhamist universe is, in fact, 'radi-

cally contingent

not

only

in

its

existence,

but

also in

its

essence.'6

According

to

the

radical

contingentism

of

Ockham,

as Gilson calls

it,

the

order

of

the

world

is no

more

than a situation

of

fact: 'there is

nothing

existing

which,

had God

so

wished,

could not

have been otherwise.'

Historically,

this conclusion means that

Ockham

overcame Greek

necessity by

factualizing

it.

In a

Greek

world,

he

first

causescan

produce

heir last effects

only

through

ntermediate

causes: he Prime Moveracts on us

only

through

he whole

sequence

of

separate

ntelli-

1

E.

Moody,

The

Logic

of

William

of

Ockham

(New

York:

Sheed

and

Ward,

1935),

pp.

8,

76,

99,

etc; R.

Guelluy,

Philosophie

et th6ologiechezGuillaumed'Ockham Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis:

Dissertationes

ad

gradum magistri

in

Facultate

Theologica

vel

in

Facultate

Iuris

Canonici

consequen-

dum

conscriptae,

Series

ii,

Tomus

39,

Louvain: E.

Nauwelaerts;

Paris: J.

Vrin,

1947),

p.

96.

On

R.

Guelluy's

book,

cf.

the

review of

A.

Maurer,

C.

S. B.

(Traditio,

v, 1947,

pp.

398-402).

2

M. de

Wulf,

Histoire de

la

philosophie

mEdi vale

6th

ed.,

Paris:

J.

Vrin, 1947),

II,

47-48.

3

E.

Gilson,

La

philosophie

au

moyen

tge,

2nd

ed.

(Paris:

J.

Vrin,

1944),

p.

638.

4

Op.

cit.,

pp.

642,

645-646.

Op.

cit.,

pp.

653-654.

6

Op.

cit.,

p.

654;

italics

mine.

452


3/13

Some Recent

Interpretations of

Ockham

gences;

in

the world

of

Ockham,

quicquid

Deus

potest

per

causam

efficientem

mediam,

hoc

potest

immediate.7

That

such

a

world

is,

in

Ockham's

intention,

under

a

permanent

cloud

of meta-

physical suspicion is clear to all but his devoted followers; it is no less clear, as

Gilson

has

likewise

pointed

out,

that what

we

call scholastic

philosophy

brought

about its

own destruction

in Ockham

by

merciless internal

criticism.8

Such a view

of

Ockham has not found favor with

those

interpreters

who

are

also

his defenders.

Father Philotheus Boehner

has attacked

many

historians

for

calling

Ockham

a

skeptic

and

a

nominalist.9

Mr

Moody

has

argued

that

Ockham

had

the

misfortune

to live in

a

skeptical

age.

Had he

lived

in

the thirteenth

cen-

tury,

we

would

have

judged

him

differently.10

Indeed,

Mr

Moody

has even

urged,

presumably

in Ockham's

favor,

that there were

more determined

skeptics

in the decades after the termination of Ockham's academic career in 1324. As

against

the

skepticism

of

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt,

Ockham

is seen

as

a

conservative

force.11

And

recently,

following

an indication

by

Father

Boehner,

Father Sebas-

tian

Day

has

expounded

the Ockhamist doctrine

of

intuitive

knowledge

in

a

man-

ner which

clearly suggests

that

the Venerabilis

Inceptor

was

replacing

what

is

to

Father

Day

the defective

Thomistic doctrine

of

abstraction

with the doctrine

of a

direct and

immediate contact

of

man's intellect

with

things.12

A

conservative

and constructive Ockham

is

the

very opposite

of Ockham as

found

in

La

philosophie

au

moyen age.

The difference

goes very

far,

as the contrast

between St Thomas and Ockham can

easily

reveal. In the

recently

published

L'etre

et

l'essence,13

as well as

in

the

forthcoming

Being

and Some

Philosophers,

not

to mention

here the

well-known

developments

of

Le

Thomisme,

Gilson has

insisted

on the

metaphysics

of

existence

as

being

the achievement

of

St

Thomas

which

most

distinguished

him

as

a

philosopher.

In

particular,

this

metaphysical

existentialism

enabled St

Thomas,

against

the

very

Greek and

Arabian

philos-

ophers

to whom he owed

so

much,

to

assimilate

Hellenism

without

either

freezing

the

liberty

of

the Christian

God

within the

mold

of Greek

necessity

or

repudiating

the

philosophical

thought

of

antiquity

as the

price

of

avoiding

its necessitarianism.

In

short,

against

Aristotelian

necessity,

St Thomas did not eliminate

necessity

from

God;

he

rather existentialized

it.

Having

the

necessity

of

existential

in-

dependence

(and

not

that

of essential

deteimination),

the Thomistic

God

has

thereby

a

liberty

of

autonomy.

He

is

a free God

and

His

creatures

are

truly

con-

tingent,

but

His freedom

is rooted

in,

and flows

from,

His

existential

necessity.14

7

Ibid.

8

Op.

cit.,

p.

640.

9

Ph.

Boehner,

O.

F.

M.,

'The

Text

Tradition

of

Ockham's

Ordinatio'

(The

New

Scholasticism,

xvI,

3

[July,

1942],

203-241),

p.

222;

'The

Notitia

Intuitiva of Non-Existents

according

to

Ockham'

(Tradi-

tio,

I

[1943],

223-275),

239-240. Cf.

also, below,

note 41.

10E. Moody, TheLogicof William of Ockham,pp. 1-2.

1

E.

Moody,

'Ockham, Buridan,

and

Nicholas

of Autrecourt'

(Franciscan

Studies,

vni,

2

[June,

1947], 113-146),

144-146.

12

S.

Day,

O.

F.

M.,

Intuitive

Cognition,

A

Key

to the

Significance

of

the Later

Scholastics

(St

Bona-

venture:

The

Franciscan

Institute,

1947);

Ph.

Boehner,

'The

Notitia

Intuitiva of Non-Existents

ac-

cording

to

Ockham,'

p.

223.

13

E.

Gilson,

L'etre

et

l'essence

(Paris:

J.

Vrin,

1948).

14

Cf.

St

Thomas,

Summa

Theologica,

,

19, 3;

Contra

Gentiles,

I,

81-82.

453


4/13

Some Recent

Interpretations of

Ockham

This

is not how Ockham saw

things.

If

we

may

say

that

there is

necessity

without

iberty

in the

God

of

Aristotle

and

Avicenna,

then we must

add

that there

is

necessity

with

liberty

in the

God

of

St Thomas

and

liberty

without

necessity

in

the God of William of Ockham. As compared with the existential realism of St

Thomas,

the nominalism

of

Ockham eliminates

intelligibility

from

God and from

things:

the

Ockhamist

God

is

a

God

of

power,

and the

Ockhamist creatures

are

without

any

inner

intelligibility.

Ockham's

world

is one

of

factualized and mono-

lithic

individuals:

factualized in order to

insure the

liberty

and

omnipotence

of

God,

monolithic

in

order

to

maintain their own

singularity.

It is

literally

true for

Ockham

that the

fear of

essences'is the

beginning

of

wisdom.

For,

though

essences

mean

intelligibility,

to Ockham

they

also

mean

determinateness

and

necessity.

One

example

will

illustrate the

point.

In De

Potentia, IIi, 15,

St Thomas

has

argued that 'Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit

nulla

necessitate naturae.' What is

interesting

in

Ockham's

rejection

of St

Thomas'

defense

of

this

proposition

is

his

assumption,

in

line

with the

Greeks

and

the

Arabs,

of a

conflict

between

necessity

and

liberty.

Against

St

Thomas,

Ock-

ham cannot

understand how the

divine

will

can

be,

at

once,

necessary

and

free.

The

philosophers

have

made the

divine

will

necessary.

St Thomas himself has

spoken

of

a

necessity

in

the divine will

in

the case

of

the

procession

of

the

Holy

Spirit.15

Hence,

Ockham cannot

see

how,

if

there

is

necessity

in the divine

will,

there

is also

liberty

in it.

In other

words,

Ockham

proceeds

as

though

the neces-

sity in question is one of determination and necessitation. There is no doubt that

such

a

necessity

cannot be

the source

of

liberty.

But there is

just

as little doubt

that

the

necessity

which St

Thomas found

in

God has

nothing

to

do

with

the

deterministic

necessity

of a

philosopher

such

as

Avicenna. It was

by

transforming

and

existentializing

the

Aristotelian and

Arabian

notion

of nature that

St

Thomas

was

able to

have a divine

necessity

which could be the source

of

the

divine

liberty.

In

the

presence

of

the same

problem,

Ockham did

not

transform,

he

merely

re-

fused the

Greco-Arabian notion

of

nature. And

since

he had no

liking

for

Scotus'

way

of

defending

God's

liberty,16

Ockham

was

left without a

philosophical

defense

of that liberty. But whether we say that Ockham reached this conclusion because

he

did

not

appreciate

St Thomas'

elimination of

the determinism

of the

Arabian

notion of

nature,

or that he

thought

the doctrine

of emanation

could

not be

re-

futed,

the

conclusion is the same.

Belief

is

the

only

ground

on which Ockham

holds

that

God is

a

free creator

-

a

belief which

has,

as

one

of

its

motives,

the

conviction

that

the

philosophers

could refute

every argument

for

God

as a

free

creator.'7

15

Ockham

has

summarized

and criticized the

arguments

of De

Potentia

in,

15,

in

his

Commentary

n

theSentences(In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, B-C; ed. Lyons, 1495, fol. 266rb-266va); cf. A. C. Pegis, 'Neces-

sity

and

Liberty:

An

Historical Note

on

St.

Thomas

Aquinas'

(Proceedings

of

the American

Catholic

Philosophical

Association,

xvi

[1941]

1-27),

pp.

5-10.

16

Cf. A. C.

Pegis,

'Necessity

and

Liberty,' pp.

10-12.

17

'Ideo

quod

Deus

sit causa

libera

respectu

omnium

tenendum

est

tanquam

creditum,

quia

non

potest

demonstrari

per

aliquam

rationem ad

quam

non

responderet

unus infidelis'

(William

of

Ockham,

In I

Sent.,

d.

42,

q.

1, H;

fol.

267

rab).

454


5/13

Some Recent

Interpretations of

Ockham

Ockhamism

may

aptly

be called

a

philosophy

of

the divine

omnipotence.18

Living

in a world

of

contingent

and

isolated

facts,

and

in

fear of the determinism

which the condemnation

of

1277

had

thought

to

remove,

Ockham

feels

at

every

turn the metaphysical impoverishment which Gilson has seen in his world. Two

recent books

help

to

make

this

aspect

of

Ockhamism

more

tangible.

Father

Guelluy

enables

us

to

see

the influence

of nominalism on demonstration.

His

Ockham

is

not

deliberatelyskeptical

and

a

destroyer;

but

he

is

a

nominalist,

for

all

that,

in

the

full

sense of the term. Father

Day,

on the

other

hand,

has written

a violent

book,

whose tone

might

have been

ignored

had

its

historical

method

and

philosophical

understanding

been somewhat more

substantial.

II

Serious in its method and objectives, the book of Father Guelluy has accom-

plished

much more than the

modest and somewhat defensive

conclusions

drawn

by

its

author.

Perhaps

he

was

appalled by

the

variety

of the

interpretations

of

Ockham

proposed

by preceding

historians

and listed

by

him

at the

outset

of his

own

work.l9

Be

that as it

may,

Father

Guelluy

has set himself an admirable

goal.

Without

any pre-conceived

thesis to

defend,

without

any

intention

of

picking

and

choosing

his

texts,

he has

sought

to

follow

Ockham

through

the

Prologue

to his

Commentary

on

the Sentences of

Peter

Lombard.

He has even

stopped

at

Ock-

ham's

digressions,

in order

to throw

light

on the centers

of

interest in

his

thought.

In this way, by observing not only its conclusions, but also its arguments, Father

Guelluy

has

hoped

'to see

Ockhamism

under construction

before

our

eyes.'20

The

Prologue,

Father

Guelluy

contends

repeatedly,

is

a 'refutation

of Scotism.'21

And since

the twelve

questions

into which the

Prologue

is

divided

are concerned

with the

possibility,

the

evidence and the

demonstrativeness

of

theology

as a

science,

to

read

the

present

book is to see

Ockham's

conception

of

the demonstra-

tive structure

of

human

knowledge

at

a crucial moment

-

namely,

the

moment

of

the

formation

of

a Christian

theology.

Even

more,

as the author

insists,

Ockham

proceeds

in

the

Prologue

as a

pure logician,

so

that

the

discussion

of the

problem

of theology as a science resolves itself into a more basic question, the nature of

scientia

according

to Ockham. From

this

point

of

view,

no less

than

because

of

its

merit,

one

may point

to the

fourth

chapter,

devoted

to Ockham's

general

theory

of

science,

as

forming

the core

of

Father

Guelluy's

book.22

In

a

preliminary chapter

Father

Guelluy

sketches the

development

of

theology

in

the thirteenth

century, stressing

the

Augustinian critique

of St

Thomas'

notion

of

a

scientific

theology.

By

the

end

of

the

century,

as the

author

notes,

the

problem

was not

merely

whether

dialectic

and

logic

could

be

introduced

into

revelation,

nor

whether

the

divine revelation could

at

all

be

penetrated

by

human

reasoning; the problem for the end of the thirteenth century (as the condemna-

tions of 1277

can

easily

remind

us)

was also

and,

even

more,

a

question

of

the

18

L.

Baudry,

Le Tractatusde

Principiis

Theologiae

attribug

a

G.

d'Occam

(Paris:

J.

Vrin,

1936),

pp.

38-40.

19

R.

Guelluy, Philosophie

et

thgologie

hez

Guillaume

d'Ockham,

pp.

13-21.

20

Op.

cit.,

p.

22.

21

Op.

cit.,

p.

24.

22

Op.

cit.,

pp.

175-220.

455


6/13

Some

Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

'independence

of

philosophical

investigation'.23

In

short,

the

problem

was

whether

an

autonomous

philosophy

was

possible

within

Christianity.

The intervention

of

Scotus

in

this

situation

was decisive

for Ockham. The exaltation

of the

divine

liberty, the contingency of things, the attack upon the determinism of the

Aristotelian

Physics

-

these

were

theses

that

Ockham

could and did

welcome

from

Scotus.

It

was

the

formalism

of

Scotus

that Ockham

pursued

mercilessly.

The

result,

which

is

a nominalistic

theory

of

demonstration,

substituted

a doctrine

of

suppositio.for

the Scotistic

formal

distinction,

and

brought

about

the famous

Ockhamist

chasm between

knowledge

and

the world

of

individual

things.

Bounded,

on

the

one

hand,

by

the

divine

omnipotence,

and

on

the

other,

by

an

impervious

singularity

in

things (and

in

God),

human

knowledge

as

conceived

by

Ockham

is defective

in more than one

way

when it tries

to

establish

itself

scientifically within revelation. For if 'the only distinction that can be admitted

in

things

is the real distinction';24

f

the

whole

system

of Ockham

'is a

theory

of

the

correspondence

of

the

logical

and

the

real';25

f,

therefore,

'Ockham

is a

logi-

cian

who demands

from his

art a

conception

of the world

-

a

metaphysics'

:26

-

if

this be

so,

and

Father

Guelluy

has

abundantly proved

it,

then

Ockham's

theory

of

demonstration

is

radically

incapacitated

before

entering

the

domain

of revela-

tion.

It is

necessary

to

appreciate

this

point

because

Ockham

is

sometimes credited

with

a

logical

rigor

which

is

supposed

to

explain

why

there

were

so

many philo-

sophical propositions

which he considered himself unable to demonstrate. Ock-

ham's

theory

of

science

rests,

proximately,

on

his

conception

of

definition

and

his

fundamental

distinction

between

quidditative

and

connotative

concepts.

Further-

more,

as Father

Guelluy

has

recognized,27behind

hese decisions

there lies

the

prob-

lem of

distinctions,

behind

which there

is

also

to

be

found

a certain

theory

of

causal

relations

in

a

universe

subject

to the radical

omnipotence

of God.

Given

that

being

is

simple,

or,

if

composite,

constituted

of

really

distinct

parts;

and

given

that in such

a world there

are no

communities

among

things

either

ab-

solutely

or

in fact

-

then,

failing

intuition,

knowledge

suffers

from all the

ways

in which it does not answer to the

pure

singularity

of

things.

It is not

surprising,

therefore,

to

see

how

for

Ockham

a

property

predicated

of a

subject

is a

concept

and

nothing

more;

or,

as Father

Guelluy puts

it,

how

'only

proper

quidditative

concepts

have an

equivalent

in

reality.'28

It is no more

surprising

to see

how

Ockham,

though

he

vigorously

insists

that

risibility

is

only

a

concept,

can dis-

tinguish

man

and

risibility

as

concepts

only by supposing

that the latter

refers to

another

reality:

'Non

possunt

aliqua

se habere

icut

subjectum

t

passio

realiter

nisi

propter

distinctionem

realem

mportatam

per

illa:

quia

scilicet

passio, quamvis

posset

supponerepro

subjecto,

tamen

aliquo

modo

importat

aliamrem a

subjecto.'29

23

Op.

cit.,

p. 62.

24

Op.

cit.,

p. 192.

25

Op.

cit.,

p.

343.

26

Op.

cit.,

p.

356.

27

Op.

cit.,

p.

350.

28

Op.

cit.,

p. 193.

29

William

of

Ockham,

n

Sent.,

Prologus,q.

III

F;

fol.

29 rb

(quotedby

R.

Guelluy,Philosophie

t

theologie

chez Guillaume

d'Ockham,

p.

184,

note

1).

456


7/13

Some Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

The

consequence

is clear. The

Ockhamist notion

of

science

is

the victim

of all

the atomization

which the

singularity

of

things

introduces

into

concepts

and

judgments.

The Ockhamist

rigor

in

demonstration

is

another

way

of

saying

that,

in a world of absolutely simple singulars, there is no basis in things for demon-

stration;

for such a world offers no communities

to the

intellect

on

which

it

might

base

the relations

of its

concepts.

When

it

enters the domain

of

revelation,

scientia stands between

two

impossibilities

-

one

arising

from the

transcendence

of the

object

of

revelation,

the

other

arising

from Ockham's

treatment

of

demon-

stration.

A

scientific

theology

is

impossible

in

the

present

course

of

things

(secundum

communem

cursum);

for

Christian

doctrine,

rooted in

revelation,

is

not

open

to

any

of

the sources of evidence:

a

theological

truth

is not

a

per

se

notum,

it

is

not

a

notificatum

per

per

se

nota,

nor

is it

a

notum

per experientiam

-

and

these are the three ways of knowing a proposition evidently.30 With Scotus, and

against

St

Thomas,

Ockham

consequently

argues

'that

a science

cannot

presup-

pose

faith.'3'

There

is

not,

in

Ockham's

notion of

theology,

that

organic

and

vital

union

between

faith and reason

which,

as Father M.-J.

Congar

has

pointed

out,

characterizes

the

theology

of St

Thomas.32

But it

would

be

a mistake

to

suppose

that the

failure

of

reason within

faith is

due

to

the

transcendence

of

the

mysteries

of

the

Christian faith. For the real

Ockhamist

problem

here is

the conflict between

demonstration

and

singularity.

For

if

a

composite

being

is

composite

in

the sense

of

being

separable

nto several

realities; if, furthermore, the distinction between quidditative and connotative

concepts

is

possible

only

by

reference

to

several

realities,

then Ockham's nom-

inalist

conception

of

things

has

made

demonstration

impossible.

What

is

more,

his

inability

to refute

the

philosophers

has forced

him

to resort

to

the

divine

omnipotence

in order

to be

free

of what

he cannot

refute. What

is

wrong

with

Aristotle,

according

to

Ockham,

is that he did

not

recognize

that the

course

of

nature has

the

stability

of a

mere fact.33

Father

Guelluy

observes that Ockham

is

not

a realist

in the mediaeval

sense of

the

term,

and that he

does not

have a true

metaphysics.34

That

is

surely

the case.

The

nominalism

of

Ockham

is

an

enor-

mously

strenuouseffTrt o neutralize the philosophical determinism which he found

in

the

Greeks and

in

the

Arabs. The

attack on

essences,

and the

consequent

re-

duction

of

things

to

impervious

singulars,

accomplished

one

part

of

Ockham's

effort;

the

glorification

of the divine

omnipotence,

whose

consequence

in

Ockham

was the

factualization

of

the

order

of

creation,

completed

the work of

stilling

the

claims

of

necessitarianism.

The

only question

which

can

be asked

at

this

moment

is whether

Ockham's

victory

is not

the

pyrrhic

triumph

of total surrender.

Father

Guelluy's

book does

not

make

easy

reading.

In

part,

the reason

is to be

found

in

Ockham

himself.

But

perhaps

the

author

could have been

a little

more

30

R.

Guelluy, op.

cit.,

p.

232,

note

i.

31

Op.

cit.,

pp.

233,

240-241.

32

Cf.

R.

Guelluy,

op.

cit.,

p.

224,

note;

M.-D.

Chenu,

O.

P.,

La

thiologie

comme

science

au

xiiie

siecle

(2nd

ed.,

Paris,

1943), pp.

117-121.

33

R.

Guelluy,

op.

cit.,

pp.

368,

371.

On

Ockham

and the

problem

of the refutation

of the

philoso-

phers,

cf.

pp.

238-239, 358-360,

368-369,

and

passim.

34

R.

Guelluy,

op.

cit.,

pp.

369,

363.

457


8/13

Some Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

surprised

at a

thinker

who set

out to

be

a

pure logician

in

theology

or

in

meta-

physics.

No one

can

accuse Ockham

of

intending

to

humiliate reason

or

to

exalt

it at

the

expense

of

faith

(or

even

to taunt

the

theologians

in the

spirit

of

John

of

Jandun). And yet this is scarcely the measure of his accomplishment, even if it

be

true

(as

it

is)

that nominalism was in

the

making

before Ockham. Father

Guelluy's

conclusions

give

the

impressions

of

a certain amount

of

haste

in

com-

position

-

not

to

mention

an

apparent

desire

to

placate

most of

his

predecessors.

Certainly

he

is

right

in

thinking

that

the

Ockhamist

doctrine

of

the

intuition of

non-existents

is a

relatively

minor

problem

in

the

Prologue

-

from

Ockham's

point

of

view;35

but

to

argue

that

because

Ockham

did

not allow the

thesis

of

the

intuition

of non-existents to

disturb

the

security

of our

knowledge,

therefore

he

was

not in

fact

disturbing

it,

is

not

very impressive

either

as historical

interpreta-

tion or as a defense of Ockham.36For, far from being 'without great significance,'37

the

doctrine

of

the

intuition

of non-existents

calls

into

question

the

validity

of

our

knowledge

of

the

present

course

of

nature.

III

If Father

Guelluy

has written

a work

of

painstaking

industry,

Father

Day

has

written

what is

primarily

a

polemical

tract

for

the

times,

aimed

at

those

who,

including

the

present

writer,

have been

guilty

of

criticizing

Ockham.

In

1943,

Father Boehner

announced

in

Traditio that Father

Sebastian

Day

was

'working

on a comprehensive study on the notitia intuitiva under my [Father Boehner's]

direction.'38

t

would

have been

an

extremely

useful

study

to

have

carried out. It

would

appear,

however,

that Father

Day

was

deterred

from

such a

study

by my

criticism of

some of Father

Boehner's views

on Ockham. We

are

given

no

indica-

tion as to

what such a

historical

study

would

have

been;

what

is

certain is

that

Father

Day

has written a

dissertation

which has

lost

its

way

in

the

no

man's

land

of

controversy.

It

was Father

Day's purpose

to

defend

the

doctrine

of intuitive

cognition

in

John

Duns

Scotus

and

William

of Ockham.

He

wanted

to

defend

it

partly

in

order to replace the Thomistic doctrine of abstraction, and partly in order to free

Ockham of the

charge

of

skepticism

made

against

him. In

dealing

with Scotus

and

Ockham,

Father

Day

has

insisted

in

going

to their texts

-

and

this

is

ad-

mirable. But

in

dealing

with St Thomas

Aquinas,

he

saw

nothing wrong

in

con-

demning

the

whole

Thomistic

doctrine

of

abstraction,

not on

the

basis

of

Tho-

mistic

texts,

but

on

that

of two articles

by

Rudolf

Allers. This

is

surely

an

amazing

manoeuvre,

both

as

research

and

as

controversy.

Father

Day

has

chosen

to

be

perplexed

in

the

presence

of the

conflicting

interpretations

of

St

Thomas

among

the

Thomists;

but

he

does

not

seem

to

have

suffered

from the same

perplexity

in

the

presence

of the Scotists and their divergences. It is not necessary to discuss

here the

merits

of

Mr

Allers'

difficulties.

As

a

matter

of

fact,

contrary

to

Father

Day's

assumption,

Mr

Allers has

recently

made

it.clear

that he has no intention

of

a6

Op.

cit.,

pp.

360-361.

36

Op.

cit.,

p.

127.

37

Op.

cit.,

p.

102 note.

38

Traditio,

I,

1943,

pp.

223,

note

1,

236.

458


9/13

Some

Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

being

a

spokesman

for

St

Thomas.39Father

Day's

performance,

however,

should

not

go

unnoticed.

There

are

surely

better

ways

of

defending

Ockham,

and

there

are better

arguments

in

his

defense. There

is,

for

example,

the

method

adopted

by Father Guelluy. Thus, one might soften some of the harshness in de Wulf's

final

verdict

on Ockham after

reading

Father

Guelluy's

book.

There

is

therefore little reason

for

reviewing

Father

Day's

dissertation.

Yet one

point

must be

mentioned.

Father

Day supposes40

that

since

Father Boehner's

reply

to

me in

Franciscan

Studies

has

gone

'unchallenged'

it

is

'conclusive.'41

That

reply

was

quite

inconclusive.42

Father

Day's

own

exposition

and

defense

of

the

Ockhamist

doctrine

of

the intuition

of non-existents

is

equally

unconvincing,

for

it

does not touch the

main issue.

In

his

Unity of

Philosophical

Experience,

Gilson

remarks that

for

Ockham

'human knowledge would be practically indistinguishable from what it is, even

though

all its

objects

were

destroyed.'43

Now,

as it

is

clear,

this is

a

charge

of

skepticism

against

Ockham.

The

most

decisive

aspect

of

the

charge

can

be

put

in

the

form of the

following question.

Does

Ockham hold

that

we

can

have

an

in-

tuition

of

a nihil as

though

it

were an

existent,

and

on

which

we would base

a

judgment

of

existence?

For

the

present,

the

problem may

be reduced

to the

interpretation

of

Ockham's

text

In

II

Sent.,

q.

15E.44

n this

text,

Ockham

defines

intuitive

cognition

as that

cognition

through

which

a

thing

is

known

to exist

when

it

does,

and

not

to

exist

when it does not: 'intuitiva est illa mediante qua cognoscitur res esse, quando est,

et non

esse,

quando

non est.'45

Then,

after

some

preliminary

distinctions and

clari-

fications,

Ockham

proceeds

to

explain

intuitive

cognition

under

the

two

parts

of

his

definition.

The

charge

of

skepticism

is based on

what

Ockham

says

in relation

to

the

first part

of

his

definition.

The

point

is

worth

reexamining,

since

Father

Boehner's

interpretation

of intuitive

cognition

threatens

to remove

from

it

its

full

scope.

Ockham

has

said

that intuitive

cognition

is that

through

which

we

know

a

thing

to

be

when

it is.

This

first

part

of the

definition

of

intuitive

cognition

Ockham

expands

into

the

following

form.

'Through

intuitive

cognition

we

judge

a

thing to be when it is - and this, generally, whether the intuitive cognition is

caused

naturally

or

by

God

alone

supernaturally.'

This

statement,

which

is the

opening

sentence

of

the text

quoted

below,

says

two

things: (1) by

intuitive

cogni-

89

R.

Allers,

'Intuition

and Abstraction'

(Franciscan

Studies,

VIII,

1,

March,

1948,

pp.

47-68).

40

S.

Day,

Intuitive

Cognition,

p.

160.

41

Ph.

Boehner,

'In

Propria

Causa'

(Franciscan

Studies, v, 1,

March, 1945,

pp.

37-54).

42

Leaving

aside

particular

issues,

which

can

be

discussed

on

another

occasion,

I find

Fr

Boehner's

reply

unsatisfactory

for

the reason that

I have

given

in

the

present

article.

Fr

Boehner's

whole

posi-

tion

hinges

on

denying

that

judgments

of

existence

can be based

on

the intuition

of non-existents.

The present article is not an answer to Fr Boehner; it is rather concerned with the interpretation of

one

text

of

Ockham,

namely,

In II

Sent.,

q.

15E.

43

E.

Gilson,

Unity

of

Philosophical Experience

(New

York:

C.

Scribners

Sons,

1941),

p.

82.

44

Edited

by

Ph.

Boehner in

Traditio,

i

(1943),

248-250. The

paragraphing

of this

text is

faulty,

obscuring

the

distinction

of the

two

parts

in Ockham's

definition

of

cognitio

intuitiva

(cf.

A. C.

Pegis,

'Concerning

William

of

Ockham,'

Tradition,

ii

(1944),

470-471;

Ph.

Boehner,

'In

Propria

Causa,'

p.

50).

45

In II

Sent.,

q.

15E;

ed.

cit.,

p.

248,

459


10/13

Some Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

tion

we

judge

a

thing

to be when

it

is;

(2)

the intuitive

cognition may

be caused

naturally

or

supernaturally.

Intuitive

cognition

enables

me

to

judge

a

thing

to exist when it exists.

When

is this condition satisfied? It is satisfied for Ockham both when the cognition is

caused

naturally

and when

it

is

caused

supernaturally.

If

naturally,

the seen ob-

ject

must be

at

a

suitable nearness

to the

knowing power;

in which case the in-

tellect

can

judge

and

assert

that

thing

to

be

as it

is.

If

supernaturally,

the seen

object

is

actually

absentfrom the

range

of

the

knowing

power,

but

God

causes

in

the knower

an

intuitive

cognition

of

something

existing,

say,

in

far-away

Rome;

and

as a

result

of this

supernaturally

caused

intuition,

I can

judge

that this

ab-

sent

thing

which

I

yet

see

and

behold

is

thus and

so,

exactly

as

though

the in-

tuitive

cognition

were obtained

naturally.

Sic igiturpatet, quod per cognitionemntuitivam udicamus em esse quandoest, et hoc

generaliter,

ive intuitiva

cognitio

naturaliter

causetur

sive

supernaturaliter

solo Deo.

Nam

si naturaliter

ausetur,

une

non

potest

esse,

nisi

obiectum

existat

praesens

n debita

approximatione,

uia

tanta

potest

esse distantia

inter

obiectum

et

potentiam,quod

na-

turaliternon

potest potentia

tale obiectum

ntueri.

Et

quando

obiectum

est sic

praesens

tali modo

approximatum,

otest

intellectus

per

actum assentiendiudicare

em esse

modo

praedicto.

Si

autem

sit

supernaturalis, uta

si

Deus causaret

n me

cognitionem

ntuitivam

de

aliquo

obiecto

existente

Romae,

statim

habita

cognitione

ius

ntuitiva

possum

udicare,

quod

illud

quod

ntueoret video

est ita

bene,

sicut si

illa

cognition

haberetur

naturaliter.46

Ockham is

certainly saying

that,

on

the

assumption

of a

supernaturally

caused

intuition, I make

judgments

about an absent

thing

as though it were a

present

thing.

But

there

is

more.

It

is

objected

that the

absent

thing

is

not

suitably present

to the

seeing

power.

The

reply,

which marks a

repudiation

of Scotus'

way

of

distinguishing

between

intuitive and abstractive

cognition,

contains

Ockham's

most radical

views

on

this

subject.

In

the natural

order,

he

writes,

intuitive

cognition

cannot

be

caused

except

when the

object

is

present

at a suitable

distance;

but

supernaturally

it

can.

Hence Ockham restricts to

the

natural order

Scotus' contention

that

intuitive

cognition

requires

a

present

and

existing

object.

This

presence

and existence

of

the

object

are not

required

in the case of a

supernaturally

caused intuition.

Absolutely

speaking,

and

this is the

crucial

moment,

no

other

presence

is

necessarily required

except

that which

will

terminate the

intuitive

act;

and

it

is

quite

compatible

with

this

requirement

that

the

object

be

nothing,

a

nihil,

or be

separated

from

the

seeing

power

by

a

very great

distance.

So

that,

however

far

away

the

intuitively

known

object may

be,

I

can

judge

it

to

be

if it

exists

in the

way

already

men-

tioned

(i.e.,

if,

though

non-present

and

even

non-existing,

it

is

supernaturally

present

through

the

substitutional action

of

God).

In the

natural

order,

of

course,

the existence

and

presence

of the

object

at a suitable

nearness

are

required;

and

that is

why

I

cannot

judge

the

intuitively

known

thing

to exist unless it be a

present

object.

Si

dicis,

quod

obiectum

non est hic

praesens

nec

debito

modo

approximatum.

Re-

spondeo:

Licet

cognitio

ntuitiva

non

possit

naturaliter

ausari

nisi

quando

obiectumest

46

Ibid.,

pp.

248-249,

460


11/13

Some Recent

Interpretations of

Ockham

praesens

in debita

distantia,

tamen

supernaturaliter

posset.

Et ideo differentiae

quas

dat

Johannes

inter

cognitionem

intuitivam et abstractivam:

quod

cognitio

intuitiva est

prae-

sentis

et existentis ut

praesens

et existens

est,

intelliguntur

de

cognitione

intuitiva

natu-

raliter

causata,

non autem

quando

supernaturaliter.

Unde

absolute

loquendo

non

requiritur

necessario ad

cognitionem

intuiti,vam

alia

praesentia,

nisi

quod

possit

actum intuitivum

terminare.

Et cum hoc

stat,

quod

obiectum sit

nihil vel

quod

sit

distants

per

maximam

distantiam;

et

quantumcumque

distet

obiectum

cognitum

intuitive,

statim virtute

eius

possum

iudicare

illud

esse,

si sit

modo

praedicto.

Sed

tamen,

quia

cognitio

intuitiva

naturaliter non

causatur

nec

conservatur,

nisi

obiectum

sit debito modo

approximatum

in

certa

distantia

existens,

ideo non

possum

iudicare

illud,

quod cognoscitur

naturaliter

intuitive,

nisi

obiectum sit

praesens.47

At

this

point,

Ockham

takes

up

the

second

half

of

his

definition

of

intuitive

cognition:

'eodem modo

per

cognitionem

intuitivam

possum

iudicare

rem

non

esse quando non est.'48 In other words what Ockham has said up to this sentence

refers to

the first

part

of

his

definition,

namely,

that

'per

cognitionem

intuitivam

iudicamus

rem esse

quando

est.' It

is

therefore

possible

to

have

an

intuition

of

a

nihil

and

judge

it to exist.

Such

a

possibility

is

supernatural,

not

natural;

but

it

is

a

possibility:

supernaturally

speaking,

it

is

possible

to see

and

to

judge

that

some-

thing

is

though

this

something

be

a

nihil.

This

is

the

plain meaning

of

the

text

under

consideration,

regardless

of

what Ockham

may

have said elsewhere.

To

repeat:

Ockham

is

here

asserting

an

intuition

of

an

existent

and

a

judgment

of

existence

in

the

presence

of a

nihil.

This

is

the situation

which

enabled Gilson to

say that for Ockham 'human knowledge would be practically indistinguishable

from

what

it

is,

even

though

all

its

objects

were

destroyed.'49

Is it

contradictory,

then,

that

there be

vision

and

that

that which is seen

not

actually

exist?

Ockham

has

said

so.50

But

he has

added

that

it is

not

a

contradic-

tion that

that

which

is

seen

be

nothing

actual outside the

soul,

provided

that it

can

exist or

has

existed:

'Sed non est

contradictio,

quod

id

quod

videtur

nihil

sit

in

actu

extra

animam,

dummodo

possit

esse

in effectu vel

aliquando

fuerit

in

rerum natura'.l6

So

long

as

the nihil

is

a

possible

being,

therefore,

it

can remain in

itself

a

nihil,

and

still

the

intuition

of

an existent

and

a

judgment

of

existence,

according to the first part of the definition of intuitive cognition, will remain for

Ockham

undisturbed.

I

can

only

add

that

this

is,

in

fact,

what

Ockham thinks

and

that it is

the

basis

of

the

charge

of

skepticism.

It

is

not

necessary

to

consider

here

the

further

dilemmas faced

by

Ockham

when,

on the

supposition

that

intuition can be

of

a

nihil,

he

tries to account for

judgments

of

non-existence. If Father Boehner's

interpretation

is

correct,

no

problem

would

arise

at this

point.

For

according

to

him,

when

the

object

of

in-

tuition

is a

nihil,

the

consequent

absence

of

any

causality

from the

side

of

the

object

will

lead

to

the

evident

assent

that

the

thing

does

not exist.52

I

agree

that

on this interpretation, there is no problem as to how the intuition of a nihil

can

lead to

judgments

of

both existence and

non-existence;

for

Father

Boehner

47

Ibid.,

p.

249. For the

correction of the

reading

determinata

by

debita,

cf.

Traditio,

ii

(1944),

473,

note

28.

48

In II

Sent.,

q.

15E;

ed.

cit.,

p.

249.

49

E.

Gilson,

Unity of Philosophical Experience,

p.

82.

50

Quodl.

V,

q.

5.

61

Quodl.

VI,

q.

6.

2

Ph,

Boehner,

'In

Propria

Causa,'

pp.

45,

49.

461


12/13

Some Recent

Interpretations

of

Ockham

is

arguing

that the

nihil

never

leads

to

judgments

of

existence in Ockham.

In

short,

Father Boehner's

position

is that for Ockham

there

can

be

an intuition

of

a

nihil;

there cannot be

a

judgment

asserting

or

assenting

to its existence.

Where,

Father Boehner asks, does Ockham say what I have attributed to him, namely,

'that

it is

possible,

given

a

supernaturally

caused

intuitive

knowledge,

to

judge

that

a

thing

exists

when

it

does

not

exist'?53

To

this

question,

evidently,

the

only

answer

is

the

text

of Ockham.

Does Ockham

speak

of

a

judgment

of existence

following

fpom

the intuition

of a nihil?

The

answer

is not

far to seek.

Judicamus

and

judicare

appear

three

times in

the

texts

edited

by

Father

Boehner and

cited

above.

And,

be it

remembered,

these

texts deal

with

the

first

part

of the

definition

of

intuitive

cognition,

i.e.,

that

part

which deals

with

judgments

of existence.

Now

Father

Boehner will

admit

that

judgments of existence and non-existence follow from intuitive cognition or

knowledge.

That,

in

fact,

is the

very

definition

of

cognitio

intuitiva. It is also

a

fact,

according

to

Ockham,

that

the

condition

for

a

judgment

of

existence

can

be

verified

in two

ways

on the

level

of

intuition,

namely, naturally

or

supernaturally.

Let us

recall the

first

part

of

Ockham's

definition:

'per

cognitionem

intuitivam

iudicamus rem

esse

quando

est.'

This leaves

no

doubt

that

we

are

dealing

with a

judgment

of existence.

Nor can

there

be

any

doubt

that

the

intuitive

cognition

on

which this

judgment

is based can

be

supernatural

as

well

as

natural;

for

the

text

continues:

'sive intuitiva

cognitio

naturaliter causetur sive

supernaturaliter

a

solo Deo.' It is evident that when the intuition is caused a solo Deo the seen ob-

ject

is in itself

a

nihil;

and

yet

it is

a

fact

that for

Ockham

a

judgment

of existence

follows

from

such

an

intuition.

This

is

surely

different

from

Father's Boehner's

interpretation.

Indeed,

contrary

to his

interpretation,

Ockham

distinguishes

two

kinds of

presence,

on the

part

of

the

object,

to the

knowing

power,

and both

ead

to

judg-

ments

of

existence.

On the

natural

level,

the

object

must be

suitably present

in

itself for

the

intellect

to assent

to its existence.

But

absolutely

speaking,

existence

and

presence

on the

part

of the

object

are not

necessary

for

intuition;

for,

accord-

ing to Ockham, 'no other presence is necessary for intuitive cognition except that

which

can

terminate

the intuitive

act.' Now what can terminate

such an

act?

On

the

present

assumption,

it is

not

the

object

in its

proper

existence. It is

compat-

ible with the termination

of

the

intuitive

act,

given

our

supernatural

assumption,

that its

object

be in

itself a

nihil

or

something

beyond

the

range

of

intuition.

But

there

is

more,

and

Father Boehner

should

not

ignore

it.

On

the

assumption

that

the

perceived

object

is in

itself a nihil

or

distans

per

maximam

distantiam,

and

that

God

alone causes

the intuitive

cognition,

it

is

possible

to

have a

judgment

of

existence:

'statim

virtute

eius

possum

iudicare

illud

esse,

si

sit

praedicto

modo'

(i.e.,

supernaturally

caused by God).

At

least

one

text of

Ockham,

therefore,

namely,

In II

Sent.,

q.

15E,

says

that,

supernaturally

speaking,

there can be

an

intuition of a

nihil which is

followed

by

a

judgment

of

existence.

By

having

only judgments

of

non-existence

following

from

53

A.

C.

Pegis,

'Concerning

William

of

Ockham,'

p.

575;

Ph.

Boehner,

'In

Propria

Causa,'

p.

46.

462


13/13

Some Recent

Interpretations of

Ockham

the

intuition

of a

nihil,

Father

Boehner's

interpretation really

eliminates

part

of

Ockham's

doctrine

on

intuition;

for it

suppresses

Ockham's

own

supernatural

possibility

from the first

part

of

the

definition

of

cognitio

intuitiva.

Nothing

in

the

text authorizes Father Boehner so to

interpret

Ockham,

in

spite

of the fact that

his

interpretation

gives

him

the

opportunity

to

argue

for the

infallibility

of

in-

tuitive

cognition

in the Venerabilis

Inceptor.4

For

the

present,

therefore,

I

shall

insist

only

on

a

purely

exegetical

point.

It is the text of

Ockham,

and not

any

supposed

construction

on

my

part,

which

warrants the

view

that for

Ockham

the

intuition of a

nihil can

lead

to

a

judgment

of

existence. It will not

be

easy

to

reconcile

In

II

Sent.,

q.

15E,

with

Quodl.

v, 5,

but

that

is

scarcely

the

question.

The

question

is

whether

Ockham has said

what I have attributed to him

in the

first

part

of

his definition

of

intuitive

cognition.

There

is

a text

which

has

said

so,

and

that text is In II

Sent.,

q.

15E. This

point

is

sufficiently

important

in

itself,

for

the

interpretation

of

Ockham,

to merit

the attention

of Ockham's

students.

This is

particularly

so in

our

own

day,

which

is

seeing

a

renewed

interest

in the

thought

of the

English

Franciscan.

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE

OF

MEDIAEVAL

STUDIES,

TORONTO.

64

Ph.

Boehner,

The Notitia

Intuitiva . .

'

pp.

231-236.

463

a.c. pegis - some recent interpretations of ockham

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