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7/23/2019 A.C. Pegis - Some Recent Interpretations of Ockham
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Medieval Academy of America
Some Recent Interpretations of OckhamAuthor(s): Anton C. PegisSource: Speculum, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Jul., 1948), pp. 452-463Published by: Medieval Academy of AmericaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2848431
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7/23/2019 A.C. Pegis - Some Recent Interpretations of Ockham
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SOME RECENT
INTERPRETATIONS
OF
OCKHAM
BY
ANTON C. PEGIS
I
MANY
difficulties
face the
student
of
Ockham.
For
even
if
we leave aside
the
ob-
scurities in
our
knowledge
of
the
early
fourteenth
century,
the
present
state and
chronology
of
Ockham's
writings,
not to
mention the
question
of
the
supposed
inauthenticity
of
the
Centiloquium,
there are not
wanting
serious
problems
sur-
rounding
the Venerabilis
Inceptor.
It
has been both affirmed and
denied
that
Ockham is a
nominalist,
a
skeptic
and
a
fideist;
and
where
Mr
Ernest
Moody,
writing
some ten
years
ago,
saw in Ockham's work
an
effort
to
purify
Aristotle
of
every
trace
of
Platonism,
Father Robert
Guelluy recently
arrived
at
an Ockham
who
is,
in
the
main,
a conservative
Augustinian theologian,
and
who
rather re-
duces
the
Aristotelian
theory
of
knowledge
to Platonism.'
Nevertheless,
in
spite
of
such
variations,
it
remains a
fact
that the most
recent
histories
of
mediaeval
philosophy
-
those of Etienne Gilson
and the late Maurice
de Wulf
-
present
an Ockham who is
fundamentally
a
destroyer,
an
agnostic
and
a
fideist.2 The
judgment
of
Gilson,
who on occasion
disagreed
with
the
eminent
Belgian
historian,
is
strikingly
in
agreement.
The
proper
character
of
the fourteenth
century,
he
writes,
was to
despair
of the
work
done by the thirteenth.3Ockhamwas, in his own eyes, the first to succeed in
denying
to
universals
any
real existence
whatever;
and the
corollary
of
this
reduc-
tion
of
things
to
impervious
singulars
is the
metaphysical
valuelessness
of
knowl-
edge.4
Of
course,
a
universe
of
such
singulars
fits in well with a
God who
is
omnip-
otent
in
the
Ockhamist
sense.
For
the God
of
Ockham
is
all-powerful
in the sense
that
He
has
no rule
of
action other than
His
power;
that is to
say,
there
are
no
divine ideas:
or,
rather,
they
are
simply
things
themselves
producible
by
God.5
In
the
perspective
of
history,
this
systematic
removal
from
God's
power,
from
things
and
from
human
knowledge
of
any
internal
intelligibility
is
Ockham's
rejoinder to Greco-Arabian necessity. The Ockhamist universe is, in fact, 'radi-
cally contingent
not
only
in
its
existence,
but
also in
its
essence.'6
According
to
the
radical
contingentism
of
Ockham,
as Gilson calls
it,
the
order
of
the
world
is no
more
than a situation
of
fact: 'there is
nothing
existing
which,
had God
so
wished,
could not
have been otherwise.'
Historically,
this conclusion means that
Ockham
overcame Greek
necessity by
factualizing
it.
In a
Greek
world,
he
first
causescan
produce
heir last effects
only
through
ntermediate
causes: he Prime Moveracts on us
only
through
he whole
sequence
of
separate
ntelli-
1
E.
Moody,
The
Logic
of
William
of
Ockham
(New
York:
Sheed
and
Ward,
1935),
pp.
8,
76,
99,
etc; R.
Guelluy,
Philosophie
et th6ologiechezGuillaumed'Ockham Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis:
Dissertationes
ad
gradum magistri
in
Facultate
Theologica
vel
in
Facultate
Iuris
Canonici
consequen-
dum
conscriptae,
Series
ii,
Tomus
39,
Louvain: E.
Nauwelaerts;
Paris: J.
Vrin,
1947),
p.
96.
On
R.
Guelluy's
book,
cf.
the
review of
A.
Maurer,
C.
S. B.
(Traditio,
v, 1947,
pp.
398-402).
2
M. de
Wulf,
Histoire de
la
philosophie
mEdi vale
6th
ed.,
Paris:
J.
Vrin, 1947),
II,
47-48.
3
E.
Gilson,
La
philosophie
au
moyen
tge,
2nd
ed.
(Paris:
J.
Vrin,
1944),
p.
638.
4
Op.
cit.,
pp.
642,
645-646.
Op.
cit.,
pp.
653-654.
6
Op.
cit.,
p.
654;
italics
mine.
452
-
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Some Recent
Interpretations of
Ockham
gences;
in
the world
of
Ockham,
quicquid
Deus
potest
per
causam
efficientem
mediam,
hoc
potest
immediate.7
That
such
a
world
is,
in
Ockham's
intention,
under
a
permanent
cloud
of meta-
physical suspicion is clear to all but his devoted followers; it is no less clear, as
Gilson
has
likewise
pointed
out,
that what
we
call scholastic
philosophy
brought
about its
own destruction
in Ockham
by
merciless internal
criticism.8
Such a view
of
Ockham has not found favor with
those
interpreters
who
are
also
his defenders.
Father Philotheus Boehner
has attacked
many
historians
for
calling
Ockham
a
skeptic
and
a
nominalist.9
Mr
Moody
has
argued
that
Ockham
had
the
misfortune
to live in
a
skeptical
age.
Had he
lived
in
the thirteenth
cen-
tury,
we
would
have
judged
him
differently.10
Indeed,
Mr
Moody
has even
urged,
presumably
in Ockham's
favor,
that there were
more determined
skeptics
in the decades after the termination of Ockham's academic career in 1324. As
against
the
skepticism
of
Nicholas
of
Autrecourt,
Ockham
is seen
as
a
conservative
force.11
And
recently,
following
an indication
by
Father
Boehner,
Father Sebas-
tian
Day
has
expounded
the Ockhamist doctrine
of
intuitive
knowledge
in
a
man-
ner which
clearly suggests
that
the Venerabilis
Inceptor
was
replacing
what
is
to
Father
Day
the defective
Thomistic doctrine
of
abstraction
with the doctrine
of a
direct and
immediate contact
of
man's intellect
with
things.12
A
conservative
and constructive Ockham
is
the
very opposite
of Ockham as
found
in
La
philosophie
au
moyen age.
The difference
goes very
far,
as the contrast
between St Thomas and Ockham can
easily
reveal. In the
recently
published
L'etre
et
l'essence,13
as well as
in
the
forthcoming
Being
and Some
Philosophers,
not
to mention
here the
well-known
developments
of
Le
Thomisme,
Gilson has
insisted
on the
metaphysics
of
existence
as
being
the achievement
of
St
Thomas
which
most
distinguished
him
as
a
philosopher.
In
particular,
this
metaphysical
existentialism
enabled St
Thomas,
against
the
very
Greek and
Arabian
philos-
ophers
to whom he owed
so
much,
to
assimilate
Hellenism
without
either
freezing
the
liberty
of
the Christian
God
within the
mold
of Greek
necessity
or
repudiating
the
philosophical
thought
of
antiquity
as the
price
of
avoiding
its necessitarianism.
In
short,
against
Aristotelian
necessity,
St Thomas did not eliminate
necessity
from
God;
he
rather existentialized
it.
Having
the
necessity
of
existential
in-
dependence
(and
not
that
of essential
deteimination),
the Thomistic
God
has
thereby
a
liberty
of
autonomy.
He
is
a free God
and
His
creatures
are
truly
con-
tingent,
but
His freedom
is rooted
in,
and flows
from,
His
existential
necessity.14
7
Ibid.
8
Op.
cit.,
p.
640.
9
Ph.
Boehner,
O.
F.
M.,
'The
Text
Tradition
of
Ockham's
Ordinatio'
(The
New
Scholasticism,
xvI,
3
[July,
1942],
203-241),
p.
222;
'The
Notitia
Intuitiva of Non-Existents
according
to
Ockham'
(Tradi-
tio,
I
[1943],
223-275),
239-240. Cf.
also, below,
note 41.
10E. Moody, TheLogicof William of Ockham,pp. 1-2.
1
E.
Moody,
'Ockham, Buridan,
and
Nicholas
of Autrecourt'
(Franciscan
Studies,
vni,
2
[June,
1947], 113-146),
144-146.
12
S.
Day,
O.
F.
M.,
Intuitive
Cognition,
A
Key
to the
Significance
of
the Later
Scholastics
(St
Bona-
venture:
The
Franciscan
Institute,
1947);
Ph.
Boehner,
'The
Notitia
Intuitiva of Non-Existents
ac-
cording
to
Ockham,'
p.
223.
13
E.
Gilson,
L'etre
et
l'essence
(Paris:
J.
Vrin,
1948).
14
Cf.
St
Thomas,
Summa
Theologica,
,
19, 3;
Contra
Gentiles,
I,
81-82.
453
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Some Recent
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Ockham
This
is not how Ockham saw
things.
If
we
may
say
that
there is
necessity
without
iberty
in the
God
of
Aristotle
and
Avicenna,
then we must
add
that there
is
necessity
with
liberty
in the
God
of
St Thomas
and
liberty
without
necessity
in
the God of William of Ockham. As compared with the existential realism of St
Thomas,
the nominalism
of
Ockham eliminates
intelligibility
from
God and from
things:
the
Ockhamist
God
is
a
God
of
power,
and the
Ockhamist creatures
are
without
any
inner
intelligibility.
Ockham's
world
is one
of
factualized and mono-
lithic
individuals:
factualized in order to
insure the
liberty
and
omnipotence
of
God,
monolithic
in
order
to
maintain their own
singularity.
It is
literally
true for
Ockham
that the
fear of
essences'is the
beginning
of
wisdom.
For,
though
essences
mean
intelligibility,
to Ockham
they
also
mean
determinateness
and
necessity.
One
example
will
illustrate the
point.
In De
Potentia, IIi, 15,
St Thomas
has
argued that 'Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit
nulla
necessitate naturae.' What is
interesting
in
Ockham's
rejection
of St
Thomas'
defense
of
this
proposition
is
his
assumption,
in
line
with the
Greeks
and
the
Arabs,
of a
conflict
between
necessity
and
liberty.
Against
St
Thomas,
Ock-
ham cannot
understand how the
divine
will
can
be,
at
once,
necessary
and
free.
The
philosophers
have
made the
divine
will
necessary.
St Thomas himself has
spoken
of
a
necessity
in
the divine will
in
the case
of
the
procession
of
the
Holy
Spirit.15
Hence,
Ockham cannot
see
how,
if
there
is
necessity
in the divine
will,
there
is also
liberty
in it.
In other
words,
Ockham
proceeds
as
though
the neces-
sity in question is one of determination and necessitation. There is no doubt that
such
a
necessity
cannot be
the source
of
liberty.
But there is
just
as little doubt
that
the
necessity
which St
Thomas found
in
God has
nothing
to
do
with
the
deterministic
necessity
of a
philosopher
such
as
Avicenna. It was
by
transforming
and
existentializing
the
Aristotelian and
Arabian
notion
of nature that
St
Thomas
was
able to
have a divine
necessity
which could be the source
of
the
divine
liberty.
In
the
presence
of
the same
problem,
Ockham did
not
transform,
he
merely
re-
fused the
Greco-Arabian notion
of
nature. And
since
he had no
liking
for
Scotus'
way
of
defending
God's
liberty,16
Ockham
was
left without a
philosophical
defense
of that liberty. But whether we say that Ockham reached this conclusion because
he
did
not
appreciate
St Thomas'
elimination of
the determinism
of the
Arabian
notion of
nature,
or that he
thought
the doctrine
of emanation
could
not be
re-
futed,
the
conclusion is the same.
Belief
is
the
only
ground
on which Ockham
holds
that
God is
a
free creator
-
a
belief which
has,
as
one
of
its
motives,
the
conviction
that
the
philosophers
could refute
every argument
for
God
as a
free
creator.'7
15
Ockham
has
summarized
and criticized the
arguments
of De
Potentia
in,
15,
in
his
Commentary
n
theSentences(In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, B-C; ed. Lyons, 1495, fol. 266rb-266va); cf. A. C. Pegis, 'Neces-
sity
and
Liberty:
An
Historical Note
on
St.
Thomas
Aquinas'
(Proceedings
of
the American
Catholic
Philosophical
Association,
xvi
[1941]
1-27),
pp.
5-10.
16
Cf. A. C.
Pegis,
'Necessity
and
Liberty,' pp.
10-12.
17
'Ideo
quod
Deus
sit causa
libera
respectu
omnium
tenendum
est
tanquam
creditum,
quia
non
potest
demonstrari
per
aliquam
rationem ad
quam
non
responderet
unus infidelis'
(William
of
Ockham,
In I
Sent.,
d.
42,
q.
1, H;
fol.
267
rab).
454
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Some Recent
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Ockham
Ockhamism
may
aptly
be called
a
philosophy
of
the divine
omnipotence.18
Living
in a world
of
contingent
and
isolated
facts,
and
in
fear of the determinism
which the condemnation
of
1277
had
thought
to
remove,
Ockham
feels
at
every
turn the metaphysical impoverishment which Gilson has seen in his world. Two
recent books
help
to
make
this
aspect
of
Ockhamism
more
tangible.
Father
Guelluy
enables
us
to
see
the influence
of nominalism on demonstration.
His
Ockham
is
not
deliberatelyskeptical
and
a
destroyer;
but
he
is
a
nominalist,
for
all
that,
in
the
full
sense of the term. Father
Day,
on the
other
hand,
has written
a violent
book,
whose tone
might
have been
ignored
had
its
historical
method
and
philosophical
understanding
been somewhat more
substantial.
II
Serious in its method and objectives, the book of Father Guelluy has accom-
plished
much more than the
modest and somewhat defensive
conclusions
drawn
by
its
author.
Perhaps
he
was
appalled by
the
variety
of the
interpretations
of
Ockham
proposed
by preceding
historians
and listed
by
him
at the
outset
of his
own
work.l9
Be
that as it
may,
Father
Guelluy
has set himself an admirable
goal.
Without
any pre-conceived
thesis to
defend,
without
any
intention
of
picking
and
choosing
his
texts,
he has
sought
to
follow
Ockham
through
the
Prologue
to his
Commentary
on
the Sentences of
Peter
Lombard.
He has even
stopped
at
Ock-
ham's
digressions,
in order
to throw
light
on the centers
of
interest in
his
thought.
In this way, by observing not only its conclusions, but also its arguments, Father
Guelluy
has
hoped
'to see
Ockhamism
under construction
before
our
eyes.'20
The
Prologue,
Father
Guelluy
contends
repeatedly,
is
a 'refutation
of Scotism.'21
And since
the twelve
questions
into which the
Prologue
is
divided
are concerned
with the
possibility,
the
evidence and the
demonstrativeness
of
theology
as a
science,
to
read
the
present
book is to see
Ockham's
conception
of
the demonstra-
tive structure
of
human
knowledge
at
a crucial moment
-
namely,
the
moment
of
the
formation
of
a Christian
theology.
Even
more,
as the author
insists,
Ockham
proceeds
in
the
Prologue
as a
pure logician,
so
that
the
discussion
of the
problem
of theology as a science resolves itself into a more basic question, the nature of
scientia
according
to Ockham. From
this
point
of
view,
no less
than
because
of
its
merit,
one
may point
to the
fourth
chapter,
devoted
to Ockham's
general
theory
of
science,
as
forming
the core
of
Father
Guelluy's
book.22
In
a
preliminary chapter
Father
Guelluy
sketches the
development
of
theology
in
the thirteenth
century, stressing
the
Augustinian critique
of St
Thomas'
notion
of
a
scientific
theology.
By
the
end
of
the
century,
as the
author
notes,
the
problem
was not
merely
whether
dialectic
and
logic
could
be
introduced
into
revelation,
nor
whether
the
divine revelation could
at
all
be
penetrated
by
human
reasoning; the problem for the end of the thirteenth century (as the condemna-
tions of 1277
can
easily
remind
us)
was also
and,
even
more,
a
question
of
the
18
L.
Baudry,
Le Tractatusde
Principiis
Theologiae
attribug
a
G.
d'Occam
(Paris:
J.
Vrin,
1936),
pp.
38-40.
19
R.
Guelluy, Philosophie
et
thgologie
hez
Guillaume
d'Ockham,
pp.
13-21.
20
Op.
cit.,
p.
22.
21
Op.
cit.,
p.
24.
22
Op.
cit.,
pp.
175-220.
455
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Some
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'independence
of
philosophical
investigation'.23
In
short,
the
problem
was
whether
an
autonomous
philosophy
was
possible
within
Christianity.
The intervention
of
Scotus
in
this
situation
was decisive
for Ockham. The exaltation
of the
divine
liberty, the contingency of things, the attack upon the determinism of the
Aristotelian
Physics
-
these
were
theses
that
Ockham
could and did
welcome
from
Scotus.
It
was
the
formalism
of
Scotus
that Ockham
pursued
mercilessly.
The
result,
which
is
a nominalistic
theory
of
demonstration,
substituted
a doctrine
of
suppositio.for
the Scotistic
formal
distinction,
and
brought
about
the famous
Ockhamist
chasm between
knowledge
and
the world
of
individual
things.
Bounded,
on
the
one
hand,
by
the
divine
omnipotence,
and
on
the
other,
by
an
impervious
singularity
in
things (and
in
God),
human
knowledge
as
conceived
by
Ockham
is defective
in more than one
way
when it tries
to
establish
itself
scientifically within revelation. For if 'the only distinction that can be admitted
in
things
is the real distinction';24
f
the
whole
system
of Ockham
'is a
theory
of
the
correspondence
of
the
logical
and
the
real';25
f,
therefore,
'Ockham
is a
logi-
cian
who demands
from his
art a
conception
of the world
-
a
metaphysics'
:26
-
if
this be
so,
and
Father
Guelluy
has
abundantly proved
it,
then
Ockham's
theory
of
demonstration
is
radically
incapacitated
before
entering
the
domain
of revela-
tion.
It is
necessary
to
appreciate
this
point
because
Ockham
is
sometimes credited
with
a
logical
rigor
which
is
supposed
to
explain
why
there
were
so
many philo-
sophical propositions
which he considered himself unable to demonstrate. Ock-
ham's
theory
of
science
rests,
proximately,
on
his
conception
of
definition
and
his
fundamental
distinction
between
quidditative
and
connotative
concepts.
Further-
more,
as Father
Guelluy
has
recognized,27behind
hese decisions
there lies
the
prob-
lem of
distinctions,
behind
which there
is
also
to
be
found
a certain
theory
of
causal
relations
in
a
universe
subject
to the radical
omnipotence
of God.
Given
that
being
is
simple,
or,
if
composite,
constituted
of
really
distinct
parts;
and
given
that in such
a world there
are no
communities
among
things
either
ab-
solutely
or
in fact
-
then,
failing
intuition,
knowledge
suffers
from all the
ways
in which it does not answer to the
pure
singularity
of
things.
It is not
surprising,
therefore,
to
see
how
for
Ockham
a
property
predicated
of a
subject
is a
concept
and
nothing
more;
or,
as Father
Guelluy puts
it,
how
'only
proper
quidditative
concepts
have an
equivalent
in
reality.'28
It is no more
surprising
to see
how
Ockham,
though
he
vigorously
insists
that
risibility
is
only
a
concept,
can dis-
tinguish
man
and
risibility
as
concepts
only by supposing
that the latter
refers to
another
reality:
'Non
possunt
aliqua
se habere
icut
subjectum
t
passio
realiter
nisi
propter
distinctionem
realem
mportatam
per
illa:
quia
scilicet
passio, quamvis
posset
supponerepro
subjecto,
tamen
aliquo
modo
importat
aliamrem a
subjecto.'29
23
Op.
cit.,
p. 62.
24
Op.
cit.,
p. 192.
25
Op.
cit.,
p.
343.
26
Op.
cit.,
p.
356.
27
Op.
cit.,
p.
350.
28
Op.
cit.,
p. 193.
29
William
of
Ockham,
n
Sent.,
Prologus,q.
III
F;
fol.
29 rb
(quotedby
R.
Guelluy,Philosophie
t
theologie
chez Guillaume
d'Ockham,
p.
184,
note
1).
456
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Some Recent
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of
Ockham
The
consequence
is clear. The
Ockhamist notion
of
science
is
the victim
of all
the atomization
which the
singularity
of
things
introduces
into
concepts
and
judgments.
The Ockhamist
rigor
in
demonstration
is
another
way
of
saying
that,
in a world of absolutely simple singulars, there is no basis in things for demon-
stration;
for such a world offers no communities
to the
intellect
on
which
it
might
base
the relations
of its
concepts.
When
it
enters the domain
of
revelation,
scientia stands between
two
impossibilities
-
one
arising
from the
transcendence
of the
object
of
revelation,
the
other
arising
from Ockham's
treatment
of
demon-
stration.
A
scientific
theology
is
impossible
in
the
present
course
of
things
(secundum
communem
cursum);
for
Christian
doctrine,
rooted in
revelation,
is
not
open
to
any
of
the sources of evidence:
a
theological
truth
is not
a
per
se
notum,
it
is
not
a
notificatum
per
per
se
nota,
nor
is it
a
notum
per experientiam
-
and
these are the three ways of knowing a proposition evidently.30 With Scotus, and
against
St
Thomas,
Ockham
consequently
argues
'that
a science
cannot
presup-
pose
faith.'3'
There
is
not,
in
Ockham's
notion of
theology,
that
organic
and
vital
union
between
faith and reason
which,
as Father M.-J.
Congar
has
pointed
out,
characterizes
the
theology
of St
Thomas.32
But it
would
be
a mistake
to
suppose
that the
failure
of
reason within
faith is
due
to
the
transcendence
of
the
mysteries
of
the
Christian faith. For the real
Ockhamist
problem
here is
the conflict between
demonstration
and
singularity.
For
if
a
composite
being
is
composite
in
the sense
of
being
separable
nto several
realities; if, furthermore, the distinction between quidditative and connotative
concepts
is
possible
only
by
reference
to
several
realities,
then Ockham's nom-
inalist
conception
of
things
has
made
demonstration
impossible.
What
is
more,
his
inability
to refute
the
philosophers
has forced
him
to resort
to
the
divine
omnipotence
in order
to be
free
of what
he cannot
refute. What
is
wrong
with
Aristotle,
according
to
Ockham,
is that he did
not
recognize
that the
course
of
nature has
the
stability
of a
mere fact.33
Father
Guelluy
observes that Ockham
is
not
a realist
in the mediaeval
sense of
the
term,
and that he
does not
have a true
metaphysics.34
That
is
surely
the case.
The
nominalism
of
Ockham
is
an
enor-
mously
strenuouseffTrt o neutralize the philosophical determinism which he found
in
the
Greeks and
in
the
Arabs. The
attack on
essences,
and the
consequent
re-
duction
of
things
to
impervious
singulars,
accomplished
one
part
of
Ockham's
effort;
the
glorification
of the divine
omnipotence,
whose
consequence
in
Ockham
was the
factualization
of
the
order
of
creation,
completed
the work of
stilling
the
claims
of
necessitarianism.
The
only question
which
can
be asked
at
this
moment
is whether
Ockham's
victory
is not
the
pyrrhic
triumph
of total surrender.
Father
Guelluy's
book does
not
make
easy
reading.
In
part,
the reason
is to be
found
in
Ockham
himself.
But
perhaps
the
author
could have been
a little
more
30
R.
Guelluy, op.
cit.,
p.
232,
note
i.
31
Op.
cit.,
pp.
233,
240-241.
32
Cf.
R.
Guelluy,
op.
cit.,
p.
224,
note;
M.-D.
Chenu,
O.
P.,
La
thiologie
comme
science
au
xiiie
siecle
(2nd
ed.,
Paris,
1943), pp.
117-121.
33
R.
Guelluy,
op.
cit.,
pp.
368,
371.
On
Ockham
and the
problem
of the refutation
of the
philoso-
phers,
cf.
pp.
238-239, 358-360,
368-369,
and
passim.
34
R.
Guelluy,
op.
cit.,
pp.
369,
363.
457
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surprised
at a
thinker
who set
out to
be
a
pure logician
in
theology
or
in
meta-
physics.
No one
can
accuse Ockham
of
intending
to
humiliate reason
or
to
exalt
it at
the
expense
of
faith
(or
even
to taunt
the
theologians
in the
spirit
of
John
of
Jandun). And yet this is scarcely the measure of his accomplishment, even if it
be
true
(as
it
is)
that nominalism was in
the
making
before Ockham. Father
Guelluy's
conclusions
give
the
impressions
of
a certain amount
of
haste
in
com-
position
-
not
to
mention
an
apparent
desire
to
placate
most of
his
predecessors.
Certainly
he
is
right
in
thinking
that
the
Ockhamist
doctrine
of
the
intuition of
non-existents
is a
relatively
minor
problem
in
the
Prologue
-
from
Ockham's
point
of
view;35
but
to
argue
that
because
Ockham
did
not allow the
thesis
of
the
intuition
of non-existents to
disturb
the
security
of our
knowledge,
therefore
he
was
not in
fact
disturbing
it,
is
not
very impressive
either
as historical
interpreta-
tion or as a defense of Ockham.36For, far from being 'without great significance,'37
the
doctrine
of
the
intuition
of non-existents
calls
into
question
the
validity
of
our
knowledge
of
the
present
course
of
nature.
III
If Father
Guelluy
has written
a work
of
painstaking
industry,
Father
Day
has
written
what is
primarily
a
polemical
tract
for
the
times,
aimed
at
those
who,
including
the
present
writer,
have been
guilty
of
criticizing
Ockham.
In
1943,
Father Boehner
announced
in
Traditio that Father
Sebastian
Day
was
'working
on a comprehensive study on the notitia intuitiva under my [Father Boehner's]
direction.'38
t
would
have been
an
extremely
useful
study
to
have
carried out. It
would
appear,
however,
that Father
Day
was
deterred
from
such a
study
by my
criticism of
some of Father
Boehner's views
on Ockham. We
are
given
no
indica-
tion as to
what such a
historical
study
would
have
been;
what
is
certain is
that
Father
Day
has written a
dissertation
which has
lost
its
way
in
the
no
man's
land
of
controversy.
It
was Father
Day's purpose
to
defend
the
doctrine
of intuitive
cognition
in
John
Duns
Scotus
and
William
of Ockham.
He
wanted
to
defend
it
partly
in
order to replace the Thomistic doctrine of abstraction, and partly in order to free
Ockham of the
charge
of
skepticism
made
against
him. In
dealing
with Scotus
and
Ockham,
Father
Day
has
insisted
in
going
to their texts
-
and
this
is
ad-
mirable. But
in
dealing
with St Thomas
Aquinas,
he
saw
nothing wrong
in
con-
demning
the
whole
Thomistic
doctrine
of
abstraction,
not on
the
basis
of
Tho-
mistic
texts,
but
on
that
of two articles
by
Rudolf
Allers. This
is
surely
an
amazing
manoeuvre,
both
as
research
and
as
controversy.
Father
Day
has
chosen
to
be
perplexed
in
the
presence
of the
conflicting
interpretations
of
St
Thomas
among
the
Thomists;
but
he
does
not
seem
to
have
suffered
from the same
perplexity
in
the
presence
of the Scotists and their divergences. It is not necessary to discuss
here the
merits
of
Mr
Allers'
difficulties.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
contrary
to
Father
Day's
assumption,
Mr
Allers has
recently
made
it.clear
that he has no intention
of
a6
Op.
cit.,
pp.
360-361.
36
Op.
cit.,
p.
127.
37
Op.
cit.,
p.
102 note.
38
Traditio,
I,
1943,
pp.
223,
note
1,
236.
458
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Some
Recent
Interpretations
of
Ockham
being
a
spokesman
for
St
Thomas.39Father
Day's
performance,
however,
should
not
go
unnoticed.
There
are
surely
better
ways
of
defending
Ockham,
and
there
are better
arguments
in
his
defense. There
is,
for
example,
the
method
adopted
by Father Guelluy. Thus, one might soften some of the harshness in de Wulf's
final
verdict
on Ockham after
reading
Father
Guelluy's
book.
There
is
therefore little reason
for
reviewing
Father
Day's
dissertation.
Yet one
point
must be
mentioned.
Father
Day supposes40
that
since
Father Boehner's
reply
to
me in
Franciscan
Studies
has
gone
'unchallenged'
it
is
'conclusive.'41
That
reply
was
quite
inconclusive.42
Father
Day's
own
exposition
and
defense
of
the
Ockhamist
doctrine
of
the intuition
of non-existents
is
equally
unconvincing,
for
it
does not touch the
main issue.
In
his
Unity of
Philosophical
Experience,
Gilson
remarks that
for
Ockham
'human knowledge would be practically indistinguishable from what it is, even
though
all its
objects
were
destroyed.'43
Now,
as it
is
clear,
this is
a
charge
of
skepticism
against
Ockham.
The
most
decisive
aspect
of
the
charge
can
be
put
in
the
form of the
following question.
Does
Ockham hold
that
we
can
have
an
in-
tuition
of
a nihil as
though
it
were an
existent,
and
on
which
we would base
a
judgment
of
existence?
For
the
present,
the
problem may
be reduced
to the
interpretation
of
Ockham's
text
In
II
Sent.,
q.
15E.44
n this
text,
Ockham
defines
intuitive
cognition
as that
cognition
through
which
a
thing
is
known
to exist
when
it
does,
and
not
to
exist
when it does not: 'intuitiva est illa mediante qua cognoscitur res esse, quando est,
et non
esse,
quando
non est.'45
Then,
after
some
preliminary
distinctions and
clari-
fications,
Ockham
proceeds
to
explain
intuitive
cognition
under
the
two
parts
of
his
definition.
The
charge
of
skepticism
is based on
what
Ockham
says
in relation
to
the
first part
of
his
definition.
The
point
is
worth
reexamining,
since
Father
Boehner's
interpretation
of intuitive
cognition
threatens
to remove
from
it
its
full
scope.
Ockham
has
said
that intuitive
cognition
is that
through
which
we
know
a
thing
to
be
when
it is.
This
first
part
of the
definition
of
intuitive
cognition
Ockham
expands
into
the
following
form.
'Through
intuitive
cognition
we
judge
a
thing to be when it is - and this, generally, whether the intuitive cognition is
caused
naturally
or
by
God
alone
supernaturally.'
This
statement,
which
is the
opening
sentence
of
the text
quoted
below,
says
two
things: (1) by
intuitive
cogni-
89
R.
Allers,
'Intuition
and Abstraction'
(Franciscan
Studies,
VIII,
1,
March,
1948,
pp.
47-68).
40
S.
Day,
Intuitive
Cognition,
p.
160.
41
Ph.
Boehner,
'In
Propria
Causa'
(Franciscan
Studies, v, 1,
March, 1945,
pp.
37-54).
42
Leaving
aside
particular
issues,
which
can
be
discussed
on
another
occasion,
I find
Fr
Boehner's
reply
unsatisfactory
for
the reason that
I have
given
in
the
present
article.
Fr
Boehner's
whole
posi-
tion
hinges
on
denying
that
judgments
of
existence
can be based
on
the intuition
of non-existents.
The present article is not an answer to Fr Boehner; it is rather concerned with the interpretation of
one
text
of
Ockham,
namely,
In II
Sent.,
q.
15E.
43
E.
Gilson,
Unity
of
Philosophical Experience
(New
York:
C.
Scribners
Sons,
1941),
p.
82.
44
Edited
by
Ph.
Boehner in
Traditio,
i
(1943),
248-250. The
paragraphing
of this
text is
faulty,
obscuring
the
distinction
of the
two
parts
in Ockham's
definition
of
cognitio
intuitiva
(cf.
A. C.
Pegis,
'Concerning
William
of
Ockham,'
Tradition,
ii
(1944),
470-471;
Ph.
Boehner,
'In
Propria
Causa,'
p.
50).
45
In II
Sent.,
q.
15E;
ed.
cit.,
p.
248,
459
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Some Recent
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of
Ockham
tion
we
judge
a
thing
to be when
it
is;
(2)
the intuitive
cognition may
be caused
naturally
or
supernaturally.
Intuitive
cognition
enables
me
to
judge
a
thing
to exist when it exists.
When
is this condition satisfied? It is satisfied for Ockham both when the cognition is
caused
naturally
and when
it
is
caused
supernaturally.
If
naturally,
the seen ob-
ject
must be
at
a
suitable nearness
to the
knowing power;
in which case the in-
tellect
can
judge
and
assert
that
thing
to
be
as it
is.
If
supernaturally,
the seen
object
is
actually
absentfrom the
range
of
the
knowing
power,
but
God
causes
in
the knower
an
intuitive
cognition
of
something
existing,
say,
in
far-away
Rome;
and
as a
result
of this
supernaturally
caused
intuition,
I can
judge
that this
ab-
sent
thing
which
I
yet
see
and
behold
is
thus and
so,
exactly
as
though
the in-
tuitive
cognition
were obtained
naturally.
Sic igiturpatet, quod per cognitionemntuitivam udicamus em esse quandoest, et hoc
generaliter,
ive intuitiva
cognitio
naturaliter
causetur
sive
supernaturaliter
solo Deo.
Nam
si naturaliter
ausetur,
une
non
potest
esse,
nisi
obiectum
existat
praesens
n debita
approximatione,
uia
tanta
potest
esse distantia
inter
obiectum
et
potentiam,quod
na-
turaliternon
potest potentia
tale obiectum
ntueri.
Et
quando
obiectum
est sic
praesens
tali modo
approximatum,
otest
intellectus
per
actum assentiendiudicare
em esse
modo
praedicto.
Si
autem
sit
supernaturalis, uta
si
Deus causaret
n me
cognitionem
ntuitivam
de
aliquo
obiecto
existente
Romae,
statim
habita
cognitione
ius
ntuitiva
possum
udicare,
quod
illud
quod
ntueoret video
est ita
bene,
sicut si
illa
cognition
haberetur
naturaliter.46
Ockham is
certainly saying
that,
on
the
assumption
of a
supernaturally
caused
intuition, I make
judgments
about an absent
thing
as though it were a
present
thing.
But
there
is
more.
It
is
objected
that the
absent
thing
is
not
suitably present
to the
seeing
power.
The
reply,
which marks a
repudiation
of Scotus'
way
of
distinguishing
between
intuitive and abstractive
cognition,
contains
Ockham's
most radical
views
on
this
subject.
In
the natural
order,
he
writes,
intuitive
cognition
cannot
be
caused
except
when the
object
is
present
at a suitable
distance;
but
supernaturally
it
can.
Hence Ockham restricts to
the
natural order
Scotus' contention
that
intuitive
cognition
requires
a
present
and
existing
object.
This
presence
and existence
of
the
object
are not
required
in the case of a
supernaturally
caused intuition.
Absolutely
speaking,
and
this is the
crucial
moment,
no
other
presence
is
necessarily required
except
that which
will
terminate the
intuitive
act;
and
it
is
quite
compatible
with
this
requirement
that
the
object
be
nothing,
a
nihil,
or be
separated
from
the
seeing
power
by
a
very great
distance.
So
that,
however
far
away
the
intuitively
known
object may
be,
I
can
judge
it
to
be
if it
exists
in the
way
already
men-
tioned
(i.e.,
if,
though
non-present
and
even
non-existing,
it
is
supernaturally
present
through
the
substitutional action
of
God).
In the
natural
order,
of
course,
the existence
and
presence
of the
object
at a suitable
nearness
are
required;
and
that is
why
I
cannot
judge
the
intuitively
known
thing
to exist unless it be a
present
object.
Si
dicis,
quod
obiectum
non est hic
praesens
nec
debito
modo
approximatum.
Re-
spondeo:
Licet
cognitio
ntuitiva
non
possit
naturaliter
ausari
nisi
quando
obiectumest
46
Ibid.,
pp.
248-249,
460
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praesens
in debita
distantia,
tamen
supernaturaliter
posset.
Et ideo differentiae
quas
dat
Johannes
inter
cognitionem
intuitivam et abstractivam:
quod
cognitio
intuitiva est
prae-
sentis
et existentis ut
praesens
et existens
est,
intelliguntur
de
cognitione
intuitiva
natu-
raliter
causata,
non autem
quando
supernaturaliter.
Unde
absolute
loquendo
non
requiritur
necessario ad
cognitionem
intuiti,vam
alia
praesentia,
nisi
quod
possit
actum intuitivum
terminare.
Et cum hoc
stat,
quod
obiectum sit
nihil vel
quod
sit
distants
per
maximam
distantiam;
et
quantumcumque
distet
obiectum
cognitum
intuitive,
statim virtute
eius
possum
iudicare
illud
esse,
si sit
modo
praedicto.
Sed
tamen,
quia
cognitio
intuitiva
naturaliter non
causatur
nec
conservatur,
nisi
obiectum
sit debito modo
approximatum
in
certa
distantia
existens,
ideo non
possum
iudicare
illud,
quod cognoscitur
naturaliter
intuitive,
nisi
obiectum sit
praesens.47
At
this
point,
Ockham
takes
up
the
second
half
of
his
definition
of
intuitive
cognition:
'eodem modo
per
cognitionem
intuitivam
possum
iudicare
rem
non
esse quando non est.'48 In other words what Ockham has said up to this sentence
refers to
the first
part
of
his
definition,
namely,
that
'per
cognitionem
intuitivam
iudicamus
rem esse
quando
est.' It
is
therefore
possible
to
have
an
intuition
of
a
nihil
and
judge
it to exist.
Such
a
possibility
is
supernatural,
not
natural;
but
it
is
a
possibility:
supernaturally
speaking,
it
is
possible
to see
and
to
judge
that
some-
thing
is
though
this
something
be
a
nihil.
This
is
the
plain meaning
of
the
text
under
consideration,
regardless
of
what Ockham
may
have said elsewhere.
To
repeat:
Ockham
is
here
asserting
an
intuition
of
an
existent
and
a
judgment
of
existence
in
the
presence
of a
nihil.
This
is
the situation
which
enabled Gilson to
say that for Ockham 'human knowledge would be practically indistinguishable
from
what
it
is,
even
though
all
its
objects
were
destroyed.'49
Is it
contradictory,
then,
that
there be
vision
and
that
that which is seen
not
actually
exist?
Ockham
has
said
so.50
But
he has
added
that
it is
not
a
contradic-
tion that
that
which
is
seen
be
nothing
actual outside the
soul,
provided
that it
can
exist or
has
existed:
'Sed non est
contradictio,
quod
id
quod
videtur
nihil
sit
in
actu
extra
animam,
dummodo
possit
esse
in effectu vel
aliquando
fuerit
in
rerum natura'.l6
So
long
as
the nihil
is
a
possible
being,
therefore,
it
can remain in
itself
a
nihil,
and
still
the
intuition
of
an existent
and
a
judgment
of
existence,
according to the first part of the definition of intuitive cognition, will remain for
Ockham
undisturbed.
I
can
only
add
that
this
is,
in
fact,
what
Ockham thinks
and
that it is
the
basis
of
the
charge
of
skepticism.
It
is
not
necessary
to
consider
here
the
further
dilemmas faced
by
Ockham
when,
on the
supposition
that
intuition can be
of
a
nihil,
he
tries to account for
judgments
of
non-existence. If Father Boehner's
interpretation
is
correct,
no
problem
would
arise
at this
point.
For
according
to
him,
when
the
object
of
in-
tuition
is a
nihil,
the
consequent
absence
of
any
causality
from the
side
of
the
object
will
lead
to
the
evident
assent
that
the
thing
does
not exist.52
I
agree
that
on this interpretation, there is no problem as to how the intuition of a nihil
can
lead to
judgments
of
both existence and
non-existence;
for
Father
Boehner
47
Ibid.,
p.
249. For the
correction of the
reading
determinata
by
debita,
cf.
Traditio,
ii
(1944),
473,
note
28.
48
In II
Sent.,
q.
15E;
ed.
cit.,
p.
249.
49
E.
Gilson,
Unity of Philosophical Experience,
p.
82.
50
Quodl.
V,
q.
5.
61
Quodl.
VI,
q.
6.
2
Ph,
Boehner,
'In
Propria
Causa,'
pp.
45,
49.
461
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of
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is
arguing
that the
nihil
never
leads
to
judgments
of
existence in Ockham.
In
short,
Father Boehner's
position
is that for Ockham
there
can
be
an intuition
of
a
nihil;
there cannot be
a
judgment
asserting
or
assenting
to its existence.
Where,
Father Boehner asks, does Ockham say what I have attributed to him, namely,
'that
it is
possible,
given
a
supernaturally
caused
intuitive
knowledge,
to
judge
that
a
thing
exists
when
it
does
not
exist'?53
To
this
question,
evidently,
the
only
answer
is
the
text
of Ockham.
Does Ockham
speak
of
a
judgment
of existence
following
fpom
the intuition
of a nihil?
The
answer
is not
far to seek.
Judicamus
and
judicare
appear
three
times in
the
texts
edited
by
Father
Boehner and
cited
above.
And,
be it
remembered,
these
texts deal
with
the
first
part
of the
definition
of
intuitive
cognition,
i.e.,
that
part
which deals
with
judgments
of existence.
Now
Father
Boehner will
admit
that
judgments of existence and non-existence follow from intuitive cognition or
knowledge.
That,
in
fact,
is the
very
definition
of
cognitio
intuitiva. It is also
a
fact,
according
to
Ockham,
that
the
condition
for
a
judgment
of
existence
can
be
verified
in two
ways
on the
level
of
intuition,
namely, naturally
or
supernaturally.
Let us
recall the
first
part
of
Ockham's
definition:
'per
cognitionem
intuitivam
iudicamus rem
esse
quando
est.'
This leaves
no
doubt
that
we
are
dealing
with a
judgment
of existence.
Nor can
there
be
any
doubt
that
the
intuitive
cognition
on
which this
judgment
is based can
be
supernatural
as
well
as
natural;
for
the
text
continues:
'sive intuitiva
cognitio
naturaliter causetur sive
supernaturaliter
a
solo Deo.' It is evident that when the intuition is caused a solo Deo the seen ob-
ject
is in itself
a
nihil;
and
yet
it is
a
fact
that for
Ockham
a
judgment
of existence
follows
from
such
an
intuition.
This
is
surely
different
from
Father's Boehner's
interpretation.
Indeed,
contrary
to his
interpretation,
Ockham
distinguishes
two
kinds of
presence,
on the
part
of
the
object,
to the
knowing
power,
and both
ead
to
judg-
ments
of
existence.
On the
natural
level,
the
object
must be
suitably present
in
itself for
the
intellect
to assent
to its existence.
But
absolutely
speaking,
existence
and
presence
on the
part
of the
object
are not
necessary
for
intuition;
for,
accord-
ing to Ockham, 'no other presence is necessary for intuitive cognition except that
which
can
terminate
the intuitive
act.' Now what can terminate
such an
act?
On
the
present
assumption,
it is
not
the
object
in its
proper
existence. It is
compat-
ible with the termination
of
the
intuitive
act,
given
our
supernatural
assumption,
that its
object
be in
itself a
nihil
or
something
beyond
the
range
of
intuition.
But
there
is
more,
and
Father Boehner
should
not
ignore
it.
On
the
assumption
that
the
perceived
object
is in
itself a nihil
or
distans
per
maximam
distantiam,
and
that
God
alone causes
the intuitive
cognition,
it
is
possible
to
have a
judgment
of
existence:
'statim
virtute
eius
possum
iudicare
illud
esse,
si
sit
praedicto
modo'
(i.e.,
supernaturally
caused by God).
At
least
one
text of
Ockham,
therefore,
namely,
In II
Sent.,
q.
15E,
says
that,
supernaturally
speaking,
there can be
an
intuition of a
nihil which is
followed
by
a
judgment
of
existence.
By
having
only judgments
of
non-existence
following
from
53
A.
C.
Pegis,
'Concerning
William
of
Ockham,'
p.
575;
Ph.
Boehner,
'In
Propria
Causa,'
p.
46.
462
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the
intuition
of a
nihil,
Father
Boehner's
interpretation really
eliminates
part
of
Ockham's
doctrine
on
intuition;
for it
suppresses
Ockham's
own
supernatural
possibility
from the first
part
of
the
definition
of
cognitio
intuitiva.
Nothing
in
the
text authorizes Father Boehner so to
interpret
Ockham,
in
spite
of the fact that
his
interpretation
gives
him
the
opportunity
to
argue
for the
infallibility
of
in-
tuitive
cognition
in the Venerabilis
Inceptor.4
For
the
present,
therefore,
I
shall
insist
only
on
a
purely
exegetical
point.
It is the text of
Ockham,
and not
any
supposed
construction
on
my
part,
which
warrants the
view
that for
Ockham
the
intuition of a
nihil can
lead
to
a
judgment
of
existence. It will not
be
easy
to
reconcile
In
II
Sent.,
q.
15E,
with
Quodl.
v, 5,
but
that
is
scarcely
the
question.
The
question
is
whether
Ockham has said
what I have attributed to him
in the
first
part
of
his definition
of
intuitive
cognition.
There
is
a text
which
has
said
so,
and
that text is In II
Sent.,
q.
15E. This
point
is
sufficiently
important
in
itself,
for
the
interpretation
of
Ockham,
to merit
the attention
of Ockham's
students.
This is
particularly
so in
our
own
day,
which
is
seeing
a
renewed
interest
in the
thought
of the
English
Franciscan.
PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE
OF
MEDIAEVAL
STUDIES,
TORONTO.
64
Ph.
Boehner,
The Notitia
Intuitiva . .
'
pp.
231-236.
463