accelerate combat power (dubik)

8/14/2019 Accelerate Combat Power (Dubik)

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INSTITUTE FOR THE

STUDY o WARMilitary Analysis and Education

for Civilian Leaders

BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)

December 2009

AccelerAting combAt Power

in AfghAnistAn

rePort 2


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Cover photo: Afghan National Army (ANA) Military Police Trainees practice vehicle mount and dismount drills at Ka-bul Military Training Center under ANA and Task Force Phoenix Headquarters Security Support Command supervisionon June 4, 2007.. U.S. Army Soldiers of Task Force Phoenix have the mission to train and mentor the ANA. The ANAis an all volunteer army much like the military forces in the United States. The ANA is ethnically balanced at all levelsand provides a truly representative force for the people of Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jim Downen218th BCT PAO)(Released).

All rights resered. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publicationmay be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical,

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2009 by the Institute or the Study o War.

Published in 2009 in the United States o America by the Institute or the Study o War.

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http://www.understandingwar.org


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BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)

AccelerAting combAt Power

in AfghAnistAn

rePort 2


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General James M. Dubi (U.S. Army, Ret.), a Senior Fellow at ISW, currently conductsresearch, writes, and bries on behal o the Institute. His areas o ocus include the ways toimproe U.S. and allied training o indigenous security orces in Aghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere;counterinsurgency doctrine; and changes in the nature, conduct, and understanding o war.

LTG Dubi commanded Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) rom June10, 2007 until July/August 2008. During this nal command, he oersaw the accelerated generationand training o the Iraqi Security Forces. Preiously, he was the Commanding General o I Corps atFt. Lewis, the Commanding General o the 25th Inantry Diision, and the Deputy CommandingGeneral or Transormation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. As the DCG orTransormation, LTG Dubi led the eort to create the Armys rst Stryer Brigade Combat Team

and design the training and leader deelopment program or these unique ormations. Dubi hasheld numerous leadership and command positions with airborne, ranger, light and mechanizedinantry units around the world. He was commissioned a second lieutenant o inantry romGannon Uniersity as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1971, and he retired rom serice onSeptember 1, 2008.

He holds a Bachelors o Arts degree in Philosophy rom Gannon Uniersity, a Masters o Artsdegree in Philosophy rom Johns Hopins Uniersity and a Master o Military Arts and SciencesDegree rom the United States Army Command and General Sta College.

His awards include the Distinguished Serice Medal, Deense Superior Serice Medal, our

awards o the Legion o Merit, e awards o the Meritorious Serice Medal, and numerous ArmyCommendation and Achieement Medals. He is ranger, airborne and air assault qualied and holdsthe epert inantrymans badge, master parachutist badge as well as the Army Sta Identication

Badge.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute or the Study o War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-prot, public policy researchorganization. ISW adances an inormed understanding o military aairs through reliable research,trusted analysis, and innoatie education. We are committed to improing the nations abilityto eecute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achiee U.S. strategic

objecties.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN | LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. DUBIk (U.S.ARMY, RET.) | DECEMBER 2009

ExEcUTIvE SUmmARy .............................................................................. 02INTROdUcTION ........................................................................................ 04

Military and Paramilitary Police Forces ..............................................................04

Accelerants to Combat Power ..........................................................................05

Local Police Forces .......................................................................................12

cONclUSION ........................................................................................... 15


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ExECUTIvE SUMMARYACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN | LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. DUBIk (U.S.ARMY, RET.) | DECEMBER 2009

2www.UNdERSTANdINgwAR.ORg

Building oreign security orces is a challenge at any time due to political and cultural

barriers, but it is een more so during actie combat.Under my command, Multi-National Security and Transition Team Iraq (MNSTC-I,pronounced minsticy) accelerated the growth o the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)militaryand policeby oer 125,000 personnel. This rate o growth ar eceeded any growth raterom preious years and, as the number o men in uniorm grew dramatically, so did theircapability and condence.

Although Aghanistan is not Iraq, some practical lessons or growing security orces duringa conict can be adapted to the unique circumstances in Aghanistan.

Building indigenous military and paramilitary police orces while ghting is not just aboutnumbers o indiiduals and units trained, equipped, and released onto the battleeld.Rather, building indigenous security orces while ghting requires one to ocus on creating

combat powerthat can be used eectiely in battle and in proiding security to the population.Combat power has two major components:

First, haing a sufcient number o sufciently trained, equipped, and led militaryoand paramilitary police orces.Second, those orces being condent and capable enough to do what is epected oothem relatie to the enemy they ace and the conditions in which they must succeed.

Any plan to accelerate the size o the Aghan National Security Forces will requireincreasing the Aghan training systems throughput capacity. Throughput capacity can beepanded by:

Building more training acilities.o

Epanding the size o eisting training acilities.o Increasing the number o training cycles per year.oCompressing the training cycle by epanding the training day by seeral hours,otraining si or seen days a wee, or eliminating unnecessary redundancies intraining.

In Aghanistan, there is currently the throughput capacity to generate and replace an armyo about 90,000 and a police orce o about 98,000. Any plans to grow these orces to240,000 and 160,000, respectiely, will require greater throughput capacity.

As a temporary mitigating strategy, NATO Training Mission-Aghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Aghanistan (CSTC-A) may be able toleerage acant or under-utilized training acilities in nations near Aghanistan. Yet, theconstruction o more acilities within Aghanistan will be necessary to accelerate the growth

o the Aghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

NTM-A/CSTC-A will also be able to eld more Aghan army and police by using aminimum essential combat equipping standard.

Equipping the ANSF can be done iteratiely, with an initial ocus on the basicoequipment associated with inantry and paramilitary police. Aghans can rely, inthe short term, on NATOs artillery, air support, medical eacuation, transport,and other combat multipliers.Oer time, NTM-A/CSTC-A must go beyond the minimum in order to build aosel-sufcient security orce.

OvERvIEw

SIZE ANd cOmBAT POwER


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ExECUTIvE SUMMARYACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN | LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. DUBIk (U.S.ARMY, RET.) | DECEMBER 2009


Condence translates potential combat power latent in raw numbers o orces intoactual, usable combat power.

Accelerating condence within an indigenous security orce requires taing coherentand coordinated action at the tactical, operational, and strategic leels.

At the tactical leel, one must increase cohesion among soldiers and leaders,opartner with Western orces, and ensure reliable access to combat multipliersystems.

At the operational leel, embedded trainers at the operational headquartersoo the indigenous orces are necessary to accelerate prociency, and thereby,condence. Partnership at the operational leel is liely een more eectiethan just embedded trainers.

At the strategic leel, deeloping competent and capable security ministriesoministry o deense, general headquarters, and ministry o interiorcanaccelerate condence. Failing to do so can create a dependence upon the

interening orce.The dierence between local police and paramilitary or military orces has importantpractical consequences or those ghting a counterinsurgency or growing indigenoussecurity orces during one.

Military and paramilitary police orces impose order and are the properoorganizations to clear insurgents rom an area. Local police, who lie and worin the same area, enorce order and cannot wor eectiely when insurgentsdominate.The security imposed by military and paramilitary police orces sets theoconditions or quasi-normal ciic and economic lie to emerge. Theseconditions are necessary beore rebuilding the local police orces can begin inearnest.

The dierence between imposing and enorcing security suggests a priority o eort

when building a security orce during a ght.In general, the priority o deelopment should go to military and paramilitaryopolice units.This prioritization is consistent with the need to sustain momentum o aocounteroensie to secure the population against insurgents and to ensurethat, when the population has been secured, there is a large enough andcapable indigenous security orce can begin to assume responsibility orinternal security.Raising local police orces is not just a matter o training and equipping aoset number o police. Rather, local police are a part o a set o enorcementsystems: patrolling, inestigations, orensics, apprehension, incarceration,logistics, acilities, training, leadership/management, and internal aairs.Growing local police orces requires: rst, setting out the proper conditionso

with military and paramilitary police orces; second, establishing rudimentarypolice enorcement systems rom local to ministerial leels; third, continuingthe proessionalization within those enorcement systems.

In places lie Iraq and Aghanistan, growing indigenous security orcesmilitary,paramilitary police, and local policeis not an actiity that can be understood separaterom the oerall counterinsurgency strategy. Rather, the eort to grow indigenoussecurity orces is nested within the conduct o oensie and deensie operations tosecure the population.

cONFIdENcE ANd cOmBAT POwER


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ACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN

By Lieutenant General James M. Dubi (U.S. Army, Ret.)

BEST PRAcTIcES IN cOUNTERINSURgENcy: REPORT 2

From the spring o 2007 to the late summer o 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)military and policegrew by oer 125,000. This growth, which too place during thesurge o US orces and at a time o intense ghting, was not just in numbers but also in ca-pability and condence and was essential to establishing the security gains that set conditionsor eentual US troop reductions. Building oreign security orces is a challenge at any timedue to political and cultural barriers, but it is een more so during actie combat. US andNATO political leaders are now considering whether such growth is possible in Aghanistan,a subject that I studied or General Stanley McChrystal last July. Although, Aghanistan is

not Iraq, there are some practical lessons or growing security orces during a conict thatcan be adapted to the unique circumstances in Aghanistan.

Under my command, Multi-National Security andTransition Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I, pro-nounced minsticy) accelerated the growth othe ISF. This eort began soon ater the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and Iraqi SecurityForces began their counteroensie to wrest theinitiatie rom the Iraqs insurgents and proidesecurity to population.

This accelerated growth o security orces wasnecessary both to sustain the momentum o thesurges counteroensie and, once security wasestablished, ensure there would be an Iraqi orcelarge enough and capable enough to assume re-sponsibility or Iraqs security.

Understanding the practical considerations as-sociated with accelerating the deelopment o

oreign security orces during a ght begins withthe recognition o the undamental dierencebetween military and paramilitary police orceson one hand, and local police orces on the other.Military and paramilitary police orces are trained,equipped, and organized to impose security inchaotic situations; local police orces, on the otherhand, enforce security. The subtle but importantdierence between imposing order and enorcingsecurity cannot be oerstated. To impose securityis to orce order amidst a chaotic, insecure situa-tion; to enorce security is to compel compliance

to order that already eists.

mIlITARy ANd PARAmIlITARy POlIcE

FORcES

Building indigenous military and paramilitary po-lice orces while ghting is not just about numberso indiiduals and units trained, equipped, and

TABlE 1 - SElEcTEd gROwTH STATISTIcS

Politicians quite rightly expect the military to respond

to their requirementsbut too often do so without anycomprehension of the practical considerations of the matter.i

i Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Age (New Yor City: PenguinBoos, 2005), p. i.

SELECTED GROWTH STATISTICS

From May 2007 to July 2008

Growth in size by over 125,000

A new brigade a month for over 5 months

Assigned strength from 85% average to over

100% average

Over 16,000 new sergeants

Iraqi Air Force flies an average of 286 missions

per week in support of the Iraqi Army, from anaverage of 29 missions per week

Almost 800 new police officers

Over 25,000 new policemen in Baghdad alone

Transformed Iraqi National Police(now the Federal Police)

Present for duty strength increased from 67%average to over 81% average


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ACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN | LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. DUBIk (U.S.ARMY, RET.) | DECEMBER 2009

released onto the battleeld.

Numbers count, especially in the ind o ght thateists in Aghanistan, but numbers alone are an

insufcient measure o capacity. Rather, buildingindigenous security orces while ghting requiresone to ocus on creating combat power that can beused eectiely in battle and in proiding securityto the population. Combat power has two majorcomponents.

First, creating combat power requires haing a su-cient number o sufciently trained, equipped,and led military and paramilitary police orces.This outcome is empirically measurable. Second,creating combat power requires those orces to be

condent and capable enough to do what is e-pected o them relatie to the enemy they ace andthe conditions in which they must succeed. Thisquality does not lend itsel to easy measurement.

Unortunately, many beliee that the empiricalelements o combat power describe the entire taso raising an indigenous security orce. This is adangerous belie because it may lead one to con-clude that when a certain number o soldiers orpolice are at a specied leel o training, the tasis complete. This alse belie is at the heart o the

ot-heard saying, when they stand up,we standdown.

Condence translates potential combat powerlatent in raw numbers o orces into actual, usablecombat powersecurity orces that are condentin themseles, in their equipment, their buddies,their leaders, and the systems that support them ina ght. For eample, condence increases when

intelligence is aailable, timely, and accurate;when re support, air or ground, can be countedupon; when medical treatment and eacuation areaailable; when orces in contact can rely on re-

supply o ammunition; when ood, water, replace-ment personnel and equipment arrie on a timelyenough basis.

Condence described in this way is easy to un-derstand. It is composed o the inds o thingsanyone would want in a ght. Interestingly, thestandards or condence are relatie. My epe-rience training with security orces around the

world conrms that what generate condence inone nations security orce may not generate it inanothers. One size does not t all. For eample,

leadership practices and training standards accept-able in the Thai Army may not be acceptable in the

Japanese Ground Sel Deense Force. Leader-to-led ratios or resupply rates in the armies o NATOcountries may be unnecessary or other nations.Standards or South korean army acilities willnot apply to eery other nations army. Iraq and

Aghanistan are liewise dierent in the standardsnecessary to deelop condence.

An organization tased to build indigenous secu-rity orces must wor with the host nation to pro-

duce a sufcient number o sufciently trained,equipped, and led military and paramilitary policeorces that are condent in the ways describedaboe.

Further, it must produce them as quicly as pos-sible. In a ght, going slowly is to no ones adan-tage ecept the enemys.

AccElERANTS TO cOmBAT POwER

The Empirical Component of Combat PowerAccelerating the growth in the empirically mea-sureable elements o combat power must ocuson resources, nancial and human. Money isthe rst accelerant; used properly, it can cre-ate throughput capacity. Funding must allowthe construction o enough training acilities togenerate and replenish the indigenous security

PHOTO 1 - IRAqI ARmy REcRUITS AT BASIc cOmBAT TRAININg


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orces. Throughput capacity is relatie to the sizeo the orce. For eample, a orce o 50,000that is eperiencing teen percent attrition rate

will require number o training bases to ac-

commodate training y number o soldiers peryear, while a orce o 100,000 with a twenty-epercent attrition rate will require either moretraining bases, larger ones, or more training cyclesper year.

o training cycles per year to accommodate morethroughput capacity. NATO Training Mission-

Aghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Tran-sition Command-Aghanistan (CSTC-A) can

also compress training to help increase through-put. Epanding the training day by seeral hours,training si or seen days a wee, or eliminatingunnecessary redundancies in training can all in-crease throughput. The tables below demonstrate

In Aghanistan, there is currently a throughputcapacity to generate and replace an army o about90,000 and a police orce o about 98,000.

Any plans to grow those orces to 240,000 and160,000 respectielyor beyondwill requiregreater throughput. This can be accomplished bybuilding more training acilities, epanding thesize o those that eist, or increasing the number

how throughput capacity increases as training timeis compressed.

By themseles, these inds o measures will notmae up or the act that growing the AghanNational Army to 240,000 or more will requiremore or larger training acilities.

Money or more construction will also be neces-

TABlE 2 - AFgHAN NATIONAl ARmy FORcE gENERATION

TABlE 3 - AFgHAN NATIONAl POlIcE FORcE gENERATION

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb SepAugJulMar Apr May Jun

72-Hr

60-Hr

55-Hr

44-Hr

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY FORCE GENERATION

Work Week

160000

150000

140000

130000

120000

110000

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE GENERATION135000

125000

115000

105000

95000

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb SepAugJulMar Apr May Jun

72-Hr

60-Hr

55-Hr

44-Hr

Work Week


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sary or barracs and operating acilities. Build-ing indigenous security orces during a ghtmeans that those orces need places to lie, ght,and train between operationsand these acili-

ties must be situated in such a way so as to protectthe population. As we grew the Iraqi SecurityForces during the Surge, or eample, MNSTC-I built permanent barracs and police stations,unit training acilities and police academies to beused to continue training, as well as commandand control centers to help coordinate ciil-military operations, and MNC-I built combatoutposts used by both the army and police. Bothsets o acilities were placed to help protect theIraqi people. Some similar set o acilities willbe necessary in Aghanistan. Still in question arenumbers, size, types, locations, purposes, andconstruction standards. These questions will haeto be answered within the contet o the ciil-mil-itary campaign plan that emerges rom PresidentObamas decision.

As a temporary mitigating strategy, NTM-A/CSTC-A may be able to leerage acant or under-utilized training acilities in nations near A-ghanistan. MNSTC-I did this at arious times tohelp increase the throughput o the Iraqi SecurityForces. In the nal analysis, howeer, construc-tion o more acilities within Aghanistan will be

absolutely necessary i NTM-A/CSTC-A is toaccelerate the growth o Aghan National SecurityForces.

Finally, money will also be necessary to buy equip-ment. NTM-A/CSTC-A will be able to eld more

Aghan army and police or its money by using aminimum essential combat equipping standardthat is coordinated with the Aghan Ministries o

Deense and Interior. Een at this minimum leelo equipment, howeer, growing oer 150,000more army and 60,000 more police personnel

will be epensie, especially or a country with solittle o its own capital and such wea economicresources.

Equipping the Aghan National Security Forces isa tas that can be done iteratiely. An initial ocuson basic equipment associated with inantry andparamilitary police needed in a counterinsurgency

will sufce as the Aghans can rely on NATOs ar-tillery, air support, medical eacuation, transport,and other combat multipliers. Oer time, NTM-

A/CSTC-A must go beyond the minimum in

order to build a sel-sufcient security orce. Thatis, the United States, NATO, and the Aghans willultimately hae to deelop a longer-range planto build and supply combat multipliers to theirarmy and police. This planning will neer taeplace, howeer, i the initiatie is not wrested romthe Taliban and security improed. Tomorrowsproblems should not preent ISAF rom taingthe action demanded by todays challenges.

Human capital is the second accelerant to grow-ing the empirical component o an indigenous

security orces combat power during a ght. Anation must be able to ll its army and police, as

well as retain enough recruits and leaders to main-tain specied strength goals. Filling the securityorcesthrough recruiting, conscription, or somecombinationwill determine whether the indig-enous orce can actually grow to the size necessary.I it cannot, then all other difculties in buildingthe indigenous orce are rendered moot.


PHOTO 3 - IRAqI REcRUITS BEgINNINg THEIRORIENTATION

PHOTO 2 - HmmwvS AwAITINg ISSUE TO IRAqI ARmy


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The number o recruits that must be retainedariesas does the number and adequacy o lead-ers. In Iraq, MNSTC-I saw both recruiting andretention improe as the successes o the Surges

counteroensie became eident to all. A similarrelationship will liely emerge in Aghanistan.

The leels o literacy, education, and technicalnowledge in a security orce hae aried through-out the history o warare. The Western proes-sional militaries are now accustomed to a recruit-ing standard that een one generation ago, letalone two or three, would hae been unattainable.This act does not mean that Western militariesought to lower their standards. Rather, it meansthat standards are relatie to the time and situa-

tion een in Western armies. In the United StatesArmy, or eample, recruiting standards changedsignicantly rom the 1960s, when soldiers wereconscripted, to the 1970s, when the U.S. Armybecame a olunteer orce. The standards werecontinually raised since that time to create thearmy the United States now elds. U.S. recruit-ing standards also change as a unction o the endstrength o the desired end strength and the stateo the economy.

Armies reect their societies, and they only hae

to be better than their enemies. When accelerat-ing the growth o an indigenous security orce,one must be cognizant o that societys humancapacity and wor within the realities o the caseand cognizant o the enemy the indigenous orcemust deeat. Illiteracy in the Aghan army, there-ore, is not an a priori insurmountable obstacleto growing the Aghan security orces. Rather, it

is a constraint to be considered in deeloping theinds o training programs that wor or Aghanrecruits gien the way that orce is organized andliely to ght. Then, oer time, literacy ratesand

other quality characteristicscan be improed.

The Non-Empirical Component of Combat Power

Condence translates the potential combat powerresident in numbers into actual combat powerthat can be used on the battleeld. Acceleratingcondence within an indigenous orce that willbe employed in an on-going ght is much morecomplicated than simply increasing its size.

Combat power is concerned with the condence

o soldiers and leaders in battle. As preiouslynoted, soldiers and leaders ght better when theyare condent in themseles, their equipment,their leaders, and the systems that support them.

System perormance and reliability matters: asoldiers condence increases when he is con-dent that the intelligence proided or an action istimely and accurate; when he is properly suppliedprior to the action; when the necessary transporta-tion is aailable, adequate, and timely; when need-ed re support, whether deliered by air or romthe ground, is aailable, timely, and accurate;

when resupplies o ammunition, ood, and waterarrie during an etended action; when medicalcare and eacuation o wounded is timely; whendamaged equipment is repaired or replaced and

CONFIDENCE FACTORS

Confidence In

BuddiesSelf

Leaders Equipment

Systems that support a unit in combat-Tactical

-Operational-Strategic

TABlE 4 - cONFIdENcE FAcTORS

PHOTO 4 - UNITS TRAIN TO mOvE UNdER FIRE


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3 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War(Peter Smith:Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1978), p. 150.

2 Military organizations must set and meet a hierarchical series o objecties at thetactical, operational, and strategic leels o war that will accomplish the oerall goal.For eample, tactical objecties may include destroying a sa e haen or holding a pieceo terrain; operational objecties may include securing a city; and strategic objectiesmay include establishing a secure and stable goernment.

new replacement soldiers arrie ater an action.These systems are so important that they are otenthey are called combat multipliers or enablers.

When they are absent, especially i this absence is

habitual, soldiers and leaders in battle ght dier-ently, i at all.

Accelerating condence within an indigenoussecurity orce requires taing coherent and co-ordinated action at the tactical, operational, andstrategic leels simultaneously.2

At the tactical leel three actions are necessary.First, one must increase the cohesion amongsoldiers and leaders. For new units, this cohesioncomes through training as a whole unit prior to

employment in combat. Following basic combattraining, new soldiers must moe to a trainingcenter, where they are issued their units equip-ment, meet their unit leaders and embeddedtrainers, and train or seeral wees as a team,


practicing the sills they will need on the battle-eld. This shared eperience will orm a bondthat increases the units condence.

Cohesion is created dierently or replacementsthat are sent to units already ormed and in battle.In this case, replacements should be sent as apacage o soldiers who hae trained together inbasic training. I possible, the unit to which they

will be assigned should proide brie orientationand training to the units specic area o opera-tions, and then assign them to duties in groups tomaintain riendships.

S.L.A. Marshalls amous boo, Men Against Fire,summarizes the importance o cohesion and

combat power when he says, all things beingequal, the tactical unity o men woring togetherin combat will be in the ratio o their nowledgeand sympathetic understanding o each other.3

Partnership with Western orces is the secondcomponent to accelerating condence at the tacti-cal leel. Newly created indigenous units mustpartner with the more procient, battle hard-ened combat units o the interening orce.

Such a partnership not only increases the con-dence o the new unit, but also continues the newunits training and deelopment. Learning doesnot stop once soldiers graduate rom basic train-ing or a unit completes its initial unit training.By planning, preparing, eecuting, and assessingcombat missions together, the new units soldiersand leaders continue to learn on the job. Assoldiers and leaders learn more, their prociencygrows, as does their condence. On the joblearning with eperienced partners and continuedcoaching through embedded trainers, when addedto the cohesion created through unit-ocused

training, are powerul accelerants to condence,and thereore, to creating usable combat power.

The last tactical accelerant concerns access to thecombat multiplier systems describe aboe.

In situations lie Iraq and Aghanistan, where

PHOTO 5 - gRAdUATION OF AN IRAqI UNITS dRIvERSANd mAINTENANcE PERSONNEl

PHOTO 6 - IRAqIS TRAIN IN TAcTIcAl mEdIcAlEvAcUATION


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security orces are being created rom scratch, the

comple set o organizations, procedures, equip-ment, and capabilities that are inherent in ullyoperational combat multiplier systems simply donot eist. Furthermore, creating them taes a lotlonger than creating combat units themseles.Initially, thereore, new indigenous units must getaccess to these systems through their partner units.

Creating condence at the tactical leel is perhapsthe most immediate tas, but it is not the onlytas. Tactical units are employed within a conteto higher headquarters. Senior headquarters are

responsible or directing and resourcing multipletactical actions, sometimes simultaneously andsometimes in sequence. The prociency o thesesenior headquarters, or lac thereo, has a directimpact upon condence at the tactical leel. Foreample, conusing, incomplete, incoherent, or

oolish directies rom senior headquarters erodecondence at the tactical leel, as does a seniorheadquarters that orders its tactical subordinatesto eecute actions but proides them inadequate

resources. Embedded trainers at the operationalheadquarters o the indigenous orce are necessaryto accelerate prociency, and thereby, condenceand combat power in battle. Partnership at theoperational leel, when possible, would probablybe een more eectie than just embedded train-ers.

Operational prociency, and the tactical combatpower to which it is connected, must ultimatelyow rom a nations strategic leel: a competentministry o deense, general headquarters, and

ministry o interior.

In cases lie Iraq and Aghanistan, building tacti-cally and operationally capable security orces

without growing competency at the strategic leelcreates a dependence upon the interening orce.

This temporary dependency, in Iraq and Aghani-stan at least, emerges not rom an unwillingnessto step up or tae responsibility, but rom animmature states inability to perorm the completass o strategic and operational coordination.

The interening orce must accept the indigenousorces dependency in the early stages o its deel-opment, while creating those higher-leel capa-bilities oer the longer term. I let unattended,howeer, such dependence becomes apparent eenat the lower tactical leels and, thereore, aectscondence in the indigenous orces ability to ghtabsent the interening orce. All security minis-tries must perorm the ten ey unctions listed inTable 5 .

Tactical and operational combat requirementsmust be treated as stimuli to these unctions, help-ing deelop ministerial capacity as well as opera-tional and strategic independence. Too oten,organizations created to grow and deelop indig-enous security orces iew combat requirements asends-in-themseles. With this perspectie, suchorganizations then get into a mode where they rstidentiy the requirements associated with generat-

PHOTO 7 - THE cHIEF OF THE IRAqI JOINT FORcE,gENERAl BABEKIR, wAlKS THE STREETS TOcHEcK PROFIcIENcy

PHOTO 8 - IRAqI TRAININg IN lOgISTIcS ANd

AdmINISTRATION


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must rst identiy the priority o eort in deel-oping ministerial unctional capacity. Then theymust embed teams to adise and assist in thoseunctional areas. For eample, in the summer o

2007, the MNSTC-I identied si unctionalareas as the priority: orce management, acquisi-tion, training, sustainment, deelopment, andresource management.

MNSTC-I then embedded airly substantial teamson the sta o the Iraqi Ministries o Deense andInterior and within the Iraqi Joint Headquar-ters. These embedded teams used the tactical andoperational requirements, whether resulting romcreating new units or replenishing already eist-ing units, as means to stimulate analysis, deci-

sion, coordination, and action at Iraqs strategicleelalways done by, with, and through the Iraqisleadership. The point was to use the requirementsassociated with accelerated growth in size andcapability o the Iraqi Security Forces as means tostimulate similar growth in Iraqs strategic securitysector. MNSTC-I wanted to match the condenceit was creating with MNC-I at the tactical and op-erational leels with sufcient competence-basedcondence at the strategic leel.

MNSTC-I eecuted the set o actions described

aboe simultaneously with the counteroensieenabled by the surge in U.S. orces. Success inthe counteroensie compounded the condencethat resulted rom the tactical, operational, andstrategic actions MNSTC-I had put in place. Byimproing security and ocusing on both theempirical and non-empirical aspects o combatpower, MNSTC-I and MNC-I created conditions


ing new orces and replenishing eisting orces,then do the planning and coordination to meetthose requirements. In doing so, they are ableto grow numbers and create the aade o combat

power, but their wor is ain to creating a Potem-in village.

Complete sel-sufciency results rom a nationbeing able to identiy and meet its own securityrequirements. Tactical and operational combatrequirements are better understood as means, notends-in-themseles. They are means to stimulatedeelopment at the strategic leel. Organizationsresponsible to grow indigenous security orces

PHOTO 9 - IRAqI FEdERAl POlIcE TRAININg

FUNCTIONS OF A SECURITY MINISTRY1. FORCE MANAGEMENT:Develop capable security forces within allocated resources.Describe the security force neededsize and compositionrelative to the security needs as well as the requirementsfor each of the functions below.

2. ACQUISITION:Access the people and purchase or produce the materialspecified in the requirements documents that result fromthe force management function.

3. TRAINING:Convert civilians into soldiers through initial training orprovide additional training associated with new equipment.

4. DISTRIBUTION:Distribute individual, units, and equipment according torequirements, authorizations, and priorities resulting fromthe force management function.

5. DEPLOYMENT:Send individuals, units, and equipment to locations based uponsecurity requirements.

6. SUSTAINMENT:Meet required levels as stated by the force management functionin the following areas: personnel, equipment, and supplies fill;individual skills; unit capabilities; and equipment operationalreadiness.

7. DEVELOPMENT:Improve individual and unit proficiency through (A) officerand sergeant education and professional developmentprograms,formal and informal, and (B) repetitive collectivetraining programs.

8. SEPARATION:Replace old, damaged beyond repair, or destroyed equipmentand materiel as well as separate individuals in a variety ofcategoriesvoluntary and involuntary.

9. FUNDING:Replace old, damaged beyond repair, or destroyed equipmentand materiel as well as separate individuals in a variety ofcategoriesvoluntary and involuntary.

10. MANAGEMENT:Establish organizations and operate processes that plan,program, direct, control, and monitor inputs, decisions, andactions associated with the 9 functions above.Leadership: transparent, accountable, and responsible.

TABlE 5 -FUNcTIONS OF A SEcURITy mINISTRy


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whereby the Iraqis wanted to tae on more securityresponsibility themselesand they had the con-

dence and competence to do so. Transition, itseems, may be best achieed indirectly.

lOcAl POlIcE FORcES

The perspectie o growing usable combat powerapplies not only to generating and replenishingmilitary orces during actie ghting, but also toparamilitary police orces. Local police, howeer,are a dierent animal.

Local police wor best when they enorce already

eisting laws or social norms, a tacit agreement oa community to lie together. One has to thinonly o the American riots in the 1960s to under-stand that no local police orce, whether in theUnited States or elsewhere, can impose securityin a situation where iolence crosses a certainthresholdlet alone in a situation in which anactie insurgency is rampant. When the securitysituation deteriorates to such a leel, a military orparamilitary police orce is necessary to imposeorder.

This philosophical dierence has important prac-tical consequences or those ghting a counter-insurgency or growing indigenous security orcesduring one.

First, the dierence shows that military andparamilitary police are the proper organizations toclear insurgents rom an area. Forcewielded orthreatened by conentional and special operations

unitsis needed to ill or epel insurgents, andthus impose security and eliminate the intimida-tion and terror that insurgents use to strangle acommunity into submission. Such orce remains

necessary to preent the insurgents ineitable at-tempt to return. The security imposed by militaryand paramilitary police orces set the condi-tions or quasi-normal ciic and economic lie toemerge.

These are the ery conditions that are also neces-sary beore rebuilding local police orces can beginin earnest. Otherwise, the eort to build a localpolice orce will liely be wasted. Local police,

who lie and wor in the same area, cannot woreectiely when insurgents dominate.

When an area is cleared o insurgents and is heldlong enough to be condent, insurgents will notreturn, one can begin the wor o recruiting, et-ting, re-training, re-equipping, and hardeningpolice acilities.

During this build phase, the iteratie proession-alization o police can also begin, and some indo initial, een i rudimentary, judicial procedureand penal acility can be established. In places lieIraq and Aghanistan, rule o law emerges slowly.

How laws are enorced is always unique to thecultural and historical eperiences o a particularplace. Local police will also not be proessional-ized in one or two training eents. These arelong-term, transormatie eorts that are bestthought o as iteratie improements.

The build phase also permits growing proincial-


PHOTO 11 - vETTINg lOcAl POlIcE USINgBIOmETRIcS

PHOTO 10 - lOcAl POlIcE REcRUIT TRAININg INBAgHdAd


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leel or regional police systemsimproing ad-ministratie prociency and equipment account-ability, continuing training and education, andthe liethat tie indiidual stations and districts

together into a coherent police entity and that tinto national police institutions (again, consistent

with a nations history and culture).

Finally, the build phase permits more rapidepansion o a national police ofcer trainingand education program. 2007 and 2008 saw theeponential growth in the Baghdad Police Col-lege. First, the acility in Baghdad was epandedto more than double its annual output. Then,the Ministry o Interior epanded the numbers oprograms that generated police ofcers. Added to

the multi-year education program, were shorterprograms or citizens who already had collegeeducations, or police sergeants with oer a decadeo serice, and or military ofcer who wanted tobecome police ofcers. Last, the Ministry de-cided to create two etension colleges, one in theNorth and a second in the South, both with a ullcomplement o police ofcer training programs.Similar epansions are possible with the kabulPolice Academy.

Certainly there will be places where the local po-

lice want to and can participate in the clearing andholding phases o an operation. When this is pos-sible, local police should be used. But this indo situation will be the eception, not the rule.Normally, using local police that hae not beentrained, organized, or equipped to ght insur-gents will result only in higher police casualtiesassuch attempts in both Iraq and Aghanistan haeshown. As a rule, the deelopment o local policeis less-than-practical while the insurgents con-trol an area. Also impractical is trying to create acommunity-based police orce during an actie in-surgency, or threat o insurgency. Such attempts,again as both Iraq and Aghanistan hae shown,are liely to ail, waste lies, and be counterpro-ductie to the counterinsurgency eort.

Second, the dierence between imposing andenorcing security suggests a priority o eort

when building a security orce during a ght. Ingeneral, the priority o deelopment should go to

military and paramilitary police units.

I there are areas o a country where the insurgen-

cy has not taen hold, the primary tass there withrespect to local police are to embed trainers oradisors; ensure the police are organized, trained,equipped, and staed at a leel sufcient to eepthe insurgents out; and harden both police acili-ties and ehicles so that they are able to withstandinsurgent attacs.

This priority o deelopment is consistent with theneed to sustain momentum o a counteroensiedesigned to wrest the initiatie rom the insurgentsand secure the populationa priority that was nec-

essary in Iraq and is now necessary in Aghanistan.Furthermore, this priority will also ensure that,when the population has been secured, a largeenough and capable enough indigenous securityorce can begin the process o assuming responsi-bility or internal security on its own.

As with military orces, raising local police orcesis not just a matter o training and equippingsome agreed upon number o police. Rather, lo-cal police are part o a set o enorcement and sup-port systems lie those depicted in Table 6.

At the tactical leel, an organization tased tobuild indigenous local police orces can only beginto deelop these systemsusually in conjunction

with other, non-security agenciesater the popu-lation is secured. The same is generally true atthe operational leeli.e. or proincial directorso police or regional police headquarters. Thenecessity o haing security imposed beore local


PHOTO 12 - UPARmOREd HmmwvS BEINg FIEldEd TOIRAqI PROvINcIAl SwAT TEAmS


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MNC-I had satisactory coerage at the stationleel, albeit spotty in some areas. But as io-lence rose in 2006 and early 2007, this coeragebecame inadequate because many o the ciilian

police proessionals could not trael to their as-signed stations. As the counteroensie succeededand MNSTC-I and MNC-I entered the buildphase in more locations, the commands wereaced with the problem o lining Iraqi ministerialpolicies with actual tactical police requirements.Thus, MNSTC-I identied the inadequacy oour attention at the proincial leel. Adminis-tratiely, addressing this linage was problematic;MNSTC-I and MNC-I had to redrat the contractor ciilian police proessionals rom one primar-ily ocused at the station and district leel, to onethat would ocus at the proincial leel. Redrat-ing the contract too oer hal a year. This linagealso proed to be bureaucratically difcult or theMinistry o Interior. Initially, the Ministrys pro-cedures were not sufciently mature to respond tolocal needs ast enough. MNSTC-Is unctionalcapability teams embedded in the Ministry oInterior helped ministry ofcials deelop manage-rial practices that wored well enough, especially

when the police adisors and trainers that MNC-Iembedded at the proincial leel ia the redrated

contract could help apply these improed prac-tices.

The second important partnership concernedthe Rule o Law Tas Force that Multi-NationalForceIraq and the U.S. Embassy, Iraq set up in2007. This tas orce set in motion a series o ac-tions to jump start Iraqs judicial system. The tasorce wored primarily with Iraqs Ministry o Jus-tice, but obiously had close ties to both the MNC-Is Military Police Brigade and MNSTC-Is wor

with the Ministry o Interior. The tas orces e-

ort in building secure rule o law acilitiescourtrooms, quarters or judges and court ofcials, anddetention acilitieswas also timed to the buildphase and was closely coordinated with relatedpolice reorm and deelopment eorts.

The difculty and compleity o growing local po-lice orces during an actie insurgency cannot beoerstated. The organization responsible or this


police deelopment can begin in earnest as well asthe compleity o the enorcement systems beginsto eplain why police deelopment usually lagsbehind military and paramilitary police deelop-ment.

As with the deelopment o military orces thetactical and operational requirements o localpolice are not just ends-in-themseles. Rather,they are means to stimulate policies and proce-

dures within the Ministry o Interior and Ministryo Justice. Again, as was the case with the deelop-ment o military orces, partnerships are ital. Noone headquarters can ulll the broad range orequirements associated with police and enorce-ment systems deelopment. In Iraq, two policepartnerships proed most important.

First, while MNSTC-I ocused on the ministe-rial leels, the MNC-Is Military Police Brigadeproided the embedded trainers and adisors atthe tactical and operational leels, either by using

military police, by using contracted ciilian policeproessionals, or some combination o each.Together, MNSTC-I and MNC-I proided thestation-to-ministry coherence necessary or theset o enorcement systems depicted in table si tobegin to emerge.

This coherence was not present, howeer, at thestart o the Surges counteroensie. Initially,

Leadership/Management

ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Patrolling

Investigations

Apprehension

Incarceration

Adjudication

Logistics

Facilities

Forensics

Training

Internal Affairs

TABlE 6 - ENFORcEmENT ANd SUPPORT SySTEmS


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INSTITUTE FOR THESTUDY o WARMilitary Analysis and Education

for Civilian Leaders

accelerate combat power (dubik)

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