admin round 4

8/7/2019 Admin Round 4

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/admin-round-4 1/35

Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotac. Form of and Promulgation of Judgment

INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES,INC.

107 PHIL 297

BAUTISTA ANGELO; Apr 29, 1957NATUREPetition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS- A complaint was filed by petitioner alleging thatrespondent has engaged in unfair labor practice- Hearings were conducted by the hearingexaminer, Atty. Emiliano Tabigne, at which bothparties, represented by counsel, appeared.-

After the presentation of the evidence, thehearing examiner rendered his report stating thatthe charge of unfair labor practice has not been

substantiated by the evidence and recommendingits dismissal. He also found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause.- The court approved the hearing examiner'srecommendation and rendered the following order:

Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommendsthe dismissal of this case on the ground thatthe evidence by the complainant did notsupport the charges of unfair labor practice.The facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner'sdated May 16, 1955.After a perusal of the record of the case, theCourt finds no sufficient justification formodifying said recommendation, findings andconclusions, and consequently, this case ishereby dismissed.SO ORDERED.

- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,which was denied by the court en banc.- Hence this petition for review.- It is contended that the aforequoted order runscounter to the Constitution which provides that"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it isbased" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35,Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which providesthat a court decision shall state "clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it isbased." And the claim is made in view of the fact

that the order does not contain either a discussionof the evidence or any finding of fact based on saidevidence, which counsel claims does not meet therequirements of the law and the Constitution.

ISSUEWON the Court of Industrial Relations can issue anorder dismissing a case without stating the factsand the law support thereof.

HELDYES- The order, it is true, does not make its owndiscussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court issatisfied with the report of its examiner or refereewhich already contains a full discussion of theevidence and the findings of fact based thereon.The situation differs if the court disagrees with thereport in which case it should state the reasons forits disagreement. If it is in full accord with thereport, it is purposeless to repeat what the refereeor examiner has already found in it.- Such is the present situation. The court approvedthe report of the hearing examiner "after a perusalof the record of the case." This presupposes that ithas examined the evidence and found nojustification for modifying his findings andconclusions. This is a substantial compliance withthe law.- When the Court of Industrial Relations refers acase to a commissioner for investigation, report,and recommendation, and at such investigationthe parties were duly represented by counsel,heard or at least given an opportunity to be heard,the requirement of due process has been satisfied,even if the court failed to set the report for

hearing, and a decision on the basis of such report,with the other evidence of the case, is a decisionwhich meets the requirement of a fair and openhearing.Disposition The order appealed from wasaffirmed.

SERRANO v PSC24 SCRA 867

FERNANDO; Aug 30, 1968

NATUREPetition for review of a decision of the PublicService Commission.

FACTS- Serrano filed an application with the PublicService Commission requesting authority tooperate a taxicab automobile service withinthe City of Manila and from said city to anyplace in Luzon open to motor vehicle trafficand vice versa. Fifty units of taxicabs wereto be used.- Serrano was a public service bus operator inthe City of Manila and was the holder of several certificates of public convenience.- His application was heard by AssociateCommissioner Panganiban. Serranocompleted the presentation of his evidence,but the oppositors and no evidence waspresented to rebut his claims as to hisqualification and financial capacity. ThePublic Service Commission denied application- A motion for reconsideration was filed anddenied by the PSC.- Serrano alleged that the Public ServiceCommission erred in failing to make astatement of facts as to each case regardingthe qualification and financial ability of theapplicant and the other factors constitutingthe criterion used as basis in granting theapplication, in whole or in part, on the onehand, and dismissing or denying theapplication on the other. He relies on theconstitutional provision that no decision shallbe rendered by any court of record withoutexpressing clearly and distinctly the factsand the law on which it is based.

ISSUE

WON the denial of the PSC of Serrano’s petitionwas correct

HELDNORatio Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the PublicService Commission, should, in all controversialquestions, render its decision in such a mannerthat the parties to the proceeding can know thevarious issues involved, and the reasons for thedecisions rendered.Reasoning- The obligation to state clearly and distinctly thefacts and the law on which the decision is based isincumbent on a court of record. The Public Service

Commission is not a court of record within the

80



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotameaning of the above constitutional provision.- The PSC is not a judicial tribunal and its functionsare limited and administrative in nature. The PSCis not a court (citing Dagdag vs. PSC and FilipinoBus Co. vs Philippine Railway ).- It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusionof the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies thesummary disposition of petitioner's application inthe manner followed by respondent Public ServiceCommission.- In Ang Tibay v. Court , speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations, which is likewise anadministrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicialpowers like the PSC, the Court made clear thatwhile it (the CIR) is "free from the rigidity of certainprocedural requirements," it does not mean "thatit can, in justiciable cases coming before it,entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental andessential requirement of due process.”- The failure to respect such cardinal primary rightof petitioner to have his application decided insuch a manner as to inform him not only of theissues involved but the reasons for the decision,which necessarily would likewise require a findingof facts, cannot receive judicial approval.- The denial of Serrano’s petition was plain andpalpable error. There is a need then to remand thematter to the Public Service Commission so that itcould consider the evidence and discharge thefunction committed to it by law. Only after it hasrendered its decision setting forth the facts onwhich it is based does the power of review on thepart of this Court come into play.Disposition Decision set aside, case remanded toPSC.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vCAMPOSANO, et al.

G.R. No. 157684PANGANIBAN; Apr 27, 2005

NATUREPetition for Review

FACTS-Camposano was the Finance and Mgt Officer,Agustin was an Accountant , and Perez was theActing Supply Officer of Dept of Health NCR (DOH-NCR)

- a complaint was filed before the DOH Resident

Ombudsman against Dir. Majarais, Acting AdminOfficer Cabrera, and respondents, for an allegedanomalous purchase by DOH-

NCR of 1,500 bottlesof Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vit B Complex andFolic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00-the Resident Ombudsman submitted aninvestigation report to the Sec of Healthrecommending the filing of a formal administrativecharge. Sec of Health filed a formal charge againstthe respondents and their co-respondents forGrave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA3019.-Exec Sec Ruben Torres issued AO 298 creating anad-hoc committee to investigate theadministrative case filed against the DOH-NCRemployees. The said AO was indorsed to thePresidential Commission Against Graft andCorruption (PCAGC)-the PCAGC took over the investigation from theDOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolutionfinding Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin,and Perez guilty as charged and recommended toPres Ramos that they be dismissed fromgovernment service.-Pres Ramos issued AO 390 finding Majarais guiltyand dismissed from service and remanded recordsof case to Sec of Health for appropriate action.-Sec of Health issued an Order disposing of thecase against respondents and Cabrera. Thedispositive portion said: pursuant to theResolution rendered by the PCAGC, respondentsCamposano, Cabrera, Agustin, Perez are herebydismissed from the service.-Respondents filed MFR of the said Order. Sec of Health denied. They filed appeal w/ the CSC. CSCdenied. Respondents went to the CA.-CA held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over

administrative complaints pertained only topresidential appointees. Thus, the Commissionhad no power to investigate the charges againstrespondents. Moreover, in simply and completely

relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of

health failed to comply with administrative due

process.

ISSUEWON the decision of Sec of Health was valid

HELDNO- Administrative due process requires that, prior toimposing disciplinary sanctions

,the disciplining

authority must make an independent assessment

of the facts and the law. On its face, a decisionimposing administrative sanctions must show thebases for its conclusions. While the investigationof a case may be delegated to and conducted byanother body or group of officials, the discipliningauthority must nevertheless weigh the evidencegathered and indicate the applicable law. In thismanner, the respondents would be informed of thebases for the sanctions and thus be able toprepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedureis part of the sporting idea of fair play in ademocracy.-Due process in administrative proceedingsrequires compliance with the following cardinalprinciples: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing,which includes the right to present one’s case andsubmit supporting evidence, must be observed;(2) the tribunal must consider the evidencepresented; (3) the decision must have some basisto support itself; (4) there must be substantialevidence; (5) the decision must be rendered onthe evidence presented at the hearing, or at leastcontained in the record and disclosed to theparties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, thetribunal must have acted on its own considerationof the law and the facts of the controversy andmust not have simply accepted the views of asubordinate; and (7) the decision must berendered in such manner that respondents wouldknow the reasons for it and the various issuesinvolved.-The CA correctly ruled that administrative dueprocess had not been observed in the presentfactual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixthrequisite is equally evident from the healthsecretary’s Order dismissing the respondents. Thedecision of Secretary Reodica should have

contained a factual finding and a legal assessmentof the controversy to enable respondents to knowthe bases for their dismissal and thereafterprepare their appeal intelligently, if they sodesired.-To support its position, petitioner cites AmericanTobacco Co. v. Director of Patents. However, thiscase merely authorized the delegation of thepower to investigate, but not the authority toimpose sanctions. Verily, in requiring thedisciplining authority to exercise its own judgmentand discretion in deciding a case, AmericanTobacco supports the present respondents’ cause.In that case, the petitioners objected to theappointment of hearing officers and sought the

personal hearing of their case by the disciplining

81



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaauthority. The Court, however, sustained the rightto delegate the power to investigate, as long asthe adjudication would be made by the decidingauthority.- (Solicitor General insists that respondents areguilty of the charges and deserve dismissal fromthe service. Suffice it to stress that the issue inthis case is not the guilt of respondents, but solelydue process. Guilt cannot be pronounced norpenalty imposed, unless due process is firstobserved. )Disposition Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO v THEDIRECTOR OF PATENTS

67 SCRA 287ANTONIO; Oct. 14, 1975

FACTS:- petitioners are challenging the validity of Rule

168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before thePhilippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" asamended, authorizing the Director of Patents todesignate any ranking official of said office to hear"inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewiseprovides that "all judgments determining themerits of the case shall be personally and directlyprepared by the Director and signed by him."These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or tradename, interference proceeding instituted for thepurpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name orservice-mark, and cancellation of registration of atrade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent

Office.- Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.166 ), the Director of Patents is vested withjurisdiction over opposition, interference andcancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise,the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases containsa similar provision, thus:

168. Original jurisdiction over inter partesproceeding. - The Director of Patents shallhave original jurisdiction over i

nter partesproceedings. In the event that the PatentOffice should be provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have theoriginal jurisdiction over these cases, insteadof the Director. In the case that the Examiner

of Interferences takes over the originaljurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, hisfinal decision subject to appeal to the Directorof Patents within three months of the receiptof notice of decisions. Such appeals shall begoverned by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11,12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rulesof Court insofar as said sections are applicableand appropriate, and the appeal fee shall beP25.00.

- The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases weredrafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.- Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with theapproval of the Secretary of Agriculture andCommerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 toread as follows:

168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partesproceedings. - The Director of Patents shallhave original jurisdiction overinter partesproceedings, [In the event that the PatentOffice is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then havethe original jurisdiction over these cases,instead of the Director. In the case that theExaminer of Interferences takes over theoriginal jurisdiction over inter partesproceedings, his final decisions shall besubject to appeal to the Director of Patentswithin three months of the receipt of noticedecision. Such appeals shall be governed bySections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofaras said sections are applicable andappropriate, and the appeal fee shall be[P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in thePhilippine Patent Office under this Title shallbe heard before the Director of Patents, anyhearing officer, or any ranking officialdesignated by the Director, but all judgmentsdetermining the merits of the case shall bepersonally and directly prepared by theDirector and signed by him. (Emphasissupplied.)

- In accordance with the amended Rule, theDirector of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically,Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, RusticoCasia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondentsherein.- Petitioners filed their objections to the authority

of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging

that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and voidbecause under the law the Director mustpersonally hear and decide inter partes cases. Saidobjections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition formandamus, to compel The Director of Patents topersonally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

ISSUE:WON the amendment of the rule is illegal and voidas it should be the Director who must personallyhear and decide inter partes cases.

HELD:NO.- The power conferred upon an administrativeagency to which the administration of a statute isentrusted to issue such regulations and orders asmay be deemed necessary or proper in order tocarry out its purposes and provisions may be anadequate source of authority to delegate aparticular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.- The nature of the power and authority entrustedto The Director of Patents suggests that theaforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relationto Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so asto give the aforesaid official the administrativeflexibility necessary for the prompt andexpeditious discharge of his duties in theadministration of said laws. As such officer, he isrequired, among others, to determine the questionof priority in patent interference proceedings,decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsedpatent, cancellations of patents under Republic ActNo. 165, inter partes proceedings such asoppositions,

claims of interference,

cancellation

cases under the Trade-mark Law and othermatters in connection with the enforcement of theaforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in viewof the magnitude of his responsibility, to requirehim to hear personally each and every casepending in his Office. This would leave him littletime to attend to his other duties. The remedy is afar wider range of delegations to subordinateofficers.- Thus, while the power to decide resides solely inthe administrative agency vested by law, this doesnot preclude a delegation of the power to hold ahearing on the basis of which the decision of theadministrative agency will be made.

82



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota- The rule that requires an administrative officer toexercise his own judgment and discretion does notpreclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him thefacts, on the basis of which the officer makes hisdecisions. It is sufficient that the judgment anddiscretion finally exercised are those of the officerauthorized by law. Neither does due process of lawnor the requirements of fair hearing require thatthe actual taking of testimony be before the sameofficer who will make the decision in the case. Aslong as a party is not deprived of his right topresent his own case and submit evidence insupport thereof, and the decision is supported bythe evidence in the record, there is no questionthat the requirements of due process and fair trialare fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concernedas the actual decision remains with and is made bysaid officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "givethe substance of a hearing, which is for thepurpose of making determinations upon evidencethe officer who makes the determinations mustconsider and appraise the evidence which justifiesthem."- In the case at bar, while the hearing officer maymake preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases,the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issuesand questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that thepoint involved is procedural and not jurisdictional,petitioners have not shown in what manner theyhave been prejudiced by the proceedings.Disposition Petition is dismissed

ALBERT v GANGAN353 SCRA 673

BUENA; March 06, 2001

NATUREPetition for certiorari

FACTS- Petitioner Ramon Albert, president of the NationalHome Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC) approvedloans taken out to finance several projects inpursuance of its Community Mortgage Program

(CMP), a low-cost home financing scheme. One of

the projects under this program was the AMAKOproject for which P36,796,711.55 was released andapproved by petitioner.- Upon petitioner’s instruction, an inspection of thesaid project was conducted and it was found thatthe project was 3 months in arrears in theiramortization. Because of this finding, petitionerordered other investigations be conducted. Afterinvestigation, the CoA Resident Auditor of NHMFCdisallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO proj. forthe following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary requirements/non-complying ordefective documents as required under NHMFCCorporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b)irregular/excessive expenditures per COA CircularNo. 85-55A- Months later, petitioner filed with theOmbudsman a letter-complaint against hissubordinate employees who appeared to beresponsible for the fraud with respect to theAMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner also filed a civilcase for sum of money, annulment, damages andattorney’s fees with preliminary attachment,against SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Palay &Development Foundation, Inc., and other personsresponsible for the misrepresentation, tortious andfraudulent acts in connection with the loan grantedto AMAKO project.- The Commission on Audit (COA), afterinvestigation, later found petitioner as among thepersons liable for the amount representingpayment of loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO.The COA disallowed the plan payment because itfound the payment irregular and an excessiveexpenditure, and held petitioner primarily liablepursuant to sec. 103 of PD 1445, which states,“expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law orregulations shall be a personal liability of theofficial or employee found to be directlyresponsible therefor.”- In his MFR, which was later denied, Albert’sdefense was that he cannot and should not be heldpersonally liable for the amount of the loan as heacted only in the performance of his official dutiesand that there was no clear showing of bad faith,malice or gross negligence on his part.- The COA in dismissing said MFR stated thus:Albert himself was the final approving authority of the transaction in question and that theofficers/employees who processed the same weredirectly under his supervision. He could have

conclusively determined the validity of a

transaction involving such a large amount. Albert’sclaim of good faith and exercise of due diligenceare disputable presumptions, and thesepresumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an offense, as wherethere exists the fact that loss of government fundsresulted from official action. Lastly, it stated thatSec3. (9) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) declares tobe unlawful the act of “entering, in behalf of thegovernment, into a contract or transactionmanifestly or grossly disadvantageous to thesame, whether or not the public officer profited orwill profit thereby.- Aggrieved, petitioner filed this case contendingthat he can’t be held personally liable for theamount of P36, 796,711.55 representing the loanproceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COAdecisions don’t have any findings that he hasknowingly participated in the alleged fraudulenttransaction. He claims that there is no clearshowing that he acted in bad faith, with malice, orgross negligence when he approved the loantransaction.

ISSUEWON COA committed grave abuse of discretionwhen it held petitioner personally liable for thesubject disallowance.

HELDYES.Ratio The decision of a government agency muststate the facts and the law on which the decision isbased.Reasoning The assailed decision failed to mentionpetitioner’s direct participation in the fraudulentscheme. It merely held that petitioner beimmediately and primarily held responsible for thedisallowance, for the simple reason that, as theapproving officer, any transaction presented tohim for approval is subject to his discretion. TheCOA decision merely stated conclusions of law.Facts and circumstances (the why’s, what’s andhow’s of the disallowance), were patently missing,inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot justperform its constitutional function of disallowingexpenditures of govt funds at sheer discretion.There has to be factual basis why the expenditureis alleged to be fraudulent or why there was amisrepresentation. Liability depends upon thewrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of govt agency. The COA even

mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes

83



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaliability for a grossly disadvantageous contractentered into by a govt functionary but as to whyand how the disbursement of funds in this casewas considered disadvantageous must be dulysupported by findings of facts.Disposition Decision of COA REVERSED and SETASIDE.

AROCHA VS VIVOGR No.24844

REYES, J.B.L; Oct 26, 1967

FACTS- Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the ManilaInternational Airport together with four otherpersons supposedly his father (Jose Gatchalian), anaunt and two brothers, and sought entry as Filipinocitizen. Not satisfied with his papers, theimmigration officer referred the case of Pedro tothe Special Board of Inquiry. This body, after duehearing, rendered decision admitting Pedro and

seven others, as Filipino citizens.- Pedro Gatchalian was issued an identificationcertificate by the immigration authorities, attestingto his admission as citizen of the Philippines- the Secretary of Justice, as department head,issued a memorandum order directing theImmigration Commissioners to review all caseswhere entry was allowed on the ground that theentrant was a citizen of the Philippines.- the Board of Commissioners reversed thedecision of the Board of Special Inquiry andordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian forbeing improperly documented. Pedro wasaccordingly. But, although the warrant for hisexclusion was issued in July, 1962, Pedro

Gatchalian was taken into custody by theimmigration authorities only June 6, 1965.- Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro, petitionedthe CFI for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming thatthe detention of Pedro, a Filipino by theImmigration Commissioner is violative of saidpetitioner's constitutional rights. Respondentsimmigration officials countered that the exclusionorder was issued pursuant to the decision of theBoard of Commissioner, finding Pedro to havefailed in proving the allegation that he is a Filipinocitizen.- In its decision, the court sustained petitioner'stheory that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond

the prescribed one-year period. Holding that thedecision of the Special Board of Inquiry, adjmittingthe Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian hadalready become final, the Court ordered hisimmediate release from detention and enjoinedrespondents, permanently, from arresting,deporting and otherwise depriving of his liberty.On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issuedby the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released fromcustody of the immigration authorities at 9 o'clockin the evening of August 3, 1965.- The cause of petitioner and appellantCommissioner of Immigration in this Court hingeson the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Commissionersreversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry. Forif, indeed, the reversal was made on July 20, 1962,as asserted by Pedro, instead of July 6, 1962, asmaintained by Vivo (the Commissioner of Immigration), then the admission on July 6, 1961by the Special Board of Inquiry of the fact of Pedro's Philippine citizenship would have becomefinal and, therefore his detention by theimmigration authorities would be unlawful.- pursuant to Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act613, as amended by RA 503, the decision of theBoard of Special Inquiry shall become final unlessreversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners, or in the absence of an appeal,unless reversed by the Board of Commissionersafter a review by it, motu proprio, of the entireproceedings within one year from thepromulgation of the said decision.

ISSUES1.WON the decision of the Board of Commissionersreversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry wasmade within the one-year prescriptive period.2. WON the decision of the Inquiry Board hadbecome non-reviewable since 1961 because of itsconfirmation by the majority of the precedingBoard of Commissioners.

HELD1. YES.Ratio The mere fact of a retyping of dates on theface of the documents, without further evidence of record, does not suffice to convict the threemembers of the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners of maliciously antedating theirdecision, considering the presumption of regularityin official actuations, and the serious implicationsof the charge, which amounts to no less than a

falsification of official documents. Such an offensecannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearlyproved beyond reasonable doubt. The operativedate of the Commissioners' action is that when theresolution of exclusion was voted and adopted bythem as a Board, regardless of the date when thedecision in extenso was prepared, written andsigned.Reasoning- the decision of the Board of Commissioners, thenotification to appellee's counsel that suchdecision was rendered, and the warrant of exclusion, bear the date July 6, 1962, or within oneyear from the reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. It is contended, however, that in allof these documents, the date of promulgation of the decision appeared to have been originallywritten as July 20, 1962, but the number "20" waserased and superimposed by "6".- Vivo insists that these erasures and substitutionswere corrections made only to rectify clericalmistakes.- the accusation of Pedro is negatived by theofficial minutes of the Board's proceedings, whichclearly show that the resolution to exclude wasadopted on July 6, 1962. No alteration in datesappears in these. In fact, the alterations observedare susceptible of the explanation that the dateJuly 20 was originally placed by the stenographeror typist because it was then that the reasonedand extended decision was typewritten in finalform, but that it was corrected to July 6, the date itwas voted, because the decision in extenso mustrelate back to the day the resolution to excludewas actually adopted.- the Court below erred in finding and declaringthat the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry inthe case of petitioner-appellee had become finaland unreviewable, and that its review andrevocation by the Commissioners of Immigrationwas null and void.2. NO.Ratio Individual action by members of a boardplainly renders nugatory the purpose of itsconstitution as a Board. The Legislature organizedthe Board of Commissioners precisely in order thatthey should deliberate collectively and in orderthat their views and ideas should be exchangedand examined before reaching a conclusion. Thepowers and duties of boards and commissions maynot be exercised by the individual membersseparately. Their acts are official only when doneby the members convened in session, upon a

84



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaconcurrence of at least a majority and with at leasta quorum present. Where the action needed is notof the individuals composing a board but of theofficial body, the members must be together andact in their official capacity, and the action shouldappear on the records of the board.Reasoning It is pointed out by Pedro that twomembers of the board in reference to said decisionhad marked "Noted" over their own signatures,while only the third Commissioner made of recordhis adverse opinion. The former ImmigrationCommissioners appeared to have actedindividually in this particular instance and not as aBoard. It is shown by the different dates affixed totheir signatures that they did not actually meet todiscuss and vote on the case. This was officiallymade to record by the Secretary of Justice in hisMemorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962,wherein he stated that for the past several years,the Board of Commissioners of Immigration hasnot met collectively to discuss and deliberate inthe cases coming before it.- Secondly, the aforementioned MemorandumOrder, issued in the exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Department Head,expressly declares that the public interest sorequiring, it is ordered that all decisions purportingto have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from or on review motuproprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry,are set aside and this nullification included thealleged 1961 decision.Dispostion decision and order of CFI reversed,nullified and set aside.

NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. NO. 24800CASTRO; May 27 1968

FACTS- On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three otherpersons, supposedly his widowed mother (DoloresNeria) and two younger brothers (Felix and ManuelNeria), arrived at the Manila International Airportfrom Hongkong on board a Cathay Pacific Airwaysplane. The immigration inspector at the airport,not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documentsand those of his companions upon primaryinspection thereof, referred the matter of their

admission to the Board of Special Inquiry forinvestigation "to determine filiation and paternityto a Filipino citizen". Accordingly, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on July14, 1961, at which time the petitioner offered oraland documentary evidence to support his claim foradmission as a Filipino citizen After the conclusionof the investigation, the said board on August 2,1961 deliberated on the case and unanimouslyvoted for petitioner's admission. The board on thesame date rendered its decision, declaring DoloresNeria a Filipino citizen, and the petitioner a Filipinocitizen as he is an illegitimate son of Dolores, andallowing his admission into the Philippines. Thiswritten decision was subsequently submitted tothe members of the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners. The Immigration authorities issuedIdentification Certificate 16306 to the petitioner,attesting that he "was admitted as a citizen of thePhilippines" per decision of the Board of SpecialInquiry No. 1 dated August 2, 1961.- On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justiceissued Memorandum Order 9 (exh. 7), directingthat[i]t appearing that for the past several years, theBoard of Commissioners of Immigration has notmet collectively to discuss and deliberate on thecases coming before it,… it is hereby ordered thatall decisions purporting to have been rendered bythe Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or onreview motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is directed to review, inaccordance with Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, alldecisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admittingentry of aliens into the country and givepreference to all cases where entry has beenpermitted on the ground that the entrant is acitizen of the Philippines, following the principlelaid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shallbe upon such alien to establish that he is notsubject to exclusion' and the ruling of thisDepartment that "

Citizenship is a status of

privilege, power and honor of inestimable value.

When doubts exist concerning a grant of it, they

should be resolved in favor of the Governmentagainst the claimant" - In compliance with the above directive, the Boardof Immigration Commissioners,

proceeded toreview motu proprio the entire proceedings hadbefore the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative

to the petitioner's case and that of his supposedrelatives. A hearing officer of the Bureau of Immigration was directed to conduct aninvestigation of the entire proceedings of and theevidence presented before the Board of SpecialInquiry No. 1. On the basis of a memorandum of the hearing officer, the new Board of ImmigrationCommissioners found that the petitioner

had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as

a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the

decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and

ordered that the petitioner be excluded from thePhilippines as an alien not properly documentedfor admission and be returned to the port fromwhence he came or to the country of which he is anational. The petitioner moved for areconsideration of said decision. This motion wasdenied by the new Board.- The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition praying the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration and the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners from arresting and expelling him,and prohibit them from taking any further steps oractions contrary to the decision rendered by theBoard of Special Inquiry No. 1. This petition wasgiven due course, and a writ of preliminaryinjunction was issued as prayed for. But thispetition was dismissed.- On April 30, 1965 the present petition for habeascorpus was filed, the petitioner claiming that therespondent's agents picked him up at Rosario St.,Manila, in the evening of the previous April 23 onthe supposed claim that he was not properlydocumented for admission as a Filipino citizenwhen he entered the Philippines; and that sincethen he "has been unlawfully and illegallyconfined, restrained and deprived of his liberty inthe Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in theEngineering Island, Manila." On the same date, thelower court required the respondent to bring thepetitioner before the court on May 3, 1965 at 8:30O'clock in the morning. The clerk of court issuedthe corresponding writ of habeas corpus directingthe respondent to submit his return. The latter'swritten return of May 6, 1965 states, among otherthings, that the petitioner was under lawfulcustody on a valid process commanding hisexclusion from the Philippines and ordering hisreturn to the port where he came from or to thecountry of which he is a national.- On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed thepetition stating that the petitioner is legally

85



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotadetained on a warrant issued by the respondentCommissioner of Immigration." On July 20, 1965the lower court set aside its decision of June 17,1965, and, on the same date, rendered anamended decision completely reversing its decision of June 17, granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. The lower court held that "the decisionrendered by the new Board of Commissioners isnull and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no administrative action being possible because thequestion involved in this case is purely a legalquestion, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application in thiscase." On July 22 the clerk of court issued thecorresponding writ of habeas corpus .

ISSUEWON the decision of the new Board of ImmigrationCommissioner is null and void for having beenrendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, orwith grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613

HELDYESRATIO Comm. Act 613, as amended, provides inpart that :“[t]he decision of any two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail andshall be final unless reversed on appeal by theBoard of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, inthe absence of an appeal, unless reversed by theBoard of Commissioners after a review by it, motupropio of the entire proceedings within one yearfrom the promulgation of said decision....”- The resolution of this issue, in turn, dependsupon the determination of the date when thedecision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 waspromulgated, August 2, 1961 when it was actuallyrendered, or September 4, 1961 when thepetitioner was actually notified thereof and a copyreceived by his counsel. The date of promulgation is important. It is from that date that the one-yearperiod commenced within which the Board of Immigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the entire proceedings of Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. - According to the Solicitor General, the correctdate of promulgation is September 4, 1961,because under the Immigration Rules andRegulations, the decision of a Board of SpecialInquiry "shall be rendered in writing",5 and undersection 27 (b), supra, the written decision "shall be

promulgated"; that the words "rendition" (from"rendered") and "promulgation" (from"promulgated") connote two separate and distinctacts required to be accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry, for rendition is the date when ajudge signs his decision and files it with the clerkof court, whereas promulgation is the date whensuch decision is published, officially announced, ismade known to the public, or delivered to the clerkof court for filing, coupled with notice to theparties or to their counsel; and that in this case,rendition was accomplished on August 2, 1961when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concludedits hearing on the petitioner's case, deliberatedthereon, voted for his admission into thePhilippines and rendered its written decision, andpromulgation was accomplished on September 4,1961 when the petitioner was actually notified of the decision, copy of which was received by hiscounsel.- No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words "rendition" and "promulgation" would conveydifferent meanings. This Court defined promulgation as "the delivery of the decision tothe Clerk of Court for filing and publication". Theword "promulgate" was viewed by the majority inPeople vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry made by the clerk of a judgment or order in thebook of entries of judgments made by said clerk.- The petitioner's argument, at all events, iswithout merit. Section 27 (b), supra, provides thatproceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry itsappraisal of a case on the merits, the result of itsdeliberation, its decision and notice thereof to analien, and the time when an appeal may bebrought therefrom "shall be conducted underrules of procedure to be prescribed by theCommissioner of Immigration."- In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date whenthe Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded itshearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312-C),deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as acitizen of the Philippines. August 2, 1961 was alsothe date when the decision in extenso wasrendered. That date and not September 4, 1961,therefore, is the date of promulgation of thedecision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1,which decision should "prevail and shall be final ...unless reversed by the Board of Commissionersafter a review by it, motu proprio of the entireproceedings within one year from thepromulgation of said decision."10 Computing theone-year period from August 2, 1961, the Board of

Immigration Commissioners had until August 2,1962 within which to review the proceedings motuproprio.- The case of the petitioner was included in theagenda of the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners for review motu propio for July 24,1962. The case was referred to the Immigrationhearing officer, who, on July 30, 1962, submittedhis memorandum to the said board. The case wasagain included in the agenda of the said board forAugust 2, 1962, the date it was consideredsubmitted for decision. The minutes of the meetingof the Board of Immigration Commissionerspresented by its Secretary Pio Noche and read intothe records of this case, however, reveal that thepetitioner's case was actually acted upon anddecided, not on August 2, 1962, as the decisionand the warrant of exclusion would tend to show,but on August 8, 1962- The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners and, the testimony of its Secretaryshow that as late on August 8, 1962, the newBoard of Commissioners was, only deliberating onthe case of the petitioner. The admission of theSecretary of the new Board of Commissioners thatthe case of the petitioner was not acted upon onAugust 2, 1962, shows that the alteration of thedate of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2,1962 was deliberate. The fact that the case of thepetitioner was submitted to the new Board of Commissioners for its resolution on August 2,1962, is no excuse for ante-dating its decisionwhich was actually rendered after that date. OnAugust 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because havingactually deliberated on the case of the petitioneron August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.- The alteration of the true date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners, made uponinstruction of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, is revealing: it shows that therespondent Commissioner knew that the one-yearperiod was to be computed from August 2, 1961; itshows also that he knew that if the decision of theBoard of Special Inquiry No. 1 had to be reversed,the new Board of Commissioners had to act notlater than August 2, 1962.As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberatedon and voted for the reversal of the decision of the

86



Administrative Law A2010 Dean CarlotaBoard of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motuproprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-yearperiod fixed by section 27 (b), supra. The saiddecision of the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners, and the warrant of exclusionissued on the strength of such decision, aretherefore, as correctly found by the lower court,null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since thedecision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 bythat time had already become "final."- The respondent also contends that thepetitioner's petition for habeas corpus wasprematurely filed, because he did not first appealthe decision of the Board of ImmigrationCommissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, bylaw, is vested with power of control andsupervision over the said Board. We have alreadyheld that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where thequestion in dispute is purely a legal one", or wherethe controverted act is "patently illegal" or wasperformed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrativenature is to be or can be done" thereon.DISPOSITION Decision affirmed from affirmed

GO YU TAK WAI v VIVOG.R. No. L-22257

AQUINO; May 25, 1977

NATUREAppeal from the decision of CFI/RTC.

FACTS- The controversy arose when Go Yu Tak Wai (Mrs.GO) applied with the Bureau of Immigration for

admission as a returning resident. It appears thatMrs. GO arrived in the Philippines after 20 years of absence from the country. The Bureau’s Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) concluded that Mrs. GOsatisfactorily proved her right to admission as areturning resident. The decision of BSI waspromulgated on March 27, 1962. It was reviewedmotu proprio on March 11, 1963 by the Board of Commissioners (BOC). On said March 11th, BOCresolved to reverse the BSI’s decision (and, thus,to exclude Mrs. GO).- However, BOC's decision in extenso (extendedopinion) was not immediately rendered andpromulgated. It appears that the draft of the BOCdecision was signed by the Commissioners during

the period August 13-26. The decision wasmailed on August 27th to Mrs. GO, who receivedthe same the following day. Upon Mrs. GO’scomplaint, CFI held that BOC’s decision was voidbecause it was promulgated after the statutoryone-year period.

ISSUEWhether or not a resolution of BOC which reversedthe decision of BSI and adopted within one yearfrom the promulgation of BSI’s decision issufficient

HELDYES.REASONING BOC is empowered to reverse motuproprio the decision of BSI within one year frompromulgation of said decision. The PhilippineImmigration Act of 1940, Commonwealth Act No.613, as amended provides:

SEC. 27.x x x(b) A board of special inquiry shall haveauthority (1) to determine whether an alienseeking to enter or land in the Philippinesshall be allowed to enter or land or shall beexcluded… The decision of… the [BSI]…shall be final unless reversed on appeal bythe Board of Commissioners… or, in theabsence of an appeal, unless reversed bythe Board of Commissioners after areview by it, motu proprio of the entireproceedings within one year from thepromulgation of said decision… Thedecision [of the BSI] shall be promulgated…not later than two days from the date of thedeliberation… [T]he Commissioner of Immigration… may grant an extension of time if he considers it necessary.(c) An alien excluded by [BSI] or adissenting member thereof may appeal tothe [BOC], whose decision in the case shallbe final. The decision on appeal shall be putin writing and promulgated not less thanseven days from the time the case issubmitted for decision. xxx

- This Court had already held that “the operativedate of the Commissioners' action is thatwhen the resolution of exclusion was votedand adopted by them as a Board, regardlessof the date when the decision in extenso wasprepared, written and signed" because "thedecision in extenso must relate back to the

day when the resolution to exclude wasadopted” (citing, inter alia, Arocha vs. Vivo andNeria vs. Commissioner of Immigration).Consequently, the Commissioners were justified inusing March 11, 1963 as the date of their writtendecision although it was actually drafted on August13th and mailed to Mrs. GO on August 27th. Thedecision related back to the date when theCommissioners deliberated on the decision of BSIand resolved to reverse it.- Section 27(b) specifies that the decision of BSI"shall be promulgated… not later than two daysfrom the date of the deliberation". The absence of such a requirement with respect to the decision of BOC supports the view that such decision need notbe promulgated within the one-year period. Itsuffices that BOC should review the decisionof BSI and deliberate upon it within one yearfrom promulgation of BSI's decision and thatthe minutes of their deliberation should reflect theaction which they took within the said statutoryperiod.- Moreover, section 27(c) expressly requires thatthe decision of BOC in case of an appeal from thedecision of BSI should "be put in writing andpromulgated not less than seven days from thetime the case is submitted for decision". Incontrast, no such requirement is provided for insection 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners'decision in case they motu proprio review thedecision of BSI.Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reversethe trial court's decision, the same is consideredaffirmed. [only 6 Justices (Fernando, Makasiar,Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin, JJ. and thewriter) voted for reversal. J. Teehankee filed adissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice(Castro) and J. Antonio concurred. J. Barredo alsodissented.]

BARREDO, J., dissenting:The operative date of the decision of BOC is thedate of promulgation, if not the date of notice tothe party aggrieved.

TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting:- The Act's provisions as well as public policysupport a construction that requires that aresolution or decision of BOC on a review motuproprio must be in writing and promulgated withdue notice on the party affected within the one-year period.

87



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota- Section 27 (b) provides that "the decision [of BSI]shall be promulgated… not later than two daysfrom the date of deliberation." Section 27 (c)likewise provides for a summary period of sevendays from submittal for decision within which BOCshall put in writing and promulgate its decision onappeal. Read in context, it seems obvious that thedecision on a review motu proprio by BOCmust be no less than a decision on appeal byeither party; it must be duly put in writing andpromulgated within the more than adequate one-year period fixed by the Act.- Where the alien has appealed from an adversedecision or a dissenting BSI member has appealeda favorable decision, the applicant for admissionknows as mandated by the law that a final decisionmust be handed down within seven days fromsubmittal of the appeal for decision. Where therehas been no appeal and BOC conducts areview motu proprio of which the applicant islikely unaware, both public policy and dueprocess demand that where no adversedecision is promulgated within the one-yearperiod, the decision of BSI shall have becomefinal. (Otherwise, such one-year periodwould be an elastic period and would haveno meaning, as in this case where theappellee would have been ordered excludedby a decision of reversal promulgated 5months after the lapse of the one-yearperiod.)- Such a view is in consonance with law's policy of a definite date of fixed finality of the BSI's decisionand to reduce occasion for anomalies andirregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens and applicants for admission, under theprocedures for appeal or review motu proprioestablished by the Act.

SICHANGCO v BOARD OFCOMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-23545MAKASIAR; Nov 7, 1979

FACTS- Sy Te, whose name was changed to BenitoSichangco was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino citizen by birth in anorder dated February 19, 1960 .Sychangco ismarried to Cheng Yok Ha. Three sons were born in

China allegedly out of their marriage, namely, SiBeng, Si Son and Si Luna.- On August 28, 1961 arrived in the Philippines andsought admission claiming to be the children of Benito Sichangco. An investigation was conductedby the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the Bureauof Immigration. After hearing, the said Boardrendered a decision on September 11, 1961 (Exh.C) admitting these minors into the Philippines ascitizens thereof, being the children of thepetitioner . said decision was submitted to thethen members of the Board of Commissioners who"noted" the decision on different dates.- On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of JusticeJose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9,wherein he found "that for the past several years,the Board of Commissioners of Immigration hasnot met collectively to discuss and deliberate onthe cases coming before it," for which reason heset aside "all decisions purporting to have beenrendered by the Board of Commissioners onappeal from, or on review motu propio of,decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," anddirected the Board of Commissioners "to review inaccordance with Section 27(b) of CommonwealthAct No. 613, as amended, all decisions of theBoards of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliensinto this country and give preference to all caseswhere entry has been permitted on the groundthat the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines,following the principle laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'theburden of proof shall be upon such alien toestablish that he is not subject to exclusion ..."- Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, acommittee examined the pretended right of thesaid minors as alleged children of petitioner toadmission, and thereafter forwarded its findings tothe Commissioner of Immigration recommendingthe exclusion of said minors, the revocation of theorder declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco aFilipino citizen, and the filing of deportationproceedings against him.A copy of this decisionwas received by the minors on October 26,1962.- Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng,Si Son and Si Luna, filed a petition for prohibitionwith preliminary injunction on November 20, 1962before the Court of First Instance of Manila, toannul the decision of the Board of Commissionersof Immigration excluding the abovenamed minorsfrom the Philippines.- CFI declared that the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962,

reversing the decision of the previous Board of Commissioners dated September 11, 1961, tohave been rendered on October 26, 1962, morethan a year from the first decision, and thereforeillegal and null and void, and the injunction earlierissued was made permanent, with costs againstrespondent Board.

ISSUE:WON the notice of the BOC decision must bereceived within the 1 year period

HELDNO- The Board of Commissioners rendered onSeptember 4, 1962 its decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No, 1 datedSeptember 11, 1961, well within the one-yearperiod required by law.- It is true that the copy of the decision of theBoard of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962was sent by mail to the petitioner's minor childrenherein only on October 26, 1962, and received bythe said minors on the same date. This fact,however, does not work to vitiate said decision. Allthat the Immigration Law requires is that thedecision of reversal of the Board of Commissionersbe promulgated within one year from the renditionof the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.Notice of said decision of reversal may be senteven after the one-year period has elapsed. In thecase of Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration (L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arochavs. Vivo, supra), the Supreme Court ruled that "theoperative date of the Commissioners' action is thatwhen the resolution (of exclusion) was noted andadopted by them as a Board, regardless of thedate when the decision in extenso was prepared,written and signed," and with more reason, as inthis case, regardless of the date when suchdecision is mailed, "because the decision inextenso must relate back to the day the resolutionto exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily theextended opinion had to be posterior to the daywhen the Commissioners voted and resolved toreverse the findings of the Board of SpecialInquiry. The Secretary's certificate shows that theBoard of Immigration Commissioners acted uponnot less than eight Immigration cases (includingthat of the Gatchalians) on July 6, 1962; and it wasof course impracticable to prepare and sign fullyreasoned decisions in all these cases."

88



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPv SENDINO

233 SCRA 665KAPUNAN, J.: July 5, 1994

FACTS:- Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino enteredinto a reservation agreement with RealtyExchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-squaremeter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its purchase price.She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee onJanuary 15, 1989 and completed payment of thisfee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00.- On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVIP16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchaseprice. However, she was advised by REVI tochange her co-maker, which she agreed, asking foran extension of one month to do so.- For alleged non-compliance with the requirementof submission of the appropriate documents underthe terms of the original agreement, REVI,through its Vice-President for Marketing, informedrespondent of the cancellation of the contract onthe 31st of July 1989.- On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed acomplaint for Specific Performance against REVIwith the office of Appeals, Adjudication and LegalAffairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board (HLURB) asking that respondentbe ordered: To comply and continue with the saleof the house and lot, Block 4, Lot 17 at theRaymondville Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paranaque,Metro Manila;- This petition was amended on August 17, 1990by impleading petitioners Magdiwang RealtyCorporation (MRC) which appeared to be theregistered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No.76023.- On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority tohear and decide the complaint was challenged byREVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favorof private respondent and ordered petitioners tocontinue with the sale of the house and lot and topay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages,P5,000 as exemplary damages and P6,000 asattorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appealfrom this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALAArbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. Thedecision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to theOffice of the President, herein public respondent.

- On January 7, 1993, the public respondentrendered its decision dismissing the petitioners'appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decisionwas denied by the public respondent on January26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come beforethis Court, in this petition.

ISSUEWON the HLURB can act validly as a divisioncomposed of only 3 commissioners

HELDYes.- Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines thepowers and duties of the commission, the board isspecifically mandated to “adopt rules of procedurefor the conduct of its business” and to performsuch functions necessary for the accomplishmentof its above mentioned functions. Since nothing inthe provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 deniesor withholds the power or authority to delegateadjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot seehow the Board, for the purpose of effectivelycarrying out its administrative responsibilities andquasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body shouldbe denied the power, as a matter of practicaladministrative procedure, to constitute itsadjudicatory boards into various divisions.- After all, the power conferred upon anadministrative agency to issue rules andregulations necessary to carry out its functions hasbeen held "to be an adequate source of authorityto delegate a particular function, unless by expressprovision of the Act or by implication it has beenwithheld." The practical necessity of establishing aprocedure whereby cases are decided by three (3)Commissioners furthermore assumes greatersignificance when one notes that the HLURB, asconstituted, only has four (4) full timecommissioners and five (5) part timecommissioners to deal with all the functions,administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise,entrusted to it. - As the Office of the President noted in itsFebruary 26, 1993 Resolution denying petitioners'Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible andvery impractical to gather the four (4) full time andfive (5) part time commissioners (together) just todecide a case." Considering that its part timecommissioners act merely in an ex-officio capacity,requiring a majority of the Board to sit en banc oneach and every case brought before it would resultin an administrative nightmare.

3. Jurisdiction

FELICIANO, et al. v DIRECTOR OFPATENTS

93 Phil 113PADILLA; May 22, 1953

NATUREPetition for review order of director of patents

FACTS- An application for patent was filed with thePatent Office. Pending examination of theapplication, Albaña filed a motion to interveneclaiming that the Feliciano and Tapinio had “soldand/or bartered and assigned to him their right tocontract or deal the sale of their invention calledFel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or throughthe Corp that they were then organizing under his

direction and to fix and decide on the purchaseprice of it to at least P200,000 in installments cashand P300,000 in shares of stock of saidCorporation * * *” and praying that applicant-inventor Tapinio be compelled to sign a contractand, together with the other applicant-inventorFeliciano who had already signed it, toacknowledge it in another contract before anotary public, to have both contracts recorded inthe Patent Office and in the office of the Registerof Deeds, and that the patent for the invention beissued in his name and in the name of theinventors.- motion: denied on ground that under the PatentLaw (RA165) the Director of Patents has no

jurisdiction or power to decide the questionsubmitted to him. He then filed an amendedmotion, denied (it contended that Albaña is theassignee of inventors Feliciano and Tapinio of theundivided part interests in the invention for whosepatent is applied for.)- Dir. Of Patents denied the amended motion, onthe ground that assignment made to Albaña is notone of exclusive right to make, use and sell theelectrical contrivance for which patent is appliedfor; that it is just an authority to act as the sellingagent for the inventors of the patent, if granted,and the invention covered thereby and to receivecompensation therefor; and that not being entitledto have his name included as one of the patentees,

89



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaif patent for the invention be granted, the movanthas no right to intervene in the proceedings for thegrant of the patent.

ISSUEWON the Director of Patents erred in denying themotion

HELDNORatio Under the provisions of the Patent Law(RA165), the Director of Patents has no power andauthority to compel the applicant-inventors to dowhat the appellant is asking them to perform.What the appellant asked the Director of Patentsto do for him is essentially a judicial function whichwould require the determination or finding by acourt of competent jurisdiction as to whether therewas a meeting of the minds of the contractingparties before it could compel the applicant-inventors to perform what the appellant prays thecourt to order them to do. Aside from want of authority and power, the Director of Patents lacksthe means to make such determination and findingwhich would be necessary before he could act onthe appellant's motion.Reasoning - Despite the amendment to the 1st

motion to intervene by which he claimsassignment of the invention, still it remains thatthe alleged assignment is not of the invention butit is an agreement whereby he is to act as sellingagent for the inventors of the patent (if granted)and of the invention covered thereby and toreceive compensation therefor.- the contract clearly shows that it wasn’t anassignment of the invention and the patent appliedfor.: “We (the inventors) *** hereby declare andratify that both of us are the co-inventors and joint50-50 owners of the 'Fel-Tap Electric Meter Guard& Detector' ***. We are now organizing aCorporation under the direction of Mr. Albaña toexploit and industrialize the invention *** which wepromise hereby to sell to said Corporation with itsletter-patent *** except the Royalty Right of thesame, ***. For and in consideration of themonetary and other help that said Mr. Albaña ***has rendered and is rendering us *** we herebypromise and actually pay to Mr. Albaña ininstallments P50,000 of P200,000 purchase price***.”- Assignments of patents and inventions coveredthereby may be recorded in books and recordskept for the purpose in the Patent Office if

presented in due form; but the appellant does notask for the registration of the alleged agreementbetween him and the inventors, but prays that theDirector of Patents compel Tapinio to sign thecontract executed and signed by Feliciano andboth applicant-inventors to acknowledge it, andthen to have both documents recorded in thePatent Office and in the office of the Registrar of

Deeds.Disposition Petition is dismissed. Order isaffirmed

SYQUIA V BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (RUIZ, ENRIQUEZ,

MOSES)74 SCRA 212

TEEHANKEE; Nov 29, 1976

NATUREPetition for special civil action for certiorari

FACTS- December 1974 > Ruiz, Enriquez, Moses(respondents) filed 3 complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia(petitioner) as administrator of the South SyquiaApartments at Malate, Manila, for selling electricitywithout permit or franchise issued by the board, inthat Syquia billed Ruiz et al various specifiedamounts for their electricity consumption at theirrespective apartments for the months of May toSeptember 1974 in excess of the Meralco ratesauthorized by the board.- Syquia’s motion to dismiss the complaintsasserting that they involved contractual

obligations of Ruiz et al as apartment tenants andwere beyond the board's jurisdiction was deniedby the latter.- Syquia filed her answer, wherein she questionedthe complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of theboard as a regulatory body, since she is notengaged in the sale of electric power but merelypasses to the apartment tenants as the end-userstheir legitimate electric current bills in accordancewith their lease contracts, and their relationship iscontractual in nature. She added that the tenantsincluding Ruiz et al had no complaint under thecontractual set-up of billings for water and electricservice consumption, whereby while individualelectric meters are installed in each apartment,

Meralco billings include all consumption in the

entire compound, including the common areas,servants' quarters and elevators, the payment forwhich was advanced by Syquia and later collectedby way of reimbursement from the tenants prorata; but that Ruiz et al alone complained laterwhen on account of the energy crisis, additionalfuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco totheir billings which were likewise passed on by

Syquia to all the tenants pro rata.- August 28, 1975 > Syquia further manifested herwillingness to abide by such computations as theboard may determine to be the correct electricbilling that should be charged against Ruiz et al fortheir respective electric consumption andsubmitted pertinent records of the electricalconsumption and Meralco billings. The board insaid order however came up with its computationwhich would allow Syquia to charge Ruiz et al onlythe cost of electricity registered in their individualapartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata bySyquia for the cost of electricity consumed by alltenants in the common areas.- Syquia pointed out in her MFR that the board'scomputation would not reimburse her for the costof the electric consumption in the common areasand elevators with a resultant loss to her at theleast of P1,250.00 a month or P15,000.00 a yearand reiterated that this was a contractualobligation of the tenants over which the regulatoryboard had no jurisdiction, the board, actingthrough its Acting Chairman de Guzman deniedreconsideration and ruled that since the tenantsare already paying rentals for the use of theirrooms and for the cost of their electricity withintheir rooms, they should no longer be required topay for the extra cost of electricity in commonareas such as the elevator and the servants'quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that thecost of electricity for common areas such as theelevator and servants' quarters be shoulderedalone by the owner of the building as part of thecost for the rentals being paid by the tenants

ISSUEWON the Board of Power and Waterworks hasjurisdiction over the said case

HELDNORatio The board as a regulatory board manifestlyexceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by Ruiz et al

90



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaagainst Syquia. The board acquired no jurisdictionover Syquia’s contractual relations with Ruiz et alas her tenants, since Syquia is not engaged in apublic service nor in the sale of electricity withoutpermit or franchise. Ruiz et al’s complaintsagainst being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by thetenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in

character that is to be adjudged under theapplicable provisions of the Civil Code (not thePublic Service Act) and not by the regulatory boardwhich has no jurisdiction but by the regular courtsof general jurisdiction.Reasoning- Comment of Acting Solicitor: the regulatoryboard acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints, since Syquia does notoperate, manage or control the power plant andfurthermore, since electricity is directly anduninterruptedly supplied to the end-user, it cannotbe correctly claimed that Syquia is sellingelectricity nor can she be considered a middlemanin the electric power business.

- The dispute between Syquia the landlord and hertenants as to how much each tenant should becorrespondingly billed, for the actual electricityconsumed and as to the proportionate amounteach tenant should bear for the common facilitiesused in the apartments, if such amounts should beborne by the tenants at all, is an issue affectingmathematical computations and conditions of lease between landlord and tenant.- Under the reorganization plan effected by PD No.1 as amended by PD No. 458 issued on May 16,1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control overpublic service related to electric light, power andwaterworks utilities formerly vested in the PublicService Act were transferred to the Board of Powerand Waterworks.Disposition The orders of the board are annulledand the complaints of Ruiz et al are ordereddismissed

GO TEK v DEPORTATION BOARD79 SCRA 17

AQUINO; Sept 9, 1977

NATUREAppeal from a decision of the Manila Court of FirstInstance

FACTSGo Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after a search of an office in Sta Cruz,Manila. He was alleged to have with him at thetime of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court whichrendered him an undesirable alien.- The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation filed a

complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that afterthe trial the Deportation Board recommend to thePresident of the Philippines Go Tek’s immediatedeportation as his presence in this country havingbeen, and will always be a menace to the peace.welfare, and security of the community.- Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the groundthat the complaint was premature because therewas a pending case against him and that theBoard had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board ,118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only onthe grounds specified in the law.- The Board denied the motion. They reasoned thatit was not necessary for an alien to be convicted

before the State can exercise its right to deportsaid alien. Besides the Board is only a fact findingbody whose function is to report and recommendto the President in whom is lodged the exclusivepower to deport an alien.- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writof prohibition against the Board.- Hence this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE/SWON the Deportation Board can entertain adeportation proceeding based on a ground notspecified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law andalthough the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.

HELDYes.- A thorough comprehension of the President'spower to deport aliens may show the baselessnessof the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. ThePresident's power to deport aliens and theinvestigation of aliens subject to deportation areprovided for in the following provisions of theRevised Administrative Code:- SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power.A subject of a foreign power residing in thePhilippine Islands shall not be deported expelled,or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to hisown country by the Governor-General except upon

prior investigator, conducted by said Executive orhis authorized agent, of the ground upon whichsuch action is contemplated. In such case theperson concerned shall he informed of the chargeor charges against him and he shall be allowed notless than three days for the preparation of hisdefense. He shall also have the right to be heardby himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his

own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposingwitnesses.- On the other hand, section 37 of the ImmigrationLaw Provides that certain aliens may be arrestedupon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated byhim for the purpose and deported upon theCommissioner's warrant - "after a determinationby the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against thealien."- So, under existing law; the deportation of anundesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant tosection 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and

(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration uponrecommendation of the Board of Commissionersunder section 37 of the immigration Law (QuaChee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).- The State has the inherent power to deportundesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). Thatpower may be exercise by the Chief Executive"when he deems such action necessary for thepeace and domestic tranquility of the nation.Disposition CFI decision is reversed and set aside

VERA v. CUEVAS

90 SCRA 379DE CASTRO; May 31, 1979

NATUREPetition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

FACTS- Private respondents are engaged in themanufacture, sale and distribution of filled milkproducts throughout the Philippines.- Commissioner of Internal Revenue requiredplaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from themarket all of their filled milk products which do notbear the inscription required by Section 169 of theTax Code within fifteen days from receipt of the

91



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaorder with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs-private respondents to comply with saidorder will result in the institution of the necessaryaction against any violation of the aforesaid order."Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmedmilk. All condensed skimmed milk and all milk inwhatever form, from which the fatty part has beenremoved totally or in part, sold or put on sale in

the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly markedon its immediate containers, and in all thelanguage in which such containers are marked,with the words, "This milk is not suitable fornourishment for infants less than one year of age,"or with other equivalent words."- The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunctionrestraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenuefrom requiring plaintiffs-private respondents toprint on the labels of their filled milk products thewords, "This milk is not suitable for nourishmentfor infants less than one year of age or words of similar import," as directed by the abovequotedprovision of law, and from taking any action toenforce the above legal provision against the

plaintiffs-private respondents in connection withtheir filled milk products, pending the finaldetermination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276,on the merits.- OSG brought an appeal from the said order byway of certiorari to the Supreme Court.Respondent court in the meantime suspendeddisposition of these cases but in view of theabsence of any injunction or restraining order fromthe Supreme Court, it resumed action on themuntil their final disposition therein.- Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand,is an action for prohibition and injunction with apetition for preliminary injunction. Petitionerstherein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Boarddesist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. 1,entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,etc." pending final determination of Civil Case No.52276.- Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both intheir individual capacities and in their capacities asPublic Relations Counsel and President of thePhilippine Association of Nutrition, respectively,filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board formisleading advertisement, mislabeling and/ormisbranding.- Among other things, the complaint filed includethe charge of omitting to state in their labels anystatement sufficient to identify their filled milk

products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk, and omitting to mark theimmediate containers of their filled milk productswith the words: "This milk is not suitable fornourishment for infants less than one year of ageor with other equivalent words," as required underSection 169 of the Tax Code.

ISSUES1. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec.169 of the Tax Code has been repealed byimplication.2. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec.169 of the Tax Code has lost its purpose.3. WON the lower court erred in ruling that the fairtrade board is without jurisdiction to investigateand prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling,and/or misleading advertisement of filled milkproducts.

HELD1. NO.- Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with

Section 141 (which imposed a specific tax onskimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalizedthe sale of skimmed milk without payment of thespecific tax and without the legend required bySection 169). However, Section 141 was expresslyrepealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, andSection 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463.By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177,Section 169 became a merely declaratoryprovision, without a tax purpose, or a penalsanction.- Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The useof the specific and qualifying terms "skimmedmilk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmedmilk" in the text of the cited section, would restrictthe scope of the general clause "all milk, inwhatever form, from which the fatty pat has beenremoved totally or in part." In other words, thegeneral clause is restricted by the specific term"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdemgeneris that general and unlimited terms arerestrained and limited by the particular terms theyfollow in the statute.- There would seem, therefore, to be no disputethat filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of allages. Being so, the declaration required by Section169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitablefor nourishment for infants less than one year of

age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law.2. YES.- With the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of theTax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose.Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost hisauthority to enforce the same. This was so held by

his predecessor immediately after Sections 141and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the PartialStipulation of facts entered into by the parties, towit:". . . As the act of selling skimmed milk withoutfirst paying the specific tax thereon is no longerunlawful and the enforcement of the requirementin regard to the placing of the proper legend on itsimmediate containers is a subject which does notcome within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section177 of the said Code having been repealed byRepublic Act No. 463."- The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police

power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the"collection of all national internal revenue taxes,fees and charges, and the enforcement of allforfeitures, penalties and fines connectedtherewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entailsthe promotion of the health of the nation and isthus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is theexclusive function of the Food and DrugAdministration of the Department of Health asprovided for in Republic Act No. 3720.3. NO.- The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and theFair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction toinvestigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding,mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited isvested upon the Board of Food and DrugInspection and the Food and Drug Administrator,with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case criminalprosecution has to be instituted. To hold that thepetitioners have also jurisdiction as would be theresult were their instant petition granted, wouldonly cause overlapping of powers and functionslikely to produce confusion and conflict of officialaction which is neither practical nor desirable.Disposition decision appealed from is affirmed entoto.

92




DE LA FUENTE v DE VEYRAG.R. No. L-35385

GUTIERREZ; January 31, 1983

FACTS- At 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the crew of

a Q-boat of the Philippine Coast Guardspotted a vessel, the M/V Lucky Star I,owned by the private respondent LuckyStar Shipping Co., unloading cargo toseveral small watercrafts alongside thevessel off the coast of Zambales. As theQ-boat was approaching the M/V LuckyStar I, it was met by gunfire from thesmaller watercrafts which immediatelyfled from the scene. Only the M/V LuckyStar I was apprehended.

- The Philippine Coast Guard officersdiscovered 3,400 cases of foreign made

Champion cigarettes allegedly owned byTeng Bee Enterprises Co. (HK) Ltd. Thecoast guard officers, also saw on board acertain Deogracias Labrador, FilipinoCaptain of the domestic watercraft, M/LSangbay, one of the boats seen alongsidethe M/V Lucky Star I.

- The captain of the Lucky Star I, Li Tak Sin,was not able to present documents orpapers for the cigarettes. He and the crewwere arrested for smuggling. Theboarding officers also seized the LuckyStar I and ordered its complement,including Labrador, to proceed to Manilaon board said vessel.

- A warrant of seizure and detention wasissued by the Collector of Customs of thePort of Sual-Dagupan against the vesseland the articles.

- The Acting Provincial Fiscal before the CFIof Zambales an information against Li TakSin, the crew of Lucky Star I, DeograciasLabrador, and other persons for violationof Section 101 of the Tariff and CustomsCode and penalized under Section 3601of Republic Act 1937, as amended byRepublic Act 4712

- Meanwhile, the private respondents LuckyStar Shipping Company and Teng Bee

Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. filed

before the CF of Manila presided over byrespondent judge de Veyra a complaintfor injunction and recovery of personalproperty against the petitioners prayingfor the return of the goods seized and therelease of the M/V Lucky Star I. The casewas docketed as Civil Case No. 87435.

- Judge de Veyra issued an order declaringthat it has no jurisdiction as jurisdiction isexclusively within the jurisdiction of theBureau of Customs. With regard to thevessel, admittedly it is more than 30 tonsdead weight thus ma not be forfeited.The remedy of the Bureau would only bethe imposition of a fine. the Bureau of Customs is given until June 29, 1972within which to inform this Court themaximum fine that may be imposed onthe vessel, and this shall be the basis fora bond that would entitle Plaintiff torepossess the vessel. In the meantime,until the vessel is released the membersof the crew of the vessel are in need of provisions and medicines and thePhilippine Navy is ordered to permitPlaintiff, under proper escort of PhilippineNavy Guards, to furnish provisions andmedicines to the members of the crew.

ISSUE:WON the CFI has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the private respondentsLucky Star Shipping Company and Teng BeeEnterprises Company (HK) Ltd. for the release of the vessel M/V Lucky Star I, which is the subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before theCollector of Customs of the port of Sual-Dagupan.

HELD:NO- It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdictionover seizure and forfeiture cases vested in theCollector of Customs precludes a Court of FirstInstance from assuming cognizance over suchcases. We, therefore, set aside the assailed ordersof the respondent judge.- It has been held that the law affords the Collectorof Customs sufficient latitude in determiningwhether or not a certain article is subject toseizure or forfeiture and his decision on the matteris appealable to the Commissioner of Customs andthen to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the Courtof First Instance. The fundamental reason is that

the Collector of Customs constitutes a tribunalwhen sitting in forfeiture proceedings beyond theinterference of the Court of First Instance. Asexpressed in Pacis v. Averia, the Court of FirstInstance should yield to the jurisdiction of theCollector of Customs. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to concludethat the legislators intended to divest the Court of

First Instance of the prerogative to replevin aproperty which is a subject of a seizure andforfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff andCustoms Code, Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easilybe undermined by the simple device of replevin.'The judicial recourse of the owner of a personalproperty which has been the subject of a seizureand forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs is not in the Court of First Instance but inthe Court of Tax Appeals, and only afterexhausting administrative remedies in the Bureauof Customs. If the property owned believes thatthe Collector's conclusion was erroneous, theremedy is by appeal to the Commissioner of

Customs, and then to the Court of Tax Appealsshould the Commissioner uphold the Collector'sdecision. The Court of Tax Appeals exercisesexclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the rulingof the Commissioner in seizure and confiscationcases. and that power is to the exclusion of theCourt of First Instance, which may not interferewith the Commissioner's decisions even in theform of proceedings for certiorari, prohibition ormandamus, which are in reality, attempts toreview the Commissioner's actuations.

CARINO v COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RIGHTS(Giulia)

SIMON, JR., v COMMISSION ONHUMAN RIGHTS229 SCRA 117

VITUG; January 5, 1994

FACTS- A "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo(one of the petitioners) in his capacity as anExecutive Officer of the Quezon City IntegratedHawkers Management Council under the Office of

93



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotathe City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, theprivate respondents (being the officers andmembers of the North EDSA Vendors Association,Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents weregiven a grace-period within which to vacate thequestioned premises of North EDSA.- The group, led by their President Fermo, filed aletter-complaint with the CHR against the

petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman for aletter to be addressed to then Mayor BrigidoSimon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, andcarinderia along North EDSA.- The CHR issued an Order, directing thepetitioners "to desist from demolishing the stallsand shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before theCommission" and ordering said petitioners toappear before the CHR.

- Despite the Order, the petitioners carried out thedemolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia.- Thus, the CHR ordered the disbursement of

financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00in favor of the private respondents to purchaselight housing materials and food under theCommission's supervision and again directed thepetitioners to "desist from further demolition, withthe warning that violation of said order would leadto a citation for contempt and arrest."

- A motion to dismiss was filed by petitionersquestioning the CHR's jurisdiction.- The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt of court.

ISSUESWON the public respondent has jurisdiction:a) to investigate the alleged violations of the

"business rights" of the private respondents whosestalls were demolished by the petitioners at theinstance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;b) to cite the petitioners in contempt and imposethe fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; andc) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 asfinancial aid to the vendors affected by thedemolition.

HELDa. The most that may be conceded to theCommission in the way of adjudicative power isthat it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence andmake findings of fact as regards claimed human

rights violations involving civil and political rights.But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot belikened to the judicial function of a court of justice,or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. Thefunction of receiving evidence and ascertainingtherefrom the facts of a controversy is not ajudicial function, properly speaking. To beconsidered such, the faculty of receiving evidence

and making factual conclusions in a controversymust be accompanied by the authority of applyingthe law to those factual conclusions to the end thatthe controversy may be decided or determinedauthoritatively, finally and definitively, subject tosuch appeals or modes of review as may beprovided by law. This function, the Commissiondoes not have.b. On its contempt powers, the CHR isconstitutionally authorized to "adopt itsoperational guidelines and rules of procedure, andcite for contempt for violations thereof inaccordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly,the CHR acted within its authority in providing inits revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any

person in direct or indirect contempt, and toimpose the appropriate penalties in accordancewith the procedure and sanctions provided for inthe Rules of Court." That power to cite forcontempt, however, should be understood to applyonly to violations of its adopted operationalguidelines and rules of procedure essential tocarry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,the power to cite for contempt could be exercisedagainst persons who refuse to cooperate with thesaid body, or who unduly withhold relevantinformation, or who decline to honor summons,and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The"order to desist" (a semantic interplay for arestraining order) in the instance before us,

however, is not investigatorial in character butprescinds from an adjudicative power that it doesnot possess.c. The CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendorsaffected by the demolition is not an appropriateissue in the instant petition. Not only is there lackof locus standi on the part of the petitioners toquestion the disbursement but, more importantly,the matter lies with the appropriate administrativeagencies concerned to initially consider.DISPOSITION Petition is GRANTED.

Dissenting Opinion (Padilla)

The CHR can issue a cease and desist order tomaintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation;that such cease and desist order maybe necessaryin situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents toinvestigate.The CHR should be given a wide latitude to look

into and investigate situations which may (or maynot ultimately) involve human rights violations.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY VS CA (CALOOCAN)

320 SCRA 478ROMERO; March 16, 1994

FACTS-Task Force Camarin Dumpsite in Caloocan filed acomplaint with petitioner seeking to stop theoperation of the Tala Estate open garbagedumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health

of the residents and possible pollution of the waterin the surrounding area. After an on-siteinvestigation affirming such contamination, andafter a public hearing, petitioner issued a ceaseand desist order (under its enabling law, RA 4850)on the city government of Caloocan to desist fromdumping waste matter in said dumpsite.-the city government filed with the RTC an actionfor the declaration of nullity of the cease anddesist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction and further sought to be declared as thesole authority on the health and safety of thepeople in Caloocan city, the TRO later granted bythe RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on theground that under RA 3931 (Pollution Control Law),

the order is reviewable both on the law and factsby the CA and not the RTC. Respondent presidingRTC judge Serapio dismissed a motion to dismissthe case, as consolidated with a similar earliercase. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition and injunction with prayer forrestraining order with the SC. The SC referred thecase to the CA for proper disposition and issued aTRO ordering Serapio to desist from exercisingjurisdiction over the case and for the mayor/citygovernment of Caloocan from its operations in thedumpsite.-respondents filed an MFR; the Court directed theCA to set a hearing to determine WON the TROshould be lifted, but the parties failed to settle the

94



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotadispute at the conference. CA promulgated adecision that the RTC had no jurisdiction on theappealed case since such appeal is w/in theexclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA underSec. 9 of BP129 and that petitioner had noauthority to issue the cease and desist order. Saidorder was lifted, with the condition that any futuredumping be in conformity with the procedure

contained in the proposal attached to the record of the case. Hence the instant petition for review oncertiorari.

ISSUEWON petitioner can lawfully exercise jurisdictionover the case

HELDYES. Petitioner’s jurisdiction was validly invoked onthe basis that the open dumpsite project wasundertaken without its clearance, as requiredunder RA 4850, which was also recognized by theEnvironmental Management Bureau of the DENR.-RA 4850 authorizes petitioner to “make, alter, or

modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution”. Petitioner may not have been expresslyconferred with the power to issue an ex partecease and desist order, but there is enoughjurisprudence to the effect that such authorityneed not be express (pollution adjudication boardvs ca). Administrative agencies are conferred notonly with such powers granted by law, but alsothose which are necessarily implied in the exerciseof its express powers. The immediate response tothe demands of the necessities of protecting vitalpublic interests gives life to the statement on ahealthful ecology in Art. 2 Sec. 16 of theConstitution.-Petitioner’s charter, RA 4850, provides it with the

power to institute necessary legal proceedingsagainst any person who shall commence toimplement or continue implementation of anyproject w/in Laguna de Bay without previousclearance from it. Such a provision was designedto give petitioner sufficiently broad powers inregulation of such projects initiated in the LagunaLake region.Disposition The petition is granted

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.HOUSING AND LAND USE

REGULATORY BOARD

210 SCRA 558GRIÑO-AQUINO; June 29, 1992

FACTS- In 1973, Martha David purchased from FereitRealty Development Corporation (FRDC) acondominium unit which was in the process of

completion, with a parking space, in thecondominium project known as "EuropaCondominium Villas" in Baguio City.- The agreed purchase price was P217,000. Davidmade a 20% down payment of P43,400 on theprice, leaving a balance of P173,600 which waspayable in 60 equal monthly installments of P3,861.64 per installment. She took possession, asowner, of the condominium unit, with notice to themanagement. As of October, 1976, she had paid atleast twenty-two (22) monthly installments of theprice of the condominium unit.- In January 1978, FRDC, without the knowledge of David, and without the prior approval of theNational Housing Authority, mortgaged the

condominium project to Bancom DevelopmentCorporation , predecessor-in-interest of thepetitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP), assecurity for a loan of P40,000,000.- As FRDC failed to pay its obligation which,Bancom foreclosed the mortgage on 45condominium units, including the unit of David.The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale toBancom and the Far East Bank and Trust Company(FEBTC). After the expiration of the redemptionperiod, UBP held out the units for sale.- David and the purchaser of her unit, Quazon,filed a complaint in the HLURB, against FRDC, UBPand FEBTC to annul the title of UBP and FEBTCover David's condominium unit and to order the

issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Quazon. The complaint sought the followingreliefs:- UBP filed a motion to dismiss. UBP's mainargument is that the HLURB has no jurisdictionover the complaint for consignation which shouldhave been filed in the regular trial courts.Furthermore, as the HLURB was created in 1981(E.O. No. 641), it has no jurisdiction over contractsthat took effect prior to 1981.- HLURB Arbiter Manuel denied the motion of UBP, on the ground that the motion will rendernugatory the summary nature of proceedingsbefore this Office.

In due time, this petition for certiorari andprohibition with injunction was filed by UBP.

ISSUEWON the HLURB for brevity has jurisdiction to hearand decide a condominium buyer's complaint for:(a) annulment of a real estate mortgageconstituted by the project owner without his

consent and without the prior written consent of the National Housing Authority; (b) for annulmentof the foreclosure sale; and (c) for annulment of the condominium certificate of title that wasissued to the highest bidder at the foreclosuresale.

HELDYESThe applicable provisions of P.D. No. 957,otherwise known as "The Subdivision andCondominium Buyer's Protective Decree" providethat the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction toregulate the real estate trade and business inaccordance with the provisions of the decree.

Sec. 18. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall bemade by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approvalshall not be granted unless it is shown that theproceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures havebeen provided to ensure such utilization. The loanvalue of each lot or unit covered by the mortgageshall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any,shall be notified before the release of the loan. Thebuyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shallapply the payments to the correspondingmortgage indebtedness secured by the particular

lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enablingsaid buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof.- P.D. No. 1344 of April 2, 1978 expanded thejurisdiction of the NHA to include the following:Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions toregulate the real estate trade and business and inaddition to its powers provided for in PD No. 957,the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A.Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claimsinvolving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific

95



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaperformance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,dealer, broker, or salesman.- On February 7, 1981, EO No. 648 transferred theregulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHAto the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.Sec. 8. The regulatory functions of the NHA

pursuant to PD No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to theCommission, together with such applicablepersonnel appropriation, records, equipment and property necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among theseregulatory functions are: 1. Regulation of the realestate trade and business; 2. Registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; 3.Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; 4.Approval of performance bond and the suspensionof license to sell; 5. Registration of dealers,brokers, and salesmen engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; 6.

Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen;7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the owner or developer;8. Granting of permits for the alteration of plansand the extension of period for completion of subdivision or condominium projects; 9. Approvalof the conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces found within the project which havebeen donated to the city or municipality concerned;10. Regulation of the relationship between lessorsand lessees; and 11. Hear and decide cases onunsound real estate business practices; claims

involving refund filed against project owners,developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance.- EO No. 90 dated December 17, 1986 changed thename of the Human Settlements RegulatoryCommission to HLURB.- Clearly, FRDC's act of mortgaging thecondominium project to Bancom and FEBTC,without the knowledge and consent of David asbuyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of the NHA (now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957,was not only an unsound real estate businesspractice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer,David, who has a cause of action for annulment of the mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and

the condominium certificate of title that wasissued to UBP and FEBTC as highest bidders at thesale. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdictionof the NHA (now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No.957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of 1978.- The allegations of UBP that the contract betweenFRDC and David had been rescinded, that theinstallment payments made by David had been

forefeited, that it is FRDC who should refund thesaid installment payments to David, are merematters of defense which are not proper in apetition for certiorari (Planters Products Inc. vs. CA,193 SCRA 563: Commercial Corp. vs. PNB, 175SCRA 1).

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE V.FACTORA

00 SCRA 00SANDOVAL-GUITIERREZ, February

27, 2002

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS-Sevenis Enterprises, Inc. (Sevenis-land owner =LO) owns a parcel of land at Paranaque. It engagedthe services of Jesus Factora (Factora -construction) to construct a four-storey condobldg. on said lot. Sevenis obtained a P3.9 M loanfrom Fund Centrum Finance, Inc. (Fund Centrum –Creditor), secured by a mortgage on the realtyproject. Sevenis also had a P1.3+ debt withFactora as contractor’s fees. Sevenis entered intoa Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Fund

Centrum and Factora wherein through a Dacion inPayment, Sevenis assigned and conveyed to FundCentrum the land and improvements on the lot.Sevenis debt with Factora was also recognized ascontractor’s lien with all the rights provided for bylaw. He was assigned 3 units. By virtue of theDacion, Sevenis is relieved from any liabilities toFund Centrum and Factora, without prejudice toreceiving its share in the net residue.-Fund Centrum sold the condo bldg to SupremeCapital (Supreme - buyer1), Supreme Capitalresold the property to MCI Real Estate and Dev’tCorp. (MCI – second buyer/lessor). MCI leasedproperty with AMA Computer College (AMA –lessee) which converted the condo into a computer

school. The conversion included 3 units assignedto Factora based on MOA.-so Factora filed 2 complaints against FundCenrum, Supreme Capital, and AMA with Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB) for recovery of condominium certificatesand title and damages. OAALA dismissed the

complaints for lack of jurisdiction. Factoraappealed to HLURB Board of Commissioners,Board affirmed OAALA decision. Factora elevateddecision to the Office of the President. Exec. SecTorres issued a resolution setting aside the Board’sdecision and remanding the records of the case toHLURB. So AMA filed petition for review with CA.CA dismissed AMA’s petition. AMA filed MFR,denied.

ISSUESWON HLURB had NO jurisdiction to takecognizance of the complaints because Factora didnot acquire ownership of the subject condominiumunits pursuant to the MOA (Not being the owner,

he is not a condominium buyer within the purviewof P.D. 957)

HELDYESRatio. Sec. 1 of P.D. 1344 expanded thejurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957,otherwise known as "The Subdivision andCondominium Buyer's Protective Decree," toinclude: (1) any claims filed by condominium buyeragainst the project owner, developer, dealer,broker or salesman, and (2) cases involvingspecific performance of contractual and statutoryobligations filed by buyers of condominium unitagainst the owner, developer, dealer, broker or

salesman. Corollarily, a transaction to "buy" and"purchase" under P.D. 957 has been defined as"any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwiseacquire for a valuable consideration x x x acondominium unit in a condominium project." Theterm "buyer" is not limited to those who enter intocontracts of sale. Its concept is broad enough asto include those who "acquire for a valuableconsideration" a condominium unit. Thus, a buyerof said unit seeking to enforce the performance of an obligation arising from such transaction, orclaiming damages therefrom, may bring an actionwith the HLURB.

96



Administrative Law A2010 Dean CarlotaReasoning. Factora is a buyer within thecontemplation of P.D. 957. He acquired the threecondominium units as they were assigned to himby Sevenis in payment for its indebtedness in theamount of P1,333,523.00 as contractor's fee.Clearly, his acquisition of the units was for avaluable consideration.-on contention that the MOA merely intends to

recognize the indebtedness of Sevenis torespondent as a contractor's lien, hence noassignment has been made: While the MOArecognizes Sevenis' indebtedness as a lien,however, it expressly provides for the settlementof such indebtedness by the assignment of thethree 2-BR units to respondent. Thus, by virtue of the assignment, respondent relieved Sevenis fromits indebtedness to him. The extinguishment of the indebtedness vested upon respondent theright to own said units.-on theory that respondent is not the owner of thesaid condominium, therefore HLURB had nojurisdiction over the case: cases for specificperformance of contractual obligations against

condominium owners filed by buyers fall within itscompetence and expertise. Arranza vs. B.F. Homes, Inc: “P.D. 957 was promulgated toencompass all questions regarding subdivisionsand condominiums. It is aimed at providing for anappropriate government agency, the HLURB, towhich all parties aggrieved in the implementationof its provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.”

SPOUSES OSEA V AMRBOSIO ANDPEREZ

486 SCRA 599CARPIO-MORALES; April 7, 2006

FACTS- Petitioner Osea and respondent Ambrosio(owner/developer of the Villa San AgustinSubdivision located at Novaliches, QC) enteredinto a Contract to Sell a “House and Lot Unit”. Amonth after occupying the house, its front andback walls cracked.- Osea lodged a complaint against respondentswith the Office of the Building Official of QuezonCity for violation of the National Building Code. Thespouses Osea subsequently filed a complaint fordamages before the RTC of QC.

- Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of theRTC, contending that it is within the exclusivejurisdiction of the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board (HLURB).- In the meantime, the Office of the BuildingOfficial of QC found that the building andoccupancy permits were validly issued and that“‘minor and insignificant deviation pertaining to

installed girt and rafters at the roof framing of subject unit-house’ would not in any way affect thestructural strength of the one-storey residence.- RTC QC promulgated its decision, finding forpetitioners and granting their prayer for actual,moral, and exemplary damages.- CA declared null and void the RTC decision forlack of jurisdiction as it is the HLURB which hasjurisdiction over the complaint.- Petitioners’ MFR was also denied.Petitioners’ Claims- The complaint before the RTC is clearly for abreach of contract in view of respondents’ failureto comply with the building plans and technicalspecifications of the residential dwelling.

- Their rights to the lot, which they admit to beunder the jurisdiction of HLURB, is separate fromtheir rights to the house built thereon which theyallege to be enforceable only in the regular courts.

ISSUEWON HLURB has jurisdiction (and not the RTC)

HELDYESRatio Generally, the extent to which anadministrative agency may exercise its powersdepends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.

Reasoning Sec. 11 of P.D. 1344 clarifies and spellsout the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB.- The extent to which the HLURB has been vestedwith quasi-judicial authority must also bedetermined by referring to the terms of P.D. 957,“THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS'PROTECTIVE DECREE” which provides that “The

National Housing Authority shall have exclusivejurisdiction to regulate the real estate tradeand business in accordance with this Decree.”- The intention was aimed at providing for anappropriate government agency, the HLURB, towhich all parties aggrieved in the implementationof provisions and the enforcement of contractualrights with respect to said category of real estatemay take recourse. In the exercise of its powers,the HLURB must commonly interpret and applycontracts and determine the rights of privateparties under such contracts.- This Court has consistently held that complaintsfor breach of contract or specific performance withdamages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium

unit buyer against the owner or developer fallunder the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.- Under the doctrine of primary administrativejurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine acontroversy where issues for resolution demandthe exercise of sound administrative discretionrequiring the special knowledge, experience, &services of the admin. tribunal to determinetechnical and intricate matters of fact.Dispositive Petition is DENIED. The assailed CADecision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.

MATEO V CA (STA. MARIA)

1 SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the

real estate trade and business and in addition to itspowers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957 ,the National Housing Authority shall haveexclusivejurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the followingnature:A. Unsound real estate business practices;B. Claims involving refundand any other claims filedby subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against theproject owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; andC. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed bybuyers of subdivision lots or condominium unitsagainst the owner, developer, dealer, broker orsalesman.

97

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm

http://127.0.0.1:7860/2000/june2000/131683.htm




247 SCRA 284PUNO; August 14, 1995

NATUREPetiton for certiorari

FACTS-Upon complaint of some Morong Water District

(MOWAD) employees, petitioners, Aniceto Mateo,Maximo San Diego, Quirino Mateo, DanielFrancisco and Leonila Kuizon, all Board Membersof MOWAD, conducted an investigation on privaterespondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then GeneralManager.

-On December 13, 1992, private respondent wasplaced under preventive suspension. He was laterdismissed on January 7, 1993.-On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed aSpecial Civil Action forQuo Warranto andMandamus with Preliminary Injunction before theRegional Trial Court of Rizal, challenging hisdismissal by petitioners.-Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on

two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdictionover disciplinary actions of government employeeswhich is vested exclusively in the Civil ServiceCommission; and (2) quo warranto was not theproper remedy.-Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied theMotion to Dismiss and the Motion forReconsideration-Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Courtthrough a petition for certiorari under Rule 65which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals-CA dismissed the petition and denied the Motionfor Reconsideration.

ISSUE

WON the Regional Trial Court of Rizal hasjurisdiction over cases involving the dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporationHELDNo.-MOWAD is aquasi-public corporation createdpursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198,known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973,as amended.

-In Davao City Water District v . Civil ServiceCommission, the Court en banc ruled thatemployees of government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charter fall under thejurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission-As early as Baguio Water District v . Trajano et, al.,

We already ruled that a water district is a

corporation created pursuant to a special law, P.D.No. 198, and as such its officers and employeesare covered by the Civil Service Law.-Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring andfiring of employees of goverment-own andcontrolled corporations are governed by theprovisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules andRegulations.

-Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No.292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum CircularNo. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil ServiceCommission spell out the initial remedy of privaterespondent against illegal dismissal. Theycategorically provide that the party aggrieved by adecision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of servicesmay appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15)days. Thereafter, under the present rule, asprovided by Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amendedby Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 whichtook effect on June 1, 1995, the party may appealthe final resolution of the Commission to the Courtof Appeals (under former rule, private respondent

could only go on certiorari to the SC under Rule 65of the Rules of Court).Disposition Petition is GRANTED

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA(AMI)

G.R. No. 127373PANGANIBAN; March 25, 1999

FACTS -The members of the Association of MindanaoIndustries are enterprises based in Mindanao andregistered with the Board of Investments which

were among those granted direct connectionfacility by the National Power Corporation althoughoperating within the franchise area of privaterespondent Iligan Light and Power, Inc. (Iligan forshort).-On October 12, 1993, Iligan filed with therespondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB forshort) a petition for the implementation of the1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector,praying specifically that the direct supply of powerto industries within its franchise area bediscontinued by the National Power Corporation(NPC, for short).-The Cabinet Policy Reforms referred to wereamong those approved by the President of the

Philippines and her cabinet on January 21, 1987,the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:“2. Continue direct connections for industriesauthorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such timeas the appropriate regulatory board determinesthat direct connection of industry to NPC is nolonger necessary in the franchise area of the

specific utility or cooperative meeting standards of financial and technical capability, with satisfactoryguarantees of non-prejudice to industry, to be setin consultation with NPC and relevant governmentagencies; and reviewed periodically by theregulatory board.' . . .-In its Petition, ILPI alleged, inter alia, that it canmeet, even surpass, the set of financial standardsadopted by the ERB pursuant to the policyguidelines set by the Cabinet . . ."AMI filed its'Answer with Affirmative Defenses and/or Motionto Dismiss,' 'without accepting jurisdiction of theHonorable Board over the subject matter of thepetition,' on the following grounds, to wit: 1) lackof jurisdiction to hear the petition for

implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in thePower Sector following the transfer of its non-priceregulatory jurisdiction and functions to theDepartment of Energy under Rep. Act No. 7638;-On January 4, 1994, the ERB denied in open courtAMI's motion to dismiss the petition. Likewise,AMI's motion for reconsideration was denied by theERB in its order dated April 7, 1994 . . . Hence, theinstant petition for certiorari and prohibition toannul the aforesaid order dated April 7, 1994 andto prohibit respondentERB from proceeding with the hearing of ILPI'spetition."

ISSUEWON ERB is the agency of the government whichhas jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute

HELDNO. DOE and ERBReasoning The foregoing sufficiently indicatesthat it is now the Department of Energy that hasjurisdiction over the regulation of the marketingand the distribution of energy resources. It may betrue that this function formerly belonged to theERB, by virtue of the "Cabinet Policy Reforms inthe Energy Sector" embodied in the CabinetMemorandum of January 23, 1987, and EO 172issued May 8, 1987. However, pursuant to Section18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted

98



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaby Congress on December 9, 1992, the non-rate-fixing jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERBhave been transferred to the Department of Energy. The applications for the NPC's directsupply or disconnection of power involveessentially the distribution of energy resources,not by any incident the determination of powerrates. Consequently, these applications must be

resolved by the DOE.It is of no moment that the petition instituted byILPI before the ERB was captioned "for theImplementation of the 1987 Cabinet PolicyReforms in the Power Sector." The relief itspecifically sought was the discontinuation of NPC's direct supply of power to privaterespondent's member-companies. Definitely then,the distribution of an energy resource was its mainpurpose.Neither does the Court agree with the petitioners'claim that the regulatory functions of the ERB thatwere transferred to the DOE concerned thoserelating to the petroleum industry only and not toelectric power. Section 3 of EO 172 broadly defines

energy resource as "any substance orphenomenon which by itself or in combination withothers emanates, [or] generates energy," Electricpower or electricity has been in turn defined as "animponderable and invisible agent producing light,heat, chemical decomposition, and other physicalphenomena." Undoubtedly, electricity produces orgenerates energy. By simple logic, it is an energyresource. The regulation of its distribution is,therefore, among those functions formerlybelonging to the ERB, which have been transferredto the DOE as expressly directed in Section 18 of RA 7638. Nowhere in this provision is there anyrestriction of its scope to petroleum and itsproducts only. The reference to petroleum is

merely by way of example of what an energyresource is. In fact, the set of examples of energyresources enumerated in the law is prefaced with"such as but not limited to." This can only meanthat the enumeration is nonrestrictive.-Moreover, Section 5 of RA 7638 defines thepowers and functions of the DOE as follows:"SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. TheDepartment shall have the following powers andfunctions:(d) Exercise supervision and control over all

government activities relative to energy projects inorder to attain the goods embodied in Section 2 of this Act. & (e) Regulate private sector activitiesrelative to energy projects as provided for under

existing laws; Provided, That the Department shallendeavor to provide for an environment conduciveto free and active private sector participation andinvolvement in all energy activities."-As to what energy projects encompass, Section 3of the same law gives this definition:"SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. (a)'Energy projects' shall mean activities or projects

relative to the exploration, extraction, production,importation-exportation, processing,transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,conservation, stockpiling or storage of all forms of energy products and resources."Disposition Petition DENIED

UNILONGO V. CA (MENDIOLA)G.R. No. 123910.

KAPUNAN; April 5, 1999

FACTS -On 4 July 1989, the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac

Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), wasincorporated and registered by petitioners(hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as anon-stock corporation with the Securities andExchange Commission (SEC). petitionerscomprised SNSNAI’s original Board of Trustees.-However, since no elections for a new Board of Trustees and for a new set of corporate officerswere held from the time of its incorporation,private respondents (hereafter referred to as theDiño group) aired their complaints and sought theintervention of the Office of the Mayor of Parañaque and the SEC.-On 29 April 1991, the Unilongo group amendedthe SNSNAI’s By-Laws by changing the term of

office of the Board of Trustees from 1 year to 2years.-Despite the above amendment, elections wereheld on 5 May 1991 and the Diño group emergedas the new Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI.-On 21 May 1991, in order to perpetuatethemselves in office, the Unilongo groupestablished the Sto. Niño de Cul de SacHomeowners Association, Inc. (CDSHA) andregistered it with the Home Insurance GuaranteeCorporation (HIGC).-On 27 June 1991, the CDSHA filed a complaint forinjunction and damages with the HIGC against theDiño group.

-On 25 October 1992, elections were conducted forthe 1992-1993 SNSNAI Board of Trustees. The Diñogroup was re-elected as members of the Board of Trustees.-Thereafter the CDSHA filed a "Motion to Cite forContempt (private respondents) and To AnnulElections of 25 October 1992" in HIGC Case.-SNSNAI is saying that by forming a separate and

distinct corporation (CDSHA) the Unilongo group is"unlawfully, maliciously, unwarrantedly andcapriciously, whimsically and oppressively, holdingand exercising in bad faith and under unlawfulpretenses, and ultimately performing the functionsof the offices and/or positions of privaterespondents in their capacities as duly and legallyelected members of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES andOFFICERS of the Sto. Niño de Cul de SacNeighborhood Association, Inc. (for short,"SNSNAI")-SNSNAI filed before the trial court.-Unilongo Group filed motion to dismiss on theground that Disputes involving homeownersassociations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC)as expressly provided by E.O. Nos. 90 and 535amending R.A. No. 580-TC denied motion. CA dismissed petition forcertiorari and prohibition filed by Unilongo Group

ISSUEWON Disputes involving homeowners associationsfall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HomeInsurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC)

HELDYES.Reasoning jurisdiction of the SEC overhomeowners associations has been transferred to

the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation(HIGC), the new name given by Executive OrderNo. 90, Section 1(d) to what was formerly theHome Financing Corporation (HFC) created underR.A. No. 580.-Implementing E.O. No. 535, the HIGC issued theRevised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners’ Disputes, thus:Rule II Disputes Triable by HIGC/ Nature of ProceedingsSECTION 1. Types of Disputes. The HIGCor any person, officer, body, board, or committeeduly designated or created by it shall havejurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving thefollowing:

99



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaa)Devices or schemes employed by or any facts of the Board of Directors or officers of the associationamounting to fraud and misrepresentation whichmay be detrimental to the interest of the public orof the members of the association or theassociation registered with HIGC.b)Controversies arising out if intra-corporaterelations between and among members of the

association, between any and/or all of them andthe association of which they are members, andinsofar as it concerns its right to exist as acorporate entity, between the association and thestate/general public or other entity.c)Controversies in the election, appointment, orselection of directors, officers, or members of theassociation, including the regularity thereof andeligibilities of such directors, officers or members.d)Suspension or revocation of the certificate of registration of any homeowners association dulyregistered by HIGC upon any of the groundsprovided by law, rules and regulation of HIGC,including but not limited to the following:1. Fraud or misrepresentation in procuring its

certificate of registration;2. Serious misrepresentation as to what theassociation can do or is doing;3. Refusal to comply with or defiance of any lawfulorder of HIGC or its hearing officers;4. Misuse of a right, privilege, or franchiseconferred upon it by law, or exercise of a right,privilege or franchise in contravention of law;5. Commission or omission of an act whichamounts to a surrender of its corporate rights,privileges, or franchise;6.Violation of any provision of HIGC rules andregulations and those of the Corporations Codewhenever the same is applicable;7. Continuous inoperation or inactivity for a period

of at least five (5) years; and8.Failure to file required reports in appropriateforms as determined by HIGC within the prescribedperiod.-In sum, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeownersassociations, including their dissolution has nowbeen transferred to the HIGC. In this case, theentities involved are homeowners associations.Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC asa non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposesfor which this neighborhood association wasestablished correspond to the requirements laiddown in the HIGCDisposition Petition GRANTED.

DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC.v CABATO

327 SCRA 521QUISUMBING; March 9, 2000

FACTS:(*This action seeks to annual the Order datedNovember 7, 1994, of Judge Cabato (RTC of LaTrinidad, Benguet) which dismissed DELTA’samended third-party complaint, and to annul aswell the Order denying the MR.)- In 1992, a Decision was rendered by Exec. LANorma Olegario, (NLRC CAR) in the case of "Alejandro Bernardino, et al, vs. Green MountainFarm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe", whereinthe respondents were found guilty of IllegalDismissal and Unfair Labor Practice and orderedthe respondents to pay the Bernardino et al, insolidum, a certain amount per person (see list inthe orig case nlng!) plus atty’s fees.

- Complainants in the abovementioned labor casefiled before the NLRC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as respondent's appeal to theNLRC and SC were respectively denied.- In 1994, Exec LA Gelacio C. Rivera, Jr. to whomthe case was reassigned in view of LA Olegario'stransfer, issued a writ of execution directing NLRCDeputy Sheriff Adam Ventura to execute thejudgment against respondents, Green MountainFarm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe.- Sheriff Ventura then proceeded to enforce thewrit by garnishing certain personal properties of respondents.- Findings that said judgment debtors do not havesufficient personal properties to satisfy the

monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded tolevy upon a real property covered by TaxDeclaration No. 9697, registered in the name of Roberto Ongpin, one of the respondents in thelabor case.- Thereafter, Sheriff Ventura caused thepublication on the Baguio Midland Courier the dateof the public auction of said real property.- A month before the scheduled auction sale,DELTA filed before the NLRC a third-partyclaim asserting ownership over the propertylevied upon and subject of the Sheriff noticeof sale. LA Rivera thus issued an orderdirecting the suspension of the auction sale

until the merits of petitioner's claim hasbeen resolved.- DELTA filed with the RTC a complaint forinjunction and damages, with a prayer for theissuance of a TRO against Sheriff Ventura,reiterating the same allegations it raised in thethird party claim it field with the NLRC.- Judge Cabato eventually issued a TRO, enjoining

respondents in the DELTA v. Ventura et al civilcase to hold in abeyance any action relative to theenforcement of the decision in the labor case.- DELTA also filed a complaint (in the NLRC)questioning its authority to hear the case,the matter being within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. LA Rivera dismissed it.- Bernardino et al moved for the dismissal of thecivil case on the ground of the court's lack of jurisdiction.- RTC ‘s decision: RTC is equal rank with theNLRC, hence, has no jurisdiction to issue aninjunction against the execution of the NLRCdecision; NLRC retains authority over allproceedings anent the execution of its decision.

This power carries with it the right to determineevery question which may be involved in theexecution of its decision; DELTA should rely onand comply with the Rules of the NLRC because itis the principal procedure to be followed, the Rulesof Court being merely suppletory in application;ESTOPPEL is N/A. . . . . [B]efore the defendantshave filed their formal answer to the amendedcomplaint, they moved to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction; DELTA having in the first placeaddressed to the jurisdiction of the NLRC by filingwith it a Third Party Claim may not at the sametime pursue the present amended Complaintunder the forum shopping rule. (Delta’s MR wasdenied)

ISSUE WON RTC may take cognizance of the complaintfiled by DELTA and consequently provide theinjunction relief sought. (or WON the actscomplained of are related to, connected orinterwoven with the cases fall under the exclusivejurisdiction of the LA or the NLRC)

HELDNO.The subject matter of Delta’s third party claim isan incident of the labor case which is a matterbeyond the jurisdiction of the regular courts, asthe complaint was, in essence, a motion to quash

100



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotathe writ of execution of a decision rendered w/inthe jurisdiction of the LA/ NLRC (i.e. the illegaldismissal and ULP case.)Ratio: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined bythe allegations in the complainant whichcomprise a concise statement of the ultimatefacts constituting the petitioner's cause of

action. (r6 sec 3 ROC)-Multinational Village Homeowners Ass., Inc. v. CA,et al.~ Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in thecomplainant, irrespective of whether the plaintiff isentitled or not entitled to recover upon the claimasserted therein - a matter resolved only after andas a result of the trial.Reasoning:- Delta asserts that the instant case does notinvolve a labor dispute, as no ER-EE relationshipexists between the parties. Nor is the case relatedin any way to either parties' case before the NLRC-CAR hence, not within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.- However, by filing its third-party claim with the

deputy sheriff, Delta submitted itself to thejurisdiction of the NLRC acting through the LA.- Precedents abound confirming the rule that saidcourts have no labor jurisdiction to act on laborcases or various incidents arising therefrom,including the execution of decisions, awards ororders as these pertain exclusively to the properlabor official concerned under the DOLE. To holdotherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which isobnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.- Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon theinstance of the parties but continues until the caseis terminated.- Whatever irregularities attended the issuanceand execution of the alias writ of execution should

be referred to the same administrative tribunalwhich rendered the decision.- This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for theadvancement of justice, to correct errors of itsministerial officers and to control its ownprocesses.- Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code canonly be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdictionover incidents arising from, in connection with orrelating to labor disputes, as the controversyunder consideration, to the exclusion of theregular courts.- A254 LC explicitly prohibits issuance of atemporary or permanent injunction or restraining

order in any case involving or growing out of labordisputes by any court or other entity (except asotherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264).- In denying the petition for injunction, the court aquo is merely upholding the time-honored principlethat a RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC hasno jurisdiction to issue any restraining order orinjunction to enjoin the execution of any decision

of the latter.

CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER ANDLIGHT CO., INC. V. CONSTANCIO F.

COLLERA ET. AL.GR No. 102184

PARDO; April 12, 2000

FACTS- Cagayan Electric had been collecting paymentsfor electric consumption from respondents underthe Power Adjustment Clause.- Respondents said they tendered payments fortheir bills less charges for power cost adjustment,currency exchange rate adjustment andsurcharge, w/c petitioner refused to accept.Because of refusal, respondents consigned tocourt.- Respondents filed with RTC a complaint againstpetitioner for unjust enrichment, recovery of sumsof money, recovery of customers’ deposits, breachof contract, consignation, injunction and damageswith prayer for preliminary injunction.- City of Cagayan de Oro filed complaint inintervention.- TC denied respondents’ application forpreliminary injunction,- TC dismissed complaint and complaint inintervention on ground that the court had nojurisdiction over subject matter- TC denied MFR. Respondents appealed to CA.- CA set aside the orders of dismissal of complaintand complaint in intervention. Hence this petition.

ISSUEWON jurisdiction over subject matter is withregular courts or Energy Regulatory Board

HELDSubject is within jurisdiction of RTC.- RTC is a court of general jurisdiction. On theother hand, RA 6173, as amended by PD 1206empowered the ERB to regulate & fix power rates

to be charged by electric companies. Power to fixrates doesn’t carry with it power to determinewhether or not petitioner is guilty of overchargingcustomers. This falls within the jurisdiction of theregular courts.- The question of determining the breakdown anditemization of the power adjustment billed by anelectric power company to its customers is not a

matter that pertains to the ERB's supervision,control or jurisdiction to regulated and fix powerrate but falls within the jurisdiction of the regularcourts.- Petitioner is a public utility company. If, indeed,petitioner used the deposits, discounts,surcharges, PCA and CERA rates as instruments toobtain undue profits through various loan activitiesand benefits provided to petitioner's employees,then respondents may have causes of actionagainst petitioner to be litigated before the regularcourts and decided on the basis of evidence whichthe parties may present during the trial.Disposition Petition is dismissed.

LIM ARRANZA V BF HOMES G.R. No. 131683

DAVIDE; June 19, 2000


FACTS- Respondent filed with the SEC a petition forrehabilitation and a declaration that it was in astate of suspension of payments. SEC placedrespondent under a management committee, andappointed Orendain as a Receiver.

- Orendain instituted a central security system andunified the 65 homeowners' associations into anumbrella homeowners' association called UnitedBF Homeowners' Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), whichwas thereafter incorporated with the HomeInsurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)- Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control andadministration of security in the subdivision, theClubhouse and the open spaces. Through thePhilippine Waterworks and ConstructionCorporation (PWCC), respondent's managingcompany for waterworks in the various BF Homessubdivisions, respondent entered into anagreement with UBFHAI for the annual collection of community assessment fund and for the purchase

101



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaof eight new pumps to replace the over-capacitated pumps in the old wells- Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties asa Receiver. The new Board revoked the authoritygiven by Orendain to use the open spaces atConcha Cruz Drive and to collect communityassessment funds; deferred the purchase of newpumps; recognized BF Parañaque Homeowners'

Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in the subdivision; took over themanagement of the Clubhouse; and deployed itsown security guards in the subdivision.- Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "forand in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeownersin the subdivision" against respondents. Petitionersraised "issues" on the following basic needs of thehomeowners: rights-of-way; water; open spaces;road and perimeter wall repairs; security; and theinterlocking corporations that allegedly made itconvenient for respondent "to compartmentalizeits obligations as general developer, even if all of these are hooked into the water, roads, drainageand sewer systems of the subdivision."

- HLURB Arbiter issued a 20-day TRO to avoidrendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgmentthat could be issued in the case; and subsequently,an Order granting petitioners' prayer forpreliminary injunction was issued

ISSUEWON it is the SEC and not the HLURB that hasjurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivisionhomeowners against a subdivision developer thatis under receivership for specific performanceregarding basic homeowners' needs

HELDNO

Ratio Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not bymere administrative policy of any court or tribunal.It is determined by the averments of the complaintand not by the defense contained in the answer.Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shallbe determined upon an examination of theapplicable laws and the allegations of petitioners'complaint before the HLURBReasoning- LAW: Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 957 (The Subdivision andCondominium Buyers' Protective Decree)empowered the NHA with the "exclusivejurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade andbusiness." P.D. No. 1344 was issued to expand thejurisdiction of the NHA to include unsound real

estate business practices; claims involving refundand any other claims filed by subdivision lot orcondominium unit buyer against the project owner,developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and casesinvolving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivisionlot or condominium unit against the owner,developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The

regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHAwere transferred to the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission (HSRC) by virtue of EO No.648. Section 8 thereof specifies the functions of the NHA that were transferred to the HSRCincluding the authority to hear and decide "caseson unsound real estate business practices; claimsinvolving refund filed against project owners,developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen andcases of specific performance." EO No. 90renamed the HSRC as the HLURB.- The fact that respondent is under receivershipdoes not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. Areceiver is a person appointed by the court, or inthis instance, by a quasi-judicial administrative

agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purposeof preserving and conserving the property andpreventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties.It is the duty of the receiver to administer theassets of the receivership estate; and in themanagement and disposition of the propertycommitted to his possession, he acts in a fiduciarycapacity and with impartiality towards allinterested persons. The appointment of a receiverdoes not dissolve a corporation, nor does itinterfere with the exercise of its corporate rights.- No violation of the SEC order suspendingpayments to creditors would result as far aspetitioners' complaint before the HLURB is

concerned. To reiterate, what petitioners seek toenforce are respondent's obligations as asubdivision developer. Such claims are basicallynot pecuniary in nature although it couldincidentally involve monetary considerationsNeither may petitioners be considered as having"claims" against respondent within the context of the following proviso of Section 6 (c) of P.D. No.902-A, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1653, 1758 and1799, to warrant suspension of the HLURBproceedings.2 The word "claim" as used in Sec. 6

2[U]pon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation

receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions forclaims against corporations, partnerships or associations under

management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,

(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts ordemands of a pecuniary nature.- LAW: For the SEC to acquire jurisdiction over anycontroversy under P.D. No. 902-A, as amended,two elements must be considered: (1) the status orrelationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of theircontroversy. The first element requires that the

controversy must arise "out of intra-corporate orpartnership relations between and amongstockholders, members or associates; between anyor all of them and the corporation, partnership orassociation of which they are stockholders,members or associates, respectively; and betweensuch corporation, partnership or association andthe State in so far as it concerns their individualfranchises." The second element requires that thedispute among the parties be intrinsicallyconnected with the regulation or the internalaffairs of the corporation, partnership orassociation- Petitioners are not stockholders, members orassociates of respondent. They are lot buyers and

now homeowners in the subdivision developed bythe respondent. Also, the controversy here isremotely related to the "regulation" of respondentcorporation or to respondent's "internal affairs."- These twoquasi-judicial agencies exercisefunctions that are distinct from each other. TheSEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or associations with theend in view of protecting the interests of theinvesting public and creditors. On the other hand,the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating toobservance of laws governing corporationsengaged in the specific business of developmentof subdivisions and condominiums. The HLURB andthe SEC being bestowed with distinct powers and

functions, the exercise of those functions by oneshall not abate the performance by the other of itsown functions. There is no contradiction betweenP.D. No. 902-A and P.D. No. 957.- P.D. No. 957 was promulgated to encompass allquestions regarding subdivisions andcondominiums. It is aimed at providing for anappropriate government agency, the HLURB, towhich all parties aggrieved in the implementationof its provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. Nonetheless, thepowers of the HLURB may not in any way bedeemed as in derogation of the SEC's authority.

board or body shall be suspended accordingly

102



Administrative Law A2010 Dean CarlotaP.D. Nos. 902-A and 957, as far as both areconcerned with corporations, are laws inparimateria. P.D. No. 902-A relates to all corporations,while P.D. No. 957 pertains to corporationsengaged in the particular business of developingsubdivisions and condominiums. Although theprovisions of these decrees on the issue of jurisdiction appear to collide when a corporation

engaged in developing subdivisions andcondominiums is under receivership, the samedecrees should be construed as far as reasonablypossible to be in harmony with each other to attainthe purpose of an expressed national policy.

COOP. DEVT. AUTHORITY V DOLEFILAGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES

COOP.GR No. 137489

DE LEON, JR.; May 29, 2002


FACTS- The CDA received from certain members of theDolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,Inc. (DARBCI), a cooperative that owns 8,860hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato,several complaints alleging mismanagementand/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by theofficers and members of the BOD (officers forbrevity). The CDA freezed DARBCI’s funds. Theofficers filed a petition for certiorari in PolomolokRTC assailing the CDA’s jurisdiction.- The CDA placed the officers under preventivesuspension paving the way for the newly-createdmanagement committee to assume office.Polomolok RTC issued a TRO directing the partiesto restore status quo. The CDA questioned thepropriety of the TRO before the CA. The CA issueda TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its TRO.- Hence, the CDA continued with the proceedingsand issued a resolution directing the holding of aspecial general assembly of the members of DARBCI and the election of new officers andmembers of the board of directors. The officersfiled a petition for prohibition with the CA whichissued a resolution restraining the CDA and theadministrator of DARBCI from proceeding with theelection. A joint venture partner of DARBCI, InvestaLand Corp., also filed a petition for annulment of

the CDA’s orders in the Polomolok RTC which alsogranted a TRO.- Due to the TROs, the planned election did nottake place. Nevertheless, the majority of themembers of DARBCI, on their own initiative,convened a general assembly and held anelection. The original officers filed Twin Motions forContempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings with

the CA. The CA granted the petition declaring theelection null & void.

ISSUES1. WON the CDA is vested with quasi-judicialauthority to adjudicate cooperative disputes inview of its powers, functions and responsibilitiesunder Sec 3 of RA 6939

HELD1. NO.Ratio The authority of the CDA is to dischargepurely administrative functions which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technicalassistance to cooperatives and implementation of

cooperative laws.Reasoning Sec 3 of RA 6939 enumerates thepowers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA,thus:SEC. 3. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities. TheAuthority shall have the following powers,functions and responsibilities:(a) Formulate, adopt and implement integratedand comprehensive plans and programs oncooperative development consistent with thenational policy on cooperatives and the overallsocio-economic development plan of theGovernment;(b) Develop and conduct management and trainingprograms upon request of cooperatives that will

provide members of cooperatives with theentrepreneurial capabilities, managerial expertise,and technical skills required for the efficientoperation of their cooperatives and inculcate inthem the true spirit of cooperativism and provide,when necessary, technical and professionalassistance to ensure the viability and growth of cooperatives with special concern for agrarianreform, fishery and economically depressedsectors;(c) Support the voluntary organization andconsensual development of activities that promotecooperative movements and provide assistance towards upgrading managerial and technical

expertise upon request of the cooperativesconcerned;(d) Coordinate the effects of the local governmentunits and the private sector in the promotion,organization, and development of cooperatives;(e) Register all cooperatives and their federationsand unions, including their division, merger,consolidation, dissolution or liquidation. It shall

also register the transfer of all or substantially allof their assets and liabilities and such othermatters as may be required by the Authority;(f) Require all cooperatives, their federations andunions to submit their annual financial statements,duly audited by certified public accountants, andgeneral information sheets;(g) Order the cancellation after due notice andhearing of the cooperatives certificate of registration for non-compliance with administrativerequirements and in cases of voluntary dissolution;(h) Assist cooperatives in arranging for financialand other forms of assistance under such termsand conditions as are calculated to strengthentheir viability and autonomy;

(i) Establish extension offices as may be necessaryand financially viable to implement this Act.Initially, there shall be extension offices in theCities of Dagupan, Manila, Naga, Iloilo, Cebu,Cagayan de Oro and Davao;(j) Impose and collect reasonable fees and chargesin connection with the registration of cooperatives;(k) Administer all grants and donations coursedthrough the Government for cooperativedevelopment, without prejudice to the right of cooperatives to directly receive and administersuch grants and donations upon agreement withthe grantors and donors thereof;(l) Formulate and adopt continuing policyinitiatives consultation with the cooperative sector

through public hearing;(m) Adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its internal operations;(n) Submit an annual report to the President andCongress on the state of the cooperativemovement;(o) Exercise such other functions as may benecessary to implement the provisions of thecooperative laws and, in the performance thereof,the Authority may summarily punish for directcontempt any person guilty of misconduct in thepresence of the Authority which seriouslyinterrupts any hearing or inquiry with a fine of notmore than five hundred pesos (P500) orimprisonment of not more than ten (10) days, or

103



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaboth. Acts constituting indirect contempt asdefined under Rule 71 of the ROC shall bepunished in accordance with the said Rule.- When the law speaks in clear and categoricallanguage, there is no room for interpretation,vacillation or equivocation; there is only room forapplication. Nowhere in RA 6939 can it be foundany express grant to the CDA of authority to

adjudicate cooperative disputes. At most, Sec 8 of the same law provides that "upon request of eitheror both parties, the Authority shall mediate andconciliate disputes with a cooperative or betweencooperatives" however, with a restriction "that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within 3months from request, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the commission priorto the filing of appropriate action before the propercourts". Being an administrative agency, the CDAhas only such powers as are expressly granted toit by law and those which are necessarily impliedin the exercise thereof.- The Court also quoted the deliberations in boththe Senate and the House to show that the

legislative intent was NOT to grant quasi-judicialauthority to the CDA in accordance with the policyof the government granting autonomy tocooperatives. The Court noted that in the past 75years cooperativism failed to flourish in thePhilippines due to the stifling attitude of thegovernment toward cooperatives. While thegovernment wished to help, it invariably wanted tocontrol. Also, in its anxious efforts to pushcooperativism, it smothered cooperatives with somuch help that they failed to develop self-reliance.As one cooperative expert put it, "The strongembrace of government ends with a kiss of deathfor cooperatives.”Disposition Petition is DENIED. But the CA order

nullifying the election is SET ASIDE for lack of dueprocess. [Kasi, no notice & opportunity to be heardwas given to the new officers.]

DE JESUS v COMMISSION ON AUDIT(Sarah)

4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings arising from the samefacts

GALANG V CA (TEE HOOK CHUN)2 SCRA 234

CONCEPCION; May 30, 1961

NATUREOriginal action for a writ of certiorari to set aside adecision of, as well as a b ail bond granted by, the

CA.

FACTS(sorry guys! a lot of the case is in Spanish)- Upon some facts (in Spanish! All I know for sure isChun was a foreigner, and the CFI found him guiltyof evading some immigration law, and sentencedhim to 1 year of prison and a P1,000 fine, and Ithink it ordered him to be deported to Hongkongfor the service of the prison sentence), the CAfound that a petition filed by Chun for a write of habeas corpus was well taken, and allowed Chunbail, and denied the petitioner’s motion forreconsideration. This was based on the theory thatthe warrant of exclusion and the judgment of

conviction of Chun are based upon the same facts;that the administrative proceeding for hisexclusion is incompatible with his criminalprosecution in our courts of justice; that theinstitution of the criminal action implied a waiverof the authority to exclude him by administrativeproceeding; and that the warrant of exclusionissued by the petitioner became ineffective uponthe filing of the mentioned criminal case.- both proceedings arose from the same facts but:- the warrant of exclusion was based on section29(a)(17) of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940which said (a) The following classes of aliens shallbe ecluded from entry into the Philippines… (17)Persons not properly documented for admission as

may be required under the provisions of this Act.- On the other hand, the charge in the criminalcase was for an offense punishable under Section45(e) of the same Act, which provided that “Anyindividual who (e) being an alien, shall for anyfraudulent purpose represent himself to be aPhilippine citizen in order to evade anyrequirement of the immigration laws… shall beguilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof,shall be fined not more than P1000, andimprisoned for not more than 2 years, anddeported if he is an alien.ISSUES1. WON the two proceedings are incompatible witheach other and that the institution of the court

action amounted to a renunciation of theadministrative proceeding; and that, upon thefiling of the criminal case, the warrant of exclusionbecame unenforceable.

HELD1. NOReasoning This situation is analogous to that

where the same act constitutes 2 or more differentoffenses not covered by Article 48 of the RPC,except that, in this case, one offense is punishableas a felony or crime, and the other is to be dealtwith administratively. The one is not legallyinconsistent with the other, and the prosecution of the former does not entail a waiver of the actiondue for the latter.

The alleged conflict is, at best, “purelyphysical” in that the conflicts affect mainly thetime and place at which certain things will have tobe done (for example, if he’s tried in one case, itmay be impossible for him to appear at thehearing of another case, which consequently mighthave to be postpoed to another date; or, for

example, the service of several sentences mightnot be served simultaneously, etc.) supported bysubstantial evidence.Disposition the aforementioned decision of respondent Court is set aside, with costs againstChun.

CO SAN V DIRECTOR OF PATENTSGR 10563

BAUTISTA ANGELO; Feb. 23, 1961

FACTS- Respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio filed with the

Philippine Patent Office two applications for theissuance of letters patent on two designs forluggages. Subsequently, the Director of Patentsissued Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 in his favor.Petitioner Co San, however, filed with the PatentOffice a petition for cancellation of said letterspatent on the grounds provided for in sub-sections(a) and (b) of section 28 of Republic Act No. 165,to wit: .(a) The design allegedly invented by Mr. Ong LianBio is not now patentable in accordance with sec7, 8, and 9 of Chapter II of RA 165.(b) The specification submitted by said party doesnot comply with the requirements of Section 14,Chapter III of said Act.

104



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota- The petition for cancellation was dismissed bythe Director of Patents without hearing andreception of evidence because of his lack of statutory authority to consider the cancellation of design patents. Upon review, however, by SC, theDirector of Patents was ordered to hear thepetition for cancellation.- Petitioner adduced only documentary evidence

and relied heavily on the CA decision in People v.Co San, in which he was acquitted of the crime of unfair competition.- The Director of Patents, after analyzing the CAdecision, dismissed the petition for cancellation forinsufficiency of evidence.- Petitioner-appellant contends that the Director of Patents erred in not accepting as final andconclusive the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, namely, that the Petitioner was the prioruser of the design in question, and that thedesigns in Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 are not newand original. The Director of Patents held thatthese findings are not "clear", "satisfactory" and"free from doubt."

ISSUE/SWON the Director of Patents is bound in thecancellation proceedings by the findings arrived atby CA in the Criminal case against petitioner.

HELDNO.Reasoning In the cancellation proceedings thequestion refers to the validity of the designpatents issued to respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio,while in the criminal case the inquiry is whether CoSan unfairly competed against the luggage of saidrespondent protected by design patent No. 7. Thefirst is within the cognizance of the Patent Office

(Section 28, Republic Act No. 165, as amended) ;the second under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance (Article 189, Revised Penal Code, asamended by Republic Act 172). The acquittal of the petitioner by the Court of Appeals was notbased on the cancellation of a patent, but on theopinion that the accused (petitioner) had notdeceived or defrauded the complainant12(respondents).Disposition Petition for review is dismissed

VILLANOS V SUBIDO45 SCRA 142

BARREDO J; May 31,1971

FACTS:-Villanos, a long-time and highly- regarded teacherin Ilocos Sur. Due to a letter she wrote to two-co-teachers containing libelous remarks, a criminalcase for libel was filed against her by therecipients of such letter. A few days later, before

the Division Superintendent of Schools anadministrative charge against petitioner-appelleefor (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/orimmoral language and/or conduct. They supportedtheir charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the criminal action.was also filed against her.-pending the decision on the administrative case,Villanos was found guilty of libel. Theadministrative case was delayed due to motionsfiled by Villanos for a different investigator for theadministrative case. Due to the long period of timethat the case was left hanging, the admin casewas indorsed to the Secretary of Education. Basedon the testimony of one witness and such

conviction for libel, the Secretary recommended “that petitioner-appellee be transferred to anotherstation, reprimanded and warned that thecommission by her of the same or similar offensewill be severely dealt with”-Subido, judge of the Civil Service Commission,disregarded such recommendation and insteaddismissed Villanos from office.-CA reversed on the ground that petitioner was notafforded fair trial.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded fair trial when shewas dismissed based solely on one testimony in anunfinished investigation and her conviction in thecriminal case.

HELD:NO-The plea that the decision of the Court of Appealswhich found petitioner-appellee guilty of libelagainst the complainants in the administrativecase, which arose from the same allegedlyslanderous remarks, is enough basis forrespondent-appellant's decision is equally withoutmerit.-A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, evenif final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for adecision in an administrative case involving thesame facts, for the simple reason that matters that

are material in the administrative case are notnecessarily relevant in the criminal case-Even where criminal conviction is specified by lawas a ground for suspension or removal of an officialor employee, such conviction does not ex propriovigore justify automatic suspension withoutinvestigation and hearing as to such conviction.-Not even final conviction of a crime involving

moral turpitude, as distinguished from convictionpending appeal, dispenses with the requisitenotice and hearing. Final conviction is in sec 2188of Revised Administrative Code as ground forproceeding administratively against the convictedofficer but does not operate as automatic removaldoing away with the formalities of anadministrative hearing.

PNR V DOMINGOG.R. No. L-30772

Teehankee: October 29, 1971

FACTS:- Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic

in the employ of the Philippine NationalRailways was charged in an informationfor qualified theft for having stolen onebrass bearing valued at P45.00 from hisemployer's shop.

- The evidence for the prosecutionconsisted of the testimonies of theRailways' policeman who apprehendedrespondent in street clothes on his wayout at about 4 p.m. of July 4, 1967 with atraveling bag which contained the brassbearing; of the Manila Police Departmentpatrolman who took down the

respondent's extrajudicial confession; andof the corroborative testimony of theRailways' security guard who participatedin respondent's apprehension; as well asof the said objects taken from respondent

- Respondent, on his part, disowned anycriminal intent claiming he was on hisway to return the brass bearing andrepudiated his extrajudicial confession,asserting that he was coerced into signingthe same without being allowed to readits contents, which were different fromwhat he stated at the police investigation.

- Respondent court, in its decision of January 18, 1969, ruled that "the

105




prosecution has failed to establish theguilt of the accused beyond reasonabledoubt" and rendered judgment"acquitting the accused on reasonabledoubt."

- After promulgation on February 7, 1969 of the verdict of acquittal, however,respondent-accused filed on February 19,

1969 a motion for amendment of respondent court's decision, alleging forthe first time that respondent had alreadybeen dismissed from the service of theRailways because of the very incidentsubject matter of the criminal charge of which respondent court had acquittedhim, and praying that respondent courtamend its decision so as to includetherein his reinstatement, with paymentof back salaries and restoration of allaccrued rights and privileges.

- Respondent court in its order dated March3, 1969 set hearing of the motion onMarch 15, 1969 and ordered that the

parties and the general manager of thePhilippine National Railways be notifiedthereof, and thereafter issued its"amendatory decision" dated March 27,1969, noting that there was noappearance nor opposition from theRailways at the hearing and grantingrespondent's motion, by adding an orderto reinstate the accused immediately tohis position from which he was dismissedon July 4, 1967 and to pay his salary infull during the period beginning July 4,1967 to the date of reinstatement, and torestore the said accused to such benefitsand rights and privileges arising from the

position that he held which should haveaccrued to him during the periodaforesaid.

- Respondent court had denied PNR’smotion to set aside the amendatorydecision on grounds of lack of jurisdictionover it and over the subject matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due process. Upon petitioner'smotion and bond, the Court issued onAugust 27, 1969 a writ of preliminaryinjunction enjoining enforcement andexecution of the amendatory decision.

ISSUE:

WON the TC may properly decree the payment of salaries and order the reinstatement of theaccused

HELD:NO

- The general rule that the court has nosuch authority has long been uniformly

pronounced by the Court. In People vs.Mañago: "In a criminal proceeding againstan accused, the judgment that the lawauthorizes to be rendered, is either one of acquittal or of conviction with indemnityand the accessory penalties provided forby law. The payment of salary of anemployee during the period of hissuspension cannot, as a general rule, beproperly decreed by the trial court in ajudgment of acquittal."

- In the analogous case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Baltazar , the Court furtherelaborated that "In criminal cases courtsof first instance may dismiss an

information, try and acquit or convict andimpose upon the defendant the penaltyprovided by law.

- The only civil responsibility that may beimposed by the court is that which arisesfrom the criminal act. The acquittal of thedefendant does not mean necessarily thathe is not civilly liable unless the verdictand judgment of acquittal is that he didnot commit the crime charged. Butwhether a defendant acquitted of acriminal charge is entitled to his salaryduring suspension is not within the powerof the court to grant in the criminal casewhere the defendant is acquitted. Neitherthe Revised Penal code nor the Rules of Court on criminal procedure vests in thecourt authority to grant such relief.

THE POLICE COMMISSION V LOODG.R. No. L-34230D

TEEHANKEE; March 31, 1980

FACTS- An administrative complaint was filed againstCaptain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano andfive other members of the Makati PoliceDepartment charging them with grave misconduct.The succeeding year, twin criminal cases werefiled in the city court of Manila charging the same

administrative respondents with grave coercionbased on the same acts for which they had alreadybeen administratively charged. Soon thereafter,acting Manila Mayor Jose C. Luciano issued aMemorandum Order effecting the suspension fromoffice of the seven accused members of the MakatiPolice Department.- After due investigation, polcom rendered its

decision declaring Paile et al. guilty of gravemisconduct and ordering their dismissal from theservice. In the meantime, the City Court of Manilarendered judgment in the criminal cases againstPaile et al., acquitting them of the charges forgrave coercion on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.- In implementation of the decision of the Polcom,acting Mayor Luciano issued Administrative OrderNo. 39, Series of 1970, ordering the dismissal of the said administrative respondents from theservice.- Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by respondent judge Guardson R.Lood against the Polcom, the Mayor and the Chief

of Police of Makati, and the Makati Board of Investigators seeking, inter alia, the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunctionrequiring the Mayor of Makati to immediatelyreinstate them to their former positions in theMakati Police Department on their theory that, byreason of their acquittal of the criminal charges forgrave coercion by the City Court of Manila, theMayor of Makati had the duty specifically enjoinedto be performed by him by the second paragraphof Section 16, R.A. No. 4864, to immediatelyreinstate [them] and order the payment of theentire salary they failed to receive during theirsuspension.- Respondent judge declared respondents'

dismissal from the service as "without authority of law, null and void and without force and effect",and directed the issuance of the writ of preliminarymandatory injunction to reinstate them to theirrespective positions as Captain and Corporal in theMakati Police Department, with all the rights andprivileges thereto appertaining, including thepayment of their salaries during the period of theirsuspension from office.- The Polcom thus filed with this Court the instantpetition for certiorari to assail the orders of thepresiding judge of the court a quo.

ISSUE

106



Administrative Law A2010 Dean CarlotaWON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminarymandatory injunction and declaring respondents'dismissal from the service as null and void

HELDYES- It is a fundamental principle of administrative

law, as reaffirmed by the Court in PhilippinesNational Railways v. Domingo that "theadministrative case may generally proceed againsta respondent independently of a criminal action forthe same act or omission and requires only apreponderance of evidence to establishadministrative guilt as against proof beyondreasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in theanalogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the CivilCode." Here, the administrative case againstrespondents did proceed independently of thecriminal action and resulted in an earlieradministrative verdict of dismissal from theservice. The subsequent acquittal of saidrespondents as accused in the criminal case was of

no consequence since such acquittal merelyrelieved them from criminal liability but in no waycarried with it relief from the administrativeliability of dismissal from the service under thefinal order of the Polcom in the administrativecase.- Respondent judge’s reasoning in his challengedorder that "the administrative proceedings beforethe respondent Polcom had not in fact beenterminated, and as a matter of fact there is noshowing that the motion for reconsideration and/ornew trial had in fact been resolved. The resulttherefore is that the dismissal of the petitionersthus partook of the nature of a punishment evenwhile their case is under consideration, a clear

violation of their constitutional right to bepresumed innocent until the contrary is proved.”,is a patent error. The proceedings in theadministrative case before the Polcom had alreadybecome final and had been executed.

TAN V COMELEC237 SCRA 353

VITUG; October 4, 1994

FACTS- Petitioner Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by COMELEC as Vice-

Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers (CBC) of Davao City for 1992 national and local electionsconformably with the provisions of RA 6646 and of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).- On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Boardof Canvassers, Garcia was proclaimed the winningcandidate as representative of Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.

- Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidatefor the position, filed cases questioning the validityof the proclamation of Garcia and accusing themembers of the CBC of "unlawful, erroneous,incomplete and irregular canvass." -- Meanwhile, the electoral protest of privaterespondent Alterado was dismissed by the HouseHRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act" before the theOmbudsman was also dismissed for lack of criminal intent. Still pending is an administrativecharge, the case now before SC, instituted in theCOMELEC against the CBC, including Tan, for"Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence

and Acts Inimical to the Service."- Tan moved to dismiss the administrativecomplaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under theExecutive Dept of the government. COMELECdenied petitioner's MTD. Hence, the instantpetition.

ISSUEWON COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction incontinuing to take action on the administrativecase.

HELD

NO- The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8),Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters,and also under Section 52, Article VII, of theOmnibus Election Code.- The administrative case against Tan, takencognizance of by, and still pending with, theCOMELEC, is in relation to the performance of hisduties as an election canvasser and not as a cityprosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes itsauthority to exercise direct and immediatesupervision and control over national and localofficials or employees, including members of anynational or local law enforcement agency and

instrumentality of the government, required by lawto perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.- To ensure that such officials and EEs of gov’tcarry out their respective assigned tasks, lawprovides that upon the COMELEC'srecommendation, the corresponding properauthority (DOJ Sec.) shall take appropriate action,

either to suspend or remove from office the officeror employee who may, after due process, be foundguilty of violation of election laws or failure tocomply with instructions, orders, decision orrulings of the COMELEC. But before making itsrecommendation, COMELEC must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of thelaw, by the person administratively charged.- Note: COMELEC merely may issue arecommendation for disciplinary action but that itis the executive dept to which the charged officialor employee belongs which has the ultimateauthority to impose the disciplinary penalty.- The investigation then being conducted by theOmbudsman on the criminal case for falsification

and violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiryinto the administrative charges by the COMELEC,on the other hand, are entirely independentproceedings. Neither would the results in oneconclude the other. Thus, an absolution from acriminal charge is not a bar to an administrativeprosecutionDisposition Petition DISMISSED

OCAMPO v OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN322 SCRA 17

Buena ; Jan. 18, 2000FACTS-Ocampo (petitioner) is the Training Coordinator of.NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the NationalIrrigation Administration.-K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bankof Nepal (ADBN) requested a training proposal onsmall-scale community irrigation development.-NIACONSULT conducted the training program forsix Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 toMarch 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative,Deutsche Gesselschaft ) TechnischeZusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh TechnicalCooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany

107



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotapaid to the petitioner the agreed training fee intwo installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00.-NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S.Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding theturn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBNwhich petitioner personally received. Despitereceipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit thesaid amount prompting NIACONSULT through its

president, Maximino Eclipse, to file anadministrative case before respondentOMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraudor willful breach of trust.-Finding enough basis to proceed with theadministrative case, the AdministrativeAdjudication Bureau of the respondentOMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued anorder requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with acaveat that failure to file the same would bedeemed a waiver of his right to present evidence.Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with thesaid order.-A year later OMBUDSMAN issued another order

giving petitioner another chance to file hiscounter-affidavit and controverting evidence.Again, petitioner failed. Thus private respondentwas required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN topresent evidence to support its complaint.-OMBUDSMAN issued Resolution that Ocampo bedischarged from the service.-The dismissal of the criminal case will notforeclose administrative action filed againstpetitioner or give him a clean bill of health in allrespects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissingthe criminal complaint, was simply saying that theprosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a conditionsine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of

proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean anabsence of any evidence whatsoever for there isanother class of evidence which, thoughinsufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonabledoubt, is adequate in civil cases; this ispreponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the"substantial evidence" rule in administrativeproceedings which merely requires such relevantevidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.18 [Office of theCourt Administrator vs. Ramon G. Enriquez, 218SCRA 1 (1993)] Thus, considering the difference inthe quantum of evidence, as well as the procedurefollowed and the sanctions imposed in criminal andadministrative proceedings, the findings and

conclusions in one should not necessarily bebinding on the other.19 [Office of the CourtAdministrator vs. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 22-23(1995)]

ISSUEWON Ocampo was denied the opportunity to beheard.

HELDNOPetitioner has been amply accorded theopportunity to be heard. He was required toanswer the complaint against him. In fact,petitioner was given considerable length of time tosubmit his counter-affidavit. It took more than oneyear from February 17, 1992 before petitioner wasconsidered to have waived his right to file hiscounter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence was set. The March 17,1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a lastchance to present his defense, despite the privaterespondent's objections. But petitioner failed to

comply with the second order.Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence issolely of his own making and cannot escape hisown remissness by passing the blame on the graftinvestigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMANhas shown forebearance, petitioner has notdisplayed corresponding vigilance. He thereforecannot validly claim that his right to due processwas violated. We need only to reiterate that aparty who chooses not to avail of the opportunityto answer the charges cannot complain of a denialof due process.21 [Esber vs. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA664.]Petitioner's claim that he was not given any noticeof the order declaring him to have waived his right

to file his counter-affidavit and of allowing theprivate respondent to present evidence ex-parte isunmeritorious.The essence of due process is an opportunity to beheard. One may be heard, not solely by verbalpresentation but also, and perhaps even manytimes more creditably and practicable than oralargument, through pleadings. In administrativeproceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;administrative due process cannot be fullyequated to due process in its strict judicialsense.20 [Concerned Officials of the MWSS vs.Hon. Omubudsman Conrado Vasquez, 240 SCRA502.]

The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiringpetitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and whichwas admittedly received by the latter explicitlycontain a warning that if no counter-affidavit wasfiled within the given period, a waiver would beconsidered and the administrative proceedingsshall continue according to the rules. Thus,respondent OMBUDSMAN need not issue another

order notifying petitioner that he has waived hisright to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way,petitioner need not be notified of the ex-partehearing for the reception of private respondent'sevidence. As such, he could not have beenexpected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.With regard to the petitioner's claim that he maderequests for the production of the documentsalleged to be material to his defense, the record isbereft of any proof of such requests. If it were truethat the graft investigator did not act on suchrequests, petitioner should have filed the propermotion before the respondent OMBUDSMAN for theproduction of the documents or to compel therespondent complainant to produce whatever

record necessary for his defense. Petitioner didnot. It was only after the respondent OMBUDSMANissued the assailed resolution of November 18,1993 that he bewailed the alleged failure of respondent's graft investigator to require theproduction of the records of the subjecttransaction.

MIRALLES V GO349 SCRA 596

PANGANIBAN; January 18, 2001

FACTS- An administrative complaint was filed before theOffice of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM againstpetitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct. Itwas alleged that he killed Patrolman NiloResurrecion and Ernesto Merculio.- After an investigation, the hearing officersubmitted to the Adjudication Board findingMiralles guilty and recommending his dismissalfrom service. The Adjudication Board also foundhim guilty.

108



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota- petitioner appealed to the Special AppellateCommittee of the NAPOLCOM. The appeal wasdismissed since no appeal brief, memorandum orany pleading was filed by the petitioner after aperiod of more than one (1) year and seven (7)months.- Petitioner filed an MFR. The Special AppelateCommittee however affirmed the decision of the

Adjudication Board.- Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA ruled thatthe petitioner’s recourse was premature becausethe SAC-Napolcom’s decision should have beenappealed first before the Civil Service Commission,pursuant to RA 6975. Even if it would, as it did,rule on the merits, the CA held that petitioner’sappeal must still fail. The CA gave great weight tothe documents presented and to an eyewitnessaccount. It also ruled that the petitioner failed tosubstantiate his claim of self-defense

ISSUE/S1. WON the recourse to the CA was proper2. WON the evidence was sufficient to support the

Board’s conclusion3. WON the RTC’s dismissal of the criminal caseagainst him was conclusive of his innocence

HELD1. NO.Reasoning- Petitioner contends that his appeal is notgoverned by RA 6975 since it was promulgatedonly on January 2, 1991 and the assailed resolutionof SAC-Napolcom had been issued on October 20,1989. However, petitioner filed its appeal to the CAonly on December 4, 1996. By then, the law inforce, RA 6975, had already prescribed thatappeals from the Decision of the Napolcom should

be lodged first with the DILG and then with theCivil Service Commission. It did not matter thatthe assailed Napolcom ruling had beenpromulgated in 1989.2. YES.RatioAs a rule, administrative agencies’ factual findingsthat are affirmed by the Court of Appeals areconclusive on the parties and not reviewable bythe SC.Reasoning- On the documents presented: The bulk of thesedocuments, except Exhibits “B” and “C,” are publicdocuments consisting of reports made bygovernment officials in the performance of their

functions. Hence, they are prima facie evidence of the facts they stated.- On the eyewitness’ testimony: Petitioner claims,however, that Lamsen was not credible becausehe subsequently recanted his testimony “duringcross-examination. A cursory perusal of therecords indicates that it was not made on cross-examination. On the contrary, the recantation was

done when Lamsen appeared as a witness for thedefense, after he had testified for thecomplainants and been cross-examined as such.His subsequent testimony for the defense was,however, rightly brushed aside, because he hadfailed to appear for cross-examination despite duenotice. Indeed, the Napolcom Adjudication Boardwrote: “However, he failed to appear for cross-examination despite due notice at the later stagesof the formal investigation prompting theprosecution to move for the striking out of thisportion of his testimony for the defense from therecords and which motion was granted by theHearing Officer.”3. NO.

RatioAn administrative proceeding is different from acriminal case and may proceed independentlythereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latteris different, such that the verdict in one need notnecessarily be the same as in the otherReasoning It should be emphasized that a findingof guilt in the criminal case will not necessarilyresult in a finding of liability in the administrativecase. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does notnecessarily exculpate him administratively. In thesame vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liabilityagainst the respondent will not inexorably lead toa similar finding in the administrative action beforethis Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in

the civil action absolve the administrative liabilityof the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminaland civil cases are altogether different fromadministrative matters, such that the disposition inthe first two will not inevitably govern the thirdand vice versa.

5. Rules of Evidence

PHILIPPINE MOVE PICTURESWORKERS ASSOCIATION v PREMIER

PRODUCTION

(Jonas)

ESTATE OF FLORENCIO BUAN VPAMBUSCO99 PHIL 373

REYES, A.; MAY 31, 1956FACTS- The estate of Florencio P. Buan (petitioner), is anauthorized bus operator along various lines incentral and northern Luzon, with authority tooperate 8 auto-trucks along the Manila-Bagac lineand 11 along the Moron Dinalupihan line. Allegedlyin response to various resolutions of municipalcouncils and on petition of civic and labor groupsin the province of Bataan urging extension of itsservices to their respective municipalities,petitioner applied in four cases in the Commissionfor certificates of public convenience to operateadditional trips between Manila and various

municipalities and barrios in Bataan.- The Pampanga Bus Company (PAMBUSCO) andLa Mallorca (respondents) opposed theseapplications, both alleging that they are authorizedto operate and are actually operating a fleet of auto-trucks on the lines applied for and renderingadequate and satisfactory service; that theadditional services applied for are superfluous, willnot promote public interest in a proper andsuitable manner, and will result in cut-throat andruinous competition.- The Commission, after hearing the parties deniedthe applications on the grounds that petitioner hadnot made a case for the grant of the certificatesapplied for, that the service of the oppositors was

adequate and sufficient for the actual needs of thepublic and that grant of the applications wouldonly result in unnecessary or wasteful competition.- To prove the inadequacy of the present service,14 witnesses took the stand for petitioner andtestified to the insufficiency of transportationfacilities and the need for additional service on thelines applied for. Documentary proof, consisting of resolutions of municipal councils of Balanga,Dinalupihan, Limay, and Orani, and a petition of the Association of Citizens of Orion, was alsoadduced to show the need for the solicitedadditional service, and there was also mention of the inability of the Pampanga Bus Company toregister its authorized number of units, as well as

109



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotathe alleged noncompliance on the part of the tworespondents companies with the terms of theircertificates by suppressing trips on hours whenthey do not expect a sufficient number of passengers. On their part the two respondentcompanies presented six witnesses, anddocumentary proof too, to show that they wererendering service in accordance with the

requirements of their certificates and that theneeds of the traveling public were beingadequately served.- Unable at first to arrive at a decision from theconflicting evidence presented for both parties, theCommission ordered a survey of the passengertraffic on the lines applied for. The agents foundthat existing passenger traffic in all the lines donot warrant the authorization of additional service.

ISSUEWON the trips rendered by all the Bus lines areadequate to serve the public need.

HELD

YES. There is no need for additional services.Ratio The law, in investing the Public ServiceCommission with the power of supervision andcontrol over public transportation, has also clothedit with broad discretion in the exercise of thatpower. With that discretion this Court is notsupposed to interfere except in case of clearabuse.Reasoning While it is true that the two oppositorshave authority to operate direct service only onthree of the nine lines applied for by petitioner, inreality these direct lines pass through the otherroutes applied for like Orani and Orion, and thetwo oppositors have sufficient and convenient tripsgoing to the other destinations, whose hours of

departure and arrival are coordinated with thoseon the direct trips to Manila.- The discriminatory attitude imputed to theCommission by reason of its having, to petitioner'sprejudice, allegedly deviated from its consistentpolicy of approving applications for direct servicesince such kind of service is more convenient tothe traveling public than the broken trips, is morefancied than real, considering the finding that thepresent authorized trips are more than adequateto take care of the passenger traffic along theroutes in question.- The fact that respondents have dispatched tripswithout previous authority may call for some kindof disciplinary action. But it would not be a good

ground for authorizing additional trips where theCommission has found that there is already morethan adequate service along the main highway.With regard to Rules of Evidence- What appears is that the Commission, faced withthe conflict of evidence on the adequacy orinadequacy of the present service, has sought todiscover the truth through an on-the-ground

inspection and observation by its own agents andhas, on the basis of information thus obtained,arrived at the conclusion that the additionalservice applied for is uncalled for because there isalready amplitude, if not superabundance, in thenumber of authorized trips. That conclusion isamply supported by the record and is far frombeing the product of partiality or unfairdiscrimination.- The findings from the documents and theCommission’s own investigation were supportedby more than substantial evidence and thereforebinding upon this Court, which is not required toexamine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence

really justifies the decision.DISPOSITION Decision is affirmed, costs againstthe petitioner.

RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC. VMUNICIPALITY OF MORONG, RIZAL,

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION24 SCRA 285

ZALDIVAR; September 28, 1968

FACTS-Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. is a domesticcorporation with business address at Morong,

Rizal. In 1949, it was granted by the Commission acertificate of public convenience and necessity forthe installation, operation and maintenance of anelectric light, heat and power service in themunicipality of Morong, Rizal.-Dec19, 1956: the Commission required Rizal Lightto appear before to show cause why it should notbe penalized for violation of the conditions of itscertificate of public convenience and theregulations of the Commission, and for failure tocomply with the directives to raise its servicevoltage and maintain them within the limitsprescribed in the Revised Order No. 1 of theCommission, and to acquire and install a kilowatt

meter to indicate the load in kilowatts at anyparticular time of the generating unit.-Rizal Light failed to appear. The Commissionordered the cancellation and revocation of RizalLight's certificate of public convenience andnecessity and the forfeiture of its franchise. RizalLight filed MFR on the ground that its manager,Juan D. Francisco, was not aware of said hearing.

Respondent municipality opposed; motion was setfor hearing and it was found that the failure of Rizal Light to appear at the hearing the solebasis of the revocation of Rizal Light's certificate was really due to the illness of its manager. TheCommission set aside its order of revocation.Respondent municipality’s MFR was denied.-June 25, 1958: the municipality formally asked theCommission to revoke Rizal Light's certificate of public convenience and to forfeit its franchise onthe ground, among other things, that it failed tocomply with the conditions of said certificate andfranchise. Said petition was set for hearing jointlywith the order to show cause. The hearings hadbeen postponed several times.

-Meanwhile, inspections had been made of RizalLight's electric plant and installations by theengineers of the Commission. When the case wascalled for hearing on July 5, 1961, Rizal Light failedto appear. Respondent municipality was thenallowed to present its documentary evidence, andthereafter the case was submitted for decision.-July 7, 1961: Rizal Light filed a motion to reopenthe case upon the ground that it had not beenfurnished with a copy of the report of the June 21-24, 1961 inspection for it to reply as previouslyagreed. Rizal Light was granted a period of 10dayswithin which to submit its written reply to saidinspection report, on condition that should it fail todo so within the said period the case would be

considered submitted for decision. Rizal Lightfailed to file the reply. And the Commissionproceeded to decide the case. On July 29, 1962Rizal Light's electric plant was burned.-August 20, 1962: the Commission, on the basis of the inspection reports of its aforenamed engineers,found that the Rizal Light had failed to comply withthe directives contained in its letters, and hadviolated the conditions of its certificate of publicconvenience as well as the rules and regulations of the Commission. Accordingly, it ordered thecancellation and revocation of Rizal Light'scertificate of public convenience and the forfeitureof its franchise.

110



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlota-Sept 18, 1962: Rizal Light filed MFR, alleging thatbefore its electric plant was burned, its service wasgreatly improved and that it had still existinginvestment which the Commission should protect.-Eight days before said MFR was filed, MorongElectric, having been granted a municipalfranchise, filed with the Commission an applicationfor a certificate of public convenience and

necessity for said service. Rizal Light opposed inwriting said application.-The company also filed MTD the application uponthe ground that applicant Morong Electric had nolegal personality when it filed its application,because its certificate of incorporation was at thattime, not yet issued by the SEC. this MTD wasdenied (Morong Electric was a de factocorporation). Sir says we can omit this corpo lawpart =)-The case was heard on the merits and bothparties presented their respective evidence. Onthe basis of the evidence adduced, theCommission approved the application of MorongElectric and ordered the issuance in its favor of the

corresponding certificate of public convenienceand necessity.-Rizal Light filed with this SC these petitions forreview.

ISSUES1. WON the Commission acted without or in excessof its jurisdiction when it delegated the hearing of the case and the reception of evidence to Mr.Pedro S. Talavera who is not allowed by law tohear the same2. WON the cancellation of Rizal Light's certificateof public convenience was unwarranted becauseno sufficient evidence was adduced against theRizal Light and that Rizal Light was not able to

present evidence in its defense3. WON the Commission failed to give protection toRizal Light's investment4. WON the Commission erred in imposing theextreme penalty of revocation of the certificate.NOTE: The other issues are under Corporation Law,which are therefore omitted, as per instructions inthe outline.

HELDA factual determination will not be disturbedby SC unless patently unsupported byevidence. The findings and conclusions of fact made by the Public Service Commission,after weighing the evidence adduced by the

parties in a public service case, will not bedisturbed by the Supreme Court unless thosefindings and conclusions appear not to bereasonably supported by evidence.1. Rizal Light is estopped from raising this as anissue.Ratio Objection to the delegation of authority tohear a case filed before the Commission and to

receive the evidence in connection therewith is aprocedural, not a jurisdictional point, and is waivedby failure to interpose timely the objection and thecase had been decided by the Commission.Reasoning While Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, whoconducted the hearings of the case below, is adivision chief, he is not a lawyer. As such, underSection 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, asamended, the Commission should not havedelegated to him the authority to conduct thehearings for the reception of evidence of theparties.-However, since Rizal Light has never raised anyobjection to the authority of Mr. Talavera beforethe Commission, it should be deemed to have

waived such procedural defect, and consonantwith the precedents on the matter, Rizal Light'sclaim that the Commission acted without or inexcess of jurisdiction in so authorizing Mr. Talaverashould be dismissed.2. NO.-In reviewing the decision of the Public ServiceCommission this Court is not required to examinethe proof de novo and determine for itself whetheror not the preponderance of evidence reallyjustifies the decision. The only function of thisCourt is to determine whether or not there isevidence before the Commission upon which itsdecision might reasonably be based. This Courtwill not substitute its discretion for that of the

Commission on questions of fact and will notinterfere in the latter's decision unless it clearlyappears that there is no evidence to support it.-The Commission based its decision on theinspection reports submitted by its engineers whoconducted the inspection of Rizal Light's electricservice upon orders of the Commission. Saidinspection reports specify in detail the deficienciesincurred, and violations committed, by the RizalLight resulting in the inadequacy of its service.Said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably asbases of the decision in question, for these are notmere documentary proofs presented for theconsideration of the Commission, but are theresults of the Commission's own observations and

investigations which it can rightfully take intoconsideration-Re: Rizal Light's failure to present evidence, aswell as its failure to cross-examine the authors of the inspection reports… Rizal Light should notcomplain because it had waived not only its rightto cross-examine but also its right to presentevidence in open court through its counsel Atty.

Luque.-Re: Rizal Light's claim that the Commission shouldhave taken into consideration the testimony of Mr.Bernardino… The Commission could not havetaken judicial cognizance of said testimony, forvarious reasons: first, it is not a proper subject of judicial notice, as it is not a "known" fact; second,it was given in a subsequent and distinct caseafter the Rizal Light's MFR was heard by theCommission en banc and submitted for decision;and third, it was not brought to the attention of theCommission in this case through an appropriatepleading.-Re: the contention of Rizal Light that theCommission had acted both as prosecutor and

judge… There are two matters that had to bedecided in this case, namely, the order to showcause and the petition or complaint filed byrespondent municipality. Both matters were heardjointly, and the record shows that respondentmunicipality had been allowed to present itsevidence to substantiate its complaint. It can notbe said, therefore, that in this case theCommission had acted as prosecutor and judge.Even assuming, for the sake of argument, thatthere was a commingling of the prosecuting andinvestigating functions, this exercise of dualfunctions, is authorized by Sec17(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended.-Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Estate of F.P.

Buan (1958) the power of the Commission tocancel and revoke a certificate of publicconvenience and necessity may be exercised by iteven without a formal charge filed by anyinterested party, with the only limitation that theholder of the certificate should be given his day incourt.-When prosecuting and investigating duties aredelegated by statute to an administrative body, asin the case of the Public Service Commission, saidbody may take steps it believes appropriate for theproper exercise of said duties, particularly in themanner of informing itself whether there isprobable violation of the law and/or its rules andregulations. It may initiate an investigation, file a

111



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotacomplaint, and then try the charge as preferred.So long as the respondent is given a day in court,there can be no denial of due process, andobjections to said procedure cannot be sustained.3. The rule is inapplicable.-"protection-of-investment rule" - BatangasTranspo Co. vs. Orlanes-"The Government having taken over the control

and supervision of all public utilities, so long as anoperator under a prior license complies with theterms and conditions of his license and reasonablerules and regulations for its operation and meetsthe reasonable demands of the public, it is theduty of the commission to protect rather than todestroy his investment by the granting of thesecond license to another person for the samething over the same route of travel. The grantingof such a license does not serve its convenience orpromote the interests of the public."-This rule is not absolute, for nobody has exclusiveright to secure a franchise or a certificate of publicconvenience. Where, as in the present case, it hasbeen shown by ample evidence that the Rizal

Light, despite ample time and opportunity given toit by the Commission, had failed to renderadequate, sufficient and satisfactory service andhad violated the important conditions of itscertificate as well as the directives and the rulesand regulations of the Commission, the rule cannotapply.-To apply that rule unqualifiedly is to encourageviolation or disregard of the terms and conditionsof the certificate and the Commission's directivesand regulations, and would close the door to otherapplicants who could establish, operate andprovide adequate, efficient and satisfactoryservice for the benefit and convenience of theinhabitants. It should be emphasized that the

paramount consideration should always be thepublic interest and public convenience. The duty of the Commission to protect the investment of apublic utility operator refers only to operators of good standing - those who comply with the laws,rules and regulations and not to operators whoare unconcerned with the public interest andwhose investments have failed or deterioratedbecause of their own fault.4. NO-Sec16(n) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, asamended, confers upon the Commission amplepower and discretion to order the cancellation andrevocation of any certificate of public convenienceissued to an operator who has violated, or has

willfully and contumaciously refused to complywith, any order, rule or regulation of theCommission or any provision of law. What mattersis that there is evidence to support the action of the Commission.-In the instant case, as shown by the evidence, thecontumacious refusal of the Rizal Light since 1954to comply with the directives, rules and regulations

of the Commission, its violation of the conditions of its certificate and its incapability to comply with itscommitment as shown by its inadequate service,were the circumstances that warranted the actionof the Commission in not merely imposing a finebut in revoking altogether Rizal Light's certificate.To allow Rizal Light to continue its operation wouldbe to sacrifice public interest and convenience infavor of private interest.-The imposition of a fine may only be one of theremedies which the Commission may resort to, inits discretion. But that remedy is not exclusive of,or has preference over, the other remedies. Andthis Court will not substitute its discretion for thatof the Commission, as long as there is evidence to

support the exercise of that discretion by theCommission.Disposition The two decisions of the PublicService Commission affirmed, with costs in the twocases against Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc.

BORJA V MORENO, ET AL.11 SCRA 568

MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1964

FACTS- Borja is the owner of a parcel of land.- An administrative complaint was filed against anumber of landowners, among them petitioner

Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any otherworks in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe,pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.2056.- In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged tohave closed the stream called Matlaue, supposedlypublic, which runs through his land.- Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Departmentof Public Works and Communications, wasdesignated by the Secretary to investigate thecharges in the complaint.- A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by theUndersecretary, M. B. Bautista, was served uponcounsel for Borja ordering the latter to remove the

dams and/or dikes illegally constructed across thechannel of the southern portion of Batacan-Matlaue- The foregoing decision of respondent Secretarywas assailed by petitioner Borja.- The trial the court rendered the judgmentgranting the writs prayed for by petitioner;declaring null and void and of no legal effect all

proceedings had by respondents in theadministrative investigation, including thedecision; restraining and prohibiting respondentSecretary from enforcing said decision, anddeclaring the injunction previously issued to bepermanent.

ISSUES1. WON the lower Court erred in holding in effectthat Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional2. The lower Court erred in not finding the decisionof the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications supported by evidence.

HELD

1. NO.- It is not true that the trial court ruled theforegoing provisions unconstitutional. On thecontrary, it declined to pass upon theconstitutional question on the ground that thoseprovisions do not apply to the facts of the instantcase.- The particular fact which removes this case fromthe purview of RA 2056 and which it consideredduly established by the evidence is that theMatlaue stream which runs through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable riverbut his private property.- The implication is that the authority of theSecretary of Public Works and Communications to

proceed under the provisions of said statutecovers only cases where there is no dispute as tothe public navigable character of the river orwaterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, butthat when this is precisely a basic fact incontention the matter should be left to the courtsfor determination.- There is a certain danger in leaving theadjudication of a claim of private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of an executive official. This danger is demonstratedby the very argument of appellants under theirthird and fourth assignments of error. They pointto the evidence submitted at the administrativeinvestigation and, invoking the "substantial

112



Administrative Law A2010 Dean Carlotaevidence" rule, assail the lower court's conclusionthat the Matlaue stream is privately owned.- The said rule, indeed, which has been applied ina number of cases in this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial evidence to support thefindings of an administrative official in matterswithin his competence, that is, "such relevantevidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion" the courts arebound to look no further, not even to considercontrary evidence of a preponderant nature.- If the decision of the administrative officialcarries with it, as the premise upon which it rests,a finding that certain property claimed by a privateparty to be his is in fact part of the public domain,it does not seem fair to take that finding asconclusive upon the courts just because it issupported by substantial evidence, although theremay be evidence to the contrary which, if properlyconsidered and evaluated, would lead them to adifferent conclusion.2. YES.- There is substantial evidence to support the

conclusion of respondent Secretary that theMatlaue stream is a public navigable river. Thisevidence consists of the testimony of twowitnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman,and of the result of the ocular inspectionconducted by the investigator.- Nevertheless, the Court di not feel justified inaffirming, for purposes of adjudication, theaforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, andreversing that of the trial court, for theinvestigation wherein the evidence was receivedwas conducted with manifest disregard of therequirements of due process. And it was solely onthat ground that the members of this Court agreedthat the decision should be predicated.

MACEDA V ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

199 SCRA 454EN BANC; July 18, 1991

FACTS- Maceda seeks nullification of the EnergyRegulatory Board Orders dated December 5and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearingsconducted on the second provisional increasein oil prices did not allow him substantialcross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a

denial of due process.- August 2, 1990 – Respondent oil companiesfiled applications for an increase in oil priceswith the ERB.- In an order dated September 21, 1990 - TheERB issued an order granting a provisionalincrease of P1.42 per liter. Maceda filed apetition for Prohibition on September 26,

1990 seeking to nullify the provisionalincrease. The petition was dismissed by theSC, saying that “while under Executive OrderNo. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it doesnot preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here,subject to its final disposition of whether ornot: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduceor increase it further; or (3) to deny theapplication.”- In the same order of September 21, 1990,authorizing provisional increase, the ERB setthe applications for hearing with due noticeto all interested parties on October 16, 1990.Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said

hearing as well as on the second hearing anOctober 17, 1990. The hearing waspostponed to October 20 to afford theoppositors the chance to be heard. Anotherpostponement followed on November 5because of a written request by Maceda.- November 5, 1990 - The three oilcompanies filed their respective motions forleave to file or admit amended/supplementalapplications to further increase the prices of petroleum products.- Hearing for the presentation of theevidence-in-chief commenced on November21, 1990 with ERB ruling that testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of

Affidavits. ERB subsequently outlined theprocedure to be observed in the reception of evidence as follows: to defer the cross-examination of applicant Caltex's witnessand ask the other applicants to present theirevidence-in-chief so that the oppositors willhave a better idea of what all of these willlead to. It was the intention of the Board toact on these applications on an industry-widebasis and the best way to give the oppositorsand a clear picture of what the applicants areasking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to the presented first. Cross-examinationwas to follow afterwards.- Maceda maintains that this order of proof

deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses anddenied him his right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He pointsout that this relaxed procedure resulted inthe denial of due process.

ISSUE

WON the order of presentation of evidence hasresulted to denial of due process

HELDNORatio The order of testimony both with respect tothe examination of the particular witness and tothe general course of the trial is within thediscretion of the court and the exercise of thisdiscretion in permitting to be introduced out of theorder prescribed by the rules is not improper.Reasoning- Such a relaxed procedure is especially true inadministrative bodies, such as the ERB, which inmatters of rate or price fixing, is considered as

exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial,function. As such administrative agency, it is notbound by the strict or technical rules of evidencegoverning court proceedings- Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice andProcedure Governing Hearings Before the ERBprovides that: “These Rules shall governpleadings, practice and procedure before theEnergy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry,study, hearing, investigation and/or any otherproceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.However, in the broader interest of justice, theBoard may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitableprocedure as shall promote the objectives of the

Order.”Disposition Petitions dismissed.

BANTOLINO V COCA-COLABOTTLERS PHIL G.R. No. 153660

BELLOSILLO; JUNE 10 2003

FACTS-Employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers filed complaintagainst the company for unfair labor practicethrough illegal dismissal, violation of their securityof tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo

113



Administrative Law A2010 Dean CarlotaSystem.-Coca-cola denies that there was ER-EErelationship (said independent contractors werethe ERs). Labor Arbiter that there was and orderedreinstatement and payment of backwages.-On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of theLabor Arbiter that there was indeed an ER-EErelationship between the complainants and

respondent company.-Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the CA which,although affirming the finding of the NLRC that anER-EE rel existed bet. the contending parties,nonetheless agreed with respondent that theaffidavits of some of the complainants, Bantolinoand 6 others, should not have been givenprobative value for their failure to affirm thecontents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the CA dismissedtheir complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. (Inthe same decision, other complainants weredeclared regular employees since they were theonly ones subjected to cross-examination)-Petitioners: CA should not have given weight to

respondent’s claim of failure to cross-examinethem. They insist that, unlike regular courts, laborcases are decided based merely on the parties’position papers and affidavits in support of theirallegations and subsequent pleadings that may befiled thereto. The Rules of Court should not bestrictly applied in this case specifically by puttingthem on the witness stand to be cross-examinedbecause the NLRC has its own rules of procedurewhich were applied by the Labor Arbiter in comingup with a decision in their favor.-Respondent: since the other alleged affiants werenot presented in court to affirm their statements,much less to be cross-examined, their affidavitsshould be stricken off the records for being self-

serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence

ISSUE/SWON giving evidentiary value to the affidavits(despite the failure of the affiants to affirm theircontents and undergo the test of cross-examination) is proper

HELDYES- Rabago v NLRC: "the argument that the affidavitis hearsay because the affiants were not presentedfor cross-examination is not persuasive becausethe rules of evidence are not strictlyobserved in proceedings before

administrative bodieslike the NLRC wheredecisions may be reached on the basis of positionpapers only."-Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v.NLRC states: under Art. 221 of the Labor Code,the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law donot control proceedings before the Labor Arbiterand the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are

authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertainthe facts in each case speedily and objectively andwithout regard to technicalities of law andprocedure, all in the interest of due process.-Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not boundby the technical niceties of law and procedure andthe rules obtaining in courts of law. The RevisedRules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence maybe given only stringent application, i.e., by analogyor in a suppletory character and effect-People v. Sorrel (cited by respondent) saying thatan affidavit not testified to in a trial, is merehearsay evidence and has no real evidentiaryvalue, cannot find relevance in the present caseconsidering that a criminal prosecution requires a

quantum of evidence different from that of anadministrative proceeding. Under the Rules of theCommission, the Labor Arbiter is given thediscretion to determine the necessity of a formaltrial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are noteven required as the cases may be decided basedon verified position papers, with supportingdocuments and their affidavits.

114