Administrative Circulars in relation to B.P. Blg. 22

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 12-2000RE: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22

Section 1 ofB.P. Blg. 22(An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds for Credit and for Other Purposes)imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998; 298 SCRA 656, 664) the Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation ofB.P. Blg. 22by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryPetitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation ofB.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Section 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case, we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitionersIn the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G. R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000), the Supreme Courten banc, applyingVacaalso deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed byB.P. Blg. 22,i.e., P200,000, and concluded that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.

All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations ofB.P. Blg. 22.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 February 14, 2001SUBJECT :CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 ON THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING CHECK LAW.Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding the operation ofAdministrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000.In particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to:1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 22;and2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused who is found guilty of violating the provisions ofB.P. Blg. 22,is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering thatAdministrative Circular No. 12-2000adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine.The clear tenor and intention ofAdministrative Circular No. 12-2000is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for inB.P. Blg. 22.The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.Thus,Administrative Circular No. 12-2000establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions ofB.P. Blg. 22such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,Administrative Circular No. 12-2000ought not be deemed a hindrance.It is, therefore, understood that:1.Administrative Circular 12-2000does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations ofB.P. Blg. 22;2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of theRevised Penal Codeprovisions on subsidiary imprisonment.Does Administrative Circular 13-2001 decriminalize violations of B.P. Blg 22?No. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, established a rule of preference in imposing penalties in B.P. 22 cases.Section 1 of B.P. 22 imposes the following alternative penalties for its violation, to wit: (a) imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year; or (b) a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceedP200,000; or (c) both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.[footnoteRef:2] [2: Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669.June 6, 2002]

The rationale of Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 is found in our rulings inEduardo Vaca vs. Court of Appeals[footnoteRef:3]andRosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines.[footnoteRef:4] The Supreme Court held in those cases that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if, in fixing the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, i.e. that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.[footnoteRef:5] [3: G.R. No. 131714, 298 SCRA 656, 664 (1998).] [4: G.R. No. 130038, 340 SCRA 497, 504 (2000).] [5: Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669.June 6, 2002]

To be sure, it is not the intention of the Court to decriminalize violation of B.P. 22.Neither is it the Courts intention to delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment.The propriety and wisdom of decriminalizing violation of B.P. 22 is best left to the legislature and not this Court.As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down arule of preferencein the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.Where the circumstances of the case, for instance, clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the more appropriate penalty.This rule of preference does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22.Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge.Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a hindrance.[footnoteRef:6] [6: Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669.June 6, 2002]

The Court is not unaware of the importance of checks in commercial transactions.In commercial parlance, they have been widely and fittingly known as the substitute of money and have effectively facilitated the smooth flow of commercial transactions.Thus, the pernicious effects and repercussions of circulating worthless checks are simply unimaginable.It is for this reason that B.P. 22 was enacted by the legislature, to penalize individuals who would place worthless checks in circulation and degrade the value and importance of checks in commercial transactions. Nevertheless, while the Court recognizes the noble objective of B.P.22, it deems it proper to apply the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing penalties for its violation.The gist of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is to consider the underlying circumstances of the case such that if the situation calls for the imposition of the alternative penalty of fine rather than imprisonment, the courts should not hesitate to do so.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669.June 6, 2002]