adventures in large scale http header abuse zachary wolff

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Adventures in Large Scale HTTP Header Abuse Zachary Wolff

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Adventures in Large Scale HTTP Header Abuse

Zachary Wolff

About Me

• SIEM Deployments, Research Engineer for LogRhythm (Labs) | 2+ years

• Threat Research Analyst for Webroot Software | 2+ years

Lets Talk About HTTP Headers

Browser

Web Server

• Standard Fields for Request & Response defined in RFC- 2616 (RTFRFC)

• GET / HTTP/1.0 is a legitimate request but may not return expected results

• RFC sets no limits on size of header, field name, value or number of headers

• Most webservers now impose their own limits :

HTTP Headers Basics

IISv4 – 2MBv5 – 128K-16KB*V6 – 16 KB*V7 – 16 KB*

Apachev2.3 – 8KB*

*Per Header Field

Existing/Past HTTP Header Attacks

The Premise

I want to break some logging applications!

par exemple, to begin

Round 1: Begin

Original Premise: GET Request returns 302, 200, (valid response) then send a second GET with a malicious User Agent string* to see if we can get 500 response

1. Crawler to collect URL’s2. Python script to send attack/test UA String 3. Store results in SQLite3 DB4. Profit!

Round 1: Results

Data set: 400K URL’s

• Lots of 500’s! • Lots of smaller, low traffic site, some bigger

high traffic sites• Various different errors….

Round 1: Results

Custom 500’s…

Regular expression parsing errors….

le yawn..

Non verbose IIS Errors…

Not as boring, generic apache 500

and the x.x.gov sites….?

Round 1: Conclusion

What did we find?

•Some SQL injectable 500’s•Possible application level DOS•Lots of websites are not expecting malicious Header requests…•Further exploration is warranted

the Question

How extensive is the problem of improper HTTP header handling?

Round 2: Begin

1. Need a more effective way to identify vulnerabilities 2. Lets attack/audit more than just User-Agent Header3. Expand beyond backtick, additional attack strings4. Larger sample set, 1.6 Million URL’s5. Must be able to store and access very large set of

result data efficiently (Shodan is amazing)

Round 2: Vulnerability Identification

500’s are ok, but much to broad What is a good indication of a possible SQLi vulnerability?

Run regular Expression against HTML.data response to match on, “you have an error in your sql syntax”

Round 2: Vulnerability Identification

Improved error detection, basic SQLi & beyonds[0] = "you\shave\san\serror" s[1] = "Warning.*supplied\sargument\sis\snot\sa\svalid\sMySQL\sresult" s[2] = "Warning.*mysql_.*\(\)" s[4] = "microsoft\sOLE\sDB\sProvider\sfor\sODBC\sDriver" s[5] = "Microsoft\sOLE\sDB\sProvider\sfor\sSQL\sServer" s[6] = "\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC Microsoft Access Driver\] Syntax error" s[7] = "Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers.*\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC SQL Server Driver\]" s[8] = "Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers.*\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC Access Driver\]" s[9] = "Microsoft JET Database Engine" s[10] = "ADODB.Command.*error" s[11] = "Microsoft VBScript runtime" s[12] = "Type mismatch | VBScript / ASP error" s[13] = "Server Error.*System\.Data\.OleDb\.OleDbException" s[14] = ":\squoted\sstring\snot\sproperly\sterminated" s[15] = "ORA-[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]" s[16] = "Invalid SQL statement or JDBC" s[17] = "org\.apache\.jasper\.JasperException" s[18] = "Warning.*failed to open stream" s[19] = "Fatal Error.*on line" s[20] = "Fatal Error.*at line" s[21] = "\[Microsoft\]\[SQL\sNative\sClient\]\[SQL\sServer\]" s[22] = "An\sunexpected\serror\shas\soccured!.*MySQL\serror!" s[23] = "\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC\sDriver\sManager\]\sDriver" s[24] = "\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC\sSQL\sServer\sDriver\]\[SQL\sServer\]" s[25] = "\[Microsoft\]\[SQL\sServer\sNative\sClient\s10\.0\]Named\sPipes\sProvider"

*Thanks to @j0emccray for contributing to regEx list

Beyond RegEx based Error Detection

Byte Anomaly Detection Added (--bad)

Compare content-length of response data from original/clean GET to data from malicious GET.

*Set margin of alert to 150 bytes above and 150 bytes below clean request, log results (including HTML response data) to file

Round 2: Additional Header Fields

• Let’s test: Host, From*, X-Forwarded-For, Referer, User-Agent, Non existent Header

• Smart Mode (-s) : Will look at all Header fields returned by the server and test those (minus whitelist of rarely dynamic Headers)

• Cookies!

Cookie Support

Cookie Support added. Server Sends us this:

PyLobster Responds with this:

And the server says?

Round 3: Updates

Updated Testing Values: “,;,%00, %00’

Round 2: Design

“I Improved the crawler to harvest 500K+ URL’s a day. You should put my picture in your whitepaper”

Output additions (beyond SQLite):• Elasticsearch Indexing support added (fast, efficient, JSON to

webinterface)• Flat File logging

Mark Vankempen, LogRhythm Labs

More Improvments

Added Footprint mode (-g)1. Generate random(ish) Hash or value2. Save to key.txt file in same directory as pylobster.py3. Activate Footprint mode: ./pylobster.py –g pyLobster will now send your unique string/hash as a request like so:

Then, Wait for it… Days, Weeks, MonthsGoogle/Bing/duckduckgo your hash/string to discover unprotected Log directories ;)

pyLobsters maiden voyage

Ready Begin!

pyLobster is currently a single threaded tool so I divided my 1.6 Million URL’s into 78 unique lists and spawned 78 instances

#!/bin/bashnohup python pyLobster.py -f a --bad -s -l -g &nohup python pyLobster.py -f b --bad -s -l -g &nohup python pyLobster.py -f c --bad -s -l -g &nohup python pyLobster.py -f d --bad -s -l -g &

And so on……

PyLobster’s Maiden Voyage Results

• Sending a null byte in your HTTP Headers will catch a fair bit of IDS attention ;)

• Grep response HTML on regEx error match directory to find patterns & specific components/module/application/CMS vulnerabilities. (highest value finding: one vulnerable component can lead to many others, shared DB’s as well)

• Various vulnerable components identified

Findings: Breakdown by RegEx #

*

Out of 1.6 Million Unique URL’s, 14,500 Error RegEx’s Matched!

*0,1 & 2 are MySQL errors, 18 & 19 are PHP

Findings: Error Breakdown by Test String

Of the 14,500 Error RegEx’s Matched

Findings: Error breakdown by HTTP Header

*Cookies: 1584

Findings: error #0, breakdown by header field

Error #0: “you have an error in you SQL syntax"

Findings: Footprint Mode

Footprint Mode

12/13/2012

02/25/2013

Foot Print Mode

3/27/2013

Findings: (--bad)

Byte Anomaly Detection Results

• Work to be done….• grep over dir for [wordpress|joomla|error|

pass.*=|cms|.*?|] • Sort response files by size for like errors• Sort by status code response & file size

Defending Against HTTP Header Attacks

• Raise developer awareness that any dynamically handled Header values need to be seen as user input and processed accordingly

• Audit your sites HTTP Header Processing (pyLobster on github, SQLmap now supports custom Header testing too. bingo!)

• Proactively review/monitor your web logs

This:

Creates this Log trail:

The End

Thank you!

@nopsliphttps://github.com/nopslip/pyLobster

[email protected]