AetiusAttila’s Nemesis

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Contents

List of PlatesList of MapsAcknowledgementsForewordIntroduction 1. Historical Background and Early Years2. Aetius the Hostage3. Aetius Takes the Stage4. The Late Roman Army5. The Barbarians6. Magister Militum per Gallias

7. Magister Militum Praesentalis8. Undisputed Leadership9. The Fall of Africa

10. The Treaty of 44211. After Africa12. The Calm Before the Storm13. Crisis14. The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains15. Attila’s Invasion of Italy16. The End17. AftermathConclusion

Outline ChronologyImperial Family TreeSelect PersonalitiesNotesBibliography

List of Plates

1. Possible diptych of Aetius

2. Sarcophagus of Stilicho

3.Mausoleum of Galla Placidia inRavenna

4. Interior of Placidia’s Mausoleum

5. Painting of Galla Placidia

6.Medallions of Honorius and GallaPlacidia

7. Solidus showing wedding ofValentinian III and Licinia Eudoxia

8.Honorius on the consular diptych ofProbus

9. Diptych of Flavius Felix

10.Inscription from Altava referring to‘barbarians’

11. Inscription to Merobaudes

12. Inscription to Aetius

13. Close-up of inscription to Aetius

14.Diptych celebrating consulship ofAstyrius

15.Silver disc made to commemorateAspar’s consulship

16. Roman amphitheatre at Arles

17. Coin allegedly produced for Aetius

18. Coin minted by Boniface in Africa

19.Siliqua produced in Africa byGaiseric

20. Coin minted by the usurper John

21and22.

Coins minted during the reign ofValentinian III

23and24.

Coins minted for Aelia Pulcheria andAelia Eudocia

25. Bronze medal showing Attila

26. ‘Attila’s Throne’ in Venice

27. Feast of Attila by Mor Than (1870)

28. The Meeting between Leo the Greatand Attila’ by Raphael

29.‘The Huns at the Battle of Chalons’,De Neuville

30. The countryside around Troyes

31.‘Genseric sacking Rome 455’,Briullov

32.‘Sainte Geneviève et Attila’,Maindron Hippolyte

List of Maps

1. The Empire at the Time of Theodosius I2. The Western Empire c.4083. The Western Empire c.4234. Aetius in Gaul5. Spain c.4296. Aetius’ Campaigns in Gaul, Raetia andItaly7. The Vandals in Africa8. The Vandal Settlement of 4359. The Western Empire c.439

10. Africa, Spain and the East11. The Vandal Settlement of 44212. Barbarian Settlements13. Spain and Gaul 449–45014. Attila’s Invasion of Gaul15. Attila’s Invasion of Italy

Acknowledgements

As is usual, my gratitude must go to PhilipSidnell for keeping faith with an unknownauthor. I hope that this third book continuesto repay that confidence.

I would like to thank Adrian Goldsworthyfor agreeing to read through early drafts ofthe entire book. For reading excerptedchapters I would like to thank PhilipMatyszak. Finally, I would like to expressmy extreme gratitude to Perry Gray for notonly reading the whole manuscript but fortaking the time to discuss significant points

throughout the process. The comments,criticisms and corrections of the above havebeen a valuable asset in the writing process.However, it should not be taken for grantedthat they agree with all that is written here,and for any mistakes that remain I amsolely responsible.

For helping me to secure otherwiseimpossible-to-acquire books, I would onceagain like to thank the staff at ThurnscoeBranch Library, Barnsley, and especiallyAndrea World of the Inter-Library LoansDepartment of Barnsley Libraries.

I would very much like to thank thefollowing people for kindly allowing me touse their photographs in the plates: BeastCoins (www.beastcoins.com), CNG coins(www.cngcoins.com), Giovanni Dall’Orto ofWikimedia, Sean Pruitt, Didier Rykner,Nigel Rodgers, and ‘Antiquite Tardive’ ofFlickr. Their generosity is very much

appreciated.For their patience and for permission to

use photographs from their extensive andvaluable libraries I would like to thank DrManfred Clauss of ILS, and Dr AndreasFaßbender and Dr Manfred G. Schmidt ofCIL.

My gratitude also goes to RaffaeleD’Amato, Roy Boss and Graham Sumner fortheir correspondence regarding depictionsof Aetius in ancient monuments anddiptychs, although they may not agree withthe conclusions I have drawn.

As with my first two books, this bookwould not have been the same without thecontributions of the members of bothwww.romanarmytalk.com/rat/ andwww.unrv.com.forum. They have yet againbeen exceptionally patient, especially withregards to questions about the availabilityof photographs.

My utmost gratitude goes to theindividuals and institutions who have madeavailable the ever-growing corpus of sourcematerial on the internet. I will, however,refrain from mentioning individuals byname, since a look at the bibliography willshow that it would need a separate book tolist all of the people involved and to singleindividuals out for special praise would beunfair.

To all of these people, once again, myheartfelt thanks.

However, most of all I would like to thankJoanna for her endurance in readingthrough a third book about ‘some bloke fromancient Rome’. For her seemingly endlesspatience and understanding I remainforever in her debt.

Finally, to my son Owen – again, I wouldlike to apologize for all of the times whenyou have wanted to play and been told, ‘Not

now, Daddy is working.’ Unfortunately, thiswill continue, as I have now signed a dealfor another book. Sorry!

Foreword

Historians of the fourth and fifth centurieshave a particularly difficult life. Those usedto the relative certainties of the late republicand early empire can only look on withadmiration at those brave souls who plungeinto the mess that is late antiquity.

‘Mess’ is not putting it too strongly.Firstly, the Roman Empire itself was in amess, and particularly so the westernempire. A series of barbarian invasions notonly tore through the countryside, but alsothrough the social and economic fabric of

the affected provinces. The empire wasbankrupt, the peasantry surly and mutinous(and often likely to side with the invaders)and the soldiers too few and of dubiousloyalty.

Secondly, the evidence is in a mess.Barbarian invasions and civil wars tend tobe confusing events even at the time, letalone 1,500 years later, when the historianhas to make sense of the fragmentarywritings of people who themselves had littleidea of what was actually going on.Furthermore, the motives of the mainprotagonists are often obscure. And that iseven if we assume that the actions of theprotagonists are accurately reported anddated – an assumption any chronicler of lateantiquity is likely to greet with sardoniclaughter. Documents are scanty and tend torefer even to major events in oblique terms.Entire battles have gone missing. To give

but one example, early in the period Britaindrifted out of imperial control. One mightthink this would be significant enough towarrant a detailed description in theprimary sources, and perhaps even ananalysis of the causes. In reality, thehistorian of late antiquity settles gratefullyfor any passing mention.

Thirdly, and most importantly, almosteveryone writing in this period had anagenda in which the accurate reporting ofevents was either irrelevant at best, or atworst something to be avoided at all costs.The sources for this period seldom say whatthey mean, or mean what they say.Sometimes the motive is political, as when awriter is attempting to praise one emperorat the cost of a rival, or trying to obfuscatehis own involvement with that rival. Atother times the issue is religious. The fourthand early fifth centuries saw the triumph of

Christianity over paganism and much, infact most, of what we know of the history inthat period is seen through the lens of thatprocess.

One consequence of such ideologicalinvolvement is that battles are seen as testsof the religious convictions of the generalsinvolved. Writers such as Jerome areapparently convinced that a prayer at theright moment affected events morepowerfully than a well-deployed legion. Andsince Jerome seldom takes interest in theactual deployment of the armies, there is notelling whether he was right. What we doknow is that his reports, like those of hiscontemporaries, must be filtered for bias,poetic exaggeration, hyperbole and plainignorance.

Furthermore, the religious struggle of theperiod was a complex affair in which thepagans were sometimes mere interested

spectators to vicious in-fighting betweencatholic Christians, Arians, Monophysites,Donatists and others. It would be fair to saythat most historians of the period wouldgladly sacrifice, say, the minutiae of thestruggle against the Pelagian heresy for aproper description of a secular event or two– for example, the invasion of Italy byRadagaisus.

To repeat: from a historian’s perspective,the period is a mess. Yet it is a criticallyimportant mess. The huge structure of theRoman Empire in the west was changingdramatically and the edifice of imperialcontrol was rushing toward final collapse.We cannot draw a veil over this criticalperiod in world history simply because it istoo untidy. It is momentously important.Out of this chaos, medieval Europe wasborn, and the outcome of the ideologicalbattles fought in those days continues to

shape our lives. How can one not study suchevents?

Yet, if the preceding part of this forewordhas not already warned the casual readerthat this is a topic to be approached withextreme caution, it has often been said thatthere is nothing like an absence of facts fora good argument, and modern studies oflate antiquity are almost as riddled withopposing viewpoints and arcane argumentas the shibboleths they analyze. ‘Pagan’ and‘barbarian’ are loaded terms that thehistorian must use with care, and even totalk of the ‘fall’ of the Roman Empire in thewest identifies one as belonging to aparticular school of historical thought.

Under these circumstances one reachesgratefully for the work of a writer such asIan Hughes, whose intent is simply toexplain, and explain as clearly as possible,who did what during those dramatic and

desperate years. If one is looking for a guidethrough the morass of events at the end ofthe western Roman Empire, then perhaps itcan be found in the lives of the men whostruggled to hold things together as theworld they knew went through wrenchingchanges. Biography is almost by definitionnarrative, and a narrative that has a singleclear focus.

As his groundbreaking biography ofStilicho (Pen & Sword, 2010) has shown, IanHughes has the expertise to understand thecomplexities of the period and theconfidence to present and argue his point ofview even against established orthodoxies.Even better, he does so with a clarity andenthusiasm that makes him as accessible tothe general reader as to the specialistscholar.

The end of the Roman Empire is one ofthe pivotal events in European history. Yet

this is not the only reason for reading thisbook, or even the best one. The simple factis that the life of Aetius was both importantand fascinating. He is worth reading aboutfor his own sake.

Philip MatyszakFebruary 2011

Introduction

Aetius was born sometime around the yearAD 391. At the time of his birth all musthave seemed well. The two halves of theRoman Empire were still strong and able todefend themselves. Yet within a few yearsthe first signs of weakness were apparent.When Theodosius ‘the Great’ re-united thetwo halves of the empire after a civil war in394 the losses inflicted by his troops on thewestern army severely weakened the west.Further, thanks to internal and externalpressures on the empire, even a strong

emperor such as Theodosius was forced toaccept that it was too large to be ruled byone individual. He immediately arrangedfor his younger son, Honorius, to rule in thewest. Theodosius died shortly after hisvictory, in January 395.

By the time of Aetius’ death the West wasalmost unrecognizable. Britain had secededfrom the Empire, large parts of Gaul andSpain were in the hands of barbarianleaders and the Vandals had conquered‘Africa’. In 444 the Western EmperorValentinian III was forced to accept that hisempire was bankrupt.

Aetius was in control of the West duringthis tumultuous time, and with so muchgoing wrong it is surprising that he is stillperceived as the ‘the man who wasuniversally celebrated as the terror of theBarbarians and the support of the republic’.1This book aims to tell his story, chronicling

the steady decline of the West and thestrategies Aetius used to halt that decline.

The fact that there have been fewattempts to tell Aetius’ story in detail is alittle surprising, as the period when he roseto power is both pivotal and fascinating.This reluctance, though, is due to the(perceived) nature of the sources. In mostcases these are vague, contradictory andusually extremely brief, consisting largely ofsingle-line entries in the survivingchronicles.

Alongside the poor quality of the sourcesare disagreements amongst historiansconcerning such fundamentals as achronology for Aetius’ lifetime. Thisuncertainty has created reluctance on thepart of many historians to make definitivejudgements, which are open to instantcriticism. This is understandable: certainty isimpossible and negative comments virtually

certain.The difficulties with the sources have one

major repercussion on the present work.This book is not a biography in the modernsense. If the fragmentary nature of thesources and the lack of detailed informationmake it impossible to outline a clearpassage of events, it is obvious that anyattempt to reach conclusions concerningAetius’ military ability or his personalthoughts and beliefs is due to failure.Instead, the book will venture to fill asmany gaps as possible, create a chronologythat incorporates all of the evidence, andattempt to peel away the years to studyAetius as a man, in so far as this is possible.Scholars of this period will find much thatthey disagree with, but this cannot beavoided.

Map 1. The empire at the time of Theodosius I

THE SOURCESThe main causes of controversy revolvearound the surviving sources that cover thisperiod. They fall into four broad categories:Ecclesiastical Histories (which include theHagiographies – lives of the saints), SecularHistories, Letters and Chronicles. Inaddition, there are the panegyrics ofMerobaudes, the law codes of the Codex

Theodosianus and the Codex Justinianus, andthe Notitia Dignitatum (List of ImperialOffices). There are also several smallerworks that sometimes give relevantinformation, for which see the list ofabbreviations at the end of thisIntroduction. Unfortunately, theirfragmentary nature and large numbermeans that there are too many to analyzeindividually. Only a brief description ofsome of the major sources is given here. Secular Histories

Gregory of Tours See Renatus ProfuturusFrigeridus

Jordanes Jordanes (fl. 550s) wrote twobooks. The Romana (On Rome) is a verybrief epitome of events from the founding ofRome until 552. Due to the fact that it isextremely condensed, it can be useful, but

offers little that cannot be found elsewhere.Jordanes also wrote the Getica (Origins andDeeds of the Goths). This work is valuable inthat it contains a lot of information thatwould otherwise be lost, especially thosesections that demonstrate a Gothicviewpoint. Unfortunately, due to its biastowards the Goths, it must be used withcaution.2

Procopius Procopius (c.500–c.554) wrotethe Wars of Justinian. In these he describesthe wars fought by the general Belisarius onbehalf of the eastern Emperor Justinian.Included are many asides and brief entriesconcerning the history of the west and ofthe Germanic peoples who had overrun thewestern empire. It is usually assumed to bereliable, but caution is needed where thework concerns events outside Procopius’own lifetime.

Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus Frigeridus(fl. fifth century) wrote a history that onlysurvives in fragments. Fortunately, he wasused as a source by Gregory of Tours for hisbook Historia Francorum (History of theFranks), from which many items of valuecan be gleaned. The accuracy of thesefragments is in many cases unknown.

Salvian Salvian (fl. fifth century) wrote awork known as De gubernatione Dei (On theGovernment of God, also known as Depraesenti judicio), in which he describes lifein fifth-century Gaul and contrasts the‘wickedness’ of the Romans with the ‘virtues’of the barbarians. Although written with aspecific purpose, it can be used with care tofurnish relevant information aboutconditions in Gaul after the invasions of406.

Victor of Vita Victor of Vita (b. c.430)

wrote the Historia persecutionis AfricanaeProvinciae, temporibus Geiserici et Huniriciregum Wandalorum (History of the VandalPersecution in the time of Gaiseric andHuneric, Kings of the Vandals, usuallyabbreviated to History of the VandalPersecution) during the persecution ofCatholics by Huneric. It depicts the horrorsof the era, but was updated after the worstwas over, following which it reflects‘happier times’.3 Victor’s hatred of theVandals can lead him to exaggerate theirmore disagreeable actions, so the workneeds to be used with caution.

Zosimus Zosimus (c.500) wrote the HistoriaNova (New History), which covers the periodfrom the mid third century to 410. Heappears to have used two main sources forhis information: Eunapius for events to 404and Olympiodorus for the years c.407–410.Zosimus was a pagan, writing in

Constantinople, who was determined toshow that Christianity was the reason forthe disasters suffered by the empire. Heclosely follows Eunapius and Olympiodorusand is not critical of his sources, so althoughhis work is useful one must use it with agreat amount of caution. Ecclesiastical Histories and AssociatedWorksAugustine Augustine (354–430) wrote manyworks, including De civitate dei (The City ofGod), which was written after the Gothicsack of Rome in 410. It includes informationthat is useful in reconstructing eventsconcerning the early years of Aetius’ life,but the moralizing Christian nature of thework needs to be taken into account.

Hagiographies Several of the ‘lives of thesaints’, for example Possidius’ Life of Saint

Augustine and Constantius’ Life of SaintGermanus of Auxerre, contain informationconcerning the era during which Aetius wasin control in the west. However, the factthat these works are aimed almostexclusively at promoting the sanctity of theindividual being described means that theyare not subjective and so extreme caution isneeded in these cases.

Socrates Scholasticus Socrates (b. c.380)wrote the Historia Ecclesiastica (ChurchHistory), which covers the years 305–439. Itwas written during the reign of EmperorTheodosius II (408–450) solely as a historyof the church. However, it does containmuch information about secular events, butmainly only where they impinge on churchhistory. However, these items are otherwiseunrecorded, so they can offer uniqueinsights.

Theodoret Theodoret (c.393–c.457) wrotemany works on Christian doctrine, but moreimportantly a Historia Ecclesiastica (ChurchHistory), which begins in 325 and ends in429. He used several sources, including,amongst others, Sozomen, Rufinus, Eusebiusand Socrates. Possibly due to the mixednature of his sources, the work ischronologically confused, and must be usedwith caution. LettersMany letters written at this time survive.Although most are obviously of a personalnature, some include information on secularevents and on some of the leading men ofthe time, including Aetius. These can bevaluable in filling in details, but theiraccuracy in most areas remains unknown.

Augustine Augustine, apart from hisreligious treatises, was a prolific writer of

letters, many of which are still extant. Theygive an impression of what life was like inearly fifth-century Africa as well asoccasionally giving useful informationconcerning secular events.

Sidonius Apollinaris Sidonius Apollinaris(c.430–489) is the most important source forconditions in Gaul during the last years ofthe west. His many letters illuminaterelations between Goths and the Romanelite as well as demonstrating the changingattitudes of the aristocracy towards their‘barbarian’ overlords. However, at all timesthe biases of a Roman aristocrat need to beborne in mind, along with the position ofthe recipient of the letter: a letter to afellow aristocrat may contain disparagingremarks about the Goths, whereas a letter toa Goth would certainly not contain these.

Chronicles4

The chronicle was the form of history that‘so well suited the taste of the new Christianculture that it became the most popularhistorical genre of the Middle Ages’.5 Thepositive aspect of this popularity is thatseveral chronicles have survived. Thenegative aspect is that they displacedconventional history as the means oftransmitting information about the past,and so no complete histories written duringthe fifth century survive.

There is a further feature that causesdifficulty when analyzing the chronicles,especially the fragmentary ones. Severalcollections of these sources were made priorto the twentieth century. Each of thesecollections could give the sources differenttitles. For example, the works referenced asthe Anonymus Cuspiniani in secondarysources from the early twentieth centuryand before are now referred to as the Fasti

Vindobonenses Priori, following Mommsen’sdescription in the Chronica Minora, Vol. 1(see Bibliography). Therefore readers shouldbe aware that references in this book arelikely to differ from these earlier works.

The Chronica Gallica of 452 is acontinuation of the Chronicle of Jeromecovering the years 379 to 452. The ChronicaGallica of 511 also begins in 379 andcontinues to 511. Due to the similaritybetween the two, it is possible to see thechronicle of 511 as a continuation of thechronicle of 452. Both of these workscontain useful information but need to beused with care, since the dates given maynot in fact be accurate. The Gallic Chronicleof 452 only becomes accurate after 447, andhere the events in Gaul are the mostaccurately dated. Prior to 447 thechronology is extremely confused.6 TheGallic Chronicle of 452 has some entries

undated. In these the reference is simply tothe modern ‘number’ given to the entry. Forexample, the invasion of Italy byRadagaisus is undated and is thereforereferenced simply as ‘no. 50’.

The Chronicon Paschale (Easter Chronicle,so-called because of the author’s use ofEaster as the focus of his dating system) isan anonymous chronicle dating from theearly seventh century, compiled inConstantinople.7 Although it is a laterdocument, and some of the dates and factsare wrong, the Chronicon Paschale is usefulin confirming other sources and addingdetail to events. However, it must be usedwith caution thanks to the temporaldistance between its compilation and theearly–mid fifth century.

Hydatius Hydatius (c.400–c.469) wrote acontinuation of the Chronicles of Eusebiusand Jerome, beginning with the accession of

Theodosius in 379 and finishing in 468, sohe appears to have finished writing in 469.His work has serious errors in dating thatare still confusing. These are probablycaused by the fact that much of hisinformation was late arriving in Spain,being taken there by embassies andmerchants whose dating was insecure.8 Forevents in Spain, especially concerning theVandals, his work is good and relativelyaccurate.9 Although potentially valuable,the errors mean that Hydatius must be usedwith caution, with dates especially beingconfirmed by other sources wheneverpossible.

John Malalas John Malalas (fl. sixthcentury) wrote a chronicle intended to beused by both churchmen and laymen.Unfortunately, the work covers ‘history’from the biblical period to the reign ofJustinian in one book, so much is glossed

over or omitted. As a result, the work isuseful in places, but this is rare.

Marcellinus Comes Marcellinus (fl. sixthcentury) wrote a chronicle that covers theperiod from 379 to 534 (an unknown writercontinued the chronicle down to 566). It ismainly concerned with the eastern empire,but includes some information concerningthe west, drawn mainly from Orosius.Where possible this information needs to beconfirmed by independent sources to ensurethe accuracy of dates and the reliability ofinformation contained.

Prosper Tiro Also known as Prosper ofAquitaine, c.390–c.455, he wrote acontinuation of Jerome’s Chronicle.Prosper’s Chronicle finishes in 455. Theearly sections contain many errors, butbetween the years 433 and 455, whenProsper was personally involved in events,

he is accepted as being the most reliable ofthe chroniclers, giving ‘careful and accurate’dating.10 Prosper was not a clergyman, buthis close association with the clergy andespecially his contacts with Pope Leo I andSaint Augustine resulted in his viewpointbeing heavily biased towards the church.Prosper doesn’t approve of Aetius. Possiblythanks to Augustine’s friendship withBoniface, Boniface is the only westerngeneral Prosper praises. This bias needs tobe taken into account when reading thechronicle.11

Difficulties with the Chronicles Themodern concept of a chronicle is that eventsare accurately dated and each singleoccurrence is allocated a separate entry inits relevant date. This preconception hasbadly affected perceptions of the chronicles,leading to accusations of inaccuracy and apoor grasp of time. In fact, some of these

observations are unfair to the chroniclers.Even in the modern era, where access toperiodicals, newspapers and the internet iscommon, one of the most common radiocompetitions is ‘Guess the Year’. It is clearthat without modern methods of establishingspecific dates, such as newspaper archives,human error in reporting events is to beexpected.

Furthermore, ancient chroniclers were notwriting with modern expectations in mind.As long as events were in roughly thecorrect order the chronicle would fulfil itspurpose. Therefore it is a commonoccurrence for the chronicler to include laterevents at a convenient place earlier in hisaccount.

Instances of the chroniclers predictingevents are common. For example, inHydatius’ entry for 430 he notes the defeatof a Gothic force by Aetius before extolling

Aetius’ ability by noting that ‘Juthungi aswell as Nori were vanquished by him in thesame way.’ At first sight, these campaignsmust therefore have taken place in 430.However, Hydatius’ entry for 431 includesthe sentence ‘Aetius, general of bothservices, subdued the Nori, who were inrebellion.’ On reflection, the secondcampaign must date to the latter entry.

A more extreme example is in theChronicon Paschale in the entry dated to 437,where the chronicler describes the marriageof Valentinian III and Eudoxia: ‘And hecelebrated his nuptial, taking Eudoxia, thedaughter of Theodosius and EudociaAugusti, in the month Hyperberetaeus, onday four before Kalends of November, andby her he had two daughters, Eudocia andPlacidia.’ The entry highlights the fact thatthe chroniclers were including later eventsat convenient places within the earlier

entries, unless Eudoxia experienced twoextremely fast gestation periods.

A further problem with the chroniclers isthat they use different methods forcalculating dates. For example, Prosper andHydatius use a different method ofcalculating Christ’s passion, Prosper datingthis to the fifteenth year of Tiberius,Hydatius to the start of Tiberius’ fifteenthregnal year. This discrepancy helps toexplain the differences in dates between thetwo chronicles.12 The consular date used byProsper, plus his closer proximity to events,results in his dating system being preferredon the majority of occasions. PanegyricsWhen reading panegyrics one piece ofadvice is worth remembering: ‘the aim ofthe panegyrist is not to tell the truth, but toglorify his subject, exaggerating the goodand suppressing or distorting the bad, the

inappropriate, or the inconvenient’.13 Withthis in mind, it is possible to look at the twowriters of panegyrics to have survived fromthis period in the fifth century.

Flavius Merobaudes14 Merobaudes wasprobably of Frankish origin, having anancestor who was either a Romanized Frankor Frankish noble who took service with theempire – possibly the Merobaudes who livedduring the reigns of Valentinian I (364–375)and Gratian (375–383).15

Perhaps originally from Gaul, he appearsto have moved to Spain, where he marriedthe daughter of Astyrius, a member of theold Spanish aristocracy. In the early fifthcentury the majority of the aristocracywithdrew from public life, but Merobaudesfollowed the example of his father-in-lawand entered into an imperial career.16

Famed for his talents as a rhetorician andwriter, he also gained a positive reputation

as a military commander.17 Obtaining theposition of either comes rei militaris (‘count’of the military) or dux (duke), his militaryand literary abilities resulted in entry to theSenate and then a rapid rise through itsranks. On 30 July 435 he was honoured byhaving a statue erected to him in the Forumof Trajan in Rome.

After these successes Merobaudes appearsto have focused mainly on his literaryworks. He may have delivered a panegyricto Aetius, as well as an ode honouring thewedding of Valentinian III and Eudoxia,daughter of Theodosius II, both in 437.Unfortunately, both have been lost. Thelatter may have been in emulation ofClaudian (d. 404), the panegyrist of Stilicho(395–408). It is possible that Aetius andMerobaudes enjoyed a similar relationshipto the earlier pair, although the fragmentarynature of the evidence means that this

hypothesis must remain conjecture.18 Theode celebrating Valentinian’s wedding inConstantinople may also have been at leastpartly responsible for Merobaudes receivingthe title of patricius from Theodosius, theeastern emperor.19

In 438 Merobaudes appears to havewritten verses celebrating the birth ofEudocia, Valentinian and Eudoxia’s firstchild, and probably in the winter of 441–442 he wrote a genethliakon (‘birthdaypoem’, ‘ode composed for a person’sbirthday’, now known as Carmen IV) on thefirst birthday of Gaudentius, Aetius’ son.

Also in the early 440s, although the exactdate is unknown, Merobaudes wrote anekphrasis (an attempt to describe physicalworks of art in literary form and which isnow known as Carmen III) for his friendAnicius Acilius Glabrio Faustus. Probably in443 he wrote two poems to celebrate the

baptism of Placidia, daughter of Valentinianand Eudoxia, which may be Carmen I andCarmen II, both of which are ekphrasticpoems, although it should be noted thattheir actual purpose and content remainsthe matter of debate.20 All of these worksare useful sources of information in theirown right, but obviously they need to beused with care.

Shortly after writing these two poemsMerobaudes was appointed magisterutriusque militiae and sent to Spain, wherehe succeeded his father-in-law Astyrius incommand. After his recall in 444Merobaudes composed another panegyric toAetius, which he delivered in Rome to theSenate and which is now known as PanegyricI.21 Shortly after this he composed yetanother panegyric, now known as PanegyricII, which he delivered on 1 January 446.

Unfortunately, little is known of

Merobaudes’ later career, and it is believedthat he died before 460. He was obviously aman of influence and power and ofconsiderable literary and military ability.Like Claudian before him, it would appearthat Merobaudes took a full part in theregime set up by the ruling magister militum,in this case Aetius. There is little doubt thatMerobaudes’ efforts on Aetius’ part helpedto maintain the latter’s popularity andesteem.

Sidonius Apollinaris In addition to hisletters, Sidonius Apollinaris wrotepanegyrics on three individuals who becameemperor after Aetius’ death, namely Avitus,Majorian and Anthemius. Within thesepanegyrics are events from the earlier livesof the three emperors, including someinformation concerning events duringAetius’ lifetime. However, it should beremembered that their aim was to praise

their recipients, not to serve the interests ofthe historian in the life and deeds of Aetius,so they need to be read with care. Other SourcesNotitia Dignitatum The Notitia Dignitatum isan extremely important document. Itpurports to list the bureaucratic and militaryorganization of both the eastern andwestern empires. Thousands of offices arelisted. Dated to c.420 for the west and c.395for the east, it is potentially a mine ofstatistical and legal information.Unfortunately, there are many problems.Probably originating with the EmperorTheodosius in the east, it may in theoryhave been intended as a full list of offices.The eastern section of the Notitia appears todate from the early 400s. As a result, it isusually believed that the survivingdocument is a copy preserved in the west ofthe eastern Notitia dating from the reign of

Arcadius (395–408). Unfortunately, it wasnot kept strictly up to date and there aremany omissions and duplications.Moreover, due to the fragmentation of theEmpire during and immediately afterStilicho’s death in 408, it is uncertainwhether many of the army units listedexisted in reality or only on paper. As aconsequence, information taken from theNotitia should be accepted as possible ratherthan certain.

There appear to have been later attemptsto update the western portion of thedocument and evidence suggests that thesewere last compiled at some date in the 420s,possibly under the orders of Constantius III(magister militum in the west from 411 andEmperor from February to September 421).

Unfortunately, there are internalproblems with the Notitia, which suggeststhat it does not reflect reality. For example,

although the provinces of Britain had driftedout of the imperial orbit in the early 410s,the leaders and troops associated with theisland are still included in the Notitia. Thesame is true of the provinces of Belgica andGermania. The fact that these are‘unquestionably anachronistic’ suggests thatthe document includes material reflectingwhat had once been available to the empirerather than the current military status.22 Yetthe document may also have been astatement of intent. If it was compiledunder the orders of Constantius III in 421, itmay have been his intention as emperor torestore the glory of the west andincorporate the lost provinces back into theempire.

As well as being useful in outlining whatthe Roman bureaucracy believed shouldhave been the case, it is also possible toanalyze the document in the hope of

gleaning material concerning the conditionand deployment of the army. This is coveredin more depth in Chapter 6.

What is often forgotten, or at leastignored, is the fact that the Notita was notupdated after some time around 420. Due tothe complicated nature of events from 423onwards it is quite possible that by the timeAetius achieved sole dominance in the mid430s events had rendered the Notitiacompletely obsolete. As a result, it must beused with extreme caution when discussingthe later army in existence during thedominance of Aetius.

Codex Theodosianus The CodexTheodosianus is a collection made during thereign of Theodosius II in the east of all ofthe laws issued since the reign ofConstantine I (306–337). Added to this bodyof laws were the new laws (novellae) passedby Theodosius II (Nov. Th.) and Valentinian

(Nov. Val.) after 439. These were alsocollected and kept with the Codex and nowform part of the main text.

The ‘Code’ and the ‘Novels’ are a valuablesource of material for the period. It ispossible to analyze the laws to establishtheir context and so determine the reasonsfor their passing. Furthermore, the laws areaccompanied by the name(s) of theemperor(s) that passed them, in most casesby the precise date on which they werepassed, and by the name of the city in whichthe emperor passed the law. This allows usto trace some of the movements of theemperor, and also enables us to link specificlaws with specific events in the lifetime ofAetius. One example is the law allowingcitizens to bear arms (Nov. Val. 9.1, dated24 June 440) being related to the conquestof Africa by the Vandals in October 439.Therefore close analysis of the Codex can

open a window into aspects of Aetius’ lifeand policies that would otherwise be blank.

It is also interesting to note that one ofthe laws dismisses laws that were destinedto be ‘valid for the cases of their own timeonly’.23 This highlights the fact that, likemodern law, some laws passed by emperorswere meant to deal with specificemergencies and events. After these hadpassed, the laws were naturally allowed tolapse. Modern examples include the lawspassed to deal with the emergency that wasthe Second World War. Once this war wasover, these laws were repealed and‘normality’ resumed.

CONCLUSIONThe information that is available in thesources should not detract us from theknowledge that they were all written with apurpose. Even when this bias is openlydeclared it can easily be overlooked or

forgotten. If this is the case with the majorsources as listed above, it is even more thecase with the multitude of minor sources notlisted. The less-important sources that areused are of varying accuracy and utility andwhere necessary an analysis of these will bedealt with in the body of the text. However,if the source only gives us one or twosnippets of information, then it is possiblethat it will not be analyzed.

One problem with all of the sources needsto be highlighted. This is where they informthe reader of political intrigue. Thedifficulty lies with the fact that the sourcesclaim to know details of the kind that arealways most suspicious: ‘tales of secretintrigues and treasons which could not beknown to the world at large’.24 Wheneverthis kind of information is encountered afull analysis will be attempted to decidewhether there is the possibility of the author

knowing the full details of events.

SPELLING AND TERMINOLOGYWherever possible, the simplest definitionsand spellings have been used throughout thebook. There are many examples in theancient sources of variations in the spellingof individuals’ names, such as Gaiseric beingspelt ‘Zinzirich’.25 Also, in most modernworks Roman spellings are usually‘modernized’ by removing the common ‘us’endings and substituting a modern variant,for example ‘Bonifatius’ becoming‘Boniface’. Wherever possible the mostwidely used variant has been employed inthe hope of avoiding confusion.

When describing both the tribes along theRhine and those who successfully invadedthe Empire, at times ‘barbarian’ rather than‘German’ has been used. Although the word‘barbarian’ is now out of fashion, largelydue to its negative aspects regarding

comparative civilization levels with theRomans, it has been used, as it is anotherwise neutral term, whereas the use ofthe word ‘German’ often implies ‘communityand ethnicity on the basis of sharedlanguage’, which is actually misleading.26

In most cases ‘Goth(s)’ has been usedrather than ‘Visigoth(s)’. Contemporarysources describe both the Visigoths and theOstrogoths simply as Goths.27 During Aetius’lifetime there was only one Gothic threat,and that was the Goths in the west. TheOstrogoths were peripheral, living in thefaraway regions of eastern Europe. It wasonly after their invasion of Italy underTheoderic in 493 that the west was forced todivide the terminology. Only where theremay be confusion between the two ‘tribes’,such as Attila’s invasion of Gaul in 451, willthe terms Visigoth and Ostrogoth be used.

ABBREVIATIONSIn order to make the references moremanageable, the following abbreviationshave been used for ancient sources: Additamenta Ad ChroniconProsperi Hauniensis Addit.

Ad Prosp.Haun.

Agathias Agath.

Ammianus MarcellinusAmm.Marc.

Annales Ravennae Ann. Rav.

Augustine Aug.

Aurelius Victor Aur. Vict.

Cambridge Ancient History CAH

Callisthenes Call.

Cass.

Cassiodorus, Chronicle Chron.

Chronica Gallica of 452Chron.Gall. 452

Chronica Gallica of 511Chron.Gall. 511

Chronica Minora (Mommsen)Chron.Min.

Chronicon PaschaleChron.Pasch.

Claudian Claudianus (Claudian) Claud.

Codex Justinianus Cod. Just.

Codex Theodosianus Cod. Th.

Collectio AvellanaCollect.Avell.

Constantius of Lyon Const.

Eunapius of Sardis Eun.

Eutropius Eut.

Evagrius Evag.

Fasti vindobonenses posterioresFast. Vind.Post.

Fasti vindobonenses prioresFast. Vind.Prior

Gaudentius Gaud.

Gildas Gild.

Gregory of Tours Greg. Tur.

Hydatius Hyd.

John of Antioch Joh. Ant.

John Malalas Joh. Mal.

Jordanes Jord.

Libanius Lib.

Marcellinus ComesMarc.com.

Merobaudes Merob.

Minutes of the Senate Min. Sen.

Nicephorus Callistus Nic. Call

Nestorius Nest.

Notitia Dignitatum Not. Dig.

Novellae TheodosianaeNov.Theod.

Novellae Valentinianae Nov. Val.

Olympiodorus of Thebes Olymp.

Orosius Oros.

Paulinus of Nola Paul.

Paulinus of Pella Paul. Pell.

Paulus DiaconusPaul.Diac.

Philostorgius Philost.

Prosopography of the LaterRoman Empire

PLRE

Possidius Poss.

Priscus, ChronicaPrisc.Chron

Priscus, RomanaPrisc.Rom.

Procopius Proc.

Prosper Tiro Prosp.

Pseudo-

Pseudo-Augustine Aug.

Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus Ren. Prof.

Saint Jerome Jer.

Salvian Salv.

Scriptores Historiae Augustae Scrip. His.

Sidonius Apollinaris Sid. Ap.

Sirmondian Constitutions Sirm.

Socrates Scholasticus Soc.

Sozomen Soz.

Suidas Suid.

Theoderet Theod.

Theophanes Theoph.

Vegetius Veg.

Victor of Vita Vict. Vit.

Zosimus Zos.

Chapter 1

Historical Background andEarly Years

HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDAt the time of the birth of Aetius, some timearound the year AD 391,* the RomanEmpire had been in existence for manycenturies.1 During that time the empire hadconstantly evolved and although mostchanges had been slow and complex onlyabout 100 years before Aetius’ birth therehad been dramatic upheavals in its nature.

In 284 Diocletian became emperor. Hisreign began at the end of a long period ofinstability and confusion caused by revoltand invasion. Although his predecessors haddone much to help stabilize the empire, itwas Diocletian’s reign that saw the return ofa more stable government under a long-lived emperor. There were still periods ofinstability, but his longevity allowed theempire a period in which to recover.

It is Diocletian and his (eventual)successor Constantine who are credited withoverseeing a period of major political andmilitary reform, although it should beacknowledged that in many cases theysimply accepted and regularized the changesthat had been ongoing throughout the thirdcentury, and that slow change wouldcontinue to occur after their deaths.

One of the most important changes hadbeen the inauguration of the Tetrarchy. The

Tetrarchy had divided the empire in half,each half being ruled by an Augustus(emperor). Each Augustus had his ownCaesar (deputy and successor) to help runhis half of the empire. As part of thebureaucratic system, each of the four co-rulers had a Praefectus Praetorio (PraetorianPrefect) to help with the administration ofhis ‘quarter’ of the empire. Each Praefectuswielded great power and could readilyinfluence military affairs, as he retainedcontrol of the main logistical system of theempire. Although abandoned on the deathof Diocletian, the system of using fourPraefecti was revived under Constantine. Astime passed the position of prefect becamemore influential, especially that of the twoprefects in charge of the two imperialcapitals.

Rome was now only the nominal capitalof the Roman Empire. Two new cities had

emerged as the major political centres of theempire: Milan in the west andConstantinople in the east. In both casesthis was in large part due to their strategiclocations. Milan, at the head of the Italianpeninsula, was strategically placed to allowwestern emperors to defend Italy andcampaign along the Rhine, whilstConstantinople, at the crossing pointbetween Europe and Asia Minor, allowedeastern emperors to command personallyRoman armies either in the east or in theBalkans.

The End of the Fourth CenturyThe sons of Constantine divided the empirebetween them, after which there was aseries of costly civil wars. The eventualvictor, Constantius II (d. 361), came to theconclusion that as the empire was beingthreatened in both east and west it was toobig for one man to control. Emulating

Diocletian, he enrolled his cousin Julian asCaesar (vice-emperor) with control in thewest. When the two men disagreed, anothercivil war was triggered, but Constantiusdied in 361, before the two rivals couldmeet. Julian (360–363), known as ‘theApostate’ because of his support forpaganism, gathered his troops and led anill-fated invasion of Persia, during which hedied. The death of Julian in 363 effectivelyended the Constantinian dynasty.

Jovian (363–364) was proclaimedemperor but soon afterwards died on theway to Constantinople. His successor wasValentinian (364–375), who, after beingacclaimed by the army and close officials,quickly acclaimed his brother Valens (364–378) as joint-Augustus, with Valentiniantaking the West and Valens the East.Diocletian’s decision to divide the empirewas now taken as the norm. Valentinian

spent his reign repairing and reinforcing thedefences of the west and attempting toenforce his will on the turbulent tribesacross the Rhine and upper Danube. Valens,meanwhile, was given the task ofminimizing the damage to the east from theunfavourable treaty with the Persianssigned by Jovian.

In an attempt to secure the new dynasty,in 367 Valentinian declared his son Gratianas Caesar and successor. When Valentiniandied in 375 Gratian prepared to take controlof the west. However, the troops inPannonia declared Gratian’s half-brother,Valentinian II, as emperor and Gratian wasforced to accept only Gaul, Spain andBritain, while Valentinian II ruled in Italy,Illyricum and Africa. Valens retained solecontrol of the east.

In 376 a large band of Goths underFritigern appeared on the banks of the

Danube seeking sanctuary from the Huns.Valens allowed them entry to the empire,but they were badly treated and broke intoopen revolt. In 378 Valens gathered anarmy together and led them to face theGoths in battle. Contrary to expectations,Valens was defeated and killed by the Gothsat the Battle of Adrianople. Gratian wasnow the senior emperor. To rule the east,Gratian chose Theodosius, the son of a manalso called Theodosius who had displayedmilitary ability in the west before beingarrested and executed in 376.

With Theodosius in the East and Gratianand Valentinian II in the West, the empirewas slowly able to recover. After beingdefeated in a second battle against theGoths Theodosius led his forces in acampaign aimed at restricting the Goths’access to supplies and, in 382, his strategywas proved to be effective: the Goths

capitulated. Although the Goths were beatenand forced to accept a treaty, they had notbeen crushed and remained united undertheir own leaders: an unprecedented move.

The Battle of AdrianopleAlthough the significance of the Battle ofAdrianople is debated, one major factor hadchanged: after the battle, the Goths were apermanent political and military forcewithin the empire. Their presence changedthe way in which the Roman governmentdealt with barbarians. At first, this changewas only visible when the Romans dealtwith the Goths, but this quickly changeduntil it became the manner in which thecourt dealt with all barbarian leaders.2

For the barbarians outside the empire thetreaty was a revelation. The Goths had beenallowed to settle under their own leaders.Prior to this, invading barbarians had beendefeated and their leaders either executed or

deployed on the far edges of the empire,away from their own men. The earlierattitude of barbarian leaders – that theempire was too large to defeat but was atempting target for raids – changed. Now itappeared possible for barbarian leaders toenter the empire and coerce it into givingthem lands and military positions at thehead of their own troops. The emphasis ofbarbarian attacks slowly changed frombeing attempts to gain plunder, toattempting to force the empire to grantthem lands and military posts within it. Thischange of emphasis was to have direconsequences for the west.

Theodosius and Civil WarsImperial neglect of Britain resulted in a mannamed Magnus Maximus being proclaimedas emperor by the British troops. When hecrossed to Gaul, Gratian’s troops desertedand Gratian was captured and executed.

After a brief hiatus, Maximus invaded Italyagainst Valentinian II. This wasunacceptable to Theodosius, who declaredwar and defeated Maximus, inflicting heavycasualties on the western army. Theodosiusinstalled a Frankish general namedArbogast to support Valentinian, but insteadValentinian died in mysteriouscircumstances. Arbogast proclaimed a mannamed Eugenius as emperor of the West,and in a repeat of earlier events Theodosiusinvaded, heavily defeating the westernarmy at the Battle of the Frigidus in 394 andremoving Eugenius and Arbogast frompower. He then proclaimed his son,Honorius, as western ruler, with Stilicho, thehusband of Theodosius’ adopted daughterSerena, as regent. When Theodosius died in395 Aetius would have been about fouryears old.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the reigns of Diocletianand Constantine are credited with haltingthe calamities of the ‘third-century crisis’,the establishment of the Constantiniandynasty hides the fact that civil warscontinued to be fought. Further, the adventof succeeding ‘dynasties’ gives a misleadingimpression regarding a continuity of peaceand a return to the quieter times of thesecond century.

In reality, change had been enormous.The empire now had two permanent courts,one in the east and one in the west.Although the emperors were quick tomaintain the appearance of unity, thecourtiers were intent upon maintaining thedivision and so preserving their positionsand lifestyles. Furthermore, the lossessuffered during the wars of the fourthcentury left the empire significantly weakermilitarily, especially in the west. Yet at the

time these weaknesses were hidden. Theempire was now reunited under thedynamic leadership of an emperor who hadbeen successful in war.

THE EMPIRE AT THE TIME OF AETIUS

Early LifeUnfortunately, the date of the birth ofFlavius Aetius is unknown, but was aroundthe year 391, as he is described as a ‘youngadolescent’ in the year 405.3 More accuracyis impossible. He was born in Durostorum,in Moesia Secunda (Lower Moesia – seeMap 1).4 His father was Gaudentius, a‘member of one of the leading families ofthe province of Scythia’.5 Little is known ofGaudentius. Born in the east, he was mostlikely a high-ranking eastern soldier whoadopted the imperial family name – Flavius– as a sign of his loyalty to Theodosius and

his heirs. After the death of Honorius in 395Gaudentius accepted service in the westwith Stilicho.6 His political status in the westwas such that early in Honorius’ reign hewas able to marry the daughter of aprominent Italian family. Unfortunately,the fact that Aetius’ mother was a richItalian noblewoman is the only informationwe have.7 That Gaudentius married her isprobably an indication that he wasfollowing Stilicho’s policies of fusing easternmilitary command with western politicalinfluence, although it should be noted thatromance may have had a very large part toplay in the arrangement.8

Stilicho controlled the army in the westbetween 395 and 408 and was commanderduring several military campaigns againstthe Goths under Alaric. Gaudentius probablybegan his service in the west as a protectordomesticus (household guard), but in 399,

shortly after the defeat of the revolt inAfrica led by Gildo, he was given the post ofcomes Africae (Count of Africa) by Stilicho.9This promotion was both a reward for hiscontinuing loyalty and a sign that he wastrusted by Stilicho to keep the grainshipments to Italy moving.

Having a father who was serving in thearmy, according to the law Aetius wouldspend his early years in the Roman militaryservice. In his early life he would also be awitness to the political and military policiesof Stilicho.

Like Stilicho (and possibly Constantius III)before him, Aetius appears to have begunhis career in the elite corps of theprotectores.10 The protectores began in thethird century and over time became abodyguard unit, reserved for individualswho were earmarked for rapid promotion.At an unknown time, and again like his

older contemporary Stilicho, Aetius wastransferred to the Tribunus Praetorianus(Partis Militaris) (‘Military PraetorianTribune’, a tribune and notary on theimperial general staff).11 It is difficult to beexact about the nature of this post, mainlybecause very little information has survivedin the sources. Unfortunately, the little weknow of the Tribunus Praetorianus suggeststhat this may have been an honorary title,‘the significance of which is not clear’, butwhich is known to have come with severalprivileges.12

The latter promotion would have resultedin the acquisition of a relatively largeamount of political rank for one so young.As will be seen, this would be important forthe next stage in Aetius’ career, but theappointment also demonstrates the highrank and political influence of Gaudentius.

The Civil ServiceFollowing in his father’s footsteps, Aetiuswas placed in a military post. This issignificant since during this period the‘bureaucracy’ of the empire had earlier beendivided between the ‘military’ and the ‘civil’.Despite the change, the civil service, ormilitia officialis, was always classed as partof the army, wearing military uniform,receiving rations, bearing the old, ‘non-commissioned’ ranks of the army and beingentered on the rolls of ‘fictive’ units. Forexample, all clerks of the praetorianprefecture were enrolled in Legio I Adiutrix,a unit that had long ago ceased to exist as amilitary formation.13 The top civilian postwas the Praefectus Praetorio (PraetorianPrefect). The Prefects acted as the emperor’srepresentatives, governing in his name withlegal, administrative and financial powers.Yet these were not the only powerful

individuals at court.The earlier consistorium (‘consistory’,

council) had consisted of any individualministers that the emperor wanted toconsult about a specific topic. Probably bythe date of Aetius’ birth this had becomemore of a formal body with specific duties.14

It was replaced by the proceres palatii(‘notables of the palace’), sometimes simplyknown as the palatium (‘palace’). As itsname implies, this was formed largely fromthose individuals whose employment keptthem in close proximity to the emperor.Closest to the emperor, at least physically,was his personal household. Included in thiscategory were the protectores et domestici(‘corps of officer cadets’). From an early ageAetius was at the heart of the imperialcourt.

Of more importance were the principalimperial ministers whose support and

advice would be of great consequence to theemperor. Amongst the most powerful ofthese men were the magister officiorum(‘master of offices’) and the comes sacrarumlargitionum (‘count of the sacred largesses’).The magister officiorum had many duties,including command of the agentes in rebus(‘imperial couriers’) and control of thescholae (‘imperial bodyguard’). He alsocontrolled the officia dispositionum andadmissionum, and so managed the emperor’stimetable and audiences. The comessacrarum largitionum was in charge offinances, controlling the precious metalmines, the mints, and all revenue andexpenditure in coin.15 These individualseach commanded a large number of menwho served as rei privatae (‘privatesecretaries’). They tended to be fiercelycompetitive and protective of their powers,rights and privileges.

All or any of these men could expect to beconsulted by the emperor on importantissues concerning their special field, and inthe case of the most powerful individualswith regards to the whole running of theempire. Yet the delineation between theseposts, especially at the top, was relativelynarrow, and as a result often overlapped.This tended to cause friction between thetop ministers of the empire.16

The ArmyThe civil service accounted for only a tinyfraction of the population of the empire anda career in it appears to have been seen as ameans of self-promotion and security. Thesame cannot be said of the army. The armywas restructured at the same time as thecivil service. Although sometimes perceivedas a precursor to modern militaryhierarchies, care must be taken whenlooking at the organization and the

apparent modernity it represents.This is nowhere borne out more than in

the Notitia Dignitatum.17 This massivedocument lists the postholders of the Romanarmy in a very hierarchical structure, withlower ranks apparently responsible to theirsuperior. Although this is a very easyassumption to make, in reality things werenot necessarily as they appear.

The emperor was the undisputed head ofthe armed forces. However, as events of thethird century had shown, he could not be atall points where danger threatened, andfrom the reign of Valentinian and Valensthe empire was permanently ruled by twodifferent emperors at separate courts in theeast and west. In the West, as time passedthe command of the army moved away fromthe emperor and devolved upon the newlycreated magister peditum (‘master of theinfantry’) and magister equitum (‘master of

the cavalry’). In the course of time themagister peditum became the more senior ofthe two posts. Yet the magister peditum had amajor problem. The series of civil warsfought by Theodosius I at the end of thefourth century had greatly weakened thewestern army. Stilicho, Constantius III andtheir successors would always be short of themanpower necessary to re-establish fully thedominion of the West.

Finance and TaxationIn the fifth century inflation was stillrampant in the West, despite the reforms ofDiocletian (284–305) and Constantine I(306–337) and other attempts to calmmatters by later emperors. Although thesehad resulted in the stabilization of the goldeconomy, lower-denomination coinscontinued to be debased. Furthermore, thecoins for the West were being produced byonly six official mints: Trier, Lyon and Arles

in Gaul, Sirmium in Pannonia, and Aquileiaand Rome in Italy.

In earlier centuries coins had beencommon items, their distribution largelybeing initiated by payments to the army,from where they had spread throughout thelocal economy. However, the cost of thearmy had taken its toll and in this laterperiod there is some evidence of units notbeing paid, whilst in the late fourth centurythe troops began to be paid in kind ratherthan in coin.18 The change from a monetarysystem to one based upon agriculturalproduction would have aggravated thepreexisting economic instability and soensured that many individuals becamedisenchanted with Roman rule.

To exacerbate further feelings ofunhappiness, many of the largerlandowners – including some of the richestpeople in the empire – were exempted from

the payment of many of the taxes. It wouldhave been galling for the poorer members ofsociety to note that the rich avoided havingto pay taxes. Even where they did have topay, the taxes were not progressive: the richpaid the same amount as the poor, leadingto a further increase in the sense ofdisenfranchisement amongst the lower andmiddle classes.

Yet despite these difficulties, the empirecontinued to survive. This was thankslargely to the fact that a proportion of thestate’s income came from public lands.These lands, either deserted thanks to thepassage of war or confiscated from ‘traitors’and pagan temples, or lying intestate orunexploited, were appropriated by the stateand leased out by bailiffs to peasants, soensuring a slow, steady trickle of moneyinto the imperial coffers.19

This money was supplemented by taxes

on mines, quarries and on the mintsthemselves, but these provided only alimited amount of revenue. As a result, theempire was forced to rely on the taxation ofthe poor and the middle classes, and onlyattempted to coerce the senatorialaristocracy to provide funds at times of direemergency, as will be seen during the courseof this book.

The CitizensIt is possible to see the later empire as onein which the divisions within societycontributed to the fall of the West. Overtime the rich became wealthier. This waspartly because many farmers were forced tosell their lands or their service to the rich tofulfil their tax obligations. Consequently,the rich greatly increased their holdings andwealth whilst many of the poorer peoplewere forced into poverty and entered apatron–client arrangement with local

political or military officials. The officialscame to be given the name potentes todistinguish them from their clients. The netresult of these developments was thecreation of a ‘submerged economy’ and ‘theformation of social groups no longer incontact with the state’.20

Where the more powerful individuals alsolost faith in the empire, or where servicewas deemed worthless, they turned to thechurch. This is the period during which thechurch cemented its position of authorityand also copied the administrative structureof the empire, an organization that exists tothis day. The civilian bureaucracy (militiaofficialis) and the army (militia armata) werejoined by the (militia Christi) ‘soldiers ofChrist’.21 Although this helped the church toprosper and grow, the result was a loss ofmanpower to both the bureaucratic andmilitary arms of the empire. Individuals

wishing to evade their responsibility asfunctionaries of the state instead joined theclergy, sometimes as bishops and men ofgreat ecclesiastical and political power, butwhere these options were not availablesimply as monks.22

There were two main outcomes to thesechanges. One was that the wealthy came tohold power greatly disproportionate to theirnumbers. Once ensconced in their position,these same men tended to use theirinfluence to protect their own interestsrather than those of the state. An exampleof their influence may be seen in therepeated elevation of usurpers in outlyingprovinces to the role of ‘emperor’.

Linked to this change is the fact that overa long period of time there was a transfer ofloyalty. In the earlier empire bonds ofloyalty had run from the poor to thewealthy to the aristocracy and finally to the

emperor. In the late third and early fourthcenturies many of the wealthy and thearistocracy entered the church. The bondsthen ran from the poor to the wealthy to thechurch. The emperor was eliminated fromthe equation and loyalties reverted from theabstract empire to the more concrete personof the local bishop. The church replaced theempire as the focus of people’s lives.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is therise of the bacaudae – by the fifth centurythe term bacaudae, rather than usurpation,was used for any uprising against theempire where there was no leader aiming atbecoming emperor – in the West. The originand nature of the bacaudae remains unclear,but it would seem that when it began thephenomenon was mainly one of armed‘uprisings’ by peasants in the less-Romanized areas of Gaul and Spain. Themovement may have been enlarged, if not

started, as a result of poorer peasantstaking up arms to protect themselves and/orsurvive. The first uprising under the namebacaudae was c.283–284, when Gallicpeasants rebelled against their treatment.23

The main cause of unrest may have beenthe laws that tied people to their places ofresidence and jobs.24 In Gaul there wasanother reason for dissatisfaction. In theearly fifth century the Praetorian Prefectmoved from Trier in the north to Arles inthe south. The move alienated a large partof northern Gaul and all of Britain, since itreinforced the concept that the emperor andhis court were more concerned with the coreof the empire and that those provinces onthe northern periphery would, as aconsequence, be neglected.25 Furthermore,the emperor moved his court from Milan,where it was easily accessible from Gaul, toRavenna, where access from northern Gaul

and Britain was poor. The move helped toalienate the indigenous aristocracy of thenorth west of the empire who were alreadytempted to join the church rather than servethe empire.

The result of unpopular laws, civil wars,movements of political centres andbarbarian invasions, was a tendency for thepoor and unprotected to begin to clustermore tightly to the heads of their families,and they in turn to their aristocratic masteror to the local warlord.26 As a result, it islogical to assume that the bacaudae wereuprisings where the local inhabitants,probably including members of the locallower aristocracy, decided to secede fromthe empire and follow their own path, muchas the British had done during the earlierreign of Honorius.27

As the empire slowly began to withdrawits influence from the northern borders, the

Germanic tribes slowly began to increasetheirs. The Franks, for example, werebeginning the gradual widening of theirinfluence over northern Gaul, yet for themost part this was a very gradual processand the full effects would not be felt untilsome time in the future.

CONCLUSIONDuring the course of the early-fifth centurythe empire in the west came underincreasing pressure from three sources.Possibly the least of these was the risk ofusurpations within the empire, since the lossof Britain, the major source of usurpinggenerals, greatly reduced the threat. Thesecond was that barbarians both inside andoutside the empire no longer took part inraids simply for financial gain. Instead,their leaders were intent on gaining landand prestige within the empire. Inhindsight, this was the greatest threat to the

survival of the west. Finally, there was thegrowing danger of large parts of the westseceding from the empire and followingtheir own courses. The loss of Britain in thisway provided a model for secessionists, butBritain had never been vital to the securityof the empire: Africa, Gaul and Spain were.* Unless otherwise stated, all dates are AD.

Chapter 2

Aetius the Hostage*

STILICHOIn 394 Theodosius I won the Battle of theFrigidus and re-united the empire. FollowingTheodosius’ death in 395 Stilicho tookcontrol of the West. He disbanded thefoederati (‘foreign’ troops, especially Goths:see Chapter 4) who had fought forTheodosius at the battle. Feeling that theirservices deserved more reward, almostimmediately these troops rebelled under theleadership of Alaric. Alaric and the Goths

would remain free agents for the remainderof Stilicho’s rule.

After twice fighting Stilicho, Alaric tookservice with the East, being given the postof magister militum per Illyricum. However,feeling that he was becoming politicallyisolated, in 401 Alaric invaded Italy. Afterlaying siege to Aquileia and Milan, Alaricattempted to cross the Alps into Gaul.Before he could do so he was caught outsidePollentia and narrowly defeated by Stilicho.Alaric agreed to a peace treaty andretreated across the north of Italy towardsIllyricum. When in the neighbourhood ofVerona Alaric made one last attempt tocross the Alps and reach softer targetsfurther in the west. Stilicho acted quicklyand this time Alaric was defeated moreheavily. With many of his men defectingand joining Stilicho, Alaric was forced toresume his march to Illyricum, finally being

settled in the West’s portion of the diocesein a minor military post.

IllyricumIn 404 Stilicho, who from the start hadwanted to be guardian for Arcadius in theEast, was forced to accept that this wouldnever happen. Instead, he sent envoys toConstantinople with the lesser claim thatTheodosius was planning to return thewhole of the prefecture of Illyricum to theWest before he died.1 Needless to say, thisdamaged East–West relations.

As relations deteriorated, Stilicho beganto make plans for the forcible annexation ofIllyricum. Part of these plans involved usingAlaric’s forces to help in the invasion. Therefollowed negotiations between Stilicho andAlaric concerning the possible invasion.Obviously, Stilicho wanted to be sure thatonce Alaric was in Illyricum he would notsimply devastate the prefecture on his own

initiative, claiming that he was acting underorders from Stilicho. Conversely, Alaricwanted to ensure that this was not simply aplan by Stilicho to get rid of Alaric. Afterall, once Alaric had invaded Illyricum,Stilicho could easily announce that Alaricwas a traitor and that the invasion wasnothing to do with the west.

It would appear that agreement wasreached, and to secure the arrangementshostages were exchanged. The names of thehostages given by Alaric are unknown, butAlaric specifically demanded that he wasgiven Jason, son of Jovius (an extremelypowerful individual, as will be seen), andAetius, who was probably in his mid teens.2

The taking of hostages now has anextremely negative association. Modern-dayhostages are taken against their will andheld to ransom, usually for either money orfor political gain. In the ancient world the

exchange of hostages was a standardmethod of demonstrating that the twoparties were in full accord and that theywere intent on keeping to the agreementsmade. As a result, it was expected thathostages were individuals of rank anddistinction, demonstrating the two parties’faith in each other. That Aetius was askedfor by name reveals that Gaudentius, likeJovius, was a highly respected and powerfulindividual within Stilicho’s private circle.

For the Romans, the taking of hostages insuch matters was an extremely importantfactor in ‘international’ relations. Romeexpected to receive important hostages, andespecially the sons and heirs of the leadingmen within the opposition forces. In thisway the Romans hoped to be able toimpress and educate the next generation ofbarbarian leaders in the superiority ofRome, so making political allies for the

future.

RadagaisusOver the winter of 405–406 the two armiesprepared for an invasion that did nothappen. In late 405 the Goth Radagaisus leda large number of people – allegedly400,000 – over the Alps into Italy.3 Theempire was paralyzed with fear, and for atime Stilicho remained with the troops atTicinum.4 Once in Italy, Radagaisus dividedhis forces into three. When the campaignseason of 406 began Stilicho moved againsthim.5 Taken by surprise, Radagaisus wasforced to retreat to the heights aroundFaesulae, where he was captured andexecuted. The other two groups were quicklydefeated and the remnants driven out ofItaly.

Stilicho returned to his plan for an attackupon Illyricum. He promoted Alaric to the

post of magister militum per Illyricum, andJovius, of whom little is known prior to this,was made praefectus praetoriano Illyrici andsent to join Alaric. In early 407 Stilichoordered Alaric to march to Epirus beforeawaiting the arrival of Stilicho with troopsfrom the Italian army.6 The plan was for thecombined force to annex the whole of theprefecture of Illyricum for the West. Aetiusdoubtless accompanied Alaric, but Stilichowould never join the invasion.

Before he could set sail Stilicho received aletter from Honorius forbidding him to go.7Not only was Honorius unhappy with theconcept of invading the East, but there hadbeen a new development in the west:barbarians had crossed the Rhine into Gaul.8

The Invasion of Gaul9On the last day of 406 a large number ofbarbarians crossed the Rhine frontier into

Gaul. They consisted of Asding Vandalsunder Godigisel, Alans under two ‘kings’,Respendial and Goa, and a separate groupof Siling Vandals and Sueves. Goa the Alanimmediately offered his services to theRomans and, along with the people he led,appears to have crossed into the empireunhindered. He is later attested as servingAetius.10 After a battle against the Franksthe main body of the barbarians crossed thefrontier and the news of the invasion wassent to Honorius. Once he received it, heimmediately ordered the invasion ofIllyricum to be cancelled.

The British RevoltUnknown to Stilicho and Honorius, towardsthe end of 406 the British had revolted andelected a man called Marcus to be the newemperor.11 He was quickly assassinated andhis place taken by Gratian, a British

native.12 The news of the invasion of Gaulreached Britain early in the new year.13

When it was realized that Gratian was notgoing to act he was replaced by FlaviusClaudius Constantinus, better known asConstantine III.14

Meanwhile, the Vandals, Alans andSueves attacked the cities of northernGaul.15 Constantine quickly collected anarmy together and crossed to Gaul, landingat Bononia (Boulogne). He sent his newlyappointed generals, Nebiogast andJustinian, to secure Lyon, the capital of theGallic prefecture. His troops ignored thebarbarian invaders. However, shortly afterthe capture of Lyon, Constantine openednegotiations with the barbarians.16 By acombination of force and diplomacyConstantine brought the invaders undercontrol and used them to swell his ownranks.17 To make matters worse for Stilicho,

Spain also recognized Constantine.18

The Fall of StilichoNews of Constantine’s landing caused acrisis and Stilicho now had no option but tocancel the proposed campaign inIllyricum.19 He ordered the Roman troops tomove from the east coast of Italy to Pavia,yet by the time the army had been moved itwas too late in the year (407) to take anyaction. In the meantime, Alaric returned tothe western-controlled part of Illyricum anddemanded 4,000 pounds of gold to pay forhis troops’ invasion of Epirus.

Constantine sent envoys asking to bemade a colleague of Honorius, a move thatwas rejected. Instead, early in 408 the GothSarus was given a small army by Stilichoand attacked Constantine, defeatingConstantine’s forces and killing Justinianand later Nebiogast before besiegingConstantine in Valence. However, new

forces from northern Gaul arrived tosupport Constantine and Sarus fled backover the Alps.

It was now clear that a major expeditionwas needed to defeat Constantine. Over theprotests of the Senate, Stilicho appointedAlaric to command in Gaul, despite the factthat the Senate had only just been forced togive in to Alaric’s demands for 4,000 poundsof gold. The move alienated many toStilicho’s domination and opposition beganto mount to his control.

At this point news arrived that EmperorArcadius had died in Constantinople.Although Honorius wanted to go toConstantinople to supervise the care of thenew emperor, his nephew Theodosius II,Stilicho intervened and declared that hewould go himself. Tensions mounted, but forunknown reasons Stilicho remainedstationary in Italy.

Finally, in mid August 408, as theemperor inspected the troops in Pavia priorto the Gallic expedition, Olympius,Honorius’ magister scrinii (master of theimperial secretaries), instigated a mutiny ofthe army. Many leading men of Stilicho’sregime were seized and killed, and theemperor himself feared for his life.

News of the mutiny was quickly carried toStilicho, who at this time was in Bononia.He fled to Ravenna, and Olympius, who wasnow master of the emperor, ordered thetroops in Ravenna to put Stilicho underhouse arrest. When news reached Stilicho ofhis impending arrest he sought sanctuary ina church. At day-break on 22 August 408 thesoldiers, led by one Heraclianus, entered thechurch and swore an oath before the bishopthat they had been ordered by the emperornot to kill but to arrest Stilicho.20 OnceStilicho was out of the church, however,

Heraclianus produced a second lettercondemning him to death for his ‘crimesagainst the state’.21 At this point Stilicho’sservants and loyal federates made to rescuehim from execution, but Stilicho stoppedthem with ‘terrible threats and submitted hisneck to the sword’.22 On his death, chaosand anarchy broke out in Italy.

Map 2. The Western Empire c.408

AFTER STILICHO

Resentful of Stilicho’s employment ofbarbarian troops and of their loss ofprestige, the regular Roman army in Italyturned upon the federates. However, thebarbarian troops were not at hand, so in anorgy of bloodlust the Romans killed orenslaved the families of the allied troops.23

This was a huge mistake, since the federatesimmediately joined their forces to Alaric.

Some of Stilicho’s supporters were alsokilled, but such executions only appear tohave been at the start of the revolt: many ofStilicho’s supporters, such as Constantius,survived and later rose to high rank.Amongst the survivors was Gaudentius,although why he was spared is unknown.The suggestion that this was due to theinfluence of his rich and possibly powerfulwife is a possibility, but remains conjecture.

ALARICWith his new reinforcements Alaric was

once again in a position to invade Italy, thistime without Stilicho to oppose him.Surprisingly, Alaric did not immediatelyinvade Italy, instead releasing the hostageshe had been given in 405. Aetius and hisfellows were allowed to return home. Therefollowed a series of embassies betweenAlaric and Honorius. As part of thenegotiations Alaric asked for a newexchange of hostages, specifically thatAetius be one of those given to him.Honorius refused.24 At an unknown date,but probably between 408 and 410, Aetiuswas sent to the Huns as a hostage, almostcertainly as part of an agreement to ensurethat the Huns did not invade the Westduring the period when Alaric was at largein Italy.25

Frustrated by Honorius’ refusal, Alariconce again invaded Italy.26 Without anactive leader, the Roman army was

powerless to resist. Realizing that Honoriusin Ravenna was safe, Alaric laid siege toRome. When the citizens of Rome agreed tosupport his demands Alaric raised the siege.Olympius fled into exile and his place wastaken by Jovius, who now begannegotiations in an attempt to preventwar,27 reaching an agreement with Alaric.28

However, when the proposal was put toHonorius, the emperor refused to ratify anyof it, declaring that he would never have aGoth as magister militum29 Alaricimmediately made a more moderate offer,but again Honorius rejected it.30

Alaric returned to Rome and in 409placed the city under siege for a secondtime. In December 409 he persuaded thepraefectus urbis Romae, Attalus, to becomehis puppet emperor. It is probable that itwas at this time that Galla Placidia wastaken captive by the Goths, as it was only

now that she is mentioned by Zosimus asbeing a hostage of Alaric, not before.31

Emperor Attalus and Alaric moved toAriminum, from where they hoped to putpressure on Honorius. Talks began, but atthis vital moment 4,000 troops arrived fromConstantinople to help Honorius. Gainingconfidence from their unexpected arrival,Honorius stood firm and the talks brokedown.32

In summer 410 Alaric deposed Attalus inthe hope that the concession wouldencourage further negotiations, and wasadvancing towards Ravenna in preparationfor the opening of talks when he wasunexpectedly attacked by Sarus.33 Althoughvictorious, Alaric saw the attack as beingordered by Honorius. Furious, Alaricreturned to Rome, and on 24 August 410 histroops were allowed to enter the city at theSalarian Gate: for the first time in 800

years, the Eternal City was sacked bybarbarians.34 The event shocked the Romanworld and doubtless when the news reachedhim Aetius was just as appalled.

After the sack Alaric marched his troopssouth and began to gather ships for anattempt to attack and conquer Africa.Unfortunately for Alaric, storms destroyedthe fleet he had gathered. At this point hebecame ill with an unknown disease anddied. His successor was his brother-in-law,Athaulf.

GAUL, SPAIN AND CONSTANTIUSWhilst this was happening in Italy, in 409Constantine III’s new magister militumGerontius had rebelled and proclaimed aman named Maximus as emperor.35 Assupport for his new regime was poor inSpain, Gerontius decided to employ thebarbarians currently in Gaul. After

devastating Gaul, in early autumn 409 theVandals, Alans and Sueves crossed thePyrenees and entered Spain to serve withGerontius.36 They were allocated land byGerontius, deciding which tribe receivedwhich area by the means of lots when theycould not reach an amicable agreement.37

The Asding Vandals received the southernparts of the province of Gallaecia while theSueves took ‘that part of Gallaecia which issituated on the very edge of the westernocean’;38 the Siling Vandals were grantedlands in Baetica; the Alans received territoryin Lusitania. Gerontius himself retainedTarraconensis and Carthaginiensis.

In 411 the remainder of the Spaniards ‘inthe cities and forts surrenderedthemselves’.39 Finally assured of his positionin Spain, and with the barbariansovercoming local opposition to theirsettlement, Gerontius attacked Constantine

in Gaul. He quickly defeated Constantine’sforces and killed Constantine’s son Constansat Vienne, after which he placedConstantine under siege in Arles.

CONSTANTIUS IIIUnfortunately for Gerontius, Honorius hadfinally appointed a new magister militum, anenergetic and capable soldier by the nameof Constantius, who had been a supporter ofStilicho. Constantius took an army acrossthe Alps and advanced on Arles. Gerontius’Spanish troops deserted him and he fledback to Spain, where shortly afterwards histroops mutinied – no doubt unhappy withhis settlement of the barbarians in Spain –and he was executed. In the meantime,Constantius continued the siege of Arles.Eventually, the city surrendered, andConstantine III was arrested and beheaded.The military exploits of Constantiustriggered a new feeling of optimism in

Rome, as evidenced by the list of buildingsrepaired in Rome after the sack of theGoths. The sense of renewal was echoed byOlympiodorus, whose history reveals a storyof decline and renewal between 407 and425.40

BRITAINWhen Constantine III had crossed fromBritain to Gaul the inhabitants of Britainwould have been hoping for the renewal ofa strong empire under the dynamicleadership of a British-nominated emperor.They were to be quickly disillusioned. Afterrapidly advancing to the south of Gaul,Constantine’s rule stagnated, even allowinghis own magister militum, Gerontius, to rebel.As events in Gaul deteriorated into totalconfusion, with usurper replacing usurper,Britain came under pressure from externalthreats, especially from the Saxons across

the North Sea.41 Unable to obtain help fromthe continent, the British finally gave uphope and decided to defend themselves. Atsome point between the years 408 and 411Britain left the empire for the last time.42

ATHAULF AND WALLIAAthaulf, the new leader of the Goths afterAlaric’s death, remained in Italy during 411.In 412 he led his forces into Gaul, takingwith them the emperor’s sister GallaPlacidia, and declared his support for yetanother usurper called Jovinus. However,Jovinus and Athaulf quickly fell out.Reaching agreement with Honorius, Athaulfattacked and captured Jovinus, who wasquickly beheaded. Despite this, Athaulfcould not count on Honorius’ full support,since the Romans did not keep their side ofthe agreement, mainly because GallaPlacidia remained a Gothic captive.Consequently, Constantius began to put

military pressure on the Goths.Notwithstanding this, in January 414Athaulf married Galla Placidia.43 Shequickly bore him a son named Theodosius.Unfortunately, Theodosius died soon after,and Athaulf himself was assassinated in415.

Athaulf was succeeded by Sarus’ brotherSigeric, who humiliated Galla Placidia bymaking her walk in front of his horse.Fortunately for her, he was assassinatedafter a rule of only seven days and the newking, Wallia, soon came to an agreementwith Honorius and Galla Placidia returnedto Italy – where she was forced to marryConstantius, despite the fact that sheloathed him intensely. As part of theagreement the Goths were ordered to attackthe Vandals in Spain, the date of the attackprobably being 416.44

SPAINThe attack came as a complete surprise.Earlier, probably in 411, the Vandals, Alansand Sueves appear to have reached anagreement with Honorius, although theaccuracy and dating of this claim is still amatter of debate.45 Since that time, thebarbarians in Spain appear to haveremained peaceful.46 However, they werestill harbouring the usurper Maximus, who,following the defeat of Gerontius, had fledto them for safety, and since then theywould appear to have refused to return himto the empire.47

In 416 Wallia led the Goths against theVandals in a campaign the Goths completedto great effect. The huge losses suffered bythe Vandals appear to have been enough toconvince Constantius to order the Goths towithdraw. It was now clear that, having lostso much of his potential support, Maximus

was no longer a threat, and it is probablethat Constantius was worried that acomplete elimination of the Vandals wouldencourage Wallia to abandon the newtreaty and instead attempt to take the placeof the Vandals in Spain. On their return, in418 or 419, the Goths were allowed to settlein Aquitania in Gaul.48 Their longwanderings were finally over.Unfortunately for Wallia, he died shortlyafterwards and was succeeded byTheoderic.49 Either before his elevation, ormore likely shortly afterwards, in anattempt to cement his position, Theodericmarried Alaric’s daughter.50

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VISIGOTHICKINGDOMThe treaty by which the Visigoths weresettled in Aquitania in 418 has been thesubject of much debate. The argument is

based upon the ambiguous phrasing used inthe sources, which can be interpreted toeither mean that the Visigoths wereallocated money and treated as soldiers orthat they were granted land and itsassociated revenues.51 However, it isprobably best to follow Philostorgius andaccept that the Visigoths were granted landto farm in return for supplying troops whenrequired.52 It is unlikely that they wereindividually allocated land by the Romanbureaucracy, although this remains apossibility. It is more likely that the Gothssimply moved in and took land in differentregions depending upon local conditions.53

The concept that the Visigoths weregranted land is reinforced by a review of thepersonalities involved in the treaty. Walliawas the leader of a large group of peoplewho had been harassed out of Italy andforced, usually on the verge of starvation,

along the southern coast of Gaul beforebeing compelled to fight in Spain for theempire. There can be little doubt that,shortly before his death, the offer of land tofarm for his people would have beenaccepted with a minimum of hesitation. Onthe other hand, the magister militumConstantius (later Emperor Constantius III)had been a follower of Stilicho. Constantiushad taken a leading role in havingOlympius killed for his actions in incitingthe mutiny against Stilicho.54 It is likely thatConstantius used both Stilicho and theEmperor Theodosius I as his military andpolitical role models. As a result,Constantius followed the example set byTheodosius, settling the Visigoths in Gauland imposing similar terms as Theodosiushad applied in 382. Due to the hardships oftheir years fighting against Rome it is clearthat the Goths were in poor condition, since

they seem to have been given a taxexemption in order to help them recoverafter the initial settlement.55

The decision to settle the Goths in Gaulmay seem strange, given that Stilicho hadtaken great pains to keep them out of thetrans-Alpine region. Yet it simply reflectedpolitical and strategic reality. At no pointcould the Romans have evicted the Gothsfrom Gaul and forced them to return east.The Romans did not have the surplusmanpower for a campaign carried out in theteeth of fierce Gothic opposition: after theirlong suffering, the Goths would haveresisted to their utmost any attempt toreturn them to their starting point inIllyricum. Furthermore, since the battlesagainst Alaric in 402, conditions hadchanged in Gaul. By settling the Visigoths inAquitania Constantine could set them toguard against any attempt by the Vandals,

Alans or Sueves to re-enter Gaul from Spain.Moreover, they were now perfectly placedfor campaigns against the barbarians inSpain, as well as against insurgents,usurpers or bacaudae in Gaul itself.56

It also seems certain that the Romangovernment did not expect the Visigoths toremain independent for long. The fact thatthe Roman administrative system continuedto function normally implies that theVisigoths were perceived as a ‘friendly andobedient force’ on Roman territory.57

However, at least in part this was due to thefact that the Germanic peoples enteringRoman territory had no political agenda oftheir own and no ideology that they wishedto impose. As such, they found it ‘mostadvantageous and profitable to work closelywithin the well-established and sophisticatedstructures of Roman life’.58

It is common to find modern historians

criticizing Theodosius, Constantius and theirsuccessors for their policy concerning thesettlement of barbarians on Roman soil. Themain problem that is addressed is that thenew settlements, unlike those of earliercenturies, retained their political leaders,rather than being settled on Roman termsunder Roman supervision and governed byRoman prefects.59 This was the major flawin the Roman plan: although the Visigothswere settled on land according to Romanterms, they remained a people apart withtheir own leader. Additionally, their newking, Theoderic, was only recently crownedand needed to boost his own standing withhis followers if he was to strengthen his holdupon his people. Although it is likely thatConstantius believed that he could weakenthe Visigoths politically and militarily overtime, he was not to be allowed that time tofulfil his plans.

The other criticism of these settlements isdue to the loss of revenue from the settledareas to a government whose coffers werealready rapidly shrinking.60 With thesettlement of the Goths these complaintsreach their apogee. Unlike earlier (andlater) settlements, the treaty with the Gothsappears to have placed two-thirds of theincome of the forfeited territory into theirhands, leaving only one-third in the handsof the Romans.61 Usually, only one-third ofthe income was granted to the settledbarbarians, following the traditional Romanmethod of quartering soldiers on the ownersof land, known as hospitalitas.

Although interpreted in a negative light,there is some validation for Constantius’policy. Firstly, and possibly of foremostimportance, the Goths were transformedfrom enemies into friends. This allowedConstantius to withdraw troops facing the

Goths to fight in other theatres. As a result,he was not compelled to begin either a newrecruiting drive or to allocate funds to payfor troops to garrison areas facing theGoths. This saving in part negated the extracost of allowing the Goths to settle inAquitaine. Secondly, the great majority ofthe taxes collected were used to pay for thearmy. In theory, the Goths were now part ofthe army, and as such were simply receivingtheir pay as usual. The loss of revenueneeded to pay the army was in effect beingused to pay the ‘army’. Thirdly, there werehuge problems with tax collecting, withmany landowners being members of thearistocracy, who were immune from someaspects of taxation. Although the number ofindividual aristocrats who owned land inAquitaine may have been small, thesettlement in effect transferred them frombeing immune from tax to being tax payers.

Finally, as will be seen in Chapter 6, theconsequences of the civil wars fought byTheodosius I against western usurpers andthe continuous warfare following the‘rebellion’ of Alaric and the crossing of theRhine in 406 were huge. Analysis hasrevealed that between the accession ofTheodosius in the East and the compilationof the Notitia Dignitatum (dating to c.420) inthe West, about half of the Western fieldarmy had been lost.62 Constantius needed toend the wars against the Goths as otherwisethe army could easily enter a process ofrapid collapse. Furthermore, by bringing theGoths within the structure of the army, hewould help to alleviate the problems ofmanpower shortage and, hopefully, begiven time in which to recruit and rebuild.

Finally, the settlement would give respiteto the war-weary provinces of Gaul andallow them the time they needed to recover,

although the concept that the settlementallowed ‘normal life to resume its course,though under new masters’ may be a littletoo optimistic.63 Following the treaty of418/419 a degree of stability againappeared in the West, despite thetremendous losses previously suffered.64

Further, the sparse written recorddemonstrates that in many cases the local‘Roman’ aristocracy benefited from thechange, since their new masters settled inToulouse and so gave them readier access toinfluence and power than was availableunder the Italo-centric empire.65 There canalso be little doubt that for some thesettlement was simply a change of masters,with Gothic landowners taking the place ofimperial tax collectors. Yet for many – andespecially those on the borders, where bothsmall-scale and large-scale warfarecontinued – the settlement was a further

blow to their dwindling prosperity.As a consequence, despite the fact that the

settlement should probably still be seen asdetrimental to the affairs of the empire, atthe time the benefits may have been seen asoutweighing the shortcomings. In fact, theadoption of the policy of creating foederatiout of the invaders may have been the mainreason why the West survived the invasionsand civil wars of the early-fifth century.66 Itis largely with the benefit of hindsight, andthe knowledge of what ramifications thepolicy would have in the long term, that thenegative aspects of Constantius’ decisioncan be seen as outweighing the positives.

SPAINThe attack by the Goths had seriouslyweakened the Siling Vandals and the Alans.As a result, they decided to leave theirterritories and place themselves under thecommand of Gunderic, the king of the

Asding Vandals.67 At an unknown point intime the king of the now-combined Vandalsand Alans took the title ‘King of the Vandalsand the Alans’, a title later attested toGelimer due to a silver missorum with thelegend Gailamir Rex Vandalorum et Alanorum.As Gelimer ruled from 530 to 534, thisillustrates that the Alans kept a separateidentity within the Vandal kingdom.68 Yetthese are not the only peoples who joinedforces under Gunderic. According toPossidius, ‘There were Vandals and Alans,mixed with one of the Gothic peoples, andindividuals of various nations’.69 Withoutrealizing it, the Roman plan to weaken theVandals and Alans instead resulted in theircoalescing to form a new Vandal‘supergroup’ that could rival that of theGoths themselves.70

Gunderic’s new ‘alliance’ was far morepowerful than the army he had previously

commanded. In 419 he led his troopsagainst the Sueves and besieged them ‘inNerbasis montibus’ (the ErbasianMountains).71 It is possible that Gundericwas attempting to force the Sueves to joinwith his forces, so making him undisputedlythe strongest military leader in Spain.72

Unfortunately for him, a Roman relief forceunder Astyrius, comes Hispaniarum, brokethe siege and foiled Gunderic’s ambition.73

Shortly after this, as a reward for hisservices both before and after thiscampaign, Astyrius was made patricius. Thiswas not the end of the matter, as theVandals retreated south, and Maurocellus,the Spanish vicarius, only escaped fromBracara after the loss of some of his men.74

The new Vandal army was at war withRome and remained a major threat to thesecurity of Spain. They were now set onfinding new territories, since the conflict at

Bracara is the first sign of them expandingtheir influence towards the south of Spain.

THE HUNSAetius was probably not fully aware of thecomplex military and political manoeuvringbeing carried on during this period ofextreme confusion, since for most – if not all– of the time he was a hostage with theHuns.75

It is extremely difficult to draw a clearpicture of the nature of the Huns at thistime. The sources are very vague and whereinformation is given it is often used toprovide an overarching view of Hunnic rulethat is contradicted by other sources.76 Forexample, due to events later in Aetius’career, it is often assumed that the king ofthe Huns at this time was Rua.Unfortunately, this association is far fromsecure, as Rua is not attested as king of the

Huns until 424.77 It is more likely thatAetius was sent to the Hun king Uldin, whoat around this time dominated the Danubefrontier. Uldin had invaded Thrace in 405and had helped in the defeat of Radagaisusin 406.78 In 408 Uldin had invaded Thraceagain. Unfortunately for him, on thisoccasion the Romans had used ‘promisesand bribes’ to cause many of his followers toabandon him.79 It is almost certain that itwas Uldin who secured Aetius as a hostagefollowing this ‘defeat’. An exchange ofhostages after negotiations would on oneside allow Uldin to save face and on theother help to guarantee that he would notattack the empire again. This was especiallyimportant during the years from 408, whenItaly was under extreme pressure from theGoths (under Alaric and later Athaulf) andfrom the usurper Constantine III in Gaul.

Yet it is clear that although Uldin was

pre-eminent in the region of the Danube, hewas not a supremely powerful sole leader ofthe Huns: there are many examples ofHunnic forces taking service with theRomans, and to a large degree they appearto have followed the ‘traditional’ barbarianpractice of following strong leaders untilthey felt that these were no longer servingtheir own best interests, after which theydefected and served somebody else.80

GOTHIC AND HUNNIC INFLUENCES ONAETIUSThere is very little evidence for the natureand appearance of Aetius except for whatcan be deduced from the sources. However,Gregory of Tours, quoting Renatus Frigidus,actually describes Aetius:

Aetius was of medium height,manly in his habits and well-proportioned. He had no bodily

infirmity and was spare inphysique. His intelligence waskeen, he was full of energy, asuperb horseman, a fine shot withan arrow and tireless with thelance (contu inpiger). He wasextremely able as a soldier and hewas skilled in the arts of peace.There was no avarice in him andeven less cupidity. He wasmagnanimous in his behaviour andnever swayed in his judgement bythe advice of unworthy counsellors.He bore adversity with greatpatience, was ready for anyexacting enterprise, he scorneddanger and was able to endurehunger, thirst and loss of sleep.

Greg. Tur. 2.8

It is almost certain that his skill as a

horseman and at archery was picked upwhilst with the Huns. Yet what is morenotable is that during his time amongst theGoths and Huns, Aetius missed the majorconfrontations between Stilicho and hisenemies. He also missed the campaignsfought by Constantius against both usurpersand Goths in Gaul. It is interesting to notethat Stilicho and Constantius III displayed apreference for the strategy of manoeuvreand blockade to that of direct militaryconfrontation. In this they followed thehabits of the later imperial army,recognizing that a defeat would drasticallyreduce the manpower available to the army.By contrast Aetius, being exposed for a longperiod to the slightly more aggressive Gothsand the far more aggressive Huns, may havelearned far more adventurous strategies andtactics from his barbarian mentors.

Furthermore, by being removed from the

court and army at an early age, Aetius wasless susceptible to the traditional Romanethos of relying largely on the Roman armyfor defence. His time amongst thebarbarians may have taught him that, farfrom being inferior to the Romans, thesepeople were at least the equivalent of their‘cultural superiors’ within the empire. Farmore importantly for his near future, histime amongst the Huns allowed him to buildpersonal relationships and alliances thatwould help him in the years to come.

Yet in the long term, and possibly ofequal importance to his absorption of the‘barbarian’ willingness to fight, Aetius’ timeamongst the Goths and Huns would result inhim being able to speak at least a littleGothic and Hunnic.81 When it came to laternegotiations with Huns and Goths, both onthe diplomatic side as well as withnegotiations with foederati, Aetius would not

have need of an interpreter. It is likely thatsuch linguistic skills would have impressedopposition ambassadors and spokesmen.

AETIUS RETURNS HOMEThere is absolutely no indication in thesources as to the date when Aetius wasreleased from his time as a hostage to theHuns. Analyzing the sparse evidence,several possibilities emerge. For a very earlydate, it is possible that upon the death ofUldin Aetius returned to the empire.However, this would not allow Aetius timeto build long-lasting, stable relationshipsamongst the Huns. It is far more likely thathe remained a hostage after Uldin’s death.

The difficulty here lies in the fragmentarynature of the history of the Huns. It isknown that Uldin invaded Thrace in 408and was forced to retire. It is also knownthat in 412 the king of the Huns wasCharaton.82 Unfortunately, we do not know

whether Charaton was the successor toUldin or a king of a completely differentgroup of Huns in a different location.

Assuming that Charaton was the successorto Uldin, the latter must have died at somepoint between 409 and 412. It would followthat at this point Aetius remained as ahostage to secure the treaty first agreed withUldin. In this way Aetius became known tothe next generation of Huns, who wereprobably of around his own age. Includedamongst these were Rua, Octar andMundiuch, the brothers who were to lay thefoundation of a genuine Hunnic empireunder the control of one individual, Attila,son of Mundiuch.83 Although conjecture, it islikely that Aetius remained with the Hunsfor a long time, at least until the death ofCharaton, which dates most likely to the endof the 410s or possibly as late as the early420s.

The extended stay would allow severalyears for him to forge strong personalrelationships with the boys who wouldbecome the next generation of rulers. It ispossible that Aetius was returned followingthe death of Charaton. After all, hiscontemporaries and friends Rua and Octarwere now beginning their ‘joint’ rule. Hispresence was not needed, since the brothershad no intention of invading the west or ofplacing the court in Ravenna underpressure. Their greatest priority in thefollowing years was to unite the Huns undertheir own leadership. After that, they wouldaim at Constantinople for glory. Details arefew and unclear and there can be nocertainty about the political circumstancessurrounding the rise of Rua and Octar.However, from the limited evidenceavailable it is possible that Rua took controlof the Hunnic tribes facing the western

empire whilst Octar took control of thosefacing the east.84 Yet although it is possiblethat the death of Charaton was the reasonfor Aetius’ return, there is one further majorevent that could have signalled the end ofAetius’ time as a hostage to the Huns. Thisconcerned the Emperor Honorius.

CONSTANTIUS III AND HONORIUSOn 1 January 417, prior to the settlement ofthe Goths in Aquitania in 418, the magistermilitum Constantius had married GallaPlacidia, half-sister of Honorius.85 They hadtwo children, a daughter named Justa GrataHonoria – usually known simply as Honoria– and a son, Valentinian, who was born on2 July 419.86

Constantius’ rise now reached towards itsapogee. In imitation of Stilicho, after hismarriage Constantius received the titleparens principum (first parent, parental

guardian) in 420, and then on 8 February421 he was appointed co-emperor withHonorius whilst Placidia was declaredAugusta and their son Valentinian wasdeclared nobilissimus (most noble).87

Although no doubt an honour, Constantiussoon regretted the elevation, since after hebecame emperor his movements wereheavily circumscribed and he no longer hadthe freedom he had enjoyed as magistermilitum.88 It is possible that this assertionwas to affect the generals who came afterhim, since the vast majority of them had nowish to place themselves upon the throne,possibly due to the knowledge that onceemperor they would be heavily tied downby bureaucratic red tape, so unable to leadthe army in person and so risk losing thearmy’s support.

Yet even aside from Constantius’ owndismay, his elevation to emperor did not

meet with universal approval: his elevation– along with those of Placidia andValentinian – was not recognized byTheodosius II in the East.89 Allegedly,Constantius was so angered by this refusalto recognize his rule that he beganpreparations for war with the East.90

Unfortunately for him, but possiblyfortunately for the empire, these came tonothing as he died on 2 Septemberfollowing a short illness after reigning foronly six months. Following his death,relations between his widow Galla Placidia– who had been declared Augusta byHonorius and Constantius in 421 – and herhalf-brother the Emperor Honorius quicklydeteriorated and she fled toConstantinople.91

Honorius himself was not to enjoy thepleasures of sole rule again for very long.On 15 August 423 he followed in his father’s

footsteps and died of oedema (dropsy).92

The West now needed a new emperor. Ofmore importance to Aetius, the death of theemperor signalled the end of the treaty thatHonorius had signed with the Huns.Although he may have returned to Ravennaprior to this (see above), it is almost certainthat with the end of the treaty all of thehostages that had been exchanged with theHuns now returned home. Aetius headed forRavenna.

GAUDENTIUSThe reunion of Aetius and Gaudentius wasdoubtless joyful. Aetius had spent severalyears with the Huns and, although hisposition as a hostage gave him a protectedposition and meant that he was unlikely tobe harmed, there were still many otherdangers that could have taken his life.

Whilst Aetius had been in the east,Gaudentius had remained in the west.

Unfortunately, there is no mention of him inany of the sources. Everything about his lifeis completely unknown. Yet it is almostcertain that he continued to serve bothConstantius III and his successors as magistermilitum in a military capacity. Honorius haddied without leaving any heirs. Gaudentius,and to a lesser degree Aetius, would now bein a position to influence events.* It is recommended that this chapter beread in conjunction with the Chronology toaid understanding.

Chapter 3

Aetius Takes the Stage

CASTINUS, BONIFACE AND AETIUSWhen Aetius returned to the court inRavenna he found that politically theatmosphere was highly charged and thecourt divided into at least two camps.Earlier, in either 420 or 421, Honorius hadappointed an individual by the name ofCastinus to be the comes domesticorum(‘Count of the Household’).1 In this positionCastinus had led a campaign against theFranks.2 Probably at the beginning of 422,

after the death of Constantius III, Honoriushad elevated Castinus to be a dux, beforeshortly afterwards making him magisterutriusque militiae (‘Master of all the Troops’).

The elevation of Castinus was to havepolitical consequences. Placidia, a veryforceful woman, appears to have aimed atbecoming the power behind Honorius.Brought up in the household of Stilicho andSerena, in all likelihood she aimed toemulate their political and militarydomination of Honorius as parens principum.On the other hand, women were usuallysubordinate to men in Roman society, andso any attempt by her to gain control of thecourt will have been resented by those menwho would have expected to be in her place.She quickly came into opposition withCastinus, who as the magister militum sawhimself as the natural heir to Stilicho andConstantius III.3 The scene was set for a

bitter rivalry. Although the advantage mayhave been with Castinus, since he controlledthe army, Placidia was known to beruthless: in 408, when Rome was beingbesieged by the Goths under Alaric, she hadallegedly approved the Senate’s decision tokill Serena, the adopted half-sister who hadraised her. Sentiment was not a strong partof Placidia’s personality.

In 422 Castinus was ordered to lead acampaign against the Vandals in Spain,being given a mixed force of Romans andVisigothic foederati (allies) from the newsettlement in Aquitania.4 In an unexpectedturn of events, another Roman general wasordered to accompany him. Boniface hadrisen to fame as early as 413, when theGoths under Athaulf had attacked Marseillesduring the conflict between Athaulf andConstantius III. During the attack Bonifacehad managed to wound Athaulf himself, a

feat for which he was ‘fêted by the citizens’.5Following this moment of fame Bonifacesuccessfully commanded troops in Africa in417 and entered into correspondence with(Saint) Augustine, in the course of whichAugustine allayed his Christian fears thatfighting wars and killing was against God’swill and would ensure ‘eternal damnation’.6

The reasons for Boniface’s appointment asthe companion to Castinus in 422 areunknown. However, later in his career hewas firmly loyal to Placidia, and it is likelythat he was appointed upon advice byPlacidia as a counterbalance to Castinusshould he become too successful.Unfortunately, having two opposingcommanders has never been an effectivestrategy, and things did not go according toplan. Even before the expedition had sailedfor Spain Castinus and Boniface quarrelled.7The reasons are unclear and may relate to

Castinus being unhappy at Boniface’sappointment by Placidia. On the otherhand, Prosper claims that it was becauseBoniface decided that following Castinuswould be ‘dangerous to himself anddegrading’.8 Whatever the cause, theargument was strong enough to makeBoniface fear for his life – at that timeCastinus was far more powerful thanhimself. The net result was that Bonifacefled to Africa, which was rapidly becominghis personal power base, for safety.9 Atsome time after this Boniface’s wife diedand in his grief he decided that he shouldenter a monastery. He was dissuaded fromthis and shortly after met a Gothic ‘princess’named Pelagia, who, although an Arian,was persuaded to convert so that he couldmarry her.10

Map 3. The Western Empire c.423

In the meantime, Castinus continued with

the campaign against the Vandals. Afterinitial successes, including the final captureof the usurper Maximus – who was laterexecuted – he managed to pin the Vandalsin one place and, having ‘reduced them tostarvation by siege so that they wereprepared to surrender, he precipitouslyengaged them in open battle and, beingbetrayed by his auxiliaries [the Goths],suffered defeat and fled to Tarragona’.11 Itwould appear that Castinus had becomeoverconfident, possibly antagonizing hisGothic foederati in the process. As a result,the Goths deserted him and he was defeated,although it should be noted that Hydatius‘hated’ the Goths, and so his statement thatthey deserted Castinus needs to be treatedwith some caution.12

Rather than taking the blame for thedefeat, Castinus claimed that his failure wasthe result of a plot against him by Placidia,

Boniface and the Goths.13 Whether his claimwas true or not is unknown but in thecircumstances it remains a strongpossibility. This is reinforced by the fact thatwhen news of the defeat reached Ravenna,Honorius and Placidia quarrelled andPlacidia fled to Constantinople.14 Boniface,however, secure in Africa, remained loyal toPlacidia rather than Honorius, and evenhelped her by sending her money.15

THE DEATH OF HONORIUSShortly afterwards, in August, Honoriusdied, like his father Theodosius of dropsy.16

Despite the modern conviction that by thistime the empire was divided, incontemporary society it was still seen as asingle entity, even allowing for theconvention of having two separate rulers, sothe west waited for Theodosius II, emperorof the east, to make a decision regarding its

rule.Amongst those awaiting developments

was the newly returned Aetius. Thanks tohis long sojourn with both the Goths and theHuns, it is likely that Aetius’ personalconnections at court were fragmentary, andbased largely upon the political connectionsof his father. As a result he was an unknownquantity to many. However, despite this, hewas to be caught intimately in the eventsthat were to follow.

At first Castinus appears to have wantedTheodosius to accept the role of soleemperor. This would have been an idealsituation, since in this event Castinus wouldbecome the effective ruler of the west.However, Placidia was haranguingTheodosius into accepting the rights of herson Valentinian, who was now four yearsold, to become the next emperor in Italy.Castinus heard of Placidia’s attempts to

promote Valentinian in Constantinople. IfValentinian was installed as emperor,Placidia would become the effective ruler inthe west. Castinus had earlier claimed thatPlacidia had conspired with Boniface tobring him down. If Placidia rose to power,Castinus’ future looked bleak.

There will have been many whosupported Placidia in her attempt to restorethe ‘House of Theodosius’. Into this groupfell Boniface, largely due to his apparentpersonal connections to Placidia. No doubthe, and others, also felt that they wouldprofit from Placidia’s gratitude when herson was set upon the throne. In fact,Boniface was to benefit from his support ofPlacidia almost instantly. Before decidingupon the identity of the new emperor, andpossibly as a reward for his loyalty toPlacidia, it would appear that Theodosiusappointed Boniface Comes Africae (Count of

Africa). It was now certain that Bonifacewould maintain his support for theTheodosian dynasty. Castinus would havebeen dismayed by Boniface’s promotion inAfrica, as it signalled that Theodosius wasinclined to champion Placidia’s claim forValentinian by promoting her supporters inthe west.

JOHNTheodosius II failed to make a quickdecision. Castinus decided to take a fatefulstep. As the magister militum Castinus wasthe senior military official in the West, and,emulating Western magistri of the past, hedecided to act on his own initiative. On 20November 423 he appointed John, thePrimicerius Notariorum (Head of theSecretaries), as the new Emperor of theWest.17 Placidia’s supporters no doubt fledfrom Rome and took refuge either in theEast or on their own estates. Their places

would be taken by loyal supporters ofCastinus and John.

Castinus’ part in John’s claim of thethrone is sometimes doubted. Yet althoughCastinus maintained a low profilethroughout this period, and ensured thatthere was no direct link between himselfand the elevation of John, there can be littledoubt that, as magister militum, he had amajor part in the appointment. Without hissupport, John, who was not the most seniorcivil servant in the West, would not havebeen crowned emperor. Furthermore,opposition from Castinus would certainlyhave resulted in the instant removal of Johnfrom power. With the tacit support ofCastinus, John was crowned in Rome,before travelling to Ravenna.18

John’s first act was to send an embassy toConstantinople in an attempt to gainrecognition for his elevation. At the same

time, the embassy was to propose Castinusas the West’s nominee as consul for 424: theembassy failed.19 Furthermore, theambassadors were badly treated and exiledaround the east.20 It was clear thatTheodosius was intent on removing Johnfrom power.

Exuperantius and AetiusBefore the reply from Constantinoplearrived it is clear that John made severalappointments to the senior positions ofcommand in the West. Following his returnfrom the Huns, Aetius had been thrust intothe political turmoil surrounding the deathof Honorius and the elevation of John. It isclear that he gave his support to John inopposition to Theodosius and Boniface. Thereasons are unknown and open tospeculation. However, there is onepossibility that has remained unexplored.

As early as 399 Aetius’ father Gaudentiusis attested as being a comes in Africa.21

Merobaudes notes that he was later made‘comitis a militibus in Galliis’ (‘Count of thetroops in Gaul’), possibly a poetic term forthe post of magister militum per Gallias.22

However, Renatus Frigeridus claims thatGaudentius eventually became magisterequitum.23 Although the dating of theseappointments is insecure, it is possible thatthey date to John’s usurpation, and implythat both Gaudentius and Aetius joined inwholeheartedly with John’s claim to thethrone in 424. As reward for their support,Gaudentius was promoted to the post ofmagister equitum and sent to Gaul, almostcertainly supplanting Boniface as the secondin command to Castinus. Aetius was giventhe post of cura palatii (‘Controller of thePalace’).24

Unfortunately, although this hypothesis

would explain much, there is no supportingevidence in the sources for it. On the otherhand, no other reason is given for Aetius’support for John and the promotion ofGaudentius helps to explain the similarpromotion of Aetius, and also explains whyAetius was so willing to support anunknown usurper.

There is one further detail that maysupport the appointment of Gaudentius asmagister equitum during John’s reign.Castinus was undoubtedly wary of thereaction to John’s crowning in the West. Heknew that if the East disagreed with John’sappointment then there would almostcertainly be a civil war. Unfortunately, theWest was no longer strong enough militarilyto oppose the East. Although againspeculation, the appointment must havebeen approved by Castinus for a specificpolitical reason. With Gaudentius as magister

equitum, Castinus could transfer allresponsibility for the appointment of Johnto Gaudentius’ shoulders. In this way, ifJohn won, Castinus would remain the seniorgeneral. If John lost, Castinus could claimthat it was not his fault that John waselevated as emperor: instead, it was clearlysimply a plot on the part of John andGaudentius. In this way, although he couldbe implicated in John’s appointment, hecould avoid the full responsibility in theevent of John losing.

At an unknown date Aetius married thedaughter of a man named Carpilio.Otherwise unknown, Carpilio is attested asbeing comes domesticorum at some time inhis career.25 The couple had one son, namedCarpilio after his maternal grandfather.26

No date is given either for the elderCarpilio’s holding of office or for themarriage. The only clue we have is that

Gregory, quoting Frigeridus, dates themarriage to after Aetius’ time as a hostagewith the Huns.27 The most obvious time wasduring the reign of John. Indeed, it istempting to claim that Carpilio was anotherof John’s appointees and that the marriagewas an attempt to bind the ‘conspirators’together and ensure their loyalty. However,there is no actual evidence to support thisclaim.

The only other appointment of which wecan be certain is that of an individualnamed Exuperantius, who came fromPoitiers in the centre of Gaul and wasappointed as Praefectus Praetorio perGalliarum (‘Praetorian Prefect of Gaul’).28

The promotion of a Gaul to the post mayhave been intended as an attempt to ensureGallic loyalty, since it paved the way forfurther appointments of Gallic nobles topositions of power in the new regime.

Reaction to John’s AppointmentUnfortunately for John, alongside thesedevelopments the continued animositybetween Castinus and Boniface also hadimmediate repercussions. Unsurprisingly, inAfrica Boniface refused to accept John’sclaim to be emperor. Declaring his loyaltyto Theodosius, Placidia and the youngValentinian, Boniface immediately cut thesupplies of grain from Africa to Italy.29 Thiswas bad news, especially for the citizens ofRome, as prolonged lack of supplies fromAfrica could easily lead to famine. Therewas now no doubt that there would be acivil war.

In a similar manner, in 398 Gildo, thecommander in Africa, had rebelled againstStilicho and attempted to attach himself tothe eastern emperor Arcadius. Stilicho hadsent Gildo’s brother Mascezel to Africa andin a lightning campaign Gildo had been

defeated.30 It would appear that Johnattempted the same sort of campaign,dispatching a picked force – including Huns– from Italy to recapture Africa.31 However,the main effect of the campaign being sentto Africa was to leave John too weak toconsider any further pre-emptivemanoeuvres in Italy.32 Instead, he wasforced to remain on the defensive as soon asthe expedition left.

In Gaul, John’s attempt to curry favour bythe appointment of Exuperantius failed.Although many will have been opposed toJohn’s position as an usurper, John’sdecision to submit clerics to secularjurisdiction also caused offence, and mayimply that he had ‘Arian tendencies’.33

Furthermore, Castinus’ abortive campaignin Spain in 422 now caused furthercomplications. The Visigoths under kingTheoderic appear to have refused to support

the new regime. Instead of supplying troopsfor Castinus, Theoderic appears to haveseen the impending civil war as anopportunity to enlarge his dominions inGaul. In the confusion the army in Gauldecided to mutiny and the troops in Arles,presumably declaring their loyalty to theTheodosian house, killed Exuperantius.34

Furthermore, the Gallic Chronicler in theentry for 425 states that ‘Count Gaudentius .. . was killed by the soldiers in Gaul.’Although brief and possible to interpret indifferent ways, the account implies thatGaudentius had only recently been killed ina ‘military uprising’, and the most obviousreason for this is the Gallic ‘rebellion’against John.35 As an eastern ‘foreigner’and a supporter of a regime that was clearlyfailing, Gaudentius was an obvious targetfor troops loyal to the House of Theodosius.No doubt the troops involved hoped that by

killing Gaudentius they would gain favourwith the soon-to-be-restored Theodosianimperial court. Unfortunately for John, hehad no troops to spare to avenge eitherExuperantius or Gaudentius, and he wasforced to remain inactive.36 It was nowcertain that there would be no help from thewest for the army of Italy.

Boniface, Valentinian and AetiusAt some point in 424 the west’s expeditionto Africa set sail. Far from regaining Africaand giving John a military victory, thecampaign ended in defeat, and one of themajor outcomes was to ensure that theforces that John had at his disposal to facethe upcoming war against Theodosius IIwere weak.37 The other was to weakenmilitary and political support for John’sreign in the West.

Furthermore, Theodosius now confirmed

his backing for Placidia and Valentinian.They were sent to Thessalonica and,reversing his decision in 421 to not acceptValentinian as nobilissimus and Placidia asAugusta, Theodosius officially investedValentinian as Caesar on 23 October 424.38

As a further sign of the new-found concordbetween Theodosius and Placidia,Theodosius belatedly recognized theappointment of Constantius III as emperorof the west in 421, three years after theevent, thus ensuring Valentinian’srecognition as the son and heir of thedeceased emperor.39 To command theexpedition against John, Theodosiusappointed Ardabur, the eastern magisterutriusque militiae, along with his son Aspar.40

With them was Candidianus, possibly afellow magister militum to Ardabur.41

Ardabur was an experienced and ablecommander. He had been in command of

the East when war broke out between Romeand Persia in 421. He had led an extensiveand successful campaign into Persianterritory in 421 and in 422 had ambushedand killed seven Persian generals.42

In late 424, and in desperation, Johnturned to Aetius. Recognizing the need forlarge numbers of reliable troops, Johnordered Aetius to go to the Huns with alarge sum of gold in the hope that Aetiuscould obtain their support.43 Aetius hadfaith in his relationships with the newHunnic kings Rua and Octar, having grownup alongside them for many years. Further,his status as a high-ranking hostage with theHuns would result in Aetius being viewed asthe representative of a legitimategovernment. If John had sent another envoyit is unlikely that this would have been asuccess, mainly due to the Huns not wishingto waste their time and manpower

supporting an unknown usurper. Aetiusaccepted the mission and began the longjourney back to the Hunnic lands.44

The Campaign in the WestWhilst Aetius travelled to the Huns,Theodosius ordered Ardabur and his sonAspar to lead their forces into Italy anddefeat John. Accordingly, Ardabur and theeastern army marched through Pannoniaand Illyricum to capture Salona.45 Based onthe coast, Salona was an ideal strategicpoint from which to launch a two-prongedattack on Italy. Placidia and Valentinianjoined Ardabur at Salona, ready for theproposed invasion.

At the beginning of the campaign seasonof 425 Ardabur contemplated the actualinvasion of Italy. He decided to divide hisforces, Ardabur himself leading the navalforces, whilst Aspar and Candidianus led the

rest of the army by the land route into Italy.Aspar now led his troops into Italy. He

appears to have taken the cavalry ahead ofthe main force in an attempt to catch Johnby surprise. The remainder of the armyunder Candidianus followed at a slowerpace. In this way Aspar managed to surpriseJohn and before a warning could besounded he captured the city of Aquileia.Placidia and Valentinian joined him there.46

For Ardabur, events took a completelydifferent path. Whilst at sea he was blownoff course and his vessel, together with twoother triremes, was captured by forces loyalto John.47 John, still hoping for recognitionfrom Theodosius, decided to treat Ardaburwell, as otherwise it was certain Theodosiuswould continue the war. Hearing of thecapture of Ardabur, the Eastern army’smorale fell, but Candidianus managed tocapture several cities in northern Italy,

helping to dispel the gloom.48

Ardabur took advantage of the situation.Allowed to wander at will, he began talkingto John’s senior officers. These men hadprobably already begun to regret theirsupport for John. After all, his campaign inAfrica had failed and now news arrived thatAspar had already taken Aquileia.49 Yetthere may be one further reason for theirchange of allegiance. Olympiodorus claimsthat Ardabur ‘suborned the generals thathad been retired from their commands’.50 Itwould appear that, alongside the promotionof Exuperantius and Aetius, John hadpromoted trusted men to senior posts withinthe army. The men who had been replacedremained with the army but, obviously,their loyalty to John had been damaged.Although an alternative translation, thisexplains the willingness of these officers tocome to an agreement with Ardabur.

Their co-operation was vital. In theknowledge that the army with John was nottotally loyal, Ardabur sent a message –probably with the aid of at least some ofthese officers – to his son Aspar telling himto travel ‘as though to a victory assured’.51

Aspar followed his father’s orders, travellingquickly to Ravenna with a picked force. Inorder to conceal Aspar’s movements,Candidianus continued his campaign ofsubduing the cities of northern Italy.52 Itwould appear that Aspar was then guidedacross the marshes that surround Ravennaand so was able to reach the cityundetected.53 Finding the gates open, Aspartook control of the city, doubtless helped bythe army under John, which at this pointalmost certainly decided to change itsallegiance.

John himself was captured in Ravennaand was then sent under guard to Placidia

and Valentinian, who had remained inAquileia when Aspar attacked Ravenna.Once in Aquileia John was taken to thehippodrome, where he was mutilated byhaving his hand cut off, and was thenparaded on a donkey, before finally beingexecuted by decapitation.54

THE ARRIVAL OF AETIUSThree days after the execution of John,Aetius returned to Italy leading a large forceof Huns.55 His orders from John had been to‘fall on the rear of the eastern army after ithad entered Italy’.56 Acting upon his orders,and likely unaware of John’s death, Aetiusimmediately attacked the eastern army.After heavy losses on both sides a truce wasagreed, probably after messages reachedAetius that John and Gaudentius weredead.57 Aetius was enough of a realist toacknowledge that his position as a rebel was

hopeless. In the circumstances, he did theonly thing that he could: he used the threatof the Huns as a bargaining point tonegotiate with Placidia, now acting asregent for her son.

Discussions with Placidia and Valentinianfollowed. Although unattested, alongsideAetius’ use of the Huns as a bargainingcounter it is possible that the prestigeaccorded to his mother’s family also playeda part. If the sources are correct in sayingthat she was rich, it is probable that she hadstrong ties to the western Senate. In thatcase, Placidia would not wish to simplyexecute Aetius, as this could provokeunnecessary resentment in the Senate.Placidia would need the wholeheartedsupport of the Senate to ensure a smoothtransition of power to her son Valentinian.

Aetius accepted the position of a high-ranking military officer in the new

regime.58 In return, he negotiated a treatywith the Huns. They were paid a largeamount of gold as compensation for theirtravel and losses, and after an exchange ofhostages and oaths the Huns departed forhome. The concept that Aetius also cededterritory in Pannonia to the Huns at thistime is mistaken and belongs to a laterepisode in his life.59

However, Placidia would never forgetthat Aetius had supported John against herson: the two would remain politicalopponents and she would not hesitate tomanipulate him in her attempts to ‘foil theambitions of any general who showed signsof becoming too powerful for her liking’.60

Having secured the West, Placidia andValentinian travelled to Rome where on 23October 425 Valentinian was proclaimedemperor by Helion, cousin of Theodosius II.Valentinian was now just six years old.

Theodosius had wanted to preside at theceremony himself, but had been preventedby illness.61 Upon securing the thronePlacidia made a man named Felix the newmagister militum praesentalis, at the sametime giving him the title patricius.62 Nothingis known about Felix before thisappointment. The lack of informationsuggests that he was not an outstandingmilitary leader. As a result, it is likely thathis appointment was due to him being wellknown and trusted, at least by Theodosius IIin Constantinople, and that he was seen asa loyal individual who would not pose athreat to Placidia.

One of the first decisions of the newregime was to send Castinus into exilerather than have him executed.63 Castinus’decision to maintain a low profile duringJohn’s reign saved him from death.64 In thehope of gaining support, and in recognition

that Rome had still not fully recovered fromthe sack by the Goths, in early 426 one ofthe main taxes on the city of Rome and theSenate, the aurum oblaticium, was remittedby the new emperor.65

The senior post given to Aetius was, in thecircumstances, an extremely important one,and one in which he would be allowed todemonstrate his military abilities to the full.He was made magister militum per Gallias.66

However, it should be noted that at sometime in the past, and presumably duringJohn’s usurpation, Aetius’ father Gaudentiushad been killed by an uprising of the troopsin Gaul.67 Although the promotion was amajor advancement for Aetius, it is possiblethat Placidia and Valentinian may havebeen hoping that Aetius’ ambition would beheld in check, or that he might even beassassinated, due to animosity felt by thetroops for his father being carried over to

Aetius. Aetius’ acceptance of the riskyappointment can be seen as his acceptingthat he needed to prove his loyalty to theimperial court, even at the risk of his ownlife. Just as importantly, the appointmentalso removed Aetius from the court in Italy,allowing Felix time to consolidate his poweras magister militum without interferencefrom Aetius and his relatives.

Aetius’ rise to power had been remarkablyfast. In under two years he had gone frombeing the cura palatii of an usurper to themagister militum of an accepted emperor.However, his meteoric rise had one majordrawback: he was now in politicalopposition to Galla Placidia, who wouldfind it hard to forgive him for his support ofJohn, and of the other two major players inthe west: Felix, the new magister militumpraesentalis, and Boniface. In return for hisundying loyalty throughout her troubled

time, Galla Placidia promoted Boniface tocomes domesticorum et Africae (Count of theHousehold and of Africa), ordering him tostay in Africa – possibly to ensure that thevital province remained peaceful andtrouble free.68 Both of these men had moreinfluence than Aetius with Galla Placidia.Yet in reality she was forced to play thethree men off against each other in anattempt to maintain a level of independencefor herself and Valentinian, and it wouldnot be long before Aetius was thrust onceagain into the centre of imperial politics. Inthe meantime, he prepared for life as thearmy commander in Gaul.

Chapter 4

The Late Roman Army1

COMMAND HIERARCHYModern historians analyzing the NotitiaDignitatum, and especially those with amilitary background, have tended to relatethe linear, rigid hierarchy apparent in itspages with the modern armies of the‘advanced’ nations.2 This fails to take intoaccount the fact that the Notitia may bedepicting an ideal, and reality is rarely thisorganized. For example, in many cases theposts depicted may have been only intended

to be occupied for a short period under aspecific emperor, or they may have beencreated by an emperor for a personalfavourite but then left vacant after theindividual retired from service.

Unfortunately, it has been relativelycommon in the past to take the titles givenin the Notitia and link them to the titlesgiven to individuals in other sources. On theother hand, it should be remembered thatancient writers were not usually interestedin applying strict military rankingsaccording to an accepted hierarchy: in manycases the writer was more concerned thatthe terminology follow the flow of thenarrative or the metre of the poem toconsider such niceties. As a result, the use oftitles such as magister peditum, magisterequitum, magister utriusque militiae and soforth may all actually represent the samepost, depending upon the authority,

accuracy, mode (history, poetry andchronicle) and sources used by the ancientauthor in question. Furthermore, there arenumerous examples in the sources ofindividuals with the title magister militumvacans. Although sometimes given tomilitary commanders conducting specificcampaigns beyond the remit of the usualmagistri, such as the campaigns in Spainunder Aetius, the title could also be usedsimply to reward a loyal follower with theprestige and privileges attached to the postof magister militum.

Furthermore, the Notitia describes thestanding army in time of peace. During amilitary campaign ad hoc commandstructures would have been utilized, ratherthan a strict adherence to the peacetimeorganization.3 Some of the ‘promotions’may then have continued in existence as aform of reward from the emperor for a job

well done. However, these did not fit easilyinto the command structure represented inthe Notitia and may account for some of theconfusion both in the document and in theexisting written sources.

There are two final warnings with regardto the Notitia. The first is that the originalwas a working document. The political andmilitary complexities inherent in the West inthe early fifth century mean that, almostwithout doubt, the Notitia was out of datewhen the final list was completed. Thisexplains why there are doublets andomissions from the text.4 The second is thatthis is not a document from the fifthcentury: it is a copy of a document, and assuch may contain many errors andomissions that were not in the original.

Yet with all of these caveats, the Notitia isstill of vital importance to the historian,since it is one of the very few documents

that, whatever its failings, gives an insightinto the intended working of the Romanmilitary and bureaucratic infrastructure.

REFORMSThe reign of Constantine I (306–337) sawthe praefecti praetoriani lose their militarypowers. These tasks were assumed by thenewly created magister peditum (‘master ofthe infantry’) and magister equitum (‘masterof the cavalry’). By at the latest themidfourth century a third, subordinatemagister, plus attendant troops, was addedin the West, the magister militum per Gallias(Master of the Troops in Gaul). These threemagistri controlled the comitatenses (on thetroop types and other ranks, see below) andin theory had authority above the provincialduces (‘dukes’), who controlled the limitaneiin the provinces. However, the ducesretained the right to correspond directlywith the emperor, so the commonly

perceived linear hierarchy is not actuallypresent.

Since the new magistri commanded largebodies of troops, for his own security theemperor retained control of the elite scholaevia the magister officiorum.5 These troopswould act as the nucleus for an army thatwould defeat any magister unwise enough toraise the standard of revolt.

Below the various magistri was anassortment of comes (counts) and duces(dukes). Attempts to maintain the illusion ofa linear hierarchy are doomed to failure, asit seems likely that the designations comesand dux were given by different emperorsdepending upon the individualcircumstances surrounding the appointment.

There is one last proviso that needs to beremembered. The fluid nature of the ranksand titles allotted within Roman Empirewas not hidebound by modern

preconceptions of ‘amateur’ and‘professional’ soldiers. The result was that inan emergency almost any imperial officialcould act as a military commander,regardless of whether he was of the ‘correct’rank, or even if he was a soldier.6

With these observations in mind, it isclear that great care needs to be takenbefore deductions are made based on thespecific titles held by military commanders.Due to the improvisational nature of manyappointments, it may be possible to drawup a table showing the chain of commandunder one or possibly two consecutiveemperors. To attempt to do the same for theentire fourth and fifth centuries would beimpossible.

UNIT HIERARCHY7During the third and fourth centuries thearmy was divided into two main

components: the comitatenses and thelimitanei. The comitatensis, usually translatedas ‘field army’, was stationed to the rear ofthe borders and was, at least theoretically, a‘mobile’ army that could be used at anypoint within the empire. The comitatenseswere further divided into two, with the‘ordinary’ units of comitatenses beingslightly lower in rank than the palatina or‘palace’ troops. Furthermore, some unitsappear to have been divided into senioresand iuniores, with the seniores havingsuperior status.

The limitanei were troops stationedpermanently on the limes (borders). Thelimitanei are given different names in thesources, being known as riparienses, ripenses,castellani or burgarii. Although in theorythese names may indicate a differentiationin the nature of the troops, what differencesthere were between them remains unknown.

Whatever the nature of the troops, the termslegiones and cohortes appear to have beenused for the infantry, with ala and equitesbeing used for the cavalry.8

To add to the complexity, over the courseof time many of the limitanei were takenfrom the frontiers and transferred to the‘field army’, being given the titlepseudocomitatenses, and units could bepunished by being downgraded fromcomitatenses to limitanei.

Slightly outside this two-tier system werethe scholae, guard cavalry units under thepersonal control of the emperor. However,since during the course of the fifth centurythe western emperor no longer went to warin person, over time the scholae graduallylost their martial status and becameceremonial units. Finally, the emperorhimself chose individuals from among thescholae to form the candidati, his personal

forty-man bodyguard.9

DISTRIBUTIO NUMERORUMIncluded within the Notitia Dignitatum is adocument with the title DistributioNumerorum (‘Distribution of the ArmyUnits’). This attempts to list the distributionof the army throughout the West.10 A closeanalysis of the Notitia, and especially of theDistributio, has suggested that between theyears 395 and 420 nearly fifty per cent ofthe western ‘field army’ was lost.11 This wasdue mainly to the civil wars at the end ofTheodosius I’s reign (379–395) and the civilwars and invasions from 401 until thesettlement of the Goths in Aquitaine in 418–419.12 The losses in manpower, due tofighting, desertion and possibly thedisbanding of rebellious units, combinedwith the loss of tax revenues caused by thecontinuous wars, decimated the ‘field-

armies’. To plug the gaps, Stilicho andConstantius III had transferred many unitsof the limitanei to the field army aspseudocomitatenses.13 The result was thatsome areas of Gaul and Africa werevirtually stripped of limitanei. Although theconsequences of these actions were to bedire, this is only apparent in hindsight. Thetreaties with tribes along the frontiers inGaul, and especially the Franks, plus thefact that Africa was not exposed to anyserious military threats, meant that thewithdrawal of troops did not result in anyimmediate repercussions.

Despite these problems attempts havebeen made to estimate the size of theRoman army in the fifth century, andespecially of the ‘field armies’ that faced thebarbarian invaders, and sometimes eachother, in the field. This is one estimate ofthe size of the different armies:

WEST

WesternIllyricum

13,500

Gaul 34,000

Praesental28,500 (by the time of Aetiusthere was usually only onemagister in the west)

EAST

Thrace 24,500

Illyricum 17,500

Oriens 20,000

Praesental 42,00014

It should be remembered that these are

‘paper’ strengths according to the NotitiaDignitatum. They do not take into accountthe fact that the Notitia was by the mid 420sbecoming obsolete. It is possible that manyof the units of the limitanei that were listedmay have had no existence outside theNotitia, especially in Africa and Spain, sinceat least some of these troops had been calledto the ‘field army’ during the earlierrebellions and invasions and never returnedto their places of origin. Further, therewould be constant attrition due to losses inbattle, by accident, from troops being ill orhospitalized, or even troops being deployedon non-military duties away from the mainbody of the army. The figures also do nottake into account difficulties withrecruitment. It is possible that in extremecases the troops available for combat couldbe as low as half- to one-third this number,although this may be taking too negative an

approach.

NON-ROMAN UNITSThe terminology used for non-Roman unitsis extremely confusing. This is in partbecause the Romans appear to have usedthe same terms for units of widely differingorigin. Furthermore, as the sources do notuse the terms in a strict, military sense, butoften use whichever word fits with the styleor meter of the work being written,certainty is impossible.15

FoederatiA major example of this is the use of theterm foederati. Originally the term wasapplied to non-Romans serving in regulararmy units under the terms of a foedus(treaty), possibly such as that signed byConstantine I (306–337) with the‘Ripuarian’ Franks, or that signed by Julian(355–363) with the ‘Salian’ Franks.16 Many

of the barbarian units listed in the Notitiaprobably began their existence as whollybarbarian units, yet it should be noted thatthese were ‘regular’ Roman units, trained,supplied and equipped by the empire. Astime passed they almost certainly lost their‘barbarian’ status due to the enlistment ofnon-barbarian troops in their ranks.17

However, over time the term foederaticame to be applied more loosely. As aresult, when the words foederatus orfoederati are used by the sources, the fullcontext needs to be determined before anydeductions are made concerning the exactnature of the troops being described.Therefore, for the purposes of this book, theterm foederati will be used exclusively withregard to barbarian troops serving undertheir own leaders in non-Roman units,whether these are ‘internal’ forces such asthe Goths or ‘external’ forces such as the

Huns.

BucellariiDuring the reign of Theodosius I (379–395)the magister militum Stilicho and thepraefectus praetorio Orientem Rufinus wereprobably the first individuals to beginrecruiting bucellarii, barbarian troopsserving as personal bodyguards to militaryand political leaders as well as theemperor.18 Indeed, the employment ofbucellarii quickly became fashionable andStilicho was forced to pass a law restrictingthe size of these ‘personal’ armies.19 As aresult, during the lifetime of Aetius suchtroops were still limited in number. It isonly later, and especially in the reign ofJustinian I (527–565), that large numbersbegan to be recruited by powerfulindividuals.

The tendency of late Roman military

commanders to supplement their forces withbarbarian mercenaries is understandable,although it was contrary to the aristocraticbelief that Rome should be defended byRomans. Magistri such as Stilicho and Aetiusmay have understood that employingmercenaries was in many ways beneficial toRome. Rather than entering the army,Roman civilians were able to continue theirtrades and pay the taxes needed to employmercenaries. Furthermore, the troopsemployed by the empire were denied to thebarbarian leaders, reducing theireffectiveness whilst simultaneouslyincreasing the power of the defendingforces.

UNIT STRENGTH20Along with the change in structure came achange in the organization of the unitswithin the army. Although figures remain

conjectural and different authorities havedifferent ideas, modern estimates of thestrength of the various units is roughly asfollows: Guard units (scholae21 etc.) 500men; auxilia palatinae 800–1,200 men;legions (comitatenses) 1,000–1,200men;legions (limitanei) 3000 men;limitanei/riparienses 300–500 men; cavalry(comitatenses) 480–600 men; cavalry(limitanei) 350–500 men. However, the unitsentitled milliary in the Notitia possiblynumbered c.750–1,000 men, as they had inthe third century, and some legionary unitsmay have retained their earlier strength ofc.5,000 men until much later.22 Anadditional factor is that, in an armycovering such a vast area as the RomanEmpire, there would also be regionaldifferences between units.23 Finally it shouldbe remembered that on campaign unitscould easily be as low as two-thirds strength

due to illness, injury and the need to leave adepot garrison behind at the unit’s base foradministrative and recruitment purposes.24

Any numbers given for Roman troops inbattle must remain hypothetical.

RECRUITMENTThere would appear to have been fourmethods of recruitment for the regular armyin the later empire: legal requirement, theenrolment of volunteers, conscription, andlevies from ‘barbarians’ settled either asprisoners of war or as normal Romanfarmers with a duty to provide troops forthe army when a levy was demanded.25

Yet a career in the army was unpopular.In the fifth century there were manybarbarian invasions of the West and a highlevel of brigandage, banditry and civil wars.Joining the army could mean a recruit beingposted to a province far away, so leaving

his family to the attention of a variety ofenemies, as a result of which many menpreferred to stay and defend their ownhomes.26 Furthermore, taxation was high,and there was a growing resentment of theactions of the army, who were now billetedaround towns and cities. As a result, there isevidence of citizens siding with invaders inthe expectation of better treatment andbooty.27 However, it is likely that here, aselsewhere, regional variations and politicalpressures played a large part in theattraction of the army as a career, sinceespecially in ‘peaceful’ provinces such asEgypt a career in the army would offersecure employment at relatively low risk.

One of the other main methods ofrecruiting for the army, and the one mostoften mentioned in the Codex Theodosianus,was conscription. However, the fall inpopulation numbers and the fact that a

relatively high proportion of the populationlived in towns resulted in competitionbetween the army and the landowners inthe Senate for able-bodied men. Although intimes of war conscription may have beenthought necessary, in times of peace thesituation was different. In peacetime,provinces were allowed to pay a tax knownas the aurem tironicum (‘gold for recruits’)instead of supplying men. Since the Senateof Rome used every means possible to avoidhaving men from their estates conscriptedinto the army, conscription was regularlycommuted into the aurem tironicum and themoney raised used to pay for Germanicmercenaries, who did not need training andwho generally equipped themselves.Furthermore, the system was open to abuse,because emperors often found themselves tobe short of money since the income fromtaxes rarely covered the expenditure needed

to maintain the empire. When thishappened, it was tempting to pass a decreecalling for conscription simply in order tocommute this to the aurem tironicum to boostthe treasury.28 The vicious cycles thesemeasures created was a major factor intensions between emperors and Senateremaining high.

Having looked at the difficulties ofrecruiting troops from large areas of theWest, it should be noted that otherprovinces, especially those on the frontierswhere life was harder, continued to supplyrecruits. In this period the Balkan provincescontinued to be good recruiting groundsuntil after the collapse of the West,following which eastern emperors began torecruit in Asia Minor.29

Whatever the origin of new troops,whether conscripts, volunteers ormercenaries, it was the task of the duces to

supervise recruitment and the assignment ofindividuals to units. This also included theweeding out of men unsuitable for amilitary career.30 Unfortunately we are notgiven any details as to how this functioned.

TRAININGUntil recently it was accepted by manyhistorians that, following Zosimus, trainingof the army had declined and that this wasaccompanied by a commensurate loss ofdiscipline.31 The quality of the troops withinthe Roman army was always proportionalto the quality of leadership, yet the questionof leadership is rarely raised in relation tothe Late Roman Empire.32 Ammianus givesaccounts where leaders did not lead theirtroops effectively.33 Following theenlargement of the army and theinaugurations of many new units underDiocletian and Constantine, large numbers

of new commanders had been required andit must be accepted that there is thelikelihood that overall the quality of armycommanders had declined. This factor isimportant, in that the training of troopsdepended upon the efficiency – or otherwise– of their commanding officers. Thepredominant factor in troop training is thequality and enthusiasm of the officers. If theofficers were of high quality, the troopswould receive regular training whereverthey were stationed; if not, they would notbe trained. If the officers were poor,training was most likely neglected.

ARMY EQUIPMENT*The equipment used by the troops was stillregulated by the government andmanufactured in fabricae, state-owned armsfactories whose workers were actuallyclassed as part of the military establishment.

Seven of these fabricae were located in Gauland it is probably indicative of theconfusion prevalent in Britain and Gaul inthe early-fifth century that at some point itwas recognized that the supply of militaryequipment to Britain would fail. Althoughthe precise date and circumstances areunknown, it is interesting to note Gildas’claim that the empire recognized thatBritain would no longer be an integral part,instead giving ‘energetic counsel to thetimorous natives’ and leaving them‘patterns by which to manufacture arms’.34

The nature of the equipment used by thelater Roman army has been the source ofmuch debate, since Vegetius claims that thearmy no longer wore armour:

From the founding of the city downto the time of the deified Gratian,the infantry army was equippedwith both cataphracts (body

armour) and helmets. But upon theintervention of neglect and idlenessfield exercises ceased, and armswhich soldiers rarely donned beganto be thought heavy. So theypetitioned the emperor that theyshould hand in first thecataphracts, then helmets.

Vegetius, 1.20

Coupled with the lack of archaeologicalfindings that can be specifically dated to theperiod and the confusing picture painted bysurviving monuments and funeral stelae, thestatement was taken at face value and usedas evidence that the later army was nolonger equipped with metal armour.

However, more recent work hasoverturned this acceptance, and has, forexample, shown that the sculptures in manycases have small holes drilled in them to

make the appearance of mail armour.35

Furthermore, it is possible that Vegetius isdescribing an actual petition from thescholae palatinae, a guard unit, that they beexcused from wearing armour.36 However,the remains of copper alloy scales found atTrier, along with remnants of mail found atTrier, Weiler-la-Tour and Indepenţa, thelatter of which date to the late-fourth orearly-fifth century, shows that armour wasstill being used in the late empire, a pointreinforced by Ammianus Marcellinus, whogives many references to individualswearing armour.37

Finally, there is the evidence in the NotitiaDignitatum. There are drawings in themanuscript that illustrate the insignia ofsome of the office holders, and in someinstances these depict some of theequipment made in the fabricae. Theseinclude the items such as helmets and body

armour previously thought to be no longerin use. As a result, it is now generallyaccepted that the late Roman army woreheavy equipment equal to that of theirpredecessors.

However, it should be remembered thatthe process of production was time-consuming and expensive and consequentlyitems that were no longer ‘fashionable’would continue to be issued until stockpileswere used. Therefore, many items ofequipment from earlier periods may havecontinued in use on a small scale, remaininginvisible in the archaeological andsculptural records. This is especially the casewhen it is noted that Synesius, Themistius,Libanius, Ammianus, Vegetius, the‘Abinneus Archive’ and the Law Codes allattest to the fact that imperial laxityresulted in troops facing a lack ofequipment, as well as arrears in pay and the

supply of food.38

MISSILES Long Range: Bows, Slings (fundae), Staff-slings (fustibali), Crossbows(arcuballistae), ArtilleryThe Romans used a wide variety of long-range missile weapons, although knowledgeof some of these can only really beattributed to scenes found on murals andmosaics, and so may only have been usedfor hunting. The most common form ofmissile weapon was the composite bow, asattested by the title sagittarii (archers) in theNotitia Dignitatum. These were the standardmissile weapon of the Roman army andwere similar to those in use by the Persiansand other eastern enemies of the empire.

Slings and staff-slings (slings attachedto a 4 foot-/1.18 metre-long stave) werealso used. However, they never appear to

have formed a large proportion of themilitary establishment, probably beingrestricted to a few skirmishers supportingthe combat troops.

A little-used weapon in military circles isthe crossbow, which may be the weapondescribed by Vegetius as arcuballistae.39

Other versions of the weapon included thecheiroballista described by Heron, which wasloaded by placing the end on the groundand pressing on the stock until the stringwas drawn and a bolt/arrow fitted into theweapon. The crossbow is often portrayed inhunting scenes in murals and mosaics, butdoes not appear to have formed a majorpart of the army’s arsenal.

Artillery had been used by the Romanarmy since at least the second century BC.Later variants included the manuballista ofVegetius, a torsion engine capable ofaccurately firing projectiles for a long

distance.40 The army also produced aversion mounted on a cart for ease oftransport, known as the carroballista, whichis shown on Trajan’s column. There is littledoubt that these weapons were used in thefield, but the regularity and form of theirdeployment remains open to doubt. Therewas also the artillery used for siege warfare,such as the onager (‘wild ass’), which wastoo large and difficult to set up for use inthe field.

Short Range: Darts, Javelins*There appear to have been a variety ofdarts, including types called plumbatae,mattiobarbuli/martiobarbuli, plumbataetribolatae and mamillatae. These were carriedby the infantry and thrown as the rangeclosed. The plumbatae had a lead weightbehind the head to aid in penetration, whilstthe plumbatae tribolatae is claimed to have

had three spikes emerging from the leadweight so that if it missed a target it stillposed an obstacle by presenting a sharppoint to an unwary foot or hoof.41

There were a variety of thrown weaponsthat come under the loose category ofjavelin. These include types called thespicula, the hasta, the pila, the iacula, theverruta and the tela. Despite prolongedinvestigation, it is clear that the differencesbetween these weapons are unknown.42

Vegetius suggests that each man should beissued one heavy javelin (spiculum) and onelight javelin (verrutum).43 However, itshould be noted that these different namesmay be describing weapons that are almostidentical. For example, it is known that theolder pilum existed in a variety of forms,with some being heavier than others. It ispossible, therefore, that Vegetius’ report of aspiculum, which is usually accepted as the

newer name for the pilum, actually describesthe heavier variety, whilst the verrutum isreferring to a lighter version of the sameweapon. Certainty in these matters isimpossible.

Combat Weapons: Swords, Spears,Others44Earlier Roman infantry had been heavilytrained in the art of using the short swordknown as the gladius hispaniensis whilst thecavalry had been issued with the spatha. Forunknown reasons, by the time of the laterempire the whole army appears to haveused the spatha. Vegetius also attests to theuse of a shorter sword, which he calls thesemispatha.45 Although there have been avariety of swords found in thearchaeological record that are smaller thanthe spatha, Vegetius tells us nothing aboutthe weapon, so any correlation between

archaeology and Vegetius remainsspeculation. The spatha was a long, double-edged sword that varied from between 0.7to 0.9 metres in length.46 Although suchweapons are usually described as being usedin a ‘slashing’ motion, the spatha had a pointthat made it suitable for thrusting as well.

It is commonly assumed that hand-held,shafted weapons can be divided into thoseused as missiles and those retained for usein hand-to-hand combat. However, it is clearfrom ancient sources and modern re-enactors that there was little, if any,difference between the two types ofweapon. This leads to the obviousconclusion that whether they were used asmissile or hand-to-hand weapons wasdetermined more by circumstances than byweapon typology. Therefore, any of theweapons described in the section on close-range missiles as javelins could also be used

in combat, should circumstances dictate.Furthermore, spears such as the spiculum,which had a large part of its shaft encasedin iron, would be ideal in combat, as theiron would protect the wooden shaft frombeing sheared by enemy swords. Alongsidethese types of dual usage are types classedsimply as ‘spears’, used by both infantry andcavalry and ranging between 2 and 2.5metres in length.47 Yet even these couldeither be thrown a short distance or retainedfor combat.

Many burials include a short, single-edgedknife, which by this time appears to havereplaced the earlier broad-edged dagger, thepugio. The change in the design of thedagger may simply have been recognitionthat its use as a utility tool far outweighedits employment as a weapon. As aconsequence, it became simpler and wasonly sharpened on one side.

Alongside traditional Roman weaponswere others that were either of unknownorigin or were Germanic imports. Forexample, there is evidence that some atleast of the Roman cavalry usedconventional axes, as mentioned byAmmianus and Procopius and shown in thestela from Gamzigrad and the Column ofArcadius.48 Unfortunately, these examplesof the use of axes are very rare and so thedistribution of these weapons remains amystery. There is also the use of maces, asmentioned by Theophylact.49 Germanicimports included weapons such as the sax (asingleedged long knife) and the francisca(throwing-axe), which were slowly beingintroduced into the empire, and attestedlater is the use of the lasso, followingHunnic practice.50 Again, the extent of theiruse in the Roman army remains unknown.

Defensive Equipment: Helmets, Mail,Scale, ‘Muscle Cuirasses’,Lamellar, Shields, OtherThe earlier use of helmets with single-piecebowls spun from a single piece of metaldisappear before the middle of the fourthcentury. Their place is taken by two newforms. The most common of these are thestyles termed ridge helmets. Possiblyderiving from Persian helmets, they are firstfound in archaeological deposits dating tothe early fourth century, possibly c AD325.51 This date is confirmed by a coin fromthe reign of Constantine I (306–337), whichappears to show Constantine wearing a‘stylized Berkasovo helmet’, and by thesculpture found at Gamzigrad dating to theend of the third century (see Illustration3).52

There are several slightly different styles,all – as in the ‘Berkasovo’ example just cited

– named after the place where they werefound. There are many finds from aroundthe empire, but probably the mostimportant were the up to twenty examplesfound at Intercisa (modern Hungary). Therewas a variety of styles involved, includingthe extraordinary version with an integralmetal crest known as Intercisa 4. Yet all ofthese were made using a similar technique,which was to manufacture the bowl as twoseparate pieces before joining them with astrip of metal along the crown, which gavethem their distinctive ‘ridge’ appearance.

It would appear that many of thesehelmets had attachable crests, and it may bethat the ‘integral crest’ of Intercisa 4 waseither cheaper than buying a separate crestor may have been a way of distinguishingofficers from other ranks.53

At some point in the fourth century, if notearlier, the Roman army adopted another

form of helmet, the spangenhelm. Namedafter the spangen, the plates that joined theseparate parts of the bowl together, theymay be dated as early as the Tetrarchy(c.293–312), although this date is uncertainand they may only have been introduced inthe fifth century.

The reason for the change from one-piecebowls to ridge helmets (and possiblyspangenhelms) is unclear. Earlier claims thatthis was due to the expansion of the armyunder Diocletian and the need to supplyequipment that was cheaper and easier tomake have recently been questioned.54 Ithas been pointed out that the newmanufacturing method required accuracy inorder to join the two halves of the bowlproperly, so making them difficult tomanufacture. Furthermore, the fact thatmany of them have traces of silver, giltand/or paste gemstones attached results in

the end product actually being quiteexpensive.

These claims do not take into account thefact that the process of spinning iron canboth weaken it and lead to irregularities inthe bowl. This may account for the need toreinforce earlier, one-piece bowls across thebrow. Furthermore, unless the manufacturewas extremely well controlled, the ensuingbowl could be slightly off-centre and soweak down one half. This would haveresulted in a high wastage of material assub-standard bowls were returned to theforge for remaking. The new methodsproduced bowls that did not need browreinforcement and were of a more uniformthickness and quality, since they are easierto work and toughen than the one-pieceskull.55 Although looking to modern eyes,with computer-driven accuracy, as if theyare a step back, in production and quality

they may actually have been animprovement on earlier helmets.

Although a little strange in appearance,there are artistic representations of troopswearing coifs.56 These appear to be allied toextremely long coats of mail. How theywere manufactured or what form they tookin reality is unknown, as none have everbeen found in the archaeological record.

A final piece of protective headgear wasthe Pilleus Pannonicus (Pannonian hat).This was a round, flat-topped cap. Theearliest depiction is from the coins ofConstantine I and from the Arch ofConstantine. When seen in detail it isdepicted as being ‘brown and furry’ and wasprobably made of felt.57 Of little defensivevalue in itself, its use amongst the militarymay have started due to its being used as ahelmet lining. It may then have become asymbol for members of the army who were

not wearing their helmets. In the porphyrysculpture of the four tetrarchs in Venice, thefour emperors are wearing the PilleusPannonicus, possibly as a sign of theiraffiliation with the army.

It is unfortunate that due todecomposition or rust the vast numbers ofhelmets that were once in use have beenreduced to a mere handful. The case is evenworse when it comes to body armour.Therefore, what follows is largelyconjectural and could be supplanted at anytime by new archaeological finds.

Simply put, ring-mail armour was madeby making lots of small rings of iron andjoining them to make a flexible, but ratherheavy, form of protection.58 Although therehave been isolated finds of mail dating tothe fifth century (see above), there isenough to show that it was certainly stillbeing made. Monumental evidence suggests

that the mail came in two lengths: either a‘short’ version covering the shoulders andcoming down to around mid thigh, or a‘long’ version, which reached to the elbowand the knee.Scale armour was made by lacing smalloverlapping plates of metal on to a fabric orleather structure. The result was a form ofprotection roughly equivalent to that ofmail, but without the large amount offlexibility that mail offered. It would appearthat the shape of the scale ‘shirts’ took thesame form as those of the mail shirtsalready described.

It is common for depictions of musclecuirasses to be represented on largemonuments in this period, such as theColumn of Arcadius. There are difficultieswith accepting depictions of musclecuirasses on such monuments at face value.The most obvious of these is that the

monuments probably owe more totraditional Hellenistic forms of carvingrather than representing contemporarymodels. Many of the items depicted referback to ancient hoplite practices rather thanreflecting what troops of the time actuallywore.59 Furthermore, a close analysis of themonuments has shown that some of theserepresentations of muscle cuirasses actuallyappear to represent scale or mail armour.This would reinforce the theory that suchmonuments were carved with an eye moreto the Hellenistic traditions of the past thanto the accurate representation ofcontemporary armour.60 As a result, it islikely that muscle cuirasses, being tailoredto the individual, would be expensive tomanufacture and so be used only by those ofhigher rank, not the average soldier.

A surprising absence during this period isthat of lamellar armour. Made of longer

strips of metal wired to a forming-garmentof cloth or leather, these long scales ranvertically in the armour, producing a veryfirm but extremely stiff protection. Attestedboth before and after the period, it iscurious that between c.350 and 425 there isno evidence at all for this armour. The mostobvious explanation is that it continued inuse but that there is no written,architectural or archaeological evidence forit. However, the lack of evidence ispuzzling.

The common form of shield used by theRomans was a large oval shape, althoughthe depiction of round shields onmonuments has led to confusion. There isevidence that the Roman army was beinginfluenced by Germanic shields, and it ispossible that the use of round shields wasrestricted to guardsmen such as thescholae.61

The Notitia Dignitatum lists many shieldpatterns and labels them as though theywere associated with specific units withinthe army. Although the accuracy of theNotitia in this regard is open to question, itis interesting to note that according toAmmianus at the Battle of Strasbourg theGermanic tribesmen recognized Romanunits by their shield devices.62 Although thepatterns allocated by the Notitia may be ofdubious accuracy, the theory that units hadspecific shield designs appears to be correct.

The use of segmented armour for thearms and legs of heavily armouredhorsemen, the catafracti and clibanari, isattested and evidenced in the drawings ofarmour produced by the fabricae in theNotitia Dignitatum. However, there is noevidence of its use by the infantry, althoughthis should not be ruled out if the occasionarose. The catafracti and clibanari also had

armour for their horses. The exact naturethat this took is unclear, although evidencefrom before and after this period suggeststhat it could be linen, horn, copper alloy oriron scales, or even possibly mail, thoughthe latter would be extremely heavy.

Finally, it should be noted that greavesfor troops’ legs were now extremelyuncommon, although again they aredepicted both before and after this period,so it is likely that they continued in use.

THE NAVYIn modern states the navy is a separateestablishment with its own hierarchy ofcommand. In the Roman Empire the navyseems to have been regarded as part of thearmy. The Notitia Dignitatum has the variousfleets being commanded by praefecti, yet inreality whenever they were used in largenumbers the fleets were commanded bymagistri or similar senior members of the

military establishment.The Notitia has a number of fleets

stationed in the western empire. The portsused include Ravenna, Misenum, Arles,Aquileia, Como and the mouth of theSomme. There would appear to have beentwo major types of ship in the fleet. Forcombat the fleets had warships, the standardgalleys as used throughout the later periodof the empire. For transport and supply, anumber of merchant vessels weremaintained with each fleet.63 A third type ofvessel was also used: specialized transportships for the carrying of horses. However,the number of vessels in each fleet is usuallyunknown, although the strengths of somefleets may give an indication of overallnumbers. For example, the fleet stationed inSkythia had 125 lusoriae (light boats) and119 iudicariae and agrarienses (varieties oflight boats) built in 7 years.64 As will be

seen later, when large fleets are gatheredtogether for a single campaign, a figure isgiven in the sources for the combined mightof the Roman navy.

There were also small fleets of riverboatsbased on the Rhine and the Danube topatrol and secure the rivers. As with themain, sea-going fleets, these were classed asbeing part of the army, and in these casesthey were part of the limitanei (riparienses)stationed on the borders.65

WARFAREAlthough often ignored by historians, therewas a fundamental change in the nature ofwarfare during the later empire: ‘In a periodcharacterized by defensive strategy and low-intensity warfare associated with theongoing maintenance of imperial security,the dangers of defeat in a large-scale actionfar outweighed the benefits of victory.’66 It

is often overlooked that Theodosius wasdefeated by the Goths after the Battle ofAdrianople. The defeat saw the end ofRoman attempts to inflict heavy defeats ontheir external enemies regardless of thecosts. Instead, they resorted to usingblockade and siege. It is only whenconfronting usurpers that Romancommanders still attempted to defeat theenemy in pitched battles.67 This outlookremained prevalent amongst Romanmilitary commanders, being promoted byMaurikios in his famous Strategikon dating tothe late-sixth century, although outrightvictory was still expected by the aristocracyuntil after the Fall of the West.

The desire to avoid pitched battleswhenever possible and the change to a morelow-level form of warfare led manyhistorians to dismiss the late Roman army asinferior to its predecessors. They interpreted

the change as being one of quality: whereasthe early army was well trained, well ledand well equipped, the later army waspoorly trained, poorly led and, at leastaccording to Vegetius, poorly equipped.68

Modern historians have reassessed theinformation available and come to theconclusion that the later army was as wellequipped and led as that of the earlierempire. Unfortunately, in some cases theargument has now swung too far. Armyefficiency was, to a large extent, based uponlocation. Warfare was extremely rare inplaces such as Africa and Egypt, where themain task of the army was policing the localpopulation and repelling low-scale raidsfrom across the frontier. The troops in theseplaces were not equivalent to the armies ofthe previous centuries. Troops on morewarlike frontiers, such as the Danube, theRhine and the areas facing Persia, were

doubtless better trained, better equipped,and more likely to be led by able andexperienced officers.

Yet this does not mean that the armies ofthese areas reacted to invasion and war inthe same way as earlier armies. Advocatesof the concept of late-army efficiencysometimes ignore the fact that, howevergood the army was, army leaders remainedconstrained by the difficulties of raising andequipping troops. Having the best army inthe world is of little value if it is wasted inunnecessary battles and worn out ofexistence.

There is another aspect to the late-Romanpractice of using blockade and siege moreoften than battle. The chance of forcing theenemy to surrender without inflicting largelosses was a priority. The standard Romanmethod of dealing with enemy prisoners ofwar was to separate them into smaller

contingents and then disperse them aroundthe empire. In this way the barbarians couldfarm territories left vacant by war as well asproviding recruits to the army. The enemycommanders would either be separated fromtheir men and, if competent, enrolled in theRoman army, or executed.69

Yet ironically the employment ofbarbarian troops could politically weakenthe Roman commander. Both the Senate andthe regular Roman army were opposed tothe mass employment of barbarians. Theneed to balance the requirements of defenceand the political opposition to theemployment of large numbers ofmercenaries and federates would remain aworry for all magistri until the last decadesof the West, when the army was no longerstrong enough to mount serious oppositionto their use.* This section on the arms and armour of the Late RomanArmy is virtually the same as that previously included in

the book Stilicho: the Vandal Who Saved Rome (Pen andSword, 2010). Readers with the previous book may wish toskip this section.

* See also ‘Spears’.

Chapter 5

The Barbarians

THE ‘GERMANIC’ ARMIES OF WESTERNEUROPE1Information concerning the Germanicarmies of the fifth century is sparse.Although ancient writers have leftdescriptions, they are based more on topoi(traditional literary themes) and a desire todifferentiate between the tribes than theyare reality. An example of this is thefrancisca. This classic Germanic throwing-axe is portrayed in the sources as being used

almost exclusively by the Franks. However,archaeology has shown that it wasdistributed over a very wide area, beingemployed, for example, by the Alamanni. Asa result, it should be remembered that ourdescriptions of the various Germanic‘nations’ conform more to ancienthistoriography and the desire to find a wayof differentiating between the tribes than itdoes to reality. With this observation inmind, it is possible to investigate theGerman armies.

OrganizationLater records show that once the Germanshad settled down in their own kingdomsthey used a decimal system to organize theirarmies.2 The theory that this is a techniquederived from before their settlements isreasonable, but prior to their establishmentin the new, large kingdoms, their armieswere formed only from whatever forces

were available. These are unlikely to havebeen conveniently numbered, and sospecific organization may have been rare. Itis more likely that these armies were basedupon a very informal adoption of thedecimal system, with plenty of leewayallowed to take into account tribal and evenvillage loyalties.

Most western barbarians were farmers.When called upon to serve in the army themajority would have been equipped onlywith a spear and shield, and possibly withmissile weapons such as the francisca or thejavelin.3 One man usually owned the loyaltyand the services of a cluster of farms andvillages, which were known as cantons.4 Thenumber of men that cantons could raisewould vary, but it is estimated that thelargest would be able to muster at most2,000 men, with the average more likely tobe around 1,000.5 This would tie in with the

later military official, the thusundifath(leader of 1,000).6 However, each leaderwould have had a small retinue, hiscomitatus, which served him in militarymatters.

CommandIn theory, the leader of each canton wouldhave a political alliance with a morepowerful leader who was likely to havedominated several such cantons. In turn,many of these leaders would serve a yetmore powerful individual. The outcome isdescribed by Ammianus Marcellinus:

Now all these warlike and savagetribes were led by Chnodomariusand Serapio, kings higher than allthe rest in authority (potestateexcelsiores ante alios reges) . . .these were followed by the kingsnext in power (potestate proximi

reges), five in number, by tenprinces (regalesque decem), with along train of nobles (optimatum),and 35,000 troops levied fromvarious nations, partly for pay andpartly under agreement to returnthe service.

Ammianus Marcellinus, 16.12.23–27

Ammianus struggled to translate theGerman terms into Latin, with reges beingthe only word he felt was suitable. Therecan be little doubt that the ten ‘princes’were the leaders of cantons, and that the‘nobles’ were their comitatus. These tenwarlords owed service, or at least someform of loyalty, to the five men ‘next inpower’ and these five followed the orders ofChnodomarius and Serapio.

This system left little room for formalcommand and control as practised by the

Romans, with each commander knowing hisplace in the line of battle. Although thewarlords may have gained experience ininter-tribal or anti-Roman warfare andraids, they would have little practice offighting in large armies alongside unknowncommanders.

Although this description seems to followto some degree the feudal system of theMiddle Ages, this is not quite true. In fact,there is a distinct lack of tribal structure, asshown by the ability of groups to move fromtribe to tribe. The new barbarian socialformations that settled in the west ‘were notsimply imported from the woods ofGermania’: they were ‘new social forms ofidentification in a complex environment’.7In other words, ‘kingdoms’ such as those ofthe Visigoths and Vandals were not simplythe mass migration of whole tribes fromoutside the Roman empire into the empire

to settle on new lands: they were acombination of many different tribesmenfrom a variety of origins deciding, underdifferent stimuli, to serve under one leader.8A major example of this lack of unity comesfrom the invasion of Gaul by the Vandals,Alans and Sueves in 406–407. What iscommonly overlooked is that one of thetribes, under their king, Goa, immediatelyabandoned the invasion and took servicewith Rome. It is clear that any of thewarlords from the canton upwards onlyowed loyalty to their superiors out ofcommon interests or fear. Each canton wasits own political unit with its own,individual agenda. In theory, one couldchange allegiance whenever desired. TheRomans had in the past exploited thesedivisions for their own political purposesand after Adrianople this factor had allowedTheodosius to slowly strip the Goths of men.

Theodosius had negotiated with individualcantons and when agreement was reachedhad moved them away from the Balkans. Inthis way he continuously weakened theGoths’ ability to fight. Political disunity wasone of the major failings of the Germanicpeoples at this time.

Once within the empire the situationchanged. The barbarian kingdoms had noadministrative institutions of their own andso used Roman administrative institutions.As a result the barbarians immediatelyadopted urban lifestyles and their mainurban centres developed into capitals. Forexample, the Visigoths had Toulouse, theOstrogoths had Ravenna, the Franks hadParis, the Burgundians had Geneva and theSueves had Braga. This resulted in anincreased tendency for the Romans toregard the leaders in these cities as kingsand helped to give these kings the military

power to dominate their kingdoms.9

Training and DisciplineAs already noted, the Germanic armies weredivided into two. The first is the trained anddisciplined comitatus of the individualwarlords, retained on a permanent basiswith plenty of free time in which to practicethe art of warfare, although the level oftheir skills would depend upon the skill andpersonality of their warlord. However, it isunlikely that they practised warfare on alarger scale, so the Roman legions tended tohave the strategic and tactical advantage inlarge-scale battles.

The other part of the army was formed ofthe farmers who made up the bulk of theGerman population. The majority wereequipped with spears and shields, althoughthe better off would be able to afford asword.10 Thrown weapons such as axes andjavelins were relatively common. These men

would have had some training, but thiswould have varied, and its inconsistencywould help to explain their reputation forferocious charges but inability to keep pacewith the Romans in a long fight.

Only the warlords and the comitatuswould have had the finances available tobuy horses. This would explain twostereotypes of Germanic cavalry. Firstly,their paucity in numbers: modern estimatessuggest that a Germanic army would at themost have a third of its forces mounted.More often than not, the proportion wouldbe lower, probably at around one-fifth.11

The vast majority of the army were farmersrelying on subsistence agriculture who couldnot afford to buy a horse. Secondly, the highquality of German cavalry: Vegetius himselfcomments that the Romans had progressedin their cavalry arm thanks to the exampleset by the Goths, Alans and Huns.12 Yet the

quote only refers to the tribes in the east,where the cost of horses was lower andmore individuals could afford to own one.13

Eastern horses were also of higher quality.Earlier, Caesar sometimes had to supply hisGerman mercenaries with horses, since theirown were too small for the task.14 Yet thesituation had improved during theintervening centuries, with the Alamannibeing renowned as a people ‘who fightwonderfully from horseback’.15 Moreover,some of the tribes that had broken throughthe frontiers in the early-fifth century, suchas the Vandals, the Goths and the Alans,were from the east. As a consequence, thenumber and quality of their cavalry wasalmost certainly greater than that of theindigenous Germans. This would help toexplain why these tribes had greater successagainst the western Roman army than did,for example, the Franks or the Alamanni.

Barbarian society had metalworkers ofgreat skill and finesse and the quality of thegoods they produced matched anything thatcould be made in Rome. However, therewere not many such workers, with the resultthat many items, such as swords, wereavailable in smaller quantities and at ahigher price. The majority of Germanicwarriors could not afford a sword.

Still less could they afford protectiveequipment. It is interesting to note that aslightly later series of Frankish lawsassessed a mail shirt as being equivalent invalue to two horses or six oxen and a helmetthe equivalent of one horse.16 This helps toexplain why the Romans forbade the sale ofweapons and armour to the Germans andwhy Germanic tribes were so poorly armed.Unlike the Romans, they simply couldn’tafford the equipment.

Equipment

Missiles The majority of missiles used byGermanic troops appear to be of the hand-thrown variety. Although bows were in use,they were not composite bows as used bythe Romans, Alans, Sarmatians and Huns.Instead, they were simple bows made froma single piece of wood.17 Archery does notappear to have been an important part ofGermanic warfare, and so the evolution ofthe bow in the west was very slow whencompared to the east. Agathias even goes sofar as to claim that the Franks did not knowhow to use the bow.18 Furthermore, unlikethe Huns and the Alans, the Germans didnot employ the bow as a mass weapon fromhorseback. Only individuals used the bowwhen mounted in the west.19 Unfortunately,there is also little conclusive evidence forthe carrying of more than one spear by thecavalry. Representations in art show only asingle spear, and ancient authors do not

mention the use of javelins by Germancavalry. As a result, it may be that Germancavalry did not practice missile warfare,instead relying on advancing quickly toclose combat and using the spear as athrusting weapon. This is certainly theimpression given by Procopius whendescribing the later warfare as practiced bythe Vandals and Goths.20

As with the bow, although there can belittle doubt that the sling was known to thenorthern tribes, there is very little evidencefor its use during the period in question.Therefore, although a possibility, whether itwas used by troops in battle remains amystery.

Alongside the variety of ‘javelins’ andtheir heavier equivalents (see below), themain missile weapon favoured by theGermanic tribes along the Rhine was thefrancisca, a throwing axe carried by a large

number of warriors. The axe was possiblyfirst called the francisca by Isidore of Seville(c.560–636), who claimed that it was giventhat name by the Spanish because of itsextensive use by the Franks.21 It is notablethat slightly earlier than this Gregory ofTours (c.538–594) called it either the securisor the bipennis,22 therefore only by the latertime of Isidore was it used extensively bythe Franks. Prior to this, it was used bymany of the Germanic tribes, and exampleshave been found in Britain, Alamannia andfurther east.23

One area where the Germans were poorlyserved was in siege warfare. The tribes ofthe west did not know how to build artilleryor other siege weapons with which to takecities. Instead, they were forced to rely onsubterfuge and the betrayal of cities bysympathetic individuals within them.

Combat Weapons The sword used by the

Germans was their own version of thespatha, the long, double-edged sword thatvaried from between 0.7 to 0.9 metres inlength.24 Unfortunately, although theGerman smiths were adept at making theseweapons, the results were expensive and sorestricted the distribution of swords amongthe poorer classes of warrior. As a result, themost common weapon was the spear. Aswas stated in the section on Romanequipment, it is commonly assumed thathand-held, shafted weapons were eitherused as missiles or retained for use in hand-to-hand combat, whereas in reality therewas little difference between spears andjavelins.

Many of the spears used by the Germanswere similar to those used by the Romans,doubtless through the extensive contactsover the centuries and the employment ofGerman warriors by the Roman army. Items

such as the Roman pilum and its derivativessuch as the spiculum found their equivalentin the German angon and its equivalents, asexcavated in places such as Vimose andIllerup (third century) and Ejsbøl andNydam (fourth century).25 These items werewidespread and not the dominant weaponof a specific group. The angon is found as farapart as Britain and the upper Danube.26

However, as with the Romans, the mostcommon item appears to have been asimple spear, which could be used eitherunderarm or overarm by both the cavalryand infantry, and which was about 2.5 to3.5 metres in length with a variety of metalheads fixed to the top of the shaft.27 Thesewere the most common weapons used by theGermans, being found in large numbersthroughout Germania.

One distinctive item of equipment carriedby German warriors was the seax, a ‘short-

sword’ or ‘dagger’, depending on thedimensions of the individual weapon.28 Thiswas a single-edged blade of various lengths,and as time passed it gradually becamelonger and developed into a short sword.However, in this early period it is probablybest thought of as a dagger for when theprimary weapon, either spear or sword, waslost or rendered unusable. Like the francisca,although later identified with a specificpeople, in this case the Saxons, in the earlierperiod it was found throughout barbaricum,not just in Saxony.29

Finally, as with the Roman army, therewere a number of other weapons thatappear to have been used in limitednumbers, according to the personal taste ofthe warrior. Amongst these are axes, clubsand ‘warhammers’, yet it should beremembered that none of these weaponswere common.30

Defensive Equipment Metal helmets wereextremely expensive and beyond the meansof the vast majority of warriors, beingrestricted to the wealthier nobles andcomitatus. What little evidence there issuggests that they were similar to thespangenhelms and ridge helmets used by theRomans. As a cheaper alternative,Ammianus mentions the use of leatherhelmets which, whilst imperfect, would nodoubt be an improvement on goingbareheaded.31

It appears that the few individuals whocould afford armour wore either mail orscale styles. As is to be expected, these wereextremely expensive: they are rarely foundin burials, suggesting that they wereconsidered valuable heirlooms rather thanitems for deposition.32 Although over timethese items slowly became more common,the process was slow. One of the greatest

rewards for a German leader would beacceptance as a Roman officer, with accessto Roman arsenals for himself and hisfollowers. This was to become anincreasingly common demand fromGermanic invaders.

The shields used by the German tribesappear to have been mainly round or ovalin shape and could be anywhere fromaround 60 centimetres to 1 metre in height(2–3 feet), probably based on personalpreference.33 The traditional hexagonalshape associated with the German cavalryemployed within the empire during the firstcenturies BC and AD was still in use, but toa lesser degree than other styles. Althoughother styles of shield are depicted onmonuments, in general they appear to bevariants of the oval or octagonal types andmay have been relatively uncommon.

In the mid to late twentieth century and

earlier there was a form of shield known asthe ‘coffin’ shield, which was traditionallyassigned to the Goths. Although this is nowfirmly fixed, it has proved impossible to findany examples in either the sculptural orarchaeological record. It is possible thatsome of the monumental evidence wasinterpreted as proof of the existence of theseshields but that these examples have sincebeen re-interpreted as stylistic conventionscaused by the problem of perspective. As aresult, although it is has proved impossibleto determine whether these forms actuallyexisted, the likelihood is that they did not.

It is interesting to note that during thisperiod there was a change in the shape ofthe boss on Germanic shields. The metalboss was used to cover the hole in the shieldmade by the hand-grip. Before and after theperiod of the migrations the boss wasusually a simple dome shape. During the

migration period, although the dome shapepersisted, there was a shift to a morepointed shape of boss. Warriors wouldalways have punched with the shield whenopportunity arose, but the earlier and laterdome shape of the boss implies that theshield retained a more important role as adefensive item. The change in boss shape toa point suggests that the shields were nowused in an offensive capacity for punching,indicating that for a short period of timeduring the migrations Germanic warriorsadopted a more aggressive attitude towarfare.

Germans and the EmpireThe people of the empire had a standard ofliving, especially amongst the higherechelons, that was unheard of in Germania.During the previous 400 years there hadbeen many examples of German warriorswho had entered the empire and risen to

high rank, gaining along the waycomparatively fabulous wealth. The empirewas ‘a land of opportunity with great easeof living’.34 The availability of goods thatthey could not otherwise obtain accounts forthe large number of raids and attackslaunched against the empire by Germancantons.

Many Germanic attacks, such as theinvasion of Italy by Alaric in 401 and theinvasion of Gaul in 406, took place inwinter.35 This was probably due to the factthat the farmers who comprised the bulk ofthe army had little to do agriculturally atthis time of year. Further, the harvest inautumn would supply the attackers withfood for the campaign.

The superior lifestyle of the Romans alsoexplains why the Germans were determinedto settle within the empire. Their leaderscould demand military positions, the pay for

which would allow them to live to standardsthey would be unable to achieve at home.Even the peasant farmers would benefit bythe move, since there were large areas ofagricultural land within the empire that wasof far better quality than that across theRhine. It is little wonder that as the empiredeclined German pressure on the frontiersincreased.

Strategy and Tactics By the time thatAetius came to power German strategy canbe defined as putting pressure on theemperor to allow the Germans to settle onimperial soil and to give the Germanicleaders posts within the Roman militaryhierarchy that would elevate their prestigeamongst their followers, as well as givingthem the money with which to maintain –and even expand – their comitatus. Thepractice of cantons raiding the empireseems to have been in decline. Instead, the

peoples along the frontiers, especially theFranks, began their slow, inexorable andpermanent infiltration of the imperialborders.

In war, although the individual leaders ofGermanic tribes may have been moresophisticated than their predecessors, thefact that the troops remained virtuallyuntrained peasant farmers restricted theirabilities. With little training andcoordination, German tactics on thebattlefield could not become too convoluted,as the troops would easily become confused.As a result, in battle the infantry formed asingle line with the cavalry on the flanks.However, the Battle of Strasbourg showsthat ambushes were a possibility when anopportunity arose.36

When defeated, many of the westernGermans simply fled as best they could, butthe eastern Germans, such as the Goths,

adopted the wagon laager of the nomadicpeoples to the east. This gave them a secureplace to which they could retreat.Furthermore, it acted as a military campand could be used as a fortification ifneeded, as happened at Adrianople andlater in Greece.37

Germanic inability to build siege enginesresulted in their being unable to capturecities unless by stealth or treachery. As aresult, they had to resort to blockade andthreat. When circumstances werefavourable, as after the victory atAdrianople, these tactics could work. If thecircumstances were unfavourable, such aswhen cities were strongly defended, theGermans tended to bypass them to reachsofter targets such as villas. Their lack ofsiege ability remained a constant weaknessin the arsenal of the German tribes, evenafter their founding of new kingdoms on

Roman soil.In conclusion, it would appear that there

were very few changes in tactics or strategybetween the first and the fifth centuries.However, the fact that many individualGermans took service in the Roman army nodoubt had the effect of very slowlytransforming their organization andoutlook. Unfortunately, the nature of anysuch transformation is not documented bythe Romans, who believed that they werefacing the same type of foes as theirancestors had faced under Augustus andMarcus Aurelius.

The HunsThe political institutions of the Huns appearto have been similar to those of the westernGermans. A group of families owedallegiance to a noble or warlord, who inturn gave service to a superior noble. Aswith the Germans, this resulted in a fluid

society where allegiance could easily changeunless loyalty or fear kept lesser nobles intheir place. The fragmentary nature ofHunnic society is demonstrated by the largenumber of Huns who, with their leaders,entered service with the Roman army. Insome cases this was doubtless to avoidserving an unpopular leader at home whohad established a large powerbase andsought to expand it by dominating thosetribes around him.

In warfare, the Huns were renowned fortheir superior skills at horse archery, themajority of their troops being lightlyequipped horse archers. Some of the noblesmay have employed helmets and bodyarmour, in which case they most probablyused the same styles of equipment as theirneighbours. If this is the case, then at leastsome of their forces may have beenequipped with simple spangenhelm helmets

and either traditional chain- or scale-mail,or possibly lamellar armour. It is probablethat scale mail and lamellar predominated,since both of these styles were easier tomake and maintain. They were also lighterand easier to tailor to the needs of mountedtroops using a bow.

Hunnic swords would probably have beeneastern versions of the spatha design, asused by the eastern Germanic tribes andmore especially by the Persians. We have noinformation on additional equipment suchas greaves and vambraces. Since the mainrole of the Hunnic warrior was as a lighthorse archer, if these items were used at allit is probable that it would have beenamongst the nobles, yet even here theywould be rare.

The main weapon of the Huns was theasymmetrical composite bow, the lowerlimb being shorter than the upper limb. The

result is a bow that is easier to fire fromhorseback, since the lower limb tends tomake less contact and be less interferedwith by the horse. Extensive research bymodern bowyers and archers has establishedthat, although the asymmetrical bowrequires much more skill and is much harderto master than the symmetrical bow, theend result is an archer that is far superior toone using the symmetrical bow. Theasymmetrical bow excels in really highpoundages (the amount of power needed todraw back the string), which gives greaterrange and power, is faster to fire, andperforms far better with a thumb ring. Intests a fair degree of accuracy and powercan be achieved even with flightless arrowsby an archer trained in the use of the thumbring.38

The Huns did not have regimentedtraining regimes such as those found in the

Roman army. Yet this was not necessary.They relied on manoeuvrability as theirmain tactic:

When provoked they sometimesfight singly but they enter thebattle in tactical formation, whiletheir medley of voices makes asavage noise. And as they arelightly equipped for swift motion,and unexpected in action, theypurposely divide suddenly inscattered bands and attack, rushingabout in disorder here and there,dealing terrific slaughter; andbecause of their extraordinaryrapidity of movement they cannotbe discerned when they break intoa rampart or pillage an enemy’scamp.39

The Huns relied on the superior

horsemanship gained from many years ofriding horses to enable them to manoeuvreso rapidly in front of their enemies. Thisskill also allowed them to employ one oftheir favourite battlefield tactics – the‘feigned flight’. By pretending to rout, theHuns would make the enemy believe thatthe battle was won, coaxing them intochasing after the retreating Huns. Once theenemy formation was broken the Hunswould quickly reverse direction and attackthe disordered pursuers, usually withdevastating effect.40 The ‘hit and run’ tacticsemployed during both raids into enemyterritory as well as large-scale battles washard for their enemies to counter because oftheir relative immobility. The prospectivelosses in booty and the need to maintaintroops to face the Huns means that inreality it was probably cheaper to pay‘tribute’ to the Huns than oppose them.

Furthermore, the lack of permanentsettlements may have made the Hunsparticularly difficult for the Romans to fight,since the usual Roman response to a raidwas to lead a counter-attack, whichdevastated the enemy homelands. It is onlylater that the Huns under Attila appear tohave made semi-permanent homesteads.When this happened, they in turn becamevulnerable to strikes against their families.41

There was no single king amongst theHuns. Division was by tribe, with each tribefollowing its own leaders. Although tribescould easily form temporary alliancesagainst mutual enemies, it should not bethought that all Huns were a single ‘people’with the same aims and ideals. The Hunsappear to have been a large collection oftribes who had slowly moved west in acombination of small groups and largearmies. Nor was there the concept of a

‘Hunnic empire’. In fact Hunnic mercenariesmay have served Gothic kings against theirfellow Huns in the fourth century.42 Themodern concept of a single, unified horde ismistaken. The only time when the Hunsever approached unity was under theleadership of Attila, and even this was onlytemporary as after his death his empirequickly collapsed.

For a long time these warriors would beallied to Aetius and be the basis of hismilitary and political standing. Yet towardsthe end of his rule they would be turnedagainst him and the most renowned point ofAetius’ career would be a fight against theseformidable warriors, led by Attila, theirmost famous leader.

Chapter 6

Magister Militum per Gallias

THE ARMY OF GAULAfter coming to an agreement with Placidia,Aetius was given control of the field army inGaul. Unfortunately, the actual condition ofthe army there is unknown at this late date,and is a matter of some debate. As wasnoted in the introduction, it is possible touse the Notitia Dignitatum as a basis foranalysis, but in reality the Notitia is ofuncertain reliability.

There is little other recourse for anyone

attempting to reconstruct the nature of thefifth-century army. Consequently, thefigures that follow, although highlyspeculative, at least give an impression ofwhat Aetius expected to lead upon assumingcommand.

The Notitia lists either fifteen or sixteenAuxilia Palatina units, one Legionis Palatinaunit, nine Legiones Comitatenses units, tenLegiones Comitatenses and twelve other unitswhose status is unclear. This gives atheoretical total of 45,600 men if all unitsare at full paper strength, or the lowerfigure of 30,400 if a two-thirds strength isassumed.

For cavalry, the Notitia lists four EquitesPalatina units and eight Equites Comitatensesunits. Again, at theoretical full strength thiswould give a mounted arm of 7,200 men,whilst the two-thirds estimate would give4,800 men.

Although in theory these forces could havebeen supplemented by taking limitanei fromthe frontiers and using them in the fieldarmy, in this period the move would havebeen risky, as weakening the frontiers couldhave invited yet further attacks from acrossthe Rhine.

It is possible that Aetius also had with himsome foederati, but if so the nature andnumbers of these troops is completelyunknown. Finally, he would almostcertainly have maintained a small force ofbucellarii for his personal use. Again thecomposition and numbers are unknown, butit is reasonable to assume that he wouldhave had a small bodyguard of Huns,provided by Rua but paid for by Aetiushimself.

The total force that Aetius could commandcan, therefore, be assumed to musterbetween 35,200 and 52,800, although it

should be acknowledged that illness, injury,the need to deploy troops away from themain field army as garrisons, plus the needto leave an administrative core at the unit’sbase, will have further reduced the numbersavailable.1 As a result, it can be assumedthat Aetius could command troopsnumbering around 20,000–30,000 foot and3,200–4,000 horse, an average ofapproximately 29,000 men. However, asnoted above, it is possible that the numberwas much less, as some of the units maynow have been part of the praesental armyin Italy, whilst others may only have existedon paper.

When Aetius succeeded to the commandthe troops were most probably stationed atvarious points around Gaul. Immediatelyupon his appointment in Italy it is mostlikely that the only troops Aetius hadcontrol of were a small number of Huns

retained for his personal service after thedismissal of the main body. These wouldform the core of his personal bucellarii. It ishighly unlikely that he would have beengiven troops from the army of Italy as thiswould be needed to guarantee the newlywon position of emperor for Valentinian IIIand, in any case, would not be given to therecently defeated leader of a rebellion incase he decided to renew the conflict.Furthermore, a large part of the army thathad won the civil war was from the Eastand would ultimately have to return home.Finally, before he could take control of theGallic army, Aetius would need intelligenceon recent events in Gaul prior to departingfrom Italy to gather his army in person.

Map 4. Aetius in Gaul

Conditions in Gaul

The barbarians above the Rhine,assaulting everything at theirpleasure, reduced both theinhabitants of Britain and some ofthe Celtic peoples to defecting fromRoman rule and living their ownlives disassociated from the Romanlaw. Accordingly the Britons tookup arms and, with no considerationof the danger to themselves, freedtheir own cities from barbarianthreat; likewise all of Armorica andother Gallic provinces followed theBritons’ lead: they freedthemselves, ejected the Romanmagistrates, and set up home ruleat their own discretion.

Zosimus 6.5 Gaul and Spain were demolished

and utterly destroyed by thebarbarian nations of the Vandals,Sueves, and Alans.

Narratio de imperatoribus domusValentinianae et Theodosiane

The greatest difficulty facing Aetius when hebecame the commander of the army in Gaulwas the confusion prevalent in the West.The rebellion in Britain and the constantusurpations in Gaul and Spain, coupled withthe invasions of the Vandals, Alans andSueves and the later arrival of the Goths,had all overwhelmed large areas of Gaul.Where the barbarians had not actuallyplundered the countryside, the army’s lackof ability to maintain order had allowedseveral areas of Gaul, such as Armorica inthe north, to become practically self-governing under the aristocrats who had

remained in the area. However, thedeparture of the Vandals, Alans and Suevesto Spain and the settlement of the Goths inAquitania allowed time for the restorationof order. The campaigns of Constantius III(d. 321) had no doubt ensured that in mostareas, and especially in the south aroundArles, peace was restored.

Yet conditions had not been restored tothose that had existed prior to 406. The seatof government was now permanently inArles rather than Trier, and the post ofPraefectus praetorio Galliarum was now firmlyin the hands of the aristocracy of southernGaul. Whereas before 406 it had tended tobe in the hands of Italian senators –probably individuals who had large land-holdings in the south of Gaul – it was nowheld by Exuperantius and possibly Amatiusafter him.2

Furthermore, although the Gallic upper

classes could still hold imperial office in thetraditional manner, there were distinctproblems in Gaul. One was that with themovement of the capital to the south andthe withdrawal of the imperial court toRavenna there was a lack of opportunitiesfor men of ambition. The resultant lack ofeconomic and political power resulted in thebeginning of a steady decline in traditionaleducation, such as rhetoric, for all but thehighest echelons of society.

Coupled with this was the lack ofenthusiasm of all but a few to enter imperialservice. In imperial service the hours werelong and except possibly at the very toplevels the financial rewards were not seenas being equal to the workload imposed. Asa result, instead of serving the empire, thoseof more modest means began to transfertheir ambition to the church, another pieceof evidence for the gradual fragmentation

and transferral of loyalties in the West.3This may seem surprising, in that the

church was an imperial institution and hadintentionally copied imperial forms ofadministration. Yet the influx of influentialmembers of the higher and lower aristocracyresulted in the church growing ever greaterin prestige. As imperial power withdrew,the removal of traditional sources ofpatronage and influence resulted in thechurch becoming the local expression ofimperial government. As a result, the localbishops soon came to be ranked higher thanother imperial representatives: for example,the Bishop of Arles soon began to wieldsocial and political power far beyond hisstatus as a bishop.4

The hierarchical ties to the emperorbroke. The local loyalties that had earlierfocused upon the hierarchy’s ties to theimperial person were transferred to the

local bishop, who became the trustedspokesman at court.5 Rather than focusingupon the empire or the province, all ranksof the local Christian community began togive their loyalties to the much smallerdivision of the diocese. As a result, bishopsbecame increasingly more autocratic.

The process had been given a major boostby a scandal in the late fourth century. In390 Bishop Ambrose of Milan hadexcommunicated Emperor Theodosius I afterTheodosius had ordered a massacre ofcivilians in Thessalonica. Theodosius hadbeen forced to undergo several months ofpublic penance before being allowed backinto the church. The episode had majorimplications. The impression given was thatbishops could have authority over theemperor himself. (It should be rememberedthat in this period the Pope was revered asbeing senior, but had not yet been

acknowledged as the infallible ‘God’srepresentative on earth’ of the MiddleAges.) In theory, any bishop could useAmbrose’s actions as a model in his dealingswith the emperor, although it must be notedthat later emperors were less likely to payattention than the pious Theodosius and notall bishops were as forceful as Ambrose. Yetthe benchmark had been set: in someinstances the church was mightier than theemperor.

The imperial government was aware ofthese developments. The inauguration of anew ‘Council of the Seven Gauls’ can beinterpreted as a major political statementby the government. Although the settlementof the Goths in Aquitania could easily beseen as the break up of Gaul into non-Roman ‘kingdoms’, the Council was torepresent the whole of Gaul and was adeclaration that the whole of Gaul,

including both the areas settled by the Gothsas well as the north, was still part of theempire, with the Goths as a small peoplewithin it.6

The usurpation of John in 424 hadresulted in yet another civil war in the Westwhen it really needed time to recuperateand restore itself. The news that the army ofthe magister militum praesentalis, andpossibly units of the army of Gaul, wasbeing withdrawn to defend Italy meant thatsome outlying areas of northern Gaul,especially Armorica, continued their driftaway from the empire, seeing no benefit inpaying high taxes to an empire that wastotally incapable of fulfilling its duties withregard to protection.

There was one further development thatwas to affect seriously Aetius’ time ascommander in Gaul. Economically andpolitically, the provinces of Gaul were

becoming increasingly divided between thenorth and the south. In the south, Arles(Arelate) was being developed until it couldbe described as Gallula Roma Arelas (‘Arelas,small Gallic version of Rome’) by Ausonius.7The town had become important largelythanks to its river harbour, which wasmainly concerned with the transport of theannona, receiving goods from theMediterranean and sending them on to Trierand the rest of Gaul. With the settlement ofthe Praetorian Prefect of Gaul in the city,Arles became even more important thanpreviously, in the fifth century rebuildingthe walls for greater protection, probablyagainst the combined threat of the Goths inGaul and of the Vandals in Spain. Thegovernment was also under pressure fromthe Senate to keep the south of Gaulinviolate and safe, who had largelandholdings in the area. Economically,

militarily and politically, southern Gaul wasseen as vital to the welfare of the empire.

In the north of Gaul, however, andespecially north of the Loire, things weredifferent. Under constant threat of invasion,the landowners of large estates hadwithdrawn and landholding had reverted tosmall, peasant plots, possibly under thecontrol of local aristocrats. The removal ofthe court and large sections of the armycaused a loss of income that resulted in areduction in the import of, for example, finepottery from southern Gaul, northern Italyand Spain.8 As the distinctive services of theempire withdrew, so the forces of self-government grew. The north was to becomea centre of resistance to Roman rule inGaul.

Despite this, even in the north thearistocracy spent much of its time andresources on the building of religious

centres. As a result, the towns of Gaul were‘transformed largely from centres of Romancivilization to the cores around which theChristian religion flourished and kept alivesome of the imperial values and structures’.9

However, for Aetius, the immediateproblem was that John’s policies in Gaulhad resulted in the death of the newlyappointed Praetorian Prefect Exuperantiusand possibly of Gaudentius, Aetius’ father,both of whom had been killed by thetroops.10 It was clear that the imperial andpersonal policies of John and hispredecessors had done much to alienate thepopulation of Gaul from imperial rule. As hetook up his post of magister militum perGallias Aetius was faced with the need tocounter the growing sense of disunity inGaul. He was also faced with the Gothsunder their king, Theoderic.

The GothsAlthough there is a tendency amongstmodern historians to call the Visigothicterritories in Gaul a kingdom from themoment of their settlement in 418–419, thisis a mistake.11 The designation ‘kingdom’has unavoidable associations, bringing tomind the more settled monarchies of theearly to high medieval period. The reality infifth-century Gaul was far different. The titlekingdom is also one given in hindsight, builtlargely upon the claim to the title rexGothorum by Alaric and his successors.12 Yetthere are two problems with thisinterpretation. The first is that the title ofrex was not Germanic. It was of Romanorigin and was used in an attempt byRoman writers to identify the military andpolitical leaders of the barbarians. Alaricwas possibly the first Germanic leader to usethe title himself, employing it as a political

tool to place pressure on the court atRavenna. The actual date at which Gothicleaders stopped using the title as a politicaltool and began to use it as a firm claim tototal dominion over their fellow Goths isunknown. Secondly, although the Visigothicleaders were using the title ‘rex’, theyaccepted that the more powerful Germanictitle of ‘thiudans’ was still only to be borneby the reigning emperor in Ravenna.13

Furthermore, it is unclear what, if any,difference there was between the earliersettlement of the Goths in 382 and the latersettlement of 419. Although it can beclaimed that the main difference was thatthe later settlement had a leader whoclaimed the title rex, the lack of informationconcerning the settlement of 382 means thatthere remains the possibility that thissettlement, too, recognised the dominanceof a single Gothic leader. Yet the earlier

Gothic settlement is not referred to as akingdom.

Apart from this, the two settlements maybe more similar than expected: in the eastthe Goths had been allocated a specificterritory but their dependence upon Romangenerosity remained and there were distinctlimits on their freedom; in the west, in thenew ‘proto-kingdom’, they were settled in aspecific territory and there was a similarlimit to Visigothic power, since they wereexcluded from the Mediterranean and theRomans maintained full control of the landroutes to Spain.14

The similarities are not surprising, sincein both cases the Roman victories thatachieved the treaties were almost identical:the Goths had achieved ‘unbelievable’triumphs – the Battle of Adrianople in 378and the Sack of Rome in 410 – before beingblockaded into submission. It is likely that

in both cases the Goths were settledaccording to the principles of receptio andthe provision of recruits for the army.15 Asin the east, there was thus no guarantee –and probably little hope – that the Gothswould establish their own rule and breakfree from the domination of Rome.

The history of the Goths from the rise topower of Alaric in 396 to their settlementonly twenty-two years later in 418 showsthat, far from being an unitary force undera settled king, the Goths were in fact aconglomeration of forces and tribes who hadagreed to follow the lead of Alaric and hissuccessors.16 At any time of their choosing,the Visigothic aristocracy always retainedthe right to leave the main body and strikeout on their own, either to move out of theempire or to join with imperial forces in thehope of employment and promotion.Naturally, the men that owed allegiance to

the aristocracy would follow their leaders inwhichever way they chose to go.

It would be unrealistic to assume that theVisigothic aristocracy gave up this right themoment that the Romans allowed them tosettle in Gaul. It is far more likely that theycontinued to act in an independent manner.Even a century later powerful Gothic noblescaused intense dynastic instability. Not onlythat, but the Goths were not the onlycomponent of the new kingdom. At somelater point during the Gothic siege of Bazastheir Alan allies had a change of heart anddefected to the Romans defending thetown.17 If the Gothic nobles and allies coulddefect later in their history, the possibilitywould be especially the case immediatelyafter the settlement in Gaul.

Yet the seeds were quickly sown for thegrowth in power of the Gothic king. The factthat the Romans had granted the Goths land

in the three provinces meant that, in effect,the Gothic aristocracy assumed the role ofthe now-vacant Roman aristocracy. Theonly way that the Goths could control theirnew lands was by the use of Romanadministrative systems. The result was thatthe Gothic aristocracy immediately began tosettle in the towns. Theoderic himself settledin Toulouse and all Roman politicalexchanges with the Goths was via the newGothic ‘capital’. The role of Theoderic as thesole leader of the Goths was important tothe Romans, as it made dealing with themeasier for the imperial government.Theoderic was treated as the sole leader, butin return he was expected to control all ofthe Goths and maintain his part of thetreaty with Rome.

The fact that the Romans tended tochannel their diplomacy through Theodericresulted in Toulouse becoming effectively

the capital of the Visigothic protokingdom.The increased political power of the king nodoubt contributed to an increase in internalpolitical control.18 Furthermore, it is likelythat from this time onwards Theodericestablished a ‘standing army’. He was ableto use this army to defend himself frominternal rebellions, as well as protecting hispeople from external threats.19

However, those aristocrats who had beengiven land away from the capital no doubtignored the commands of the new king indistant Toulouse whenever it suited them. Ineffect, rather than being the anointed king,it is better to see Theoderic as an individualwho has continually to prove himself inorder to retain control of his most powerfulsubjects. Only by exerting his full power anddemonstrating that he was in control wouldhe ensure that the majority of thearistocracy would look to him for guidance.

Otherwise, they would continue in the oldtraditions of independence.

In this context, the outbreak of a Romancivil war was of inestimable value toTheoderic. As a recently created king, hishold on power was likely to be relativelytenuous. After all, two of his immediatepredecessors had been killed by disaffectedfactions that remained within Theoderic’sfollowing. In order to avoid this happeningto himself, Theoderic needed to demonstratethat he had the ability to support those whofollowed him.

Consequently, as the conflict betweenJohn and Valentinian began, Theodericattempted to augment and demonstrate hisstrength. It is possible that he sent forces tocapture many small towns, especially thoseat strategic points. However, only one cityis mentioned directly in our sources. At thetime when Aetius was appointed to the

command in Gaul, Theoderic and the Gothswere busy laying siege to Arelate (Arles).20

The Visigothic siege of Arles, the capitalof Gaul and the seat of the newly foundedCouncil of the Seven Provinces, is usuallyinterpreted as an attempt by Theoderic toextend Visigothic influence to theMediterranean.21 However, this is almostcertainly too simplistic an interpretation.The decision to lay siege to Arles wasprobably the combination of many factors.One of these is that the deaths of Gaudentiusand Exuperantius demonstrate that Gaulwas not going to support John. Bypromoting his actions as those of a loyalrepresentative of the ‘true’ imperialgovernment, Theodoric could join the Gallicforces in besieging the agents of theusurper. After all, Theoderic’s treaty waswith the members of the Theodosiandynasty, and he may have been able to

claim that he was simply fulfilling hisobligation by attacking disloyal elements.

A second factor is that financially the citywas of huge importance to the empire, as itwas the main commercial centre of Gaulthrough which the majority of trade passedto the Mediterranean. Its loss would be aserious blow to the financial affairs ofRavenna, which were already in a perilouscondition.22 Furthermore, Arles was now thecapital of Gaul and was of inestimablepolitical importance to Rome. Given the factthat the north of Gaul was beginning itsslow slide away from the empire, the loss ofArles would result in the imperial hold onGaul becoming extremely tenuous. If hecould take the city, whichever of the twosides won the civil war would be forced tomake concessions to Theoderic for thereturn of the city, and if the Theodosianclaim was victorious they may also have felt

obliged to reward him for his loyalty.On the other hand, taking Theoderic’s

attempt to capture Arles as evidence of aGothic attempt to expand their influence tothe Mediterranean is unrealistic. Arles wasan extremely important city and the chanceof the Goths taking Arles and of beingallowed simply to keep it were extremelyremote. Theoderic would have known this.If the city was taken and held, it was farmore likely that a major Roman expeditionwould be sent to recapture Arles at the firstopportunity, and the past twenty years ofconflict had shown that the Goths simplycould not win. Therefore, it is unlikely thatTheoderic seriously contemplated annexingthe city on a permanent basis.23

Additionally, political treaties wereusually seen as being signed betweenindividuals such as Theoderic andConstantius, not between political entities

such as Rome and the Goths. The death ofHonorius almost certainly meant that therewould need to be a new treaty signed withwhoever won the civil war. It is more likelythat the move to lay Arles under siege was adeclaration of loyalty to the Theodosiangovernment in the hope that they wouldchange the terms of the treaty of 418.

It is probable that Theoderic wanted twoamendments to the original treaty. The firstwould have been concerned with extendingthe land personally held by him. An increasein his personal landholdings would result inan increase in revenue for Theoderic. This inturn would finance an enlarged personalcomitatus (personal following). As a result,he would be able to begin the process offirmly establishing himself as undisputedleader of the Visigothic kingdom, since hisincreased military power would allow himto bring the aristocracy under ever-tighter

control.The second was related to the past. In

order to be compared favourably with Alaric– the Visigoth who had, after all, sackedRome itself – Theoderic needed a militarypost high in the hierarchy of the Romanarmy. In this way, he would gain thefinancial benefits from his new position, aswell as holding an official rank to use in hisdealings with the local aristocracy inAquitania. He would also gain prestige frombeing the first of Alaric’s successors to gainan official post in the imperialinfrastructure.

As a result of these deliberations, whencivil war again broke out within the empireTheoderic acted without hesitation and laidsiege to Arles.

AETIUS’ FIRST CAMPAIGNOnce Aetius had learned of events in Gaulhe would have known what to do. He left

Italy with his bodyguard and advanced intoGaul with the intention of gathering hisforces for a campaign against the Goths.This doubtless took some time, as only ashort time previously he had been part ofJohn’s regime and had only recentlyaccepted service under Valentinian. Initiallythe troops stationed in Gaul would havebeen wary of Aetius’ motives and strategiesand of following his orders unquestioningly.Having gained the trust of most of the Gallicarmy, and learning of the composition ofthe enemy, Aetius collected his forces beforeadvancing towards the Visigothic siegelines.

It is unclear exactly what happened atArles when Aetius reached the city. The twosources that tell of the siege give only verybrief notices of events:

Arles, noble city of Gaul, wasassailed by the Goths with great

violence, until, threatened byAetius they withdrew not withoutlosses.

Prosper Tiro. s.a. 425 Arles was freed from the Goths byAetius.

Chron Gall 452 102 s.a. 427

Prosper’s statement that the Goths withdrew‘not without losses’ is ambiguous. It couldmean either that Aetius’ forces attacked andforced the Goths to withdraw after takingcasualties, or more likely, if the statementthat Arles had been ‘assailed by the Gothswith great violence’ is accurate, that theGoths had taken losses whilst attempting tostorm the city. The Gallic Chronicler’sstatement is completely uninformative onthe point. The only thing that is certain is

that Theoderic was unwilling to face Aetiusin a pitched battle.

It is most likely that Theoderic withdrewwithout battle, having taken losses onlyduring the course of the siege. As the Romanforces approached, Theoderic’s forces wereprobably dispersed around the city in orderto enforce the siege. Needing time to collectand order his forces, Theoderic would havehad little choice but to withdraw.

Yet there is another factor. Aetius was thelegitimate representative of the newTheodosian government, and his previousrole as a hostage with the Goths attested tohis political importance. As the son-in-lawof Alaric, it is certain that Theoderic wasalready acquainted with Aetius due toAetius’ tenure as a hostage between 405 and408. Theoderic could not maintain hisstance of supporting the House ofTheodosius if he continued the siege in

opposition to Aetius.After the Visigothic departure, Aetius and

Theoderic conducted negotiations, duringthe course of which an exchange of hostagesappears to have been arranged and peaceterms agreed, possibly with increasedbenefits in return for continued loyalty tothe Theodosian dynasty, although the detailsare unknown.24

The raising of the siege of Arles was ofinestimable value to the regime in Ravenna.A military success would have helped tosecure Valentinian on the throne, a positionthat was still precarious. The fact that Aetiushad won a victory over the Goths was a signthat after the confusion of the civil war thenew regime was asserting itself and theopponents were now working together.

It should be noted that the actual datingof Aetius’ campaign is open to question.Prosper dates it to 425, whilst the Gallic

Chronicle of 452 dates it to 427.25 Althoughcertainty is impossible, given the nature ofevents it is possible to reconstruct a viabletimeline.

In 425 Aetius was made magister militumper Gallias and travelled to Gaul. However,he was unable to act instantly as he neededtime to re-establish control there. He wouldneed to convince all of the localcommanders that he was now the loyalservant of Valentinian and that he had nointention of leading the Gallic army inanother civil war. He would also need todemonstrate that he was not going to takereprisals for the death of his father. Afterthis he would need to collect his forces,during which time, and claiming to beunaware of the change in circumstances, theGoths launched their attacks upon thebesieged city.26

It will have been at the earliest in 426

when Aetius led the Gallic army to relievethe siege of Arles and forced Theoderic toretire. The necessary negotiations needed toconclude the war will most likely havecontinued into 427, especially as at thisearly stage in his rehabilitation Aetiuswould not have had the power to sign thetreaty on his own. A lot of time will havebeen spent waiting for Valentinian and hisministers to ratify the new treaty. Thereforeit was only in 427 that a treaty was agreedbetween Aetius and Theoderic and hostageswere exchanged.

Although only a theory, the timeline doesallow a reasonable passage of time for all ofthe events to take place, as well asexplaining the confusion in the differentchronicles.27 Following the conclusion of thecampaign, and possibly accompanied by anembassy from Theoderic to ratify the treaty,in 427 Aetius returned to Ravenna to report

in person on the Gallic campaign.

THE DISGRACE OF BONIFACEWhen Aetius returned to the court in 427 itwas to find himself embroiled in a politicaltangle. Felix appears to have been takingsteps to ensure that he remained the solemilitary power in the West. According toProsper, either during or shortly afterAetius’ campaign against the Goths, atribune by the name of Barbatus hadattacked and killed Patroclus, Bishop ofArles, for which Felix was held responsible.It is possible that Aetius was recalled in partto explain the circumstances surroundingPatroclus’ death. Furthermore, a deacon inRome was also attacked, again allegedlyupon the orders of Felix.28 It would appearthat Felix was reacting to religious dissentagainst his rule, and this may reflect abroader sense of unrest.

However, the crisis came when Boniface,

Placidia’s supporter for several years, wasaccused of wanting to set up his own empirein Africa.29 The accusation was made byeither Aetius or Felix – unfortunately, oursources differ. Procopius, John of Antiochand Theophanes all claim that Aetius wasresponsible for the accusations.30 However,as a note of caution, it should beremembered that Procopius was writing inthe sixth century, John of Antioch in theseventh and Theophanes in the eighth.Unfortunately, we do not know what theirsources were for these allegations, so it isuncertain how accurate they are likely tobe.

Prosper, however, implies that it wasFelix who was responsible for theaccusations.31 Given that Prosper was acontemporary who was also antagonistictowards Aetius, it seems possible that he ismore accurate in his allegations. Yet, as

usual, certainty is impossible. The claimwould tie in to the ‘aggressive’ stanceapparently being taken by Felix with regardto any opposition, as shown by the deathsof the clergymen. Furthermore, it is unlikelythat Placidia would listen to any accusationsmade by Aetius, a man who had untilrecently been the supporter of a usurper.Aetius was not yet in a position where hisword would be accepted against Placidia’sstaunchest ally.

As a consequence, it seems highlyprobable that it was Felix who made theaccusations against Boniface.32 Comingfrom the patricius and the leader of the armythat was supporting her in power, Placidiahad to take the accusations seriously. SinceAetius had just returned to report on hisactions in Gaul, it would make sense forPlacidia to request that Boniface shouldreport on affairs in Africa in person. It

would also be a chance to all three of themost important men in the West together toformulate plans for the West’s restoration.

Consequently, Placidia was persuaded tosummon Boniface to Ravenna, but she wasalso told that he would not come as he wasturning against her. In the meantime, wordwas sent to Boniface warning him of a plotand advising him not to return to Italy.33

When Boniface refused to return, Placidiadeclared him a rebel and ordered Felix tosend an army to take control of Africa.34

According to his (no doubt welcome)instructions, Felix sent Mavortius andGallio, both of whom may have been comesrei militaris, and Sanoeces, who may alsohave been a comes rei militaris but who couldinstead have been the leader of a contingentof Huns, to Africa.35 It would appear thatthe army was besieging Boniface whenMavortius and Gallio were killed, being

betrayed by Sanoeces, although the precisedetails are unknown. Shortly afterwardsSanoeces himself was killed. When the newsreached Italy, the comes rei militaris Sigisvultwas sent to Africa to conduct the war, whichhe proceeded to do for the next two years.36

It is almost certain that Sigisvult was a Gothand that when he was ordered to go toAfrica he took a contingent of Gothic troopswith him, possibly in accordance with thenew treaty signed between Aetius andTheoderic, although the context is extremelyinsecure.37 What is more certain is thatSigisvult was an Arian and that he took withhim the Arian bishop Maximinus. Shortlyafter landing, Maximinus was sent todispute with Augustine in Hippo.38

PANNONIAIn the meantime, either late in 426 or earlyin 427, Felix set out to fight the Huns, who

had allegedly held Pannonia for fiftyyears.39 Interestingly, Jordanes also notesthe attack on the Huns, claiming that theRoman army was accompanied by Goths.40

Although the entry in Jordanes is suspect,and doubtless there were many groups ofGoths who were unattached to thesettlement in Aquitaine seekingemployment, it is intriguing to note that thistallies with the possibility of theemployment of Goths by Sigisvultmentioned above. Consequently, it is almostcertain that immediately after the treatywith Theoderic there is evidence for theGoths supporting Rome. It is also evidentthat the Huns did not have any largesettlements in Pannonia, their presencebeing restricted to smaller settlements andthe pasturing of flocks across the RiverSave. As a result, the campaign was asuccess, and the Huns, who had probably

only lightly held areas in Pannonia, wereforced out.

Politically and militarily the successfulcampaign would be important to Felix. Hehad led the Italian comitatensis against theenemy in his first military operation as thesenior magister. The ‘victory’ over thebarbarians established his credentials andhelped to cement his grasp on power. Felixwould be able to broadcast a large amountof positive propaganda about his leadershipqualities, if only to act as a counterbalanceto the victories Aetius was winning in Gaul.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RHINEIt is unlikely that Aetius was involved in thiscampaign, since his presence was needed inGaul, where a lot of work was still neededin order to restore the whole of Gaul to theempire. He is likely to have spent theremainder of the year of 427 returning toGaul and preparing for the campaign of the

following year.When the campaign season of 428 began

Aetius gathered his forces and advancedtowards the Rhine.41 The Franks had usedthe opportunity given by the Roman civilwar to extend their territories along theriver. It is likely that the Franks had notconducted a military campaign, but thatthere had been a peaceful settlement onabandoned farmland along the frontier, in asimilar manner to the Huns in Pannonia.Surviving farmers may also have employedcheap illegal immigrants rather thanRomans, helping the Franks to recognizewhere Roman lands were becomingdeserted.42 Advancing with his army, Aetiusforcibly evicted the trespassing Franks,making them retire from Roman territoryand probably taking the opportunity to re-negotiate agreements with the recognizedleaders of the Franks which had been

annulled by the death of Honorius.43 At thesame time, Aetius reinforced the conceptthat the empire was now strong andreunited once more, and that the Frankswere again subject to Roman commands.

Aetius now had two successful campaignsto his credit against two of the dominantbarbarian groups of Gaul. It was fitting thatthe newly appointed magister militum perGallias was responsible for restoring Romanauthority by defeating the Goths and theFranks. Furthermore, the speed at which hewas intimidating barbarians and recoveringGaul was no doubt appreciated in Ravenna.He was quickly gaining credibility.Furthermore, the involvement of the Gallicaristocracy in the usurpations of 411 and413 had damaged their influence at court.In response they changed to taking religiouscareers, during which they could rise to thepoint where they could wield a great deal of

religious and political power.44 However,those who were still hoping that they couldregain their political influence saw Aetius asthe ideal man to support. His success inGaul and his political power in Ravennaresulted in him being seen by the Gallicaristocracy as the man to follow. However,political events in Africa and Ravenna wereto have far-reaching consequences, both forAetius and for the empire.

BRITAINAetius’ successes in Gaul may have had animpression on the peoples of Britain. Theresurgence of the empire on the continentappears to have resulted in an increase incontact between Britain and Gaul. Theattempt by the empire to reassert its controlof northern Gaul may have resulted in anexpectation that the empire would soon berestoring its government in Britain.45

Accordingly, the Catholic leaders of the

island sent messengers to Rome asking for amission to be sent to combat the rise ofPelagianism on the island.46 There was asynod held in Gaul and ‘on therecommendation of the deacon Palladius,Pope Celestine sent Germanus, bishop ofAuxerre, as his representative’.47 Byrestoring the links between Gaul and Britainvia the church the government was able todeclare that the British provinces were oncemore part of the empire.

THE VANDALSAs was mentioned earlier, whilst all of thisactivity was occurring in Gaul and Italy, inSpain the Vandals had not been idle. Theyand their allies moved into the south ofSpain and in 425 and 426 capturedCarthago Spartaria (early Roman CarthagoNova, now Cartagena) and sacked Hispalis(Seville), following which Gunderic, king of

the Vandals, died. His successor was hisbrother, Gaiseric.48 It is likely that with theircapture of Carthage the Vandals captured alarge number of sea-going vessels in theharbour. Using these, in 425 they ravagedthe Balearic Islands and also raidedMauretania.49 It is likely that they facedlittle opposition in Mauretania, a fact thatGaiseric would remember.

Normally, the Romans would havegathered a fleet together to oppose theVandals’ use of ships, but at this time thefleet from the western Mediterranean waseither in Gaiseric’s own hands after the fallof Cartagena, or was being used totransport, guard and supply the forces beingused by Sigisvult for the war againstBoniface. However, the capture of a Romanfleet and the lack of Roman opposition gaveGaiseric the chance to implement a movethat would prove fateful for both the

Vandals and for the Romans. Access to thesea gave him the opportunity to cross theStraits of Gibraltar and land in Africa.

Map 5. Spain c.429

Realizing that an alliance with the nowMediterranean-based Vandals could help todefeat the enemy, either Felix or Sigisvultmade a complete U-turn and attempted torecruit at least some of the Vandals to theircause. At the same time, and possibly withmore hope of success, Boniface may alsohave attempted to gain the alliance of atleast some of the Vandals:

Thereafter access to the sea wasgained by peoples who wereunacquainted with ships until theywere called in by the rival sides togive assistance.

Prosper Tiro s.a. 427

It was unlikely that the Vandals wouldagree to fight alongside the Goths, who hadonly the decade before so ravaged the

Vandals themselves. However, in the case ofBoniface, the recruiting of Vandals was anobvious measure to offset the opposition’suse of Goths. Furthermore, following theattack of the Goths in 416–418, it is likelythat the opportunity to fight the Gothswould be taken by at least some of theVandals. It would appear that at least someagreed to join the Roman army and fight forBoniface against Sigisvult and his Goths.They would have represented thoseindividuals who were unhappy at the totaldominance of Gaiseric in Spain.

Yet Gaiseric retained command of themajority of the Vandals and was still intenton capturing more territory in Spain. In 428they captured, and this time held, Hispalis.50

They now had large parts of the south ofSpain under their control.51

The Vandals Cross to Africa

Despite his successes in Spain, it was clearto Gaiseric that his people would alwayslive in fear of a Roman and Suevic attack aslong as they remained in Spain.Furthermore, following his acquisition ofships, there was now within his reach aRoman province that was untouched by warand of vital importance to the Romans.With the Roman fleets in use elsewhere, andso unable to stop him, in 429 Gaisericgathered his people together and preparedto lead them in a wholesale migrationacross the Straits of Gibraltar to Tingitania.

It is usually accepted that Gaiseric led thewhole of the Vandals and Alans to Africa.However, it is possible that some of themhad no desire to fight yet another long warwith the Romans and instead wished toremain in Spain. These may have nowseparated from the main body of theVandals under the leadership of an

individual named Andevotus.52 It should benoted that Andevotus is otherwise unknownand may not have been associated with theVandals, instead being an (Ostro)Goth.53

With his heart set on a move to Africa,Gaiseric received disturbing news.Hermenegarius, described by Hydatius as‘king of the Sueves’, although more likelyeither a son of Hermeric or an unrelatednoble, was plundering Lusitania.54 Gaisericdid not have enough ships to ferry theVandals to Africa in one crossing: it wouldtake many journeys before they were allsafe in Africa.

Gaiseric realized that to attempt acrossing now would leave those Vandals stillin Spain awaiting the return of shipsvulnerable to attack by the Sueves.Gathering his forces, he led his army inpursuit of the Sueves, finally catching themat Emerita. Defeated in battle,

Hermenegarius fled, drowning in the RiverAna.55 Returning south, Gaiseric finally ledhis people across the Straits into Africa.

There has been much debate concerningthe dating of the crossing to Africa andregarding the claim by Procopius andJordanes that Boniface invited the Vandalsin return for aid against his Romanenemies.56 The dating of the crossing isinsecure. However, on this occasion it ispossible that Hydatius, living in Spain, iscloser to the mark, especially as he may bereferring to an unknown source when hedates the crossing specifically to May of429.57 Furthermore, 429 allows time for allof the other events chronicled to happenwithout undue speed of action beingrequired.58 Consequently, it will be assumedthat it was in May 429 that the Vandalscrossed to Africa from Spain.

The claim that Boniface was responsible

for inviting the Vandals into Africa is alsoextremely unlikely.59 Although in revoltagainst the government in Ravenna, he willhave suspected that it was not Placidiaherself that was responsible but Felix:Boniface’s loyalty had been rewarded in thepast and his faithful service would expectcontinued loyalty from Placidia. Such aninvitation would have been seen as theultimate treachery in Ravenna. However,the strongest argument against Bonifaceinviting the Vandals into Africa is thecomplete silence of contemporaries, who inreality would have made the most violentcomplaints had this been true.60

Furthermore, as an experiencedcommander, Boniface will also have knownthe perils associated with inviting such alarge body of barbarian troops into arelatively undefended province, especiallywithout military supervision. The scenes of

his battles against Felix’s commanders in theprovince of Africa were a long way from theVandals’ crossing point. Unsupervised, theVandals would almost certainly begin todevastate the country around them in thehope of extorting large subsidies and landfor their families. As a result of thesedeliberations, it is possible to theorize thatboth Procopius and Jordanes knew ofBoniface’s employment of small numbers ofVandals in the civil war and so assumed thatthe price for their use was the invitation tocross into Africa.61 As a final point, at thistime Boniface’s friends at court were by nowenlisted to help clear him from theaccusations that had started the war. Itwould be foolish of Boniface to risk his hopeof clearing his name by inviting the Vandalsinto Africa.

It has also been suggested that Aetius wasresponsible for the suggestion that the

Vandals cross to Africa after the loss of theunnamed battle alongside the Sueves inSpain.62 This is extremely unlikely, as at thispoint he was not in a position either totravel to the south of Spain, being embroiledin events in Gaul and Ravenna, or tonegotiate with the Vandals, since his officewas that of magister militum per Gallias. Inthis context it should be noted that theconcept of reaching Africa had proved a lureto the Gothic leader Alaric shortly before hisdeath in 410, and his successor Wallia hadalso contemplated the crossing in 415:63

that Gaiseric should consider it with hisnewly acquired fleet is only natural.

In May–June 429 Gaiseric used hisavailable ships to transport his peoplesacross the Straits of Gibraltar. The onlysource for the number of people who crossedis Victor of Vita. He notes that, in an effortto cause fear in Africa, Geiseric ordered a

count of his people, ‘even those who hadcome from the womb into the light that veryday’.64 This produced a figure of 80,000men, women and children. Procopius laternoted the claim that there were 80,0000Vandals in the crossing to Africa, but thatthe actual number was 50,000.65 Thissuggests a viable fighting force of no morethan around 20,000 men. Althoughsometimes questioned by modern historians,it is interesting to observe that Victorhimself notes that ‘news of this [number of80,000] had spread widely’, and that he wasinforming people of the true nature of thecrossing.66 It would appear that the rumourhad spread that the Vandals had crossedwith 80,000 fighting men.

Landing in Mauretania Tingitana,Gaiseric might have expected to face thelocal army in battle, but since the comesTingitana had a maximum of 5,000–7,000

men, of whom at the most 1,500 would havebeen capable of facing Gaiseric’s battle-hardened veterans, it is unsurprising thatthe local commander made no move to stopthe overwhelming might of the Vandals.67

With the Vandals now at large south of theMediterranean and with the importantprovince of Africa under direct threat,Boniface’s position was looking extremelyinsecure.

Chapter 7

Magister MilitumPraesentalis1

FELIX, BONIFACE AND AETIUSStilicho (who controlled the West between395 and 408) had used the term comes etmagister utriusque militum praesentalis andparens principum to denote his power in theWest up to his death in 408.2 Following hislead, Constantius III had combined the titlescomes et magister utriusque militumpraesentalis and patricius (patrician) to

demonstrate his position of dominance inthe West.3

In 425, after the defeat of John, Felix hadprobably been given the title of comes etmagister utriusque militum praesentalis andpatricius in emulation of Constantius III.4 Intheory he was now in the same position asStilicho and Constantius: effective ruler ofthe West. Yet this was not so, as, unlikeStilicho or Constantius, Felix had no knownbacking from the aristocracy of the Westand had two challengers to his authority.The first was Boniface, who had supportedGalla Placidia during her time of need, andthe other was the latecomer Aetius.

Due to Felix’s (successful) attempt to haveBoniface disgraced, it is clear that early inValentinian’s reign Felix understandablyperceived Boniface as the greater threat.This is supported by the fact that during thisearly period it would actually have been

easier for Felix to invent a claim that Aetiuswas planning on rebelling, since his loyaltyto Valentinian would have been a cause forconcern. That this was not attemptedimplies that Aetius was too weak politicallyand militarily – especially once the Hunshad been sent home – to be seen as a threat,although it is possible that even at this earlydate he had a reputation for being a man ofhis word and so unlikely to rebel.Furthermore, unlike Aetius, Boniface hadbeen appointed by Honorius and supportedby Theodosius II. He had no reason tosupport Felix as a benefactor. It is likelythat Felix would have liked to removeBoniface and replace him with one of hisown supporters. Recent history had shownthat the commander in Africa wielded greatpower, as he could cut the supply of grain toRome and Italy. Felix would not want thisposition occupied by a political opponent.

Yet although the plan to disgrace Bonifacehad apparently succeeded, the situation wasabout to be turned on its head.

The year 429 began with two verydifferent reports. Aetius returned toRavenna bringing news of victories in Gauland what looked like the beginnings of acomplete Roman recovery in the north west.On the other hand, the Vandals wereravaging the western Mediterranean andthe war with Boniface looked like it wouldlast indefinitely. However, at some pointduring the course of the war Placidia haddecided that it was not in character forBoniface to attempt to establish his ownempire, especially as his loyalty hadpreviously been faultless. As a result, shesent some of Boniface’s friends to Africa toopen talks with him.5 At this point theenvoys were shown the evidence, andespecially the letter telling Boniface not to

return to Rome if so ordered.6 When sheheard this Placidia ordered a halt tohostilities and under the guidance of anegotiator from Rome by the name ofDarius, who was a senator, Sigisvult andBoniface concluded a peace treaty.7Boniface was re-instated in favour at thecourt.8 With peace declared, either in late429 or early in 430 Sigisvult returned toItaly, and Celer, an individual who hadpreviously been vicarius of Africa, wasappointed Proconsul of Africa.9

This was none too soon, as it will havebeen in mid–late summer 429 thatmessengers arrived in Carthage with thenews that the Vandals had crossed theStraits of Hercules and landed in Tingitania.After Sigisvult had returned to Ravenna,probably early in 430, Boniface began tomartial his forces for a campaign againstthe Vandals. Furthermore, if in Italy they

had not heard before, Sigisvult returned toRavenna with the disastrous news that theVandals were in Africa and heading towardsCarthage. Alarmed at the news, messengerswere sent from Ravenna to Constantinopletelling of the Vandal invasion and askingfor help.10 Darius headed west in an attemptto negotiate with the Vandals.11

comes et magister utriusque militiaeThe fact that Felix had used his influenceand power to disgrace Boniface, who up tothat point had been Placidia’s loyalsupporter, no doubt turned Placidia againstFelix. Recognizing that Felix’s position asthe only comes et magister utriusque militiaegave him almost unlimited power, Placidiadecided to set up a rival to counterbalancehis presence. This could not be Boniface:politically, appointing him as comes etmagister utriusque militiae would be

unacceptable, since it was clear that he andFelix were now enemies. Such a move wouldbe interpreted – correctly – by Felix asspecifically aimed at himself. Although hisreaction would be unknown, it wouldalmost certainly result in another civil war.

However, appointing Aetius was apossibility. He was certainly in oppositionto Felix. In fact, Felix may have recognizedthat Aetius was quickly becoming a threat,with his power-base in Gaul. As a result,Felix may have attempted to undermineAetius’ popularity in Gaul by appointing aGaul named Theodosius, who is otherwiseunknown, as praefectus praetorio Italiae etAfricae (Praetorian Prefect of Italy andAfrica).12 Felix may have hoped thatfostering clients in Gaul would help tocounterbalance Aetius’ popularity there. Onthe other hand, it is possible that theappointment was made by Valentinian and

Placidia and was simply an appointment bythe new regime of an individual known tobe loyal to Valentinian.

Although the appointment of Theodosiushas sometimes been interpreted as a part ofAetius’ political manoeuvring, this is almostcertainly false. Theodosius was promoted tothe post prior to February 430, when Aetiuswas still only magister militum per Gallias andso unable to make such high-levelappointments.13 Even if Aetius hadsuggested the appointment, Felix wouldnaturally have blocked such an obviousattempt by Aetius to curry favour in Gaul.The political attempt to undermine Aetiusensured that there would be no co-operationbetween him and Felix.

The appointment of Aetius as magistermilitum praesentalis could be justified: hismilitary achievements in Gaul had gone along way to recovering Rome’s authority in

the area. If his skills could be employed inlarger areas of the West, it would help tosecure Rome’s recovery. However, asmagister militum per Gallias he did not havethe authority to interfere in Spain andpossibly at a later date Britain. For that heneeded a post that allowed him to movefreely between prefectures. As a result, onhis return from Gaul Aetius was given thepost of comes et magister utriusque militiae,although this would have been related to thejunior post of magister equitum: Placidia wasnot strong enough to oust Felix, whoretained the more senior post of magisterpeditum.14 It is possible that in her desire toraise Aetius to be magister militumpraesentalis Placidia was trying to emulatethe situation in the East. Since the time ofTheodosius I there had been five nominallyequal magistri.15 Unfortunately, this wasagainst all of the traditions of the more

conservative West, and any attempt toenforce such a reform would doubtless helpto cement opposition to her plans. This waseven more the case since she was not theruling emperor.16 Although as magisterpeditum Felix still retained seniority, therecan be little doubt that Aetius’ promotionwas against his wishes. Placidia haddecidedly raised the stakes by making Aetiusa real rival to Felix, rather than just apotential one.17

430*Aetius’ appointment could not come toosoon. The west was still in dire straits withenemies both internal and external roamingat will. Probably his first task in the newyear was to counter a large band ofVisigoths led by an individual namedAnaolsus who were wandering in Romanterritory near to Arles. It is unknown

whether this attack was ordered byTheoderic or was simply one of his noblesacting independently. If it was Anaolsusacting on his own initiative, then given therecent defeat at the hands of Aetius this wasa dangerous move and liable to incur thedispleasure of Theoderic, since it couldeasily be interpreted in Ravenna asTheoderic re-opening the earlier conflict. Itis more likely that Theoderic had instigatedthis manoeuvre in order to test the strengthand readiness of the empire: by thecampaign season of 430 the news that theVandals had invaded Africa had doubtlessspread across the western Mediterranean.By employing Anaolsus, if the campaignwent badly Theoderic could claim thatAnaolsus was acting unilaterally and soavoid further conflict. If it went well,Theoderic could expand the attack using‘royal’ forces. In the event, Theoderic did

the right thing in distancing himself fromAnaolsus’ attack. Leading the Gallic army,Aetius attacked Anaolsus and annihilated hisforces, Anaolsus himself being captured.18

Map 6. Aetius’ Campaigns in Gaul, Raetia and Italy

Shortly after defeating Anaolsus Aetiusturned the army around and headed backeast, where he defeated a force of Iuthungi(Alamanni) in Raetia.19 It would appear

that it was during this campaign thatFlavius Merobaudes served under Aetius,according to an inscription on the base of astatue to Merobaudes in Trajan’s forum.20

The two victories ensured that Aetius’reputation as a general continued to grow.

The speed of the two victoriesdemonstrates one outstanding aspect ofAetius’ generalship. In an era wheremanoeuvre and blockade were the order ofthe day, Aetius relied on the more directtactics of either ambush or direct battle. Thereason for this is simple. He had, in effect,been trained by the Huns and not by theRomans. The Huns’ use of ambush anddirect force is mirrored in Aetius’ tacticsthroughout his career.

It may have been during his time inRaetia that Aetius heard the sad news thatOctar, king of the Huns, had died.21 He hadbeen leading a raid on the Burgundians –

probably those settled in Gaul in 413 – andhad been killed in battle.22 This left Rua asthe single leader of the Huns north of theDanube. Aetius had lost one of his mostloyal supporters. Undeterred, he returned tothe court at Ravenna, where the politicalstakes were to be raised in dramatic fashion.

The Fall of FelixAs is usual in these cases, the sources giveonly brief outlines and place differentemphases upon the course of events. Whatfollows is an attempt to analyze one of themajor political events of Aetius’ career,based upon two divergent sources, Prosperand Hydatius. In order to understand theproblems faced at this juncture, it is usefulto look at both. Prosper states that: ‘Aetiuskilled Felix and his wife Padusia and thedeacon Grunitus, sensing that they wereplotting against him.’23 On the other hand,

Hydatius claims that: ‘Felix, who was calledPatrician, was killed at Ravenna by amutiny of the troops.’24

At first glance it would appear that thetwo sources are contradictory and givealternative views of events. However,Prosper does not state how Felix was killed,and Hydatius does not give a reason for the‘mutiny’. Close analysis allows for the twoto be seen as complementary, one givingthe reason for Felix’s death, the other themanner in which it was carried out.Although uncertainty must remain, whatfollows is a rational description of theevents surrounding Felix’s death.

Returning with the troops to Ravenna,Aetius discovered that Felix was presentwith his wife Padusia. Also with them wasthe deacon Grunitus. Aetius now claimedthat Felix was plotting against him, just ashe had plotted against Boniface, and was

planning to have him killed. Whether theclaim was made on Aetius’ initiative isunknown. The troops appear to have beenmore loyal to Aetius, a Western general whowas actively defeating the enemies of theWest, rather than Felix, an easterninterloper who does not appear to havestrayed far from court.25 The troops dulydecided that their loyalty to Aetius wasparamount and rebelled – mutinied –against Felix. They attacked and killed himand his party, including Padusia andGrunitus.

It is also possible that Placidia had a handin these events. Boniface had been loyal toher throughout his career and she had beenmade to look extremely foolish when shehad been tricked into declaring him a traitorand waging war against him. It was nowclear to her that Felix was not going tosimply serve Valentinian in the interests of

the empire, but was intent on becoming thesole military officer of any standing. Shemay have approached Aetius in order tohave Felix removed, but there is no evidencefor this in the sources, and the fact thatAetius had only recently been opposed toValentinian suggests that Placidia may nothave trusted him fully. As a result the theoryremains interesting but unproven andimprobable.

The hypothesis that Aetius acted on hisown and that the troops supported him hasthe benefit of uniting the two sources aswell as giving a reasonable sequence ofevents, at the end of which Aetius could beaccused of ‘killing’ Felix and his wife. Aetiuswas now the sole comes et magister utriusquemilitiae. The man who had been the rebel of425 had risen to be the supreme militarycommander of the west.

The question remains as to whether Felix

was really plotting to overthrow Aetius orwhether Aetius invented the plot as a meansof eliminating one of his two major rivals topower. It was only the year before thatFelix’s machinations against Boniface hadcome to light, no doubt to the anger ofPlacidia. As a result it is almost certain thatFelix would not begin a new plot to removeAetius, since Placidia and the rest of thecivilian government would be alert to such amove and so be in strong opposition to themeasures. Yet there remains the possibilitythat, prior to the plot against Bonifacebeing uncovered, Felix had set in motionplans to remove Aetius and that Aetiusfound out about this in either 429 or earlyin 430.

Yet on reflection it is more plausible thatAetius viewed his inferior status to Felix asundeserved and so used Felix’s reputationagainst him. By accusing Felix of a plot in

front of the troops, who were no doubtheavily sprinkled with his supporters, Aetiuscould leave it to the troops to decide thetruth of the matter. Given that Felix hadearlier plotted to overthrow Boniface –another popular Western general – thematter would be in little doubt. In duecourse, the troops faithfully killed Felix andPadusia, removing one of the two barriersto Aetius’ complete control.

AfricaIn Africa, the Vandals were slowlyadvancing along the northern coast,hampered by the slow pace of the women,children, elderly and the baggage animals.Although the actual route of their advance isunknown, it is likely that it followed themain routes east towards Carthage.Although Victor of Vita accuses the Vandalsof the mass destruction of cities andbuildings, it is clear from other evidence

that he exaggerates their destructive impact,since little if any literary or archaeologicalevidence survives that supports his view.26

Possibly the only direct evidence for theVandals’ march is an inscription found atAltava, dating to August 429, which includesthe mention of the deceased being woundedby a ‘barbarian’: 27

Map 7. The Vandals in Africa

- - - - - -

1 KALSEMANNOPROCCCXC

3 GLADIOP*ABARBAROS - - - discessit - - -]Kal(endas)se(pte)m[bres]Anno pro(uinciae)cccxcGladio p(ercessus) abarbaros

Although the attribution is insecure, it ispossible that these ‘barbarians’ were theVandals on their long journey across northAfrica.28

At an unknown date either shortly beforeor shortly after the ‘attack’ at Altava,Darius, the man who had negotiated a peacebetween Boniface and Sigisvult, convincedthe Vandals to accept a truce and halt their

advance.29 In the meantime, freed from theburden of fighting a civil war, Bonifacegathered his forces ready to oppose anyfurther advances by the Vandals. When theVandals resumed their march east early in430, no doubt much to the disappointmentof Darius, Boniface led his men out and metthe Vandals in battle somewhere to the westof Hippo Regius.

The size and deployment of the opposingforces are unknown. According to Victor ofVita, the Vandals at the crossing into Africawere organized into eighty thusundifaths,each of 1,000 people. However, he alsostates that the organization was inaccurate,being an attempt to convince onlookers thatthe forces crossing to Africa were largerthan they actually were.30 Therefore, thewhole population that crossed to Africanumbered substantially less than 80,000,perhaps in the region of 70,000, possibly

even lower. At the most, this should havegiven the Vandals an army of around20,000 fighting men.31

Opposing the Vandals were the troopsunder Boniface. According to the NotitiaDignitatum, the commander in Africa shouldhave had thirty-one comitatenses (field) unitsand twenty-two limitanei (garrison) unitsstationed in Tripolitania and Numidia. Thisgives a total of approximately 35,000 men,although the actual strength may have beenmuch lower.32 However, these troops wereused to dealing with minor border raids andthe supervision of the movement of nomadictribes through the provinces. These menwere not of the same quality as the Vandaland Alan warriors who had been fightingacross western Europe for the previoustwenty years. Furthermore, it is likely thatGaiseric was a far better commander oftroops than Boniface.33

Gaiseric also had under his command aforce of Goths.34 Unfortunately, the numberof Goths is completely unknown, as is theirorigin. Most likely is that they were a groupof Goths who had joined the Vandals earlier,in Spain. It is also claimed that they werethe entourage of Boniface’s wife Pelagia,who is described as a ‘Gothic princess’ byboth Merobaudes and Sidonius Apollinaris.35

As such, upon her marriage she wasprobably followed by a small band of loyalretainers. These may have rebelled andjoined Gaiseric, for an unknown reason.However, the Goths could also be acontingent left behind by Sigisvult when hereturned to Italy to help in the defence ofAfrica and who rebelled and joined theVandals. The claim that they were followersof Sanoeces, who was most likely a Hun, hasalso been proposed, but this can be deemedthe least likely of the four hypotheses.36

Despite Boniface’ undoubted skills as ageneral, his men were defeated, and thesurvivors – including Boniface – retired tothe safety of Hippo.37 The victoriousVandals followed and in May or June 430Boniface was laid under siege in the city.38

The siege soon became a desperate affair.Thanks to their ships, the Vandals were ableto cut completely all supply lines into thecity.39 As the siege lengthened the priests inthe city, including (Saint) Augustine, heldprayers pleading for relief from the siege.40

However, in the third month of the siegeAugustine died, probably of a fever, on 28August 430.41 With their great religiousleader dead, the citizens of Hippo began tolose all hope of salvation. Despite this,Boniface himself continued to lead the braveresistance to the siege.

However, the Vandals themselves alsobegan to suffer. This was not an army intent

upon sacking the city before retiring withthe booty. The Vandals besieging the cityincluded very large numbers of the old,women and children, non-combatants whoweakened the attackers by using anysurplus supplies that would have allowedthe besiegers to last longer than thebesieged. Soon, the Vandals began to feelthe effects of the siege as much as thecitizens of Hippo. Despite these problems,they continued to press the siege. Stretchedon all fronts, and unsure of events in Africa,the West was unable to send troops to helpBoniface. Instead, they relied on theirappeals to the East to supply the troopsneeded in Africa.

SpainAlthough the Romans had helped the Suevesto retain their independence from theVandals in 420, by 430 they, under theirking Hermeric, had reverted to type and

were pillaging the central areas ofGallaecia.42 Although there do not appear tohave been Roman troops in the area, therewas still strong resistance from the nativeinhabitants, especially from ‘people[plebem] who remained in possession of themore secure forts’. Due to this fierceresistance, Hermeric appears to have calledoff the raid, instead renewing the peacetreaty and returning the captives he hadtaken.43

431Almost certainly due to the confusion causedby the news that Felix had been killed, andaugmented by the news that the Vandalswere at large in Africa, warfare andrebellion erupted again in 431. The firstreports that arrived in Ravenna were that atleast some of the peoples of Noricum –probably the Vandals settled there by

Stilicho in 400–401 – had rebelled. Situatedguarding the northern approaches to Italy,these two provinces (Noricum Ripense andNoricum Mediterraneum) were of vitalimportance to the defence of Italy, and soneeded to be pacified as quickly as possible.Aetius wasted no time. He led the praesentalarmy north from Italy and quickly crushedthe rebellion before it could becomewidespread.44

Following this victory, Aetius prepared fora campaign against the Franks underClodio, who had invaded Roman Gaul andcaptured Tournai and Cambrai.45 It isunclear whether these were the same Franksthat had been forced to retreat in 428 orwhether this was a different group.46 Sincethe earlier canton(s) had been given noticethat the West was recovering after the civilwar, the latter is more likely. However,there was not enough time left in the

campaign season to allow for the campaignto be concluded. As a result, Aetius crossedthe Alps into Gaul and prepared his forcesfor a campaign against the Franks early in432.

Before he left for Gaul, as a reward fordefeating so many enemies in such a shortspace of time, Aetius was nominated for theconsulship of 432. The nomination impliesthat Placidia was either not too distressedby the recent death of Felix or that thepolitical strength of Aetius was such that shehad no choice but to accept the nomination.It is more likely that it was a combination ofthe two. What is more surprising is that thenomination was accepted by the East, sinceFelix would appear to have been an Easternnomination – or at least accepted byTheodosius. The East’s nominee for the yearwas Valerius, brother of the EmpressEudoxia.

Very late in the year an embassy led byBishop Hydatius of Aquae Flaviae arrivedfrom Gallaecia in Spain and informed Aetiusthat, once again, the Sueves under Hermerichad broken their treaty and wereplundering the area.47 It is also possible thatHydatius informed Aetius that an individualnamed Vetto, who is otherwise unknown butwho may have been an envoy sent by theGoths, had arrived in Gallaecia for talkswith the Sueves.48 Unfortunately forHydatius, Aetius was preoccupied with theupcoming campaign against the Franks. It isprobable that Aetius felt that the news of asuccessful campaign in Gaul would help todampen the enthusiasm of the Sueves forcontinuing their depredations and possiblydeter them from making an alliance withthe Goths. In any case, Aetius could notmove south into Spain until after the Frankshad been defeated. As a result, the bishop

was forced to wait until the new year for asatisfactory response.

Interestingly, although by 431 Britain isusually seen as being isolated from the restof the empire, Prosper records that a bishopnamed Palladius, ‘having been ordained byPope Celestine, was the first bishop sent tothe Scots believing in Christ’.49 It wouldappear that, even at this late date, some atleast amongst the clergy believed that thefate of Britain was as yet undecided, andthat they were determined to ensure thecontinuation of Christianity in the farthestreaches of the empire.

AfricaAfter fourteen months of siege, hunger andthe inevitable diseases were ravaging boththe city inhabitants of Hippo and theVandals outside the city walls.50 However,the Vandals appear, like most German

tribesmen, to have been poor in the art ofsiege warfare. Running out of provisionsthemselves, and with disease spreadingamongst their dependents, in July or Augustthey raised the siege.51 Shortly after therewas an unexpected twist. Unannounced, theEastern magister utriusque militiae Aspararrived with reinforcements from both Eastand West.52 Aspar’s arrival is evidence ofdetailed contact between East and Westconcerning the condition of Africa, possiblyunder Aetius’ direction, and illustrates thatthe two halves of the empire still sawthemselves as being united in their rule.53

432In early 432 Boniface and Aspar led theirtroops to meet the Vandals. Somewhere tothe west of Hippo Regius the two sides metin battle. The Vandals were againvictorious, forcing the Romans to retreat.54

It is after this defeat that the future emperorMarcian was captured by Gaiseric.55

According to later legend, Gaisericwitnessed an omen that Marcian wasdestined to be emperor and as aconsequence was released after havingpromised never to attack the Vandals.56

Unlike the previous battle, on thisoccasion Boniface, followed by Aspar, didnot retire to Hippo, probably as he did notwant to experience being placed under siegeby the Vandals again. Unfortunately, thedecision left Hippo undefended, and the citywas taken and sacked by the victoriousVandals.57 No doubt this was particularlysavage due to the suffering caused amongstthe Vandals by its earlier refusal tosurrender. The Vandals then went on toattack the whole of the Prefecture exceptCirta and Carthage.

The FranksWhilst Boniface was being forced to retreatin Africa, early in 432 Merobaudes was inGaul delivering a panegyric to Aetius on theoccasion of his first consulship, which hasunfortunately not survived.58 Shortly after,Aetius once more led his troops north to theRhine. Success appears to have been rapid,and after retaking the lost cities of Tournaiand Cambrai a treaty with Clodio wasagreed.59 With the threat from the Franksovercome, Aetius turned his mind to thematter of the Sueves in Spain.

It is very likely that Aetius knew of theattempt by the Goths to form an alliancewith the Sueves. It is also virtually certainthat he was quickly made aware that theovertures of the Goths had been rebuffed:Vetto ‘returned to the Goths having achievednothing’.60 No action was yet neededagainst the Goths.

Unexpectedly, neither did Aetius lead hisforces into Spain to engage in battle withthe Sueves. Instead, he sent comes (count)Censorius as an envoy to the Sueves, and onthe journey Censorius was accompanied byBishop Hydatius. The mission was a successand the Sueves halted their attacks.61

Although Aetius may have wanted to leadthe army to face the Sueves, eventselsewhere halted any planned campaign.

The removal of Felix as comes et magisterutriusque militiae in 430 would have been asurprise to Placidia. Having learned in 429that her loyal supporter Boniface wasinnocent of the claims laid against him,there is little doubt that she would havewanted him as the senior military official towork alongside her. Aetius’ actions hadremoved the greatest obstacle to her wish.Moreover, Aetius’ assumption of theconsulship for 432 was most likely against

her wishes and forced upon her by hisstrong position in Italy. It is possible thatAetius becoming consul was the final strawfor Placidia and made her decide that hemust be removed from power before he hadestablished an unassailable position.

Aetius’ long absence on campaign gavePlacidia the chance she needed. In early 432she sent messengers to Boniface in Africaordering him to return to Italy.62 Arrivingshortly after his defeat by the Vandals, itwill have been a relief for Boniface toreceive the order. He took ship for Italy,probably accompanied by a sizeable force ofloyal troops, or at least his bucellarii. Asparremained in Africa commanding theremnants of the Western force, as well asthe troops sent by Constantinople.63

The Battle of RiminiBoniface landed in Italy, probably at Portus,

and travelled the short distance to Rome.Upon his arrival he was endowed with thetitle of comes et magister utriusque militiae.64

Marcellinus claims that at the same time hewas invested with the title of patricius.65

When combined with the title of magistermilitum, this usually denoted the individualwith the greatest military and politicalpower in the West.66 Boniface hadsupported Placidia throughout her ‘exile’ inConstantinople due to the quarrel with herbrother Honorius. He had also stood by herwhen John had usurped the throne in 424.There can be little doubt that Placidiawanted her most loyal supporter to be incommand in Italy. The fact that Placidiaarranged for the promotion to happen inRome, rather than waiting for Boniface totravel to Ravenna, implies that there was aneed for haste. This is confirmed byHydatius, who specifically states that

Boniface was recalled and that Aetius wasthen ‘deposed’ (depulso).67 Aetius was to beousted from his command and from court.

Aetius was most likely preparing for thecampaign against the Sueves in Spain whenthe news arrived that Boniface had landedin Italy and promptly been invested withthe above titles. It is possible that Boniface’sson-in-law Sebastian (Sebastianus) wasmade magister equitum, a post junior to thatof Boniface. No doubt Aetius feared for hissafety and decided that the best form ofdefence was attack. This was the reason hesent Censorius as an ambassador to theSueves and led his own troops across theAlps and into Italy.

In the meantime, Boniface gathered all ofthe troops that he could find in Italy andprepared to meet Aetius in battle. That hewas able to meet Aetius on at least equalterms indicates that Boniface was held in

high esteem by the troops. Although thearmy that had been serving Aetius remainedloyal to him, others in the West appear tohave preferred Boniface, the long-standingsupporter of Placidia and Valentinian,rather than an ex-rebel, to be in control ofthe army.

The two forces met in the proximity ofRimini.68 It is extremely frustrating thatthere is no detailed account of the battlethat followed. Instead, what littleinformation can be gleaned comes from theChronicles.69 It would appear that Boniface,supported by his son-in-law Sebastian, wascompletely victorious and Aetius was forcedto surrender. It is even possible that Aetiusand Boniface met in personal combat on thefield, with Aetius wounding Boniface with a‘long spear’, although this is uncertain.70

Following the defeat, Aetius agreed torelinquish power and to retire to his estates

in Italy.71

Unfortunately, Boniface had beenwounded in the battle (whether by Aetius oranother individual is unknown), andbetween a ‘few days’ and three months laterhe either died directly from or bycomplications caused by his wounds, orfrom an illness.72 It was extremelyunfortunate for the empire that Bonifaceand Aetius had been opponents. Bonifacewas later praised for his bravery andhonesty, and it is possible that an allianceof the two men may have resulted in a verydifferent history for the Western Empire.73

It is surprising to note that Aetius, whohad now twice been in opposition toPlacidia (425 and 432), was allowed toretire to his own estates after losing thebattle rather than being either executed orexiled.74 There are at least two possiblereasons for this. One is that Aetius had very

powerful supporters who were prepared tostand by him. Rather than alienate thesemen, Placidia and Boniface agreed thatAetius should be allowed simply to retire. Asecond is that a large part of the army wasstill loyal to Aetius. By allowing Aetius toretire, Placidia, and especially Boniface,may have hoped to allow Aetius’ forces tointegrate more easily with the victoriousarmy under Boniface.

Whichever it was, one major factor isconspicuous: it was assumed that Aetiuswould remain true to his word to retire. Thisimplies that both Placidia and Bonifaceaccepted an oath that Aetius would notcontinue to fight. Furthermore, it appearsthat Aetius accepted his defeat graciouslyand also accepted Boniface’s word that hewould be safe. It would appear that Aetius,despite the defeat, did not instantly fear forhis life and so either flee into exile or

commit suicide. The fact that these twoopponents seemed to trust each other in anyway is quite remarkable.

Not long after the battle, the situationchanged. With the death of Boniface his son-in-law Sebastian ‘inherited’ the post ofcomes et magister utriusque militiae.75

Unfortunately, it would appear that he wasunwilling to allow Aetius to remain at largein Italy. Sebastian’s supporters – or possiblyfollowers of Boniface angry at his death –made a sudden attack on Aetius’ home in anattempt to kill him.76 Aetius fled to Rome,possibly in an attempt to seek support.When this was not forthcoming, at least onthe scale needed to defend himself, heescaped and travelled, via Dalmatia andPannonia, to the lands of the Huns (see Map6).77

433

Aetius arrived at the court of the Hunnicking Rua.78 His long-standing friend againagreed to help him, although upon whatterms are unclear. It is possible that Aetiusagreed to recognize Hun control of territorythat they were already occupying inPannonia, or that he took with him a sum ofgold that, along with his friendship,sufficed, or that he agreed to an allianceand, less likely, to the payment of subsidies.It is possible that it was a combination of allthree of these factors. Unfortunately, thereare no details in any of our sources, and allsuggestions about the terms agreed arespeculation, not fact.79

Following the agreement, Aetius returnedto the West.80 Although it is often assumedthat he was accompanied by a large force ofHuns, this is nowhere specifically stated inthe sources and it is also possible that hewas simply accompanied by an embassy

that threatened war if he was not restoredto his former position. The threat of anattack by the Huns may have been enoughto intimidate Placidia into accepting Aetius’return.81 Aetius was restored to his previousposition as comes et magister utriusquemilitiae without having to fight a battle,although a cryptic mention in the GallicChronicle of 452 suggests that Sebastianwas preparing to fight Aetius by summoningVisigoths to his aid.82

Yet there is one further factor in Aetius’quick return to power. We have only a fewglimpses into the character of Sebastian,and these come from later in his life.Although ‘an able advisor and an activesoldier’, he later allowed his men to engagein ‘piratical’ activities.83 It is possible thathis conduct during his brief role as seniorgeneral resulted in Sebastian losing popularsupport very quickly in Rome and Ravenna,

so that when the news arrived that Aetiuswas being supported by the Huns and wason the point of return, the army refused tosupport Sebastian, who was thus in noposition to face Aetius. Althoughspeculation, this would explain Aetius’ rapidreturn to power.

Aetius quickly re-established himself in thecourt at Ravenna. One of his first acts wasto secure the dismissal of Sebastian, whosought refuge in Constantinople.84 He wasalso now in a position to continue thediplomatic activity that he had begun priorto Boniface’s recall from Africa. At anunknown date in 433 Censurius returnedfrom his embassy to the Sueves and Aetiuswas able to ratify a new peace treaty,including an exchange of hostages betweenthe Sueves and the Gallaecians.85 WhenCensurius returned it would appear that hewas accompanied by bishop Symphosius,

who is otherwise unknown, who attemptedto reach an agreement with Aetius. Thenature of the discussions is unclear, but it ismost likely to have been an attempt byHermeric, king of the Sueves, to gain amilitary post in the higher hierarchy of theempire. Unfortunately for Hermeric, thepetition failed.86

For Aetius, the disaster of losing the Battleof Rimini had been completely reversed.There was now no military figure of anystanding capable of opposing him in theWest. In 424 he had been a rebel againstValentinian III and Galla Placidia. By 433he was in a position to achieve totaldominance of the Western Roman Empire,but on both of these occasions he hadneeded the support of the Huns to retain hispower.

Aetius’ return and total dominance ofpolitical and military affairs had a negative

aspect for at least two people. One was theyoung Emperor of the West. In 433Valentinian ‘came of age’ – being fourteen –but there was little prospect of his learninghow to function as emperor on his own.87

The other was Valentinian’s motherPlacidia. She had raised Boniface to powerin opposition to Aetius, but in the end Aetiushad been triumphant. With her loyalsupporter Boniface dead, Placidia doubtlesshad serious concerns for the future,especially in the matter of Aetius’ ambitions.* Events in the years 430–439 are extremely confusing andopen to very different interpretations. To help simplify thenarrative, at this point the text will be divided annually inorder to make the analysis easier to follow.

Chapter 8

Undisputed Leadership

Sebastian, Boniface’s son-in-law, had beenremoved from office and had fled into exile.Restored to power, Aetius now made a quitestartling political move: almost immediatelyupon his return he married Pelagia,Boniface’s widow. This was allegedly uponthe advice of Boniface himself, and it gaveAetius control of Boniface’s name, hiswealth and his bucellarii.1 This implies thatdespite their political opposition, there doesnot appear to have been any deep-rooted

animosity between Aetius and Boniface –simply a question of earlier dividedloyalties. This hypothesis has one furthermajor implication: if Boniface had approvedof his son-in-law taking power Aetius wouldcertainly have been either exiled or killed. Itwould seem that Boniface felt that Aetiuswas more fitting to lead than Sebastian. Thefact that Sebastian was so easily removedfrom his position suggests that this lowopinion had quickly come to be shared bythe people of Rome.

Pelagia herself was probably a Goth andhad been brought up as an Arian. Althoughshe converted to Catholic Christianity beforeher marriage to Boniface, it was alleged thatshe had had their daughter baptized by anArian priest.2 Whatever the circumstancessurrounding the new marriage, she appearsto have been loyal to Aetius, even ‘prayingassiduously’ for his return from war in 451.3

Sadly, there is no mention of whathappened to Aetius’ first wife, the daughterof Carpilio. The fact that Boniface allegedlyadvised Pelagia to marry Aetius implies thatshe had died by this time.4

The marriage may have been useful toAetius in another way. Pelagia’s origin as a‘Gothic princess’ may have given him usefulconnections to the Gothic nobility.5 As wellas marrying Pelagia, Aetius also bought allof Boniface’s property.6 This combinationensured that no one else could aspire toreplace Boniface and so challenge Aetius.

434All of these developments took time, and itis likely that Aetius spent the whole of theyear 434 arranging his marriage, adjustingto his new role as sole military leader,settling affairs in Italy, negotiating withPlacidia and Valentinian, appointing trusted

men to positions of power and beginningthe process of linking all of the variousoffices of state to himself.7 He alsodispatched political embassies to a largenumber of people in an attempt to establishpeace in at least some quarters of the West.

In many cases the negotiations failed. Theoutbreak of yet another civil war and therecall of large numbers of troops to Italy,coupled with the ensuing lack of militaryactivity elsewhere, had resulted once morein the various barbarian tribes both withinand outside the empire testing the limits ofRoman power by attempting to expandtheir spheres of influence, nominally bysupporting one of the two sides in the civilwar. The quelling of these invasions anduprisings would take up most of Aetius’ timefor the next few years.

435However, in one area Aetius had an early

success, and one that would potentially givehim the breathing space he needed to beginthe recovery of the West. In 434 he had sentTrygetius to negotiate terms with theVandals. Trygetius was a man of someimportance and had previously been comesrei privatae in 423.8 In the years since 431and Boniface’s campaigns against theVandals, Aspar, the Eastern magister militum,had been conducting a campaign ofcontainment.9 It is a testament to his skillsthat, despite being defeated by the Vandalsin his first battle, the Vandals do not seemto have been able to make any permanentsettlements in Africa. This can be comparedto Gaiseric’s ability to defeat Boniface ontwo separate occasions.

Over the winter months of 434–435Trygetius managed to convince Gaiseric thata peace treaty was preferable to continuingthe war, and on 11 February 435, at Hippo,

a treaty was announced. The Vandals weregiven ‘a part of Africa to live in’.10 As areward for his efforts in Africa, Aspar wasawarded the post of consul for the year 434.Despite being an Eastern general, inrecognition of his services to the West hewas the West’s nomination.11

It is unfortunate that we do not have anyclear indication of the actual terms of thetreaty with the Vandals. Procopius claimsthat in return for land in ‘Libya’, theVandals agreed to pay a yearly tribute andHuneric, son of Gaiseric, was sent as ahostage to Ravenna.12 Yet as Procopiusmakes no other mention of a treaty, it iscertain that he has conflated the treaty of435 with the later treaty of 442 (seeChapter 12).13 Although some of the detailsgiven might be an accurate representationof the treaty of 435, which these were isunknown. It should be noted, however, that

Procopius’ statement that the Vandals weregiven only some areas in Africa, and notAfrica Proconsularis itself, certainly relatesto the earlier treaty.

Alongside Procopius, Prosper states onlythat the Vandals were given ‘a part ofAfrica’.14 As a result, modern interpretationsof the specific territories allocated differ.For example, there is the claim that theVandals were given ‘Numidia and theMauretanias’.15 Another hypothesis is thatthey were given ‘the province of Africa –except the city of Carthage – the province ofByzacena, and a part of Numidia’.16 Afurther suggestion is that they wereallocated territories ‘probably along thecoast of Numidia’.17 They might even havegained control of ‘large areas of Numidiaand Mauretania Sitifensis, including Calamaand Sitifis’.18

These differing suggestions can lead to

confusion, yet it is possible that slightlymore detail can be inferred from a laterentry by Prosper, where he notes that:‘[Gaiseric] persecuted some of our bishops,of whom the most famous were Possidius,Novatus, and Severianus.’19 This entry issupported to some degree by the Novels ofValentinian.20 It has been suggested thatPossidius was bishop of Calama, Novatus ofSitifis, and Severianus of Cera.21 Thisimplies that the Vandals were settled inparts of Mauretania Sitifiensis, Numidia andAfrica Proconsularis, but beyond this theexact nature of their settlement isunknown.22

Map 8. The Vandal Settlement of 435

The references to the treaty also implythat Gaiseric was given an official postwithin the empire, since he appears to havehad the rights of a military commander andRoman official to order ecclesiasticalaffairs.23 The suggestion is possiblysupported by a famous passage in Victor ofVita:

In his cunning duke Geiseric[Geiserici ducis], intending to make

the reputation of his people asource of dread, ordered then andthere that the entire crowd was tobe counted, even those who hadcome from the womb into the lightthat very day.

Victor of Vita, 1.2

Although the majority of interest in thepassage concerns Victor’s claim concerningthe number of Vandals who crossed toAfrica, it is interesting to note that he callsGeiseric Geiserici ducis (dux, duke), not rexor a similar Latin term.24 The most likelyexplanation for this is that in the treaty of435 Geiseric, following the example ofprevious barbarian leaders such as Alaric,had demanded an official post as part of thepeace agreements. He was given the titledux, probably with responsibility for theareas of Africa allocated to the Vandals.

Victor, who hated the Vandals, used his titleanachronistically to highlight thetreacherous nature of Geiseric in later‘invading’ Roman territory as a Romanofficer. If this hypothesis is true, then it isalmost certain that the Vandals were givenland and billets according to traditionalRoman methods.25

The treaty would appear to be similar inmany respects to that accorded to the Gothsin Aquitaine in 419, where the Goths weregiven territory in return for military serviceas foederati. However, there was one majorexception: due to the weaker status of theempire Gaiseric, unlike Theoderic, appearsto have been given a military post.26

However, it should be remembered that thisis only conjecture based on very limitedevidence.

Despite the appalling circumstances, thepeace treaty was a welcome piece of news,

since when the information arrived in ItalyAetius was already campaigning against theBurgundians in Gaul. It would appear thatduring the confusion of Aetius’ return topower the Burgundians had seized theopportunity to raid one of the Belgicprovinces.27 However, it is likely thatanother main cause for the war, as with theother tribes in the west, was the slow spreadof Burgundian families into desertedagricultural areas nominally under thecontrol of the empire.

Whilst in Gaul Aetius received news of amajor rebellion. In ‘Farther Gaul’ anindividual named Tibatto was leading abacaudic revolt of servitia (the ‘servileorder’).28 The origins and nature of therevolt are unknown. Although manydifferent theories are possible, it is mostlikely that it was part of the slowfragmentation of Gaul that had been

occurring since the start of the fifth century.The slow drift of northern Gaul away fromimperial control may have resulted in adesire in those areas to set up their owngovernment to govern their affairs withoutthe need to pay taxes or to consult with theemperor. However, there was little or noaristocratic support for the rebellion, andthe army remained loyal. As a result, theuprising is classed in the sources merely as‘bacaudic’ rather than being seen as a revolt.

Fortunately for Aetius, help was near tohand. Litorius, who was either already acomes rei militaris or who was promoted tothe post specifically for the campaign, wassent to Armorica to put down thebacaudae.29 It is possible that even at thisearly date Litorius was appointed asmagister militum per Gallias, butunfortunately the only source for this periodis Prosper, who simply calls Litorius

comes.30 Taking with him a contingent ofHuns, Litorius headed north.31

With matters in hand, Aetius continuedhis campaign against the Burgundians,probably using only the praesental army ofItaly, estimated at around 28,500 men.32

After a very fast campaign the Burgundianswere crushed and their king, Gundichar,forced to agree to a treaty favourable toRome.33 Unfortunately, later events wouldshow that the campaign did not quell thespirit of rebellion amongst the Burgundians.One possible reason for this is that, due tothe tumultuous state of affairs in the West,Aetius may have rushed the negotiations forthe treaty and so imposed terms that werefar too stringent on the Burgundians.

In the midst of the wars in the West,Aetius had one small piece of good newsconcerning the internal politics of theempire. On 30 July 435 a statue of

Merobaudes was erected in the Forum ofTrajan, built at Aetius’ suggestion(according to Merobaudes as thanks for hisearlier panegyric). The inscription on thebase of the statue has survived:

Dedicata III Kal(endas) Aug(ustas)conss(ulibus) dd(ominis) nn(ostris) /Theodosio XV et Valentiniano IIII //[Fl(avio) Merob]audi v(iro)s(pectabiili) com(iti) s(acri)c(onsistorii) / Fl(avio) Merobaudiaeque forti et docto viro tam facere /laudanda quam aliorum facta laudarepraecipuo / castrensi experientiaclaro facundia vel otiosorum / studiasupergresso cui a crepundiis parvirtutis et elo / quentiae curaingenium ita fortitudini ut doctrinae /natum stilo et gladio pariter exercuitnec in umbra / vel latebris mentisvigorem scholari tantum otio / torpere

passus inter arma litteris militabat / etin Alpibus acuebat eloquium ideo illicessit in praemium / non verbena vilisnec otiosa hedera honor capitis /Heliconius sed imago aere formataquo rari exempli / viros seu in castrisprobatos seu optimos vatum /antiquitas honorabat quod huicquoque cum / augustissimis Romaprincipibus / Theodosio et PlacidoValentiniano rerum dominis / in foroUlpio detulerunt remunerantes in viro/ antiquae nobilitatis novae gloriae velindustriam / militarem vel carmencuius praeconio gloria / triumfalicrevit imperio

CIL VI 1724 v.2 = ILS 2950=Hubner 748

The text states that Merobaudes wasrenowned as both a warrior and a poet.

Moreover, in an unrelated text Hydatiusimplies that other statues were erected toMerobaudes.34 Although many of theseothers may also have been erected at theinstigation of Aetius, some at least weredoubtless proposed by the Senate withouthis involvement. The acclamation given toMerobaudes no doubt was taken by Aetiusto be a reflection of support for his regime:after all, Merobaudes was clearly one ofAetius’ more powerful supporters and hadwritten and delivered the earlier panegyricfor him in 432.

BritainWhilst these developments had been takingplace on the continent, Britain was onceagain being converted to Pelagianism. Inresponse, probably in 435, Germanus,Bishop of Auxerre, was sent to Britain forthe second time, winning back the convertsand this time taking the preachers of

Pelagianism to exile on the continent.35

Although sometimes overlooked, in thecontext of the time the military campaignsof Aetius and the spiritual campaign ofGermanus can be interpreted as a ‘carefulco-ordination of the political and militarypolicies of Felix and Aetius with theecclesiastical activities of [Pope]Celestine’.36 Although tempting, the ideamust remain open to doubt. The activities ofGermanus may possibly have been initiatedby the Pope, but it is more likely that thetwo missions in 429 and 435 wereinstigated by the islanders. Furthermore, thepressure on the frontiers and in Gaul wassuch that the policies and actions of Felixand later Aetius would appear to have beenreactive rather than proactive. As a result, itis probably better to see these activities asseparate and linked to ‘external’ activityrather than being the formulated policies of

the military and spiritual leaders working intandem to regain control of the west. PatriciusUpon returning from the wars against theBurgundians, Aetius received the greatestconfirmation that his position was secure, atleast for the time being and as long as hewas being successful. On 5 September 435he was honoured with the title patricius.37

This is not surprising. Although opposed byPlacidia up to the death of Boniface, Aetiushad shown that he was determined tomaintain his position, probably since hethought he was the best man for the task.

Although Placidia may have been loath toappoint Aetius as patricius, it would havebeen difficult for her to refuse: he wasclearly the only general with power at thetime, and whatever she thought of him,realistically she could not do anything else.On the other hand, his record was actually

quite good. Since 425 he had fought in twocivil wars, ‘drawing’ the battle in 425 andlosing to Boniface in 432. But these were hisonly failures. He had also fought sevencampaigns against barbarians within theempire, winning them all. His energy andwillingness to fight almost certainly markedhim out from most of his contemporariesand set an example moulded on the guidesset by Constantius III and, to a slightlylesser degree, by Stilicho.38

Yet despite the fact that Aetius hadobtained the title of patricius against theodds and could be expected to be fiercelyjealous of his titles and power, it should benoted that he was now mentally secure inhis position: secure enough to allow otherindividuals to use the title patricius. Whenthis happened Aetius – and possiblyConstantius III before him – adopted a moregrandiose title: in the case of Aetius,

magnificus vir parens patriusque noster insteadof the more modest patricius noster.39 As theempire became more desperate in itsattempts to survive and the Westdisintegrated, the most powerful individualswere striving to invent ever more complextitles with which to emphasise theirimportance.

436No doubt the celebrations concerning thetitle of patricius lasted for a long time. As aresult, it was not until the new year thatAetius prepared to meet the fresh challengesthat awaited him. The first of these was thatTheoderic, king of the Goths, ‘confoundedthe peace agreements and seized manytowns in the vicinity of their settlements,attacking the city of Narbonne most ofall’.40

At the same time, the Burgundians were

again attacked by the Romans. Although thereference to a second war against theBurgundians by Hydatius is sometimes seenas a doublet, simply repeating the war of435, the information given by Prosperconfirms that this was a second war:41

At the same time Aetius crushedGundichar, who was king of theBurgundians and living in Gaul. Inresponse to his entreaty, Aetiusgave him peace, which the king didnot enjoy for long. For the Hunsdestroyed him and his people rootand branch.

Prosper, rather than dating the conclusionof the war to 437, keeps the informationunder one entry, a relatively commonoccurrence in the chronicles.42 Yetinformation in Hydatius also suggests that

the war was not begun by Aetius:43

The Burgundians, who hadrebelled, were defeated by theRomans under the general Aetius.

Hydatius’ claim that the Burgundians had‘rebelled’ may refer to the war of 435, but itis just as likely that he is noting that in 436the Burgundians had rebelled against therecently signed treaty.44

The reason for the combined rebellion isunknown. Yet given the context it ispossible, although unfortunately impossibleto prove, that the reason for the renewal ofwar was Gothic and Burgundian discontentwith the peace treaties of 426 and 435respectively. Since Gundichar had‘entreated’ Aetius for peace, it is almostcertain that the treaty of 435 was to thedetriment of the Burgundians, and sounhappiness may have continued to fester.

Yet the fact that war again erupted soquickly is surprising, unless there was anexternal stimulus. The cause may have beenan alliance in 436 between the Goths andthe Burgundians, probably proposed by theGoths, instigated by their respectiveunhappiness with the extent of Romandomination. It is also feasible to conjecturethat the Goths had been preparing for thiswar for a long time. It is feasible that theenvoy to the Sueves named Vetto, who hadin 431 travelled to Gallaecia, wasattempting to enrol the Sueves in a generaluprising of ‘barbarian nations’ within theWestern Empire.45

It is also within the realms of possibility,although extremely uncertain, that it was in436 that Theoderic arranged an alliancewith the Vandals in Africa. This wouldensure that no Vandal troops would be sentto Gaul to support the Romans against the

Vandals and Burgundians. To cement thealliance Theoderic’s daughter, who isunfortunately not named, was married toGaiseric’s son Huneric.46 Although thedating and true nature of this event isuncertain, and it may be dated to 431alongside the similar attempt to enrol theSueves by Vetto, it is at this date that thecircumstances would best fit such analliance.47

Although the rebellion may primarilyhave been caused by a desire to renegotiatethe earlier treaty, a secondary cause mayhave been Theoderic’s attempts to establishhimself as the dominant political leader inhis new kingdom. In a later entry dated to439, Prosper states that Vetericus was‘considered loyal to our state and renownedfor the frequent demonstration of his skill inwar’.48 Vetericus is otherwise unknown, butwas most likely a Gothic noble who had

decided to take employment with Romerather than serve under Theoderic. Thereason for his choice, and his opposition toTheoderic, is unspecified, but may be theresult of a disagreement with Theoderic’spolicies. As a result Vetericus may have leftthe Gothic area and taken service withRome as a result of his opposition toTheoderic. His desertion of Theoderic andhis taking part in the war on the Romanside would explain his ‘loyalty’ to Rome. Itmay also be evidence that not all Gothicnobles were happy with Theoderic’sleadership and may have resented hisattempts to force them to obey him.

The Gothic and Burgundian RebellionPossibly taking advantage of the fact thatthe Romans were distracted by events inArmorica, the new rebellion broke out.49

The two simultaneous rebellions forcedAetius on to the defensive. During 436

Litorius was completing the suppression ofthe Bacaudic revolt in Armorica, probablywith the Gallic army, and it would appearthat Aetius was using the praesental forces tosimply contain the combined Gothic andBurgundian rebellion. Unwilling to face theGoths with his thinly stretched forces and soleave other areas open to attack by theBurgundians, Aetius was forced to remaininactive whilst the Goths moved into Romanterritory and laid siege to Narbona(Narbonne).50 The rest of 436 was spentensuring that the rebellion did not spreadand that the Goths and Burgundians did notbreak out from their already-conqueredareas to spread devastation around Gauland possibly Italy.

Aetius and the HunsHowever, Aetius was not idle. He could notafford to allow the Goths to becomeindependent in any way, shape or form. If

the Goths were allowed to break the treatythey had agreed with Rome, Rome wouldlose both the revenues that the Gothscurrently enjoyed as well as their militaryservice. The loss of both money and service,along with the need to garrisonpermanently the suddenly unfriendlyfrontier with the Goths, would stretch theresources of the empire to breaking point.

Accordingly, Aetius dispatched at leastone emissary in the hope of receiving helpin Gaul. For over a decade he had receivedsupport from the Huns whenever it wasneeded, especially in 424 and more recentlyin 433. Furthermore, analysis of the yearsbetween and after these events illustratesthat the army of the West now had a largenumber of Huns fighting alongside theRoman army. However, rather thanreceiving small numbers of reinforcements,Aetius realized that a larger force was

necessary. Although the dating is uncertain,it is very likely that it was in 436–437 thathe formally ceded parts of Pannonia near tothe River Save to the Huns.51

The formal cession of territory inPannonia was not in reality actually givingaway land ruled by Rome. Priscus does notsay ‘the whole of Pannonia’ but ‘the part ofPannonia close to the River Save whichbecame subject to the barbarian by thetreaty with Aetius’: the treaty only alienatedmarginal lands along the borders to theHuns. In 427 Felix had led a campaign toevict the Huns from Pannonia, but it is clearthat in the intervening period they hadsimply re-crossed the river to graze theirherds again.52 By formally allocating landsthey already controlled in reality to theHuns, Aetius was able to boost the politicalpower of Rua. In response, Rua agreed tolead his main army against the Burgundians

as soon as the weather allowed.Although interpretations differ and many

see the cession of Roman territory as ‘un-Roman’, it is clear that as de facto leader ofthe West Aetius was determined to maintainhis personal ties with the Huns. They in turnresponded by providing him with thefoederati and other troops he needed tomaintain himself in power. Furthermore, itis possible that Aetius was using the Hunnicfoederati to offset the lack of new recruitsbeing provided by the imperial court, andespecially the Senate. It is feasible thatAetius was becoming increasingly reliantupon the Huns to help bolster his ownrather precarious military position withinthe empire. Without their aid, the lack ofrecruits would severely limit his freedom ofaction. By accepting the reality of the Huns’penetration of Pannonia, Aetius ensuredthat for a long time his armies in the West

would continue to be supported by Hunnicallies.

437The siege of Narbonne by the Gothscontinued over the winter of 436–437.Fortunately for Aetius, at the end of 436, orpossibly early in 437, Litorius was finallyable to capture Tibatto, leader of thebacaudae.53 With their main leader capturedand their other leaders either captured orkilled, the rebellion in northern Gaulcollapsed.54 Litorius was at last free to movesouth.

Narbonne was by now in the last stages ofthe siege, since the inhabitants werestarving. Marching through the Auvergnedistrict, Litorius arrived unexpectedlyoutside Narbonne.55 Caught by surprise intheir siege positions and unable to form acoherent battle line, the Goths were quickly

routed.56 Fortunately for the inhabitants ofNarbonne, every man in Litorius’ army hadbeen ordered to carry two measures ofwheat, which was now used to ease theproblem of starvation in the city.57

However, Litorius’ limitations were alsoexposed during this campaign. On themarch through the Auvergne some of theHuns in his army broke away and plunderedthe region until stopped by a force led byEparchius Avitus,58 a Gallic senator ofdistinguished family who had become afavourite of the Gothic king Theodericduring the 420s.59 He had served in thearmy under Aetius during the campaignsagainst the Norici and Iuthungi in 430–431,after which Aetius may have promoted himto be magister militum per Gallias, althoughthis is uncertain.60 He would appear to havebeen in control of forces stationed near tothe Gothic siege lines at Narbonne, possibly

in an attempt to restrict their ability toforage and so limit their capacity tomaintain the siege indefinitely. He defeatedthe renegade Huns in a battle nearClermont before joining Litorius, probablyshortly after the latter’s entry intoNarbonne.61

It may appear surprising that Litorius didnot halt his advance and turn to deal withthe Huns, yet given the fact that the city ofNarbonne had been under siege for a longtime he may have thought that raising thesiege was of more importance than losingthe element of surprise. He decided not towaste time bringing the Huns back undercontrol. Furthermore, he might have lost theadvantage of surprise if he had turned todeal with the Huns and allowed news of hisarrival to reach the Goths.

At roughly the same time as the siege ofNarbonne was being raised, the Huns under

Rua arrived in Gaul and attacked theBurgundians. The attack was devastating:according to Hydatius, 20,000 Burgundianswere slaughtered, including the king.62

Although no doubt the numbers wereexaggerated, the scale of the defeat isechoed by the Gallic Chronicler, who notesthat ‘almost the entire people with theirking were destroyed’.63 This historical eventmay be the origin of the Nibelungen cycle,upon which Wagner later based his epic DerRing des Nibelungen.64

Spain and Northern GaulYet it would appear that the confusion andwar in southern Gaul had resulted in furtherattacks and rebellions. In Spain the Suevesresumed their attacks on the nativeinhabitants. Censurius and Fretimund, whois otherwise unknown, were sent asambassadors, but this time it would appear

that Aetius was unwilling to rely on politicsalone.65 It is probably at this date thatAetius sent an unknown commander intoSpain with orders to defeat the Sueves.Jordanes notes that Aetius had beensuccessful, since by ‘inflicting crushingdefeats he had compelled the proud Sueviand barbarous Franks to submit to Romansway’.66 Furthermore, Merobaudes in hisfirst surviving panegyric alludes to Aetius’successes in Spain.67 It should be noted,however, that this campaign is otherwiseunrecorded and of dubious dating.

The note in Jordanes also points to afurther war, this time with the Franks. As isusual, the events described are extremelydifficult to confirm or to date, yet it isknown from Salvian that at some time priorto 440 the Franks had attacked Gaul andcaptured Cologne and Trier.68 It seems thatanother force had been sent by Aetius to

face the Franks in the north and haddefeated them. However, it is possible thatdue to the ongoing war with the Goths thecampaign against the Franks was merelyone of containment, and that the Frankswere not actually evicted from Romanterritory at this time, since the dating andcontext of this war are very difficult toestablish.

Valentinian and Licinia EudoxiaAetius was not present during thecampaigns against either the Goths or theBurgundians. Instead, he was involved in aseries of major diplomatic coups with regardto the East. In 437 he travelled east toConstantinople with Valentinian forValentinian’s marriage to Licinia Eudoxia,daughter of the Eastern Emperor TheodosiusII, in October 437.69

The party arrived in Constantinople on 21

October 43770 and appears to have includedMerobaudes and Sigisvult, who at this datemay have been magister equitum, and so themost senior military figure behind Aetius,although the date of Sigisvult’s appointmentis insecure.71 However, it is certain that hemust have held an important position due tothe events that then occurred.

The marriage took place on 29 October437.72 In an attempt to ensure continuinggood relations, to foster a sense of thecontinuing unity of the empire, but mainlyin the spirit of sharing engendered by themarriage, as part of the marriagecelebrations Theodosius made majorpolitical concessions to the West. In thespirit of goodwill and rejoicing, Aetius wasgranted his second consulship.73 At the sametime, Sigisvult was made a consul.74 Thiswas an exceptional occurrence, since it wastraditional that one consul was nominated

by the West and one by the East. Theallocating of both consulships to the Westwas a major concession and is almostcertainly connected with the marriage.75 Itis also evidence that by 437 the regime ofValentinian and Aetius in the West was seenas being successful by the East, a conceptthat is reinforced by Socrates when he statesthat Valentinian had ‘made the westernregions safe’.76 The achievements ofValentinian and Aetius were highlyappreciated.

Furthermore, in a continuation on thetheme of awarding ‘Eastern’ posts to theWest, it is possible, but by no means certain,that at the same time Merobaudes wasdeclared patricius by Theodosius, almostcertainly on Aetius’ recommendation,although the post was in the East and wasno doubt only honorary.77

GaisericYet amidst all of the rejoicing andhappiness, the first signs of a comingcatastrophe were appearing in the West. In437 Gaiseric, King of the Vandals, began topersecute the Catholic priests in hisdominions in Africa.78 Despite the Catholicsources’ dismay at such actions, it is almostcertain that other Christians in Africa wouldhave found the treatment of the CatholicChristians ironic, since it was only twelveyears previously, in 425, that a persecutionof non-Catholic Christians in Africa and anempire-wide ban on non-Catholics in citieshad been ordered by Valentinian.79

Nor was this the only sign of the storm tocome: ‘In the same year barbarian desertersof the federates took to piracy.’80 Althoughthe meaning was no doubt obvious tocontemporaries, this is now a very crypticentry, which could mean many things.

However, given the context and with thebenefit of hindsight, the entry almostcertainly refers to the Vandals. Gaiseric,having learned of the revolt in Gaul, andpossibly having arranged a marriagealliance with the Goths, was intent onexpanding the boundaries of his proto-kingdom, or at least of enriching himself inorder to pay his comitatus. It is likely that heordered members of the Vandal aristocracyto begin raiding the West using the shipsalready used for the crossing to Africa,hence the reference to ‘deserters’ and‘piracy’. The move would allow his kingdomto gain in wealth, but at the same time ifnecessary he would be able to denyinvolvement to the Roman government,declaring that these ‘pirates’ were‘deserters’. He could also claim to his Gothicallies that he was doing something to helpthe war effort. Using these methods Gaiseric

could benefit from the raids, test thereadiness of the West to punish furtheraggressive action, avoid responsibility forthe attacks if the West proved too strong,and show faith with his allies.

438When it became clear that the West wasunable to hinder these acts, in 438 theVandals began to spread their activities.They now started to raid the westernMediterranean, focusing their attention onthe undefended island of Sicily.81

The reason for the continued neglect ofthe Mediterranean was that Aetius wasfocused upon the war against the Goths.Although the Burgundians had beendecimated by the Huns, the Goths continuedto fight. It would appear that their anger attheir treatment was such that they werewilling to continue the war unaided, eventhough alone they were unable to defeat the

armies of the West.Returning to Ravenna after the marriage

in Constantinople, it is probably in 438 thatAetius made slight alterations amongst thecommanders in Gaul. Avitus, who hadprobably been magister militum per Gallias,was appointed praefectus praetorioGalliarum.82 His removal from a militarypost may have been a consequence of hisfailure to defeat the Goths in person duringthe earlier siege of Narbonne, insteadrelying upon the arrival of Litorius. On theother hand, the new post was a position forwhich Avitus was supremely suited. A Gallicsenator, his appointment could be used asproof that Gaul and its senators remainedcentral to the concept of imperial unity.Further, his intimate knowledge of Gaul andits resources would ease the burden ofsupplying the army during the Gothic war.

Interestingly, the appointment of Avitus

as first a general and then a civilianbureaucrat demonstrates that the hypothesisthat military and civilian posts were nowdefinitely separate is mistaken. As with theearlier empire, talented individuals wouldbe given whichever post suited theirabilities, regardless of whether this meantchanging between military and civilianstatus.

Avitus was probably replaced as magistermilitum per Gallias by Litorius, who hadclearly demonstrated his military abilityduring the suppression of the bacaudic revoltand by the raising of the siege ofNarbonne.83 However, for the campaignseason of 438 Aetius once again personallyassumed command of the armies in Gaul. Ina great battle he won a significant victory,allegedly slaughtering 8,000 Goths.84 Thismay be the Battle of Mons Colubrariusreferred to by Merobaudes in his

panegyric.85 The battle demonstrates thatAetius was not content to arrangetraditional, set-piece battles with the Goths:

All the forces of the Goths . . . hadsallied forth with their king toravage Roman territory . . . At themountain that the ancients call . . .Snake Mountain [MonsColubrarius]. . . he surprised – as ishis custom – and killed the greatestpart of the enemy; once theinfantry units, which were verynumerous, were routed, he himselffollowed hard on the scatteringcavalry troops and overwhelmedthose standing fast with his might,and those fleeing with his eagerrapidity. Not long afterwards theking himself was on hand with theremainder of his forces, and,stupefied with sudden horror near

the trampled bodies . . . [here thetext finishes].

Merobaudes, Panegyric 1, fragmentIIA, 10f

The claim that Aetius preferred to usesurprise ‘as his custom’ rather than pitchedbattle not only demonstrates his skill as ageneral, but also implies that he could notrisk losing the large number of men thatwould be engaged in a formal battle. At thesame time, he may have been employingtraditional Roman military doctrine coupledwith Hunnic concepts of ‘hit-and-run’ toensure success in battle. Although the scaleof the victory and the number of lossessuffered by the Goths are no doubtexaggerated by Merobaudes – since this is apanegyric – it would appear that Theoderichad experienced a fairly heavy reverse. Yetit was not catastrophic, since he refused to

accept defeat and the war continued on into439.

In the same year Aetius was to receive awelcome piece of good news. In Spain peacehad once again been established betweenthe Sueves and a ‘section of Gallaecians’.Yet in part at least this had been forced onthe Sueves by an internal problem. Theirking, Hermeric, was extremely ill at thistime and after the peace treaty had beenagreed he abdicated in favour of his son,Rechila.86 Rechila immediately set the tonefor his new reign, crushing the VandalAndevotus near the River Singilis in Baeticaand capturing his treasury.87 The southerlylocation reinforces the possibility thatAndevotus was the leader of the remnants ofthe Vandals in Spain (see Chapter 7). Theaggressive start to his reign also implies thatRechila was seeking to negotiate newtreaties that were more advantageous to the

Sueves.

The Codex TheodosianusIn the East there was a further cause forcelebration. In 438, after ten years ofcompilation, the Codex Theodosianus wasfinally published.88 A major work of civillaw, the Codex was commissioned in 429 byTheodosius and listed all of the laws thathad been promulgated since the year 312. Acopy was sent to Valentinian in the Westand was laid before the Senate in Rome foracceptance. In 439 it was accepted as lawby the West, so ensuring the continued legalunity of the whole empire.89 Interestingly,the Code implies that the dominance ofAetius was not yet complete by 439. In theGesta Senatus Urbis Romae (Minutes of theSenate of the City of Rome), which outlinesthe procedure in the Senate by which thelaws were accepted, there were cries for

Faustus, Paulus and Aetius to be madeconsuls.90 However, the fact that neitherPaulus nor Faustus ever gained their hoped-for consulships and that Aetius had to wait afurther seven years for his third suggeststhat Valentinian and Placidia may have stillretained a large degree of autonomy at thisdate, although the extent of this isuncertain.91

By 438 it was clear that the financialsituation in the West was deteriorating. InJuly of that year Valentinian was forced toaccept that some of the outstanding taxes heso desperately needed were never going toarrive due to the financial straits of hissubjects. As a consequence he agreed to aremission of delinquent taxes, almostcertainly in the hope that this sign of gracewould encourage the taxpayers to then keepup with their newly levied taxes.92

439It would appear that political circumstancesin Ravenna demanded that Aetius leave theconduct of the Gothic war in the hands ofLitorius, not least because Aetius may haveneeded to be present when Merobaudesdelivered his second panegyric.93 He wouldalmost certainly have wanted to be at theceremony when he was honoured with astatue erected by order of the emperors.94

The evidence suggests that Aetius was themost aggressive, talented and – above all –successful military leader in the West.However, with generals of the calibre ofSigisvult and Litorius, plus the fact that theGoths had just suffered a great defeat,Aetius probably felt that there was no needto remain in Gaul and take commandhimself. As time passed and Aetius began tofeel secure in his position, it is notable thathe came to rely more and more on his

subordinate generals, such as Litorius andSigisvult, to do the actual fighting whilst heremained in Italy. From a fixed position itwould be easy for him to provide strategicdirection: messengers would know where tofind him without having to chase acampaigning army and as a result he wouldhave all of the intelligence he needed to beable to make the most appropriatedecisions.

Map 9. The Western Empire c.439

Sigisvult and Litorius

Questions have been raised concerning theposts being occupied by Sigisvult andLitorius. Prosper states that in 439 Litoriusheld a post ‘second only to that of Aetius’.95

Since other evidence suggests that at thisdate Sigisvult was magister equitum, whatProsper probably means is that Litorius was‘second’ in Gaul, meaning that he wasmagister militum per Gallias: the militaryleader in Gaul would no doubt only have toanswer to Aetius for his actions. On theother hand, it has been suggested that hemay have actually been given a specialtemporary command as magister militum ofSpain.96

It is almost certain that Sigisvult wasmagister equitum, especially since he hadbeen honoured with the consulship in 437. Ithas been proposed that the promotion ofindividuals to be magistri militiae wasordered by Placidia in an attempt to

undermine Aetius’ position.97 However,Aetius at no point appears to have feltthreatened by these appointments, and hecertainly did not attempt to defeat them byforce, as he had Boniface. Moreover, he didnot even change his military titles in a wayto emphasize that he was superior to themagistri militiae who were being appointed.Instead, it is probably nearer to the mark tointerpret these promotions as being basedupon the military ability and loyalty of theindividuals and to them being appointed onAetius’ recommendation.98

The Death of LitoriusSigisvult’s activities during the campaignseason of 439 are unknown. It is possiblethat both he and Litorius were involved inattacks upon isolated groups of Goths whohad been despatched around Gaul in anattempt to extend Theoderic’s power, and sowere not present at the Battle of Mons

Colubrarius in 438. Sigisvult appears tohave been a more cautious commander thanLitorius, and hence has received little noticein the surviving histories and chronicles ofthe period.

Litorius, however, was a far moreaggressive commander. He appears to havebeen experiencing great success, pushing theGoths back into the territory allocated tothem by the treaty of 418. Unfortunately,his success resulted in him becomingcomplacent about the ability of his Romantroops, along with their Hun allies, to beatthe Goths.

The Goths, now forced on to thedefensive, were retreating into their originalterritories, pursued by Litorius. Sigisvultmay also have been involved, although hemay instead have remained in Italy. Litoriusdecided to end the campaign by fighting onelast glorious battle near to the Gothic

‘capital’ of Toulouse.After seeking the advice of soothsayers,

possibly demonstrating that he was apagan, Litorius led his army into battle withthe Goths. After a long fight, with heavylosses on both sides, Litorius led his Huns –probably meaning his bucellarii – in apersonal attack, but the Huns were killedand he himself was captured.99 Shortlyafterwards he was put to death.100

In the emergency conditions thatfollowed, it would appear that the GothVetericus was temporarily placed in charge– at least if that is the meaning of Prosper’svery short statement ‘in the same period,Vetericus was considered loyal to our stateand renowned for the frequentdemonstration of his skill in war’.101

Vetericus stabilized the situation followingthe potentially disastrous defeat.

In this emergency, Aetius himself left

Ravenna to take control of the Gallicarmy.102 Fortunately for him, the lossessuffered both in this battle and in theprevious years of the conflict had weakenedthe resolve of the Goths. In fact, accordingto Salvian, ‘The Goths sought peace and wedenied it; they sent bishops to make termsand we rejected them; they honoured Godeven in the person of alien priests and wedespised him in our own.’103

There can be little doubt that Aetiuswanted to conclude the war with asignificant victory, which would help raisemorale in the West as well as deter theGoths from renewing their attempts atexpansion. As a result, he personally led acampaign against the Goths. Advancingtowards Toulouse, Aetius began the siege ofa Gothic military camp near their capital.After a brief pause in which to build siegetowers, his men breached the walls of the

camp and slaughtered the defenders, whowere unable to flee.104

Shortly after the siege Aetius sent Avitusto the Goths to negotiate.105 The end resultwas a peace treaty that in many waysappears to have left the situation unchangedfrom before the war started.106 The treatywas most likely unsatisfactory in somedetails to both the Goths and the Romans.However, in two areas it was beneficial tothe Goths: firstly, the Goths needed time torest and recover their strength after theirdefeats, although the Romans also neededthe peace in order to deploy the freed troopsto other theatres of war. Secondly, althoughthe evidence is inconclusive, it is possiblethat this treaty was the first in which thetwo sides treated each other as ‘sovereignentities’, and in which Theoderic wasrecognized as ‘king’ in return for controllinghis subjects.107 The impression is reinforced

by the fact that, unlike in the previousdecade, Theoderic appears to have observedthe terms of this treaty until the death ofValentinian, suggesting that one of his mainaims – that of being acknowledged in Romeas king and equal – had been fulfilled.

Following the peace treaty with the GothsAetius’ reputation, especially in Gaul, wasat its height. The Gallic aristocracyespecially appear to have been supportingAetius and his policies in Gaul.108 After thetreaty had been arranged, Aetius returned toItaly.109 It is most likely at this time that helearned three pieces of news. The first wasnot good: in Spain Rechila, the new king ofthe Sueves, taking advantage of the longwar between the Romans and the Goths inGaul, had captured Emerita.110 The secondalso was bad and concerned affairs acrossthe Danube.

The HunsFollowing the agreements with Aetius in433 and 435, and no doubt encouraged byhaving a secure peace agreed with the west,Rua turned his attention to the EasternEmpire. Although details are few and nodates are given, it would appear that atsome point after Aetius’ visit in 433 theHuns and the East were at war.111 Thisseems to have been a success for the Huns.However, Rua now achieved a dominationnorth of the Danube, which was notaccepted by some of the subordinate tribes.At some point in the late 430s largenumbers of the ‘Amilzuri, Itimari,Tounsoures, Boisci, and other tribes whowere living near to the Danube were fleeingto fight on the side of the Romans’.112

Disturbed by the idea that these mencould defy him, Rua sent an embassy toConstantinople threatening to renew the

war if the Romans did not return the‘fugitives’. After a flurry of exchanges,conducted by Eslas for the Huns andPlinthas for the Romans, a meeting was setin the town of Margus. Alongside theRoman and Hun delegates were assembledthe ‘kings of the Scythians’, probably theleaders of the tribesmen who were defectingto Rome.113

The East did not want a war and so in theTreaty of Margus agreed to the terms set bythe Huns. At least some of its details arepreserved by Priscus: the Romans would nolonger accept service from individualsfleeing from Hunnic territories; those whohad already crossed to Roman territory wereto be returned; Roman prisoners-of-warfrom the previous conflict who had returnedhome were to pay eight solidi each to theirprevious captors; the Romans were notallowed to make alliances with any tribes

upon which the Huns were about to wagewar; the Huns and the Romans were to betreated equally at ‘safe’ markets; and thetreaty was to last as long as the east paid700 pounds of gold annually to the Huns,whereas previously they had paid only 350pounds of gold.114

In order to put the tribute intoperspective, it is possible to note the annualincome of some Roman families: ‘Many ofthe Roman households received an incomeof four thousand pounds [of gold] per yearfrom their properties, not including grain,wine and other produce which, if sold,would have amounted to one third of theincome in gold. The income of thehouseholds at Rome of the second class wasone thousand or fifteen hundred pounds ofgold.’115 Although appearing a considerablesum, the subsidy was only half the annualincome of a family household ‘of the second

class’ in Rome. On the other hand, in 434the cost of supplying the whole of the city ofConstantinople with grain was 611 poundsof gold.116 Although a relatively smallamount for the rich, the sum was a vastamount for the poor.

The treaty was a major coup for the Hunsand demonstrated to all of their subjectsthat even the mighty Roman Empire wasnot beyond their control. Furthermore, evenwithin the Roman Empire the might of theHuns was now an accepted fact: Aetius, inthe West, had been restored to power by thethreat of Hunnic intervention whilst theEast had been forced to accept a treatyimposed by the Huns.

The power of the Huns was now such thatindividuals other than Aetius felt that itwould benefit their careers if they couldestablish strong political ties with them.During the negotiations for the Treaty of

Margus, the imperial side had beenrepresented by the ex-general and ex-consulPlinthas, who had employed a variety ofdevious schemes to ensure that he would bethe main envoy and so gain influence withboth the Romans and the Huns, possibly inan attempt to emulate Aetius’ position inthe west.117

However, the treaty was not concludedwith Rua: early in the proceedings he died,possibly as the result of being hit by athunderbolt.118 Although the date of Rua’sdeath is stated by the Gallic Chronicler to be434, other evidence makes this unlikely.119

The major factor is that during the long warwith the Goths between 437 and 439 theWest was helped by large numbers ofHunnic allies.120 The fact that these Hunscontinued to serve Rome implies that thepolitical situation amongst their fellowsacross the Danube had remained unchanged.

Although it is possible that Rua’s successorhad continued to supply mercenaries to theWest, or that these Huns were simplymercenary bands, this is unlikely.

The rule of the Huns passed jointly to thesons of Mundiuch, Rua’s brother.121 One ofthese was called Bleda, and apparently heassumed control of the Hunnic tribes facingthe Eastern Empire. The other, and the onewho inherited control of the tribes facingthe Western Empire, was called Attila.122

Following the signing of the Treaty ofMargus, in a display of power Attila andBleda marched through Scythia and foughtthe Sorosgi, an otherwise unknown tribe.123

The martial attitude of the new rulers wasimmediately being displayed, althoughaccording to Socrates it may have beentempered by the outbreak of a plague, butthis is otherwise unattested.124

Yet even though the news of the death of

Rua, his ally, and the accession of Attila,who was of the next generation and so didnot have the same personal ties to Aetius,was bad, it was the third piece of news thatwould have caused the worst shock to Aetiusand the court at Ravenna. Either late in 439or early in 440 news arrived in Italy that amajor disaster had happened: the provinceof Africa Proconsularis, the source of muchof the grain for Italy and especially Rome,had been lost.

Chapter 9

The Fall of Africa

AFRICAWhen talking about Roman rule in Africathere is, understandably, sometimesconfusion concerning the meaning of theterm. Although Africa is now the name forthe whole continent, for the Romans Africawas more usually applied to the provincecreated in 146 BC after the defeat ofCarthage. Shortly after this the Romansconquered more areas of the North Africancoast and these became the provinces of

Tripolitania, Byzacium, Numidia,Mauretania Sitifensis, MauretaniaCaesariensis and Tingitana. Tingitanaeventually became part of the Diocese ofHispania, but the rest were included as partof the Diocese of Africa with its capital atCarthage. As a result, it is easy to becomeconfused, so wherever applicable the term‘Africa’ applies to the whole Diocese, andthe term Africa Proconsularis will be appliedto the province (see Map 10 for furtherclarification).

The province of Africa was known asAfrica Proconsularis. Along with Egypt, itwas the breadbasket of the early RomanEmpire. Grain had been taken, as part ofAfrica’s tax, to feed the citizens of Rome andItaly. Egypt had also supplied grain, butafter the foundation of Constantinople thishad been diverted to Constantine’s new city.Since then, Rome had come to rely almost

completely on the African grain supply tofeed its citizens, and two-thirds of Africa’sannual harvest was exported to Rome.Control of the grain shipments to Rome wasvital and from early in the empire’s historythe governor of the province – and a fewother provinces (see Map 1) – was aproconsul rather than a senator, hence thename Africa Proconsularis.

Although in the earlier empire the maincommodity exported from Africa had beengrain, from the late second century olive oilhad become important, with the interior ofthe provinces of Numidia, Byzacena andTripolitania, and especially the territories ofLepcis Magna, Oea and Sabratha (See Map11), being used for olive production. In fact,the anonymous author of Expositio totiusmundi et rerum noted that Africa waswealthy in all things, including grain, fruit,trees, slaves and textiles, but ‘it virtually

exceeds all others in the use of the olive’.1The other major commodity exported fromAfrica was African red-slip ware, adistinctive form of pottery that is now usedby archaeologists as evidence for tradepatterns from Africa to the widerMediterranean area. However, in the early-fifth century all of these goods were mainlydestined for the market of Rome and Italy.

The fact that the city of Rome wasdependent on African grain was of greatbenefit for the citizens of Africa. Not onlydid they have a ready market, but theimperial government ensured that all of thetransport facilities in Africa and itssurrounding provinces were of the higheststandard to ensure quick delivery of thegrain. This infrastructure was highlybeneficial to those wishing to export othergoods. Thanks to the favourable lease lawsemployed in Africa there was a huge

production of surpluses and these weretransported along government-maintainedhighways to the Mediterranean for shipmentto Rome and throughout the Mediterranean.Apart from agricultural surpluses, traderswere also willing to take African red-slipware on their journeys, stowing thesesmaller items between the larger loads offoodstuffs.

A final reason for the prosperity of theAfrican provinces was that they were notexposed to war. Although there may havebeen local troubles in the area, the troopsstationed in Africa were mainly there tocontrol the movement of the local nomadictribes as they migrated between their winterand summer pastures, ensuring that they didnot stray on to settled lands and causedamage.

Yet Africa was not exempt from thechanges being seen in the other parts of the

west. In Africa, as elsewhere, the localcouncillors were becoming reluctant to serveon their local councils since financially theburden was very high. Commercially, inmany areas the forum, the centre of townsand cities, had either fallen out of use or atleast had become much reduced in size.Furthermore, temples and some bathhouseswere starting to fall into ruin. The functionsof the forum were now being replaced bybuildings connected to churches, signallingthe rise in attachment to Christianity andthe loss of emphasis of pagan institutions.Additionally, large houses were nowbeginning to be divided into smaller unitsand shop fronts were appearing along streetfrontages, replacing the shopping area ofthe forum.2

There were also areas of dispute. Themain one of these was Christianity. Therewas a large community of Donatists in

Africa, who were in opposition to theCatholic majority. The disagreement wentback to the previous century, whenDiocletian (284–305) had ordered apersecution of Christians in the empirebetween 303 and 305. Many Christianclergymen had been killed in thepersecution, but some had surrendered,giving up their copies of the scriptures andin some cases betraying fellow Christians tothe authorities. These men were known astraditores (‘the ones who handed over’).

After the persecution, and particularlyfollowing Constantine the Great’s edict oftoleration, many of these men had beenallowed to return to their former positions.A large number of Christians refused toaccept their authority, seeing them astraitors to the faith. When a new Bishop ofCarthage was consecrated by a traditor, hisopponents refused to accept him.

Eventually, in 313, a man named Donatus(after whom the movement was named) waselected as bishop and the controversybroadened due to the fact that Donatus wasan anti-traditor.

As Bishop of Carthage, Donatus wieldedgreat power and was able to appeal againstthe appointment of traditors, but in 313 acommission found against the Donatists.Despite this, the movement continued,especially in Africa, leading to widespreaddivision even after Donatus’ death in 355.This was largely due to the Donatist priestsbeing local men who spoke local languagesand dialects, so endearing them to theprovincial population outside the big cities.On the other hand, Catholic priests tendedto speak only Latin, and so had more of afollowing in the cities.

The Donatist cause was not helped by therise of the Circumcellians. These were groups

from the lowest levels of society whodeveloped anti-Roman biases and wereprone to rebellion. They were usuallyDonatists and their infamy resulted inDonatism being associated with rebels andbandits. As a result, in the early-fifthcentury there began a persecution of theDonatists in Africa, which Saint Augustinethought to be harsh and ill judged.3

In June 411 in Carthage a conferencetook place that found against the Donatists.Slowly, under pressure, Donatist adherentsbegan to convert to Catholic Christianity.Yet by the 430s there were still many strongadherents to the cause who were unhappywith the course of events: religious divisioncontinued.

As a final point, although Roman Africatends to be studied as a single entity, itshould be noted that only in AfricaProconsularis was Latin a common

language. The other provinces were not thesame and there were at least threelanguages in use in the area. Furthermore,there was a distinct cultural divisionbetween Romanized Carthage and the ruralcountryside.4 These divisions meant thatalthough the Vandals arrived as barbarianoutsiders, and are so described by Catholicand aristocratic literature, they may havebeen seen as ‘saviours’ by those members ofthe population unhappy with Catholicimperial rule.5

Despite these changes, the province waspeaceful and relatively prosperous, so theVandal invasion in 430 was doubtless amajor shock for the inhabitants. Not onlywere they under threat of war for the firsttime in several generations, but the troopsin the area were unused to having to fightset-piece battles. Probably as a result oftheir lack of experience and suitable

training, the Roman army in Africa wasdefeated, first under Boniface, and thenunder Boniface and Aspar reinforced withthe East Roman forces.

The treaty of 435 was in many waysunwelcome in the area, since it was nowclear that the empire was not in a positionto evict the Vandals, or defeat them andensure their compliance with the treaty (seeMap 8). However, given the fact that theresources of the West were becomingincreasingly strained from both internal andexternal threats, the treaty had one majoradvantage: it saved most of Numidia,Byzacena and Africa Proconsularis –including Carthage, the point of export formost African grain – from the Vandals.6Although there was political and religiousconfusion following the Vandal invasion,the actual damage to the economy waslimited, and there is little doubt that after

435 grain exports to Rome were resumed.Carthage itself was the third-largest city

of the empire, only Constantinople andRome itself having greater populations. Bythe end of the fourth century it has beenestimated that it may have had a populationas high as 100,000.7 The main task ofCarthage was to act as the administrativecentre of Africa Proconsularis and as themain port for the distribution of goodsbrought from the interior and from smallerports along the coast. Anyone in control ofCarthage would be able to impose taxes onthe goods being exported, so becomingfantastically rich.

The net result of these factors was that theprovinces of North Africa had extremelyhigh productivity but were low onmaintenance, and so were the major netcontributor to the financial stability of theWest. Furthermore, surplus revenues from

Africa were vital to the maintenance of thearmed forces.8 However, this should not beoverestimated. The largest estates wereowned by relatively few men, who were themost powerful and influential in Italy.These individuals did not want men fromtheir estates being conscripted into thearmy, nor did they want to pay the taxesnecessary to furnish new recruits. AlthoughAfrica was vital to the economy, thepolitical power of the major landownerswas a source of constant friction betweenthe emperor, the magister militum and theSenate.

THE VANDALSThe Vandals had now achieved a positionsuperior even to that of the Goths in Gaul.Gaiseric had a military position, hisfollowers were settled in some of the mostprosperous areas of the West and, mostimportantly, the main armies left in the

West were focused upon the defence of Gaulrather than on opposing the Vandals inAfrica. The improvement in the fortunes ofGaiseric’s people since the attack of theGoths in 416 was immeasurable. Yet as hasalready been noted, Gaiseric does notappear to have been content with this new-found security. From 437 he began to testthe preparedness of Aetius to face theVandals. The piracy of ‘barbarian deserters’implies that Gaiseric was looking at thepossibility of extending his influence inAfrica, a theory reinforced by the fact thathe began to persecute Catholic priests andthe local nobility.9 Both of these actionssuggest that Gaiseric had not fulfilled hisultimate ambition, especially since thepersecution of clergy and nobles suggeststhat he was aiming at removing all of thoseindividuals who could lead indigenousresistance to his aims. He replaced the

departing Roman nobles and clergymenwith Vandal nobles and Arian clergymen.10

THE FALL OF CARTHAGEWhen it was clear to Gaiseric that Aetius’attention was focused upon the war againstthe Goths in Gaul, Gaiseric decided that, ifhe did not act whilst the Roman army wasoccupied, he might never again get thechance. He had twice defeated the army ofAfrica, once when it had been reinforced bytroops from the East, so confidence wouldhave been high. It is almost certain that by439 the Eastern troops had returned homewith Aspar. Furthermore, it is unknownwhether the troops Boniface took to Italy toface Aetius in 432 were ever returned toAfrica. Consequently, it is clear that Gaisericwas facing a very weak army in Africa, butone that could be reinforced from Italyshould the war against the Goths be won.With these considerations in mind, he now

took the last, fateful step on the journey ofthe Vandals. In an act of supreme politicaldaring, he led his army out of the areasallotted to them and advanced towardsCarthage, breaking the treaty of friendshiphe had agreed with Rome.11

On 19 October 439 Geiseric arrivedoutside the walls of Carthage.12 There islittle primary information for the manner ofGeiseric’s attack on the city, the mainevidence being that he took it by a‘stratagem’ or ‘trickery’.13 As a militaryofficial of the empire, there can be littledoubt that he could easily gain entry to thecity with a small bodyguard, after which theopening of the gates would have been asimple matter.

Whatever method he used, once inside heunleashed the Vandals. The Vandal sack ofCarthage is usually seen as being a viciousepisode. Prosper claims that Gaiseric:

Put its citizens to various kinds oftorture and took all their wealth ashis own. Nor did he refrain fromspoiling the churches. Emptyingthem of their sacred vessels, anddepriving them of the attention oftheir priests, he ordered that theyno longer be places of divineworship but quarters for his people.He was harsh towards the entirecaptive population but particularlyhostile to the nobility and clergy sothat no one could tell whether hewas waging war more against manor God.

Prosper s.a. 439

This passage is illuminating, if interpretedcorrectly. It is clear that the aristocracywere targeted by Gaiseric in order toremove them and replace them with his own

nobles.14 Many of the landowners fled toItaly. Those who left had their landsconfiscated by the Vandals.15 The events aresimilarly described by Victor of Vita, whonotes that the ‘old class of freemen,freeborn, and noble’ were condemned toslavery.16

Prosper also states that Gaiseric wantedhis people to settle in abandoned churches.In this context it is likely that the phrase ‘hispeople’ should really refer to the VandalArian clergy. The claim is reinforced byHydatius, who claims that Gaisericimmediately began a persecution of the‘Catholics’.17

These accounts combine to paint a pictureof a violent sack of the city, yet this may bemisleading. The dual attack on the CatholicChristian church and the aristocracyprobably had three aims. One was toremove the leading clergy and aristocrats

who could lead resistance to Gaiseric’stakeover. A second was to release lands thatcould then be used to reward Gaiseric’s loyalfollowers, including the Arian priests.Thirdly, the persecution of Catholic clergywould result in the Donatists, and otherChristian sects who had been recentlypersecuted, transferring their loyalty toGaiseric.

Consequently, it is probably far better toaccept that on the whole the ‘sack’ ofCarthage was more of an exercise inevicting the clergymen and the aristocracy –the potential leaders of resistance – fromCarthage rather than a wholesaledestruction of the city, although the Vandalwarriors were no doubt let loose to enter thecity and spread terror and disruption, soensuring that there would be no attempt atdefence by the population.

After the first attack was over the troops

at large gained at least some of its booty forthemselves, but not too much: Gaiseric wasable to pass a decree ordering ‘that eachperson [citizen of Carthage] was to bringforward whatever gold, silver, gems anditems of costly clothing he had’, hardlynecessary or successful if the city had beenransacked as described since the vastmajority of these goods would otherwisehave been taken by the Vandal troops.18

Many of the Catholic clergy and Romanaristocracy fled from Africa and arrived inItaly as refugees.19 No doubt their horrorstories heavily influenced Prosper’s accountof the capture of Carthage. In themeantime, the lands in Africa Proconsularisowned by absentee landlords who hadalways lived in Italy were also seized byGaiseric and divided as he thought best fit.20

However, there is little evidence that oncethe initial conquest was over Gaiseric

ordered a full persecution of Catholics.21

RAVENNAThe capture of Carthage was a major blowto the empire. In one fell swoop Gaiserichad stripped the West, and especially Italy,of its major grain supplies and a large partof its tax base. Since the capture of Carthagetook place on 19 October 439, it is unlikelythat news of the event reached Ravennauntil early in 440, and a novel issued byValentinian concerning the employment ofdecurions (city officials) in January 440makes no mention of the loss of Africa.22

Although unrecorded, there can be littledoubt that panic swept Rome when thenews of the Vandal success arrived. Aetiusand Valentinian now had to securealternative sources of grain for the imperialcity. The likelihood is that in the firstinstance Aetius followed the example set byStilicho during the ‘Revolt of Gildo’ in Africa

by arranging for emergency supplies ofgrain to be transported to Rome from Gauland Spain.23 However, a series of novellaewere now issued in order to prepare thewest for the emergency.

The first of those still extant is dated to 2March 440 and was concerned specificallywith the military aspects of the crisis, as itordered a conscription of troops to meet theemergency. With the Vandals at large in theMediterranean, there was a need to enlargethe number of troops at the empire’sdisposal, and in an attempt to strengthenthe army a simultaneous novel was issued,entitled De Tironibus et de OccultatoribusDesertorum (Concerning Recruits and thoseHiding Deserters), announcing that alllandowners should furnish the correctnumber of recruits for the army anddeclaring the punishment for those who didnot do so and instead harboured these

deserters.24 It is also possible that a lostnovel calling for a new conscription oftroops, which is referred to in a novel of444, also dates to this period.25

The further novel was concerned with thelogistical aspect of the loss of Africa.26 Up tothis time Greek merchants had been allowedto trade only under severe restriction in theWest, no doubt in an attempt to protect theeconomy in the face of strong Easterncompetition. With the loss of Africa themarkets of Rome were opened to Greekmerchants, and an attempt was made to fixthe price of goods, no doubt especiallygrain, to ensure that prices remained stable.The need to avoid fluctuating prices wasmade even more important by the fact thatthe West had lost the most important taxbase for its financial stability.

As has already been noted, the surplusrevenues from Africa were a major factor in

the maintenance of the armed forces.Without Africa, the west would struggle tomaintain its army. To make matters worse,tax collectors were collecting double theamount of taxes required by law andkeeping the surplus half. This was obviouslycausing huge levels of resentment and alsodestroying the tax base. In an attempt tostop the practice, a law was passedspecifically ordering tax collectors to stop,although the law appears to have had littleeffect.27

In the same novel in which Greekmerchants were allowed into Italy it wasordered that the walls of Rome were to berepaired to defend against any attack by theVandals.28 At the same time it would appearthat attempts were made to repair andupgrade the fortifications of Naples.29 Thesemeasures to defend the West werenecessary. Prior to the seizure of Carthage

the Vandals had captured a small fleet whenthey had moved into the south of Spain,probably the one based at Cartagena.Although this had allowed them to beginraiding the western Mediterranean, theWest still had enough ships to pose a threatto them if they attempted to raid eitherSicily or Italy. With their rapid seizure ofCarthage the Vandals had captured theRoman fleet that was permanently stationedthere. Although the fleet was most likelytransport ships rather than warships, thisinstantly made the Vandals a naval force tobe reckoned with as it allowed Gaiseric totransport a much larger force anywhere inthe Mediterranean. Moreover, itsimultaneously reduced the ships availableto the West, so making it harder forValentinian and Aetius to counter Vandalmoves. Gaiseric now determined to use hisnewly won fleet.

When news was received in Ravenna thatGaiseric ‘had led forth from the port ofCarthage a large fleet’ it was suddenlyrealized that with their new fleet theVandals could strike anywhere along thecoast, and having troops in the correct placeto defend against them would be extremelylucky. As a result, a novel entitled De RedditoJure Armorum (Restoration of the Right to useWeapons) was issued, countermanding a lawof 364 that declared that ‘No personwhatever, without Our knowledge andadvice, shall be granted the right to employany weapons whatsoever’:30

Genseric, the enemy of Our Empire,is reported to have led forth fromthe port of Carthage a large fleet,whose sudden excursion andfortuitous depredation must befeared by all shores. Although thesolicitude of Our Clemency is

stationing garrisons throughoutvarious places and the army of themost invincible EmperorTheodosius, Our Father, will soonapproach, and although We trustthat the Most Excellent Patrician,Our Aetius, will soon be here with alarge band and the Most illustriousMaster of Soldiers, Sigisvuldus,does not cease to organize guardsof soldiers and federated allies forthe cities and shores, nevertheless,because it is not sufficientlycertain, under summertimeopportunities for navigation, towhat shore the ships of the enemycan come. We admonish each andall by this edict that, withconfidence in Roman strength andthe courage with which they oughtto defend their own, with their own

men against the enemy, if theoccasion should so demand, theyshall use those arms which theycan, but they shall preserve thepublic discipline and themoderation of free birthunimpaired. Thus shall they guardthe provinces and their ownfortunes with faithful harmony andwith joined shields.

Nov. Val. 9.1 (24 June, 440)

The same novel also demonstrates that alongwith ordering the citizens to arm themselvesother measures were being taken for thedefence of Italy. Aetius had been recalledfrom Gaul and was gathering troops prior tomarching to the defence of Italy, and themagister militum Sigisvult was deployingthose troops stationed in Italy to defendagainst the impending attack.31 The novelalso proves that by June 440 the scale of the

emergency was so great that envoys hadalready been sent to the East andTheodosius II had instantly agreed to sendtroops. Unfortunately, the fact that the Eastwas under great pressure from the Hunswould result in a delay in the arrival of thepromised reinforcements.

In other areas too things were not goingas smoothly as Valentinian would havehoped. In particular, Aetius was havingdifficulty in Gaul. The main cause of this islikely to have been a decision made byAetius: ‘abandoned country properties of thecity of Valence were given over for divisionto the Alans who were led by Sambida(Sangiban)’, possibly the same Alan ‘king’known as ‘Sangibanus’ who was to featurelater in Aetius’ life.32 The decision may havebeen the cause of an argument betweenAetius and Albinus, who was probably thePraefectus Praetorio Galliarum (Praetorian

Prefect of Gaul).33 The mutual hostility onlyappears to have been soothed and the‘friendship restored’ by the intervention ofDeacon Leo, later to become the Bishop(Pope) of Rome.34 It is possible that thesettlement of the Alans was also the cause ofthe ‘disturbances’ in Gaul that Aetius wasforced to pacify before he was able to returnto Italy.35 Whatever the nature of thesedisturbances, by June 440 Aetius wasexpected to arrive in Italy.

Earlier, in January, a novel had beenissued that abolished all tax exemptions.36

This was doubtless aimed specifically at thearistocracy and was a demonstration thatthe financial condition of the west wasbecoming alarming and that the loss of therevenues of Africa was a crippling blow.Equally certain is that opposition to the lawwill have arisen amongst the aristocracy.

Aetius did indeed return to Italy in June.

Once there a novel was issued, dated 4 June,aimed at halting the abuses of tax collectorsby allowing complaints against them to bejudged by the Praetorian Prefect, ratherthan the comites (counts) of the treasuries.37

It would appear that this measure may havebeen attempting to stop the abuses ofimperial tax collectors in Gaul, Aetius’ mainpower base.38 The measure was proposed byPetronius Maximus, the praefectus praetoriohimself. It was opposed by Paterius, a manfamous for his influence at court.39 Therenow began a long struggle between Aetiusand opposing factions at court.40 Pateriushimself later became Praefectus praetorioItaliae and repealed the law in a novel issuedon 27 September 442.41 The most likelycause of opposition to Aetius’ policies wasthe unhappiness of the Senate with the newnovel. This stopped the flow of income to thebureaucratic elite involved with the

collection of taxes, who were eithermembers of, or intimately connected to, theSenate.

GAISERICGaiseric had become a major threat to thesecurity of the West. Yet this was not theonly danger. With a fleet at his disposal,even the court at Constantinople fearedattack.42 Although the nature and the datingof the building work on the Sea of Marmarahas been questioned, the fact that it could beassociated with the Vandal threat by theauthor of the Chronicon Paschaledemonstrates the alarm that was caused inthe East by the Vandal seizure of Africa.43

In the meantime, Gaiseric did not remainidle. Unwilling to allow the West to regainthe initiative and determined to putpressure on the government in Ravenna toreach a compromise, he gathered his fleet

and set sail for Sicily, laying siege toPanormus, the island’s main naval base.44

Taking the city would not only allow him toforce the emperor to accede to his seizure ofCarthage: it would also allow Gaiseric tocapture yet more ships to add to his fleet.

At least one group of Vandals crossed theStraits of Messina to raid Bruttium.45

However, Gaiseric’s campaign in the islandwas to end without permanent gain: in astrange irony one of Aetius’ major enemiesgave him, and the West, an unexpectedrelief from Vandal attacks.

SEBASTIANIn 432, after the death of Boniface, his son-in-law Sebastian had taken the position ofmagister militum before being driven outupon the return of Aetius. Sebastian had fledto Constantinople, but once established hehad allowed his followers to engage in

‘piratical’ activities in the Hellespont andPropontis.46 With his position becominginsecure, Sebastian had finally fled fromConstantinople, attempting to take refugewith Theoderic and the Goths in Aquitaine.47

Rebuffed, he had fled to Barcelona, butbeing declared a public enemy had left andtravelled to Africa.48

When Gaiseric was informed thatSebastian had landed he feared that he wasintent on using his father-in-law’sreputation to raise an army and retakeAfrica. Gaiseric was doubtless aware of theloyalty of Africa to Boniface. Furthermore,by the end of the year Gaiseric must havebeen aware that Theodosius had promised tosend aid to the West, as claimed in the novelalready mentioned from June 440.49 Thedouble threat of a Roman commander inAfrica and an invasion from Constantinopleensured that Gaiseric returned to Carthage.

Either late in 440 or early in 441 Gaisericleft Sicily. The actual date is unknown, but aletter from Paschasinus, Bishop ofLilybaeum, to Pope Leo I implies that thedate may have been early in 441.50

However, at least some of Gaiseric’s fearswere unfounded: Sebastian had actuallygone to Gaiseric in the hope of gainingasylum from his Roman enemies.51 Thishope was to be mistaken. Fearing hismilitary abilities, a short time after hisarrival Gaiseric had him executed.52

It would have been a great relief to theemperor and Aetius when Gaiseric leftSicily. Yet it was not all good news: thedamage caused by the Vandals forcedValentinian to lower the assessment of taxesin Sicily and the surrounding islands to one-seventh of their pre-attack level.53 The novelalso notes that Syracuse, Aetna, Lilybaeum,Thermae, Solus and other places were to be

treated differently, but unfortunately thetext after the word ‘Solus’ has been lost andso their treatment is unknown.

At some point early in 441 Aetius learnedthe news that the east was finally sendingan army to help in the reconquest ofAfrica.54 This piece of good news wasechoed by a second, more personal one.Either in late 440 or early 441 Pelagia gavebirth to a son, Gaudentius.55 Possibly priorto this Aetius also had a daughter, althoughwhether her mother was Carpilio’s daughteror Pelagia is unknown. She appears to havebeen married to Thraustila, who was eithera Hun or a Goth who served Aetius,probably as a bucellarius. Thraustila laterjoined Valentinian’s bodyguard and was toplay a major part in events after the deathof his father-in-law.56

Buoyed by the news that he now had twosons and that the east was sending an

expedition to help the west, Aetius began toprepare for the upcoming campaign, whichwould begin when the weather cleared inthe spring to allow the eastern fleet to sailthe Mediterranean in safety.

Chapter 10

The Treaty of 442

440Although the Vandal seizure of Africaremained the focal point of activitiesthroughout 440, other events continued tounfold. One of these was the renewal ofhostilities with the Sueves in Spain. Thecause of the war is unknown, but Aetius atonce resorted to the tried-and-tested tacticof sending Censurius as an envoy to theSueves. On this occasion the tactic failed:instead of negotiating a peace treaty,

Censurius was forced to take refuge inMartylis (Mertola) and endure a siege bythe Sueves. Eventually he was forced tosurrender under terms and was takenprisoner.1 It would appear that he remaineda captive with the Sueves until 448, whenhe was murdered at Hispalis by a mannamed Agiulfus.2

441Throughout 441 and into 442 the attentionof the Western court remained fixated onevents taking place in Africa and Sicily andon the financial measures needed to supportthe army. In March 441 a series of novelswas passed enforcing taxes upon the richand upon the guilds, who were claimingmany exemptions due to the privilegesgiven to them by earlier emperors.3 Yetalthough the focus was to the south,pressure remained on the remainder of the

West. At some point either late in 440 orearly in 441 Aetius received news of amajor bacaudic rebellion in Tarraconensis.With the Goths in Gaul now at peace, andwith the troops from the East expected,Aetius decided to send an expedition toSpain. Accordingly, Astyrius, the father-in-law of Merobaudes, was promoted to thepost of comes et magister utriusque militia andsent to Spain to suppress the revolt.4

The appointment as magister utriusquemilitiae is attested by two separate sources.The first is Hydatius, where Astyrius iscalled ‘a general of both services’.5 Thesecond is by an ivory diptych found atLiege:

Fl(avius) Ast<e = Y>rius v(ir)c(larissimus) et inl(ustris) com(es) exmag(istro) utriusq(ue) mil(itiae)cons(ul) ord(inarius)

CIL XII 10032.2 = ILS 1300

The appointment is unusual in that bothbefore and after this date Sigisvult isattested as magister utriusque militiae,implying that he held the post continuouslyunder the supreme command of Aetius.Therefore, either Sigisvult remained in postand Astyrius was appointed to a special,one-off command for the campaign inSpain, or Sigisvult stood down and wasreplaced for a short period before beingreinstated to his former post. If Sigisvultwas replaced and reinstated, there thenremains the possibility that this happenedmore than once, but the event is notmentioned by the surviving sources. If this isthe case, Aetius may have used the juniorpost of magister utriusque militiae to rewardhis loyal followers on a periodic, rotationalbasis. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that thisquestion will ever be resolved, but it is most

likely that Astyrius was given a one-off postto ensure his seniority in Spain, whilesSigisvult remained as magister, but wasoccupied with the preparations for theAfrican campaign.

Map 10. Africa, Spain and the East

The speed at which the expedition wassent to Spain probably relates to the need of

the government for the revenues lost whenthe ‘rebellion’ in Spain began and the needto reconquer quickly the area in order tohelp replenish the imperial coffers. In fact,the loss of the African taxes was such that inMarch 441 a novel issued by Valentinianadmitted that imperial reserves were almostgone.6

Once in Spain Astyrius quickly began asavage campaign in order to destroy the‘rebels’. According to Hydatius he‘slaughtered the Bacaudae of Tarraconensisin large number’.7 The savagery of theattack was probably due to the fact that thearmy was needed elsewhere in Spain. TheSueves were attempting to expand theircontrol yet again. In 439 they had capturedEmerita, and at some point in 441, possiblyafter their old king Hermericus had finallypassed away after a four-year illness, theirnew king Rechila captured Hispalis (Seville)

and took control of Baetica andCarthaginiensis.8 Coupled with the loss ofTarraconensis to the bacaudae, it was clearthat unless serious steps were taken Spain,like Africa, would slip from imperialcontrol.

It may seem surprising that with theSueves expanding their dominions andtaking control of both Baetica andCarthaginiensis the focus of Aetius was onthe bacaudae of Tarraconensis. Yetstrategically this was the most sensibleoption. Prior to any military campaignagainst the Sueves the army in Spain wouldneed to ensure a secure base from which tooperate. Without this, a campaign thatended in defeat would result in disaster,since the defeated troops would havenowhere to go. Furthermore, the dissidentsin Tarraconensis were declaring theirseparation from the empire. As rebels, once

the leaders were caught they would beexecuted and their belongings confiscatedby the emperor. In dire straits financially,any revenue would be welcome. Althoughthe Sueves now had a large area under theirimmediate control, they did not have theforces to defend these new territoriesagainst a concerted imperial attack, as longas the imperial forces had a base from whichto operate. As a result, and as was usual inlate imperial politics, internal rebellionsalways took precedence over barbarianinvasion.

The African ExpeditionUnfortunately the sources for the Africanexpedition are few and brief. However, withcare it is possible to reconstruct a sequenceof events that explain the actions andmotives of the people involved. However, itshould be noted that this recreation ishypothetical and other interpretations are

possible.At an unknown date in 441 a large fleet

was dispatched from Constantinople, boundfor Sicily.9 The equipping and organizationof the campaign was allocated, according toEvagrius, to Cyrus, the Praefectus PraetorioOrientis.10 It appears that an otherwise-unknown individual named Pentadius wasthe man who actually ensured that the armywas well equipped once it had arrived.11

Both Prosper and Theophanes give a fewdetails concerning the expedition.

Theodosius opened hostilities withthe Vandals by sending thegenerals Ariobindus, Ansila, andGermanus with a large fleet. Theydeferred the business with longdelays and proved to be more of aburden to Sicily than a help toAfrica.

Prosper s.a. 441

Theodosius sent out 1100 cargoships with a Roman armycommanded by the generalsAreobindus, Ansilas, Inobindos,Arintheos, and Germanus. Gizerichwas struck with fear when thisforce moored in Italy and he sentan embassy to Theodosius todiscuss a treaty.

Theophanes 5941

Surprisingly, Aspar, the magister militum whohad campaigned in Africa against Gaisericbetween 430 and 434, remained behindwhen it could be expected that he lead thecampaign. This was probably due to risingtensions between Constantinople and boththe Persians and the Huns, demanding the

attention of Theodosius’ most trustedgeneral.12 He may also have manipulatedevents so that he remained near the capital:the example of Aetius and his predecessorsin the West may have provided a model thatthe generals in the east still had hopes ofemulating, however remote.

Of the generals mentioned, Ariobinduswas magister militum, and probably thesenior officer as magister militumpraesentalis.13 Germanus was almostcertainly the magister militum vacansmentioned in the Code of Justinian.14 SinceAnsila is included in both lists it is possiblethat he also was a magister militum, butotherwise he is unknown.15 Inobindos andArintheos are only mentioned byTheophanes and not by Prosper, implyingthat they were of lesser rank. Neither isknown beyond Theophanes’ reference.16

This list of commanders, along with the

number of vessels carrying the troops,suggests that this was a significant militaryexpedition, probably comprising the bulk ofthe praesental army stationed inConstantinople as well as elements of thefield army of Thrace. The commanderswould expect to receive furtherreinforcements from the West.

Despite their orders to invade Africa, theexpedition reached Sicily and then stopped.Once ashore, according to Prosper, they‘deferred the business with long delays andproved to be more of a burden to Sicily thana help to Africa’.17 There are at least twolikely causes for the delay. The first is theneed to co-ordinate the forces of East andWest, for example deciding who would leadwhich units and formations, and mostespecially who would be in overall charge ofthe army. In a similar manner, Belisarius, inhis campaign against the Vandals almost a

century later in 533, took advantage ofdelays in the sea voyage fromConstantinople to Sicily to order his troopsand to allocate commands.18

The second is that it is almost certain thatorders to stop the attack swiftly arrivedfrom Constantinople whilst negotiationswere entered into with Gaiseric’s envoys.Since the reign of Arcadius the East hadpreferred to husband its armies, insteadusing diplomacy and its seemingly endlesssupplies of money in order to ‘subsidize’potential attackers. The prospective attackupon Gaiseric had caused Gaiseric to panicand send envoys. Gaiseric had been able todefeat the armies in Africa, but he knewthat he could not defeat the combinedpraesental armies of East and West. At thesame time, following their traditionalpolicy, if at all possible the East wouldprefer to reach a peaceful solution to the

problem of Africa.Yet there was a more pressing reason for

Theodosius to want a quick ending to thewar against Gaiseric. In 441, even as theexpedition was setting sail, the Persians hadattacked Theodosiopolis (Erzerum) andSatala (Sadagh) in the east (see Map 10).The cause of the war was simple. TheRomans had begun building andstrengthening the defensible frontier systemin the east. Furthermore, earlier, theRomans had agreed to subsidize Persiandefences at the Caspian Gates, the mainarea of weakness where the Huns had in395 crossed into Persian and Romanterritory. For internal propaganda purposesthe Persians referred to these subsidies as‘tribute’ and Theodosius, unhappy with theclaim, stopped the payments. With Romandefences being built and the subsidy beingwithheld, the Persians attacked. Aspar and

Anatolius may have been sent to deal withthe invasion.19 Although the war was ofshort duration, ending in June 441, it wasclear that any attempt to evict the Vandalsfrom Africa could result in the Persiansinvading the east.20

Unfortunately, the war against thePersians was not the worst event for theEast in 441. Whilst the majority of thepraesental and Thracian armies were inSicily, the Huns attacked Thrace.21 When anembassy was sent to ask for the reasons forthe attack, Attila and Bleda complainedabout the actions of the Bishop of Margus,who had allegedly robbed the royal tombsacross the frontier. They demandedrestitution and that the bishop be handedover.22 When this did not happen, theyinvaded Thrace, capturing the cities ofViminacium, Singidunum and Naissus in theprocess (see Map 10).23 The Huns may also

have captured Sirmium at this time,although this is not certain.24 When theBishop of Margus realized that he was aboutto be handed over, he went to the Huns andoffered to betray Margus to them inexchange for his safety. They accepted thedeal and duly captured Margus.25 The Hunswent on to ‘devastate’ Illyricum.26

At the same time internal rivalries withinthe Eastern command system also appear tohave raised their head. John, a Vandal whowas magister militum per Thracias, was‘treacherously killed by Arnegisclus’, one ofhis subordinates.27 It is possible that onereason for his death is that he was a Vandaland that his death was a reaction to theVandal invasion of Africa. However, it ismore likely that the execution was part ofthe internal political fighting in the Eastand may have been sanctioned by the courtin Constantinople.28 His position as magister

militum suggests that he was an able soldier,and his death is a clear indication that thewar effort against the Huns was to behampered by internal politics.

Despite the internal problems, Anatoliusand Aspar gathered their armies and facedthe Huns.29 At this point, and for anunknown reason, Attila and Bleda decidedto accept a one-year truce and withdrewfrom Illyricum.30

Theodosius was now under intensepressure and could not afford to fight a waron more than one front, especially as thewar against the Vandals would be foughtwith troops withdrawn specifically fromThrace. Accordingly, he was willing to agreeterms with Gaiseric that would otherwisehave been unacceptable. Furthermore,unable to muster enough forces to reconquerAfrica on his own due to the ongoing warsin other theatres, Aetius would be forced to

accept any treaty agreed by Theodosius.

The Treaty of 442It is unfortunate that no comprehensive listof the terms of the treaty of 442 still exists.Instead, estimates of the terms have to bemade from the fragments that remain inexistence. Two of the most important ofthese are to be found in Prosper andProcopius. The statement in Prosper’schronicle is very brief:

The Augustus Valentinian madepeace with Gaiseric and Africa wasdivided between the two intodistinct territories.

Prosper s.a. 442

The report in Procopius is slightly moredetailed, but unfortunately, as seen earlier,it is also slightly confused. It would appear

that he has conflated the treaties of 435 and442, which, given the timescale between thetreaties and Procopius’ writing, isunderstandable:

[Gaiseric] made a treaty with theEmperor Valentinian providingthat each year he should pay to theemperor tribute from Libya, and hedelivered over one of his sons,Honoric, as a hostage to make thisagreement binding.

Procopius 3.4.13

The use of the term ‘Libya’ is clearly fromthe earlier Treaty of 435, since there is nomention of the Vandals taking AfricaProconsularis and Carthage. However, thepaying of ‘tribute’ and the sending ofHuneric (Honoric) as ‘hostage’ both appearto refer to the Treaty of 442.

The specific nature of the ‘tribute’ isunknown. However, given that whenGaiseric had first captured Carthage he hadcut the supplies of grain to Italy, it is almostcertain that the term refers to therestoration and continuation of the grainsupply from Africa. Since the provinces inAfrica produced a very large excess of grain,this was a small price for Gaiseric to pay inreturn for being accepted as the ruler ofAfrica.31

To help cement the treaty, Gaiseric’s son,Huneric, was sent as a hostage to Ravenna.His time in the capital was to be very wellspent. Merobaudes describes this period as asuccess, especially since it resulted inHuneric becoming attached to the imperialfamily.32 Prior to the reading ofMerobaudes’ poems, which occurred sometime around the year 443, Huneric hadbecome engaged to Eudocia, daughter of the

emperor Valentinian.33 Interestingly, thiswas in direct contravention of the lawpassed by Valentinian and Valens and onlyrecently ratified by its inclusion in theTheodosian Code.34 This would not be thefirst time that a female member of theimperial family had been forced to marry abarbarian: Galla Placidia had been marriedto Athaulf in 414. It is possible, however,that the betrothal was not a seriousproposition but was merely a ruse aimed atensuring that Gaiseric continued to adhereto the terms of the treaty. If that is true, thebetrothal was a counterbalance to Hunericbecoming a hostage. Gaiseric may haveasked for a daughter of the emperor ascounter-hostage to Huneric, but as theimperial family did not exchange hostagesfrom its members, the betrothal did give amodicum of assurance to Gaiseric that hisson would be safe.

Although this was most likely a separateagreement from the treaty and representsHuneric’s acceptance at court as much as hisfather’s capture of Carthage, the betrothalhad one immediate side-effect: Huneric’smarriage to the daughter of the Gothic kingTheoderic was annulled. Possibly in anattempt to place the blame on her, she wasaccused of attempting to poison Huneric. Inretaliation, she was mutilated – her noseand ears were cut off – and sent back to herfather.35 Much to the approval of Aetius, thealliance between the Vandals and the Gothshad ended in dramatic fashion. However,since Huneric would now be theoretically inline for the throne, Eudocia’s claim toinheritance was declared ineligible to avoida barbarian being Valentinian’s heir.Pulcheria thus became the heir apparent inthe West.36

Merobaudes may also give a further detail

on the nature of the agreement, althoughthis is slightly more conjectural. In thesecond panegyric he ‘uses the adjectivesocius [which] with other tenuous evidencesuggest that the Empire bestowed onGaiseric the ancient status of socius etamicus cum foedere’ (ally and friend bytreaty).37 This would help explain both thefact that the empire could accept theVandals’ occupation of Africa and the factthat Gaiseric continued to honour the treatyin the future, since he was now beingacknowledged as virtually the equal of theemperor. This impression would have beenreinforced by the prospective marriagebetween Huneric and Eudocia.

AfricaSecure in his position, Gaiseric was nowable to distribute lands and positions ofpower as he thought fit, steadfast in theknowledge that he was safe from attack by

the empire.

Byzacena, Abaritana and Gaetulia,and part of Numidia he kept forhimself; Zeugitana and theproconsular province he divided upas an allotted portion for hispeople’; and he allowedValentinian . . . to take for himselfthe remaining, and now devastatedprovinces.

Victor of Vita, 1.13

Map 11. The Vandal Settlement of 442

The fact that the parts of Numidia,Mauretania Caesariensis and Sitifensis thathad been returned as part of the treaty hadbeen ‘devastated’ by the Vandal occupationis reinforced by the novels of Valentinian,which mention the large reduction in taxesthat the regained provinces had to pay inorder to allow them to recover – only one-eighth of the pre-Vandal assessment.38

The remainder of the African territory,Africa Proconsularis, Byzacena, Tripolitania

and parts of Numidia, were now ruled bythe Vandals. Most of the territory remainedunder Gaiseric’s direct control, but he ‘gavethe best and richest land [AfricaProconsularis] to his sons and the Vandalpeople’, although Carthage itself remainedin his own hands, and he established hisroyal palace on Byrsa, the Acropolis ofCarthage.39 This territory was later knownas the sortes Vandalorum (‘lot’/‘allotment’ ofthe Vandals), which, despite moderninterpretations, is used by Victor of Vitasimply to mean ‘land of the Vandals’. Thenature of these divisions is confused andopen to interpretation, with some historiansclaiming that the land of the dispossessedRoman senators was given to the troops,whilst others claim that it was the incomefrom the land, not the land itself, that wasdistributed.40

It is probable that only the income from

the land was given, following the Romantradition of ‘honesta missio’, which in returnbrought hereditary service in the army, afact which Gaiseric would have approved.41

The net result was that the Vandals simplytook the place of the empire, as the Vandalnobles ‘effectively stepped into the shoes ofthe Roman authorities that had ruled Africapreviously and took over the existingadministrative regime, including the taxsystem’, whilst the warriors received thetraditional stipends of regular Romantroops, plus land out of the fisc (imperialexchequer) and agri deserti (uninhabitedlands), whilst remaining billeted in towns –mainly Carthage.42 The remaining Romanspaid their usual taxes, but to the king, notthe emperor: the only difference in thesecases appears to have been that the leasesissued by the Vandals were dated by theregnal year of the Vandal king, rather than

using the Roman dating system.43

If the Vandal warriors took the place ofthe Roman army, Gaiseric and the Vandalnobility took the place of the emperor andthe aristocratic landowners. This simplechange of ‘landlord’ doubtless eased thetransformation from Roman to VandalAfrica, as well as proving simple for thenew Vandal rulers to understand and keeptrack of. However, the maintenance ofRoman institutions can easily result in thesuffering and dislocation caused by theVandal takeover being minimized. Thetakeover was not peaceful and doubtlessinvolved forceful evictions and deaths.

In fact, Gaiseric’s actions in annexing thelands of powerful, rich absentee landlordsand in forcing the resident Romanlandowners to flee resulted in a largepressure group in Ravenna agitating for therecovery of Africa. Under the constant

threat of invasion, Gaiseric doubtlessretained a large proportion of his troops inCarthage rather than allowing them todisperse in order to farm personally. Itshould be noted, however, that once theimmediate threat of invasion had passed theattitude of Gaiseric to the dispossessedRomans did in some respects relent. Latersome of them returned to Africa and at leastsome of their property was returned.44 Atthis time some of the Vandal troops mayhave been released from immediate service,especially those who had been involved inthe fighting since before 429, who may havebeen close to retirement age, to begin theirnew lives as farmers and landholders, andthe likelihood is that at the end of theVandal kingdom the only differencebetween the Vandals and the ‘native’Romans was that the Vandals served in thearmy.

Catholic churches were given to the newArian clergy, as was some of the landconfiscated from the Roman aristocracy, nodoubt in order to make them selfsufficientand a powerful force to support the king.When Gaiseric later allowed some of theRoman aristocracy to return, the land‘donated’ to the church was not restored tothe returning Romans.45

Furthermore, despite the ancientportrayal of a rigid demarcation betweenthe Vandal conquerors and the nativeRomans, close analysis of the sourcessuggests that there was a ‘much more porousborder between Arian and Nicene and muchmore traffic across it than our sources arewilling to disclose’.46 Although there wasalways a divide between the Arian Vandalsand their Catholic Christian and Nicenesubjects, laws enforcing a separationbetween Arians and – especially – the

Nicenes explain why later kings orderedpersecutions of Catholics: the law may havebeen needed in order to maintain Vandalidentity and stop them being absorbed intothe majority population.47

In one way, however, Gaiseric was able tochange the nature of African society. Thevast majority of the production of Africawas geared towards supplying Italy withnecessities via the system of annona(supplying goods instead of tax). After theVandal conquest, Africa was freed from thisburden, and although the Vandalsthemselves must have appropriated some ofthe annona for themselves, their demandswere less than those of Rome and Italy.Despite the fact that the ‘tribute’ will havecontinued to siphon goods, especially grain,for the empire, African traders were nowallowed to trade a significant proportion ofthe surplus produce in other markets,

including southern Gaul, Spain, north-western Italy and Sicily.48 Alongside these,trade continued with Rome and SouthernItaly, although now the customers wereexpected to pay for the goods they receivedrather than relying upon government‘donations’ due to the annona.49 Taxes fromthese activities will have helped to financethe embryonic Vandal kingdom.

The treaty was a landmark in Romanaffairs. Although Valentinian and Aetiussaved face by claiming that the Vandals hadsettled in Africa under Roman rule, thereality was that the government in Ravennahad agreed to the ‘permanent’ loss ofterritory to a barbarian king andacknowledged that they did not have thetroops to retake it without help from theEast.50 Yet probably contrary to popularexpectations, the Vandals did not attempt tofurther enlarge their realm until after the

death of Aetius and Valentinian, after whichtime they believed that the treaty of 442was invalid.

In part this was due to the fact that theVandals, and especially Gaiseric, realisedthat they would provoke a further invasionfrom the East if they attempted to attack theWest: after all, it was a matter of luck thatthe eastern expedition had been halted bythe attacks of both the Persians and theHuns. There is no evidence, as suggested bysome historians, that there was a politicaland military agreement between Gaiseric,Attila and Yezdigerd II. Furthermore,Gaiseric may have been following the‘standard barbarian policy’ of attacking theWest when it was weak or divided and ofcoming to terms with the emperor when theWest was stronger and more able to defenditself.51

Yet there was a further factor in the

protracted period of peace following thetreaty of 442: Gaiseric was not yet totallysecure in his ‘kingdom’. Prosper notes thatfollowing the treaty:

Some of Gaiseric’s magnatesconspired against him because hewas proud even among his ownpeople, due to the successfuloutcome of events. But when theundertaking was discovered, theywere subjected to many torturesand killed by him. Whenever othersseemed to venture the same thing,the king’s mistrust served todestroy so many that he lost moremen by this anxiety of his than ifhe had been overthrown in war.

Prosper s.a. 442

As with the Goths, the modern perception

that the Vandals were a unified ‘kingdom’under the rule of Gaiseric conceals thereality of many different nobles and groupsbeing unhappy with the rule of one man.Furthermore it is possible, thoughimprovable, that Aetius and Theodosius hadbeen able to send agents to Africa who hadmanaged to provoke the conspiracy.52 As aconsequence, it would have been very riskyof Gaiseric to provoke another war with theWest, since it was possible that many of hisown followers would change allegiance, soweakening his forces and giving a greaterchance of victory to the Romans.

ItalyDespite the focus on the negative aspects ofthe treaty with the Vandals, at least onearea actually profited from the loss ofAfrica. In the north of Italy the ruralsettlements continued their decline,mirroring the majority of the rest of the

West and notwithstanding their function ofsupplying the ‘imperial capital’ of Ravenna.Yet the rural settlements in the southprospered. Apulia, Basilicata and Lucaniabegan to supply Rome with the grain lostfrom Africa. Furthermore, Samnium andLucania provided the old capital withanimals, especially pigs, and the whole ofthe south now supplied the wine for Romantables. This especially benefited thesenatorial families who had largelandholdings in these areas, since itnaturally increased their financial andpolitical importance.53 It also resulted inthese families wanting the Vandals toremain in Africa, as a Roman recoverywould reduce their own income.

The HunsOnce the treaty was agreed, Theodosiusrecalled the forces in Sicily.54 The timing

was good, as the treaty with the Huns hadexpired and Attila and Bleda had renewedtheir attacks on Illyricum, capturingRatiaria (probably Arzar-Palanca), Naissus(Niš), Phillipopolis (Plovdiv), Arcadiopolis(Lüleburgaz) and Constantia (Constanţa):only Adrianople (Edirne) and Herakleia(Marmara Ereǧlisi) were not captured (seeMap 10).55

Returning to Thrace, the Eastern armyunder Aspar, Areobundus and Ardegisclusmet the Huns in battle, but was repeatedlydefeated.56 However, the Huns wereunwilling to continue the conflict andprobably in mid-442 a peace treaty wasagreed, seemingly involving the payment ofincreased ‘subsidies’ by Theodosius to Attilaand Bleda.57 The reasons for the suddenacceptance of a treaty by the Huns whenthey obviously had the upper hand areunknown. They had devastated the Balkans

and repeatedly defeated the armies thatwere sent against them. There can be littledoubt that the increase in the ‘subsidies’paid by the East were a factor, yet it islikely that there were more reasons for thedecision.

One of these is the outbreak of a‘pestilence’ in 442, which struck theempire.58 If, as is likely, the disease firststruck imperial cities, then it is certain thatthe Huns, who up to that time had beentotally victorious, would be dubious aboutthe wisdom of continuing the war. Attackinginfected cities would increase their chancesof catching the disease. It is likely that thedecision divided the two brothers. Bleda, incontrol of the Huns facing the East, was theone who would be most at risk from aplague already apparent in the Balkans.Although the two joint rulers most likelyusually ruled by consensus, on this occasion

they may have been in completedisagreement. It is possible that Bledaforced Attila to accept the Eastern peacetreaty in 442 simply by ordering his ownforces to withdraw, despite Attila’s desire tocontinue the campaign in order to extractmore concessions. As is so often the case,certainty is impossible.

It should also be noted that, although theywon the battles, the Huns are still likely tohave suffered casualties. The manpowerreserves of the East, unlike the West, werevast and in a war of attrition the Hunswould simply run out of men. Moreover, theHuns needed to maintain a strong militarybase in order to maintain their grip on their‘empire’. They could not afford to go onfighting indefinitely. Their victories and thepayment of tribute ensured that the Hunsclearly emerged triumphant from the warand their high morale and aura of

invincibility was maintained. This madecertain that there would be no rebellionsagainst their rule at home.

In Constantinople, Theodosius wasunhappy with this state of affairs and set inmotion a series of reforms in the Balkans.By September 443 the defences along theDanube were being strengthened untilfinally Theodosius felt that they had beenimproved to the point where there was nolonger any serious threat from the Huns.59

Either in the late 443 or in 444, andpossibly reflecting Roman awareness of theincreased division and tensions betweenAttila and Bleda, the payments to the Hunsstopped.60

The outbreak of pestilence in 442 is anevent that is sometimes overlooked,although it is extremely important. The factthat Hydatius, who usually focused onevents in Spain, took time out to mention it

demonstrates its severity. Although it isunknown which of the various diseases –cholera, diphtheria, smallpox etc. – it was, itis likely that a large percentage of thepopulation, and of the army, died as aresult. For the barbarians who doubtless alsosuffered it was a setback. For Aetius, whowas already short of manpower in the army,it was a calamity.

GaulIn Gaul peace with the Goths and Franks,and the earlier destruction of theBurgundians by the Huns, meant that onlythe bacaudae remained as a threat to thepeace. Aetius probably realized that theeasiest way to discourage yet anotherbacaudic rebellion was to station troopspermanently in the area. Unfortunately, hisRoman troops were needed for regularcampaigns, yet there remained onealternative. The Alans under Goa had first

entered the empire in the invasion of 406,when, in ‘alliance’ with the Vandals and theSueves, they had crossed the Rhine intoGaul. However, unlike the other tribes, theAlans under Goa had quickly foundemployment with the empire and hadcontinued to serve it for the ensuingtwentyfive years. Since the majority of hismen were nearing or beyond retirementage, Goa was undoubtedly asking Aetius forland upon which they could settle. Solvingtwo problems with one stroke, Aetiusdecided to give them lands in ‘Farther Gaul’,which belonged to people associated withthe bacaudic rebellions.61 In this way theAlans received the lands they deserved fortheir faithful service, and at the same timetheir presence inhibited the activities of thebacaudae, lessening the likelihood of anyrebellion within their specific area.

Learning of the decision, the Armoricans

asked (Saint) Germanus of Auxerre tointervene on their behalf. As Goa wasadvancing towards Armorica fully expectinga fight with the natives he was met andstopped by Germanus. Allegedly Goa agreedto wait until Aetius had been informed ofevents and made a decision in the matter.62

The reprieve was short lived. Unfortunatelyfor the natives, Aetius confirmed hisdecision and the Alans and the nativesfought for the land, the Alans emergingvictorious.63 From now on the bacaudaewould operate in the knowledge that therewas a veteran fighting force in theimmediate vicinity willing to oppose them.Affairs in Africa and Gaul now appeared tobe settled, although not necessarily to thecomplete satisfaction of Aetius.

BritainAffairs in Britain at this late stage are

extremely vague and the references given inthe sources are of dubious accuracy andopen to debate. However, the government’sfocus on Africa and, to a lesser extent, Gaulresulted in Britain continuing its slide awayfrom the empire. However one event, datedto 441–442, is worth recording: ‘The Britishprovinces, which up to this time hadendured a variety of disasters andmisfortunes, were subjected to the authorityof the Saxons.’64 The exact meaning of thisstatement has been the cause ofconsiderable debate, which it is notnecessary to consider, but one factor seemsclear: at some time in these years the rule ofthe south-eastern areas of Britain facingGaul passed from ‘Roman’ into ‘Saxon’hands.65 From the early 440s onwards thesouth east of Britain no longer looked to theempire for guidance, instead looking acrossthe North Sea to the Saxon and Jutish

homelands, and turning its energies to theextension of ‘Saxon’ rule ever further west.The Romanized aristocracy in Britain beganto be dispossessed and as a result in place ofthe rule of Roman law the rule of ‘English’law began to emerge. Naturally, many ofthe islanders began to long for the securityof belonging to the empire.

1. Possible diptych of Aetius. However, the attribution is uncertain,

especially as the individual may be older than Aetius at his death.

2. The Sarcophagus of Stilicho. Despite its title, the identity of the

burial is actually unknown and it has been suggested that it may be

Aetius, although this is doubtful.

3. The Mausoleum of Galla Placidia in Ravenna, which contains three

sarcophagi. The largest is attested as being Galla Placidia’s. That on the

left is attested as being Constantius III, whilst that on the right is either

Valentinian III or Honorius. It is now a UNESCO World Heritage site.

4. The interior of Placidia’s Mausoleum in Ravenna.

5. Painting of Galla Placidia from her Mausoleum in Ravenna.

6. Medallions of Honorius and Galla Placidia.

7. Unpublished solidus showing the wedding of Valentinian III and

Licinia Eudoxia. Theodosius II stands in the centre with his hands on

the shoulders of the couple. The imperial couple spent the winter of

437438 in Thessalonica, at which time this coin was struck. (© CNG

coins)

8. Honorius on the Consular diptych of Probus (406).

9. Diptych of Flavius Felix. Valentinian’s first magister militum, he was

killed by order of Aetius. (By kind permission of Antiquité Tardive)

10. An inscription from Altava. The inscription refers to ‘barbarians’

and may be the earliest evidence for the Vandals in Africa.

11. Inscription to Merobaudes recognizing his abilities as an orator.

12. The inscription to Aetius described in Chapter 13. (Courtesy CIL)

13. Close-up of the inscription to Aetius. The length and details of

inscriptions can sometimes add to our knowledge of important

individuals. (Courtesy CIL)

14. Diptych celebrating the consulship of Astyrius, Merobaudes’ father-

in-law, in 449, preserved in Liège. (Courtesy ILS)

15. Silver disc: ‘Aspar at the Games’, made to commemorate Aspar’s

consulship in 434, probably a reward for his long and successful

service in Africa.

16. The Roman amphitheatre at Arles. In the fifth century Arles became

the ‘capital’ of Gaul, and the splendour of its buildings attest to the

importance and wealth of the city. (© Stefan Bauer)

17. A coin allegedly produced for Aetius. Although its provenance is

insecure, some have taken this coin as being proof that he was

intending to seize the throne before he was executed. (beastcoins.com)

18. Coin minted by Boniface in Africa. It is possible to use this coin as

proof of Boniface’s treacherous intentions, yet as with many such

artefacts the purpose is open to interpretation. (beastcoins.com)

19. A Siliqua (small silver coin) produced in Africa by Gaiseric. The

use of such coins demonstrated the independence of the Germanic

ruler, as well as being evidence that the Vandals (and other ‘Germans’)

adopted Roman customs after settling within the empire.

(beastcoins.com)

20. A coin minted by the usurper John. The advantage of studying

coins is that these are sometimes the only representations that remain

of short-lived usurpers, since their monuments were immediately

demolished and defaced. (beastcoins.com)

21 and 22. Two coins minted during the reign of Valentinian III. Both

emphasise the youth of the emperor, a factor that helped Aetius to

dominate the west for so long. (beastcoins.com)

23 and 24. Coins minted for Aelia Pulcheria (left) and Aelia Eudocia

(right). These may show two of the few remaining likenesses of these

women and demonstrate the high standards of dress and comportment

still expected of the imperial family despite the west’s increasing

bankruptcy. (beastcoins.com)

25. A bronze medal showing Attila. The ‘demonic’ wispy beard and the

pointed ears emphasise his later reputation as the ‘Scourge of God’.

26. ‘Attila’s Throne’ in Venice. Although anachronistic (Venice wasn’t

founded until after Attila’s invasion and death), this item demonstrates

the exceptional hold that Attila has had on the western psyche.

27. ‘The Feast of Attila’ by Mór Than (1870). A stereotypical view of

the court of Attila, all of which are based on Priscus, the only

description we have of him and his court. (Hungarian National Gallery,

Budapest)

28. Raphael’s ‘The Meeting between Leo the Great and Attila’. Based

largely upon anachronistic descriptions of the meeting, this image is

now widely accepted as a true picture of events.

29. De Neuville’s depiction of ‘The Huns at the Battle of Chalons’. This

picture demonstrates that the image of ‘eastern hordes’ attacking

Europe still strikes fear into the hearts of the west. It is interesting to

note that there weren’t too many women and babies at the Battle of

Chalons.

30. The countryside around Troyes. This photo shows some of the

typical countryside in the region where the Battle of the Catalaunian

Plains took place. The manner in which the ground rises to a crest

shows the importance for both sides in seizing such a dominant feature.

(© Sean Pruitt)

31. Briullov’s painting ‘Genseric Sacking Rome 455’. The barbarism of

the Vandals is emphasised by the impotence of the Pope, and although

the historical accuracy is minimal, the treasures taken by the Romans

during the sack of Jerusalem are now being taken by the Vandals.

32. Maindron Hippolyte’s ‘Sainte Geneviève et Attila’ in the Musée

Beaux-Arts, Angers. Although a meeting between the two individuals is

almost certainly imaginary, the production of such fine works of art

emphasises both the longevity of Attila’s reputation as well as the need

in the Middle Ages to promote local heroes as saints. (Didier

Ryknerdes)

Chapter 11

After Africa

Although the treaty of 442 was not thedesired outcome, and the aftereffects wouldbe severe, it gave Aetius the breathing spacenecessary to continue his reclamation ofother areas in the West. As an example,Astyrius, father-in-law of Merobaudes,remained on campaign in Spain suppressingthe bacaudae of Tarraconensis.

Yet the troubles of the empire were notover. Even before the treaty had beensigned a new disaster was overtaking the

West: as noted in the previous chapter, in442 a pestilence, the nature of which isunknown, began ‘which spread over almostthe entire world’.1 The blow to an empirealready suffering manpower and economicshortages was catastrophic. Fortunately forthe empire, the barbarians both inside andoutside it were also infected with thedisease, so maintaining the balance ofpower.

On the other hand, it is possibly partly asa result of the disease – or at least theempire’s failure to help those suffering –that in 442 there was yet another revolt ofthe bacaudae in the north of Gaul. Inresponse, Aetius sent one of his personalstaff, Majorian, with a small force of troopsto deal with the rebellion.2 No doubt Aetiusexpected the Alans of Goa, who had settledin the north, to join the imperial forces intheir new conflict.

Majorian was the son of a magistermilitum, also named Majorian, who hadserved in the late-fourth century.3 Alsoserving under Aetius at about this time wasRicimer, whose father was a Sueve andwhose mother was the daughter of theGothic king Wallia.4 Both of these menwould have a huge impact on the destiny ofthe West after Aetius’ death, and it isinteresting to note that they servedalongside each other at this formative timein their lives.

443The treasury, which had already beenweakened by the loss of Africa, was nowforced to take a humanitarian role in thetreatment of the exiles from Africa. Thanksto the loss of income from their estates inAfrica, the refugees were struggling to paytheir taxes. In response, Valentinian issued

a law giving tax relief and financial aid tothe exiles.5 Although it was hoped that thiswould be a temporary measure, it added tothe drain on the imperial coffers.Furthermore, the loss of their income hadforced the exiles to take loans in order tocover their expenses during their temporarystay in exile. When Valentinian and Aetiusbecame aware of this, a law was passed thatforbade the collection of interest on loans to‘Africans’, and also stated that they shouldnot have to repay any of their loans untiltheir fortunes were restored.6 It wouldappear that extended discussions wereongoing with Gaiseric to repatriate therefugees to their estates in Africa, with someof the refugees eventually being allowed toreturn.7

AetiusAfter the disappointments of the previous

year, and with the fighting in the north ofGaul continuing, in 443 Aetius continuedwith his attempts to settle affairs in thoseparts of the West that he still controlled in amanner that would hopefully reduce thetendency of parts of Gaul to rebel. Despitethe level of recruiting almost certainly beinglow, there was yet another attempt to levyrecruits in the West.8 Towards the end of theyear a law was passed that reminded thelimitanei of their obligation to work thelands assigned to them in order to reducethe liability of the taxpayer to feed them, aswell as ensuring that the lands remainedinviolate and free from purchase by otherlandowners.9

Map 12. Barbarian Settlements

Faced with low levels of manpower, and

willing to use any available source, Aetiusnow gave parts of Sapaudia (Savoy) to theremnants of the Burgundians to be dividedwith the native inhabitants.10 By doing thishe may have hoped to use the Burgundiansas a garrison force facing the Alamanni, soallowing him to withdraw the regulargarrison units to reinforce the field army.Moreover, the agreement doubtlesscontained a clause making the Burgundiantroops liable to be called to serve in theWestern army, along similar lines toagreements with the other barbarian settlersin the West.

This was to be the last deliberatesettlement of barbarians on Roman soil:afterwards, such settlements were ‘littlemore than official recognition of barbarianexpansion and conquest’.11 Furthermore,Aetius continued to rotate commanders,using the men he thought best fit to

command in each theatre. Accordingly,Astyrius, who was a Spaniard, was recalledand replaced in Spain by his son-in-lawMerobaudes. Unfortunately, the exactreason for Astyrius’ withdrawal is unclear.Aetius may have been deliberately rotatinghis subordinates: he would not want asituation such has had occurred earlier inAfrica, where Boniface had made the regionhis own personal power base, and there isno evidence to show whether he trusted hisfollowers completely.

Following a brief period in command inwhich he ‘smashed the arrogance of theBacaudae of Aracelli’, Merobaudes was alsorecalled to Rome by an imperial order ‘atthe urging of some jealous people’.12 Itwould appear that factional issues hadresurfaced and that at this point there was apolitical conflict between Aetius’ supportersand their opponents in the Senate.

At roughly the same time Valentinianissued a novel that changed the rules for theranking of senators.13 When coupled withthe political conflict the novel is usuallyinterpreted as an attempt to weaken Aetiusby undermining his main supporter, since itis to the disadvantage of Sigisvult.14 Thenovel was largely to the advantage of a manwho was rising to oppose Aetius’ influencewith the emperor: Petronius Maximus.Maximus had enjoyed a long anddistinguished career in the higher echelonsof power. This had culminated in hisconsulships in 433 and 443. It is the secondconsulship with which the law is concerned,and it gave Maximus with his secondconsulship precedence over Sigisvult, eventhough Sigisvult had the title patricius, sincethe latter had only one consulship. Althoughthe issuing of the novel may indeed havebeen an attack on Aetius, it is possible that

this was also simply a measure to rewardMaximus for his service, rather than anattempt to weaken Sigisvult. Unfortunately,the sparse evidence means that a firmconclusion cannot be drawn.

In tandem with the perception thatValentinian was attempting to weakenSigisvult’s position, the suggestion byHydatius that Merobaudes was recalled dueto jealousy has often been echoed in modernworks, in which the order is seen as anotherattempt to weaken Aetius.15 It is certainlypossible that in part the novel and the recallwere against Aetius’ wishes, and that Aetiusfound himself facing new opposition withinthe imperial court. The influence of theSenate on the allocation of military andcivilian posts was always a restrictinginfluence on the men in power, and the newlaw and the recall may simply signal atemporary swing towards a group of

senators led by Maximus.Yet there are other possible reasons for

the recall of Merobaudes. One is the factthat yet again war broke out against theFranks. At some point in 443, possiblyhoping that the imperial forces would bedistracted by the bacaudae, Clodio, king ofthe Franks, attacked and capturedAtrebatum (Arras).16 He then went on tobesiege the city of Turones (Tours), whichwas ably defended by Majorian. The attackmay have been political. Clodio may haveattempted to put pressure on Aetius to agreeto the Franks keeping Arras in return forleaving Tours, rather than attempting tocapture and keep Tours, which was a longway from Frankish territory (see map 12).The strength of the defence resulted in thesiege lasting over the winter and into thenew year.17 Aetius may have wantedMerobaudes available to use in the face of

this new conflict.Another possible reason for Merobaudes’

recall is that the West was about to enterinto a new relationship with the Huns.

Attila*With a new peace treaty in place with theEast, in 443 Attila turned his attentions tothe West. There is no doubt that he wantedthe West to offer him the same sort ofconditions that the East had offered. Yet hewas a realist: his uncles had been closefriends of Aetius and he respected thewestern general as an opponent. He alsoknew that the West was not in the samefinancial condition as the East, and so hewas willing to demand less money.

With these conditions in mind, Attila sentenvoys to Aetius demanding the opening ofnegotiations. Aetius, wary of Attila and halfexpecting an attack, sent Cassiodorus and

Carpilio, his son from his first marriage, tothe court of the Huns to arrange a treatywith Attila.18 With large parts of Spain inthe hands of the Sueves, Africa under thecontrol of the Vandals, large areas of Gaulbeing controlled by the Goths, with anongoing war with the Franks, and withother areas of Gaul in rebellion, Aetiusknew that he could not afford a conflict,even if it was with only the western Hunnictribes under Attila.

On the other hand, Aetius may have feltthat a new treaty was necessary, since hehad always employed Hunnic troops both asbucellarii and foederati and would not wantthe source of these troops cut off. Failure todeal with Attila could have resulted in largenumbers of Hunnic warriors being recalled.Although many of these troops would haveno reason to join Attila, since they wereserving in the Roman army under their own,

independent leaders, Attila could easily usetheir failure to leave the West as a pretextfor war, or at least a devastating raid.Aetius had to be careful.

The two sides quickly came to anagreement. Aetius ceded territory inPannonia to Attila, although the majority ofPannonia remained under Roman control.19

It is also likely, mirroring Hunnic practice atother times, that the Romans agreed to pay‘subsidies’ to Attila. Although this is nowhereexplicitly stated it is possible that a novelissued by Valentinian in 444 relates directlyto the need to pay money to the Huns.20

A major concession to Attila, and oneprobably meant to increase his enthusiasmfor signing a treaty without declaring war,is that it is most likely during this treatythat Attila was awarded the honorary postof magister utriusque militiae of the West.21

This was probably seen as a huge privilege

by the Huns and was no doubt used byAttila to raise his standing to new heightsamongst his people, and especially toincrease his reputation over and above hisbrother Bleda. On Aetius’ part, the grantingof the title was a cheap way to give Attilaimperial status without actually givingaway anything substantial. In theory, Attilawas now a ‘friend and ally on equal termswith the other western magistri’.22 As Attilaneeded to establish a new Roman militarybureaucracy, as part of the deal Aetius sentConstantius to be Attila’s notarius(secretary).23 Finally, and to hopefullyensure adherence to the treaty, hostageswere exchanged, with Carpilio remainingwith the Huns for an unknown length oftime.24 Despite this, there can be little doubtthat from this period onwards Aetius wouldbe worried by the possibility of a Hunnicattack.

444Yet the financial cost of the peace was tohave a major effect on the West. The loss ofrevenue, especially from North Africa,where the richest provinces were in thehands of Gaiseric and the remainder hadbeen devastated and were only able to paya small proportion of their taxes, plus theneed to maintain the various armies, placeda heavy drain on the exchequer.25 In fact, ithas been estimated that the loss of revenuesfrom Africa may have been enough to equipand maintain up to 40,000 infantry or20,000 cavalry. The impact on the army ofAetius was dramatic and disastrous.

Finally, in July 444 the emperorValentinian was forced to accept that thetreasury was empty:

We have issued this decree only forthe present time, because of thenecessity of imminent expenses for

which the resources of Our treasurycannot suffice.

Nov. Val. 6.3.1 (14 July 444)

When even this was deemed insufficient, ineither late 444 or early 445 Valentinianinstituted a brand new tax, the siliquaticum,a payment of one twenty-fourth on all salesof goods.26 Although this no doubt helped toraise extra taxes, it also resulted in thecreation of a black market, wheremerchants attempted to sell their goods insecret in order to avoid having to pay thetax. The practice grew and necessitated alater law forbidding such activity.27

Furthermore, early in 445 the inflation thatwas now rampant in the West forcedValentinian to issue a law laying down thevalue of a solidus (gold coin) at a set price,since merchants and moneylenders were

attempting to devalue the coin.28 This wouldmean even greater pressure on the depletedtreasury.

In stark contrast to the West, and largelydue to the strengthening of the Danubefrontier and his refusal to pay any moresubsidies to the Huns, in November of 444the Eastern Emperor Theodosius was able toorder a remission of taxes inConstantinople.29 The fact that the East wasslowly recovering from the turmoil of theearly-fifth century was to have graveconsequences for Aetius and the West.

Yet these lay in the future. For theremainder of 444 Aetius continued thestruggle to regain Roman control of theWest, especially Gaul. The siege by theFranks of Majorian in Tours finally ended.The reasons why the Franks raised the siegeare unknown, but it is likely that it was dueto Roman military activity authorized or led

by Aetius aimed at both defeating theFranks and at putting down the bacaudae.The relief of the siege was probablyaccompanied by further manoeuvring byAetius, yet the lack of funds in the treasurywill have had a limiting effect on hisoptions. Despite this, slowly, his effortswere starting to bear fruit.

The HunsIn one respect Aetius was helped by eventsoutside the empire. Relations between Attilaand Bleda appear to have beendeteriorating. Finally, Attila acted: ‘Bleda,king of the Huns, was struck down throughthe deceit of his brother Attila, whosucceeded him.’30 As usual, the dating isinsecure: Prosper and Cassiodorus date theevent to 444, Marcellinus to 445 and theGallic Chronicler dates it to 446.31 On thisoccasion it is likely that Prosper and

Cassiodorus are correct, since theassassination would then take place shortlyafter the treaty of 442 with the East and theassumed treaty of 443 with the West. Thevariance in dates may simply be a case ofsources reporting events when the news wasreceived: it may have taken a year or morefor news to be circulated outside the innercircles of the imperial government.

These treaties would have freed Attilafrom the threat of attack on the Huns’ twomajor borders. These guarantees werenecessary, as Attila would be contemplatingthe possible outbreak of a civil warfollowing the assassination of his brother.As a final guarantee, and in order tomaintain good relations with Aetius, it ismost likely at this point that Attila gaveZercon, a dwarf originally belonging toAspar, the Eastern general, to Aetius.Zercon had been captured and kept by

Bleda, but after Bleda’s death Attila had nouse for him. Aetius returned Zercon toAspar.32 The exchange signifies that Aetius,Attila and Aspar all had at least informalrelationships. The fact that Aetius and Asparwere in continuing communication isunsurprising, given that they shared equalpower and were also potential allies. Nodoubt at the same time, Attila will havebeen campaigning to ensure his acceptanceby the majority of the Huns.

445445 was the year in which Aetius finallybegan to see some rewards for his hardwork. The most important event of the yearwas the campaign in Gaul. Following therelief of the siege of Tours Aetius andMajorian continued to campaign innorthern Gaul. During the campaign Aetiusset an ambush at a village called VicusHelena, possibly Hélesmes. The details come

from Sidonius, who describes the ‘battle’:

There was a narrow passage at thejunction of two ways, and a roadcrossed both the village of Helena,which was within bowshot, and theriver, where that long but narrowpath was supported by girders.Thou (Aetius) wert posted at thecross-roads, while Majorian warredas a mounted man close to thebridge itself. As chance would haveit, the echoing sound of a barbarianmarriage-song rang forth from ahill near the river-bank, for amidScythian dance and chorus ayellow-haired bridegroom waswedding a young bride of likecolour. Well, these revellers, theysay, he laid low. Time after timehis helmet rang with blows, and hishauberk with its protecting scales

kept off the thrust of spears, untilthe enemy was forced to turn andflee.

Sidonius, Carmen V. 214f

The poem goes on to note that the bride wascaptured. However, Sidonius does notexplain why this battle was so important. Itis most likely that the fighting involvedClodio himself, as well as his relatives, andthat the outcome was that Clodio waswilling to negotiate for the release ofcaptives, and possibly his treasury, ratherthan continue the war. The other point to bemade is the small scale of the warfare beingfought most of the time in this period.Although in the earlier empire battles wouldbe fought with large numbers of men, by thefifth century the majority of campaigns willhave been fought using at most a fewthousand men.

After the defeat of the Franks a peacetreaty was agreed. It is possibly at this timethat Cologne and Trier were finally returnedto Roman rule after their capture by theFranks in 437 (see Chapter 8). Incelebration of this military and politicalsuccess, in 445 and 446 Aetius issued coinsfrom the mint at Trier celebrating thevictory.33

The treaty with the Vandals also began tobear fruit. In 445 there was a Vandal raidon Turonium in Gallaecia (see Map 12).34

While this could possibly have been anattack by Vandals who had chosen toremain in Spain, the likelihood is that theseVandals were far too weak to launch anattack deep into Suevic territory. It is farmore likely that it was a seaborne raidlaunched from Africa. It is also plausiblethat it was instigated by Aetius as part of hislong-term strategy: the raid was ‘so far from

their African base and such an unlikelysource of booty that one must suspect aRoman initiative behind this attack onSuevic territory’.35 Vandal raids would forcethe Sueves to retain troops in Gallaecia todefend the coast from attack. In this way,Aetius could limit the activities of the Suevesin the rest of Spain, so helping him in futureattempts at reconquest.

445–446At the end of 445, and possibly in responseto his recent successes, Aetius was heavilyhonoured in the West. For example, at somepoint in the 440s, and almost certainlydating to 445, a statue of Aetius was erectedin the Atrium Libertatis:

[Fl(avio) Aetio viroinl(ustri) comiti . . . ne]cnon et magistro militumper Gallias quas dudum

[o]b iuratas bello pacevictorias Romano Imperioreddidit, magistroutriusq(ue) militiae etsecundo consuli ordinarioat(que) patricio simper reipublicae [i]npensoomnibusq(ue) donismilitarib(us) ornato . . .

CIL VI 41389 = AE 1950,3036

It was also in this period that Aetius’ fulltitle is used in a novel of Valentinian:‘comes et magister utriusque militiae etpatricius’.37 However, the greatest honourwas when Aetius was allowed to hold a‘victory procession’ through the streets ofRome. In the first days of the empire theawarding of a triumph was a sign of themilitary victories achieved by a successful

general. Unfortunately, the honour was nowthe exclusive prerogative of the emperorhimself. Instead, Aetius was allowed tocelebrate a processus consularis (consularprocession), assuming traditional triumphaldress and marching in a ‘festive procession’to the Capitoline Hill.38 This was his rewardfor his recent victories and for his recentnomination for his third consulship, whichwas to take place in 446.

Although the third consulship may alsohave been awarded due to Aetius militaryactivity, it is necessary to remember thatone of the main themes of his time incommand was the sharing of military,bureaucratic and civil powers with arelatively large group of senators. Forexample, Maximus, possibly one of Aetius’most powerful opponents, was made consulin 443. In the following year the honourwas bestowed upon Albinus, an influential

senator who had already been a PraetorianPrefect and who was later to be honoured aspatricius. Throughout this period theimperial court acknowledged a largenumber of powerful individuals in the West.Although Aetius was doubtless wielding alarge amount of military and civilianinfluence both directly and through hissupporters, the appointment of ‘outsiders’was almost certainly a necessity in order tolimit the amount of opposition to Aetius’policies.

It is possible that Merobaudes’ poem, thefirst surviving panegyric, was given at thistime.39 Despite being classed as a panegyric,it is more likely that this poem is instead agratiarum actio privata (private thanks fordeeds), a specific panegyric aimed both atpromoting the patron and of thanking himfor the writer’s own career.40

The quality of rewards Aetius was

receiving is mirrored in the level of hispower. This can be measured by the factthat he was now in a position to intervenein all aspects of imperial government, notjust the military. For example, in 445 heinvolved himself in the appointment ofGallic bishops, in the cases of children soldinto slavery due to the poverty of theirparents, and even concerned himself in thedetails of the supply of pigs to Rome.41

The Third ConsulshipThe height of the celebrations honouringAetius was the panegyric delivered byMerobaudes on 1 January 446.42 Given thefact that warfare had been a constant from433, when Aetius returned, until 445, it issomewhat surprising to learn that ‘thepredominant theme of this composition ispeace’.43 Yet a close analysis of the poem,and a comparison of the poem with events

in the West, leads to the conclusion that, inmost respects, Merobaudes is actuallycorrect.44

In lines 1–4 Merobaudes claims that theDanubian frontier is at peace. This is a truestatement of affairs, since there had been aseries of treaties with the Huns of Rua andAttila, and Aetius had not needed tocampaign in the area since 431. In lines 5–7he makes a similar claim for the Rhinefrontier. Aetius had only the year beforedefeated the Franks and recovered much lostterritory; the Burgundians had been heavilydefeated and settled on Roman terms withinthe empire; and there is no record offighting against the other tribes on thefrontier. This too would appear to be a fairrepresentation of events.

Lines 8–15 of Merobaudes’ poem coverthe pacification of Gaul. Although it hadtaken several campaigns over many years,

by 446 the north seemed quiet, especiallysince the bacaudae had only recently beendefeated and were as yet wary of renewingthe conflict. Lines 16–22 focus upon affairsin the south of Gaul. After many years offighting, following their defeat in 441 andthe signing of the most recent treaty, theGoths appear to have remained quiet andmade no further attempts to expand theirdominions or their influence.

In line 24 Merobaudes begins hisdescription of Africa and the treaty with theVandals. In the early part of this sectionMerobaudes identifies the Vandals in Africabefore, in line 27, he talks of the ‘pacts’between Gaiseric and Valentinian.Merobaudes confirms the notion that in 435Gaiseric had concluded a foedus with Romeconcerning some of the western provinces ofAfrica. It also confirms that after the treatyof 442 Gaiseric was paying tribute to Rome,

probably in the form of the grain supplythat was so desperately needed in Italy. Ashas already been noted, when Merobaudesuses the term socius he is confirming that theVandals are currently independent allies,rather than being subservient to Rome.

Before the end of the poem, in lines 98–104, it would appear that war was about tobe resumed, although the enemy isunidentified. After this the poem returns toAetius’ martial abilities, yet as there aremany large lacunae (missing words andphrases) in the text, the detailed contentand the context are somewhat confused andthe missing parts have to be reconstructedby hypothesis. The poem ends with adescription of the victory over the Goths in439, at the end of which Aetius appears tohave surrounded an enemy camp beforefinally defeating the enemy – a fittingconclusion to the panegyric.

The reason for Merobaudes’ panegyricwas the bestowal upon Aetius of his thirdconsulship. The importance of this is clear.For more than 300 years the honour of athird consulship had been reserved formembers or prospective members of theimperial family. Aetius would never be amember of the imperial family, unlike hispredecessors Stilicho (son-in-law and[adopted] brother of Honorius I) andConstantius (married to Honorius’ sisterGalla Placidia). As a result, the nominationof Aetius as consul for the third time shouldprobably be seen as his desire to follow intheir footsteps, and ‘not to fall short of hispredecessors in either distinction orpower’.45

Overall, the panegyric and the bestowalof a third consulship offer the impressionthat, although things were not perfect, theempire would be in a worse condition

without Aetius at the helm. This is anobvious thing for a panegyric to claim, butanalyses of the events of 433 to 445demonstrate that in some respects theseclaims are accurate. Yet the final emphasisof the poem on peace and security may alsohave been a way of underling the fact thatalthough the financial condition of theempire was poor, as long as Aetius receivedthe necessary funding and recruits for thearmy peace and prosperity would continue.

The main difficulty, both for Aetiushimself and for Merobaudes’ poem, was theloss of Africa to the Vandals. Even prior to442 the West had been strugglingfinancially; after 442 the situation haddeteriorated to the point where by 444 theWest was, effectively, bankrupt.46 Thequestion remained as to what Aetius coulddo to redress matters.

Britain

The peaceful condition of the empire andthe ‘renewal’ of its power under the rule ofAetius may also have caused the Romano-Britons once again to hope for help from thecontinent. Gildas records that they sentmessengers:

To Aetius, now consul for the thirdtime: the groans of the Britons . . .The barbarians drive us to the sea;the sea throws us back on thebarbarians: thus two modes ofdeath await us, we are either slainor drowned.

Gildas, Exc. Conq. Brit. 20

Unfortunately, Aetius had no time or troopsto spare for the help of Britain, especially asthe routes north were insecure due to thebacaudae of Armorica. This last appeal toRome for help failed, and the result was thatthe British either gave up hope and

surrendered or decided to take up arms andfight for themselves:

In the meantime the discomfitedpeople, wandering in the woods,began to feel the effects of a severefamine, which compelled many ofthem without delay to yieldthemselves up to their cruelpersecutors, to obtain subsistence:others of them, however, lying hidin mountains, caves and woods,continually sallied out from thenceto renew the war. And then it was,for the first time, that theyoverthrew their enemies, who hadfor so many years been living intheir country.

Gildas, Exc. Conq. Brit. 20

Although this passage is of uncertain dating

and its accuracy can be questioned, onething is clear. At some point in the 440s,and almost certainly either during or after446, the British finally gave up any hope ofhelp from Rome.47* It should be noted that the dating of the events describedhere is extremely insecure. It is possible for this treaty to bedated to any year prior to 446, when it is mentioned byMerobaudes (Pan. 2.1-4). This date has been chosen as itallows other events the time to happen and so fits in bestwith the proposed chronology.

Chapter 12

The Calm Before the Storm

446Following the panegyric, Aetius once againset to work. Appointing an individualnamed Vitus as his fellow magister utriusquemilitiae, Aetius sent him to Spain with anarmy comprising regular forces and anallied Gothic contingent, although it is likelythat Aetius retained the majority of thepraesental army in Italy in case of an attackby the Huns.1 The purpose of the campaignis unclear, but since the main field of

operations was Carthaginiensis and Baetica,it is likely that the aim was to restoreRoman authority in these areas, as they hadbeen under the control of the Sueves since441 (see Map 12). This would tie in with theotherwise mysterious raid on Gallaecia bythe Vandals in 445 (see Chapter 13). Thecampaign in 446 could expect to face lessopposition, since many Sueves would beretained in Gallaecia to garrison strategicpoints along the coast. That there was noneed to campaign in Tarraconensis impliesthat Merobaudes’ campaign of 443 musthave been a success.2

The strategy appears to have worked.Once in Spain Vitus ‘oppressed thepopulation of Carthaginiensis and Baetica’.3However, the oppression of the populationtook too long and Rechila was able togather his troops to face the Roman attack.Somewhere in Spain the Sueves launched an

attack on the Romans. The Goths wererouted and Vitus fled with the rest of thearmy.4 The Sueves re-established their ruleover Carthaginiensis and Baetica.5 Thestrategy adopted in Spain was not workingout as expected.

447Aetius’ actions in the following years areunknown, since the remaining sources tellus little about events in the West between447 and 450. With Gaul seemingly at peace,and with the Vandals keeping faith with thetreaty of 442, it is most likely that any newmilitary campaigns were again directedagainst the Sueves in Spain, although it ispossible that, for the first time in manyyears, Aetius did not send out forces onmilitary operations.6 However, the extantsources focus on an event that occurred inthe East.

On 27 January 447 there was a majorearthquake and the part of the walls ofConstantinople between the porticusTroadensis (near to the Golden Gate) andthe Tetrapylon (near to where the SahzadeMosque now stands) collapsed.7 Almostcertainly connected with the news that thewalls had fallen and that Constantinoplewas vulnerable, and annoyed at the East’srefusal to continue with its subsidies, in 447Attila sent envoys to Constantinople.8 Thesedemanded the return of all of the fugitivesfrom the Huns who had fled to the empirefor safety, as well as the tribute that had notbeen paid, otherwise Attila claimed that hewould be unable to restrain the Huns.9

Map 13. Spain and Gaul 449–450

Analysis of the relevant passage of Priscusreveals the possibility that at this stageAttila had not yet brought all of the Hunnictribes under his rule and that only thepayment of tribute would enable him torestrain those he did not control.10 This is anintriguing possibility, but it is just as likely

that this was a piece of political posturingdesigned to allow Attila to pose still as thefriend and ally of the Romans whilst makingdemands with menaces. The ploy did notwork. The advisors to the emperor declaredthat war should be risked, and as aconsequence Attila invaded Thrace.11

The new assault was devastating: ‘Newdestruction broke out in the east. No lessthan seventy cities were laid waste by theplundering Huns, for no assistance wasbrought from the west.’12 Callinicus goesfurther and claims that over 100 cities werecaptured.13 The Gallic Chronicler’s criticismthat no help was sent to the East issurprising. With a shortage of manpowerand barbarians occupying large areas of theWest, it would seem impossible that Aetiuscould spare troops. An explanation of theclaim may be that, for the first time in manyyears, the Roman armies of the West were

not deployed on campaign. This wouldexplain why the Chronicler was shocked bythe fact that troops in the West remainedidle whilst the East was fighting a savagewar.

The claim that seventy cities werecaptured also illustrates the perceivedsavagery of the attack. The cities ofRatiaria, Athyras and Marcianopolis wereamongst them, the latter after the defeatand death of the magister militum Arnegisclusin battle at the River Utus in Dacia Ripensis(see Map 1).14 Attila advanced as far asThermopylae, but by the time he hadtravelled that far the walls inConstantinople that had collapsed in theearthquake had been rebuilt under thedirection of Flavius Constantinus, thePraetorian Prefect of the East.15

At this point the Huns rapidly withdrewfrom the Balkans: the Hunnic army had

contracted ‘sickness of the bowels’, althoughfortunately for Attila the majority of thearmy was unaffected, probably thanks totheir swift withdrawal from the affectedareas.16 With Thrace devastated, Theodosiussent the patricius and former magister militumper Orientem and consul Anatolius to Attilato negotiate a peace.

448Over the winter of 447–448 thenegotiations continued until a treaty wasagreed. The terms were harsh. The arrearsin the tribute had to be paid in full,amounting to 6,000 pounds of gold, and thenew annual tribute was set at 2,100 poundsof gold.17 But, and ‘most dangerous for thefuture’, a belt of land ‘five days’ journeywide and extending along the Danube fromPannonia to Novae in Thrace’ was to bevacated by Rome,18 implying that prior to

this the Romans had been able to interferein the workings of Attila’s ‘empire’ even ifonly to spy on his movements and reportthem quickly to the emperor.19 The netresult was that the Huns now had a freecrossing of the Danube without thepossibility of interference from the Romans.Thrace was completely at their mercy. ForAttila, the war was of even greaterimportance. In his first major campaign assole leader of the Huns, he had smashed theRoman armies in Thrace and had forcedhumiliating terms upon the EasternEmperor. His position as ‘king’ was assured.

The WestIn the West the treaties with the Franks, theGoths and the Vandals were holding. Aetiusdid not have to concern himself withsouthern Gaul or Africa. However, in Spainthere were still the Sueves and the bacaudaeto worry about. Although the existing

sources for the period tell us little aboutimperial campaigns in Spain, they doinform us that Rechila launched an attackupon the ‘furthest reaches’ of Gallaecia.20

He was clearly still intent uponconsolidating his sphere of domination.Shortly afterwards he died of natural causesand the rule passed to Rechiarus, his son.21

Although the situation in the Westappeared to be stabilizing, it is possible thatin 448 there was yet another bacaudic revoltin northern Gaul. The Gallic Chroniclerstates that ‘Eudoxius, a physician byprofession and of perverse, if well-developed, talents, fled to the Huns whenimplicated in the bacauda that took place atthat time’.22 Although otherwise unattested,and of dubious reliability, analysis of othersources shows that it is possible that a revolttook place.

The precise nature of events is insecure,

but an entry in Jordanes suggests that atsome point after 446 there was indeed arebellion of the bacaudae in northern Gaul.Jordanes is not always the most accurate ofhistorians, yet his testimony concerningevents in 451 lists the peoples allied toRome. Included in this list are theArmoriciani.23 It is possible that theseArmoriciani took part in the rebellionrecorded by the Gallic Chronicler and thatEudoxius was the ‘Gallic’ leader of therevolt. Although the revolt of 448 wasdefeated, between 448 and 451 Aetiusfinally accepted that specific Roman controlof the north of Gaul was now lost.

It is possible that Aetius’ change of heartwas due to the nature of these rebels.According to the British historian Gildas, atsome date in the 440s the Britons sent anappeal to an individual in Gaul, eitherAetius or to a later Magister Militum per

Gallias named Aegidius: unfortunately, thename is unclear and so Gildas could bereferring to either man.24 If it was addressedto Aetius the claims went unanswered,probably because Aetius did not haveenough troops to send aid to the Britons andto face the expected Hunnic attack.25 Inorder to escape from the Saxons, in the fifthcentury many Britons fled from Britain toArmorica, augmenting the settlers who hadallegedly arrived in the fourth century.26

Indeed, so many eventually crossed theEnglish Channel that the area in which theysettled was renamed Brittany (‘LittleBritain’).

The British nobles and their followersprobably settled in Armorica in the mid tolate 440s. Therefore, it is possible to suggestthat during the bacaudic rebellion of 448Aetius came into contact with these freshsettlers, whose manpower had swelled the

forces in rebellion. Aetius was forced toaccept that these new reinforcements meantthat he would be unable to defeat anyfurther rebellions using military force. As aresult, he entered into negotiations with therebels. As part of the agreement the Gallicleader, Eudoxius, and possibly his leadingfollowers, was forced to flee and Aetiusconfirmed the ascendancy of the incomingBritish aristocracy. In return, the new Britishleaders formed a military alliance withAetius, becoming the Armoriciani ofJordanes. At least part of Aetius’ willingnessto accept the ‘British’ settlement may havebeen due to a feeling of guilt: he had beenunable to send the help requested to Britain.The charitable actions of Aetius andValentinian to the refugees from Africademonstrate that they were aware of thefailings of the empire and would take stepsto help those who were suffering as a result.

Furthermore, these people had shown clearevidence of a loyalty to Rome by crossingthe English Channel to remain part of theempire. By accepting the incomers as alliesAetius ensured that the area would now bepeaceful, discharged his moral obligations tothe British exiles and released the troopscampaigning in the area for other service.He will almost certainly have believed thatin time the newcomers would retain theirloyalty to the emperor in Italy.

Although pure speculation, this hypothesisdoes allow the sparse information thatsurvives to be transformed into a logicalnarrative. It also gives an explanation forhow the incomers were able to replace thelocal leaders, who were now in exile, andestablish their own ‘Little Britain’. It should,however, be noted that other chronologiescan be constructed.

Whatever the cause and the nature of the

inhabitants, the acceptance of the bacaudaeas semi-independent was probably anecessity since the continuous wars in Gauland Spain were keeping the treasury at adangerously low level.

SigisvultOne further event took place either in orshortly before 448. Contrary to (modern)expectations, by 448 Sigisvult had beenmade patricius.27 This has resulted inspeculation as to the nature of hisappointment and the political motivesbehind it. Recent debate has questionedwhether Sigisvult was even made patricius.28

The argument revolves around the beliefthat a combination of the two titles of comeset magister utriusque militiae and patriciusmust result in the bearer being the ‘supremecommander’ in the west. Therefore, ifSigisvult – or indeed Merobaudes before him

– was magister militum and patricius, theneither Valentinian or Placidia must, at leastin theory, have promoted him in oppositionto Aetius.

This need not necessarily be the case. Theconcept that a combination of the two titlescould only be borne by one man rests on thecases of two of Aetius’ predecessors, Stilichoand Constantius. Yet in both of theseexamples the men involved were breakingnew political ground with theirappointments and no doubt were wary ofcompetition. After fifteen years ofundisputed leadership it is not surprisingthat Aetius finally relented and allowed hisloyal and long-serving supporter Sigisvult toachieve the only title that had eluded him.By allowing Sigisvult to be made patriciusAetius both rewarded him for his loyalty andensured that he received the recognition hedeserved. The move also ensured Sigisvult’s

continued loyalty.

449–450In line with Aetius’ policy of rewarding hisloyal followers with the highest status hecould award, in 449 Astyrius, father ofMerobaudes, was made consul in the West,at which point he was probably stationed inArles. In commemoration, he was given apanegyric by Flavius Nicetus.29

Furthermore, Aetius appointed Firminus,a Gaul, as praefectus praetorio Italiae: for thefirst time since 430 the prefect was not fromone of the powerful Italian senatorialfamilies. This was to be only the secondtime between the years 426 and 465 that anon-Italian was made prefect.30 Theappointment has resulted in solemn debateregarding Aetius’ policies concerning theempire and especially of the internalpolitics prevalent in Rome.31 Unfortunately,

these arguments rely on the fact that theprevious non-Italian incumbent, Theodosius,was also an appointee of Aetius.32 This iscertainly a mistake, as Theodosius wasappointed prior to February 430, whenAetius was only magister militum per Galliasand so unable to make such appointments.There are two more likely options. One isthat the appointment of Firminus wassimply a political ploy to maintain Aetius’popularity with the senators of Gaul, ratherthan a response to Aetius’ political andfinancial requirements within Italy. Theother is that the dire financial problems nowfacing the empire required an ‘outsider’ toforce through legislation attempting to raisetaxes and recruits from the senators whousually occupied the post of prefect and socould use their power to block or changeany proposals.

In reality, it is more likely that the

appointment was a combination of the two.The appointment allowed Aetius to rewardthe Gallic aristocracy who had long sincebeen amongst his greatest admirers: Aetius‘was a hero to at least a large section of theGallic aristocracy’.33 This concept isreinforced by his appointment the followingyear of Opilio, another Gallic aristocrat, tothe post of Prefect of the City of Rome, andhis apparent seizure of the financial reinsfrom Valentinian and the Senate.34

Furthermore, Aetius’ reliance on these twomen and their combined success issupported by the fact that some time aroundthe year 451 both men were elevated to thepatriciate, whilst Firminus remained in thepost of prefect until 29 June 452.35

The whole episode implies that prior to450 there had been political opposition toAetius that had been powerful enough toretain control of state finances. Yet this was

now at an end. A novel issued in March 450remitted all delinquent taxes prior toSeptember 447 and then renewed the law of440 limiting the authority of the comites ofthe treasury and declared that from thistime forward the only tax inspectorsallowed must be confirmed by either thepraefectus praetorio or by Aetius.36 WithFirminus’ support, Aetius began an attemptto break the dominance of the Senate ofRome over financial and military matters:the imperial court may have favouredItalians, who had a tendency to forgive eachother their outstanding taxes.37

The WestHowever, things were again beginning to gowrong in the West. A possible sign that kingTheoderic was beginning to resent Aetius’domination, early in 449, and doubtlessafter negotiations begun in 448, was his

giving his daughter in marriage toRechiarius, king of the Sueves.38 Although itis possible that this was the daughtermutilated by Gaiseric and Huneric, this isnowhere attested, and it is more likely thatshe was another, unnamed daughter.

There are most likely two major reasonsfor the marriage alliance. Firstly, there isTheoderic’s desire to break from Romancontrol. Despite his attempts to break free,or at least establish himself as a politicalplayer at court, Theoderic was still confinedto his nascent kingdom. An alliance with theSueves, who were in a similar position tohim, albeit with slightly more freedom,would strengthen his hand when dealingwith Roman politicians, especially Aetius.Secondly, Theoderic’s daughter who hadbeen married to Huneric and who had beenmutilated had returned home. The fact thatthis was done after the Vandals had made a

treaty with Rome no doubt caused Theodericto blame the emperor and Aetius, at least inpart, for the fate of his daughter. Theodericwill have been unhappy to remain in thesame subservient position to people whohad caused his family such grief.

Reassured that the Goths would not nowattack him under orders from Aetius, inFebruary 449 Rechiarus plundered theterritories of the Vasconiae (Basques).39 Ataround the same time, Censorius, the envoywho had been captured by the Sueves inMartylis in 440, was ‘assassinated’ byAgiulfus. Agiulfus may have been one of theGothic envoys and the act may have been adramatic signal that the treaties with theRomans were now considered to be over.40

Probably in an associated move, and ‘toshow his outstanding daring’, an individualnamed Basilius ‘gathered together bacaudaeand killed federates in the church of

Tyriasso (Tarazona)’.41 Situated close to thearea of Rechiarius’ attack, it is likely thatthe two ‘uprisings’ were co-ordinated.

That these attacks were co-ordinated isproved by the fact that in July Rechiariusvisited his new father-in-law in Gaul, but onthe return journey he joined with Basiliusand they pillaged the territory aroundCaesaraugusta, capturing the city of Ilerdawith ‘trickery’ (see Map 13).42 SinceTheoderic now had a marriage alliance withRechiarius, Aetius, who had previouslyrelied on Gothic reinforcements for thecampaigns in Spain, would be forced to relysolely on Roman troops.43 Yet with Spain ina renewed upheaval, Aetius was faced witha trickier situation at court in Ravenna.

Attila and ChrysapiusIn the east, Chrysapius, eunuch andspatharius (bodyguard) to Theodosius,

instigated a plot to murder Attila.44

Chrysapius had slowly risen to power overthe preceding years and by 449 was theleading figure in the East. Unfortunately forhim, Attila discovered the plot andattempted to extradite Chrysapius forpunishment. Due to Chrysapius’ superiorposition at court the attempt failed, and anembassy sent to Attila comprising Anatoliusand Nomus, the latter being a loyalsupporter of Chrysapius, managed tosmooth things over. However, the incidenthardened opposition to Chrysapius, and hisenemies, especially Pulcheria, looked toweaken his position.

Yet that was not Attila’s only infuriatingproblem. As part of the earlier treaty withAttila, Aetius had sent a Gaul namedConstantius to act as Attila’s secretary. ThisConstantius had allegedly taken somegolden bowls from Attila and sent them to a

Roman banker named Silvanus. Attila nowdemanded that Silvanus be handed over tohim.45

450In hindsight the story of these continuouswars and the information that the West wasbankrupt can lead to the assumption thatwhat was needed at this time was imperialunity and the joining together of allimperial peoples to use whatever meanswas necessary to claw back the lost groundand restore the empire to its previous glory.Yet despite the fact that the West was indisarray, life for the moneyed classescontinued as normal. Two laws passed inMay 450 demonstrate that personalinterests dominated over imperial ones: dueto the focus on the wars by the government,unscrupulous tax collectors were beingallowed to defraud the taxpayer, and therewere problems collecting the taxes from

Sardinia.46 The situation was made worse bythe fact that in 450 there was a famine inItaly, although the precise causes areunknown.47

However, these were not the worst eventsfor Aetius. Either in 449 or in 450 Honoria,sister of Valentinian, was:

caught in a clandestine affair witha certain Eugenius . . . He wasexecuted for the crime, and she wasbetrothed to Herculanus, a man ofconsular rank and of . . . goodcharacter. [In response, she] . . .sent the eunuch Hyacinthus toAttila offering him money toavenge her marriage. She also senther ring as her pledge to thebarbarian.

Prisc. fr. 17 = Joh. Ant. fr. 199,2 =Exc. De Ins. 8448

Although this claim has been doubted, it isalmost certain that the event happened.49

Several interpretations are possible, butprobably the correct interpretation of thepassage is that Honoria was disgraced andbetrothed to Herculanus, a man deemed tobe safe from imperial pretensions, but aman in whom she had no interest. As aresult, she petitioned members of the courtfor help. When this was not forthcoming,since the courtiers were either supporters ofValentinian or Aetius, both of whom appearto have agreed upon her marriage, shesought elsewhere for aid. The only otherindividual of any political or militarystanding who could possibly help her wasAttila, who since the treaty of 443 was an‘honorary’ magister militum. As a result, sheoffered him gold to take her side in thedisagreement at court.

The act of attempting to enlist the aid of a

barbarian is usually interpreted as abetrayal, since in hindsight the effects of herrequest were to be calamitous. This is amistake. In the first place, Attila was animperial officer and her last resort.Secondly, this was not the first time that amember of the court had appealed to theHuns for help against their opponents atcourt: Aetius owed his career to that ability.Finally, Honoria’s mother had actually beenmarried to a ‘barbarian’: Alaric’s brother-in-law and successor Athaulf.50 There was afamily tradition of dealing with ‘barbarian’individuals only indirectly connected withthe court.

As proof of her identity, Honoria also senther ring with the messenger. This gesturemirrored a common act of giving a specificpersonal item to the messenger as proof thatthe bearer was acting on the sender’s behalf.In return, Honoria will have expected Attila

simply to make a threat for the engagementto be annulled.

Furious, Valentinian now had to decidewhat to do with his sister Honoria.Messengers arrived from Theodosiusadvising that she be sent to Attila. However,the prolonged pleas for clemency fromPlacidia, the mother of Valentinian andHonoria, finally bore fruit. Honoria wasbanished from court and surrendered to thecustody of Placidia.

Before any other action could be taken,events in the East again intervened. Theemperor Theodosius injured his spine afterfalling from his horse.51 Despite the bestefforts of his physicians, on 28 July he diedin Constantinople at the age of forty-nine.52

The only surviving male member of theHouse of Theodosius was Valentinian in theWest.

Claim to the ThroneAccording to Priscus, Valentinian nowdecided that he wanted to be the emperor ofboth East and West: the first emperor of aunited empire since Theodosius I in 395.53

Although unsubstantiated elsewhere, theclaim may be true. As the last male heir tothe throne, Valentinian almost certainly sawhimself as the only valid claimant to theEastern Empire. The East was in a farstronger financial position than the Westand a large infusion of money may havehelped the West to reconquer some lostareas and so stave off the West’s terminalbankruptcy. Yet if it is true, the claim wasnot transmitted to the East. Without anobvious heir, Pulcheria, the sister ofTheodosius II, would soon lose her positionof political independence. As a result, shedecided to raise her own emperor and soensure her continuation in power. Her

choice fell on Marcian, the man who hadbeen captured by Gaiseric in Africa in 432.He was immediately summoned and on 26August 450 was crowned the forty-secondemperor at Constantinople with the consentand approval of the Senate and the army.Marcian immediately married Pulcheria, soensuring that he was seen as part of theTheodosian dynasty.54 With the death ofTheodosius, Chrysapius had lost his onlymeans of support and shortly afterwards hewas beheaded by the order of Pulcheria, soone bone of contention with Attila wasremoved.55

Again according to Priscus, at this pointValentinian wanted to lead an army toConstantinople ‘to remove Marcian from histhrone’.56 Aetius disagreed, and Priscusclaims that this disagreement was a majorcause of Valentinian’s unhappiness withAetius’ domination.

Yet the claim that Valentinian wanted toinvade the East is unlikely. The East wasmuch stronger both militarily andfinancially than the West and would haveeasily been able to defeat any ‘invasion’ byValentinian. Furthermore, by 450 the courtand bureaucracy of the East had a longtradition of separation from that of theWest. A unified empire would, theoreticallyat least, result in a united court. Manypowerful officials would have lost power, orat least had their influence reduced by thearrival of the Western Emperor. Although inhindsight the possibilities are tantalising, inreality the Eastern court would not acceptthe imposition of Valentinian as emperor inConstantinople.57

MarcianWith the elevation of Marcian there was animmediate change in policy in the East.Unlike his imperial predecessors, who had

been forced to rely from a young age uponministers and generals, Marcian was amature individual who had spent his careerrising through the ranks of the army. Hisconfidence in his military abilities was highand he had no fear that a strong magistermilitum would force him to relinquish thereigns of power, as had happened in theWest. As a result, one of his first decisionswas to put a halt to the paying of subsidiesto the Huns, and messengers were sent toAttila informing him of the new regime.

Only a few months later Placidia,Valentinian’s mother, also died and wasburied in the monastery of St Nazarius atRavenna.58 She had supported Valentinianthroughout his rule and had been the powerbehind the throne for the last quarter of acentury, whenever possible guarding herson from outside political interference.Although she appears to have been an

opponent of Aetius at the beginning, thelack of opposition to his dominance impliesthat she was later reconciled to him,especially after she became convinced thathe was not aiming to either take the thronehimself or to remove Valentinian andreplace him with his own nominee. As aresult, it is possible that in her later yearsshe actually supported him. It should beacknowledged, though, that she may neverhave reconciled with Aetius, but was unableto muster enough support to oust him.59

With her death Valentinian now becamesusceptible to political machinations atcourt.

Consequently, Attila received two piecesof news in quick succession. The first wasthat Theodosius had died and that Marcian,the new, more militant emperor of the East,was not going to pay the subsidies Attilaexpected. The second was Honoria’s request

for help.60

Chapter 13

Crisis*

450The request from Honoria wasn’t the onlydiplomatic activity in the west in whichAttila was embroiled. The king of the Frankshad died. At an unknown date his youngerson had been sent on an embassy to Rome.He had been befriended by Aetius, who hadadopted him as his son, promised to supporthim in his claim to the throne and then senthim home laden with gifts.1 This was ashrewd move by Aetius. An alliance with the

Franks would eliminate the need to stationtroops in the north east of Gaul and allowhim to use them in other theatres of war.Further, the alliance would result in theFranks themselves protecting the northernfrontiers against tribes from further insideGermania. When the Frankish king died, theyounger son seized the throne. The supportof Aetius had proved to be decisive, so theelder son of the Frankish king decided toappeal to the only power that could opposeAetius. He went to Attila and asked for theHun’s support in his claim to the throne.2Any attempt to support the elder son wouldbreak Attila’s agreement with the West andprecipitate war.

However, when Honoria’s request arrived,followed by the news that Theodosius haddied, Attila saw a way forward. In responseto the two envoys, Attila decided to reply inan aggressive fashion. Realizing that

Christian ambassadors would have a betterchance of achieving his aims than pagans,Attila sent two embassies, both composed ofGoths, to Constantinople and to Italy.3

The embassy to Constantinople wasstraightforward. Attila demanded thepayment of the tribute, plus the missedpayments. The Chronicon Paschale alsoclaims that he included the message ‘Mymaster and your master Attila commandsyou through me to make ready a palace forhim.’4 It is unlikely that this is correct, andthe concept that Attila believed that hecould overthrow the Roman empire ismistaken, especially as the ChroniconPaschale only claims that Attila wanted ‘a’(singular) palace, not the throne. It isprobably better to assume that this is adevice used by the author to highlightAttila’s arrogance and pride, and so use it asa counterpoint to his later fall, a popular

theme amongst Christian writers.Attila’s grasp of political opportunities is

nowhere more apparent than with his use ofHonoria’s offer. The likelihood is thatHonoria was expecting him to use hisinfluence to stop her marriage, much as hispredecessors had used theirs to manoeuvreAetius back into power. Attila appeared tobe following her request when he sentenvoys to the West demanding that unlessHonoria was given ‘the sceptre ofsovereignty, he would avenge her’.Unfortunately, Attila also demanded herhand in marriage.5 He had picked on oneitem and used it to change Honoria’s requestinto something far more alarming for thewest: Attila chose to interpret Honoria’sinclusion of her ring as a proposal ofmarriage.6

He was to be disappointed: both of hisenvoys received a negative reply.7 In the

case of the East it was a straight refusal topay, but with the additional response that ifhe kept the peace they would give him gifts.From the West came a denial that Honoriacould be married to Attila, since she wasalready engaged to another. Furthermore,the envoy reported that the West hadrefused Honoria any regal rights to thethrone, ‘since the rule of the Roman statebelonged not to females but to males’.8

Calmly accepting the denial of bothemperors could have encouraged his rivalsto see him as weak and so have precipitateda civil war amongst the Huns and theirsubjects. Attila was the leader of a ‘vastmilitary machine which demanded actionand an influx of rewards, otherwise it couldeasily turn on him’.9 He had to declare awar. He now had to decide which option totake. Attacking the East was a possibility,but there were three major problems. One

was that the provinces that were withinreach had been plundered on severaloccasions in previous years. The likelihoodis that the amount of booty he would obtainwould be minimal. Furthermore, ravagingalready ravaged areas was unlikely to putenough pressure on Marcian to force him toagree to Attila’s terms. Secondly, and moreimportantly, Marcian was not Theodosius II.Theodosius from a very young age had beenat the mercy of warring political groupswithin the government. Marcian was amature, strong-willed individual who wouldnot yield to pressure from his courtiers. Thepolitical contacts Attila had fostered inConstantinople, and which had almostcertainly helped to hinder policy making,had been rendered powerless. Finally,Marcian was a military man. If Attilainvaded – unlike his predecessors, who hadused the army sparingly to avoid having a

‘military dictatorship’ such as existed in theWest – Marcian could gather as many troopsas he needed and personally lead themagainst Attila.

On the other hand, Attila believed that ifhe attacked Gaul he was on strongerground. He could guarantee support fromthose Franks who supported the olderbrother of the deceased king. Furthermore,if his political strategy was correct, he couldeasily divide the nations of the west,especially if he could convince the Goths ofTheoderic to abandon their treaty withRome. This would mean that Aetius’ allieswould be limited to only ‘half’ of the Franksand possibly the settled Alans.

The later historian Jordanes, along withthe ‘Chronicle of Fredegar’, claims that atleast part of the reason why Attilacontemplated the attack on Gaul wasbecause he was bribed by Gaiseric to attack

the Goths.10 Allegedly, this is becauseGaiseric was afraid that Theoderic would tryto avenge his daughter’s earlier mutilation.Obviously, if Theoderic was already at warwith the Huns, Gaiseric would be safe. Inaddition, Priscus claims that Attila attackedGaul and the Goths partly because he was‘laying up a store of favour with Gaiseric’.11

If these claims are true, it would meanthat Gaiseric was encouraging the Huns towage war against the Romans. As a result,the statements are usually dismissed byhistorians. However, there is one additionalpiece of information that may hint that atleast some of this story is true. In 450Eudocia reached the age of twelve andaccording to Roman custom was nowallowed to marry. In theory, she shouldhave gone to Carthage to marry Huneric.The fact that she did not may hint atstrained relations between Gaiseric and

Valentinian – possibly caused by theknowledge that Gaiseric had suggested toAttila that he invade Gaul.12

In conclusion, although the two claimsconcerning a Vandal–Hun ‘alliance’ remaina possibility, they must be classed as ofdoubtful reliability, largely because Gaiserichad no influence over events and, despitehis control of the sea, would be unable tohelp Attila in central Gaul. Further, thereasons for Attila wishing to retainGaiseric’s friendship and alliance are notmade clear by Priscus. It is perhaps best toassume that in the confusing times of late450 and early 451 envoys were travellingthroughout the Western Empire and to Attilain the east, including those from theVandals. What was really said at thesemeetings was unknown, even at the time,but gossip within the empire may havesuggested that the Vandals wanted Attila to

invade the West and that Attila agreed withthe Vandal envoys who suggested that thesoftest target for Attila was Gaul. The truthwill never be known. Yet whetherinfluenced by Gaiseric or not, Attila nowbegan to send envoys to Italy to talk withAetius and to Gaul to talk with the Franks,the Alans and with Theoderic, the king ofthe Goths. Attila’s policy was clearly one ofdivide and conquer.

After weighing his options, Attila haddecided that war with the west was thebetter of the two. The East had always beenstronger than the West and was now led bya military emperor who was prepared tomarshal the forces of the whole East todefeat Attila. Attila knew when to cut hislosses. His envoys in Constantinople agreeda treaty with the new emperor, which was‘surprisingly favourable to Rome’: theconcept that this was due to the ‘wisdom of

his East Roman interlocutors’ is mistaken.13

Attila simply wanted a peaceful border inthe East when he invaded the West. It ispossibly during the negotiations for thistreaty that Attila complained about theRoman cultivation of those lands five days’march deep along the Danube betweenPannonia and Novae in Thrace, which weresupposed to have been left deserted.14

It was only Aetius’ relationship withAttila’s predecessors that had saved the Westfrom Hunnic attack. Attila knew thatattacking Italy would be problematic, sinceAetius would be ready to defend the Alpsagainst any attempt to enter Italy, andtheoretically Aetius had enough forces toenable him to block the passes. It is possiblethat before he decided to attack Gaul Attilahad attempted to have Aetius removed.However, the accuracy of this claim isuncertain.15

There is yet another possible reason forAttila’s decision to invade Gaul. At anunknown time he had received ‘divine’evidence of his destiny:

And though his temper was suchthat he always had great self-confidence, yet his assurance wasincreased by finding the sword ofMars, always esteemed sacredamong the kings of the Scythians.The historian Priscus says it wasdiscovered under the followingcircumstances: ‘When a certainshepherd beheld one heifer of hisflock limping and could find nocause for this wound, he anxiouslyfollowed the trail of blood and atlength came to a sword it hadunwittingly trampled whilenibbling the grass. He dug it upand took it straight to Attila. He

rejoiced at this gift and, beingambitious, thought he had beenappointed ruler of the whole world,and that through the sword of Marssupremacy in all wars was assuredto him.’

Jordanes Getica 35.183 = Priscus,fragment 11.2

There is one other factor that may haveaffected Attila’s decision to attack Gaulrather than either the East or Italy. Althoughusually ignored, in 448 a leader of thebacaudae in Gaul named Eudoxius had fledto Attila.16 Although his fate is nowherementioned, there is a strong possibility thatpart of Attila’s reason for attacking Gaulwas out of the belief, fed by Eudoxius, thatthe bacaudae in the north would rise up tosupport him against the empire.

Attila was now determined to fulfil his

destiny and the weaker half of the RomanEmpire would be his target. Accordingly, hesent envoys to Italy. The message to Aetiushad two parts. The first demanded thatHonoria be handed over to Attila, claimingthat she had been betrothed to him, and asproof Attila sent the ring she had sent tohim. More alarmingly, he also demandedthat ‘Valentinian should resign to him halfof his empire, since Honoria had receivedthe sovereignty of it from her father andhad been deprived of it by her brother’sgreed’.17 No doubt also included in themessage was a further demand that Silvanusthe banker be handed over (see Chapter14). In the meantime, Attila prepared forwar.

451As he gathered his armies ready to travelwest, Attila’s diplomatic tactics struck a newnote. He now declared that in his new role

as co-emperor and ‘guardian of Romanfriendship, he would wage (war) onlyagainst the Goths’.18 No doubt he claimedthat this was only his duty, both as theprospective husband of and co-ruler withHonoria and as honorary magister militum.This would not have been the first time thatan army of Huns had destroyed Germanicintruders in the West: in 437 under Rua theyhad annihilated the Burgundians.

This was a plausible claim and wasdoubtless intended to create division andturmoil in the Western court. However,Attila had underestimated Aetius. The courtin Italy stood firm and rejected the claim. Inpart, this was thanks to the fact that Aetiuswas aware of the other envoys that Attilahad sent, and of their missions – probablythanks to a spy network both within Gauland within the Hunnic court. Aetius mayhave been receiving information from

several sources in Attila’s court, includingOrestes, who later had a major role in theWest. Furthermore, Aetius may haveprovided several officials to the Huns, someor all of whom reported to him, and it ispossible that his son Carpilio was still ahostage with the Huns at this time and ableto inform Aetius of events at the Hunniccourt.19

It is also possible that many of the olderHuns, who were contemporaries of Aetiusand knew him from his days as a hostage,did not support Attila in his attack on theWest. This allowed Aetius to inform theemperor and the Senate that Attila was alsoattempting to form a ‘barbarian coalition’ ofHuns, Franks, Alans and Goths in Gaul.

Attila’s message to the Franks was quitesimple. It was a call to arms for supportersof the older brother of the dead king and anattempt to gain support against the younger

brother, the adopted son of Aetius. SinceAetius was already supporting the youngerson, there was little Aetius could do exceptreply in kind, attempting to rally supportfor his foster-son.

Attila sent envoys to the Alans underSambida, leader of those Alans who hadbeen settled in the area of Valence (see Map14). According to Jordanes, Sambida nowconsidered the possibility of joining Attila,although if so this was no doubt out of fearrather than disloyalty to Aetius.20

Amid all this frantic political activity itwas the Hunnic envoys to the Goths thatwere the cause of gravest concern to theRomans. In a direct contradiction to themessage to Rome, Attila sent a message toTheoderic urging him to break his treatywith the Romans, and remember instead therecent defeats he had suffered at the handsof Aetius.21 Aetius was able to use Attila’s

duplicity for his own purposes, sendingembassies to Theoderic to request analliance and informing him of Attila’s claimthat he was going to attack the Goths.Unsure of whom to trust and of what Attila’sintentions actually were, Theoderic decidedto remain neutral and follow his ownpolicies.22

The Western Alliance23For his part, Aetius began an attempt tobuild a ‘western alliance’ against the Huns.Apart from the attempts to gain the Goths’support, Aetius also sent envoys to otherpeoples in the west, including all of thosewho had signed treaties to serve as foederatiwhen called upon. Obviously, he could relyon at least a large percentage of the Franks,the supporters of the deceased king’syounger son who was his own adoptedson.24 At the same time, he sent messengers

to the Sarmatians – an alternative andpoetic name for any of the nomadic tribesfrom the east, but which in this case denotesthe Alans of Sambida and Goa. Althoughunder pressure from Attila to join with theforces from the east, Sambida now bowed toRoman pressure and agreed to fight againstthe Huns.25

In his bid to join together the militarypowers of the whole of the west, Aetius alsosent messengers to several distinct politicalwestern entities.26 One of these was theArmoriciani, the semi-independent natives ofArmorica, by this date possibly under‘British’ leadership.27 Another was the‘Liticiani’ or ‘Liticians’, of unknown originbut perhaps the remnants of old units oflaeti now living on the extreme edges of theempire but still willing to serve theRomans.28 Also included were the ‘Ripari’(Riparians), Franks from northern Gaul, and

the ‘Olibriones’, ‘once Roman soldiers andnow the flower of the Allied forces’.29 It hasbeen suggested that the Olibriones were oldRoman units of riparienses from northernGaul, now serving the Franks. By this timethese units were probably largely mannedby Franks, although the new recruits mayhave been trained in traditional Romanfighting techniques by the Roman officersand their descendants in command of theunits.30 An unexpected addition to the list isthe Saxons, which would appear strangegiven their isolation from events, unlessthey had established otherwise-unknownenclaves in north Gaul, possibly around theregions of Bologna (Boulogne) and Bessin.31

Jordanes also notes the inclusion of severaltribes of ‘Celts’ and ‘Germans’, althoughthese are not individually named. Finally,Aetius managed to convince theBurgundians he had settled in Gaul also to

join the alliance.However, despite the agreements of all of

these people, the main concern for Aetiusremained enlisting the aid of the mostpowerful force in Gaul, the Goths ofTheoderic.

The Invasion of GaulWhilst the diplomatic activity was stillongoing, in early 451 Attila arrived on theRhine. However, he had not neglected hishomeland. At the same time as his mainforce moved west another group of Hunsattacked the Balkans, probably in anattempt to pin down the Eastern forces andprevent co-operation between the twoempires.32 This demonstrates that Attila didnot trust Marcian to keep to the terms of thetreaty. On the Rhine he set his men tobuilding boats using wood from the Germanforests, before crossing the Rhine andentering Gaul ‘as if he had the right to ask

for a wife that was owed to him’.33

Despite being called a ‘Hun’ army, Attila’sarmy was actually composed of manydifferent tribes. Sidonius provides a list ofthose tribes allegedly joining with Attila’sattack, yet it should be remembered that insome cases the poem may be followingtraditional literary motifs rather thanaccurately enumerating the tribesinvolved.34

The tribes listed include the Geloni fromthe region of the Volga, the Neuri andBastarnae from the Ukraine, the Sciri fromthe region of modern Odessa, the Rugi fromPomerania, the Bructeri from the Weser andthe Thuringi from Bavaria.35 Also included isa contingent from those members of theBurgundians who had remained in theiroriginal homeland around the Vistula ratherthan taking up Aetius’ offer of land in Gaul.Finally, those Franks who supported the

claim of the deceased king’s elder sonappear to have joined Attila en route.

However, the main allied contingentswere provided by the Ostrogoths under theirleaders, the brothers Valamir, Thiudimerand Vidimer, and the Gepids under theirking, Ardaric. In fact, Valamir and Ardaricwere even recognized by Attila himself asbeing of far higher value than the otherkings.36

The course of the Hunnic attack on Gaul issparsely attested and open to differentinterpretations. The main problem is thefact that medieval ecclesiastical chroniclesexaggerated the effects of Attila’s attacks.The medieval chronicles include a list oftowns that claimed to have been attackedby Attila, yet many of them are now knownto have escaped unscathed.37 What followsis a list of the towns noted as beingattacked, taken largely from the Acta

Sanctorum (Acts of the Saints), a collectionof minor hagiographies (biographies ofsaints), which include in the text storiesconcerning the behaviour of religiousleaders as their towns were attacked by theHuns, plus an analysis of the accuracy of theclaims.38 Along with the accounts ofGregory of Tours, Sidonius Apollinaris andJordanes, amongst others, these help toexpand on the course of the war.

The WarAttila marched through Germania towardsGaul. The fact that the Alamanni are notmentioned in any of the sources concerningthe invasion suggests that they either simplybowed to the inevitable and let him passunhindered or that the Huns passed to thenorth of the Alamannic territory.39 The firstcity that Attila is known to have attackedwas Metz, on 7 April – Easter Eve.40 It was

quickly taken and sacked.41 Following thisearly success, Attila ‘ravaged a greatnumber of other cities’.42 The meaning ofthe term ravaged is open to question. Mostauthorities assume that the towns werestormed and sacked, but this would havetaken time, and the speed of the Hunnicadvance suggests that this was not the case.In the context of the war and of the lateRoman empire it is more likely that inreality a large proportion of the towns‘ravaged’ were not themselves attacked:rather, their supporting territories wouldhave been scoured by the Huns forprovisions for their large army whilst theinhabitants cowered behind the city walls.43

After this, the areas ravaged would haveneeded a large amount of time to bringthem back to full productivity. However,some of the more strategically importanttowns, and any towns that were

inadequately defended, were no doubtattacked and sacked in the traditionalmanner.

Several towns are described in the Acta asbeing attacked. Reims was captured andsacked, with its bishop (Saint) Nicasiusbeing killed, and Tongres (Tongeren) wasalso sacked, although its bishop, (Saint)Servatius, escaped to die shortlythereafter.44 According to the GestaTreverorum (Deeds of the Treveri) Trier wasattacked too, an event possibly supportedby excavations in the twentieth century.45

Other towns alleged to have been attackedduring Attila’s invasion are Strasbourg,Worms, Mainz, Cologne, Cambrai, Arras,Tournai, Therouanne, Cologne, Amiens andBeauvais.

It is possible that either Strasbourg orWorms were attacked and sacked, as theywere on the route towards the centre of

Gaul. Yet the claims that Cologne, Tournai,Cambrai, Therouanne and Arras were alsosacked would appear to be unlikely.Instead, it is probable that a small pickedforce was separated from the main armyand sent north in an attempt to force theFranks to submit to Attila’s nominee for theFrankish throne. The Frankish king would inreturn be expected to establish a firm baseand recruit troops for the upcomingcampaign (see Map 14). As Attila wasexpecting a military reaction from theRomans, the ‘Frankish’ detachment willhave been given orders to move quickly, soit is likely that these towns had theirterritories ‘ravaged’ by the invading Huns asthey marched to rejoin the main force, andin their search for supplies for their largearmy, rather than being captured andsacked.

Yet there is another possible explanation

for the widespread devastation of northernGaul. Attila may have moved his army inseparate columns, which would also explainhow the Huns were able to sack so manytowns. The main force may have movedfrom Metz to Orleans with two or morecontingents operating on its flanks. Thiswould have been difficult for the Romans tooppose because there were many threatsand Aegidius may not have been strongenough or mobile enough to do more thanwithdraw ahead of Attila.46

Map 14. Atilla’s Invasion of Gaul

This is unlikely. Attila would not haveknown how the different groups within Gaulwere going to respond to his invasion. Nordid he know of their likely deployment. Thechances are that, apart from the ‘Frankish’detachment, he would have wanted to keephis troops concentrated to meet any threat

from the Romans. The majority of damagenot caused by the main force is probablyattributable to either the troops sent to theFranks or to the activities of the Hunnicscouts as they scoured the countryside forsupplies and information.

In addition, thankfully for the futurecapital of France, Paris was bypassed.Although normally attributed to theintervention of (Saint) Genevieve, in realityat this period the city was small andinsignificant. What is more likely is that thecity itself was ignored by the Huns – whowere intent upon rejoining Attila – ratherthan being saved by divine intervention:only the surrounding territories werescoured in the search for supplies.47

One factor emerges from the Huns’attacks on the cities of Gaul: all of the‘sacked’ cities were taken quickly before theHuns pressed on to new targets. This can be

contrasted to the siege of Aquileia in thefollowing year.48 It is obvious that thetowns and cities of Gaul did not have largegarrisons, and that the men who had oncebeen expected to defend them had beenremoved and were now part of the Gallicfield army. This may have been according toAetius’ orders: no doubt he wanted toconcentrate as many troops as possible toface the Huns. Conversely, that he needed towithdraw garrisons from the cities impliesthat Aetius was fast running out of recruits.

The Roman ResponseThere is no evidence for the activities of theGallic army when Attila invaded Gaul.Although it is possible that some of thetroops were ordered to act as garrisons forthe threatened cities, the fact that thesecities were taken very quickly implies thatthis is unlikely. Instead, it is probable thatthe Gallic army was ordered by Aetius to

retreat in front of the advancing Huns,heading for either Toulouse to join the Gothsor to Arles to join with Aetius when hecrossed the Alps into Gaul.

Whilst the Huns were ravaging the northeast of Gaul Aetius crossed the Alps fromItaly with ‘a thin, meagre force ofauxiliaries without legionaries’ (tenue etrarum sine milite ducens robur in auxiliis).49 Itwould appear that he had been anticipatinga Hunnic attack on Italy after theirdiplomacy had neutralized the Goths.50

Once across the Alps, Aetius would havebeen expecting to meet the Gallic field armybefore joining the Goths and advancing toface the Huns.51 The remainder of his forceswere left in Italy, partly to guard theemperor from attack across the Alps, butpossibly also to deal with any unrest inItaly: at this moment of crisis the crops inItaly had failed and the region was

threatened with the prospect of famine.52

Unexpectedly, he now found that the Gothswere waiting on events in their ownterritory and refusing to join with himagainst the Huns. He travelled to Arles andpondered his next move.

In desperation, Aetius made a finalattempt to win the support of Theodericagainst Attila. Despite the gravity of thesituation, and contrary to expectation, hedid not travel to Toulouse in person.Instead, Aetius, intent on using the best manfor the job, sent Avitus. Avitus was afavourite of king Theoderic I, having firstvisited the Gothic court in either 425 or 426.After this he had been involved with theeducation of Theoderic’s son Theoderic.Avitus had also had a military career,serving under Aetius in the campaigns of430, 431 and 436. Following his successfulcareer under Aetius, Avitus was promoted to

be magister militum per Gallias in 437, andhad helped raise the siege of Narbo byTheoderic. In 439 he had become praefectuspraetorio Galliarum, during which tenure in439 he negotiated the peace treaty withTheoderic. After this, he had retired to hisestates.53 With his prolonged activity inGaul and his personal contacts withTheoderic, Avitus was the ideal man for thetask at hand.

After a brief but intense bout ofdiplomatic manoeuvring, Avitus succeededwhere Aetius had failed. He convinced theGoths that their interests would be bestserved by an alliance with Rome against theHuns, although it must be acknowledgedthat the fact that the Huns had instantlybegun to ravage Gaul probably had at leastsome influence on the negotiations.54

Furthermore, it is possible that rumoursconcerning the possible attempts by Gaiseric

to influence Attila to attack had someweight in Theoderic’s judgement: Theodericwould never forgive Gaiseric for what hadhappened to his daughter.

Abandoning his policy of self-reliance,Theoderic prepared for war, taking withhim his two eldest sons, Theoderic andThorismund.55 His other sons were left inToulouse. In the meantime, it is likely thatAetius called for reinforcements from Italyprior to advancing further into Gaul, as itwas now clear that the Goths would notattempt to invade Italy. It is probably atthis point that news reached Pelagia thatAetius was in great difficulty in Gaul. Shenow began praying for his safety and thesuccess of the war.56

It may also have been at about this timethat news arrived in Orleans that the Hunshad invaded. Anianus, the bishop of the city,realized that Orleans would be a target for

the Huns, since it was the last major citydenying them access to the Goths inAquitania. Anianus therefore travelled toArles to meet Aetius and request aid for thecity.57 With Aetius’ assurances that he wasnow advancing to join with the Goths andface Attila in battle, Anianus left Arles andreturned home.

Although Attila was roaming Gaulunhindered, there was one major factor thatwas to prove to be his undoing. Aetius hadthe advantage of interior lines of supply, aswell as the logistical support of the WesternEmpire. Early in the year Aetius had orderedFerreolus, the praefectus praetorio Galliarum(Praetorian Prefect of Gaul), to organize thecollection of supplies and equipment at pre-designated locations.58 With suppliesassured, the allies (with the exception of theGoths) joined forces, almost certainly atArles. This is the most logical place for them

to collect, since the Huns were threateninglocations in the north or east of Gaul, and itis almost certain that Aetius had orderedthat supplies be collected at the city readyfor the upcoming campaign. The movewould also allow the Goths and Burgundiansto be supplied by the imperial government:as they gathered and began the march toconfront the Huns, Ferreolus’ logisticalabilities kept the Romans and their alliessupplied with the necessities needed for thecampaign.59

In direct contrast, Attila’s coalition wasforced to rely on plundering the local areasfor supplies. Although a viable means ofsupport, they did not have large reserves ofsupplies and so could not afford to either beblockaded or to have their lines of retreatcut off. Any such occurrence would result inthe army quickly being reduced tostarvation and of having to surrender to

Aetius. Attila could not afford to besurrounded.

The Siege of OrleansEventually, Anianus’ fears came to berealized. Even as Aetius travelled toToulouse to join with Theoderic, Attila’sforces arrived at Orleans and began to laysiege to the city.60 Deploying battering ramsand doubtless other siege-engines, Attila’smen began their assault.61 There are twodifferent accounts of the siege, and bycombining them it is possible to gain aclearer view of the event. The city wasunder heavy siege and the Huns werepreparing their forces when ‘four days’storm of rain’ hampered their attempts totake the city.62 However, after the rain hadcleared, on 14 June they launched an attackthat breached the walls and they preparedto take the city.63 At this moment, the

armies of the West arrived.64 With his forcesdispersed and doubtless concerned about hissupplies and line of retreat, Attilaimmediately called off the attack andretreated from the city.65

Although the story has undoubtedly beenembellished by the ancient chroniclers, andthe end of the siege dramaticallyembellished to enhance the story, it is clearthat the siege of Orleans was a close-runthing. It is only thanks to the speedy arrivalof the allies that the Huns were stoppedfrom entering and plundering the city.Moreover, Hunnic success would have leftthe route into the Gothic heartlands open.With the Huns at large in his own territoriesit is uncertain whether Theoderic wouldhave remained loyal to Aetius or changedsides and joined Attila in order to spare hispeople from attack. Whatever the case, thesiege of Orleans proved to be the high point

of Attila’s attack on the West. Unwilling tochance being cut off from his way home andblockaded, Attila retreated towards theRhine with the allies in hot pursuit.

The PursuitHaving been forced to raise the siege, Attilaretired in front of the Romans and theirallies. The direction his forces took impliesthat he was aiming to retreat from Gaul, orat least outdistance the pursuit in order toreform and prepare a fresh plan for thecampaign. Unfortunately for Attila, this wasnot to be. Five days after the end of thesiege Attila arrived at Troyes. The city wasunprotected and could be easily taken andsacked by the Huns. It is claimed in the ActaSanctorum that it was only the saintlyactions of Lupus, the Bishop of Troyes, whopleaded with Attila to spare the city that itwas saved from destruction. However,although Lupus probably met Attila outside

the city, it was not the bishop’s pleas thatsaved Troyes. Attila would have been moreintent on the actions of the pursuing alliesthan on Troyes’ plight. Although Troyes wasundefended and easy to attack, the allieswere in close pursuit, and Attila could notspare the time for sacking the city, whichwould have resulted in large numbers of hismen losing discipline and no doubt gettingdrunk. The loss of time in reordering hisforces after the sack might have been aworry, but even more was the prospect ofhis disorganized and dispersed forces beingattacked by the Romans and their allies asthe Huns sacked the town.66

Yet there was one other factor. Troyeswas on the River Seine. As Attila’s forcesgathered on the nearby plains known as theCampus Mauriacus and awaited thedaybreak, Attila himself was no doubtaware that there was little chance of him

escaping with his troops unhindered acrossthe river.67 Furthermore, he needed tosafeguard the plunder he had already taken.Leaving the spoils behind would havedemoralised his men and damaged hisprestige. He could afford neither.

Crossing the river by bridge would take avery long time, and there was a goodchance of his forces being attacked by thepursuing allies. Attila decided that this wasthe place where he was going to stand andface them. Possibly the allied forceoutnumbered the Huns slightly, as Attila,who had shown himself perfectly happy totake aggressive action in the past, actedvery defensively as soon as the combinedRoman–Visigoth army came close.* The events in this reconstruction, especially those relatingto 450, are based upon the primary sources. However,readers should be aware that the majority of these sourcesare undated, and so open to different interpretations.Furthermore, the accuracy of some of the sources,

especially Jordanes, is open to question. For more details,see the Introduction.

Chapter 14

The Battle of theCatalaunian Plains

In the afternoon of 19 June 451 Aetius’forces finally caught sight of the Hunnicarmy. For an unknown reason his Frankishallies clashed with the Gepids beforedarkness fell. In a brief but savageengagement neither side could gain theadvantage and the onset of night broughtthe fighting to a halt. Although Jordanesclaims that 15,000 men died in thisencounter, it is certain that these figures are

vastly inflated.1 However, the clash wasproof to Attila that on the following dayAetius would not balk from fighting a set-piece battle.

On the morning of 20 June 451 the twoarmies prepared for battle.2 Its location isunknown, although many suggestions havebeen proposed. The difficulty lies in thevague terms used by the sources. Jordanes,Hydatius and the Chronica Caesaraugustanote that the battle was fought on the‘Catalaunian Plains’.3 However, the GallicChronicler of 511 locates it on the MauriacPlain, which is echoed by the ConsulariaItalica, Gregory of Tours and the LexBurgundionum.4 Theophanes writes simplythat Attila was defeated at the River Lygis(Loire).5 On the other hand, the claim byMalalas that Attila was defeated on theRiver Danube is certainly mistaken.6Nothing has yet been proved decisively.7

SoothsayersAccording to Jordanes, Attila was in doubtas to the outcome of the battle, so decided to‘inquire into the future through soothsayers.These men examined the entrails and bonesof cattle and foretold disaster for the Huns.’8However, they also announced that theleader of the enemy would fall, and Attilatook this to mean that Aetius would bekilled. Although it is likely that Attila soughtthe advice of soothsayers, as this was acommon feature of non-Christian societiesbecause forecasting the future could ofteninfluence the morale of the army, the detailgiven is of doubtful accuracy. Instead, itsinclusion in the text may be Jordanes’method of emphasising Attila’s barbarity,since he took part in a pagan ritual that wasno longer relevant to the Christian Romans.Unfortunately, without corroboratingevidence, it is unlikely whether the truth

will ever be known.

The DeploymentThe only detailed description we have of thebattle is that given by Jordanes.9 Althoughin most cases Jordanes needs to be usedwith care, the fact that this is the onlydescription of the battle forces reliance onhis account, yet the end result can beconfusing.

For example, the traditional accountfollowed by most modern historians has theVisigoths attacking a hill on the right flankand dominating the battle from there.10 Thisis mirrored in other writers and has becomeaccepted. Its origins are unclear, but thefollowing extract may give a clue as to itssource. It is a translation of Jordanes:

Now this was the configuration ofthe field of battle. It rose [on oneside] [sic] into a decided

undulation which might be called ahill.

Hodgkin, 1892, Vol. 2, 127

The fact that the phrase ‘on one side’ hasbeen added leads to the conclusion that allof the modern interpretations of thebattlefield are based upon this addendum,although the author does not state his sourceand so it cannot be traced further back.However, both the original Latin and thetranslation of Jordanes’ account do notsupport this reconstruction, so is worthquoting:

Convenere partes, ut diximus, incampos Catalaunicos. Erat autempositio loci declivi tumore in editumcollis excrescens. Quem uterquecupiens exercitus obtinere, quia locioportunitas non parvum benificium

confert, dextram partem Hunni cumsuis, sinistram Romani et Vesegothaecum auxiliariis occuparunt, relictoquede cacumine eius iugo certamenineunt.

Jordanes, Getica, 39 (196–197)The armies met, as we have said, inthe Catalaunian Plains. The battlefield was a plain rising by a sharpslope to a ridge, which both armiessought to gain; for advantage ofposition is a great help. The Hunswith their forces seized the rightside, the Romans, the Visigoths andtheir allies the left, and then begana struggle for the yet untaken crest.

Translation CC Mierow

Therefore, discounting the earlierinterpretations, the battlefield appears tohave been a plain dominated by a ridge

across its centre, not by a hill, although theridge was higher in some places than others(see Plate 30). Having reached thisconclusion, the rest of the passage fromJordanes is easier to interpret, althoughthere are still one or two points that areuncertain.

As already noted, Jordanes claims that theHuns ‘seized the right side, the Romans, theVisigoths and their allies the left’. IfJordanes’ use of ‘right’ and ‘left’ refers to‘east’ and ‘west’ respectively, which is asimple conclusion from both his phrasingand from the allies’ line of advance, theHuns were on the east of the plain and theallies on the west, with the ridge crossingthe battlefield near the centre. Yet thissentence gives us evidence that Jordanes’account needs to be treated with caution.The Huns are the enemy, and theappearance of other tribes as their allies –

especially the Ostrogoths – is unwelcome toJordanes. In direct contrast, Jordanesfocuses on the Visigoths almost to theexclusion of the Romans. This demonstratesJordanes’ bias: the work is a history of theGoths, both branches, and so theappearance of the Ostrogoths on the side ofAttila is downplayed and that of theVisigoths overplayed in order to boost theirstatus. This needs to be borne in mindthroughout the analysis of the battle.

Catalaunian Plain 1 Deployment

Attila arrayed his forces with himself andhis Huns in the centre. The Ostrogoths, andpossibly some of the minor allies, wereplaced on Attila’s left wing specifically toface the Visigoths, as Attila had faith in theirking Valamir and his brothers Thiudimerand Vidimer. The Gepids, and possibly someother allied troops, appear to have been onthe right wing under the Gepid king Ardaric.

The tactics of Attila appear to have beenremarkably simple and based on theassumption that Aetius would adopt thetraditional Roman deployment of cavalryon the flanks and infantry in the centre. Inthis scenario, Attila’s whole army was toadvance to the top of the hill, and then thetwo flanks, under his most trustedsubordinates, would charge at the enemycavalry whilst the Huns used theirtraditional tactics to pin the enemy infantryin the centre and cause as much confusionas possible with a hail of missiles. At thepoint where one or both flanks of thealliance broke, the Huns would then be in aposition to put pressure on the remainingenemy, and possibly be able to follow theretreating Romans and so turn the flanks ofthe centre. The enemy would then collapse,leaving the Huns to pursue, a tactic at whichthey excelled.

Unfortunately for Attila, Aetius was not atypical Roman general. The western alliesdeployed with the Visigoths taking the rightwing, with Theoderic in charge of theextreme right and Thorismund in charge ofthe troops next to the centre. Aetius and themajority of his Roman and other alliedtroops took the left wing. Sambida and theAlans were in the centre, possibly with astiffening of Roman troops. Jordanes claimsthat the Alans were placed in the centre,‘thus contriving with military caution tosurround by a host of faithful troops theman in whose loyalty they had littleconfidence. For one who has difficultiesplaced in the way of his flight readilysubmits to the necessity of fighting.’11

Although this interpretation is usuallyaccepted at face value, in reality it has littleto recommend it.12 The major difficulty isthat the Alans were not surrounded. Once

battle began, the troops on either side of theAlans would be more concerned with theopposition, as would any troops stationed tosupport the Alans. On the contrary, thedeployment suggests that Aetius wasunworried, as otherwise by placing theAlans in the centre Aetius was taking agreat risk. Should they rout, the Roman lineswould be divided and each sector easilydealt with piecemeal. As will be seen,Aetius’ trust was vindicated. Rather than arealistic attempt to evaluate the truth,Jordanes was almost certainly attempting tominimize the role of the Alans and contrastit to that of the Visigoths, the main object ofhis writing.

The question then remains concerningAetius’ use of the Alans. It is often forgottenat this point that Aetius was a man with adeep knowledge of Hunnic strategy andtactics due to his time amongst them as a

hostage and his continuing employment ofthem as foederati and bucellarii. Althoughspeculation, the chances are that he foresawthat the Huns would deploy using astandard formation, especially since theywere being assisted by large numbers ofsubject troops and this would help to avoidconfusion. If this is the case, then Aetiusmust have predicted the deployment andplaced the Alans in the centre for a purpose.

It is likely that Aetius was using hisknowledge of the Huns against them.Knowing that they would deploy their ownforces, comprised mainly of horse archers,in the centre, Aetius deployed the Alans –whose troops used roughly the same tactics– to face them. Rather than being faced by asolid block of relatively immobile infantryin the centre, Attila found himself faced bythe mobile and highly skilled Alans.Furthermore, these men had been fighting

alongside the Romans for many years andknew how to fight effectively as their allies.Unable to use the Huns’ standard hit-and-run tactics in the centre, Aetius will havehoped that Attila would be confused aboutwhich course to take. This would give himtime to destroy Attila’s flanks.

With this in mind, Aetius’ deploymentmakes complete sense. He hoped that theAlans would be able to at least hold theHuns in the centre, if not beat them to thecrest of the hill. However, the two strongestdivisions were on the flanks, and there canbe little doubt that he was intending forthese troops to deliver the fatal blow to theHuns and their allies.

There is one other, highly debatable,possibility to be borne in mind. Aetius, likeall educated Romans of his day, would havebeen taught by use of the classics. Amongstthese were the works of Polybius and Livy.

It is not impossible that Aetius, aware of theHuns’ probable deployment, had decided toemulate two of the great generals of thepast: Hannibal, one of the great enemies ofRome, and Scipio Africanus, Hannibal’sopponent. In 216 BC at the Battle of CannaeHannibal had turned the flanks of theRoman army and surrounded them.13 At theBattle of Ilipa in 206 BC Scipio Africanushad outmanoeuvred a Carthaginian armybefore attacking its flanks and routing itscentre.14 By destroying Attila’s flanks andsurrounding his centre, the Visigoths on theright and the Romans on the left couldpossibly advance to the vicinity of theHunnic camp, so copying the earlierstrategies. Additionally, the tactic wouldtrap the Huns and so negate their greatestadvantage: their mobility. This isspeculation of the highest order, but it isoften forgotten that the classic works that

still survive were copied because they werepopular and people read them. This is astrue of late antiquity as it is today. Althoughthe concept that the Romans of the lateempire would utilize the tactics of a bygoneera remains conjecture, and is not usuallyconsidered by modern historians, it mustremain a possibility.

With a ridge between them, both Aetiusand Attila would have known the tacticaladvantage of possession of the crest. Withthis in mind, it is surprising that the battlebegan ‘about the ninth hour of the day’(early to mid afternoon). The late start isallegedly due to the fact that Attila wasscared by the omens and decided to wait: ifthe battle should prove to be a disaster, inthis way darkness would cover the retreat ofthe Huns and allow many of them toescape.15

This does not, however, explain why

Aetius did not make the first move. Thelikelihood is that both generals realized thata pre-emptive attempt to attack without aproper deployment could lead to disaster.Both sides had troops capable of makingfast attacks on isolated and unsupportedformations. Therefore, a combined assaultwould be necessary to win the battle.

Furthermore, any aggressive move bysmall groups could easily lead to confusionamongst their own armies. Both armieswere comprised of large numbers of troopswith little experience of working togetherand without a common language.Deployment would take a long time. Inaddition, there were troops on oppositesides who spoke the same language, so careand accuracy of deployment would avoidthe risk of troops attacking their own allies.As a result, both generals chose to slowlydeploy their troops ready for battle. The

deployment was crucial: thanks to languagedifficulties and the lack of joint training,both sides would find changes difficult tomake.

The Battle16The armies now set in motion, bothattempting to seize the crest and sodominate the battlefield. Again, Jordanes’account is open to debate: ‘The Huns withtheir forces seized the right side, theRomans, the Visigoths and their allies theleft, and then began a struggle for the yetuntaken crest.’17 All depends upon theinterpretation of right and left. In themajority of modern accounts the Huns seizethe hill to their right, opposing Aetiushimself, while the Visigoths beat theOstrogoths to the crest and so dominate thebattlefield on their flank. Yet this analysis isalmost certainly mistaken. The real course

of events can be seen by arrangingJordanes’ account into a chronologicalcourse of events.

Catalaunian Plain 2 Stage 1

As already stated:

The Huns with their forces seizedthe right side, the Romans, theVisigoths and their allies the left,

and then began a struggle for theyet untaken crest.

Jord. Get. 38 (197)

This is followed by a description of thedeployment of the Romans and their allies,following which:

So then the struggle began for theadvantage of position we havementioned. Attila sent his men totake the summit of the mountain,but was outstripped by Thorismudand Aetius, who in their effort togain the top of the hill reachedhigher ground and through thisadvantage of position easily routedthe Huns as they came up.

Jord. Get. 38 (201)

What has happened is clear – Jordanes is

describing the battle from the Roman lines.Attila’s forces had occupied the crest on theright of the Romans, facing the Visigoths. Atleast part of Attila’s plan to defeat theRomans’ wings, as hypothesized above,looked to be succeeding. In contrast, Aetiushad seized the left side of the crest facingthe Gepids, who were no doubt weakenedby their skirmish of the night before. In ajoint operation, Aetius’ troops – includingthe Alans – had then taken the centre of theridge, helped by the Visigothic forces underThorismund. Attempting to dislodge theallies from this strong position, the Hunswere easily beaten back as they climbed theslope.

The Huns now became demoralized bytheir failure and Attila was forced to make aspeech:

Now when Attila saw his army wasthrown into confusion by this

event, he thought it best toencourage them by anextemporaneous address . . .

Jord. Get. 39 (202)

The text of the speech need not be analyzedin detail, since it is extremely unlikely thatJordanes would have been able to write,word for word, a speech made by Attila. Infact, it is unlikely that Attila made anyspeech at all, since in the din and confusionof the battle his words would have been lostto all but a few.18 The wording is arhetorical piece invented by Jordanes, butone small part of the speech is useful, as hegives clues as to the nature of thebattlefield:

They seek the heights, they seizethe hills and, repenting too late,clamour for protection against

battle in the open fields.

Jord. Get. 39 (204)

The use of the plurals ‘heights’ and ‘hills’reinforces the concept suggested earlier thatthere was not just a single hill on the righthand side of the Romans’ deployment area,but rather a long crest, with some partsbeing higher than others, especially in thecentre.

Encouraged, the Huns and their alliesrenewed their assault on the crest:

And although the situation wasitself fearful, yet the presence oftheir king dispelled anxiety andhesitation. Hand to hand theyclashed in battle, and the fightgrew fierce, confused, monstrous,unrelenting – a fight whose like noancient time has ever recorded.

There such deeds were done that abrave man who missed thismarvellous spectacle could nothope to see anything so wonderfulall his life long.

Jord. Get. 40 (207)

However, the Visigoths on the extreme rightof the Roman line appear to have beenunable to take the ridge in front of them. Atthis point there was a potential disaster forthe Roman allies:

Here King Theoderic, while ridingby to encourage his army, wasthrown from his horse andtrampled under foot by his ownmen, thus ending his days at a ripeold age. But others say he was slainby the spear of Andag of the host ofthe Ostrogoths, who were thenunder the sway of Attila. This was

what the soothsayers had told toAttila in prophecy, though heunderstood it of Aetius.

Jord. Get. 40 (209)

By way of contrast, both Malalas and theChronicon Paschale claim that Theoderic waskilled by an arrow.19 Since this is very lateevidence it is probably less likely than theaccounts given by Jordanes: however, thereremains the remote possibility that it isaccurate.

It is interesting to note that Jordanes,writing the history of the Goths, does notmention the Ostrogoths during the course ofthe battle anywhere but at this point. Thereason is almost certainly that he wanted tominimize the fact that the Ostrogoths foughtagainst the Romans alongside Attila, laterreviled as the ‘Scourge of God’. However,Jordanes had access to the descendents ofAndag, and so may have recorded a family

tradition that may in fact have containedthe true course of events. Theoderic hadbeen killed by Andag as he led his menuphill against the Ostrogoths. Yet the newsdid not immediately spread.

Unaware of his father’s death and asdarkness was beginning to descend,Thorismund saw from the top of the ridgethat the Huns to his front were beginning tolose heart and that they were trappedbetween their wings and their camp. Healso located Attila’s position in the battle.Thorismund seized the opportunity and ledhis forces in a downhill charge at the Hunsopposing them, trying to reach Attila.Unable to use their traditional hit-and-runtactics, the Huns disintegrated and began torout, in the process exposing Attila todanger:

Then the Visigoths, separating fromthe Alans, fell upon the horde of

the Huns and nearly slew Attila.But he prudently took flight andstraightway shut himself and hiscompanions within the barriers ofthe camp, which he had fortifiedwith wagons. A frail defenceindeed; yet there they soughtrefuge for their lives, whom but alittle while before no walls of earthcould withstand.

Jord. Get. 40 (210)

Catalaunian Plain 3 Stage 2

When Attila fled the field his army,including his allies, also seem to have lostheart. As the sun set what was left of theHuns and their allies attempted to retire totheir camp and await the dawn. Otherswandered lost in the darkness. Many ofthese men were killed, and no doubt largenumbers of them forgot their alliance to

Attila and fled the field and attempted tomake their way back to their homes –especially the Franks. Yet Attila’s decision topostpone the battle now paid dividends. Inthe darkness, confusion quickly spread:

But Thorismud, the son of KingTheoderic, who with Aetius hadseized the hill and repulsed theenemy from the higher ground,came unwittingly to the wagons ofthe enemy in the darkness of night,thinking he had reached his ownlines. As he was fighting bravely,someone wounded him in the headand dragged him from his horse.Then he was rescued by thewatchful care of his followers andwithdrew from the fierce conflict.Aetius also became separated fromhis men in the confusion of nightand wandered about in the midst of

the enemy. Fearing disaster hadhappened, he went about in searchof the Goths. At last he reached thecamp of his allies and passed theremainder of the night in theprotection of their shields.

Jord. Get. 40 (211–212)

Catalaunian Plain 4 Stage 3

With a high level of confusion, andexpecting the worst, the allies awaited thedawn, with Thorismund receiving treatmentfor his head wound. Much to their surprise:

At dawn on the following day,when the Romans saw the fieldswere piled high with bodies andthat the Huns did not venture forth,they thought the victory was theirs,but knew that Attila would not fleefrom the battle unless overwhelmedby a great disaster. Yet he didnothing cowardly, like one that isovercome, but with clash of armssounded the trumpets andthreatened an attack. He was like alion pierced by hunting spears, whopaces to and fro before the mouthof his den and dares not spring, butceases not to terrify theneighbourhood by his roaring. Even

so this warlike king at bay terrifiedhis conquerors. (213) Therefore theGoths and Romans assembled andconsidered what to do with thevanquished Attila. They determinedto wear him out by a siege, becausehe had no supply of provisions andwas hindered from approaching bya shower of arrows from thebowmen placed within the confinesof the Roman camp. But it was saidthat the king remained supremelybrave even in this extremity andhad heaped up a funeral pyre ofhorse trappings, so that if theenemy should attack him, he wasdetermined to cast himself into theflames, that none might have thejoy of wounding him and that thelord of so many races might not fallinto the hands of his foes.

Jord. Get. 40 (212–213)

Determined to capture or kill Attila, thevictorious allies now deployed troops tocontain the Huns, but at the same timebegan the task of dealing with the dead andwounded on the battlefield. Foremost intheir minds was the absence of Theoderic:

Now during these delays in thesiege, the Visigoths sought theirking and the king’s sons theirfather, wondering at his absencewhen success had been attained.When, after a long search, theyfound him where the dead laythickest, as happens with bravemen, they honoured him with songsand bore him away in the sight ofthe enemy.

Jord. Get. 40 (214)

Aetius and the GothsOn the day following the battle the Hunsremained in their camp. Once the Visigothshad recovered Theoderic’s body, the alliesneeded to decide what to do next:

Thorismund was eager to takevengeance for his father’s death onthe remaining Huns, being movedto this both by the pain ofbereavement and the impulse ofthat valour for which he was noted.Yet he consulted with the PatricianAetius (for he was an older manand of more mature wisdom) withregard to what he ought to do next.But Aetius feared that if the Hunswere totally destroyed by theGoths, the Roman Empire would beoverwhelmed, and urgently advisedhim to return to his own dominionsto take up the rule which his father

had left. Otherwise his brothersmight seize their father’spossessions and obtain the powerover the Visigoths. In this caseThorismund would have to fightfiercely and, what is worse,disastrously with his owncountrymen. Thorismud acceptedthe advice without perceiving itsdouble meaning, but followed itwith an eye toward his ownadvantage. So he left the Huns andreturned to Gaul. Thus whilehuman frailty rushes into suspicion,it often loses an opportunity ofdoing great things.

Jord. Get. 41 (215–217)

This passage is echoed by Gregory of Tours,who similarly claims that Aetius toldThorismund that he should return home asotherwise he ‘would be cheated out of his

father’s kingdom’. Interestingly, Gregoryalso notes that Aetius gave the same adviceto his foster-son, the young son of thedeceased Frankish king, who had alsofought at the battle.20 Gregory then goes onto say that the reason for the advice was toenable Aetius to collect the booty from thebattlefield before returning to Italy.21

Modern historians have tended toquestion Aetius’ motives in allowing theHuns to escape. However, this overlooks themilitary realities of the time. The Frankshad been, in effect, fighting a civil war atthe battle. It was no doubt possible for thevictor, Aetius’ foster-son, to delay and helpin the assault on Attila’s camp. Yet theoutcome was still in doubt. The Huns wereclearly prepared to defend themselves to thelast and in their defence there was a distinctpossibility that the Frankish leader would bekilled, as had already happened to

Theoderic. This would lose Aetius a valuableally.

The same can be said of Thorismund.Thorismund had five brothers: (another)Theoderic, Euric, Frederic, Retemer andHimnerith.22 Aetius’ chief negotiator withthe Goths, Avitus, would have told him thatThorismund was probably the weakest andthe most inclined to work alongside theRomans rather than against them.Furthermore, Aetius and Thorismund hadjust fought together and defeated one of thegreatest enemies of the Romans, Attila.Relying on his new-forged friendship andsupport, Aetius chose to advise the new kingto return home and ensure that his brothersdid not claim the throne in his absence. Fourof them had remained in Toulouse and sowere in a position to depose him quicklyonce news of their father’s death arrived,unless he took affirmative action.

Aetius no doubt concluded that the defeathad seriously weakened Attila’s position.The Huns relied on fear and their reputationas invincible warriors to cow their subjectsinto submission. The defeat to Aetius was amajor blow to Attila’s prestige. It wasreasonable to expect that any subsequentinvasion of Gaul by Attila would be met bya renewed alliance of the Romans, Visigothsand Franks. Furthermore, Attila’s lossesmeant that his own army would be weaker,especially as many of his allies haddoubtless retired in the night and were nowseparated from the Huns, and even possiblyon their way home. Aetius might also haveexpected that at least some of Attila’ssubjects would be unwilling to support asecond invasion of Gaul.

A further factor in the equation is thatAttila was the nephew of Aetius’ friends Ruaand Ochtar. Although they were now dead,

Aetius may have been hoping that thedefeat would spur Attila into accepting asimilar role as ‘friend’ of Aetius, rather thanas an enemy, and so allow Rome and theHuns to resume their former partnership. Todefeat heavily Attila and the Huns nowcould result in Attila being unwilling toallow Huns under his control to serve theRomans as foederati or bucellarii in thefuture. Although this would have been adistant hope, Aetius may have stillharboured it. Furthermore, his own armieshad suffered heavy losses, and the West’sdesperation for manpower resulted in anunwillingness to take risks and heavy losseswhen the same result – the retreat of Attila –could be obtained by peaceful means.

On the other hand, all of this would belost if either Attila was able to repulse anattack on his camp or if either or both ofAetius’ allies were to die in the attempt:

after all, Theoderic had already died andThorismund had only just avoided a similarfate. Assessing his options in the cold lightof day, Aetius came to the conclusion thatkeeping his new-found allies alive and wellin Gaul would help most by ensuringcontinuing peace in the area, as well asdeterring Attila from further attacks by thethreat of a renewal of the alliance. After hisdeliberations, Aetius chose to disband thearmy and send them all home. The Visigothsunder their new king returned to Toulouse,where ‘although the throng of his brothersand brave companions were still rejoicingover the victory he yet began to rule somildly that no one strove with him for thesuccession to the kingdom’.23 In a likemanner, the Franks and the other alliesjourneyed north to their own homelands.

When the allies withdrew and dispersed,Attila was at first fearful of a trick and

thought that they would attack as he left hiscamp. As a result, he waited in his camp fora long time.24 When he was certain that hewas safe, he gathered the remnants of hisforces and began the long march home. Histhoughts would have been busy with plansboth to negate the negative politicalramifications of his loss and to have hisrevenge on Aetius, the only man who hadever defeated him in battle.

AftermathThe Romans accepted that they had onlywon the battle with the help of the Goths, afact acknowledged by the Romanchroniclers.25 The value of the Gothicalliance is also stressed by Sidonius in hispoem in praise of Avitus, the man whomade the alliance possible, although thismay also have been an attempt by Sidoniusto ingratiate himself with his new overlords,

the Goths.26

The writings of the chroniclers andSidonius clearly emphasize that the battlewas seen as important shortly after it hadoccurred, but it is possible that at the timethe battle was seen as just yet anotherbarbarian raid. For example, Prosper, whowas hostile to Aetius, ignores the battle, buteven he could not have overlooked it if ithad been instantly recognized as one of themost important events of the fifth century.27

Yet in retrospect many historians haveseen this battle as one of the pivotalincidents that shaped modern Europe. It hasbeen suggested that had Attila won a new,non-Christian empire would have come intoexistence between the Atlantic and the BlackSea.28 Yet early in the twentieth centurydoubts began to be raised about thisconcept. The main objection must remainthat Attila’s empire only existed while he

was alive. Upon his death it fragmented.Even had he conquered Gaul, upon his deathhis sons would still have been unable tomaintain the empire and it would havequickly fallen apart.29 Gaul might have beendamaged and the specific history of Francechanged, but Christianity would have beenmaintained and the impact of the Huns beenonly fleeting.

GaulWhen Attila withdrew from Gaul he leftbehind a group of provinces that had beendevastated by his invasion. The inhabitantswere left in a perilous condition, but, inspite of expectations, in this difficult timethe officials appear to have rallied to thesupport of the provincials, rather thanattempting to take advantage of thesituation. Ferreolus, the praefectus praetorioGalliarum, immediately petitioned theemperor for tax remissions, whilst Avitus

also supplied aid to the inhabitants.30 Theshock of the attack would take time to pass.At around the same time as the officialsarrived from Ferreolus asking for taxremissions in Gaul, Valentinian wascontinuing to help those Africans who werestill suffering from their extended exile.31

Furthermore, it is possible that theinvasion of Gaul, despite disruptingproduction and damaging property, maynot have been as harmful as usuallyaccepted. Although towns were originallythe centre of productive and economicforces, these functions had gradually passedto more rural areas. Moreover, in time ofwar it has been suggested that thepopulation of the towns, knowing that theywere likely to be the focus of an attack,would leave and take refuge in thesurrounding countryside.32 As a result,although the capture of a town was

obviously a dreadful occurrence, a largeproportion of the population would havesurvived unharmed, and the main locationsfor economic re-growth may have been atleast relatively untouched. This may help toexplain the relatively fast rebirth of townsthat in theory should have been devastatedand beyond recovery if the sources arefollowed literally.

Chapter 15

Attila’s Invasion of Italy

In late summer or early autumn Attilareturned home to find that contrary toexpectations the East had been fighting‘vigorously against the Huns in theBalkans’.1 However, his grievances againstthe East were small compared with his needto restore his aura of invincibility. Over thewinter months between 451 and 452 Attilaspent his time consolidating his position athome and preparing for a return to the fray.He will have been heartened by the news

that the western allies had gone theirseparate ways and may have known thatthere was – or appears to have been – littlecontact between the victors. He began tolook at the options for the new year.

In Gaul, Thorismund began the process ofcementing his rule. However, in one respectat least he appears to have been dissatisfied.His father had been killed fighting as an allyof the Romans and he himself had beenclose to death. Yet there is no record of anyagreements between Aetius andThorismund, either extending Thorismund’sdominions in Gaul or rewarding him withan imperial position. It is likely, thoughimprovable, that Thorismund was offendedby the apparent lack of gratitude of theemperor. Like Attila, he began to make hisplans for the new year, his aim being toestablish himself as his father’s heir despitehaving several brothers as rivals. He may

also have started to look at ways to putpressure on Aetius for the rewards he felt hedeserved. In the north, the new Frankishking settled down to rule, and the survivorsof the contingent from Armorica no doubtreturned home confident that their part inthe victory would be acknowledged by theempire.

Back in Italy it was finally accepted thatmost of the landowners dispossessed by theVandals’ conquest of Africa were not goingto be allowed by Gaiseric to return andregain all of their lands. As a result,Valentinian arranged for them to be leasedlands in Sitifensis and Caesariensis (see Map12) as compensation, with full inheritancerights.2

Whilst these measures were beingimplemented Aetius would have beenfocusing on the recruitment and training ofrecruits to replace the losses in the battle.

This may not have been as difficult as inprevious years: the Battle of theCatalaunian Plains was the first recordedmajor defeat of the Huns and it is certainthat Aetius’ reputation as a general and aleader of men now reached new heights.The glory of winning such an unexpectedvictory, coupled with the large amount ofbooty taken from the field of battle,probably resulted in there being a smallincrease in the number of volunteers for thearmy. With the Goths and the Franks asallies and with Attila running homedefeated, Aetius will have felt a certainsense of security when looking forward tothe new year. He may even have begunmaking plans for limited reconquests of‘lost’ areas, hoping in this way to begin theprocess of restoring the empire’s financialability to survive.

452

Militarily, all seemed well as the campaignseason of 452 began. There was no sign of aHunnic backlash against the defeat andaffairs in Gaul appeared to have settled. TheVandals in Africa remained peaceful andwere adhering to the treaty of 442. Overall,Aetius will have been pleased with hisposition. However, domestically thereremained the problem of famine in Italy. Nodoubt Aetius used alternative resources forgrain, such as Gaul, Sicily and themerchants of the East, much as he had donefollowing the fall of Africa in 439, whichmay have helped to alleviate the problem.However it is unlikely that these temporarymeasures were a solution, especially sinceconditions in Gaul and Sicily may not havebeen ideal either. His priority at the timewas the provisioning of Rome, since if theinhabitants of Rome rebelled due to faminehe and Valentinian would be put under

extreme pressure by the population.3

The Invasion of ItalyUnfortunately for Aetius, Attila wasdetermined to avenge his defeat and regainhis aura of invincibility.4 The fact that hehad been defeated could easily lead tointernal unrest in the Hunnic empire.Furthermore, there was also the possibilitythat the victorious Aetius in the West andthe new regime of Marcian in the Eastwould cooperate militarily to oppose him.Yet in one respect, Attila had a greatadvantage: he realized that the alliancebetween Aetius and Thorismund had beenforged only thanks to his own invasion ofGaul. Intelligence from the West, possiblyfrom Franks unhappy with their new youngking, may have informed Attila of how closethe Goths had been to remaining neutralduring his invasion of Gaul. Attila correctlyassumed that if he attacked Italy the Goths

would not join in the defence and so hewould only have to face the forces ofAetius.5 Yet it took Attila a long time togather his troops together ready for anotherinvasion of the West. This was doubtless inpart due to the losses he had suffered inGaul, a hypothesis reinforced by the factthat, for this second invasion, he did notleave troops behind to pin down the forcesof the East.6

In the early summer of 452 Attila invadedItaly.7 His course took him through Illyricumand across the Julian Alps into the north-east corner.8 In the previous year Aetius hadbeen expecting Attila to invade Italy, yetProsper claims that this invasion was a‘complete surprise’.9 This has usually beenaccepted, but analysis has disputed theclaim.10 The main reason why the claim hasbeen accepted is the statement that Aetius‘failed to make use of the barriers of the

Alps’.11 In some ways this makes sensemilitarily – a determined defence of thepasses at the mountains would have causedAttila serious losses and may have causedhim to turn back. Yet the impression isactually false. Although applicable to highmountain ranges, the theory does not applyto the Julian Alps, which are lower andeasier to traverse than their northerncounterparts.12 In the past, attempts todefend these passes had ended in defeat,especially as the defences that were inplace, the Claustra Alpium Juliarum(Fortifications of the Julian Alps), werelightly held and mainly intended to haltbarbarian raids that had penetrated intoIllyricum from the east.13 Knowing that inthe height of summer the mounted and fast-moving Huns would easily outflank hispositions, Aetius probably decided not toattempt a forward defence, but rather to

retreat and call on reinforcements from thewest. In the meantime he probablyreinforced the garrison of Aquileia, whichwould be the first city reached by the Huns.

Map 15. Attila’s Invasion of Italy

Towards the end of June Attila did indeedreach Aquileia. Over fifty years earlier, in401, the Gothic leader Alaric had invadedItaly and, having no knowledge of siegewarfare and believing that Aquileia was toostrong to attack, had simply bypassed thecity.14 In contrast, Attila had the ability tocapture cities and he appears to havethought it unwise to bypass Aquileia,possibly since the garrison would be in aposition to threaten his lines ofcommunication, his rear and to block hisreturn home. In contrast, Alaric had had nodesire to return to Illyricum. Attilaimmediately began a siege using a varietyof siege engines.15 Attila will have hoped fora quick siege, much as had happened tomany cities in Gaul the previous year.16 Ifso, he was to be disappointed: ‘He pressedthe siege there long and hard . . . fromwithin the bravest of Roman soldiers

withstood him.’17 Attila’s need for a veryfast campaign was thwarted by thedefenders of Aquileia. Instead, in the middleof a famine in Italy he found himselfbesieging the city for three months.18

Eventually, his army began to lose heartand think of home, but Attila noticed thatthe storks that nested in the city werecarrying their young away.19 Seeing this asan omen, he ordered his troops to renew theassault, and either in late August or earlySeptember the city fell to the Huns. In angerat its resistance, Attila and his troopssavagely plundered it, although Jordanes’claims that no trace of the city was left arefalse.20

Despite the fact that Attila was in thenorth east of Italy, Aetius continued toaddress the problems of famine, issuing anedict to ensure the arrival of animals inRome to feed the population.21 However

once the scale of Attila’s invasion becameknown, Prosper claims that Aetius ‘believedhis only hope lay in a full retreat fromItaly’, but that a ‘sense of shame’ stoppedthis proposal.22 Prosper does not statewhere Aetius would have retreated to, and,indeed, there were very few places left inthe West where the Roman emperor wouldbe safe. The only possibility is that Aetiuswas intending to take Valentinian toConstantinople and there to seek thesupport of the Eastern Emperor Marcian toprovide an expedition to retake Italy.

Although Prosper’s claim is usuallydismissed or ignored, given later events, it isclear that Aetius was in contact withMarcian, and the episode would make senseif Aetius was convinced that he would beunable to face Attila in battle withoutexternal help. Consequently, it is possible tosuggest that Aetius did in fact send

messengers to Marcian asking for help andmooting the possibility of exile for himselfand Valentinian should Attila overrun Italy.Fortunately for Aetius, Marcian agreed tosend help as soon as he could.23 Even morefortunately, the defenders of Aquileia gaveAetius the breathing space he needed toorganize his forces.

Whilst Aetius was negotiating with theEast, which given the distances involvedprobably took up to at least two months,Attila successfully stormed Aquileia and thenled his forces deeper into Italy. Advancingfurther into Venetia and Liguria, hebesieged and sacked Mediolanum (Milan)and Ticinum (Pavia).24 According to Paulthe Deacon, at the same time – the actualchronology is unknown – Attila also sackedConcordia, Altinum (Altino) and Patavium(Padua). Paul goes on to say that the Hunsin addition attacked Vicetia (Vicenza),

Verona, Brixia (Brescia) and Pergamum(Bergamo?).25 It is unclear whether thesecities were actually sacked, since Paul’sphrasing is somewhat ambivalent. However,it is possible to conclude from the wordingthat Concordia, Altinum and Patavium weresacked, and that the territories of Vicetia,Verona, Brixia and Pergamum wereravaged, although the cities themselvesremained untouched.

In Milan it is claimed by Priscus thatAttila saw a painting of the Romanemperors on golden thrones with ‘Scythianslying dead before their feet’, over which heordered a painter to paint ‘Attila upon athrone and the Roman emperors heavingsacks upon their shoulders and pouring outgold before his feet’.26 Although the originof the story is unknown, it is possibly true,as it would accord with what we assume ofthe temperament of Attila from the sources.

It is unknown at this time what Aetiuswas doing or where he had positioned theRoman forces. As he was awaitingreinforcements from the East, it is possiblethat he was in one of the ports on theeastern coast of Italy. If this is the case, itwas almost certainly Ravenna.

The other options were that Aetius,recognizing that he could not defend thevalley of the River Po against the mobileHuns, resolved to defend Rome, especiallyas the ongoing famine would have madesupplying a large army difficult. He mayalso have hoped that the Huns would bedemoralized by a long siege of Aquileia andwithdraw.27 As a final note, it wastraditional Roman tactics to attack largeenemy forces within the empire when thebarbarians were on the way home ladenwith loot and so more likely to fight.

If any of these scenarios are applicable,

then it is possible that Aetius positioned hisforces in Bononia (Bologna). This not onlycovered the major routes to the south ofItaly – it also covered the crossing of theApennines, via the Via Flaminia Minorleading directly to Rome. If Attila decided toattack Ravenna, Aetius would also be in aposition to fall on his unprotected rear. Inthis way, Aetius could ensure that Attila’sactivities were confined to the north ofItaly. Furthermore, if the Huns began toretreat, he was in a good position to harassthem as they left Italy.

However, Attila and his men were nothaving everything their own way: ‘The Huns. . . were victims of divine punishment,being visited with heaven-sent disasters:famine and some kind of disease.’28 Attilahad made the mistake of invading Italywhen the region was suffering from afailure of the harvest. Outside the walls of

Aquileia his men had been suffering theeffects of the siege, mainly hunger due to ashortage of provisions and probable adisease, such as dysentery, which affectedarmies that were stationary for too long atime.29 Attila’s strategy had no doubt beenaimed at a very quick campaign, as hadhappened in Gaul: he had not organized the‘substantial logistic support’ needed tosupply the army during what, in the event,turned out to be a series of sieges.30

Passing into the valley of the River Po didnot help in any significant way. Althoughprovisions for the horses would have beeneasier to secure, with the inhabitants havinglittle food of their own the Huns wereunable to secure provisions without sackingcities and looting the imperial granaries.After they had penetrated as far as Ticinum,Attila faced a dilemma. At this point thelack of supplies was probably being very

keenly felt. The only options were to eitherreturn home or attempt to cross thenorthern Apennines and so march down theVia Aurelia to Rome. According to Priscus,Attila’s followers pointed to the fate ofAlaric after he had sacked the ‘Eternal City’in 410, fearing that Attila, like Alaric, woulddie if he sacked Rome.31 Although Attila wasprobably superstitious, if he had wanted tohe could easily have ignored this advice.However, things were not that simple. TheHuns were suffering from hunger andsickness. Furthermore, it is probably ataround this time when news arrived thatMarcian had sent forces out of Illyricum toattack the practically defenceless homes ofthe Huns.32

Aetius and AetiusAt about the same time Aetius himself hadreceived reinforcements from the East.

Unfortunately, there is confusion around thesource of this information. Hydatius writesthat:

The Huns ... were victims of divinepunishment, being visited withheaven-sent disasters: famine andsome kind of disease. In addition,they were slaughtered byauxiliaries sent by the emperorMarcian and led by Aetius, and atthe same time they were crushed intheir settlements by both heaven-sent disasters and the army ofMarcian.

Hyd. s.a. 452–453

The wording of this statement could havebeen clearer. What makes it harder tointerpret is the fact that by 452 there was asecond Flavius Aetius, this time a general inthe East. Some historians have conflated the

two Aetiuses, seeing them as a singleindividual.33 However, it is clear that therewere two men: the Eastern Aetius wasPraetorian Prefect of the east in 425 whenthe Western Aetius was in Gaul.34

Furthermore, the Eastern Aetius was presentat the sixth session of the Council ofChalcedon on 25 October 451 when theWestern Aetius was still dealing with thefallout of Attila’s invasion of Gaul.35 TheEastern Aetius was clearly the East’snominee for Consul in 454, possibly as areward for his campaigns against the Hunsin the previous two years. Finally, there aretwo inscriptions referring to Aetius in Syria,one dating to after the death of the WesternAetius.36

The reason for the confusion, other thanthe identical name of the two generals, isHydatius’ account. Hydatius lived in Spainand his information coming from the East

would have been late and confusing to him.He knew that Aetius, the western patricius,had received reinforcements from the East.He was also told that Aetius had led troopsinto the Hunnic homelands. Due to themixed-up nature of the tale, and uncertainthat the two men were separate individuals,it is likely that Hydatius’ wording wasambiguous in order to cover his ownconfusion.

As a result of these deliberations, it ispossible to propose that Marcian sent twoarmies out of the East. The first was asmaller force that was sent to reinforceAetius in Italy. With these Aetius putpressure on the Huns as they retired acrossnorthern Italy. The second force was led bythe Eastern general Aetius and invaded thehomeland of the Huns in an attempt toweaken them and also to force them toleave Italy to defend their homes.37 If this

interpretation is accepted, it allows for aneasier reading of the passage and also aclearer interpretation of events, especiallywith regard to Attila’s decision to leave Italywithout fighting Aetius.

With the news that Aetius had beenreinforced from the East, Attila was certainthat his chances of negotiating with theemperor were over. He began thewithdrawal from Italy, which was very slowdue to the number of wagons carrying thebooty and the large number of captivesbeing forced to march away from theirhomes. In the meantime, once thereinforcements arrived, Aetius was in aposition to put further pressure on the Hunsto leave. As they re-crossed northern Italytowards the east Aetius and his men wereable to harass their rear, destroy anystragglers that were lagging behind andattack any foraging parties sent out from

the main host.

Pope LeoWhen Attila and his men reached theterritory of Ambuleium in Venetia and werecrossing the River Mincius, a tributary of theRiver Po, envoys arrived fromValentinian.38 The nature and result of thisembassy has been the subject of controversyever since.

The story begins with Prosper, who issupported by Victor Tonnensis, theChronicle of Cassiodorus and Priscus.39

Accompanied by Trygetius, Vir Praefectorius– the same man who had negotiated thetreaty with the Vandals in 435 – andAvienus, who had been consul in 450, Leomet Attila:

The king received the wholedelegation courteously, and he wasso flattered by the presence of the

highest priest that he ordered hismen to stop the hostilities and,promising peace, retired beyondthe Danube.

Prosper, s.a. 452, tr. Maenchen-Helfen

During the course of the Middle Ages thisstory was magnified until now it is almosttotally altered. For example:

When Attila marched on Rome, Leowent out to meet him and pleadedfor him to leave. As Leo spoke,Attila saw the vision of a man inpriestly robes, carrying a baresword, and threatening to kill theinvader if he did not obey Leo;Attila left. As Leo had a greatdevotion to Saint Peter the Apostle,it is generally believed the firstpope was the visionary opponent

to the Huns. When Genseric [sic]invaded Rome, Leo’s sanctity andeloquence saved the city again.

http://saints.sqpn.com/pope-saint-leo-the-great/August 2010

Interestingly, Hydatius, who as Bishop ofAqua Flaviae would be expected to make themost of this opportunity to promoteCatholicism, makes no mention of the Pope.

The main objection to this version ofevents is that, far from marching on Rome,Attila was in the north-east of Italy andmarching away from the city. However, ifLeo was not attempting to save Rome, as isusually portrayed, the question remains asto the actual reasons for him being present.

This was simply due to the fact thatValentinian, the emperor, requested him tolead the delegation. As a major religiousfigure he was of immense political statureand his presence added sincerity and grace

to the meeting: it will have been expectedthat this would influence Attila’s decisionsconcerning the embassy.

The origin of the story of Saint Peter andthe flaming sword probably lies with PaulusDiaconus, who claims that one of Leo’sattendants ‘threatened the king with adrawn sword’, a story later embellished byIsidore of Seville, amongst others.40

However, Leo’s main purpose was not to‘order’ Attila to withdraw. Fortunately, aletter from Eastern bishops to PopeSymmachus dated to 512 or 513 shows thatLeo’s task was to negotiate the release ofcaptives, not only of the Christians, but ‘ifthat can be believed, Jews and Pagans’.41 Inreturn for a large sum of gold he hadbrought with him, Leo was able to obtainthe release of many – but not all – of thecaptives.

Attila also agreed to continue his retreat

from Italy. However, he repeated hisdemand that Honoria be surrendered to him,threatening to invade again unless she wassent to him ‘with her due share of the royalwealth’.42 Realistically, he was not in aposition to make good on his demands.Attila’s invasion had gone some waytowards repairing the damage to hisreputation of the previous year, but it wasstill far from a complete success.Furthermore, the attack on the homes of theHuns demonstrated that his boasts aboutcontrolling the Eastern Roman Empire wasno longer true. Attila retired to hishomeland, this time determined onvengeance against the East, whose actionshad helped to thwart his plans.

ConclusionThe major difference between the invasionsof Gaul and Italy was the defence ofAquileia. In 451 Attila had taken a number

of cities in quick succession, a fact that hadallowed him to penetrate deep into Gaul.Aetius will have quickly realized that a longdefence of any of the Gallic cities wouldhave given him more time to organize thedefence of Gaul and may even have haltedthe invasion. Accordingly, Aetius may havestationed a strong garrison in Aquileia assoon as he heard of Attila’s approach. Thethree-month siege of Aquileia caused Attilato lose a great part of the campaign season,and coupled with the heavy losses and thebeginnings of disease ultimately brought thecampaign to an abrupt end.

Aetius’ strategy is usually seen as poor,mainly due to the fact that he allowed Attilato enter Italy without attempting to defendthe Julian Alps. However, as noted above,this is unrealistic. Having realized that hecould not defend the Alps, Aetius hadresorted to delaying tactics, reinforcing

Aquileia in the hope that the city would holdout and give time for the East to organize arelief force for Italy. Although Aetius wouldhave been hoping simply for help in Italy,Marcian’s decision to send the other Aetiuson campaign against the Huns’ homelandwas a major bonus. Furthermore, Aetius hadunderstood that as long as he guarded theApennines Attila would not be able tothreaten Rome, and Ravenna was stillimpregnable behind its marshes. Withfamine throughout Italy meaning thatAttila’s forces would struggle to feedthemselves, time was on Aetius’ side.

Once the troops arrived from the eastthere can be little doubt that Aetius used hisforces to harass the Huns as they retreatedacross northern Italy. This, together with theenvoys sent by Valentinian, determinedAttila that the West, although fragmented,was simply too strong whilst led by Aetius.

Attila took the only course open to him.Having saved at least a little face byransoming some of the prisoners innegotiations with Pope Leo, the Hunsreturned home to begin the rebuilding oftheir shattered homesteads and Attila’spalaces.

Chapter 16

The End

453Following his ‘victory’ in Italy, Attila turnedhis mind to the East. Since Marcian hadascended the throne the East had beentroublesome for Attila. With the Westnominally chastised, he returned to his usualstance with the East. Early in 453 he notonly demanded the payment of tribute butalso the arrears that had not been paid tohim since before the death of Theodosius.1In response, Marcian sent emissaries to

meet with Attila to negotiate, but he refusedto treat with them and the mission was afailure.2

Yet this attitude benefited the east morethan Attila. Marcian had concluded peacetreaties with both the Persians in the eastand the Blemmyes and Nobades south ofEgypt. With peace on his other frontiers,Marcian, although wary of the threat stillposed, was no longer fearful of the Hunsand was prepared, if necessary, to fight.3Marcian’s dogged refusal to pay was nodoubt also reinforced by the fact that Attilahad now been ‘beaten’ twice and there wasin all likelihood increased tensions withinAttila’s empire as the subject nationsconsidered the possibility of a rebellionagainst Hunnic rule. It is possible, althoughimpossible to prove, that Marcian had sentagents into Hunnic territory with thespecific intention of stirring up discontent

and encouraging a rebellion.Prior to leading his men against the East,

Attila:

took in marriage according to thecustom of his race a very beautifulgirl named Ildico. At his weddinghe gave himself up to excessivecelebration and he lay down on hisback sodden with wine and sleep.He suffered a haemorrhage, andthe blood, which would ordinarilyhave drained through his nose, wasunable to pass through the usualpassages and flowed in its deadlycourse down his throat, killing him.

Prisc. fr. 24.14

There is a claim in Malalas that Attila didnot die of natural causes but that Aetiusbribed his spatharius (bodyguard) to killhim.5 This is extremely unlikely as it is not

mentioned elsewhere, and Malalas, writingso long after events, does not explain wherehe obtained the information. So passed theruler of the empire of the Huns and thegreatest external threat to Roman imperialsecurity.

When the news arrived in Constantinopleand Rome no doubt there was great relief:the individual who had welded the disparatetribes of the Huns into a major militaryforce had died. Yet at the same time therewould have been great concern over whatwould happen to Attila’s empire: after all,one of his sons could easily emulate – if notbetter – the acts of the ‘Scourge of God’.

This was not to be. Rather than closingranks and ensuring that the Hunnic Empireremained one whole body, Attila’s sonsimmediately began a civil war to determinewho would inherit it.6 Attila had numerouswives, and although it is not known if all of

them bore him children, there is a goodchance that he left his empire to be dividedamongst many sons, who ‘themselves almostamounted to a people’.7

The EastThe relief with which the news of the Huns’implosion was received was tempered bysome unhappy news, especially for Marcian.In July 453 his wife, his link with theTheodosian dynasty, died, leaving herproperty for ‘charitable purposes’.8 Marciannow had to survive without her politicalsupport, so he was extremely fortunate thatthe death of Attila and the outbreak of acivil war amongst the Huns gave him andthe East a breathing space in which tocement his position as sole ruler.

The WestIn the West the death of Attila and theeruption of civil war amongst the Huns will

also have been greeted with relief: indeed,Aetius may have hoped that at least one ofAttila’s sons would appeal to him for aid, soallowing a return to the former situationwhere he and at least one section of theHuns were close allies.

However, it was events in Gaul thatdominated his attention. Probably afterhearing of Attila’s death, and so knowingthat Gaul was secure from Hunnic attack,Thorismund attacked and defeated the Alansnorth of the Loire.9

The event may have caused someconfusion in the sources. Jordanes writesthat in 453 the Goths and the Alans unitedto defeat a second invasion of Gaul by theHuns, this time without Roman aid.10 Thereis no other evidence for this campaign and,given the timescale, it is very unlikely thatit happened. The reasons for Jordanes’ oddaccount are unknown. Jordanes may have

known of the Goths and the Alans fightingand may have been simply confused,assuming that the two must have beenfighting the Huns rather than each other. Ifso, the account should probably be seen asan attempt to boost further the reputationof the Goths, this time by having them beatthe Huns with the help of the Alans butwithout Roman aid. On the other hand, itmay simply have been an attempt todisguise the fact that in 453 the Goths wereagain on the warpath and fighting againstthe empire.

The reasons for the Gothic attack on theAlans are unclear. In part at leastThorismund may have been annoyed at thelack of any reward for the Battle of theCatalaunian Plains. It can be assumed thatAetius believed that the Goths had beenfighting as part of their foedus with Rome.Thorismund may have expected more.

Despite the death of his father and his ownnarrow escape there does not appear tohave been any recompense to the Gothsfrom Aetius, neither in land nor inappointments within the Roman militaryhierarchy. It is also likely that Thorismund,like his father before him, wanted to extendhis power both politically at Rome andterritorially in Gaul. Furthermore, internalpolitics may have played a part, since afailure to extract any rewards would resultin his brothers, who remained watching inthe wings, being ready to remove him if hisreign was not satisfactory.

In this context the attack makes sense.The Alans, originally led by Goa, who bythis time may well have died with the eventnot being recorded, were staunch allies ofAetius and could be expected to join him inany war with the Goths. By defeating themin a pre-emptive strike, Thorismund would

weaken Aetius’ alliance and ensured that hisown northern border was safe from attack.

Understandably, Aetius appears to havebeen completely taken by surprise by theattack on his ally. According to Sidonius, heled his army north out of Italy to help theAlans and stop the Goths from extendingtheir frontier northwards, although thenature of the forces he commanded andtheir employment remain obscure.11

In response Thorismund now turned hisattention to the south and laid siege toArles, the ‘capital’ of Gaul.12 According toSidonius, although he tried Aetius could notbreak the siege of Arles.13 However, at thispoint events took a strange turn. Residentin the city was Ferreolus, the praefectuspraetorio Galliarum. In an unexpected twistFerreolus invited Thorismund into thebesieged city and entertained him at abanquet. His methods were decidedly odd,

but effective. During the banquet somehowFerreolus convinced Thorismund to lift thesiege.14 The Goths returned to Aquitaine.

It is possible that even at this late stageThorismund was willing to accept a nominalreward for the help the Goths had givenagainst Attila and for the death of hisfather. Although the attribution is uncertain,it is possible that as part of the agreementreached between Thorismund and Ferreolusand later ratified by Aetius, Frederic,Thorismund’s brother, was given the post ofmagister militum in the West, since he wasshortly afterwards attested as fighting inSpain on behalf of the Romans.15

Unfortunately for Thorismund, hisbrothers were dissatisfied with this course ofevents. Prosper notes that they wereunhappy with the fact that Thorismund hadgone to war with Aetius.16 Further, thedescription of Theoderic (Thorismund’s

younger brother and the next in line to thethrone) given by Sidonius portrays anindividual with pro-Roman leanings.17

Perhaps his brothers were unhappy with thefact that Thorismund had so quickly brokenthe peace with Aetius.

To compound his error Thorismund didnot have the will to grasp his opportunities,since although his siege of Arles was toostrong to be broken by force he agreed towithdraw. In the ensuing negotiationsThorismund’s brothers could have expectedmore than a single Roman military post andmay have felt that Thorismund was tooindecisive to rule properly.18 He was clearlynot the type of forceful, dynamic leader thatwas needed by the Goths.

Whatever the cause, later that year thebrothers quarrelled and Theoderic andFrederic conspired to remove Thorismund.19

In the end, Thorismund was defeated by his

brothers and garrotted.20 With his deathTheoderic succeeded to the throne and isnow known as Theoderic II.21 Interestingly,given Theoderic’s alleged pro-Roman bias,the peace treaty agreed between Ferreolusand Thorismund remained active andTheoderic made no attempt to declare waron Rome. In fact, it is likely that he wasmore politically astute than his brother andhad recognized that the Goths had more togain by joining the Romans than byopposing them. Frederick had just beenappointed as magister militum and suchmilitary positions in the Western armywould gain the Gothic leaders legitimacy inthe eyes of the Gallic population and so easethe transferral of Gallic loyalty within theGothic kingdom. It would also help later,when the Goths could be seen as inheritorsof the Roman political body rather than asbarbarian settlers.

SpainAt around the same time as the Gothsattempted to expand their influence in Gaul,Mansuetus, the comes Hispaniarum, andFronto, also a comes, were sent as envoys tothe Sueves. Whilst Aetius and the allies hadbeen preoccupied with events in Gaul andengaged in battle with Attila the Sueves hadagain broken the peace and launched raidsagainst their neighbours. As was the normalcase by now, the threat of war from Aetius,probably combined with the news of thedefeat of Attila in Gaul and his subsequentdeath, convinced the Sueves to accept yetanother treaty, reestablishing ‘the termswhich had (previously) been imposed’,though doubtless without the need for theSueves to return the acquired booty.22

454If not before the new year then almostcertainly at the start of it Aetius received the

news that the Hunnic empire, already in thegrip of civil war, now faced internalrevolt.23 With the death of Attila his treatieswith other peoples became void, and thehostages given by Aetius – probablyincluding his son Carpilio – returned home.At the same time the bureaucrats sent byAetius to serve Attila when he was madehonorary magister militum, including Orestes,also returned. They will have brought thenews that a revolt had begun againstHunnic rule. Ardaric, the king of the Gepids,had been one of Attila’s most trustedallies.24 He didn’t give the same respect toAttila’s sons as he had to their father,probably angered that the sons weresquabbling over Attila’s empire and had‘allotted war-like kings and peoples likehousehold servants’.25 In response he raisedthe standard of revolt. Other tribes emulatedhis actions and within a short time an

alliance was formed against the Huns.

The Battle of the Nedao26At an unknown date, but most likely in 454,in a great battle the two opponents met atthe River Nedao (Nedava). The forces of theHuns were led by Ellac, the eldest of Attila’ssons and his personal favourite. Due to thenature of the rebellion it would appear thatmost, if not all, of Attila’s other sons joinedEllac’s forces in an attempt to defeat therebels.

Ardaric and his Gepids had enlisted thehelp of the Ostrogoths, the Rugians, theSueves, the Alans and the Heruls, amongstothers. Although it may appear surprisingthat many of the tribes listed are to befound within the boundaries of the RomanEmpire – for example, the Sueves in Spain –it should be remembered that the troopsrepresent those tribes who did not join in

the invasion of the Roman Empire, eitherpreferring or being compelled to remain intheir original homelands under thedominion of the Huns.

In a fierce battle the Huns, unexpectedly,were heavily defeated and Ellac himself‘died fighting so bravely that, had his fatherbeen alive, he would have wished for an endso glorious’.27 After his death the Hunnicempire disintegrated with the survivorsfragmenting and separately following thosesons of Attila who were still alive. The Hunsended near the coasts of the Black Sea,disunited and unable to reconstruct theempire of Attila. Although they were to playa minor part in events for the next century,they lost their ability to influencehappenings and slowly passed into history.

SpainWith the attention of the imperialgovernment focused on Gaul, yet again the

bacaudae in Spain became active. As part ofthe treaty with Thorismund before his death,or possibly as part of a new, unattestedtreaty with the new king Theoderic,Frederic, the brother of Theoderic, was sentto Spain with an army. Whether this armywas composed solely of Gothic troops or ofRomans or was an allied force is unknown.Once in Spain Frederic attacked thebacaudae of Tarraconensis, slaughteringlarge numbers ‘under orders from theRoman government’.28

AetiusIn Italy Aetius would have been in highspirits: Gaul was at peace, the Vandals werequiet, Spain was being chastised for itspresumption and now the empire of theHuns was being dismantled. His positionwas now such that he could browbeatValentinian into agreeing to his demands.At some point prior to 454 Eudoxia, the

wife of Valentinian, had decided that thebest man to become emperor after the deathof Valentinian was Majorian, the member ofAetius’ staff who had fought alongside himat the Battle of Vicus Helena.29 His militaryability was promising and he appealed toEudoxia as being well suited to continue theTheodosian dynasty. Accordingly, sheproposed that he be married toValentinian’s daughter Placidia, the heir tothe throne since Eudocia was betrothed toHuneric, Gaiseric’s son, and so ineligible torule.

Unfortunately for Majorian, Aetius wasnow in such a strong position thatValentinian could deny him nothing. Insteadof a betrothal, Majorian retired from activeservice and went to live on his privateproperty in the country.30 The retirement issaid by Sidonius to have been due to thepolitical manipulations of Aetius’ wife

Pelagia.31 With Majorian removed from thescene, Valentinian agreed to the betrothal ofPlacidia and Aetius’ son Gaudentius in placeof Majorian.32

Although Sidonius’ claims are suspect,since they are part of a panegyric deliveredto Majorian, the story is probably near tothe truth. Valentinian may have longharboured resentment of the general whohad supported his rival in 424 and havewanted Majorian as his successor on thethrone rather than agreeing to Aetius’ plans.By betrothing Majorian to PlacidiaValentinian would ensure that Aetius’control of the West was weakened. Thechances are that Valentinian was opposedto Aetius’ proposal but had little option butto accede to the betrothal of Gaudentius andPlacidia.

Although the betrothal doubtless annoyedValentinian, for other members of the court

the idea was anathema. The army wasalready totally dominated by Aetius, whoused his military position to controlValentinian. If Gaudentius was betrothedand married to Placidia then Aetius’domination would continue long into thefuture. Opposition to Aetius began to grow.

Doubtless Eudoxia and Valentinianencouraged such opposition to neutralizeAetius. He had by now been in command ofthe army for twenty years and as a resulthis supporters had received the lion’s shareof the important political and militarycommands. Furthermore, his health stillseemed to be good and there appeared to beno end to his domination. Opposition grew.

Paradoxically, the collapse of the Hunnicempire also weakened Aetius politically.Earlier, he had been supported by the Huns.From the late 440s his skills as a generaland his knowledge of the ‘barbarian’ way of

thought had helped to maintain hisdominant position in the face of thebarbarian threat. Now, with the Hunsremoved, Aetius was seen as no longercritical to Valentinian’s survival.33

As a result, two major political figures atcourt began to intrigue against Aetius. Thefirst of these was Petronius Maximus, amajor political leader in the West. He hadbeen consul in 433 and 443 and was createdpatricius at some time before 445.34 Yetdespite having been Aetius’ supporter, itwas clear that he would never become aspowerful as Aetius.35 It may be that hehoped that when Valentinian died he wouldbe a viable candidate for the throne.However, Gaudentius’ betrothal meant thatMaximus would never accede to any greaterpower than he already wielded. Unhappywith this state of affairs, he began to casthis net for other like-minded individuals

who were unhappy with Aetius’ dominance.He quickly found an accomplice.

Heraclius, a eunuch and the primicerius sacricubiculi (officer of the imperialbedchamber), was also unhappy with Aetius’power, and so the two men began aconspiracy to overthrow him.36 Slowly,Heraclius was able to convince Valentinianthat Aetius was using the betrothal as ameans of overthrowing Valentinianhimself.37

The Death of AetiusKnowing that the army was supportive ofAetius, the conspirators decided that theonly way for Valentinian to eliminate himwas when he was unprotected by the troops.Accordingly, Valentinian and Heracliusdecided that the best time would be whenAetius was in the palace to hold a planningmeeting with Valentinian, since he was not

allowed bodyguards in the presence of theemperor. On either 21 or 22 September 454Aetius duly arrived at court and was in aplanning meeting with Valentinian todiscuss proposals to raise money when ‘witha shout Valentinian suddenly leaped upfrom his throne and cried out that he wouldno longer endure to be abused by suchtreacheries’38 before stabbing Aetius with hissword. Heraclius, who was nearby,withdrew a concealed cleaver and the twomen, raining blows upon Aetius’ head, killedhim.39 Shortly afterwards they also killedBoethius, the praefectus praetorio, an allyand friend of Aetius.40 A further number ofAetius’ supporters were also killed.41

The bodies of the two men were displayedin the Forum whilst Valentinian called ameeting of the Senate and gave a speechdenouncing Aetius and his close supporters.Valentinian was afraid that Aetius’

supporters in the Senate would support arevolt against him.42 It was probably at thistime that he enquired of an unknownRoman whether he had done well inexecuting Aetius. The oft-quoted reply toValentinian was that the Roman ‘was notable to know whether he had done well orperhaps otherwise, but one thing heunderstood exceedingly well, that he had cutoff his own right hand with the other’.43

Militarily, Valentinian knew that he hadto maintain the good will of the army andespecially of those troops – particularlyAetius’ bucellarii – who had been loyal toAetius and might now support a usurper. Bythe time of Aetius’ death the praesental armyof the West had shrunk. Aetius’ personalfollowing of bucellarii, mainly composed ofHuns, comprised a large proportion of theWestern ‘field army’.44

As a result, and probably following the

plan he had wanted all along, Valentinianrecalled Majorian from his ‘retirement’ andmade him comes domesticorum (count of thehousehold), allocating Aetius’ bucellarii tohim in the hope that their loyalty would betransferred to Majorian, alongside whommany will have served, and that he wouldprevent a coup.45 Believing that Valentinianwould now allow him to marry Placidia,Majorian would have been happy to obligethe emperor.

Knowing that Aetius’ death would alsoprecipitate actions in the wider world, atthe same time Valentinian sent envoys tothe barbarians, the one to the Sueves beingcalled Justinianus.46 What actions the Goths,the Sueves, the Alans and especially theVandals would have taken are unknown.Events in Rome quickly changed thepolitical circumstances of the West forever.

The Death of ValentinianMaximus now attempted to dominateValentinian in a manner similar to Aetius.When he endeavoured to have Valentiniannominate him for the consulship he wasopposed by Heraclius, who may have been asupporter of Majorian.47 Angry at hisambition being thwarted, Maximussummoned Optila and Thraustila, two ofValentinian’s guards. These two men hadserved in Aetius’ bucellarii before beingpromoted to the imperial guard.Additionally, Thraustila is claimed to havebeen Aetius’ son-in-law, married to an un-named daughter.48 Unfortunately, this isattested nowhere else, and it is unlikely thatValentinian would have continued toemploy a relative of Aetius in his personalguard after murdering him. However, givenValentinian’s naïve policy towards Aetius,this should not be taken for granted and so

the concept remains an interestingpossibility. In their meeting Maximusblamed the death of Aetius squarely onValentinian and strongly suggested that thetwo men take revenge on Valentinian forAetius’ ‘execution’.49 He also claimed thatValentinian had brought shame on his houseby raping Maximus’ wife, although this isunlikely.50

In the meantime it would appear thatValentinian, recognizing that to continue torule in safety he would need the support ofthe army, began to pay more attention tothe troops, taking part in military exerciseswith them and hoping by his presence toboost their support for him.51 As part ofthese routines he regularly attended thetraining sessions on the Campus Martius. Afew days after Maximus’ meeting withOptila and Thraustila, on 16 March 455,Valentinian, accompanied by Heraclius, was

exercising on the Campus Martius with afew guards. After he had dismounted fromhis horse, Optila, Thraustila and theirfollowers drew their swords and killed bothValentinian and Heraclius.52 Despite hisattempts to win their loyalty, not one of hisguards or the troops in the area attemptedto intervene: their loyalty was apparentlystill given to Aetius. With Valentinian’sdeath the House of Theodosius, or at leastthe male heirs, came to an inglorious end.

Chapter 17

Aftermath

The assassination of Valentinian caused‘disorder and confusion’ in Rome.1According to Priscus, the army was dividedbetween supporting Maximus and a certain‘Maximian’, the son of Domninus andattendant of Aetius.2 It is possible, thoughuncertain, that Priscus’ text at this point iscorrupt and that ‘Maximian’ is to beidentified as the later emperor Majorian: thetwo words are very similar in ancient Greekand so it is possible that a later copyist

made a mistake.3 What is certain is that, ineffect, the army could not decide whether tofollow the policies of Aetius(Maximian/Majorian) or to adopt a new setof policies (Maximus).

The matter was decided very quickly.Maximus began to distribute money toinfluential people and at the same timeforced Eudoxia, Valentinian’s widow, tomarry him by threatening her with death ifshe refused.4 Theophanes also claims thatEudoxia was raped by Maximus, but he mayhave been confused as to the actual courseof events and so took the worst possibleinterpretation.5 Maximus further orderedthat Eudoxia’s daughter Eudocia marry hisson, the newly proclaimed Caesar Palladius,despite the fact that she was betrothed toHuneric, son of Gaiseric.6 In an attempt toreinforce his position, Maximus may alsohave arranged the betrothal of Placidia to

Olybrius, a leading senator in Rome, whoprobably threw in his lot with Maximus as aresult. On 17 March, the day afterValentinian’s death, Maximus wasproclaimed emperor in Rome.7

Eudoxia was, understandably, furious ather treatment. She had always wantedMajorian as the new emperor and Maximus’actions alienated any hope of heragreement to his schemes.8 She ponderedher options. Her next move could beinterpreted as a betrayal of Rome, and infact it is now ignored by many historians,probably being seen as mere rumour andscandal rather than fact.9

Eudoxia could not appeal to the East forhelp since her aunt Pulcheria had died andthe emperor Marcian would most likely notbe willing to intervene on her behalf.10 TheWestern court was either unable orunwilling to take her part against the new

emperor. Her only hope lay with thebarbarians. The Goths were one possibility,but the more obvious course of action – andthe one she took – was to appeal toGaiseric, her daughter’s potential father-in-law, for help.11

Although at first surprising, when themove is analyzed it is clear that Eudoxiawas not betraying Rome but ratherfollowing the example set by Aetius, whohad more than once appealed to barbariansfor aid, although in his case it was the Huns.Furthermore, Gaiseric was settled in Africaas socius et amicus cum foedere.12 As an allyof her former husband, Gaiseric was theobvious person for her to appeal to.Moreover, Maximus’ decision to forceEudocia to marry Palladius was an addedincentive to Gaiseric to evict Maximus fromthe throne. Eudoxia may have been hopingthat Gaiseric, as her ally, would enter Italy,

remove Maximus, and then join with her toelevate Majorian.

Unfortunately, Eudoxia made one graveerror in her assumptions. She assumed thatGaiseric, as her former husband’s ally,would agree to help her. However, thebarbarian invaders of the Roman Empire, orat least Gaiseric, appear to have had adifferent interpretation of alliances. ToEudoxia and to modern eyes an alliance isan agreement on behalf of politicalinstitutions to support each other. Gaisericand other Germanic tribesmen did notinterpret things in this way. Gaiseric’salliance and treaty was with Aetius andValentinian, the individuals who hadconcluded the negotiations with him.13 As aresult, with their deaths the treaty wasperceived by Gaiseric as being void.Furthermore, without the threat of Aetius,Italy was now open to raids. The message

from Eudoxia also demonstrated to Gaisericthat there was confusion in Rome.14 Nodoubt hoping to create further disorder,Gaiseric instantly cut the supply of grain toRome and, deciding that a swift attackwould meet little resistance, collected hisarmy and set sail, not just for Italy, butdirectly for Rome.

THE WESTHearing of the assassination of Aetius, earlyin the campaign season of 455 thebarbarians along the Rhine had begun totake advantage of the loss of Rome’s mostoutstanding soldier. The Saxons began tospread their raids along the coast, theFranks began to encroach on the two‘Belgian’ provinces, and the Alamannicrossed the Rhine into Roman territory andbegan to expand their holdings.15 Theseattacks were only to be expected. In the

previous twenty years any attempts toexpand had been met by the Roman armyunder Aetius, usually supported by Huns,and the attackers forced to retire to theirprevious borders. Now, with the Hunnicempire in cataclysmic decline and Aetiusdead, all of the barbarian tribes saw theirchance and took it.

The GothsSince the settlement of the Goths in 418/419the policies of the West, including those ofConstantius III, John, and, of course, Aetius,had been to minimize the impact of thesettlement on political affairs. The fact thatthe Gothic kings wanted to play a morecentral role in the affairs of the West, or atleast expand their territories, is emphasisedby the number of wars that they fought withRome between 419 and 454. Seeking tocement his position as emperor Maximuspromoted Avitus, the man who had been

Aetius’ negotiator with the Goths, asmagister utriusque militiae praesentalis.16

The timing was good as the Goths, awareof the death of Aetius, had decided onceagain to attempt to expand their politicalpower and dominions.17 Preparing theirarmies, the Goths were ready to marchwhen Avitus arrived. The events that followare taken from Sidonius’ panegyric toAvitus, so may not be strictly accurate.18

Avitus clearly had a military and politicalreputation in the West.19 According toSidonius, when the news arrived that Avitushad been made magister militum, the Franksand the Alamanni quickly retreated to theirprevious frontiers and the Saxons stoppedtheir raids through fear. Although the extentof their capitulation is no doubtexaggerated, Avitus’ reputation appears tohave at least given them pause for thoughtand slowed down their rate of advance.

Once he had received messages from thesetribes asking for peace, Avitus, leaving thearmy behind, went to Toulouse simply as anenvoy. Due to Theoderic’s relationship withAvitus, and to the esteem in which he washeld, the Goths agreed to forego any attacksupon the empire.

The concept that Theoderic accepted anew treaty simply due to Avitus’ influence isprobably exaggerated. Sidonius was Avitus’son-in-law and the story is part of Sidonius’panegyric to him. Yet if the new treaty wasnot arranged simply because of Theoderic’sadmiration for Avitus, there must be anotherreason for the Goths’ alliance with Rome.

The chances are that the alliance wasagreed on condition that Maximus acceptedTheoderic as an ally and an equal, a policythat undid the guiding principle of all of theprevious rulers who had fought to keep theGoths in a subordinate position.20 Despite

the reversal of policy, the agreement wasgood news for Maximus. However, badnews was soon to follow.

The Sack of RomeLanding near Rome, Gaiseric advanced to‘Azestus’.21 Maximus heard the news on 31May.22 Maximus, who had little militaryexperience and was aware that not all ofthe army was happy with his elevation,immediately panicked and fled.23 Sickenedby his cowardice, his bodyguard left him torun. As he was leaving the city a bystanderthrew a rock that hit him on the temple andkilled him. The crowd then tore his body topieces.24

Leaderless, and with any available troopsapparently refusing to fight, the city ofRome bowed to the inevitable. Gaisericentered the city. Contrary to theexpectations of Eudoxia, he did not come as

a liberator. As he was about to release histroops on the defenceless city Pope Leoconvinced Gaiseric not to let his troopsburn, kill or torture the citizens, butnevertheless the city was put to the sack forfourteen days and ‘emptied of all its wealth,and many thousands of captives, all thatwere satisfactory as to age or occupation,along with the Queen and her children,were taken away to Carthage’.25 Also takenwas Gaudentius, Aetius’ son.26

Once back in Africa Eudocia was kept insafety prior to her marriage to Huneric,following the earlier betrothal and theagreement of 442. As Placidia wasbetrothed to Olybrius she was not marriedto anybody by Gaiseric. Instead, both sheand her mother Eudoxia were simply heldby Gaiseric in Carthage.27 Although theEastern Emperor Marcian sent envoys ontwo occasions to Gaiseric demanding a halt

to hostilities and the return of Eudoxia,Eudocia and Placidia, these were ignored.28

With the West in disarray, Gaisericrapidly extended his holdings, taking thewhole of Roman Africa west of Cyrenaica,the Balearic Islands, Sardinia and Corsica.He then went on to have a long careerinterfering in imperial politics to further hisown ends before dying of old age in 477.

ItalyIn the meantime, the imperial throne passedto Avitus. In a complete break with thepolicies of the past he accepted the supportof the Goths, being nominated as emperorby Theoderic. For the first time a barbariangroup within the boundaries of the empirewas involved in politics at the highest level,even to the point of appointing an emperor.

Avitus appointed a man named Remistusas magister militum et patricius and Ricimer,an individual of mixed barbarian descent, as

comes. Ricimer was sent to face the Vandals,who were attacking Sicily, defeating themin a land battle at Agrigentum and again atsea near Corsica in 456.29 Gaiseric’s hopesof annexing Sicily were thwarted, and as aresult of his victories Ricimer was mademagister militum by a grateful Avitus.30

The GothsPrior to these developments the Sueves inSpain attempted to enlarge their kingdomby annexing Roman territory. Although boththe emperor in Italy and Theoderic, King ofthe Goths, ordered them to stop, the Suevesrefused to bow to diplomatic pressure.Finally, in 456, Theoderic invaded Spainwith a large army and defeated them.31 Bythis action Theoderic laid the foundationsfor the Visigothic Kingdom of Spain.

Unfortunately for Avitus, Gaiseric stilldominated the seas and Avitus remained

unpopular in Italy due to the famine causedin Italy by the complete loss of grain fromAfrica.32 As a result he was forced to dismisshis Gothic bodyguard, but in order to paythem he stripped ‘bronze fittings’ and othermetals from public buildings, selling theresultant goods to merchants for the funds.33

The people of Rome rebelled againstAvitus and, correctly judging the prevailingmood, Ricimer betrayed his patron andjoined with Majorian in rebellion. Remistuswas killed and one month later, on 17October 456, Avitus was defeated at theBattle of Placentia and killed.34 Thus wasset in motion Ricimer’s domination, whichresulted in a series of short-lived emperorsbeing crowned and executed. The West nowbegan its short decline into obscurity.

This was not helped by the fact that theGoths, upon hearing of Avitus’ death,instantly rebelled, along with the

Burgundians. With the West in turmoil, fromDecember 456 to April 457 the RomanEmpire was nominally reunited under thesole rule of the Eastern Emperor.Unfortunately, at this critical junctureMarcian died (26 January 457), and it wasnot until the appointment of Leo (7February 457) as the new emperor that newpolitical plans could be instigated in theEast. One of Leo’s first moves was toappoint Majorian as magister militumalongside Ricimer.35 Yet the invasion of agroup of Alamanni proved that a newemperor of the West was needed.36 On 6April 457 the army acclaimed Majorian.37

After settling into his new rule in 458 and459 Majorian led the troops on a campaignto restore order in Gaul. As part of the buildup to the campaign, Majorian sent envoysto the Huns in the hope of enlisting theirhelp in his armies. The embassy was a

success, but succeeded in more thanMajorian may have hoped: a letter fromNicetas, Bishop of Aquileia, to Pope Leosurvives asking what should be doneconcerning the ‘returning captives’. It wouldappear that a large number of the captivestaken during Attila’s invasions of the Westwere returned in 458 as part of theagreement between Majorian and the Huns.Released in Dacia and Moesia, thesepeople’s first port of call on their journeyhome was Aquileia, and the bishop had beenswamped by the refugees.38

LATER EVENTS Placidia, Eudoxia and EudociaAround the year 462 Gaiseric finally saw hisson Huneric marry an imperial princesswhen he was wed to Eudocia after their longengagement.39 Gaiseric was doubtless happywith the marriage on all levels, especially

politically: theoretically, any sons ofHuneric and Eudocia would have a claim tothe throne of the West, although the chancesof the Senate in Rome acquiescing to therule of a ‘semi-barbarus’ would be slim. Afterthe marriage Eudoxia and Placidia werefinally allowed to return home, possibly in464, after being ransomed by the Easternemperor Leo.40

Once home, Placidia was married toOlybrius, to whom she was alreadybetrothed. Olybrius had fled from Romeduring the sack of 455 and was destined tobe emperor of the West for a short time in472.41 In the early 460s there is evidencethat Gaudentius, Aetius’ son, was still alivein Carthage.42 Unfortunately, after this datethere is no source that tells of his ultimatefate.

THE END OF EMPIRE

In the West in the years after 456 abewildering series of short-lived emperorsruled until in 476 the last of these, titledRomulus Augustulus, was forced to abdicateby the magister militum Odoacer. Afternegotiations with Zeno, by this timeemperor of the East, Odoacer agreed to rulethe West – now little more than Italy – inthe name of the empire. The Easternnominee for the Western throne, JuliusNepos, lived for four more years in Illyricumbefore his death in 480. Nominally, he wasthe last Roman Emperor of the West.Without an orderly succession and a strongmilitary leader, the West would survive foronly one more generation after the death ofAetius.

Conclusion

It is difficult to reach any firm conclusionsabout Aetius. The greatest difficulty lies withthe paucity of the sources. In addition totheir rarity, their lack of detail makes itdifficult to appreciate his achievements andfailures, let alone establish what he was likeas a person. A significant factor that adds tothe difficulty is Aetius’ long career, for someof which he was not the main policy maker.As a result, his career needs to be brokeninto three distinct parts: his youth and timeas a hostage, his time as an ‘associate’

general and his time as sole magister militum.The evidence for his time as magister militumis poor but for the other two periods isalmost non-existent.

AS A HOSTAGEAetius’ youth is largely unknown and littleunderstood. Although it is believed that hewas earmarked for a military career froman early age, there was no guarantee thathe would fulfil any latent potential. Theturning point in his life was when he wassent as a hostage to the Goths and then theHuns. This separated him from hiscontemporaries who remained within theempire and gave him experience that theylacked. Further, his time amongst the Gothsand the Huns influenced both his behaviourand his career, as his behaviour amongst theGoths and Huns no doubt differed fromwhat would have been expected within theRoman military hierarchy. The fact that he

was sent whilst still young, when he willhave been less set in his ways and so haveabsorbed more than a fully grown adult,resulted in him knowing how thebarbarians’ minds worked and allowed himto use their more aggressive tactics andstrategies.1 His time as a hostage alsoallowed him to make close friends of theleading Goths and Huns of his own age andthe extensive time he spent with the Hunsresulted in these friendships remaining closewhen his friends rose to positions of power.These factors would be of vital importancein his future career.

AS AN ‘ASSOCIATE’ GENERALAetius first came to prominence in 423. Atthis time the Franks were occupying largeareas of Gaul on the imperial side of theRhine, the Goths were occupying large areasof Aquitania and the Vandals had mergedwith the Alans to form a new ‘superpower’

in Spain. Also in Spain, the Suevescontinued to act as an independentkingdom.

There is no clear indication of the statusof the barbarian leaders in the West.Although some may have had official postswithin the imperial government, others didnot. However, whether they did or didn’t, itwould appear that they consideredthemselves to be independent of imperialcontrol and free to engage in diplomaticactivity on their own behalf, regardless ofwhether this conflicted with imperial aims.

In the years between 423 and 433 Aetiuswas one of the three (later two) mostinfluential men in the Western Empire. Thecivil conflicts between 424 and 433 were ofmuch shorter duration than those followingthe rebellion of Constantine I in the early-fourth century.2 Unlike the earlier civilwars, in 423–424 and again in 432–433,

there was paralysis at the political centre inRavenna that allowed ‘untamed alien forces’to ‘pursue their own agendas, largelyunhindered’.3 Local troops facing thebarbarians remained static, awaiting theoutcome of the civil wars and relying on thevictors to defeat the barbarians.

Once appointed magister militum perGallias Aetius spent his time reversing thelocal effects of the civil war. During the civilwar the Franks had attempted to expandinto vacant agricultural areas along thefrontier, but were pushed back by Aetius,the Goths had attempted to extend theirpower in Gaul, but were defeated andforced to retreat by him, and theBurgundians attempted the same expansionbut suffered the same fate.

Away from Aetius’ command, in Spain theSueves maintained their independence andalso attempted to expand their sphere of

influence. Yet the greatest danger was inAfrica. In 429 the Vandals and their alliescrossed from Spain to Mauretania beforeadvancing along the coast to threatenCarthage and the province of Africa itself.

SOLE RULEWhen Aetius took sole control of Westernaffairs in 433 he had many pressures to dealwith. The Franks, the Goths, the Sueves andthe Vandals all needed to be faced with thefull might of the praesental army. Obviously,this was impossible. Fortunately for Aetius,in 435 his envoy managed to secure a treatywith the Vandals that gave them the less-productive areas of the African coast whilstreserving the most productive provinces forRome. With peace in Africa Aetius wasfinally able to bring the Goths and Franks toheel, while at the same time, and with thehelp of his allies the Huns, the Burgundianswere decimated and brought under the close

control of the empire.The factors that helped Aetius and the

West to recover from an almost impossibleposition are varied and interconnected. Themain point to note is the generalship ofAetius. He had ‘learned warfare from theScythians [Huns]’ and so did not conform tothe stereotypical image of a late Romangeneral.4 The army commanded by Aetiuswas expected to take the initiative andassault enemy positions, which is verydifferent from the standard late Romantactic of ambush and siege – although Aetiuswas not averse to using these tactics whenthe situation required them.

Furthermore, the army was constantly onthe move. It was efficient and well suppliedthanks to a successful logistic operation.Between 425 and 439 Aetius and hisgenerals fought at least eleven campaigns,no doubt with losses in both men and

material. The fact that the army continuedto fight successfully can be attributed to agood replacement system, especially oftrained troops.5 However, it is possible thatthe majority of the replacements were nowmercenaries from outside the empire. Thecontinuing success also demonstrates thatAetius appears to have trained and instilleda high level of discipline in his men,whatever their origin. It is possible, thoughnot attested, that his successes may havepartially eased the burden of recruitment,since an army that is winning will attractvolunteers whereas a losing army will not.

Yet the recruits his success attracted werenot sufficient to maintain constant militarycampaigns on more than one front and theconstant campaigning resulted in a steadyattrition that slowly reduced the strength ofthe praesental army. To replace the lossesAetius needed the wholehearted support of

the aristocracy, both to supply recruits andto pay the taxes needed for the upkeep ofthe army. It was not forthcoming. At thisvital juncture:

the two main groups in the [West]– the senatorial aristocracy and theCatholic Church – disassociatedthemselves from the fate of theRoman army that defended them.Both groups unwittingly sapped thestrength of the army and of theimperial administration; and,having hamstrung their protectors,they found, somewhat to theirsurprise, that they could do withoutthem.6

The only way that Aetius could keep thearmy at the strength needed to campaignwas to enlist foreign mercenaries. This wasa feasible proposition when the empire was

rich, but in the mid 430s the financialresources of the empire were becomingstretched.

It appeared that by the end of the 430sAetius was regaining control of the west.One event in 439 dashed his hopes. Whenthe richest province of Africa was lost to theVandals it sounded the death knell for theWest. The imperial coffers, already low,could not stand the loss of the Africanincome and with the failure of the Africancampaign of 441 the end was nigh. In 444Valentinian was forced to admit that theWest was bankrupt. Furthermore, the loss ofAfrica sent a signal to the other barbarianson Roman soil that the West was too weakto resist and internal conflict with thebarbarians grew.

War with the HunsUnfortunately for Aetius, this loss ofpolitical and military control occurred just

as the Huns began to reach the height oftheir power under Attila. Attila nowdisplaced Aetius as the main political focusin the West, largely due to the power of theHuns but also due to the apparent weaknessof the West and Aetius’ inability to interferein the workings of Germania. Attila was thusable to use his policy of divide and rule toensure confused loyalties in the West priorto the invasion of Gaul.7 Fortunately forAetius, Attila’s policy failed whenconfronted with the undivided andpolitically more mature Goths. Without theGoths, Gaul would almost certainly havebeen lost to the empire: although the Hunnicempire collapsed after Attila’s death, theWest would not have had the strength toreconquer Gaul. Instead, the Goths, theFranks and the ‘Armoriciani’ would havemoved into the vacuum left by the collapseof the Huns.

Attila’s invasion of Italy almost reversedthe result of Aetius’ victory in Gaul. Aetius’decision to reinforce the garrison of Aquileiaand await reinforcements from the East isan indication of the reduced strength of thepraesental army in Italy. The decision couldeasily have resulted in a catastrophic defeat.Fortunately, Aetius had correctly judged thatAttila would be forced to capture Aquileiaand that with additional troops the garrisoncould hold out for a long time. Although theeventual sack was a catastrophe for theinhabitants, the length of the siege gaveMarcian the time needed to collect his forcesand launch an attack into the Hunnichomelands, as well as sending troops tohelp Aetius in Italy.

Further, Aetius knew that time was on hisside. He knew that the Huns did not have alarge baggage train, instead relying to alarge part on finding supplies as they

campaigned. With the famine in Italy Aetiusdoubtless expected the Huns to suffer lossesfrom hunger as well as the inevitabledisease that accompanied famines. TheItalian campaign demonstrates that Aetiuswas a realist with a strong grasp of strategyand tactics, both his own and those of hisenemies.

Up to 450, when Attila began to considerinvading the West, Aetius had relied on apolicy of ‘government through punitiveexpedition’, which enjoyed mixed success.Gaul was brought back under imperialcontrol, but the situation in Spain waschanged with the marriage of Rechiarius,king of the Sueves, and the daughter ofTheoderic, king of the Goths. Aetius hadrelied on supplements of Gothic manpowerto maintain the Roman position in Spain.With this lost, the Sueves were allowed toagain extend their sphere of influence –

much to the detriment of the empire’sprestige and coffers.8

By 452 the empire in the West was in direstraits. By this date Britain, most of Spain,the richest provinces of Africa, and largeparts of Gaul had either been lost tobarbarian kingdoms that only accepted thenominal rule of Rome or had establishedvirtual independence from Roman rule.9Financially, the empire was in the laststages of bankruptcy. Despite this, to thepeople living at the time there were signs ofrecovery. Although only nominally subjectto Rome, the Vandals and the Gothsremained at peace and Aetius was able togain their cooperation in both Gaul andSpain. Furthermore, the barbarians’acceptance of Roman rule – howevernominal – meant that politically Aetiuscould claim that Rome still ‘ruled’ all theWest, with the possible exception of Britain.

AETIUS AND STILICHOModern historians have tended to viewStilicho as a Vandal who helped to bringabout the fall of the West, largely due to theperception that he was willing to do dealswith his fellow-barbarian Alaric and waspreparing to start a civil war against theEast in 406 rather than defending the Westagainst invasion. The fact that the Vandals,Alans and Sueves crossed the Rhine frontierand stopped the projected invasion ofIllyricum is perceived as highlightingStilicho’s failure as a military commander,bent on causing an unnecessary civil warinstead of monitoring the borders andanticipating the barbarian attack.10

Conversely, Aetius has tended to beviewed in a more sympathetic light thanStilicho. No doubt this is mainly due to bothhis long tenure in control of the West andthe fact that throughout that time he

continuously fought to maintain the West’sintegrity, on several occasions – and incontrast to Stilicho – even gaining militarysupport from the East.

Yet there are several parallels betweenthe two commanders. Both had contactswith powerful barbarians – Stilicho withAlaric and Aetius with Rua – and at timeswere forced to rely on these contacts tosupport their position. Both also had to dealwith weak emperors who had come to thethrone at a young age and never displayedthe necessary ability to rule independentlyof the magister militum.

Furthermore, both had tried to arrangemarriages to ensure that their grandchildrenwere heirs to the throne. Stilicho hadmanaged to arrange two marriages withHonorius, first with his elder daughter andthen, after her early death, with his youngerdaughter. The first of these had been

accepted, but the second had causedopposition to grow in the Senate. Neitherhad resulted in the hoped-for offspring.Aetius (or possibly his wife) had forcedValentinian to accept the betrothal of hisdaughter with Aetius’ son. Again this hadprovoked a growth of opposition at court,but in this case the resistance had coalescedand Aetius had been killed before themarriage had taken place.

Finally, shortly after their deaths Rome –the symbolic capital of the empire – wassacked, in 410 by Alaric and in 455 byGaiseric. Historians have blamed the sack of410 on Stilicho, accusing him of failing toeliminate Alaric when he had the chance in402. On the other hand, Aetius’ success inrepeatedly defeating barbarians and thegood fortune he experienced when Attiladied before him has resulted in blame forthe sack of 455 by Gaiseric being laid

elsewhere: principally with Valentinian forkilling his vastly experienced and capablemagister militum, and with Eudoxia forinviting Gaiseric to intervene in Italy afterMaximus had been crowned emperor.

In spite of these assumptions, a closeanalysis of events has shown that Stilichowas not really to blame for the events of408, but rather the Italian troops, as theyplayed into Alaric’s hands when theymassacred the families of Stilicho’s foederati,forcing thousands of the foederati to changetheir allegiance and join Alaric.11 Moreover,Eudoxia cannot realistically be blamed forGaiseric’s sack of Rome in 455: there can belittle doubt that he would have attacked thecity whether invited by her or not.

Although neither general was perfect, themajority of the blame must be laid at thefeet of the two emperors who removed theircapable generals without having either the

ability to lead the troops themselves nor thestrength of purpose to promote a capablewarrior from within the court to takecontrol of the army and defeat the invaders.

Stilicho and Aetius, who certainly kneweach other, although they were fromdifferent generations, were responding tothe specific, and vastly different, problemswith which they were faced. Neither couldfind all of the answers.

THE BARBARIAN SETTLEMENTSIn recent years there has been a revolutionconcerning interpretations of the effects ofthe barbarian invasions that took placemainly during the period of Aetius’ lifetime.Historians have tended to highlight thecontinuity between the Roman and the‘barbarian successor’ kingdoms, especiallywith regard to the Goths and the Vandals.The apparent continuity of imperialinstitutions has allowed historians to

downplay the dislocation and bloodshedcaused by both the invasions and thealmost-continuous civil wars.

This has been overplayed. Having noadministrative structures of their own, whenthe barbarian kingdoms came into existencethey naturally adopted and adapted theimperial structures that were in place, withthe ‘king’ taking the place of the emperorand the nobles the place of the absenteearistocracy. As a result, the administrativestructure continued, and is now beinginterpreted as a sign that the takeover was(relatively) peaceful, which has concealedboth the level of warfare that continued totake place and the fact that in many placesin the West imperial power had actuallycollapsed and the burden been assumed bylocal ‘warlords’, whether of barbarian orRoman origin, prior to the foundation of thebarbarian kingdoms.12

A further difficulty lies in interpretationsof the origins of the barbarian settlements.There is a tendency, especially in historiesdescribing the long periods fromConstantine’s death to the ‘Fall of the West’,to perceive all barbarian settlements asbeing forced on the West by hostile foreigninvaders.13 This is not the case. There werefive types of settlement by barbarians onRoman territory.14

The first of these was where barbariansattempted to impose their settlementwithout imperial sanction, for example, theSalian Franks in 358 and other Frankishtribes in 428. These were quickly counter-attacked and forced to leave the territorythey had just occupied. That this infiltrationcontinued and that it eventually succeededafter Aetius’ death is a sure sign of imperialweakness.

The second type of settlement was where

terms were imposed by Rome and weresimply to the benefit of the Romans withoutinterest in the effects on the barbarians.These were the types imposed on barbariansthroughout most of imperial history.Unfortunately, by the time of Aetius theRomans had effectively lost the ability toforce such settlements on the barbarianinvaders, although the settlement of theBurgundians in Gaul in 443 and 456 mightfit this category. Following their decimationby the Huns, the Burgundians were settledas ‘citizens’ in a similar manner toequivalent situations in the earlier empire.It is only the fact that the Burgundiansmaintained a separate identity for the shortperiod until the fall of the West, after whichthey managed to establish a smallindependent kingdom for themselves, thatmakes it appear as if they were yet anotherbarbarian invader whose invasion helped

dismantle the empire.The third type was where usurpers

allowed barbarians to settle on condition oftheir military support. Examples include theSueves, Vandals and Alans who wereallowed by the usurper Maximus to settle inSpain in 409.15 In this case the tribesmenwere always liable to be attacked by‘legitimate’ imperial forces intent on eitherdestroying them, moving them to a separatesettlement area or of forcing them to acceptnew treaties that were more beneficial toRome.

The fourth type was where, with Romanagreement, the barbarians were settled onroughly equal terms to Rome. Theseagreements include the settlement of theGoths in Aquitaine in 418–419 and theVandals in Africa in 442. The Goths weresettled in 418–419 partly in recognition ofwhat they had achieved in Spain, but

mainly because an attempt to destroy themwas too risky. Therefore, they were grantedland specifically in return for their alliance.The Vandals were allowed to retain Africawhen it became apparent that the Easternarmy was needed to face the Huns and thatthe Western army could not face theVandals alone, since a defeat in Africawould certainly have resulted in the totalloss of Gaul to the Goths and probably tothe complete collapse of the West. The maindifference between the Vandals and theother Germanic invaders is that the Vandalsasserted and maintained their independencefrom an early date thanks both to theirgeographical location and to the militaryand political ability of Gaiseric. From hissecure base in Africa Gaiseric established anindependent kingdom that was to last untilthe reconquest under Belisarius in 533–534.

The final type of settlement is one where

barbarian troops were rewarded for theirloyal service to Rome and can be seen as theequivalent of earlier land grants of‘colonies’ to troops after their retirementfrom service. The two settlements of Alansin Gaul in 440 and 442 should beinterpreted as the settling of veterans ontheir own land after long and faithfulservice, although in both cases Aetius hadulterior motives for the settlements. Forexample, that of the Alans under Goa in 442was partly to inhibit the rebellions of thebacaudae in Armorica. Yet it is better to seetheir settlement as a traditional reward ofland for Roman veterans, rather than abarbarian invader annexing large parts ofGaul in the face of imperial impotence.

Whatever the nature, the method ofsettling barbarians in Gaul and Spain, whichwas begun before Aetius came to power,was very effective in the short term and

helped to maintain the empire. However, inthe long term the net result was a loss ofrevenue without a similar reduction in costs.This is mirrored in the hiring ofmercenaries. Although effective in the shortterm, in the long term the mercenariesretired to their own territories and themoney that they had earned left theempire.16

Overall, however, it should beremembered that despite appearances theempire did not admit that the lands in Gaul,Spain and Britain had been permanentlylost.17 Aetius’ recovery of control in Gaul inthe mid 440s was certainly seen as a sign ofimperial recovery, as evidenced by theappeal to him from Britain for help. WhilstAetius was alive contemporaries probablybelieved that the worst was over and thatimperial recovery would allow life to returnto what it had been in previous centuries.

This was no more so than after the repulseof Attila from Gaul and Italy, followed byhis death and the collapse of the Hunnicempire.

One further aspect deserves attention –the treatment of the barbarian leaders in theWest as compared to the East. It has beenobserved that in the East the barbarianaristocracy were offered military posts andwere integrated into the empire, whereas inthe West no such employment was offeredand so the barbarian kings remainedseparate and eventually overthrew theWest.18 This is not strictly accurate. In theWest the barbarian leaders had largenumbers of followers, usually equivalent toone of the Roman field armies. To allowsuch leaders a military post wouldnecessitate allowing their followers to jointhe army in similar fashion. This wouldresult in the new commanders suddenly

becoming equivalent in power to theestablished Roman military leaders. Thisobviously was not allowed until after Aetius’death, after which it can be interpreted asone of the major reasons for the collapse ofimperial authority in the West.

In the East, on the other hand, thebarbarian leaders had a smaller troop offollowers. In normal circumstances, thebarbarian followers were separated fromtheir leader and deployed away fromConstantinople. The leader was thenentrusted with the command of Romantroops loyal to the empire. In this way thebarbarian general was not allowed tobecome a threat to the empire. The onlytime when this rule was not followedallowed the Goth Gainas, in the year 400, totake command of a joint army of his owntroops and the followers of his barbariancolleague Tribigild. Although his time in

power was short, it ensured that the East didnot allow a repetition of thesecircumstances. When the Gothic generalTheoderic later threatened the stability ofthe East, he was sent to Italy, saving theEast from further disruption.

AETIUS: ‘TERROR OF THE BARBARIANSAND THE SUPPORT OF THE REPUBLIC’?Despite the difficulties, it is possible fromthe few remaining sources to glean a hint ofwhat Aetius was like as a person. The factthat Boniface was willing to allow him tolive after defeating him at the Battle ofRimini suggests that he was a man who wastrusted by his contemporaries. This isemphasized by the fact that Boniface, as apolitical and military mover at Court, mayhave known of Aetius from an early age. Itis even more the case when the long-standing support of the Huns is taken intoaccount. It is unlikely that they would have

continued to support a man who continuallyfailed to honour his personal agreements.

He appears to have been a man ofcompassion and humanity, as well as arealist, as evidenced by his treatment of theAfrican refugees. At a time when the empirewas bankrupt Aetius and Valentinian passedlaws to relieve the refugees of their taxburden, even though Aetius was no doubtdesperate for income to strengthen thearmy.

Yet this should not blind us to the factthat Aetius was a political and militarycommander who had a sense of his ownsuperiority that made him prepared to riskall in civil war. His actions cost many lives,first in support of John and then on his ownagainst Boniface. It would appear that aslong as he was recognized as being needed,if not pre-eminent, he was trustworthy, yetwhen this was removed he could be self-

centred enough to force others to do thingshis way.

On the other hand, when he was defeatedby Boniface he appears to have acceptedthat Boniface was the better man and tohave stepped aside, retiring to his estatesand being content to allow Boniface hischance of running the empire as militaryguardian to Valentinian. It should not beforgotten, however, that he would have hadfriends and supporters in the Senate and thecourt who would have kept him aware ofpolitical developments and he was almostcertainly simply waiting for an opportunityto step forward and resume the burden ofpolitical and military life.

His chance came with the death ofBoniface. It is clear that Aetius did not holdSebastian in the same esteem as he had heldBoniface and was willing to plunge theempire into civil war to regain his position

and oust Sebastian – although to a largepart the attempts on his life certainly madeAetius more willing to risk all.

In combination, these qualities appear tohave endeared him to both contemporariesand later historians. It is noticeable that itwas only after ‘ruling’ the West unopposedfor twenty years that effective opposition tohis control materialized. Even then, after hisexecution the troops remained loyal to hismemory, standing aside as Valentinian waskilled and then failing to arrest and punishthe murderers.

LAST OF THE ROMANSYet the real test of Aetius’ ability is when histime in power is compared to the eventsimmediately after his fall. The rapidfragmentation and collapse of the Westattests to his determination and ability tohold the disintegrating empire togetherdespite the odds.

One of the most important facets of hispersonality appears to have been that hewas able to command undivided loyalty inhis subordinates. In turn, he was able to usetheir military ability for the benefit of theempire, sending several independent armiesto different theatres in Gaul and Spain,confident that the generals he appointedwould not raise the standard of revolt.19

Later commanders in the West did not havethis luxury.

Aetius was a superb military commanderand politician, but even had he lived longerhe could not have saved the West. He wasfighting against the tides of history. Thefinancial decay of the West coupled with themoral decay of the aristocracy removed anychance he had of defeating the barbariansand re-establishing a viable empire.

Aetius established a reputation as anexcellent general and a fierce defender of

Roman power. As long as he was alive,despite numerous attempts to promote theirinfluence, the kings of the barbariankingdoms remained subordinate to theemperor. After his death the situationchanged dramatically. The Goths becameemperor-makers, promoting Avitus to thethrone. The heart of the empire was nowsubordinate to the wills of a king whosemain interest was the expansion of his ownpower, not the good of Rome.Simultaneously, the Vandals, released fromthe treaty and no longer afraid of militaryinterference, launched a series of attacksthat annexed large areas to their kingdom,whilst at the same time drastically reducingthe area still loyal to Rome. Although thesack of Rome by Gaiseric in 455 is still seenas important, in reality it was the loss ofterritory that was most damaging to theempire. Neither of these events would have

happened during Aetius’ lifetime. The moraleffect of having an able military leader incontrol subdued the barbarians andconcealed the weakness of the empire fromits inhabitants.

It is true to say that ‘If all the barbarianconquerors had been annihilated in thesame hour, their total destruction would nothave restored the empire of the West: and ifRome still survived, she survived the loss offreedom, of virtue, and of honour.’20 Aetius’rearguard action was valiant and full ofvalorous deeds, but in the end it wasdoomed to failure simply because there wasno one of his quality to replace him.Without a dynamic military leader at leasthis equal in ability the West could notsurvive

Outline Chronology

306–337 Rule of Constantine I, ‘The Great’

376Goths allowed into empire byValens

377 Revolt of Goths

378 Battle of Adrianople

379Theodosius I installed as Emperorin the East

Conclusion of Gothic War: treaty

382 signed

383Revolt of Magnus Maximus inBritain

388Theodosius defeats and killsMagnus Maximus

c.390Birth of Aetius. Spends early lifein the tribuni praetoriani partismilitaris

391Alaric first attested as a leader ofa Gothic group in the Balkans

392Elevation of Eugenius as WesternEmperor by Arbogast followingdeath of Valentinian II

Theodosius again invades the

394 West to defeat Eugenius

395Death of Theodosius. Stilichoregent in the West. Revolt ofAlaric

395Stilicho’s campaign against Alaricin Illyricum ends in failure

397Stilicho’s campaign against Alaricin Greece ends in failure. Fall ofRufinus

398Revolt of Gildo in Africa. Stilichosends an army that defeats Gildoand restores Africa to the West

399 Fall of Eutropius

400 Fall of Gainas

401 Alaric invades Italy

402

Battles of Pollentia (April) andVerona (June). Alaric defeated byStilicho

pre-405Aetius tribunus praetoriani partismilitaris

405Invasion of Italy by Radagaisus.Aetius sent to Alaric as hostage,aged c.15

406

Defeat and execution ofRadagaisus. Stilicho decides toinvade Illyricum. Stilicho sendsAlaric to Epirus. Invasion of Gaulby Vandals, Sueves and Alans

The usurper Constantine III

407

crosses to Gaul from Britain.Uneasy alliance of Constantineand the barbarian invaders ofGaul. Invasion of Illyricumcancelled. Alaric ordered to returnto Pannonia. Constantine securesGaul and Spain

408

Fall of Stilicho. Olympius assumescontrol in west. Alaric returnsAetius as a sign of good faith:Aetius sent to the Hunnic KingRua as hostage. Massacre of thefamilies of the federates in Italy.Federate troops join Alaric.Formation of the Visigoths. Alaric

lays siege to Rome in an attemptto secure military post for himself.Honorius refuses Alaric’s requestfor a military post. Alaric raisessiege

409

Revolt of Gerontius in Spain andinstallation of Maximus asEmperor. Vandals, Sueves andAlans enter Spain. Alaric layssiege to Rome for a second time.Alaric promotes Priscus Attalus asEmperor. Pestilence in Spain

Alaric deposes Attalus and layssiege to Rome for third time.Rome sacked by Goths.

410 Traditional date for the formalsecession of Britain from theempire with the ‘Rescript ofHonorius’

411Flavius Constantius becomesmagister militum and begins torestore the fortunes of the west

413Constantius campaigns againstAthaulf and the Goths. Settlementof Goths in Aquitaine begins

416–419

Combined Gothic–Romancampaigns in Spain destroy powerof Alans and Siling Vandals. Thesurvivors join the Asding Vandals

Constantius marries Galla

417 Placidia, sister of Honorius

419Birth of Valentinian, son ofConstantius and Galla Placidia

c.420Death of Charaton, release ofAetius

421Constantius III made joint-Augustus. Death of Constantius III

422

Castinus and Boniface sentagainst Vandals in Spain. Theyquarrel and Boniface flees toAfrica. Castinus defeated byVandals. Galla Placidia breakswith Honorius and moves toConstantinople, taking her son

Valentinian with her

423

Death of Honorius. Theodosius IIin Constantinople delaysdeclaration of new emperor. Thepatricius Castinus names John asEmperor. Aetius made cura palatii.Possible date of Aetius’ marriageto Carpilio’s daughter

424

Late in the year John sends Aetiusto the Huns to ask for support inJohn’s claim to the West. October,Theodosius declares his cousinValentinian III emperor of theWest and betroths Valentinian tohis daughter Licinia Eudoxia

425

Eastern army invades West. Johntakes refuge in Ravenna but isbetrayed by the garrison andexecuted. Three days afterexecution Aetius arrives with aHunnic army: battle with Easternforces under Aspar. Aetius andPlacidia (mother of ValentinianIII) reach agreement: Huns paidoff, Aetius made comes et magistermilitum per Gallias, Felix mademagister militum praesentalis andpatricius. Valentinian crowned 23October, aged six. Vandalscapture Cartagena and sackSeville

426Aetius defeats Goths besiegingArles. Vandals occupy Seville

427Felix contrives disgrace ofBoniface: civil war in Africa

428Aetius defeats Franks on theRhine. Vandals occupy Seville

429

Aetius made magister militumpraesentalis (magister equitum),remaining subordinate to Felix.Truth concerning contriveddisgrace of Boniface emerges.May 429 Vandals cross Straits ofGibraltar to Africa. August 429inscription at Altava in NorthAfrica attests to movement of

Vandals towards Carthage. Dariusbrokers truce with Vandals.Sueves plunder Lusitania

430

Aetius destroys a Gothic groupnear Arles led by Anaolsus.Returning to Italy, Aetius accusesFelix of plotting against him. Thetroops kill Felix and his wife.Aetius defeats Iuthungi(Alamanni) in Raetia. Suevespillage central Gallaecia. InAfrica, Vandals break truce anddefeat Boniface in battle. Siege ofHippo begins. Saint Augustinedies 28 August in the third monthof the siege

431

Aetius defeats Nori in Noricum.Aetius accepted as Consul for 432.Sueves pillage Gallaecia. Vandalsraise siege of Hippo. Frankscapture Tournai and Cambrai

432

Aetius Consul for the first time.Aetius defeats Franks on theRhine. Boniface and Aspar, anEastern magister militum, defeatedby Vandals. Sack of Hippo.Boniface returns to Italy: Aetiusattacks him at the Battle of Riminibut is defeated and returns to hisestates. Boniface dies of woundsreceived in the battle and his son-

in-law Sebastian takes control inRome. Alleged attack on Aetius,who flees to the Huns

433

Aetius returns and is installed asmagister militum. Sebastian flees.Aetius marries Pelagia, widow ofBoniface

435

Treaty with the Vandals, givingthem parts of North Africa. Aetiusdefeats the Burgundians and signsa treaty. Tibatto leads a bacaudicrebellion in ‘Farther Gaul’. Aetiusmade patricius 5 September

Aetius sends army into Armoricaunder Litorius to fight the

436 bacaudae. Goths declare war andbegin siege of Narbonne.Burgundians break treaty

437

Litorius defeats Tibatto and raisesGothic siege of Narbonne. Aetiusreceives help from the Huns, whoattack and decimate theBurgundians. Sueves pillageGallaecia. Franks capture Cologneand Trier. Vandals beginpersecution of Catholic priests andbegin tentative raids in theMediterranean. 21 Octobermarriage of Valentinian III andLicinia Eudoxia in Constantinople.

Aetius attends wedding. AetiusConsul for the second time

437/438Unknown commander sent toSpain and defeats Sueves

438

Peace treaty with Sueves.Publication of Codex Theodosianusin Constantinople. Vandal raidsincrease, focusing on Sicily

439

Codex Theodosianus accepted inWest. Death of Litorius, treatywith Goths. Sueves under theirnew king Rechila capture Emerita.Probable death of Rua andaccession of Bleda and Attila.Treaty of Margus between Huns

and the East. 19 October Vandalscapture Carthage

440

Sueves capture Mertola. Aetiussettles the Alans of Sambida nearValence. Vandals lay siege toPanormus in Sicily and raidBruttium

440/441 Birth of Gaudentius, son of Aetius

441

Bacaudic rebellion inTarraconensis. Astyrius sent withan army and ‘slaughters’ therebels. Sueves capture Seville andtake control of Baetica andCarthaginiensis. The East sends anarmy to retake Africa: it stops in

Sicily. Persians and Huns declarewar on the East

442

The Eastern army is recalled fromSicily after a peace treaty issigned with the Vandals givingthem the province of Africa andother territories in the area.Pestilence in the empire.Settlement of the Alans in ‘FartherGaul’

Remnant of the Burgundianssettled in Savoy. Astyrius recalledfrom Spain and his son-in-lawMerobaudes sent to replace him.Merobaudes ‘smashes thebacaudae of Aracelli’. Treaty

443

between Aetius and Attila: partsof Pannonia ceded to the Huns,Attila made honorary magistermilitum, Constantius sent to act asAttila’s secretary and Aetius’ sonCarpilio sent as one of thehostages. Clodio, king of theFranks, captures Arras andbesieges Tours

444

Valentinian III acknowledges thebankruptcy of the West. Siege ofTours by Franks ends. With hisborders secure against the Empire,Attila has his brother Bledaassassinated and assumes sole

control of the Huns

444/445A new tax, the siliquatum, leviedin the West

445

Aetius ambushes the Franks atVicus Helena. Peace treaty agreedbetween the West and the Franks.Vandals attack Turonium inGallaecia. Statue of Aetius erectedin the Atrium Libertatis

446

Aetius Consul for the third time.On 1 January Merobaudes readspanegyric. Aetius leads a victoryprocession through the streets ofRome. Plea from the Britons foraid. Vitus sent to Spain but

defeated by Rechila and theSueves

447

27 January major earthquake inConstantinople: part of the wallscollapse. Huns’ envoys rejectedand Attila devastates Thrace andIllyricum. Huns withdraw aftercontracting ‘sickness of thebowels’

448

East signs a peace treaty with theHuns. New annual tribute set at2,100 pounds of gold and landalong the Danube from Pannoniato Thrace vacated by Rome.Rechila attacks the ‘farthestreaches’ of Gallaecia then dies:

Rechiarius the new king. Bacaudicrevolt in northern Gaul underEudoxius. Sigisvult made patricius

449

Astyrius made consul. Firminus, aGaul, made Praetorian Prefect ofGaul. Theoderic, King of theGoths, gives his daughter inmarriage to Rechiarius, King ofthe Sueves. In February,Rechiarius attacks the Basques innorthern Spain. Basilius leadsbacaudic uprising in Spain.Rechiarius and Basilius join forcesand capture Ilerda

Honoria, sister of Valentinian,

449/450 caught having affair withEugenius

450

Eugenius executed; Honoriaappeals to Attila for support. 28July death of Theodosius.Theodosius’ sister Pulcheriachooses Marcian as new emperor;crowned on 26 August 450. Heimmediately rejects all treatieswith the Huns. Attila chooses toinvade the West in ‘support’ ofHonoria rather than attempt todefeat Marcian. Aetius recognizesthe danger and begins attempts toestablish an alliance to face Attila.Aetius holds his troops in Italy,

expecting Attila to invade

451

Attila invades Gaul, razing andravaging many cities. Easternforces fight the Huns in theBalkans. Attila lays siege toOrleans. After much debate theGoths under Theoderic join withAetius. The combined force raisesthe siege of Orleans and pursuesthe Huns eastward. Battle of theCatalaunian Plains: defeat ofAttila and death of Theoderic.Beginning of famine in Italy.Sueves ravage large areas ofSpain

452

Attila invades Italy, sackingAquileia and capturing manycities. Aetius guards the Apenninepasses. Attila’s forces, sufferingfrom hunger and disease, begin toretreat from Italy. Reinforcedfrom the East, Aetius harassestheir rear. Forces from the Eastunder the Eastern general Aetiusinvade the Hunnic homelands.Attila meets Pope Leo andransoms some of his captivesbefore leaving Italy

Attila prepares a campaignagainst the East. Death of Attila:civil war in the Hunnic empire.

453

Thorismund, the new King of theGoths, attacks the Alans innorthern Gaul. He then lays siegeto Arles. Thorismund persuaded toraise the siege by Ferreolus.Frederic, brother of Thorismund,made magister militum. New peacetreaty made with Sueves. Death ofThorismund

454

Bacaudic revolt in Tarraconensis:Frederic, brother of Thorismund,sent with an army and slaughterslarge numbers of rebels. Betrothalof Aetius’ son Gaudentius withValentinian’s daughter Placidia.

Opposition to Aetius coalesces onPetronius Maximus. Battle of theNedao and collapse of Hunnicempire of Attila. Assassination ofAetius

455

Beginnings of expansion of Goths,Saxons, Franks and Alamanni.Assassination of Valentinian III.Maximus proclaimed emperor.Avitus sent as envoy to the Goths.Eudoxia, Valentinian’s widow,appeals to Gaiseric for help.Vandals land in Italy. Maximuspanics and is killed by the Romanmob. Sack of Rome by the Vandalsand capture of Eudoxia, Pelagia,

Eudocia and Gaudentius. Gaisericthen conquers the whole ofRoman Africa west of Cyrenaica,the Balearic Islands, Sardinia andCorsica. Goths proclaim Avitus asEmperor. Sueves ravage RomanSpain

456

Theoderic II invades Spain anddefeats the Sueves. Avitusappoints Ricimer as magistermilitum, who defeats Vandals onland near Agrigentum and at seanear Corsica. Rebellion ofMajorian; defeat and death ofAvitus

461

Death of Majorian: Ricimer rulesthe West, elevating anddestroying a series of short-livedemperors

472Death of Ricimer. Gundobadbecomes magister militum

473

On the death of his father, theking of the Burgundians,Gundobad abdicates his post andleaves Italy to fight for hisinheritance

474The Eastern emperor Leo appointshis nephew Julius Nepos asWestern Emperor

Orestes appointed magister militum

475

by Nepos. Orestes rebels andevicts Nepos from Italy: Nepostakes refuge in Illyricum. Oresteselevates his son RomulusAugustulus to emperor. Orestesrefuses to bow down to thedemands of the imperialmercenaries. They rebel underOdoacer. Death of Orestes.Romulus Augustulus deposed

480Death of Julius Nepos. End ofWestern Empire

Imperial Family Tree

Select Personalities

Aetius c.390–454.

Ardabur

An Alan and father ofAspar. Eastern magistermilitum, he defeated thePersians (421–422) beforebeing sent by TheodosiusII to overthrow the usurperJohn in the West. Consul

in 427.

Aspar

An Alan and son ofArdabur. Accompanied hisfather in the overthrow ofJohn in the West. In 431he arrived in Africa tosupport Boniface againstthe Vandals. After beingdefeated, Boniface wassummoned to Italy and forthe next two to three yearshe conducted a holdingcampaign against Gaiseric.Consul in 434, he wasrecalled and later foughtagainst Attila in the

Balkans, being defeated.Appointed patricius priorto 451. In 457 he madeLeo I emperor in the East.He was murdered in 471.

Astyrius

A Spaniard and father-in-law of Merobaudes, heserved Aetius as magistermilitum, fightingcampaigns against thebacaudae in Spain 441–443. He was made Consulin 449.

Son of Mundiuch, he wasthe king of the Huns in

Attila

succession to Rua inpartnership with hisbrother Bleda. After killinghis brother, he was soleruler. Invaded the East in441 and 447. He wasmade honorary magistermilitum in the West in 449.After Honoria the sister ofValentinian III had askedfor help in 449/450, in451 he invaded Gaul.Forced to retreat fromOrleans, he was defeatedat the Battle of theCatalaunian Plains.

Determined on revenge, in452 he invaded Italy, butwas forced to retreat dueto hunger, disease and theravaging of his homelandsby the East. He died in453.

Augustine(Saint)

Bishop of Hippo,Augustine was baptised by(Saint) Ambrose in 387.He is acknowledged as oneof the founding fathers ofthe Christian Church. Aprolific writer, the volumeand quality of his works,especially De civitate Dei

(City of God) resulted incanonisation. He diedduring the siege of Hippoby the Vandals, August438.

A Gaul, he was the friendof King Theoderic of theGoths and often acted asambassador from theWestern court. Servedunder Aetius against theIuthungi in 430 and theNori in 431. Master of theTroops in Gaul in 437 andPraetorian Prefect of Gaul

Avitus in 439. He acted as Aetius’envoy to the Goths in 451and persuaded them tojoin the alliance againstAttila. After the death ofAetius he was mademagister militum in 455 andin the same year wasmade emperor. Defeatedby Ricimer in a civil war,he was made Bishop ofPlacentia shortly beforehis death.

A native of Thrace,Boniface rose to becomeCount of Africa in 422. In

Boniface

this year he was assignedto accompany Castinusagainst the Vandals, butargued with Castinus andfled to Africa. Remainedloyal to Placidia after thedeath of Honorius. Accusedof treachery by Felix in427, Boniface was forcedto defend himself againstimperial attacks until thetruth was discovered andhe was restored toimperial favour in 430. Inthe same year he wasdefeated by the Vandals in

Africa and besieged inHippo. The Vandals raisedthe siege in 431 and in432 Boniface,accompanied by Aspar,again fought the Vandalsand lost. Shortly after hewas summoned to Italyand made patricius byPlacidia. He defeatedAetius at the Battle ofRimini but died shortlyafter. One of his last actswas to allegedly tell hiswife Pelagia to marryAetius.

Carpilio

Son of Aetius, he was sentto Attila as ambassadorand in 443 he was one ofthe hostages exchangedwith Attila.

Castinus

Made magister militum byHonorius in 422, he wassent to Spain to fight theVandals. He quarrelledwith Boniface and wasthen defeated by theVandals. On Honorius’death he promoted John tobe emperor. After John’sdefeat and execution,

Castinus was exiled in425.

Charaton

Overlord of the Huns fromc.412, it is likely thatAetius spent a lot of timeas a hostage with the Hunsunder Charaton.

Clodio/Chlogio

King of the Franks, in 431he captured Tournai andCambrai, and in 437Cologne and Trier. In 443he captured Arras andbesieged Tours. In 444 thesiege was raised and in445 the Franks weredefeated by Aetius at Vicus

Helena. The cities ofCologne and Trier werereturned to the Romans.

Darius

vir inlustris (illustriousindividual), he negotiateda (temporary) truce withthe Vandals in 429.

Ellac

Eldest son of Attila, he waskilled fighting the Huns’rebellious subjects at theBattle of the Nedao in 454.

Full name Licinia Eudoxia,she was the daughter ofTheodosius II and wasmarried to Valentinian III

Eudoxia

in 437. They had twochildren, Eudocia andPlacidia. After theassassination ofValentinian in 455 shewas forced to marry thenew emperor Maximus.She appealed to Gaiseric,who then sacked Rome,captured Eudoxia and hertwo daughters and tookthem back to Carthage.Around the year 462Eudoxia’s daughterEudocia finally marriedHuneric, son of Gaiseric,

and Eudoxia and Pelagiawere sent toConstantinople.

Felix

When the Easterncampaign against theWestern usurper Johnsucceeded, Valentinian(Placidia) appointed Felixas the new magister militumand patricius of the West.In 427 he led a successfulexpedition against theHuns living in Pannonia.In 430 he was accused ofplotting against Aetius andkilled by the troops in

Ravenna.

King of the Vandals (428–477), Gaiseric led them outof Spain into Africa. In435 he agreed terms withthe West which gave theVandals large areas ofAfrica to live in before, in439, he successfullycaptured Carthage. Thefailure of the campaign tooust Gaiseric in 441–442resulted in the Treaty of442, in which Gaiseric wasgiven large areas of fertileland in North Africa,

Gaiseric

including the city ofCarthage. After the deathof Valentinian in 455Gaiseric believed that histreaty obligations wereover and he sacked Romebefore expanding hisempire to include all ofAfrica west of Cyrenaica,plus the Balearic islands,Sardinia and Corsica. Afterdefeating two furtherattempts by the empire todefeat him in 460 and468, Gaiseric finallyconcluded a treaty with

the East in 476 before hisdeath in 477.

Gaudentius

Second son of Aetius, bornc.440. In 454 Aetiusarranged for a betrothalbetween Gaudentius andPlacidia, daughter ofValentinian III. AfterAetius’ death, Gaudentiuswas captured by theVandals in the sack ofRome in 455 and taken toCarthage. He was stillalive in the early 460s.

Gundichar

King of the Burgundians inthe early 430s, he wasdefeated by Aetius afterattempting to extend hisdominions in 435. Hisrebellion in 436–437resulted in Aetius callingupon the Huns for help.The Burgundians weredecimated and Gundicharwas killed. This may havebeen the origin of theNibelungen cycle.

Roman Emperor 395–423.His death without an heirin 423 prompted the

Honorius succession crisis thatresulted in the elevation ofJohn and the start ofAetius’ dramatic rise topre-eminence.

Huneric

Son and heir of Gaiseric,he was married to adaughter of Theoderic,king of the Goths. In 442he was sent as a hostageto Valentinian III. Heappears to have made afavourable impression andwas betrothed toValentinian’s daughterEudocia. His first wife was

mutilated and sent home.After the sack of Carthagein 455 Eudocia wascaptured and kept atCarthage until she wasfinally married to Hunericc.462. He ruled theVandals 477–484.

John

A primicerius notariorum in423, after the death ofHonorius he was madeAugustus by Castinus. Johnsent Aetius to the Huns togain their support, butthey arrived too late to

save John. In 425 he wascaptured by the Easternforces supporting theclaim of Valentinian (III)and executed.

Litorius

Appointed as comes reimilitaris in Gaul in 436 todefeat the bacaudae led byTibatto in Armorica, hethen marched to relievethe siege of Narbonne bythe Goths in 437. In 439he was made magistermilitum per Gallias andforced the Goths to retreattowards Toulouse. He was

killed attempting to defeatthe Goths.

A military commanderunder Aetius, he foughtagainst the Franks andwas besieged in Tours in443–444. In 445, alongwith Aetius, he defeatedthe Franks at VicusHelena. By 454 he hadwithdrawn from publiclife, probably underpressure from Aetius andPelagia: Eudoxia may havewanted Majorian to marryher daughter Placidia and

Majorian

so be the next heir to thethrone. Pelagia wasagainst this, and withMajorian’s withdrawalfrom public life shearranged that her sonGaudentius was betrothedto Placidia instead. Afterthe death of Aetius,Valentinian recalledMajorian. He remained apowerful figure during theshort reign ofValentinian’s successorMaximus. Shortly afterAvitus was made emperor

Majorian rebelled. In 457he was crowned emperorand in 460 led anunsuccessful campaignagainst the Vandals inAfrica. In 461 he wasdeposed by Ricimer andfive days later he wasexecuted.

After a long anddistinguished career,including being thePraetorian Prefect, Consuland patricius, in 454 hewas intimately involved,

Maximus

along with the eunuchHeraclius, in the death ofAetius. Realising thatHeraclius would block anyattempts he made to takeAetius’ place, Maximus isalleged to have urgedOptila and Thraustila tomurder Valentinian. OnValentinian’s death,Maximus assumed thethrone, marryingValentinian’s widowEudoxia. When he learnedthat the Vandals hadlanded near Rome

Maximus panicked andfled. As he attempted toleave Rome he was struckby a missile and the mobthen turned on him andtore him to pieces.

A native of Spain, possiblyof Germanic ancestry, hewas acclaimed as both apoet and a general.Panegyrist to Aetius, healso served in a militarycapacity under Aetius in430 and 431 against theAlamanni and the Nori. In435 he was honoured by a

Merobaudes statue in Trajan’s Forumand was probably declaredpatricius on the marriageof Valentinian andEudoxia in 437. In 443 hewas made magister militumand sent to Spain torelieve his father-in-lawAstyrius in the campaignagainst the bacaudae.

Mundiuch

Brother of Rua and Octar,joint kings of the Huns.His sons were Bleda andAttila.

OctarBrother of Rua andMundiuch, he was jointking of the Huns until hisdeath in 530.

Optila

Either a Hun or a Goth, heserved in Aetius’bodyguard before beingtransferred to thebodyguard of ValentinianIII. After Aetius’ deathOptila assassinatedValentinian, andThraustila the eunuchHeraclius, on the CampusMartius in 455.

Pelagia

Wife of Boniface andAetius. Of Gothic origin,and so starting as anArian, she converted toCatholic Christianity uponmarrying Boniface,although it is claimed thatshe had their daughterbaptized as an Arian. OnBoniface’s death he isreported to have told herto marry Aetius, which shedid, bearing him a sonnamed Gaudentius. In 454she is said to have beenstrongly against the

betrothal of Majorian andEudocia, managing toblock this and arrange forEudocia’s betrothal toGaudentius instead.

Full name Aelia GallaPlacidia. Daughter ofTheodosius I, in 414 shewas married to Athaulf,the ‘king’ of the Goths.Their son Theodosius diedsoon after his birth andAthaulf was assassinatedin 415. Returning to theempire, in 417 she marriedConstantius, the patricius

of her brother Honorius,giving birth to Honoriaand Valentinian, thefuture Valentinian III.Constantius was madeEmperor in 421 andPlacidia was declaredAugusta at the same time.Unfortunately,Constantius died later thesame year. After the deathof her brother Honorius in423 she campaigned inConstantinople for her sonValentinian to be acceptedas Emperor of the West.

Placidia

After the East’s successfulcampaign to oust theusurper John, in 425Placidia regained herplace as Augusta in theWest and acted as regentto her son Valentinian III.She undoubtedly took partin the politicalmanoeuvres of Felix,Boniface and Aetius and in432 recalled Boniface inan attempt to oust Aetiusfrom his pre-eminentposition in the West. Thissucceeded, but Boniface

died shortly afterwardsand Aetius returned topower. Any evidence forlater opposition to Aetiusis implied rather thanexplicit and it may be thatshe accepted Aetius as herson’s protector,recognising that Aetiuswould not attempt toremove Valentinian andreplace him with Aetius’own nominee. She died in450.

Bishop of Rome (Pope)

Pope Leo I

from 440, in 452 Leo wassent on an embassy toAttila, apparently toorganize the release ofAttila’s captives. The storyhas changed over time intothe wellknown versionwhere he saved Rome fromsack with the aid of divineintervention. In 455 heattempted to intercedewith Gaiseric during thesack of Rome, and mayhave been responsible forGaiseric limiting thecourse of the sack to

looting.

Rechiarius

Son of the Suevic kingRechila, after Rechila’sdeath in 448 he plunderedwidely in Spain. He alsomarried the daughter ofTheoderic I. He made apeace treaty with Rome in452 and renewed it in454. After Aetius’ death heagain began expandingSuevic territories in Spain,despite threats fromTheoderic II. Shortlyafterwards Theoderic IIinvaded Spain and

Rechiarius was defeatedand killed.

Rechila

A pagan king of theSueves he succeeded to thethrone in 438. He oversawSuevic expansion in Spainwhen Aetius wasconcentrating his energieson Gaul and Africa. Priorto his death in 448 he hadconquered the majority ofGallaecia, Baetica andCarthaginiensis.

Brother of Mundiuch andOctar, he was joint king of

Rua

the Huns between hisaccession c.420 and deathin 439. A staunch ally ofAetius, during his reign hesupported Aetius’successful attempt toregain his position in 433.His death ended thealliance between Aetiusand the Huns and resultedin the accession of Attilaand Bleda.

Son-in-law of Boniface,between Boniface’s deathin 432 and Aetius’ returnin 433 he was magister

Sebastian

militum in the West.Fleeing the capital, hetook refuge in the East,where he earned a poorreputation for allowing hisfollowers to act as pirates.In 444 he fled to Toulouseand from there to Spain.He finally attempted totake refuge with theVandals in Africa, butGaiseric distrusted him andhad him killed.

One of Aetius’ most giftedsubordinates, he was a

Sigisvult

Germanic Arian, althoughhis origin is unknown. In427 he was sent to Africato continue the civil waragainst Boniface. He wasin command in Africa untilBoniface’s reinstatementat court in 429. As part ofthe wedding celebrationsof Valentinian III andEudoxia he was madeConsul alongside Aetius in437. Made magistermilitum, in 440 heorganized Italian defencesagainst the Vandals after

they had conquered Africa.In 448 he was madepatricius, but his careerafter this is unknown.

Theoderic I

King of the Visigoths (418–451), he succeeded Walliain 418 and oversaw thefoundation of the Gothickingdom in the West.Unhappy with both thelimits set on his kingdomand with his exclusionfrom Roman politics, hemade several attempts tocorrect these grievances by

attacking the empire, mostnotably in 425 and 436–439. In 451 he agreed tojoin Aetius against Attila.He was killed at the Battleof the Catalaunian Plains.

Son of Theoderic I, in hisyouth he was taught by theRoman Avitus. Heaccompanied his father tothe Battle of theCatalaunian Plains in 451.Unhappy with the rule ofhis brother Thorismund,Theoderic and his brotherFrederic had Thorismund

Theoderic II

murdered and Theodericbecame king. In 455 hesupported Avitus’ claim tothe imperial throne. In thesame year his envoys tohis brother-in-lawRechiarius of the Sueveswas rebuffed andTheoderic invaded Spain,capturing and killingRechiarius. He oversaw thefirst expansion of theGoths and theestablishment of anenlarged realm.

Eastern Emperor (402–

Theodosius II

450). Married to AeliaEudocia, in 437 hisdaughter Licinia Eudoxiamarried the WesternEmperor Valentinian III,so re-uniting the dynasticlines of the two halves ofthe empire. Not a militaryman, he presided over theperiod when the East wasforced to pay ever-larger‘subsidies’ to the Hunsunder Attila and was alsounder pressure from thePersians in the east.

Thorismund

King of the Visigoths (451–453). Eldest son ofTheoderic I, Thorismundaccompanied his father tothe Battle of theCatalaunian Plains in 451.Although Theoderic waskilled, Thorismund’sactions in driving throughthe centre of the Hunniclines in an attempt to killAttila resulted in the Huns’flight and the victorygoing to the Romans andtheir allies. Assuming thethrone, Thorismund

attacked the Alans northof the Loire in 453 andalso laid siege to Arles,possibly in anger at thelack of rewards hebelieved he was owed byAetius for the death of hisfather at the CatalaunianPlains. Shortly afterwardshe was murdered by hisbrothers Theoderic II andFrederic.

Possibly Aetius’ son-in-law.Either a Hun or a Goth, heserved in Aetius’bodyguard before being

Thraustila

transferred to thebodyguard of ValentinianIII. After Aetius’ deathOptila assassinatedValentinian, andThraustila the eunuchHeraclius, on the CampusMartius in 455.

Trygetius

In 435 he was Aetius’envoy who negotiated thetreaty with the Vandals inAfrica. In 452 heaccompanied Pope Leo inhis embassy to the Huns tosecure the release of their

prisoners as they retreatedfrom Italy.

Uldin

King of the Huns (400–408). He was allied to theRomans prior to 406 butinvaded Thrace in 408.Possibly succeeded by Rua.

Emperor of the West (425–455). Coming to thethrone aged only six,Valentinian’s early yearswere dominated by hismother Placidia and hislater years by Aetius. Hemarried Eudoxia in 437.

Valentinian III

Allegedly a weak ruler, in454 he was induced byMaximus and Heraclius theeunuch to kill Aetius,possibly in the hope thathe would then be allowedto rule in person. Thefollowing year he waskilled on the CampusMartius by Optila andThraustila.

Notes

Introduction1. Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Rome and

the Barbarians Roman Empire, Vol. 2, p. 380.2. Heather, Goths and Romans, p. 5ff.3. Mathisen and Shanzer, Society and Culture in Late Antique

Gaul, p. 273.4. For the Chronicles of Prosper and Hydatius and the Gallic

Chronicles of 452 and 511 Muhlberger, The Fifth-CenturyChroniclers, is an invaluable introduction andcommentary, from which much of this section is derived.

5. Muhlberger, The Fifth-Century Chroniclers, p. 2.6. Ibid., p. 147.

7. Whitby and Whitby, Chronicon Paschale 284–628 AD, p.ix.

8. Muhlberger, Fifth-Century Chroniclers, pp. 147, 213.9. Ibid., p. 213.

10. Ibid., p. 73ff.11. Ibid., p. 98. For more on Prosper’s ‘unhappiness’ with

Aetius, see p. 99ff. Muhlberger comments: ‘one wonderswhat Prosper might have said if Aetius had not beenruling when he wrote’. However, Prosper wrote ineditions, and in the last edition of 455 Aetius was dead, sowe might be seeing Prosper’s ‘official’ opinion.

12. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p. 237,n. 78.

13. Oost, ‘Aetius and Majorian’, p. 23.14. This section is based largely upon Clover, Flavius

Merobaudes: A Translation and Historical Commentary, p.7ff.

15. PLRE Vol. 1, Merobaudes 2.16. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 8ff, esp. p. 8, n. 6 and n.

11.17. See especially Chapters 7, 8 and 10.18. On the similarities between the existing fragments of

Merobaudes and the works of Claudian, Clover, FlaviusMerobaudes, pp. 32–33: citing Vollmer, MGH: AA 14, pp.3-6, 12-13, 16-20.

19. See Chapter 8.20. For a detailed analysis of these poems, along with a

bibliography, see Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 16–28.21. The dating of this piece is extremely difficult and several

possibilities exist. The dating of 443–446 is that given byClover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 32–41, where he alsodiscusses the other hypotheses.

22. Wood, in CAH, pp. 519–520.23. Cod. Th. 1.1.5 (26 March 429).24. Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’, p. 423.25. Gaiseric being spelt ‘Zinzirich’, Chron. Pasch. s.a. 439.26. Kulikowski, ‘Nation versus Army: A Necessary Contrast?’,

p. 69, n. 2.27. Collins, Visigothic Spain 409–711, p. 19.

Chapter 11. Birth 391, Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 30.2. Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars, pp. 144–145.3. Merob. Carm. 4.42–43.

4. Jord. Get. 34 (176).5. PLRE Vol. 2, Gaudentius 5, 493–494, translating Greg. Tur.

2.8. (citing Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus). See also Zos.5.36.1; Jord. Get. 34 (176). The claim that Gaudentius wasa Goth, based upon the late-Roman use of the term‘Skythian’ for the Goths, appears to be mistaken.

6. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 281.7. Greg. Tur. 2.8; (Anonyma 6).8. I would like to thank Perry Gray for his thought-

provoking input on Gaudentius’ political influence inItaly.

9. Cod. Th. 9.17.3.10. On Stilicho, O’Flynn, Generalissimos of the Western Roman

Empire, p. 15.11. For a summary of current thinking, ibid., p. 15. On

Stilicho, see Greg. Tur. 2.8 (a puero praetorianus): cf.PLRE vols 1 and 2I, Stilicho.

12. Cod. Just. 12.23; description of the post, CodexJustinianus, 12.23 (p. 9). See also, Jones, The Later RomanEmpire, 284–602, PLRE 2, p. 174, n. 67.

13. Jones, The Decline of the Ancient World, p. 200.14. Ibid., p. 139.

15. Ibid., p. 140 ff.16. A similar system was adopted by Adolf Hitler in Germany

between 1933 and 1945. The main purpose appears tohave been to encourage friction between individuals,resulting in there being less chance of these same menallying with each other to overthrow Hitler. Althoughunattested, it is possible that the emperors followed thistradition as a matter of policy, rather than of merechance.

17. For a more detailed discussion of the Notitia, see theIntroduction.

18. Jones, Decline of the Ancient World, p. 173.19. A good example of this followed Stilicho’s war against

Gildo in 398. When Stilicho seized Gildo’s lands for theempire following his victory, they were so great that anew official, the comes Gildoniaci patrimonii (Count of thePatrimony of Gildo), had to be appointed to administerthem. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 112; Zos. 5.13.4.

20. Rouche, ‘Autopsy of the West’, pp. 29–31.21. Ibid., p. 31.22. Ibid., pp. 34–35.23. Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and

Spain’, p. 1506.24. These laws appear to have been introduced by Diocletian

in the hope of solving internal problems of recruitment,training and social mobility. cf. Fossier, The CambridgeIllustrated History of the Middle Ages 350–950, p. 8.

25. For a more detailed examination of the cause and effect ofthese changes, see Hughes, Stilicho, pp. 151–152.

26. Fossier, Cambridge Illustrated History, p. 8.27. Cf. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p.

249, where he notes that the Bacaudae in Spain were‘local landlords who had established their own authority’.

Chapter 21. It is possible that Stilicho ‘revived or manufactured a

claim’ that Theodosius had ordered that the prefecture ofIllyricum be attached to the West: CAH, p. 121.

2. For both hostages, Zos. 5.36.1.3. ‘400,000 Gauls and Germans’: Zos. 5.26.3. On a more

believable estimation of numbers, see the discussion inHughes, Stilicho, p. 164.

4. Zos. 5.26.4.5. Williams and Friell, Theodosius, p. 155.

6. Soz. 8.25.7. Soz. 8.25: Zos. 5.27.2.8. Zos. 5.27.2.9. For a more detailed analysis of these events, see Hughes,

Stilicho, p. 177 ff.10. Chron. Gall. 452 s.a. 442.11. Olymp. fr. 12, perhaps giving the date as late 406, cf.

PLRE Vol. 2, Marcus 2, 719: Zos. 6.2.1, giving the date as407; cf. Soz. 9.11.2.

12. ‘municeps eiusdem insulae’, Oros. 7.40.4.13. Paschoud on Zos. 5.27.1–2 suggests a date in February

(referenced in Kulikowski, ‘Barbarians in Gaul’, p. 333, n.48): Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome, p. 210suggests the date of 1 March.

14. Dating, Burns, Barbarians Within the Gates of Rome, p.210; reason for overthrow, Kulikowski, ‘Barbarians inGaul’, p. 332.

15. For a full itinerary of the cities attacked, see Hughes,Stilicho, pp. 183–184.

16. We are not informed directly that Constantine attemptedto ally himself with the Vandals, Sueves and Alans.However, Oros. 7.40.4 and 7. 28. describes ‘unreliable

alliances’ with barbarians and how these treaties were ‘notstrictly kept’. This can only relate to treaties with theinvaders.

17. Oros. 7.28.18. Oros. 7.40.5.19. Zos. 5.27.2.20. As a reward for his service, Heraclianus was made comes

Africae: Zos. 5.37.6; PLRE Vol. 2, Heraclianus 3, p. 539.He remained loyal to Honorius and was granted theconsulship in 413. In that same year he rebelled, aiming tobecome emperor, before being murdered.

21. Zos. 5.34.4. For the date of the execution, Addit. Ad Prosp.Haun. s.a. 408.

22. Zos. 5.34.5.23. Zos. 5.37.6.24. Zos. 5.36.1.25. Greg. Tur. 2.8; Merobaudes, Pan, 2.1–4; Zos, 5.36.126. Zos. 5.37.1.27. Jovius retained close ties with Alaric, Soz. 9.4.4.28. Zos. 48.3.29. Zos. 48.4.30. Zos. 5.45–52; Soz. 9.7.

31. Zos. 6.12.3.32. Zos. 6.8.33. Zos. 6.6–12; Soz. 9.7.34. Zos. 6.13; Soz. 9.9.35. Zos. 6.5.2.36. For a greater analysis of this interpretation, see Hughes,

Stilicho, 213–214.37. Probably following the rules of hospitalitas: cf. Burns,

Rome and the Barbarians, p. 59; Hydatius 49; ‘Gerontiusmade peace with the barbarians’, Olymp. fr. 17.1.

38. Hyd. s.a. 411.39. Hyd. s.a. 411.40. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court, pp.

354–356, 382.41. Attacks from ‘beyond the Rhine’, Zos. 6.5–6; attack by

Saxons, Chron. Gall. 452, no. 62.42. Zos. 6.5–6: ‘Now the defection of Britain and the Celtic

peoples took place during Constantine’s tyranny.’43. Goldsworthy, The Fall of the West, p. 303.44. Oros. 7.43.45. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 331. Oros. 7. 43. A

complex and debatable passage in Orosius also implies

that a peace treaty had been concluded, although no dateis given, Oros. 7.43.

46. Kulikowski, The Visigothic Settlement in Aquitania’, p.28; Hydatius, passim, but cf. Oros. 7.41.7.

47. Collins, Visigothic Spain 409–711, p. 15.48. For the alternative date of 419, see Schwarcz in Mathisen

and Shanzer, Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul, pp.15–25. Although a compelling argument, for the sake ofsimplicity the date of 418 will continue to be used.

49. PLRE Vol. 2, Theodericus 2, 1070. cf. Sid. Ap. Carm.7.505.

50. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.505. Theoderic is nowhere mentioned asAlaric’s son, and since Sidonius attests that Theoderic’sson, also called Theoderic, was the grandson of Alaric,Theoderic must have married Alaric’s daughter.

51. For a more detailed discussion, see TS Burns, ‘TheSettlement of 418’ in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth CenturyGaul, p. 62ff, and bibliography.

52. Philost. 12.4.53. CEV Nixon, ‘Relations between Visigoths and Romans in

Fifth-Century Gaul’ in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth CenturyGaul, pp. 64–74.

54. Olymp. fr. 8; PLRE Vol. 2, Constantius 17, p. 322.55. Nixon in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 72.56. cf. Burns in ibid., p. 57.57. Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of

Civilization, p. 56, referencing A. Loyen, ‘Les Débuts duroyaume wisigoth de Toulouse’, Revue des études latines12 (1934), pp. 406–415.

58. Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, p. 67.59. Jones, The Decline of the Ancient World, p. 68.60. Ibid., p. 81 ff: cf. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire,

Vol. 1, p. 207.61. As described in the Visigothic Code of Euric, Bury,

History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 206, n. 89.62. Jones, Decline of the Ancient World, p. 81.63. Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, p. 66.64. Rouche in Fossier, Cambridge Illustrated History, p. 53.65. Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, p. 70.66. Rouche, ‘Break up and Metamorphosis’, p. 53.67. Hyd. s.a. 418.68. Collins, Visigothic Spain 409–711, p. 25, referencing C.

Courtois, Les Vandales (Paris, 1955), p. 229.69. Poss. 28.

70. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, pp. 264–265.71. Hyd. s.a. 419, Burgess, tr., p. 87.72. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 265.73. Hyd. s.a. 420, referenced in PLRE Vol. II, Asterius 4, 171.74. Hyd. s.a. 420.75. Greg. Tur. 2.8; Merob. Pan. 2.1–4. Unfortunately, neither

reference gives a date for Aetius’ time as a hostage to theHuns.

76. For an in-depth analysis of the history of the Huns, seeMaenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns: for the periodin question, esp. p. 70ff.

77. Soc. 7.43.3.78. Invasion if Thrace, e.g. Soz. 8.25.1; help against

Radagaisus, e.g. Oros. 7.37.12.79. PLRE Vol. 2, Uldin 1180; Soz. 11.5.1.80. Examples of Huns serving others are plentiful: the

bucellarii serving Aetius himself; the claim by Ammianusthat the Gothic king Vithimer, fighting against the firstinroads of the Huns in the fourth century, used Hunnicmercenaries (31.3.3); Huns being used by Castinus later in424 against Boniface (Pseudo-Aug. Ep. 4, PL33, 1095); seeChapter 7.

81. MacGeorge, Late Roman Warlords, p. 12.82. Olymp. fr 18.83. Jord. Get. 180.84. For a full discussion of the problems surrounding Rua and

Octar, see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 80ff.85. Olymp. fr. 34.86. Marc. com. s.a. 419.87. Parens principum; PLRE Vol. 2, Constantius 17, 323, Inscr.

1–2; Emperor, PLRE Vol. 2, Constantius 17, 324; Theoph.AM 5913; Placidia Augusta, Olymp. fr. 31, Prosp. s.a. 423,425; Valentinian nobilissimus, Olymp. fr. 34; Philost.12.12.

88. Olymp. fr. 3489. Olymp. fr. 34; Philost. 12.12.90. Philost. 12.12.91. Olymp. fr. 40; Philost. 12.12.92. Date, Soc. 7.22.20; cause, Philost. 12.13.

Chapter 31. Greg. Tur. 2.9.2. Ibid.3. O’Flynn, Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire, pp.

74–75.4. The dating is slightly problematic, but unimportant.

Prosper has him as Dux in 422 (s.a. 422), but he is thenacknowledged as magister in 423 (s.a. 423). However,Hydatius states that he is magister in 422 (s.a. 422). Theconfusion in the sources is most likely caused by a similarpolitical confusion following the unexpected death ofConstantius III in 421. Cf. Cass. Chron. s.a. 422.

5. Olymp. fr. 22.2; PLRE Vol. 2, Boniface 3, p. 238.6. Aug. Ep. 189.7. Prosp. s.a. 422.8. Ibid.9. Prosp. s.a. 422; Hyd. s.a. 422; Chron. Gall. 511 no. 571.

10. Aug. Ep. 220.11. Hyd. s.a. 422: Salv. De gub. Dei, 7.11. The claim in CAH

that he was killed appears to be a mistake: CAH, Wood,The Fall of the Western Empire and the End of RomanBritain, p. 519.

12. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 265.13. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 75.14. Prosp. s.a. 423.15. Olymp. fr. 38.

16. Ann. Rav. s.a. 423.17. Date, Ann. Rav. Col. 2.10–12; Castinus’ involvement,

Prosp. s.a. 423; Hyd. s.a. 424. Matthews, WesternAristocracies, p. 379; cf. Soc. 7.23.

18. Ann. Rav. Col. 2.10–12.19. PLRE Vol. 2, Castinus 2, p. 270. On the theory that

Theodosius accepted Castinus’ own proposal of himself ascandidate for consul, see O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 75.On the failure of the embassy, see for example, Greg. Tur.2.8; Soc. 7.23.3 ff.; Philost. 12.13.

20. Philost. 12.13.21. Cod. Th. 2, 17.3; Aug., Civ. Dei, 18.54.22. Merob. Pan. 2.110–114.23. Greg. Tur. 2.8.24. Greg. Tur. 2.8; cf. Philost. 12.14.25. Greg. Tur. 2.8.26. Prisc. Rom. 3; Cass. Var. 1.4.11.27. ‘Aetius . . . while still a youth, spent three years in the

hands of Alaric as a hostage, and then was passed on to theHuns. Later in life he became the son in law of Carpilio,one-time head of the imperial household and thengovernor of the palace.’ Greg. Tur. 2.8.

28. Prosp. s.a. 424.29. Ibid.30. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 101ff.31. Pseudo-Aug., Ep. 4, PL33, 1095, cited in Maenchen-

Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 76–77.32. Prosp. a.424: ‘John’s defences were weaker because he

tried to recapture Africa, over which Boniface wasmaintaining his control.’

33. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 379; Sirm. 5 (9 July425); Arian tendencies, Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’, p.430.

34. Prosp. 424.35. cf. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 281.36. Chron. Min. 1.470.37. Prosp. s.a. 424.38. Olymp. fr. 43. The appointment as Caesar was normal,

with the appointment as Augustus certain to follow at theappropriate time, yet the manner of the appointment wasalso doubtless to ensure that Theodosius maintainedseniority, rather than Valentinian being seen as an equal.

39. Greg. Tur. 2.8; Olymp. Fr. 46; Marcel. com. s.a. 424.40. Philost. 12.13.

41. PLRE Vol. 2, Candidianus 3, 257.42. Soc. 7.18, 20 and 23; Joh. Ant. fr. 195; Theoph. AM 591843. ‘with gold’: Greg. Tur. 2.8.44. For a more detailed account of the Huns, see esp. Chapter

12.45. Philost. 12.13. Socrates (7.23) claims that Theodosius had

taken Salona as soon as Honorius had died. This wouldseem an odd manner in which to begin the new rule of thewest.

46. Philost. 12.13.47. Ibid.48. Olymp. fr. 46.49. CAH. 136.50. Olymp. fr. 43.2; Blockley, 209 and 220, n. 84.51. Philost. 12.13.52. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 380.53. Soc. 7.23 suggests that the passage was assisted by angels,

but a rather more prosaic manner of entry seemspreferable. Philostorgius suggests that there was a battleoutside the city, but his imprecise claim that ‘there wassome sort of battle’ (12.13) may be a way of describingthe confusion surrounding Aspar’s unexpected entry into

the city.54. Proc. 3.3.9; Philost 12.13.55. Philostorgius following Olympiodorus claims ‘as many as

60,000’; Olymp. fr. 43.2; Philostorgius 12.14. Also, Cass.Chron. s.a. 425.

56. Greg. Tur. 2.8.57. ‘Heavy slaughter on both sides’: Olymp. fr. 43.2.58. Philost, 12.14; Greg. Tur. 2.8; Prosp. s.a. 425.59. Philost. 12.14 (Olymp. fr. 43.2). On ceding of Pannonia,

see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 89.60. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 74.61. Soc. 24.62. Hyd. s.a. 425; PLRE Vol. 2, Fl. Constantius Felix 14, 461.

O’Flynn follows Prosper in dating the patricianship to 429(Prosp. s.a. 429).

63. Chron. Min. 1. 471.64. It is possible that either luck or his political and marital

contacts helped Castinus to survive at this time, althoughwithout evidence it has been decided that the main reasonwas his decision to maintain a low profile.

65. Cod. Th. 6.2.25 (26 April 426).66. It is possible that Aetius simply retained the title of

comes, but the level and the duration of his activitysuggest the more senior post of magister militum, althoughthere is no record elsewhere of the name of any magistermilitum per Gallias between 411 and 429: O’Flynn,Generalissimos, pp. 78 and 82 and 176, n. 35.

67. Chron. Gall 452. s.a. 425.68. PLRE Vol. 2, Boniface 3, pp. 238–239.

Chapter 41. For a more detailed examination of many aspects of the

late Roman army, see Sabin, van Wees and Whitby (eds),The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare.

2. For a more detailed examination of the Notitia, and of thechanges in the army from the reign of Diocletian, see e.g.Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, The CambridgeHistory of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol 2, p. 271ff.’

3. Hoffmann, D, ‘Der Oberbefehl des spätrömischen Heeresim 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr.’ in DM Pippidi (ed.), Actes desIXe Congrès International d’études sur les frontièresromains (Cologne, 1974), pp. 381–397, as referenced inLiebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops, p. 54, n. 8.

4. For examples, see Appendix.

5. Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, p. 57.6. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, The Cambridge

History, p. 270.7. For a more detailed discussion of the Roman army

hierarchy, see Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350–425, pp. 89–107.

8. Ibid., p. 99.9. Ibid., p. 95.

10. Not. Dig. Oc VII.11. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, Appendix III.12. For the earlier losses, see Hughes, Stilicho, passim.13. Jones, Later Roman Empire, Appendix III; Jones, The

Decline of the Ancient World, p. 81; Heather, Fall of theRoman Empire, p. 175.

14. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, p. 1434.15. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, pp. 91–92.16. Rouche, ‘Autopsy of the West’, p. 26. The ‘Ripuarian’

Franks, possibly derived from ripa (‘river bank’), werefrom the west bank of the Rhine; the ‘Salian’ Franks,possibly from sal (‘salt’, ‘sea-side’, although otherderivations are possible) were from Toxandria (northBelgium).

17. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History,p. 281.

18. Hughes, Stilicho.19. Cod Th. 7.13.16 (406).20. For a full discussion on the size of units and the problems

of dating any changes, see for example Coello, Unit Sizes inthe Late Roman Army, passim; Nicasie, Twilight of Empire,p. 23ff.; Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp.29–33; Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 89ff; Elton inSabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, p. 278ff.

21. By the fifth century these were sometimes known as theobsequium: Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby,Cambridge History, p. 278.

22. On milliary units, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p.89ff.

23. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History,271.

24. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 90. As an earlierexample, in Alexandria Caesar’s Legio VI had fewer than1,000 men left of its original ‘paper’ strength ofapproximately 5,000 men (Caesar, Alexandrian War, 69),and in the Civil Wars his legions average fewer than 3,000

men (Caesar, Civil Wars, 3.6 and 3.89).25. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 129.26. Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops, p. 20.27. See Southern and Dixon, Late Roman Army, p. 69.28. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 129.29. Jones, Decline of the Ancient World, p. 82.30. Cod. Th. 15.1.13.31. Zos. 4.23.2-4.32. For example, the troops that were led by Scipio Africanus

in the third century BC were first trained to meet hisdemanding standards before being led on campaign.

33. For examples, see Amm. Marc. 27.2.2–8, 22.7.734. Gildas, De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae, 2.18.35. For a full discussion, Coulston, ‘Later Roman Armour,

3rd–6th Centuries AD’.36. Milner (tr.), Vegetius, p. 19, n. 6.37. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment from the

Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, p. 208; Amm. Marc.16.10.8, 19.8.8, 24.6.9, 25.1.16 etc.

38. MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome, pp. 185and 274, n. 15.

39. Veg. 2.15 and 4.21.

40. Veg. 4.22.41. No examples of the plumbatae tribolatae have been found,

so the weapon must still remain a possibility rather than acertainty.

42. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.43. Veg. 2.15.44. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 205.45. Veg. 2.15.46. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.47. Ibid.48. Amm. Marc. 19.6.7; Proc. 2.21.7.49. Theoph. Hist. 8.4.13.50. Lasso, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.51. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, pp. 213–

214.52. Ibid., p. 213.53. Attaching of crests, ibid., p. 214.54. Earlier claims, e.g. James, 1986, cited in ibid., p. 230, n.

43.55. I would like to thank the members of

www.romanarmytalk.com for their in-depth discussionson these topics: for example at

www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=25150&p=224574&hilit=spangenhelm#p224574(December 2008–July 2009).

56. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 110ff.57. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 216.58. For more detailed analysis of mail manufacture, see ibid.,

pp. 241–242 and associated bibliography.59. Coulston, ‘Later Roman Armour, 3rd–6th Centuries AD’,

p. 143.60. For example, Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military

Equipment, p. 208.61. Germanic influence, ibid., p. 217; guardsmen using round

shields, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 115.62. Amm. Marc., 16.12.663. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 97.64. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History,

p. 278ff.; Cod. Th. 7.17.1.65. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 100.66. Rance, ‘Battle’, p. 343.67. For example, the Battle of the Frigidus (394) and the

invasion of Italy by the east in order to place Valentinian Iupon the throne in 425.

68. Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, 1.20.69. For example, in 393–394 Stilicho conducted a campaign

against Alaric in the Balkans, finally blockading him intosurrender. Alaric was forced to serve in the army thatTheodosius led at the Battle of the Frigidus in 394. On theother hand, when the Gothic king Radagaisus led histroops into Italy in 405–406 he was blockaded anddefeated in the hills near to Faesulae, after which he wasexecuted and Stilicho enrolled 12,000 of Radagaisus’ meninto the Roman army.

Chapter 51. This includes the armies of the (Visi)Goths, the Franks,

the Alamanni, the Burgundians and the Vandals, amongstothers.

2. For example, the Goths: Wolfram, History of the Goths, p.145.

3. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 22.4. Ibid., p. 72.5. Ibid.6. Proc. 3.5.18.7. Pohl, ‘Ethnicity, Theory and Tradition’.

8. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 41.9. Ibid., p. 43.

10. From the third century on, the deposition of swordsbecomes slightly more common in burials, although thefinds at Ejsbøl North in Jutland has spearmenoutnumbering swordsmen by a factor of three-to-one:Todd, The Early Germans, pp. 41–42.

11. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 58.12. Veg. 1.20.13. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 58.14. Todd, Early Germans, p. 35.15. Aur. Vic. Caes. 21.2.16. Todd, Early Germans, p. 39.17. Although usually dismissed as poor in comparison to the

composite bow, it should be noted that the Englishlongbow of the Middle Ages was made from a single pieceof wood, utilizing the differences in compression andflexibility between the heartwood and the outer layers.

18. Agathias, Hist., 2.5.4.19. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 68.20. For example, Proc. Vandals 3.8.15–28; Goths 5.27.1ff.21. Isidore, Etymologiae, 18.6.9:

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Isidore/18*.html#6(June 2009).

22. Greg. Tur. securis e.g. 2.27, 8.30: bipennis e.g. 8.19, 10.27.23. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.24. Ibid., p. 108.25. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 200.26. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.27. Ibid., p. 67.28. Defined by the Bosworth-Toller dictionary as a short-

sword or dagger:http://beowulf.engl.uky.edu/~kiernan/BT/bosworth.htm,p.853 (June 2009).

29. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.30. Ibid., p. 67.31. Amm. Marc. 16.12.24. Unfortunately, the claim does not

seem to be attested by the reference.32. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 70.33. Ibid., p. 69.34. Ibid., p. 45.35. Ibid., p. 74.36. Amm. Marc. 16.12.21–2 and 37–42.37. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 81.

38. I would like once again to thank Chris Constantine ofspitfirehorsebows.com for the illuminating discussions onthe difference between the symmetrical and asymmetricalbow.

39. Ammianus, translated by Maenchen-Helfen, World of theHuns, pp. 201–202.

40. For example, Zos. 5.20: Agathias 1.22.41. See Chapter 15.42. Heather, The Goths, p. 98.

Chapter 61. For comparison, Jones, Later Roman Empire, p. 1434

estimates the strength of the Gallic army at 34,000.2. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 333.3. Ibid., p. 345ff.4. Heinzelmann, in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul,

p. 245.5. The most obvious example of this is Hydatius, who made

appeals in person to Aetius concerning conditionsregarding the Sueves.

6. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 336 and n.1.7. Ausonius, Ordo Urbium Nobilium 10.

8. MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome, p. 171;Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284–641, pp. 351–354.

9. Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 355.10. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a 425; Prosp. s.a. 424.11. For example, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 42 notes

that the Goths ‘quickly established a kingdom’: cf.Mitchell, S, A History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 110;Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars, p. 183.

12. See Hughes, Stilicho, p. 135ff. for a discussion of Alaric’suse of this title. For alternate uses of the title ‘rex’, see forexample Gillett, On Barbarian Identity, p. 116ff.

13. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 135.14. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 7315. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 53.16. cf. Nixon in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, pp.

68–69.17. Paul. Pella, 377f: Heather, 2002, 87-8.18. Elton, 2004, 42-3.19. Nixon in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 72.20. Prosp. s.a. 425.21. For example, Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 329;

Heather in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p.85.

22. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 335.23. For an alternative view, see for example ibid., p. 329, who

claims that the attack was due to the fact that the Gothswere isolated, both with regards to communications andtrade from the Mediterranean.

24. This course of events is based upon Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.215–226, 481–483, 495–499. The Eparchius Avitus underconsideration was Sidonius’ father-in-law and is attestedas visiting his relative Theodorus, a hostage at the courtof Theoderic. The most likely date for this is shortly afterthe conclusion of the war of 426.

25. PLRE Vol. 2 gives a date of either 425 or 426 (Aetius 7,22). See also the discussion of the chronology of thechronicles in the introduction.

26. cf. Gall. Chron. 452, s.a. 425.27. For further analysis of the chronicles, see the

Introduction.28. Prosp. s.a. 426.29. Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’, p. 436ff. claims that the

problem, as illustrated by the letters of St Augustine, was

that Boniface was no longer interested in fulfilling hisduties and had lost control of large parts of Africa.Although a possibility, the details are outside the scope ofa book on Aetius.

30. Proc. 3.3.14–22; John Ant. fr. 196; Theoph, AM 5931.31. Prosp. s.a. 427. Oost, ‘Some Problems in the History of

Galla Placidia’.32. A view also supported by O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 78–

79.33. The main part of this version of events is taken from

Procopius, 3.3.14–22. Although in this version it is Aetiuswho makes the accusation, it has been assumed thatalthough Procopius has named the wrong individual, thegerm of the story is correct.

34. Prosp. s.a. 427; O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 79.35. Prosp. s.a. 427; Mavortius, PLRE Vol. 2, Mavortius 1, 736;

Gallio, PLRE Vol. 2, Gallio, 492; Sanoeces, PLRE Vol. 2,Sanoeces, 976; Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp.77, 419-420.

36. Prosp. s.a. 427; Chron Gall. 452, s.a. 424; Comes, Aug.Coll. Cum Maximino 1, Sermo 140, PLRE Vol. 2, Fl.Sigisvultus, 1010.

37. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p. 240;Goths in Africa, Aug. Coll. Cum Maximino 1, Sermo 140.

38. Aug., Coll. Cum Maximino 1, Sermo 140; PLRE Vol. 2, F.Sigisvultus, 1010.

39. Marc. com. s.a. 427.40. Jord. Get. 166.41. This campaign is dated to 428 by Prosper and

Cassiodorus, but possibly to 432 by Hydatius. On theconfusion prevalent in the chronicles, see theIntroduction.

42. Elton in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 167.43. Prosp. s.a. 425 and 428; Cassiodorus, Chron. s.a. 42844. Heinzelmann, in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul,

p. 243.45. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 238.46. Const., Vit. Germ. 12.47. Prosp. s.a. 429. Wood, ‘Fall of the Western Empire’, pp.

251–252, claims that Prosper associated the mission witha Roman imperative, although a close reading of the twosuggests that they are in fact complementary.

48. Hyd. a. 425, 426 and 428.49. Hyd. s.a. 425: the reference is to Mauretania Tingitania.

50. Hyd. s.a. 428.51. It is possible that the Vandals at this stage were actually

foederati called up by Felix to supplement the forces ofSigisvult. Blaming Boniface for inviting the Vandals toAfrica may be later propaganda aimed at discrediting anenemy of Aetius. Rather than capturing Cartagena, theVandals may have mustered in southern Spain inaccordance with their foedus with the imperial court.This could explain why there was no opposition to theirmove to Mauretania. However the fact that they hadrecently been subjected to an unprovoked attack by theRoman government weakens this proposal.

52. PLRE Vol. 2, Andevotus, 86, cf. Hyd. s.a. 438.53. PLRE Vol. 2, Andevotus, 86, cf. Cassiodorus, Variae, 5.29

for a similar-named individual who was an Ostrogoth.54. Hyd. s.a. 429.55. Ibid.56. Dating: Prosp. s.a. 427; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 428; Hyd. s.a.

429; Gall. Chron. 452, s.a. 430. Boniface responsible forthe crossing to Africa: Proc. 3.3.22–6; Jord. Get. 33.167.

57. Hyd. s.a. 429, ‘Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, abandonedthe Spanish provinces in the month of May, crossing

along with all the Vandals and their families from thecoast of the province of Baetica to Mauretania and Africa.’For a more detailed critical analysis of the accuracy of the‘chronicles’, see ‘Introduction’. But cf., for example, Cass.Chron. s.a. 427.

58. See ‘Chronology’.59. cf. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 268.60. Schwarcz, “The Settlement of the Vandals in North

Africa’, p. 51.61. Proc. 3.3.22–6; Jord. Get. 33.167. Jordanes was describing

one of the traditional enemies of the Goths and Procopiuswas discussing the campaigns of his patron, who defeatedheretics and barbarians, so their biases are evident.

62. Mathisen, ‘Sigisvult the Patrician, Maximinus the Arian,and Political Stratagems in the Western Roman Empire c.425–40’, pp. 189–191.

63. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 267.64. Vict. Vit. 1.2.65. Proc. 3.5.18–19.66. Vict. Vit. 1.2.67. Numbers, Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 269. It

should be noted that the province of Mauretania Tingitana

was classed as part of Hispania, rather than of Africa bythe Romans.

Chapter 71. It may be useful to read this with reference to the Outline

Chronology to aid understanding.2. Hughes, Stilicho, esp. p. 38.3. MacGeorge, Late Roman Warlords, p. 5.4. Hyd. s.a. 425; PLRE, Fl. Constantius Felix 14, 461. O’Flynn

follows Prosper in dating the patricianship to 429 (Prosp.s.a. 429). See also Chapter 5.

5. Although it is certain that Felix, Aetius and Boniface allhad a close company of political supporters, their relativestrengths are unknown.

6. Proc. 3.3.27-30.7. The senator Darius the chief peace negotiator: Aug. Ep.

229–231 (www.ccel.org/ ccel/schaff/npnf101.vii.1.CCXXIX.html): (October 2010).

8. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 79.9. Cod. Th. 11.30.68.

10. The fact that messengers were sent to Constantinopleasking for help is not explicitly stated in the sources.

However, reinforcements arrived in Africa in 431, anevent which must have been precipitated by an embassyfrom the West. See later in the chapter, and Proc. 3.3.35;Theoph. AM 5931.

11. Aug. Ep. 229.12. Cod. Th. 12.6.3; PLRE Vol. 2, Theodosius 8, 1101.13. For a further analysis of this appointment, see Chapter X.14. Dating: Prosp s.a. 429; Hyd. s.a. 430. On the use of these

military titles and their meanings, see Chapter 6 andHughes, Stilicho, pp. 48–49.

15. Hughes, Stilicho, pp. 48–49.16. For the opposite view, see O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp.

175–176, n. 25.17. Compare with Prosp. s.a. 432, where Boniface is later

made comes et magister utriusque militiae to counterAetius. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 79.

18. Hyd. s.a. 430. Anaolsus’ fate is unknown.19. Chron. Gall. 452 s.a. 430; Hyd. s.a. 430; Sid App. Carm.

7.233.20. See chapters 7 and 8.21. PLRE Vol. 2, Octar, 789–790.22. Soc. 7.30: ‘Uptaros’ = ‘Octar’.

23. Prosp. s.a. 430. See also Joh. Ant. fr. 201.3 (referenced inO’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 79).

24. Hyd. s.a. 430.25. It is possible that Felix was a Western general who had

remained loyal to Placidia. However, the fact that he waskilled by the troops implies that this was not the case.

26. Vict. Vit. 1.8. Some of the buildings Victor claims weredestroyed by the Vandals had already been ‘overthrown’by the Catholics in Africa, whilst others may simply havealready been in decline before the advent of the Vandals:cf. Moorhead, Victor of Vita, p. 5, n. 8.

27. Marcillet-Jaubert, Les Inscriptions D’Altava, no. 147.28. Heather, 2005, 269.29. Aug. Ep. 230 (AD 429), where Darius, in a reply to

Augustine, hopes that the peace with the Vandals willlast.

30. Vict. Vit. 1.1.31. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 268.32. Not. Dig. Oc. 25; c.15,000 comitatenses and 15,000

limitanei: Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 268.33. This is shown by the fact that after he had been

reinforced by Eastern troops Boniface lost another battle

against Gaiseric: see below.34. Poss. 28.35. Merob. Carm. 4, ‘an offspring of heroes, and a descendant

of kings’; Sid. Ap. Carm 5, 203ff.36. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 51.37. Proc. 3.3.30–31; 3.3.34.38. Possidius (29) states that Augustine died in the ‘third

month of the siege’. As Augustine is known to have diedon 28 August, this means that the siege began in May orJune, depending upon the exact meaning of Possidius’words.

39. Poss. 28. It is probable that the Vandals maintained theships used in the crossing to Africa and that thesefollowed the main body along the North African coast.

40. Poss. 28.41. Prosp. s.a. 430.42. Hyd. s.a. 430.43. Ibid.44. Ibid., s.a. 431.45. Greg. Tur. 2.9; Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 43.46. Hyd. s.a. 432. Although it has been posited that Hydatius

was conflating the campaigns of 428 and 432, this is

unlikely since he took a personal part in the embassy toAetius to request aid against the Sueves, and the campaignof 428 is attested separately by Prosper (s.a. 428), who isusually accurate in these matters.

47. Hyd. s.a. 431. Aquae Flaviae is almost certainly nowChaves, Portugal: www.portugal-info.net/transmontana/chaves.htm (May 2010).

48. Hyd. s.a. 431.49. Prosp. s.a. 431.50. Fourteen-month siege, Vict. Vita, 3.10.51. Proc. 3. 3. 35: dating the siege, Possidius notes that

Augustine died in the third month of the siege. Accordingto Prosper (s.a. 430) the date of his death was 28 August430, the third month of the siege. The siege lasted forfourteen months, Vict. Vita, 3.10: therefore, the siege wasfrom May–June 430 to July–August 431.

52. Dating the arrival to 431, PLRE Vol. 2, Fl. Ardabur Aspar,166, noting a letter written during the Council of Ephesusin 431; ACOec. 1.4, p. 76. Reinforcements from ‘bothRome and Byzantium’, Proc. 3.3.35.

53. Aetius responsible for arrangements, Heather, Fall of theRoman Empire, p. 285.

54. Proc. 3.3.35–36; Evagr. 2.1; Theoph. AM 5931, 5943; Zon.13.24.12.

55. Evagr. 2.37–38.56. Theoph. AM 5931; Evagr. 2.1; Proc. 3.4.2ff.57. Poss. 28.58. Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 432, Chron. Min. I, 301;

Merob., Pan I, fr. IIA.59. Hyd. s.a. 432.60. Hyd. s.a. 431.61. Hyd. s.a. 432.62. The order may date to late 431, just after Aetius had left

for the campaign in Gaul.63. Aspar remained in Africa until at least 434; PLRE Vol. 2,

Fl. Ardabur Aspar, 166.64. Prosp. s.a. 432; cf. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 432; Marcell.

com, s.a. 432; Proc. 3.1.3; cf. John Ant. fr. 201.365. Marcell. com. s.a. 432, 435.66. cf. Stilicho, Constantius (III).67. Hyd. s.a. 432.68. Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 432: ‘Pugna facta inter Aetium

et Bonifatium in V do Arimino.’69. Prosp. s.a. 432; Gall. Chron. 452, s.a. 432; Addit. ad Prosp.

Haun. s.a. 432; Marcell. com. s.a. 432; John. Ant. fr. 201.3(who claims that Aetius defeated Boniface); PLRE Vol. 2,Aetius 7, 23.

70. Marcell. com. s.a. 432. The claim that Aetius was patriciusin this entry is probably Marcellinus simply using the titleby which he could be definitely identified andanachronistically applying it to the past.

71. Prosp. s.a. 432.72. Illness, Prosp. s.a. 432: ‘Although he fought a battle with

Aetius, who was opposing him, and defeated him, he dieda few days later of illness.’ Wounds, Gall. Chron. 452, s.a.432: ‘Boniface was wounded in a battle against Aetius butretired from it to die’; ‘three months later’, Marcell. com.s.a. 432.

73. Olymp. fr. 40.74. cf. Castinus.75. Hyd. s.a. 432; cf. Vict. Vit. 1.1976. Prosp. s.a. 432.77. Prosp. s.a. 43278. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 432; Maenchen-Helfen, World of the

Huns, p. 86.79. For a detailed analysis and bibliography of these

discussions, see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p.90ff.

80. Prosp. s.a. 432.81. Ibid.: ‘[Aetius] used their [the Huns’] friendship and

assistance to obtain the peace of the emperors and get hispower restored.’ Chron. Gall. 452, ‘[Aetius] returned toRoman territory with the help he had asked for.’ cf., forexample, Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 262:Aetius returned ‘with enough reinforcements to makeSebastian’s position untenable’.

82. ‘The Goths were summoned by the Romans to bring help’,Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 433. Although there is no mention ofa battle in the sources, there is a small chance that a battleoccurred but that the sources that have survived simplyfail to mention it.

83. ‘An able advisor and an active soldier’, Vict. Vit. 1.19, butVictor may have idolized Sebastian as the son of the‘African’ Boniface. ‘Piratical’ activities, Suid. Θ 145; Prisc.fr. 4. Although his later actions do not necessarily meanthat he was prey to this activity earlier in his career, it isnotable that he was later declared a public enemy by theRomans and fled, finally residing with the Vandals in

Africa until Gaiseric had him killed: see PLRE Vol. 2,Sebastianus III, 983–984 for a more detailed account of hislife.

84. Hyd. s.a. 434.85. Ibid., 433.86. Ibid.87. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 369.

Chapter 81. Marc. com. s.a. 432; John Ant. fr. 201.2. Visigoth, cf. Sid. App. Carm. 5.128, 203–204; Merob.

Carm. 4.17. Arian and daughter baptized as an Arian, Aug.Ep. 220.4 (a.427 or 429); PLRE Vol. 2, Pelagia 1, 856.

3. Greg. Tur. HF. 2.7; PLRE Vol. 2, Pelagia 1, 8574. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 31.5. Merob. Carm. 4.17; Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 31.6. John. Ant. fr. 201.3.7. Although this is nowhere specifically stated, this is the

most likely reason for the lack of campaigning representedin the sources. For a similar process undertaken byStilicho, see Hughes, Stilicho, pp. 30–33.

8. Comes rei privatae, Cod. Th. 11, 20.4a (19 May 423).

9. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, pp. 285–286.10. Prosp. s.a. 435; cf. Laterc. Reg. Vand. et Al. (Hispani 1).11. The consul for the east was Areobindus.12. Proc. 3.4.13–15.13. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 52.14. Prosp. s.a. 435. Isidore in his ‘History of the Vandals’

notes only that the Vandals arrived in Mauretania andAfrica: H. Vand. 74: Chron. Min. II, 297.

15. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p. 243.16. Bury, A History of the Later Roman Empire From Arcadius

to Irene, vol I, p. 170.17. PLRE Vol. 2, Geisericus, 497.18. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 269, map 10, p.

286.19. Prosp, s.a. 437.20. Nov. Val. 13 and 34.21. C. Courtois, Les Vandales en Afrique (Algeria, 1955), p.

170 and n. 2, cited in Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of theVandals’, p. 53.

22. cf. Courtois, Les Vandales, pp. 172–175, cited inSchwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 54, n.35.

23. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 53.

24. In his translation and commentary Moorhead notes thatthe title dux is ‘surprising’ as Geiseric had ‘become kingthe previous year’: Moorhead, Victor of Vita, p. 3, n. 2.

25. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 57.26. Ibid., pp. 56–57.27. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.234.28. Gall. Chron. 452. s.a. 435.29. Date, Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 435.30. Comes, Prosp. s.a. 436; O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 83–

84.31. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 246–247.32. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, p. 1434.33. Prosp a. 435; cf. Cass. Chron. s.a. 435.34. Hyd. s.a. 443.35. Const. Vit. Germ. 25–27.36. Wood, ‘The Fall of the Western Empire and the End of

Roman Britain’, pp. 252–253.37. Date, Ann. Rav. s.a. 435.38. On Stilicho’s wars, see Hughes, Stilicho, passim.39. MacGeorge, Late Roman Warlords, p. 6, n. 3.40. Prosp. s.a. 436.41. Ibid.

42. For a more in-depth discussion, see the Introduction.43. Hyd. s.a. 436.44. There remains the possibility that the two wars were

against two different groups of ‘Burgundians’. Althoughpossible, the lack of evidence means that certainty isimpossible.

45. Vetto, Hyd. s.a. 431. See Chapter 9.46. Jord. Get. 36.47. In 431 the Vandals were still at war with the Romans in

Africa, so a Gothic alliance with the Vandals would havebeen interpreted by Aetius as an extremely hostile move,necessitating action. Since no action was taken at thistime, the later date is preferred. Clover, ‘Geiseric andAttila’, p. 106 dates the alliance to between 440 and 442.However Jordanes (36.184) claims that Huneric hadchildren, and there is no mention of any other wife. As aresult, time needs to be allowed for their children to beborn, so the earlier date is preferred.

48. Prosp. s.a. 439. It is possible that Vetericus is identicalwith Vitericus, as attested in PLRE Vol. 2, Vetericus, 1157.For more information on Vetericus see below.

49. Elton in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 169.

50. Prosp. s.a 436; Hyd. s.a. 436.51. Prisc. fr. 11.1.52. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 176 n. 30: ‘around 435 parts of

Pannonia officially ceded to the Huns’. The terminologyused by Priscus may indicate that by the time of theagreement, Rua was dead and that the treaty was actuallyagreed with his successor: Prisc. fr. 11.1; Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 87ff. Rua dead in 434, Gall.Chron. s.a. 434.

53. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 246–247. Dates, Chron. Gall. 452, s.a.435 and 437.

54. Chron. Gall 452, s.a. 437.55. Sid, Ap. Carm. 7.246–248; Prosp. s.a.. 436; Hyd. s.a. 436,

s.a. 437.56. Prosp. s.a. 436.57. Ibid.58. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.244–271, 278–294.59. PLRE Vol. 2, Eparchius Avitus, 196–198.60. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.255; PLRE Vol. 2, Eparchius Avitus, 197.61. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.244–294.62. Hyd. a. 437.63. Chron. Gall. 452, a. 436

64. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p. 244;referencing e.g. Barnish in Drinkwater and Elton, FifthCentury Gaul .

65. Hyd. s.a. 437.66. Jord. Get. 34 (176).67. Merob. Pan I, fr. IIA 22–23.68. Salvian, de Gub. Dei. 6.8; cf. Salvian, Ep. I.69. Valentinian travelling to Constantinople, Prosp. s.a. 437.70. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 437.71. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 83.72. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 437; Ann. Rav. s.a. 437. cf. Soc. 7.44.73. Rossi, I 698; inscription, Xystus, Ep. 9–10, CIG, 9427;

PLRE Vol. 2, Aetius 7, 25.74. For references, PLRE Vol. 2, Sigisvultus, 1010.75. This theory may be compared to O’Flynn, ‘For some

reason the Eastern government agreed to having twoWestern consuls’. Generalissimos, p. 81.

76. Soc. 7.44.77. This interpretation of Merobaudes, Panegyric I, fragment

IIA is not conclusive: for further analysis, see O’Flynn,Generalissimos, p. 177, n. 45; Clover, Merobaudes, pp. 36–37.

78. Prosp. s.a. 437 gives a relatively detailed account ofGaiseric’s attempts to convert the Catholic clergy in Africato Arianism.

79. Africa, Cod. Th. 16.5.63 (4 August 425); empire-wide,Cod. Th. 16.5.64 (6 August 425), both issued in Aquileia.

80. Prosp. s.a. 437.81. Ibid., s.a. 438.82. PLRE Vol. 2, Eparchius Avitus, 197.83. Ibid., Litorius, 684-685.84. Hyd. s.a. 438.85. Merob. Pan. I, fr. IIB. This can be compared to the phrase

‘Measures against the Goths in Gaul went well’ used byProsper, s.a. 438.

86. Hyd. s.a. 438.87. Ibid.88. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 438.89. Long, G in Smith, W, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman

Antiquities (London, 1875), pp. 302–303:http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Codex_Theodosianus.html(June 2010).

90. Min. Sen. 5.91. Pharr, The Theodosian Code and Novels and the

Sirmondian Constitutions, p. 6, n. 55.92. Nov. Val. 1.1 (8 July 438).93. Merob. Pan. 1, usually dated to 439, but more likely dating

to c.446: see Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 36–38. Thefirst, lost panegyric was given in 432.

94. PLRE Vol. 2, Aetius 7, 25–26.95. Prosp. s.a. 439.96. PLRE Vol. 2, Litorius, 685. For a discussion of the other

possibilities, including magister militum of Spain, O’Flynn,84.

97. For a full discussion of this matter, including abibliography, see O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 84ff. plusfootnotes.

98. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 85.99. Hyd. s.a. 439.100. For example, Prosp. s.a. 439; Hyd. a. 439. Rather than

him being executed, Salvian claims that he simply ‘wastedaway in a barbarian prison’: Salv. De Gub. Dei, 7. 39–43.Cassiodorus (s.a. 439) simply notes Litorius’ death.

101. Prosp. s.a. 439: see above.102. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 440 notes that in that year Aetius

returned to Italy ‘having pacified disturbances in Gaul’.

103. Salvian, De Gub. Dei, 7.9–10.104. Merob. Pan 2, 153–186: commentary, analysis and

bibliography, Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 58–59.105. Prosp. s.a. 439; Hyd. s.a. 439; Sid. Ap. Carm. 7, 308–312.106. Prosp. s.a. 439; Hyd. s.a. 439.107. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, pp.

246–247.108. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 178, n. 52.109. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 440: see note 99.110. Hyd. a. 439.111. For an analysis of the chronology and of the various

sources and interpretations, Maenchen-Helfen, World ofthe Huns, p. 90ff.

112. Prisc. fr. 2.113. ‘Scythian kings’, Ibid.114. Ibid.; ‘Treaty of Margus’, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the

Huns, p. 90.115. Olymp. fr. 41.2.116. Cod. Th. 14.16.3 (26 November 434).117. Plinthas wanting to profit from the treaty, Prisc. fr. 2;

Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 91. cf. PLRE Vol.II, Fl. Plinta, 892.

118. Soc. 7.43.119. Chron. Gall. 452, s. a. 434.120. e.g. Prosp. s.a. 437; the decimations of the Burgundians

in 437; the presence of the Huns alongside Litorius in 439.121. Priscus, fr. 2: cf. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 434. On the

dating, see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 90–93. There is a claim that Mundiuch himself may havebeen a joint ruler: Jord. Get. 180, 257; cf. Priscus. fr. 12.However, the meaning is slightly obscure and it is morelikely that he died before his brothers.

122. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 85ff.123. Priscus, fr. 2.124. Soc. 7.43.

Chapter 91. Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284–

641, p. 345.2. For a more detailed examination of these developments,

including a more extensive bibliography, see ibid., p. 346and associated references; Heather, Fall of the RomanEmpire, p. 276ff. and associated references.

3. Aug. Ep. 93. 1.2.

4. Hays, ‘Romuleis Libicisque Litteris’, p. 103.5. cf. the description of these events by Gibbon, History of

the Decline and Fall, Vol. 2, pp. 334–335.6. Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 312.7. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 279ff.8. Ibid., p. 281.9. Vict. Vit. 1.7; Prosp. s.a. 437.

10. Arian bishops placed in ‘deserted’ basilicas: Vict. Vit. 1.9.11. Prosp. s.a. 439; Marc. com. Chron. s.a. 439; Cass. Chron.

s.a. 439.12. Hyd. s.a. 439; Laterc. Regum Vand. et al. 2 (439); Marc.

com. s.a. 439; Cass. Chron. s.a. 439. Although the precisedate is sometimes disputed, it was seen as accurate by theVandals, as it was used by Geiseric for the dating of atleast some of his coins: Steinacher, The So-calledLaterculus Regum Vandalorum et Alanorum’, p. 175.

13. Hyd. s.a. 439.14. cf. Vict. Vit. 1.14.15. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 55.16. Vict. Vit. 1.12.17. Hyd. s.a. 439.18. Vict. Vit. 1.12.

19. Ibid., 1.14.20. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 294.21. Shanzer, ‘Intentions and Audiences’, p. 286 citing

Courtois, Les Vandales, p. 292.22. On the dissemination of news, see Hughes, Stilicho, pp.

102–103; the law, Nov. Val. 4 (24 January 440), dealingwith attempts of decurions to evade their duties byentering the church.

23. Hughes, Stilicho, ch. 8; supplies from Gaul and Spain, e.g.Claudian, de Cons. Stil.

I, 314ff.; de Cons. Stil. II, 393ff.24. Nov. Val. 6.1 (2 March 440).25. Ibid., 6.2.1. (14 July 444).26. Ibid., 5 (3 March 440).27. Ibid., 7 (4 June 440); on later re-issue of the law, ibid. 1.3

(5 March 450). See Chapter 13.28. Ibid., 5 (3 March 440).29. D(ominus) n(oster) Placidus Valentin[ianus providen] /

tissimus omnium retr[o principum] / salvo adqueconcordi [d(omino) n(ostro) Fl(avio) Theo] / dosioInvictissimo Au[g(usto) ad decus no] / minis suiNeapolitana[m civitatem] / ad omnes terra mari[que

incursus] / expositam et nulla [securitate] / gaudentemingenti [labore atque] / sumptu muris turrib[usq(ue)munivit]: CIL X 1485 = ILS 804 = Fiebiger – Schmidt33.

30. Cod. Th. 15.15.1 (5 October 364).31. This is the first dated information that Sigisvult had been

promoted to the post of magister militum: cf. O’Flynn,Generalissimos, p. 83.

32. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 440. For an analysis of thesettlements of the Alans in Gaul, see Chapters 10 and 11.

33. PLRE Vol. 2, Albinus 10, 53.34. Prosp. s.a. 440; PLRE Vol. 2, Aetius 7, 26.35. Chron. Gall. 452, a. 44036. Nov. Val. 4 (24 January 440).37. Twyman, ‘Aetius and the Aristocracy’, p. 488ff.; Nov. Val.

7.1.38. Twyman, ‘Aetius and the Aristocracy’, p. 489.39. Ibid.40. On the theory of a protracted struggle between Aetius and

opposing factions, see ibid., passim.41. Ibid., pp. 488–489; Nov. Val. 7.2.42. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 439.

43. On the controversy concerning the walls, Whitby andWhitby, Chronicon Paschale 284–628 AD, p. 72, esp. n.243.

44. Gathering of fleet, Nov. Val. 9.1 (24 June 440); invasion ofSicily, Chron. Pasch. s.a. 439; Cass. Chron. 440; Panormus,Continuatio Chronicorum Hieronymianorum, 120 (AD440); Hyd. s.a. 440.

45. Cass. Var. 1.14, although the dating is insecure: seeCassiodorus, Barnish (tr.), p. 11, n. 7.

46. Suid. 145.47. Hyd. s.a. 444.48. Ibid., 445, 449.49. Nov. Val. 9.1 (24 June 440).50. Pope Leo, Ep. 54, 606, 1271–1271, as cited by Maenchen-

Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 108, n. 495.51. Prosp. s.a. 440.52. Hyd. s.a. 449.53. Nov. Val. 1.2 (after 24 June 440, but the exact date is

unknown).54. An edict addressed to Areobindus shows that he was still

in Constantinople in March 441: Nov. Theod. 7.4 (6 March441).

55. On the date, Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 29–30.56. Addit. Ad Prosper Haun s.a. 455 = Chron. Min. I, 303;

Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 29, n. 5.

Chapter 101. Hyd. s.a. 440.2. PLRE Vol. 2, Censorius, 280: cf. Agiulfus, 34.3. Nov. Val. 10.1, 2, 3, and 4 (all dated 14 March 441).4. Date of appointment, Hyd. s.a. 441; relationship, Hyd. s.a.

443.5. Ibid., 441.6. Reference to the ‘attenuated resources of Our loyal

taxpayers’; Nov Val 10 (14 March 441).7. Hyd. s.a. 441.8. Ibid.9. As with the later expedition of Belisarius, Sicily was the

main staging point prior to the planned invasion of Africaitself. Hughes, Belisarius, pp. 78–79; Proc. 3.13.24ff. Seealso Nic. Call. HE 14.57; Cass. Chron. s.a. 441.

10. Evag. 1.19.11. Cod. Just. 12.8.2.4.12. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 110–111.

13. PLRE Vol. 2, Ariobindus 2, 145.14. Cod. Just. 12.8.2 (440–441); PLRE Vol. 2, Germanus 3,

505.15. PLRE Vol. 2, Ansila 1, 92–93. Prosper allocates the title

ducibus to all three commanders: Prosp. s.a. 441.16. PLRE Vol. 2, Inobindus, 592; PLRE Vol. 2, Arintheus, 142–

143, where it is suggested that he is the same individualas ‘Agintheus’, although this is open to doubt.

17. Prosp. s.a. 441.18. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 78ff.19. Marc. com. s.a. 441.20. Ibid.: attack on Theodosiopolis and Satala, and ending by

late June, cf. Nov. Theod. 5.1 (26 June 441).21. The war is dated to 442 by Prosper, who conflates the war

and the treaty into a single entry dated to the year of thetreaty. Prosp. s.a. 442; Marc. com. s.a. 441.

22. Main story Prisc. fr. 6.1; Attila and Bleda, Marcell. com,.2.81.

23. Viminacium and Naissus, Priscus, fr. 6.2; Singidunum,Marcell. com. s.a. 441.

24. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 116, referencingAlfoldi, Der Untergang der Römerherrschaft in Pannonien,

2 vols (Budapest 1924–1926), Vol. 2, p. 96. See alsoChapter 10.

25. Prisc. fr. 6.1.26. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 442; Cass. Chron. s.a. 442.27. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 441; Marcell. com. 2.80.28. PLRE Vol. 2, John the Vandal, 13, 597.29. Marc. com. s.a. 441. The text is ambiguous and implies

that Aspar and Anatolius fought against both the Persiansand the Huns, which although possible would haveentailed long periods of very fast travel.

30. Marcell. com. 441.31. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 50.32. Merob. Carm. 1, 17–18; Carm. 2, 13–14.33. For a more detailed discussion and bibliography

concerning the significance of Huneric’s betrothal, seeClover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 54.

34. Cod. Th. 3.14.1. This law appears to have only beenfollowed selectively. For example, Stilicho’s father was aVandal who married a Roman. However, it may be that byaccepting service in the army (Stilicho’s father) or bybeing part of a treaty (Huneric) the non-Romansautomatically became classed as citizens, and so the law

only applies to Romans marrying ‘invading andunaccepted’ barbarians.

35. Jord. Get. 36 (184)36. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 371.37. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 54, esp. n. 115.38. Nov. Val. 13 (21 June 445). The delay was no doubt due

to the time taken for requests for remission from theconquered territories to be agreed.

39. Proc. 3.5.11–17, Byrsa, Mitchell, A History of the LaterRoman Empire: AD 284–641, p. 347.

40. For a more detailed analysis and bibliography, see e.g.Schwarcz, Settlement of the Vandals, p. 54ff.

41. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 55.42. Nobles, Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, pp.

347–348; on the warriors, Salvian, De gub. Dei 7.89, statesthat the Vandals were ‘city dwellers’, suggesting that theyremained centred upon the main cities such as Carthage.This would not have been the case if the Vandals had beenscattered as farmers throughout Africa.

43. This has been confirmed by the discovery of 45 written‘tablets’ dating to the end of the fifth century: Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, p. 201, n.11, referencing, C.

Courtois et al., Tablettees Albertini: Actes privés del’époque vandale (Paris, 1952).

44. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ferrandus, V. F. 1.4. Eno, RB (tr.),Fathers of the Church 95 (Washington, 1997), referencedin Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 55.

45. Schwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 55, citing Duval,N, ‘Discussions des communications publiées dans lenumero 10’, Antiquité Tardive, 10 (2002), p. 38.

46. Shanzer, ‘Intentions and Audiences, pp. 286–287.47. Examples of laws (all from Victor of Vita): Vandals barred

from entering Nicene Churches, 2.9; Nicenes forbidden towork at court, 1.43; commensality between Vandals andNicenes forbidden, 2.46; two Vandal ‘confessors’ (near-martyrs), 3.38.

48. Hitchner in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p.128: Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 348.

49. Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 348.50. On the Vandals being settled under Roman rule, Merob.

Pan II, 24ff.51. cf. Wood, CAH, p. 537.52. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, p. 247.53. Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, pp. 356–357.

54. Prosp. s.a. 442.55. Theoph. AM 5942; Marc. com. 442; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 442.56. Theoph. AM 5942.57. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 110ff., esp. p.

117; war ended by August 442, Cod. Just. 2.7.9; increasedpayments, Theoph. AM 5942.

58. Hyd. s.a. 442.59. On the reordering of the defences, Nov. Theod. 24 (12

Sept 443).60. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 117.61. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 451–452.62. Const. Vita Germ. 28.63. Gall. Chron. s.a. 441–442.64. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 441–442.65. Wood’s claim that Aetius may have made concessions to

the Saxons by giving them land in Britain appearsunlikely: CAH, p. 519.

Chapter 111. Hyd. s.a. 442: see also Chapter 11.2. Sidonius, Carm. 5.206ff.; Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p.

44ff. Majorian on Aetius’ personal staff, PLRE Vol. 2,

Maiorianus, 702.3. Sid. Ap. Carm. 5.266–268; PLRE Vol. 2, Maiorianus, 702.4. Sid. Ap. Carm. 5.266–268; PLRE Vol. 2, Ricimer 2, 942–

943.5. Nov. Val. 2.3.1 (17 August 443).6. ‘Africans’ not having to repay loans, Nov. Val. 12.1.;

levying of interest forbidden, Nov. Val. 12.3 (both 19October 443).

7. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ferrandus, V. F. 1.4. RB Eno (tr.),Fathers of the Church 95 (Washington, 1997) referenced inSchwarcz, ‘Settlement of the Vandals’, p. 55.

8. Nov. Val. 6.1.3 (25 March 443).9. Nov. Th. 24.1.4 (12 Sept 443) = Cod. Just. 11.60.3.

10. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 443.11. CAH, 519–520.12. Hyd. s.a. 443.13. Nov. Val. 11 (13 March 443).14. For example, O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 177, n. 43.15. Sirago, Galla Placidia, p. 349, n. 2, referenced and

discussed in Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 10. n. 32.16. Sid. Ap. Carm. 5. 206ff.; dating, Clover, Flavius

Merobaudes, p. 44ff.

17. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 44ff.18. Cass. Var. 1.4.11; expecting an attack, Merob. Pan. 2. 55:

cf. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 338.19. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 89–90; Priscus

21–23. This would explain the passage in Priscus (fr.11.1) which notes that Orestes, Attila’s notarius(secretary), was by origin a Roman who ‘lived inPannonia close to the river Save which became subject tothe barbarian [Attila] by the treaty made with Aetius’.

20. Nov. Val. 6.2.3.1. See also earlier in the Chapter, ‘444’.21. Prisc. fr. 8.22. Conversation with Perry Gray, March 2011.23. Prisc. fr. 8.24. Ibid., 11.3; Cass. Var. 1.4.11.25. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 296.26. Nov. Val. 15.1 (between 11 September 444 and 18

January 445).27. Ibid. 24 (25 April 447).28. Ibid. 16 (18 January 445).29. Ibid. 26.1 (29 Nov 444).30. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 44631. Prosp. s.a. 444; Cass. Chron. s.a. 444; Marcel. com. s.a.

445; Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 446. Both Jordanes (Get. 181)and Theophanes (AM 5942) fail to provide a date for theevent.

32. Prisc. fr. 13.3.33. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 45 and 43, n. 17.34. Hyd. s.a. 445.35. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, pp.

249–250 where he suggests that it may be associated withEudocia’s engagement to Huneric.

36. See also, e.g., Bartoli, Rendiconti della pontificiaaccademia romana di archeologia, ser. 3, XXII (1946–1947), pp. 267–273; Mazzarino, Renania romana, p. 298ff., and tavola 1 facing p. 316; referenced in O’Flynn,Generalissimos, pp. 81, 176, n. 32.

37. Nov. Val. 17 (8 July 445). For a list of the other titles usedby Aetius, Ensslin, KLIO XXIV (1931), p. 481ff.

38. Clover, 54-55.39. The actual date for the panegyric is unknown, but from

internal and other evidence it should date to somewherebetween 443 and 446. for a more detailed analysis, seeClover, 1971, 32f, and esp. 36-8.

40. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 33–34.

41. Gallic bishops, Nov. Val. 17 (8 July 445); children soldinto slavery, Nov. Val. 33 (31 Jan 451); pigs, Nov. Val. 36(29 June 452); for more information, O’Flynn,Generalissimos, p. 86.

42. Merob. Pan 2; Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 41ff.43. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, pp. 41–42.44. The analysis that follows is based mainly on ibid., p. 42ff.45. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 81–82.46. This can be compared to the richer East, which was not

only able to meet the ‘subsidies’ of Attila, but also able toallow remissions of taxes throughout the period (e.g. Cod.Th. 5.12.3; 11.28.15 and 16 and 17).

47. On the dating, Wood, ‘The Fall of the Western Empire’, p.256.

Chapter 121. Hyd. s.a. 446: main army in Italy to face Huns, Heather,

Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 345. Vitus may have beenone of the temporary magistri sent to Spain to deal withthe Sueves and bacaudae (conversation with Perry Gray).

2. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 250.3. Hyd. s.a. 446.

4. Ibid.5. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 250.6. Implied by statement of the Gallic Chronicler, s.a. 447.

For full analysis see below.7. Date and extent of collapse, Joh. Mal. 14. 22 (363); see

also Prisc. fr. 5; Marcell. com. s.a. 447.8. On the date, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p.

117ff. Prisc. fr. 9.3; Marcell. com. s.a. 447; Jordanes Rom.331; Theoph. AM 5942.

9. Prisc. fr. 9.110. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 118–19: Prisc.

fr. 9.1.11. Prisc. fr. 9.1.12. Chron Gall. 452. s.a. 447.13. Call. 104.14. Ratiaria, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 118;

Athyras, Prisc. fr. 5.; Marcianopolis, Marcell. com. s.a.447; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 447.

15. Details of rebuild, Joh. Mal. 14. 22 (363); ‘Rebuilt in threemonths’; Marcell. com. s.a. 447.

16. Flight of the Huns, Nestorius, 363–368; due to ‘sickness ofthe bowels’, Isaac of Antioch, Homily on the Royal City,

referenced and translated in Maenchen-Helfen, World ofthe Huns, 121–123.

17. Prisc. fr. 9.3. Unfortunately, no details are given byMarcellinus (s.a. 448).

18. Prisc. fr. 11.1; ‘dangerous for the future’, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 124.

19. Whitby in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, CambridgeHistory, p. 326.

20. Hyd. s.a. 448.21. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 250.22. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 448.23. Jord. Get. 36 (191).24. Gild. 2. 20.25. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, pp. 347–8.26. Geoffrey of Monmouth, British History, Chapter 12,

suggesting that Conan Meriadoc was the founder of theKingdom of Brittany. However, it should be noted thatthis is a very late document written in the twelfthcentury, so its accuracy is extremely doubtful.http://books.google.com/books?id=FUoMAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=geoffrey+of+monmouth&as_brr=3#v=onepage&q&f=false(January, 2011)

27. Const. Vita Germ. 5. 38, which notes that he had acancellarius (secretary) named Volusianus: cf. Mansi, V1163, 1167, ‘which although a forgery contains genuinehistorical matter’ (PLRE Vol. 2, Sigisvultus, 1010).

28. Opponents to Sigisvult’s ‘patriciate’ include Ensslin andDemandt, acceptance includes Sundwall and Stein. For amore detailed analysis, including references andbibliography, see O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 86–86 and178, n.47.

29. Fasti, Rossi I. 745, 747; SB 9515 (PLRE 2, 1243); Leo, Ep.23–4, 27–40, 42, 44–5, 47–51, 54.

30. Twyman, ‘Aetius and the Aristocracy’, p. 482ff.31. The debate centres around Stein’s claim that Aetius, in

league with the Italian aristocracy, thwarted Valentinian’sattempts to raise taxes and supplement the armed forces.For further discussion, see ibid, passim.

32. PLRE Vol. 2, Theodosius 8, 1101: Cod. Th. 12.6.3.33. Twyman, ‘Aetius and the Aristocracy’, p. 480, n.1.34. Ibid., p. 488ff.35. Ibid., p. 488.36. Nov. Val. 1.3 (14 March 450); see also Chapter 10.37. Conversation with Perry Gray.

38. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 449.39. Ibid.40. Hyd. s.a. 449 (Burgess). PLRE Vol. 2, Censorius, 280, dates

the event to 448.41. Hyd. s.a. 449.42. Ibid.43. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 250.44. For the full story, Prisc. fr. 7, 8, 12–13; Joh. Ant. fr. 198.45. Prisc. fr. 11.2.314ff.46. Tax collectors, Nov. Val. 1.3; Sardinia, Nov. Val. 1.3.6 (5

March 450).47. Famine, Nov. Val. 33 (no precise date).48. cf. Marc. com. s.a. 434, who claims that Honoria was

pregnant and sent to Constantinople.49. On the doubts, see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns,

p. 130.50. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 335.51. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450.52. The accident happened near the River Lycus not far from

the city: Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450: Joh. Mal. 14.10 (358), 14.27 (367); Cass. Chron. s.a. 450. Vict. Tonn. s.a. 450.1.

53. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201. Although Theodosius

II had theoretically been sole emperor in 424, he hadmade no attempt to impose his rule on the West.

54. Date, Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450; Hyd. s.a. 450; Chron. Gall.452, s.a. 450; Cass. Chron. s.a. 450; Vict. Tonn. s.a. 450.3;Pulcheria as the main instigator, Theoph. AM 5942.

55. Prosp. s.a. 450; Theod. Lect. Epit. 353; Addit ad Prosp.Haun. s.a. 450; Coll Avell. 99.11; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450;beheaded, Joh. Mal. 14.31 (368) etc.

56. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201. I have acceptedBlockley’s translation for this difficult passage.

57. cf. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 371.58. Agnellus, Liber Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis, 42; Chron.

Gall. 452, s.a. 450; Proc. 3.4.15.; burial Agnellus, LiberPontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis, 42.

59. Conversation with Perry Gray.60. Prisc. fr. 20.1.

Chapter 131. Prisc. fr. 16, cf. Greg. Tur. 2.7.2. The chronology is based on the description given by

Priscus, fr. 20.3, where Attila’s support of the elder sonfollowed the death of the king. But cf. PLRE Vol. 2, Aetius

7, 27, where the assumption is that the king of the Franksdied during the Battle of the Catalaunian Plain.

3. Gothic embassies, Chron Pasch. s.a. 450; cf. Prisc. fr. 17.4. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450. The message is echoed by Malalas,

14.10 (358).5. Prisc. fr. 20.1.6. Ibid., 17.7. Ibid.8. Ibid., 20.1.9. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 366.

10. Jord. Get. 184-5.11. Prisc. fr. 15.12. On the strained relations between Gaiseric and Valentinian

in 450, Clover, ‘Geiseric and Attila’, p. 108.13. PLRE Vol. 2, Attila, 182: ‘East Roman interlocutors’

mistakenly praised, Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p.334.

14. Prisc. fr. 11.15. Joh. Ant. fr. 199.2.16. Prosp. s.a. 448.17. Prisc. fr. 20.3.18. Hyd. s.a. 451.

19. Conversation with Perry Gray. The date of Carpilio’sreturn from being a hostage – or even if he was ever senthome – are unrecorded.

20. Jord. Get. 194 (37). The reality of this claim is insecure,as will be discussed in the next chapter.

21. Ibid., 186 (36).22. The fact that the Romans sent more than one messenger is

a possible conclusion from the passage in ibid. (188–189:36) where ‘several arguments’ were needed by theambassadors to convince Theoderic to fight, possibly frommore than one embassy.

23. The list is based on ibid. 36 (191). It may be confused dueto the fact that Jordanes was writing approximately 100years after the events being described, and so has confusedthe peoples fighting alongside Aetius. Additionalinformation and some of the analysis, Hodgkin, Italy andHer Invaders, p. 109ff.

24. Prisc. fr. 16; cf. Greg. Tur. 2.7.25. Jord Get. 37 (194).26. The list is derived from ibid., 36 (191).27. See Chapter 12.28. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invader, p. 109.

29. Jord, Get, 36 (191).30. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 109.31. Hodgkin is followed by Bury, History of the Later Roman

Empire, p. 292, n.55: Boulogne and Bessin, Rouche, inFossier, Cambridge Illustrated History of the Middle Ages350–950, p. 55.

32. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 131, esp. nn. 614—616.

33. Chron. Gall. 452, s.a. 451.34. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.319–325. Sidonius (and Jordanes) may

have embellished their lists to reflect that the two armieswere formed from many peoples.

35. Locations, Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 106ff.36. Jord. Get. 38 (199–200).37. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, pp. 117–118.38. The relevant lives in the Acta are summarized in ibid., p.

114ff.39. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 129, n. 604.40. Greg. Tur. 2.6.41. Sid. Ap. Ep. 2.5; Greg. Tur. 2.6: Hyd. s.a. 451.42. Greg. Tur. 2.7.43. This hypothesis is supported by Gordon, Age of Attila, p.

107.44. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 115ff.45. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 131 and n.618.46. Conversation with Perry Gray.47. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 116ff.48. See Chapter 17.49. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7, 329–330.50. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 129, referencing

letters of Pope Leo I: see esp. n. 605 and 606: Leo, Ep. 41.51. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 329–330.52. As implied by Nov. Val;. 29 (24 April 450) and Nov. Val.

33 (31 January 451): Clover, ‘Geiseric and Attila’, p. 116and see Thompson, The Huns, p. 161.

53. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.215-317: see Chapter 7.54. Ibid., 7.339ff. The agreement was reached when the Huns

were already in Gaul; Aetius persuaded Theoderic viaAvitus to join with him against Attila, ‘who had attackedmany Roman cities’: Joh. Mal. 14.10 (358). cf. Sidonius,who claims that Theoderic waited until the last minute,Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 328–331. See also Bury, History of theLater Roman Empire, p. 292.

55. Thorismund, Greg Tur. 2.7; Theoderic, Jord. Get. 190.

56. Greg Tur 2.7.57. Ibid.58. Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.12.3.59. Conversation with Perry Gray.60. Theoph. AM 5943.61. Greg Tur. 2.7. Modern sources, for example Bury, History

of the Later Roman Empire, p. 292, n.58 suggest that therewas no siege, but that Aetius and Theoderic arrived at thecity first. The versions given by Gregory of Tours and inthe Acta Sanctorum, supported by the testimony ofSidonius (Ep. 8.15. 1) have been preferred.

62. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 121, n.1: ‘The Life ofSaint Anianus’ from the

Acta Sanctorum.63. For the date, Vita Aniani, ch. 7, p. 113: ‘octavodecimo kal.

Iulias’, referenced in Bury, History of the Later RomanEmpire, p. 292, n. 59.

64. Greg. Tur. 2.7.65. cf. Sid. Ap. Ep. 8.15.1, where the city was ‘invaded but

never plundered’.66. Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders, p. 122.67. Greg Tur. 2.7.

Chapter 141. Jord. Get. 41 (217).2. Date following Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire,

pp. 292–293, n. 59.3. Jord. Get. 36 (191–192) and 38 (196–197): Hyd. s.a. 451:

Chron. Caes. s.a. 450.4. Chron. Gall. 511, s.a. 451, ‘Tricassis pugnat loco

Mauriacos’; Consul. Ital. (Prosp. Havn.), ‘quinto miliario deTrecas loco nuncupato Maurica in eo Campania’; Greg.Tur. 2.7, ‘Mauriacum campum’; Lex Burg. 17.1, ‘pugnaMauriacensis’.

5. Theoph. AM 5943.6. Joh. Mal. 14.10 (358).7. For further analysis, Bury, History of the Later Roman

Empire, p. 293, esp. n.60.8. Jord. Get. 37 (196).9. Ibid. 38 (197ff).

10. This is the story given by Gibbon, who notes that: ‘Thisspacious plain was distinguished, however, by someinequalities of ground; and the importance of an heightwhich commanded the camp of Attila was understood anddisputed by the two generals’: History of the Decline and

Fall, Vol. 2, pp. 370–371.11. Jord. Get. 38 (197–8).12. e.g. Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders Vol. 2, p. 126.13. For a modern appraisal of this battle, and a more detailed

bibliography, Goldsworthy, A K, Cannae, Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 2001.

14. For a modern appraisal and references, see A.Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Wonthe Roman Empire (Phoenix, 2003).

15. Jord. Get. 37 (197).16. Again, the detail given here is obtained from ibid., 38–40

(197–212). It is probable that he derived his materialfrom Priscus: Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire,pp. 28–29.

17. Jord. Get. 38 (197).18. The use of pre-battle speeches is an old tradition and is

usually included in histories even if the words are purefiction. The authors followed a format. Jordanes waswriting well after the period so much of his account maybe based on oral history rather than written accounts andhe wanted to please his Gothic audience: conversationwith Perry Gray.

19. Joh. Mal. 358. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 450.20. Greg Tur. 2.7; see also Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a 451.21. Greg Tur. 2.7; Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a 451.22. PLRE 2, Theodericus 2, 1070.23. Jord. Get. 41 (218).24. Ibid.25. Prosp. s.a. 451; Hyd. s.a. 451; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 451 (who

confuses Theoderic with the earlier Gothic ‘king’ Alaric);Greg. Tur. 2.7; Cass. Chron. s.a. 451. cf. Cass. Variae 3.3.

26. Sid. Ap. Carmina 7, esp. 330ff.27. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 126.28. Possibly following Creasey, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of

the World, ch. 7.29. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 294.30. Ferreolus, Sid. Ap. Carm. 7.12.3; Avitus, Sid. Ap. Carm.

7.338ff.31. Nov. Val. 34 (13 July 451).32. Rouche, ‘Autopsy of the West, pp. 44-45.

Chapter 151. Clover, ‘Geiseric and Attila’, p. 109, esp. n.20.2. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 294: Nov. Val. 34

(13 July 451).3. Nov. Val. 36 (29 June 452); see below.4. He was ‘enraged’ by the ‘unexpected defeat in Gaul’;

Chron. Gall. 511, s.a. 452.5. Prisc. fr. 22.1 = Jord. Get. 42. 219–24.6. Maenchen-Helfen, 1973, 132.7. Date, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 132–135:

probably before Aetius issued Nov. Val. 36 (29 June 452),as this talks of warfare – possibly in Italy.

8. Attila travelled through ‘Pannonia’; Prosp. s.a. 452.9. Ibid.

10. Disputed, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 134.11. Prosp. s.a. 452, who notes that the invasion was

unexpected and so Aetius had accordingly taken noactions to defend the passes across the Julian Alps.

12. See Paul. Diac. 2.9: Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns,p. 135.

13. For example, Theodosius defeating Magnus Maximus atthe Battles of Siscia and Poetovio.

14. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 138.15. Prisc. fr. 22: Marc. com. s.a. 452: Cass. Chron. s.a. 452:

Greg. Tur. 2.7. Siege engines, Jord. Get. 42 (221).

16. See Chapter 13.17. Prisc. fr. 22.18. Paul Diac. 14.9. Paul gives ‘three years’, but this is

obviously an error: cf. Maenchen-Helfen, World of theHuns, p. 133, n. 628.

19. Prisc. fr. 22; Paul Diac. 14.9.20. Burning of Aquileia Theoph. AM 5945; Jord. Get. 42

(221): analysis, Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp.136–137.

21. Nov. Val. 36 (29 June 452).22. Prosp. s.a. 452.23. This is proved by later events: see below.24. Prisc. fr. 22.1 = Jord. Get. 42. 219–24.: ‘Taken some

cities by storm’ Hyd. s.a. 452–3.25. Paul Diac. 14.11.26. Prisc. fr. 22.3.27. Conversation with Perry Gray.28. Hyd. s.a. 452–3.29. Compare this to the invasion by the Franks during the

Wars of Belisarius, when the Franks lost a third of theirarmy to disease: Hughes, Belisarius, p. 172.

30. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 340.

31. Prisc. fr. 22.1 = Jord. Get. 42. 219-24. Alaric had diedshortly after the sack of Rome.

32. Hyd. s.a. 452–3.33. Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’ claims that ‘we first hear

of Aetius in his own peninsula as prefect ofConstantinople in the consulship of Maximus and Plintha(p. 428). He also notes that ‘Aetius’ was made consul in454 and that therefore ‘Aetius was killed during his fourthconsulship’ (p. 418). In this he is combining the careersof the two Aetius’s. Muhlberger also denies that there wasa second Aetius (Fifth-Century Chroniclers, p. 231. n. 86).

34. PLRE Vol. 2, Aetius 1, 19–20.35. Ibid.36. Ibid. 8, 29–30.37. Although earlier attested as a civilian administrator,

Hydatius calls Aetius ‘Aetio duce’, implying that hecommanded the army: Hyd. s.a. 452: PLRE 2, Aetius 8, 29.

38. Prisc. fr. 22.1 = Jord. Get. 42. 219–24.39. Prosp. s.a. 452: Vict. Tonn. s.a. 449: Cass. Chron. s.a 452:

Prisc. fr. 22.1.40. Paul Diac. 14.12: Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns,

pp. 140–141.

41. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 141 referencingPatrologiae Latina 52, 59–60.

42. Prisc. fr. 22.1 = Jord. Get. 42. 219–24.

Chapter 161. Prisc. fr. 23.1, 2: Jord. Get. 225.2. Prisc. fr. 23.3.3. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 143: Jord. Get.

255.4. See also Prisc. fr. 24.2; Marc. com. s.a. 454; Cass. Chron.

s.a. 453; Vict. Tonn. s.a. 453.2; Theoph. AM 5946.5. Joh. Mal. 14.10 (359).6. Theoph. AM 5946: Prisc. fr. 25 = Jord. Get. 50 (259–

263).7. Prisc. fr. 25 = Jord. Get. 50 (259–63).8. Date, Hyd. s.a. 453. PLRE Vol. 2, Pulcheria, 930; Chron.

Pasch. s.a. 453; Theoph. AM 5945.9. Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 453.

10. Jord. Get. 43 (225-229).11. Sid Ap. Ep. 7.12.3.12. Chron. Gall. 511, no. 621.13. Sid Ap. Ep. 7.12.3

14. Sid. Ap. Ep. 7. 12. 3; Chron. Gall. 511, no. 621.15. PLRE Vol. 2, Fredericus 1, 484; Hyd. s.a. 453–454. See

below.16. Prosper (s.a. 453) claims that it was his willingness to

wage war against Rome that was his downfall.17. Sid. Ap. Carmina, 7.424ff.18. cf. Jordanes (Get. 41 [218]), who describes his rule as

‘mild’.19. Quarrel, Hyd. s.a. 452; Prosp. s.a 453; Addit. ad Prosp.

Haun. s.a. 453; Chron. Gall. 511, no. 621; Jord. Get. 228;Greg. Tur. 2.7.

20. Greg. Tur. 2.7.21. Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 453; Jord. Get. 229.22. Hyd. s.a. 452–453.23. Prosp. s.a. 453.24. Jord. Get. 38 (199–200).25. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.26. The information on this battle is drawn from Priscus (fr.

30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201) unless otherwise stated.27. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.28. Hyd. s.a. 453–4.29. Joh. Ant. fr. 201.6: on Vicus Helena see Chapter X.

30. Sid. Ap. Carmina, 5.290–300.31. Ibid. 5. passim.32. Prosp. s.a. 454.33. Heather, The World of the Huns, p. 372.34. PLRE 2, Maximus 22, 749–751.35. On his support, see Chapter 11.36. Prisc. fr. 30 =Joh. Ant. fr. 201. cf. Prosp. s.a. 454.37. Prosp. s.a. 454. cf. Evag. 2.7 (54).38. 21 Sept = Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 454: 22 Sept = Ann.

Rav. s.a. 454.39. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.40. Prisc. fr. 30. 1. = Joh. Ant. fr. 201; Cass. Chron. s.a. 454;

Marc. com. s.a. 454; Vict. Tonn. s.a. 454; Prosp. s.a. 454;Theoph. AM 5946: Evag. 2.7 (54).

41. Aetius killed along with a number of honorati(distinguished citizens), Hyd. s.a. 454.

42. Prisc. fr. 30 =Joh. Ant. fr. 201.43. Proc. 3.4.28.44. Oost, ‘Aetius and Majorian’, p. 25.45. Sid. Ap. Carmina, 5.306–308: Joh. Ant. fr. 201, 4-5.46. Hyd. s.a. 453-4.47. Prisc. fr. 30 =Joh. Ant. fr. 201. Priscus claims that

Maximus also wanted to be patricius, but other evidencesuggests that he was already patricius in 454: PLRE Vol. 2,Maximus 22, 750–751.

48. Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 455.49. Prisc. fr. 30.1.50. Evag. 2.7: analysis, Whitby, The Ecclesiastical History of

Evagrius Scholasticus, 82, n. 87.51. Oost, ‘Aetius and Majorian’, p. 25.52. Joh. Mal. 360; Addit. Ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 455; Marc. com.

s.a. 455; Jord. Rom. 334; John Ant. fr. 201.5; Greg. Tur.2.8; PLRE Vol. 2, Placidus Valentinianus 4, 1139; plot byMaximus and Heraclius, Vict. Tonn. s.a. 455.

Chapter 171. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.2. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.3. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201. cf. PLRE 2,

Maximianus 5, and Blockley, The Fragmentary ClassicisingHistorians of the Later Roman Empire, p. 393, n.134.

4. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.5. Theoph. AM 5947.6. Joh. Ant. fr. 201.6. Hyd. s.a. 455.

7. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201; Addit. ad Prosp. Haun.s.a. 455; Vict. Tonn. s.a. 455; Joh. Mal. 360, 365; Evag. 2.7etc.

8. Joh. Ant. fr. 201.6.9. For example, Halsall, 2, Barbarian Migrations, Heather,

Fall of the Roman Empire and Mitchell, History of the LaterRoman Empire ignore Eudoxia’s alleged part in Gaiseric’sactions, simply noting that Gaiseric was attempting toavenge the insult to his son by Eudocia’s betrothal toPalladius.

10. Theoph. AM 5947.11. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201; Evag. 2.7 (54).12. Clover, Flavius Merobaudes, p. 54, esp. n.115. See Chapter

11.13. cf. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 255.14. Dissolution of the peace treaty, Eudoxia’s message, and

the weakness of the new regime, Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh.Ant. fr. 201.

15. Sid. Ap. Carmina, 7.369–375.16. Ibid., esp. 7.377–378, 432 and 464–8. See Sidonius

Apollinaris, Poems and Letters, Anderson (tr.), pp. 148–149, n. 6.

17. Sid. Ap. Carmina, 7.360ff.18. Ibid., 7.388ff.19. See Chapter 14.20. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 378.21. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.22. Date, Theoph. AM 5947; cf. Prosp. s.a. 455. The Fasti

Vindobonenses Priori date the event to 12 June, but seeBury, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 205 and n. 2:note that the Anonymus Cuspiniani are now referred to asthe Fasti Vindobonenses Priori.

23. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201.24. Prisc. fr. 30.1 = Joh. Ant. fr. 201; Prosp. s.a. 455.25. Prosp. s.a. 455. Vict. Tonn. s.a. 455; Joh. Mal. 14.26 (365–

6); Theoph AM 5947, etc.26. Hyd. s.a. 455.27. Theoph. AM 5947.28. Prisc. fr. 24.29. Hyd. s.a. 456; Prisc. fr. 24; Sid. Ap. Carmina 2.367.30. Auct. Prosp. Haun. s.a. 456.31. Isidore of Seville, Chron. 110.32. Joh. Ant. fr. 201.6; 202.33. Joh. Ant. fr. 202.

34. Auct. Prosp. Haun. s.a. 456; Vict. Tonn. s.a. 456; Joh. Ant.fr. 202; Theoph. AM 5948.

35. Fast. Vind. Prior. s.a. 457 (582).36. Sid. Ap. Carmina 5.373–385.37. Fast. Vind. Prior. s.a. 457 (583).38. Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 142, 162.39. Theoph. AM 5949.40. Chron. Pasch. s.a. 455; Chron. Pasch. s.a. 464. cf. Joh. Mal.

14.31 (368) and Evagrius (2.7 [54]), who claims thatEudoxia and Placidia were returned ‘to placate Marcian inthe East’. See also Theoph. AM 5949.

41. Evag. 2.7 (54–5).42. Sid. Ap. Carmina 5. 203–206; Hyd. s.a. 455; Joh. Ant. fr.

88.

Conclusion1. Sid. Ap. Carmina 7. 230.2. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 262.3. Ibid., pp. 262–3.4. Sid. Ap. Carmina 7. 230.5. Elton, ‘Defence in Fifth-Century Gaul’, p. 170.6. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, p. 119

7. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 252.8. cf. ibid. p. 250f.9. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 348.

10. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 177ff.11. Ibid., p. 210ff.12. cf. CAH, 537.13. See, for example, Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, p. 54.14. Based on Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 55.15. Hughes, Stilicho, pp. 213–214.16. Elton, ‘Defence in Fifth-Century Gaul’, p. 171.17. cf. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, p. 248.18. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, p. 124.19. This can be compared with Stilicho, who had earlier sent

a man named Mascezel to Africa to reconquer theprovince, but after the success of the campaign had hadMascezel killed.

20. Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall, Vol. 2, p. 382.

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