INTRODUCTION

The public, media, and even most law enforce-ment officials, have traditionally associated the term“organized crime” with Italian ethnic criminal syndi-cates, commonly called La Cosa Nostra (LCN) or theMafia. To counter this narrow point of view, theState Commission of Investigation (SCI or Commis-sion) has, for some time, emphasized that LCN,while a serious problem, represents only part of theorganized underworld which preys on New Jerseyand the rest of the country.

Among the criminal groups which should receivemore attention than they have in the past are those ofAfrican ethnic background. Such Afro-lineal orga-nized crime -- composed exclusively or predomi-nantly of persons of African ancestry -- includescriminal syndicates of African-Americans, Jamai-cans, Nigerians and others.

The neglect of this problem stems, in part, fromthe erroneous stereotype that African ethnic groupslack the stability to organize and are not capable ofstructuring a syndicate of any consequence. Inaddition, law enforcement resources are limited, andthey have been devoted to dealing with more familiargroups which receive greater media attention, prob-ably because they are perceived to threaten suburbaninterests.

Whatever the cause of the neglect, it has led, inmany areas, to a serious shortage of informationconcerning the activities, membership and leadershipof Afro-lineal criminal groups. As a result, severalhave become wealthy and entrenched , with substan-tial numbers of members. Their leaders are insulatedfrom police investigations. They have terrorizedneighborhoods, corrupted youth and fanned vio

lence in urban areas.

Afro-lineal criminal groups are particularly threat-ening because they are heavily engaged in narcoticstrafficking, a scourge against all of society and asevere impediment to urban revitalization. They alsopromote significant frauds, high-volume illicit gam-bling, murder, extortion, official corruption and othercriminal activities.

For several years, the SCI has developed intelli-gence on Afro-lineal mobs. These efforts culminatedin a public hearing on November 29, 1990. Thisreport summarizes the public hearing and providesadditional information in order to give a comprehen-sive review of the problem and recommendations fordealing with it. In addition, some successful lawenforcement efforts to curtail Afro-lineal organizedcrime will be highlighted in anticipation that they willbe imitated elsewhere in New Jersey.

A survey of New Jersey law enforcement agen-cies conducted by the Commission concentrated onreported activity by African-American, Jamaicanand Nigerian criminal groups in New Jersey. Asreported at the Commission’s public hearing by SCIIntelligence Analyst Debra A. Sowney, African-American groups have been identified as active inthirteen counties: Passaic, Bergen, Hudson, Essex,Union, Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, Atlantic,Camden, Mercer, Somerset and Morris. They par-ticipate primarily in the distribution of narcotics, butthey were also reported to be involved in homicides,robberies, aggravated assaults and weapons offenses.In addition, the survey, combined with the SCI’s ownintelligence, revealed that African-American groupsare involved in organized illegal gambling, often in

AFRO-LINEAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The Commission shall have the duty and power to conduct investigations in connection with ...organized crime and racketeering .... (N.J.S.A. 52:9M-2)

... [T]he Commission shall keep the public informed as to the operations of organized crime ....(N.J.S.A. 52:9M-11)

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cooperation with La Cosa Nostra, in the counties ofBergen, Essex, Union, Camden, Passaic, Mercerand Hudson.

The survey also showed that Jamaican possesoperated throughout New Jersey. They were re-ported to be active in the same thirteen countieswhere African-American criminal groups were re-ported, as well as Burlington and Cumberland coun-ties. Jamaican posses primarily distribute drugs andtraffic in weapons, but they also engage in homicides,robberies, assaults and extortion. In the survey,several agencies reported that Jamaican posses inter-act with African-American groups in drug distribu-tion, providing them with narcotics and using themfor transportation.

Agencies identified Nigerian criminal operationsin six counties, Hudson, Essex, Union, Middlesex,Burlington and Mercer. Nigerian groups specializedin various types of fraud, including false bank ac-counts, writing bad checks, forgery, counterfeiting,credit card fraud and student loan fraud. Localgroups are small, but they interact with larger groupson the national level. Those Nigerians involved in thesmuggling of heroin and cocaine into the UnitedStates have not, to date, been linked to the leadershipof the organized Nigerian fraud networks, althoughboth the fraud and narcotics operations have ties tooperatives in Nigeria.

AFRICAN-AMERICANS

Organized and powerful, African-American crimi-nal groups have operated in the United States fordecades. One of the witnesses at the SCI’s publichearing, Donald L. Ashton, Special Agent-in-Chargeof the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s(DEA) New Jersey Division, testified about his expe-riences with such organizations throughout the coun-try:

Highly organized, wealthy and dangerousAfrican-American organized crime groupshave been around for a long time, particu-larly in the area of drug trafficking. As an

example, in 1968, while I was assigned to the[DEA’s] Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office Iinvestigated an African-American heroin traf-ficking organization which controlled theheroin distribution in Pittsburgh and identi-fied the source of supply for this organizationas an individual in New York.

In 1972, while assigned to Cincinnati, Ohio,I investigated an African-American herointrafficking organization, which also con-trolled the heroin distribution in Cincinnati.The source of supply for this group was alsoin New York.

In 1976, while assigned to the Wilmington,North Carolina, office, I investigated a ma-jor heroin trafficking organization whichwas responsible for bringing into the UnitedStates thousands of kilos of pure heroin fromSoutheast Asia during the height of the Viet-nam War. Our investigation revealed thatthis North Carolina-based organization andimporter of heroin, consisting of well over100 members, was the source of supply toboth individuals in New York which suppliedthe organizations I referred to in Pittsburghand Cincinnati, as well as other groups inDetroit, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Richmondand Norfolk. This organization developed anumber of sophisticated methods of smug-gling heroin into the United States, most ofwhich were through the U.S. military chan-nels.

...They were ex-military, inactive military, mostwere master sergeants. They utilized themilitary system in a number of differentmethods to bring heroin back from South-east Asia. The most notable method, whichmade the media, was that they were allegedto have brought heroin back in the bodies ofdead servicemen.

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THE FAMILY (NORTH)

New Jersey has a significant presence of African-American organized crime. A Newark-based co-caine and marijuana trafficking organization, calledThe Family, operates in several areas of the country.It was headed by Wayne (Akbar) Pray for nearly 20years until his incarceration in federal prison in 1989for life, without the opportunity for parole. Pray wasconvicted for being the “principal administrator” ofa substantial cocaine importing and distribution or-ganization. At its height, Pray’s group had about300 members and associates. Newark Police Direc-tor Claude M. Coleman testified at the SCI publichearing as to the difficulties encountered in investi-gating Pray:

For some years ... [Pray] was considered tobe one of the so-called untouchables, be-cause he never came close to the [narcotics].He was leading the life of wealth and influ-ence, [but] I think everyone knew that he wasinvolved in drug dealing .... Nonetheless, hehad not been ... brought to justice, so tospeak.

Director Coleman related how Pray built up TheFamily through “fear, intimidation and violence,”directed primarily against rivals for the drug trade.Although the group has continued after Pray’s incar-ceration, Director Coleman described it as “frag-mented” with several of Pray’s former lieutenants“now dealing on their own as freelancers” and somehaving been incarcerated.

DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashton detailedthe past and current status of The Family in testimonyat the Commission’s public hearing:

... Akbar’s African-American organizedcrime network, called The Family, continuesto operate. It is based in Essex County andconsists of over two hundred members. Pray’sorganization started in the early 1970s as[an outgrowth of] the New World of Islam.The Muslim [name] Akbar means omnipo-

tent, all powerful, or the great one. In fact,Akbar referred to himself as Akbar Akbar insome cases, or the greatest of the great. Helived up to this name by assuming controlover a vast and durable criminal network.The New World of Islam initially focused onsupporting bank robberies and even oper-ated a bank robbery school. Pray’s drugtrafficking venture started out in a smallarea of Essex County and eventually ex-tended to several states, including Ohio,Michigan, New York and Southern Florida.

At its height Pray’s network had at least 12mid-level supervisors classified by the DEAas Class I violators. A Class I cocainetrafficker is defined by DEA as one who hasthe capability of distributing at least fiftykilos of cocaine on a monthly basis andmanages at least five subordinate drug traf-fickers.

...

During Pray’s 1989 federal trial for leadinga continuing cocaine and marijuana traf-ficking enterprise, DEA witnesses testifiedthat he was responsible for possessing anddistributing approximately 188 kilograms ofcocaine in a five-month period between Feb-ruary and June of 1987. In addition, he wasresponsible for distributing approximately544 pounds of marijuana during the sameperiod. It is estimated that Pray’s organiza-tion was receiving millions of dollars ofgross income annually.

...

Pray’s organization is presently operatingat a much lower and more discrete level withbasically the same structure. Reliable sourceshave indicated that Pray ... has maintainedhis customers and contacts and is still over-seeing his drug transactions from prison.

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NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME GROUPS IN NEW-ARK

In his public hearing testimony Director Cole-man described several criminal groups that takeadvantage of drug markets concentrated in certainNewark neighborhoods. He noted that sometimesthe territory of one of these groups extends no fartherthan the environs of a single large building “in theprojects.”

Paterson Group

Kenneth (KP) Paterson was a Wayne Pray pro-tege who operated a successful cocaine traffickingring in the Columbus Home projects for many yearsuntil the buildings which he controlled were aban-doned. Paterson was incarcerated on April 28,1989, after a conviction for distributing drugs tominors. Estimates of the size of this group rangefrom five street managers and an undetermined num-ber of workers to 20-25 members.

Ratchford Family

This group operates in the area of a single build-ing at 260 Prince Street. Led by Eddie Ratchford,once an associate of Wayne Pray, the group numbersonly about 15 members. Director Coleman de-scribed the group as “sophisticated” and “ratherviolent in defending its territory.” Eddie Ratchfordis presently in federal prison for cocaine traffickingand is scheduled for release on December 17, 1992.His brother, Derrick, is in federal prison for drugdistribution and is scheduled for release on October10, 1991. Two other brothers, Marvin and Willie,continue the operations of the group.

Brown Family

The Brown group distributes drugs in the 17thAvenue area. It occasionally cooperates with theRatchford brothers, according to Director Coleman,and was similarly led by three brothers. One brother,Ernest (Bo), was incarcerated in state prison formurder on June 25, 1982. Another, Phil, was

murdered, and the third, Dennis (Mufee), is pres-ently in charge of the group, which has 20-25 mem-bers.

Williams Group

Until he was recently sentenced to 60 years inprison, Roger G. (Little Akbar; Little Ak) Williamsled a cocaine and heroin distribution ring, which hadat least 30 members and operated in the Prince Streetarea of Newark. A close associate of Wayne Pray,Williams started his group after Pray’s incarceration.The Williams group was recently involved in a turfwar with the Ratchford family in the area of 260Prince Street. The territorial squabbling eruptedafter a lengthy period during which the two groupsrespected each other’s territory. Williams is pres-ently incarcerated for homicide.

Lee Group

Another group which distributes cocaine in thePrince Street area is headed by Harry (Butch) Lee.The group is composed of 40-50 members. Leeoversees the group from his residence in the state ofGeorgia. Director Coleman noted that Lee himself iswell-insulated from the people that are directly sell-ing the drugs in New Jersey.

THE FAMILY (SOUTH)

Rivaling the power of The Family headed byWayne Pray in northern New Jersey, another groupcalling itself The Family distributed heroin and co-caine for nearly 20 years in the Philadelphia area,including southern New Jersey. The group washeaded by the late Roland (Pops) Bartlett, a residentof New Jersey, until his federal conviction in the fallof 1987 for conspiracy to distribute heroin andoperating a continuing criminal enterprise. He wasimprisoned in that case for 35 years with no oppor-tunity for parole. The Family consisted of approxi-mately 60 members and associates, 35 of whom wereindicted with Bartlett in 1987.

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Bartlett was also convicted in state court on Novem-ber 29, 1988, for ordering the contract murder of hisWillingboro, New Jersey, neighbor. Bartlett wassentenced to life with a minimum 30-year term inDecember 1988. He died in federal prison on January15, 1990.

Bartlett cooperated with the Genovese-Gigantecrime family of La Cosa Nostra and made substantialinvestments in legitimate businesses. Much of TheFamily’s income was invested in the corporate enti-ties Bartlett Enterprises, Inc. and Domino Records,Inc. Among the group’s known assets were a 60-acre retreat in the Pocono Mountains; five houses,two lots and a night club in Philadelphia; a $750,000home in Cherry Hill; 32 acres in Georgia, and severalrace horses.

Bartlett group members and associates sold heroinand cocaine to street operatives in Camden andBurlington counties in New Jersey. It has beenestimated that The Family grossed close to $7 millionper year while it existed.

JUNIOR BLACK MAFIA

Based in Philadelphia, the Junior Black Mafia(JBM) is involved primarily in the distribution ofdrugs, mainly cocaine. It also offers murder contractservices. The JBM cooperates with associates of theBruno-Scarfo LCN crime family in the distribution ofcocaine and appears to have modeled its criminalmethods after that organization, relying heavily onviolence and extortion to further its drug enterprises.

The JBM came into existence in 1985 to countera sudden migration of New York-based Jamaicanposses into the Philadelphia drug scene. Originalmembers of the 1960s Black Mafia (and later Black,Inc.) organized African-American youths into theJBM to thwart the Jamaican influence and to regainfrom the Jamaicans control of drug distribution in theaffected areas of Philadelphia.

The JBM is estimated to have approximately 100members and about 300 street-level associates. Its

members drive expensive cars and often wear goldjewelry and rings with the JBM initials encrusted indiamonds. Originally, admission into the grouprequired a $1,000 initiation fee, lack of a criminalrecord and the operation of an established illegalactivity.

In Philadelphia the JBM has sought to expand itsdrug trafficking profits by offering independent nar-cotics dealers membership in the JBM. The Pennsyl-vania Crime Commission documented two 1989incidents in which the JBM targeted for death dealerswho turned down such offers.

Information regarding the JBM’s influence oractivity in New Jersey has been limited due to the lackof a coordinated intelligence collection effort. TheCommission has been able to document at least twomembers and eight associates living in Camden andBurlington counties. On February 20, 1991, fiveassociates of the JBM from Philadelphia were ar-rested in Camden County by the Philadelphia officeof the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)while transporting a kilogram of cocaine intended forsale in Philadelphia. Just as the old Black Mafia fromPhiladelphia eventually spread into Camden,Burlington, Gloucester, Cumberland and Atlanticcounties, it is likely that this new group of African-American organized criminals will follow suit.

CAMDEN “SETS”

Three detectives from the Camden Police De-partment -- Leonard Hall, George Joyner and LouisMuzyczek -- testified at the public hearing thatscattered street-level drug markets in Camden arecontrolled by organized groups of youthful drugdealers who claim dominance over particular “sets”or areas of operation for drug sales. In response toquestions by SCI Counsel Charlotte K. Gaal, Detec-tive Muzyczek described these youth gangs:

Q. What is the age range of these youths?A. Their ages range between 13 and 24 yearsold.

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Q. How are the youth involved in the drugtrade structured or organized?A. The drug dealing youth are structuredinto sets which vary in size and area ofoperation. The controlling elements of theyoung street dealers in Camden are outsidethe city, and they are insulated by means ofmid-level managers.

...

Q. Can you give us some examples of sets inCamden?A. We have approximately 38 active setsthroughout the city. They label themselvesby some street corner names like the 24thStreet Posse, the 32nd Street Posse, and soforth.

Q. What is the racial composition of thesesets?A. Some of the sets are racially mixed,Hispanic and black. Approximate composi-tion of these sets throughout the city, of thetotal of 38 that we know, 75 percent I wouldestimate are black and 25 percent are His-panic.

Q. How many principals control the 38 setsin Camden, in your opinion?A. I would say there are no more than sevento 10 individuals who control all of the setsin the City of Camden.

Q. Are the sets organized?A. The fact that the sets are organized is notin doubt. The problem is being able toidentify the controlling individuals, sincethey do not get directly involved in the distri-bution of the drugs. In most instances theyoung street dealers have no idea who theultimate boss is of the operation, as the bossonly deals with trusted managers, who inturn deal directly with the mid-level manag-ers. We know they are well-organized be-cause if we go into an area and we make fivearrests on a corner today, tomorrow there

will be five more people ... out there toreplace them.

GAMBLING RINGS

Historically, many ardent supporters of illegalnumbers gambling were in the African-Americancommunity. Illegal lottery operations run by Afri-can-American groups continue to thrive in NewJersey’s urban areas despite the existence of a legalstate lottery. Unlike the state lottery, illegal lotteryoperations have no minimum wager. They also offerbetter odds and extend short-term credit to thebettors. Finally, convenience and cultural traditionsplay a role in the continued existence of illegalnumbers.

Leonard Jones Group

Over the decades, the illegal lotteries and num-bers games were actually controlled by La CosaNostra, and black operatives worked within theframework established by them. Today, LCN con-trol has begun to diminish in some areas of NewJersey.

Leonard A. (Benny the Bum) Jones has operatedan independent black numbers gambling network foryears in Camden, Burlington and Gloucester coun-ties. In 1989, the New Jersey State Police arrestedJones and several of his underlings for operating anillegal lottery. They were subsequently indicted by astate grand jury on July 19, 1990, for operating anillegal lottery. The case is awaiting trial. Based onthe records seized at the time, it was estimated thatJones’ operation netted over $1 million per year.

Gilbert Young Group

Another numbers operation in Camden County isrun by Gilbert R. (Buck) Young. Young is associ-ated with Frank A. DiSalvio, an associate of theBruno-Scarfo organization of La Cosa Nostra, wholast year fled New Jersey to avoid an SCI subpoena.The group lays off bets to the Bruno-Scarfo mob.

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Lewis Tyler Group

In northern New Jersey African-American illegalgambling operatives work with the LCN. For ex-ample, Lewis H. Tyler of Jersey City runs a gamblingand narcotics operation in conjunction with theGenovese-Gigante crime family.

Eugene Terry Group

Also in Jersey City, Eugene Terry, Sr., is theleader of a black gambling syndicate which alsooperates in conjunction with the Genovese-Gigantecrime family. Terry, along with his brother, Steven(Buzz) Terry, is also involved in the financing of acocaine distribution network.

Wayne Pack Group

In Trenton an African-American known as WaynePack conducts an illegal lottery which lays off toGambino-Gotti LCN associate Anthony (Pushy)Pulcinello. Under changing leadership, this opera-tion has been in existence since 1954. In its earlyyears, its leaders dealt with the Bruno-Scarfo LCNfamily.

E’PORT POSSE

At the Commission’s public hearing ElizabethPolice Detective Thomas G. Swan testified about aparticularly vicious group of young African-Ameri-can males that operated a cocaine trafficking net-work in Elizabeth and the Clinton Avenue area ofNewark. In March 1988, working with the UnionCounty Narcotics Strike Force and the State Police,the Elizabeth Police Detective Division began mak-ing a series of undercover narcotics buys from streetlevel dealers near the Pioneer Homes housing projectin Elizabeth. The investigation was dubbed Opera-tion Pioneer.

After search warrants and arrests in November1988, Detective Swan was able to develop a confi-dential informant, Mutah Sessoms, who revealedthat the vast majority of those arrested in Operation

Pioneer were part of organizations controlled by twobrothers, Robert and Bilal Pretlow. After the arrests,the two groups merged under the leadership of theyounger brother, Bilal. Organization members calledthemselves the E’Port Posse, Phase II, after theElizabeth Seaport, and modeled themselves afterJamaican posses, often dressing in flamboyant style,arming themselves with sophisticated weapons andinvesting in expensive jewelry. Several expensivecars driven by group members were placed in thenames of their acquaintances or relatives.

Starting out as a marijuana dealer in high school,Bilal Pretlow eventually grabbed the drug market forhis and his brother Robert’s organization and ranrival gangs out of Elizabeth, occasionally withshootouts -- some in broad daylight. Detective Swantestified as to the grandiose style in which BilalPretlow pursued his goal to expand:

Bilal convened a meeting of drug dealersfrom all over Elizabeth in a central NewJersey restaurant. There he indicated hisintention to control drug trafficking in theElizabeth area and threatened that thosewho would not go along would face repri-sals.

Detective Swan testified that the group’s cocainesupply came from a Dominican by the name ofBenson, who was located in New York City. Thecocaine was generally transported to Elizabeth intaxi cabs. In 1989 the group was distributing kilo-grams of cocaine resulting in profits up to a hundredthousand dollars a week.

Law enforcement strengthened its resolve todeal with the E’Port Posse as the violence surround-ing its operations escalated. Mutah Sessoms, theinformant, was murdered in June 1989. RobertPretlow was slain by a rival gang on July 9, 1989. Thenext day, a third Pretlow brother, Thomas, killedBobby Ray Davis, a Newark drug trafficker withdesigns on the Pretlow turf, in retaliation for RobertPretlow’s death. The federal Drug EnforcementAdministration, Union County Sheriff’s Office, New-

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ark Police and Essex County Sheriff’s Office joinedthe Elizabeth Police, State Police and Union CountyProsecutor’s Office in the investigation. Sessoms’description of an organized criminal enterprise wastaken seriously at all levels.

Detective Swan testified how Bilal Pretlow con-tinued to run the operation even while incarcerated:

At the time of the November 1988 and subse-quent arrests, Bilal Pretlow had paid bailand attorneys fees for his group members.While in the Union County Jail on variousdrug charges, he continued to run his or-ganization by calling telephones equippedwith speed dialing, call forwarding and con-ference call capabilities. Telephone tollrecords to the apartment used by ShawnHartwell, his first lieutenant who ran theoperation in his absence, showed nearly 400collect calls from the Union County Jailfrom December 1988 to early February 1989.Many of these calls were for extended peri-ods of time. Some lasted more than an hour.We had one or two going into three and a halfhours.

Normally the inmates are allowed use thepublic telephone at the jail during a specificeight-hour period, and each is restricted toapproximately five, maybe ten minutes at atime. Bilal Pretlow, however, ingratiatedhimself with other inmates by getting hisunderlings to post bail for them. He boughtthem gifts and promised them jobs upon hisrelease. Those jobs were in his drug distri-bution operation. In one instance he bought$70 Reebok sneakers for all the inmates onhis tier, which numbered in excess of thirty-five. The inmates returned favors by givingup their allotted telephone time to Pretlow.This alone, though, does not adequatelyexplain to us ... the extensive use of thetelephone [from the jail].

On January 18, 1991, Thomas Pretlow was con-

victed of manslaughter in the fatal shooting of BobbyRay Davis. Federal charges brought by the UnitedStates Attorney for New Jersey are pending againstBilal Pretlow and eight other members of his group.Bilal Pretlow faces the death penalty on two of thecharges brought under a new federal law whichprovides for capital punishment for persons con-victed of drug-related murders. He is presentlyscheduled to begin trial in federal court in Newark onMarch 26, along with eight other members of hisgroup charged with participating in the drug ring andvarious other offenses. Bilal Pretlow is presentlyserving a 20-year sentence in state prison stemmingfrom a drug trafficking conviction in November 1989arising out of Operation Pioneer.

In December 1990 Husamiddi Williams was sen-tenced to 13 years in federal prison after pleadingguilty to charges of possession of cocaine withintention to distribute and possession of weapons infurtherance of illegal drug activity. Williams ran a“franchise” at Sixth and South Park streets in Eliza-beth for the E’Port Posse for more than a year untilhe was arrested in August 1989. He employed atleast four juveniles to assist in the drug sales. Wil-liams was apprehended by Elizabeth detectives aftera shootout between Williams and rival drug dealers.

Detective Swan testified that police seized $270,000in cash, 19 guns, five cars and about $30,000 injewelry from Bilal Pretlow and his underlings.

ISAAC WRIGHT GROUP

Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas L. Bis-sell, Jr., testified at the Commission’s public hearingabout the operations of a cocaine trafficking ring thatplagued housing projects in Somerset and Middlesexcounties. He described how various law enforce-ment agencies first came into contact with membersof the group and how this led to a successful coop-erative effort to short circuit its operations and bringits alleged leader, Isaac Wright, Jr., to trial:

Q. Please describe the operation of [theIsaac Wright] group and the roles played by

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various individuals in it and the efforts bylaw enforcement to discover it and curtail itsactivities.A. Our office first became aware of thisgroup when the Franklin Township PoliceDepartment reported to us that they hadmade observations [of a] member of thegroup, Willie (Chill Will) Sirmans, in Octo-ber of 1988. Mr. Sirmans was a juvenile atthe time operating a Lincoln limousine witha forged driver’s license, the limousinebelong[ing] to an Isaac Wright of Edison,New Jersey, and Mr. Sirmans at the time wasalso carrying a ... telephone pager that wasregistered to Mr. Wright.

In February of 1989 the Edison Police De-partment had contact with Ernest Earvin,another member of the group. He was stoppedfor a routine traffic check, and the police,during the check, noticed a bag with 884vials of cocaine in the back of a motorvehicle belonging to Mr. Wright. Duringthat contact Mr. Earvin fled the scene, wasfollowed to an apartment in Edison, and itturned out that it was Mr. Wright’s apart-ment. Mr. Wright indicated to the police atthat point that he hadn’t seen anyone. Thepolice asked for permission to search theapartment. It was granted, and they foundMr. Earvin hiding under the bed in thebedroom. They also found a large quantityof cash on the table in the apartment.

In addition to that, in March of 1988 FredDickerson, also known as Fred Gilbert, wasarrested by members of our office and theFranklin Township police in possession of inexcess of 700 vials of cocaine. He was alsousing a vehicle owned or leased by IsaacWright[, and] Isaac Wright provided bailmoney for these people to post bail after theywere arrested.

All of them indicated during the course ofinterrogation that they were involved in an

operation that was run by Isaac Wright, and,based on that information and continuingintelligence, we determined that the groupwas operating in the Franklin Townshiparea, primarily at the Edgemere and Parksideapartment complex and in the Robeson Vil-lage area in New Brunswick, also an apart-ment complex. And based on that informa-tion we began an investigation targeting Mr.Wright and the rest of the organization.

...

Q. Where did the cocaine come from, andhow much of it was being sold?A. The investigation revealed that Wrightsupplied cocaine to these people for sale,buying approximately two to three kilogramsof cocaine per week. The supplier that wasidentified during the course of the investiga-tion was Roberto Alexander of Passaic City,a Dominican national with cocaine sourcesin New York City, and also a former Brook-lyn Dodgers minor league baseball player.

Wright would pick up the cocaine from Alex-ander in Passaic, and it would then either betransported to a safe house in New Brun-swick or to an apartment at 455 ElizabethAvenue in Newark, that apartment having-specifically been rented by Dickerson, or inDickerson’s name, along with Wright for thepurpose of cutting the cocaine. There wasnothing in the apartment other than a tableand a couple of chairs and instruments to cutand package the cocaine into vials for sale.

We estimate, based on the guilty plea en-tered by Mr. Sirmans, that in his case alone... he distributed approximately $15,000worth of cocaine per week. And extrapolat-ing that we estimated that the group wasgood for annual gross sales of approxi-mately $20 million.

Q. So now we’ve got this group operating, in

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addition to Middlesex and Somerset Coun-ties, also in Essex County and PassaicCounty?A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did your office cooperate with other lawenforcement agencies in the investigation ofthe Wright group?A. Yes, we did. [As] the scope of theoperation was revealed, ... we contacted theagencies from those various localities andjurisdictions. And the first that we wereinvolved with was the Middlesex CountyProsecutor’s Office. And this operationbecame a joint operation with that office.And as the investigation expanded we be-came involved with the Passaic County Prose-cutor’s Office, the Franklin Township Po-lice Department, the New Brunswick PoliceDepartment and the New Jersey State Po-lice, as well as the Essex County Sheriff’sNarcotics Unit.

This operation led to the [formalization] ofthe relationship between our office, Mid-dlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, Franklinand New Brunswick Police Departments.And we formed a unit known as the BorderAnti-Drug Team [BAT] to deal specificallywith this investigation and with successororganizations. Essentially [the BAT] unitprovides personnel from each of the officesthat I mentioned to work in a specific areaand on a specific problem. So we have a BATunit, if you will, that exists that deals with theSomerset, Middlesex, Franklin Township,New Brunswick border, and recently we’veexpanded that to the eastern portion of Som-erset County where we share a border withUnion County. And the Union CountyProsecutor’s Office, along with theMiddlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, ouroffice, North Plainfield, Plainfield, SouthPlainfield and Piscataway Police Depart-ments, and I believe also Edison, have pro-vided personnel. And we formed that unit to

do the same thing in that area.

Q. This BAT operation is ongoing, then?A. Yes, it’s ongoing in two areas. And whatit does is it allows these units to focus on aparticular problem in a particular area with-out being concerned about being movedbecause of resources or other demands orother ... law enforcement problems that mayexist.

Q. Did electronic surveillance help in bring-ing down the Wright group?A. Yes, this group was unique because theydid not operate from a fixed location. Theyessentially operated out of the automobilesthat Wright leased for the members of thegroup, and they contacted each other by useof cellular telephones and telephone pagingdevices. So, we obtained a court order, andwith the help of the State Police, who pro-vided us the technology, we were able to bugtwo of the vehicles. And those bugs ledsignificantly to the results of this investiga-tion.

For example, without the bugs we would nothave been able to know when Wright wasmeeting Alexander on July 25, [1989], forthe pick up of the narcotics and we would nothave, in all probability, been able to not onlyarrest Wright with [the] product, but also toarrest Alexander and then get a search war-rant, execute that search warrant on hishouse and seize yet another three kilos ofcocaine....

...

Q. Now, when you talk about the electronicsurveillance, did the State Police supply theexpertise and you supplied the equipment?A. Yes. What happened was we contactedthe State Police because ... our people knewwhat we wanted to do, but we didn’t have thetechnology, and the State Police ElectronicSurveillance Unit provided us with the know-

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how, so to speak, the technology. And theyput us in contact with someone who couldbuild for us that particular equipment thatwe needed .... And without their assistancewe would not have been able to do it. Andsince then we’ve shared that technology withthem, as well.

Q. How did Wright attempt to insulatehimself from the activities of his underlingsand from law enforcement detection?A. Wright only dealt with two people, essen-tially, directly, and that was Earvin andDickerson. Dickerson and Earvin then dealtwith all the others. So there was very littledirect contact with respect to distribution ofcocaine between Wright and street dealerssuch as Sirmans. In addition to that, all thecontacts were made through the pagers, thetelephone pagers that he provided. Therewere no telephone calls from a fixed loca-tion, such as Wright’s home or anything likethat.

In addition, for example, when they leasedthe apartment in Newark Wright picked alocation, he brought Dickerson with him,and Dickerson signed the lease for the apart-ment. Wright’s name doesn’t appear on thelease. He also instructed these people, Earvinand Dickerson, on how to instruct the run-ners with respect to ... not keeping cash andnarcotics together. He provided for inter-mediaries when they were arrested to postbail so the bail didn’t come directly fromhim, but at the same time his people didn’tstay in jail for any significant length of time.

In addition to that, he owned a ... recordingcompany in New York known as ExpressRecords, which we believe was essentially acover for the narcotics operation, while hiswife was a member of a recording groupknown as the Cover Girls. We also discov-ered in his apartment two sets of tax returnsindicating the use of an alias on his part to

further cover the nature of the operation.

Q. What’s the status of the Wright groupnow?A. ... [T]welve people were arrested as aresult of this operation. With the exceptionof Wright, who is awaiting trial, and Earvin,who will shortly enter a guilty plea, all othershave entered guilty pleas, with the exceptionof two whose charges were dismissed. Theywere relatives of Alexander who were ar-rested when his house was searched and thecocaine was found and his guilty plea exon-erated them from involvement.

...

Q. Wright still faces jail time?A. Yes, he’s in the Somerset County Jail andawaiting a trial scheduled for [early] 1991.

FIVE PERCENTERS

At its public hearing the SCI heard testimonyfrom an electronically disguised former member of agroup which variously calls itself the Five Percenters,the Five Percent Nation or the Gods. Also, Louis L.Jordan, an Investigator with the Monmouth CountyProsecutor’s Office with extensive experience intracking the group’s members and activities, testifiedat length.

Particularly troubling about the Five Percentersis the existence of racist attitudes and criminal activi-ties behind the facade of a culture with religiousovertones. The dogma underlying the group origi-nated in New York City in 1964 when the lateMalcolm X expelled the late Clarence 13X from theNation of Islam (better known as the Black Muslims)for adulterating the beliefs of that movement. Whilethe Muslims believe that blacks should respect them-selves and their fellow human beings and that blacksshould take their rightful place in society, Clarence13X postulated that black men (not women) aregods, that black men are the sole creators and con-trollers of the Earth and that whites are devils.

11

Clarence 13X’s teachings included the dogmathat 85 percent of the world’s population are blackswho, like cattle, have strayed away from “true teach-ings.” Ten percent are the white “devils,” who arenot to be trusted. The remaining five percent are the“pure righteous teachers” or “originals,” who mustlead the cattle back to the “true way.” Thus, thegroup came to be called Five Percenters or Gods.Some Hispanics and Sicilians are allowed into FivePercenter groups, as they may be considered to be“half-originals,” tracing themselves to black ancestryor relations.

In the 1980s the Five Percenters migrated fromNew York to New Jersey and several other states.They became active in Asbury Park, Long Branch,Red Bank, Freehold Borough, Bradley Beach, Aber-deen, Lakewood, Matawan, Elizabeth, Linden,Irvington, parts of Newark, Jersey City, Camden,Atlantic City, Trenton, Paterson, Plainfield, MountHolly and Pemberton Township. They are presentlyconcentrated in Monmouth and Ocean counties withapproximately 14 chapters numbering about 300 to400 members in Monmouth County, according toDetective Jordan.

In addition to developing a prejudiced and de-meaning cultural dogma, the Five Percenters becamea haven for those engaged in criminal activities,primarily narcotics distribution.

Investigator Jordan testified that investigationshave revealed Five Percenters “involved in every-thing from criminal mischief to murder, arson, bur-glary, robbery, aggravated assault, possession of aweapon ....” He emphasized that religious teachingsare only a nominal part of the movement:

Q. Since they are an offshoot of a religiousmovement, we should clarify one thing. Areall Five Percenters involved in violence andcrimes?A. No, they are not.

Q. How many would you say are?A. I have met, in my experience since 1980,

of tracking, two families that have not beeninvolved in any way, form or fashion with thenegative aspects. However, the rest I’vefound to be all involved in criminal activity....

...

Q. When you say families, you mean —A. Mother, father, children.

Under questioning by SCI Deputy Director andCounsel Robert J. Clark, the disguised witness testi-fied about the difference between Five Percentersinvolved in criminal activities and those who are not:

Q. Are Five Percenters involved in criminalactivity?A. Five Percenters are involved in drugsales, sales of guns, robbery, stolen cars,chop shops, murder, all types of criminalactivities.

Q. Can a Five Percenter choose not to beinvolved in criminal activity?A. Yes, he can.

Q. What would this be called by the move-ment?A. He would be leading a pure righteous life.

Q. So the pure righteous life is a FivePercenter who is not involved in criminalactivity?A. Yes.

Q. How many of the Five Percenters that youknow live the pure righteous life?A. About 15 percent.

Investigator Jordan detailed how Five Percen-ters spread their doctrine and expand their criminalactivities:

Q. We’ve heard of operations called univer-sal rallies. Could you explain what that is?

12

A. That’s normally a place set up by some-one in that movement where they go and theyhave meetings. One of the key places wherethey go to have these rallies is in New YorkCity. We have also tracked them since 1980as having their rallies down in Florida,Great Adventure in Jackson [Township, NewJersey] and also several parks [within] theState of New Jersey, such as Shark RiverPark in Neptune and several other parks inMonmouth, Middlesex and Ocean counties.

Q. What is the purpose of these rallies?A. The purpose is supposedly to educate theyoung men [and] young women in the betterunderstanding of their culture. We havefound that a lot of them are involved innarcotics trafficking, ... that is, that they aregoing out, instead of attending the meetings,for example, the bus takes them from here toNew York City, some will attend the rallies,the others will stray away and be involved ina lot of narcotics trafficking and bringingthe drugs back across the line.

Q. Are these places where they learn tech-niques for the distribution of narcotics?A. They learn that, as well as New Jersey,New York and Pennsylvania law.

Q. Learning the law is a means of protectingthemselves against it?A. That’s very true.

The disguised witness elaborated on the activi-ties at the Five Percenter universal rallies:

Q. You said rally?A. Yes, sir, [they] usually go to the rally inCentral Park in New York City.

Q. Do people from New Jersey attend theserallies?A. Yes, they do.

Q. Five Percenter members from New Jer-

sey?A. Yes.

Q. What is the purpose for a rally?A. To bring out existence, to gain knowledgeof self.

Q. Is there any other purpose for theserallies?A. Certain members use the rally for certainthings like to make connection for drugs,guns or whatever they into at that time.

The Five Percenters have run into some barriersto the spread of their organization. In answer toCommissioner Kenneth D. Merin’s questions, Inves-tigator Jordan testified that Five Percenters “initially... would go in and set up in places where there is aconstant denial of their existence, just giving them alever to operate, if you will ....” He explained onereason why they are not well-established in someplaces, such as Newark:

[I]n Newark there is the Muslim faith, whichis very strong there, as well as in New York;and they denounce what the Five Percentersare doing. And as a result of that it is verydifficult for the Five Percenters to get afoothold. You have to understand also thatit is taboo in the Muslim faith to call yourselfa god, so here you have these gentlemencalling themselves gods and the Muslimcommunity just does not want to hear that, sothey denounce what they are doing.

Investigator Jordan described the subservientrole of women in the organization:

Women, for the most part, are basically anauxiliary. They are used, for the most part,to be impregnated, to have the children ... tokeep the movement going. ... [W]e’ve foundthat [those on welfare or state aid turn it]over to the movement. Part of that is thengiven back to them. A majority of it is turnedover into narcotics trafficking ....

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Five Percenters are apparently not consistentlyresponsive to a centralized leadership. Leaders in themovement may be called ministers, Allah, FatherTeacher, Father Allah, and the like, according toInvestigator Jordan. The disguised witness furtherdescribed the leadership and organization of the FivePercenters and the division of profits from illegalactivities:

Q. What happens to the proceeds of FivePercenter criminal activity, that is the moneythat is earned?A. It goes to support the Five PercentNation. The money from the criminal activi-ties is shared among the members.

Q. Are the profits passed up to a leader?A. There is not really one certain leader.[They] are more of a group activity.

Q. Are there people called kingpins?A. Yes.

Q. And do they operate in different areas?A. Yes.

Q. Do they receive a share of the profits?A. Yes.

...

Q. Who decides what type of crimes aparticular group of Five Percenters willcommit?A. It’s usually a group activity. Someonedecides to do a certain crime, and the restagree. It’s like a Mafia type thing where theyare all a family and they make a decision asa group.

...

Q. Do you know of any Five Percenterkingpins in New Jersey?A. Yes.

Q. In what area do you know of them?

A. Asbury Park.

Q. Could you give their righteous names?A. King Nijee and Knowledge Supreme.

...

Q. Have both these kingpins been involvedin drug distribution?A. Yes.

Q. What kind of drugs have they sold?A. Whatever the traffic demands they sell,but it’s mostly cocaine and marijuana.

Q. Where do they get their supply of co-caine?A. They go up to, like 135th Street or 185thStreet, Upper Manhattan or the Bronx andbuy the cocaine from the Dominicans.

Q. Where do they get their supplies ofmarijuana?A. From the Jamaicans in Queens andHarlem.

Q. Are any of these Jamaicans Five Percen-ters themselves?A. Yes.

...

Q. Would you say that the Five PercentNation is an organized crime group?A. Yes.

Q. And why would you say that?A. They sell drugs, they steal cars, they doburglaries, commit murder, they have policeworking for them. I guess you could say theywere an organized crime group.

Investigator Jordan described how localities candetermine if they have a Five Percenter presence:

Q. How do you, as a law enforcementmember, identify a Five Percenter or an

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area where there is Five Percenter activity?A. ... [W]e look for the graffiti around thebuildings, public places, and the telephonebooths, the curbing. We look for the nega-tive attitude by the members. At one timethey were easily identifiable. They used towear the knitted skull caps and [lens]lessglasses .... Now we are identifying them witha half crescent moon and star with a number7 in it, which is their logo, which representsthe Five Percenter Nation. And again welook for that negative attitude.

Q. Is there any kind of distinctive dress thatFive Percenters wear?A. It changes from area to area. Here inTrenton I understand they do wear a certainmanner of dress, but down in MonmouthCounty ... they no longer wear it.

Q. Would you watch for people wearing a lotof jewelry?A. Yes, I would, large amounts of gold,beepers, and in short we just look for that“Mr. T starter kit”, so to speak.

...Q. Is there any particular language orjargon that the Five Percenters use?A. Yes, there is. Other than calling them-selves righteous, they use [names, such as]... Master Born, King Understanding, Wis-dom Knowledge, Divine Power, RighteousGod, Queen Asiatic.

Q. Are these substitutes for their givennames, or do they use them alternatingly?A. You have to understand that they say thisis their righteous name and they refer to theterm righteous. The name that they have,such as Johnson or Jones or Smith, is an“enslaved name,” and they do not acceptthat, even though if you were to challengethem ... in law enforcement, they will alwaysgive their government name, but that is onlybecause of all the press that they’ve beengetting lately. Normally they use their right-

eous names.

Q. Do some gangs that are not composed ofFive Percenters adopt some of the trappingsof Five Percenters in order to make them-selves more intimidating?A. Yes, we have that, as well, where we havegang members that ... call themselves FivePercenters, even though they are really not,just because the Five Percenters are basi-cally the dominant gang in MonmouthCounty.

Q. Have you heard of a term, Jive Percen-ters?A. Yes, I have. Those are what ... some true,so-called, Five Percenters say are the oneswho are just setting a name for themselves,who are actively involved in all the differenttypes of crimes and so forth.

One multi-kilo cocaine distribution network inAtlantic City had substantial connections to the FivePercenters. Its leader, Hakeem Abdul Shaheed (akaRobert E. Molley or Midget Molley), and most of its60 some members were Five Percenters. Shaheed, aresident of Vineland, called his group the Aso Posseand often flaunted his drug-financed wealth by wear-ing a gold crown.

Victor (Shorty) Fernandez, a Dominican wholived in Edgewater, New Jersey, was the principalsupplier of cocaine to Shaheed’s organization. InFebruary 1989, Shaheed, Fernandez and 18 mem-bers of the Aso Posse were arrested by federalauthorities, who estimated that Shaheed’s organiza-tion was obtaining and distributing $1 million worthof cocaine per month in the Atlantic City projects.Shortly after Shaheed’s arrest, several Jamaican drugdealers from Brooklyn moved into the Atlantic Cityprojects to take over his territory. Shaheed wasconvicted, and on January 22, 1990, he was sen-tenced to 19 years in prison.

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GANGS

While testifying specifically about the FivePercenters, Investigator Jordan described the gangproblem in general. He noted that although there areabout 14 Five Percenter chapters in MonmouthCounty, there are approximately 68 gangs in thatcounty involved in criminal activity.

Investigator Jordan is a member of ConcernedOfficers Organization On Gang Activities (CO3GAor COOOGA). He outlined the organization’s struc-ture and activities at the Commission’s public hear-ing:

Q. What is that organization and what doesit do?A. [CO3GA] was ... started in 1980 by fourconcerned police officers, from the AsburyPark and Neptune Police departments whofelt that gang violence was on the rise, whoalso felt that there was a lot of denial withrespect to the growth of gangs, and who feltthis was a contributing factor to the tremen-dous drug problem that we have in our statetoday, that constant denial. ... [T]he Con-cerned Officers Organization basically tracksgangs. What we do is monitor groups thatare out there, youth groups, as well as adultgroups, and if we find that they are involvedin gang activity or they take up criminalactivity, we inform not only the local policedepartment, but the community as a whole.

Q. This is a non-profit organization?A. Non-profit, self-supporting, civilian-runorganization that also does a lot of counsel-ing with gang members.

Q. Does it have any ties to law enforcement,aside from the members being from lawenforcement, a lot of them?A. No ties.

Q. Are the members of this organizationboth black and white, male and female?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And it works with civic organizations?A. Yes, we will work with any organizationthat is in the State of New Jersey or elsewhereto help combat this juvenile delinquencyproblem or gang problem.

Q. Does it work with law enforcement agen-cies?A. Yes, sir, definitely.

Q. In what capacity?A. Seminars, training, identifying activegang members that are involved in an ongo-ing investigation of crime where a patternhas been set.

Q. And this organization studies gangs thatare not just Five Percenters, is that right?A. That is correct.

Investigator Jordan elaborated on CO3GA’sdefinition of a gang and described the various typesof gang leadership encountered:

Q. In general, is there a definition that youuse to describe a gang ...?A. Yes, we say that there must be fourelements that must be met ... for them to beclassified as a gang. The first one is theymust have an identifiable leader. That lead-ership structure, weak or structured in na-ture, must be there.

...[Second,] we say that they must have ageographic area or turf that they call theirown. [Third, w]e say that they must meet ona continuous or regular basis. [The] fourthelement certainly must be there, and that isthat they must be involved in juvenile delin-quency or criminal activity. If you have allfour of those elements you have what we callthe working definition of a gang.

...

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[W]ith respect to leadership, ... we look atthree different types ... [--] a bull’s-eye, apyramid, and an intrigue structure. ... If youvisualize with me, if you will, a bull’s-eye, wefind with this particular structure there is noreal identifiable leadership to this gang. Wealso find that the closer you get to the centerof this bull’s-eye the closer you get to thehard core members of the gang. We also findthat, whether the gang structure was there ornot, this particular group would still beinvolved in some form of criminal activity.

Next we see the pyramid structure, ... every-body at the bottom catering to the person atthe top. All movements within this gang arecontrolled ... by that person at the top. Thisis the structure you will more than likely seewhen you start to talk about narcotics traf-ficking with respect to this gang. It is organ-ized in that sense.

The intrigue or want-to-be structure is noth-ing more than a bunch of looseballs attachedby a single thread. These are the up andcoming members who have not yet beeninvolved in criminal activity, who are stilllearning their lessons or are still studying, ifyou will, they are the want-to-bes. Mostly,you will find this gang operating in terms ofleadership [somewhere] between the pyra-mid or concentric circle or bull’s-eye struc-ture.

...

Q. Are you saying that the leadership fluc-tuates or changes to meet the needs of theorganization or different criminal enterprisesthat it’s involved in?A. Yes.

Q. So, it’s fluid, the leadership?A. Yes, it is.

Q. Are there certain higher leaders thatcommand attention from the members more

than others?A. Yes, there are. At present we are in courtwith several. On the street now, at least inMonmouth County, there are not too many.Most of our leaders are incarcerated orpending trial, but we do have several on thestreet that are out there that are trying tobuild themselves to take over the leaders’places.

JAMAICAN POSSES

Born in the poverty and political turmoil ofKingston, Jamaica, violent, structured organizedcrime groups spread to the United States during thelast two decades. Jamaican criminal gangs adoptedthe term “posse” because of their fondness for Ameri-can western films and because the word connoted theuse of violence to enforce political will and to protectneighborhoods from intrusion by rival gangs. Eachposse eventually came to be structured, with a par-ticular leader -- sometimes called a general -- and asubstructure divided into cells. Cell leaders aresometimes called captains or lieutenants.

The initial impetus for the migration of Jamaicanposse members to the United States in the 1970s wassimply the need for funds to obtain sophisticatedweapons to be used in the perpetual gang warfare inKingston. Once in this country, posses were soonable to take over marijuana distribution networks ofnonviolent Jamaicans who preceded them here. Asthe posses matured in the United States, the leadersbecame more insulated from actual street drug salesand expanded into bulk distribution, especially whenthey became involved in the cocaine and crack mar-kets.

Since the mid-1970s, posses have been traffick-ing the high-grade sinsemilla strain of marijuanacalled “Jamaican Gold,” which is indigenous to Ja-maica. By 1984, the various posses became active inthe transportation and distribution of cocaine andcrack, also called rock cocaine. In addition to drugdistribution, the posses are involved in trafficking offirearms, kidnappings, robberies, home invasions,

17

alien smuggling and money laundering.

The two largest Jamaican posses are Shower andSpangler. Many of the active posses in the UnitedStates are spin-offs from these two. Traditionally,the Shower and Spangler groups have been bitterenemies because of their political differences. Mem-bers of the Shower Posse are avid supporters of theJamaican Labor Party, while Spangler Posse mem-bers have been solidly behind the opposition PeoplesNational Party.

Typically, posse members and associates usealiases, nicknames and false identification. Mostwho enter the United States are here illegally. Theyare very adept at obtaining phony drivers licenses,birth certificates, passports, citizenship cards andnaturalization certificates. They are also very mo-bile.

Under questioning by SCI Deputy Director Clark,a disguised Jamaican posse associate testified aboutthe posses’ operations in New Jersey:

Q. Where in New Jersey were the possesactive?A. Well, [there are] different posse figuresfrom different groups, and they are active inEast Orange, Englewood, Paterson, Newarkand I would say to a lesser extent in Hack-ensack. Also in Port Elizabeth there are a lotof posse figures in that area who are in-volved in smuggling marijuana, I would saywith the help of the Jamaicans who work onthe docks, because many times the cargocontainers would be used to hide shipmentsof marijuana.

Q. In what particular types of criminalactivity are the posses involved in New Jer-sey?A. Sir, New Jersey [was] always consideredto be a safe place to hide from the New Yorkpolice and a very good place to stash mari-juana, weapons. During the ’70s and early’80s New Jersey was always considered and

used as a safe area.

Q. Why was New Jersey considered to be asafe area?A. Police in New Jersey did not take possesseriously at the time and, as a matter of fact,... I don’t think that they even knew that theyexisted.

Q. That the posses existed?A. Yes, sir. We would use hotels and motelsspecifically in New Jersey on Route 4 to keepmarijuana and later distribute it back overinto the New York area.

...

Q. What area in New Jersey has the highestamount of Jamaican posse activity?A. Well, from my experience personally Iwould say that Paterson is the number onearea in New Jersey, you know, and alsoplaces like East Orange.

Q. Why Paterson?A. Maybe because posse members, theyhave relatives that live in the Paterson areaand East Orange, you know, and because ofthis it was always a good area to hide out,you know.

Q. Is that also true for East Orange?A. Certainly, sir.

The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco andFirearms (ATF) estimates that there are at least 40Jamaican posses with more than 13,000 membersoperating in the United States. The SCI has posi-tively identified five posses that presently or in thepast have operated drug distribution networks inNew Jersey: Shower, Spangler, Dunkirk Boys, TelAviv and Waterhouse. Members or associates ofother posses who are not aligned with an operationaldrug network have also been arrested in New Jersey.Similar to many La Cosa Nostra operatives who livein New Jersey and conduct their criminal activities inNew York, many Jamaican posse members who

18

operate drug distribution networks in New Yorkhave chosen to live in New Jersey. In addition to theposses already mentioned, members of the Painelandand Two Mile posses have been identified as living inNew Jersey.

SHOWER POSSE

The Shower Posse originated in the Tivoli Gar-dens section of Kingston around 1981. Its membershave been avid supporters of the Jamaican LaborParty (JLP). Its name derives from its reputation forshowering its victims with bullets. In September1988 a federal grand jury in Miami indicted 34members of the Shower Posse, including LesterLloyd (Big Jim Brown) Coke, the top leader inKingston, as well as Vivian Blake, the top leader inthe United States. Coke is scheduled for an extradi-tion hearing from Jamaica. Blake is still a fugitive.Intelligence information indicates that in September1989 he had been in Atlantic City for less than 24hours before departing for Toronto and then toJamaica.

Shower Posse networks are involved in the saleof cocaine and marijuana in the New Jersey cities ofNewark, East Orange, Irvington, Camden, AtlanticCity, Vineland, Trenton and Bridgeton. Recentarrest statistics indicate that the number of ShowerPosse members operating within the state is growing.As of November 1988, 53 Shower Posse membershad been arrested in New Jersey for involvement indrug distribution. In 1989, the number of membersidentified increased to 75.

SPANGLER POSSE

The Spangler Posse originated in the MatthewsLane area of Kingston, and its members have tradi-tionally supported the Peoples National Party (PNP).The late Glenford (Early Bird) Phipps headed theNew York City-based operations for the Spanglers,along with the recently murdered Toywell (Cow)Phillips, who also controlled drug distribution net-works in Englewood and Paterson in New Jersey.Under investigation by New York authorities, Toywell

Phillips fled back to Jamaica in early 1989. Some lawenforcement officials believe that the new leader ofthe Spanglers in New York City will be from NewJersey. According to the disguised Jamaican witnessand several other sources, the leader of the Spanglersin Jamaica is an individual named Dannie Dodd.Glenford Phipps was murdered in Kingston on July15, 1990, while acting in his capacity as Supervisorof Metropolitan Parks and Markets in Kingston.Toywell Phillips was killed on December 1, 1990, inJamaica, reportedly on orders of Lester Lloyd Coke,the leader of the Shower Posse in Jamaica.

Spangler Posse networks distribute primarilymarijuana, cocaine and crack in Paterson. Intelli-gence indicates that Spangler members in New YorkCity continue to supply marijuana to associates inTrenton and Camden. The number of SpanglerPosse members identified as operating drug distribu-tion networks in New Jersey in 1989 was 45, anincrease from the 27 reported in 1988.

DUNKIRK BOYS POSSE

The Dunkirk Boys Posse, also known as Kirkys,has been under the leadership of Dennis (Stickman)Smith since 1977. Traditionally, this posse has beenmixed politically, but has many members who sup-port the PNP in Jamaica. From 1987 through 1988,the Dunkirk Boys in New York City were at war withthe Spangler Posse, but within the last two years atruce has been declared.

Some members and associates of the DunkirkBoys who did not wish to participate in the NewYork war moved into Englewood, New Jersey, in1987, selling marijuana, cocaine, crack and weap-ons. However, the group has been virtually elimi-nated from that area because of arrests of their streetdealers and mid-level suppliers by the EnglewoodPolice Department and the Bergen County NarcoticsTask Force. Ledlo (Blacker) Gillings, who operatedin conjunction with this cell of Dunkirk Boys, wassentenced to federal prison on March 3, 1989, oncharges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Theother members of this cell split, some moving their

19

operations to Boston, others to Richmond, Virginia.

Intelligence information indicated that in 1988several members of the Dunkirk Boys who left NewYork City went to the New Brunswick area. Thesepersons, who were only known by their street names,were not reported to be involved in drug distribution.Instead, they were using New Brunswick only as asafe area.

There were 29 members and associates of theDunkirk Boys Posse identified as operating or con-trolling drug distribution networks in New Jersey in1988. At the present time, however, there is noknown network of this posse actively operating inNew Jersey.

TEL AVIV POSSE

In the late fall of 1989, information was devel-oped regarding known members of the Tel AvivPosse operating in Paterson. This posse originated inthe Tellerville section of Kingston, where it wasinitially known on the streets as the Skulls. Itsmembers support the PNP, and they have beenknown to associate closely with members of theJungle Posse. The Spangler Posse has long operatedseveral drug distribution networks in Paterson, and itappears that they are operating independently of andnot in conflict with this new posse. Since theSpangler, Jungle and Tel Aviv posses are all support-ers of the PNP, it is possible that they are workingtogether.

The disguised Jamaican witness identified theleader of the Jungle Posse as Tony (Red Tony) Welshof Miami. The SCI has corroborated this informa-tion from additional sources.

WATERHOUSE POSSE

The name of this posse derives from the fact thatmany of its members are from the Waterhouse areaof Kingston. Members and associates of the Water-house Posse have been arrested in Jersey City andMount Laurel in the past. Between 1983 and early

1985, a small cell of the Waterhouse Posse operateda marijuana distribution network in Trenton. Theprincipal operatives of this network were DennisDerrick Dobson and Daniel Augustus Comrie, bothof Willingboro, who were arrested in 1985 for at-tempting to bribe a Trenton police officer to protecttheir operation on South Clinton Avenue. On June 4,1990, Dennis Dobson was arrested by police inBristol Township, Pennsylvania, for operating a co-caine and crack distribution network out of theVenice-Ashby housing project in the township.Dobson’s operation sold cocaine and crack throughstreet operatives in Lower Bucks County, Pennsyl-vania, and Trenton, New Jersey.

Since about 1989, the term “posse” has becomepopular with non-Jamaican gangs, due to the public-ity surrounding the Jamaican groups. In many urbanareas, for instance, African-American youth gangshave adopted the term “posse.” On February 15,1991, several members of a group comprised of bothJamaicans and African-Americans were arrested ondrug and weapons offenses in Trenton. The group,calling itself the Suicide Posse, had been active in thewestern section of the city selling marijuana.

Meanwhile, many of the real Jamaican posseshave started calling their groups “massives.” Manyof the second-tier members have started using theterm “crews” to describe their cells or drug distribu-tion networks. For example, at the SCI’s publichearing the disguised Jamaican witness identified aNew York City group, calling itself the Tower HillCrew, led by a Jamaican named Bonnie Wizzie.

By the end of 1989, entrepreneurial considera-tions had become more important than politicalallegiances in running the posses. As members of theold guard of the posse leadership are either killed orjailed, younger members, some of them second gen-eration immigrants less attuned to the gang warfareand politics of Kingston, are taking over. Theemphasis now is on practical concerns such as whois able to supply the drugs and at what price. Thedisguised Jamaican witness described some of thesetrends:

20

I feel the future of the first generation mem-bers connected to Jamaica is very, very dim.[A]gain they are beginning to run back toJamaica due to the heavy sentences that ...they are getting in the U.S., you know. Someof, I would say, the second generation areinvolved in the same, just as they pose more[of a threat] as far as they are concerned,because they know more about the Americanjustice systems ... because they were bornhere. They are American citizens, but fromJamaican parentage, you know.

This does not mean that a posse member in theUnited States no longer cares who is in power inJamaica. On the contrary, politics affects his rela-tives and friends in the old neighborhood in King-ston. What this does mean is that the new Jamaicanimmigrants connected to a posse think more of thebottom line as they assume leadership roles in theirgangs rather than of political labels as their elders did.

Law enforcement has even reported former en-emies, such as Spangler and Shower posse members,working together in drug deals to increase profits fortheir common benefit. Within the next three years, asposses are dismantled by law enforcement, theyounger members will splinter into smaller groupsand operate their drug networks on a regional levelrather than on the expansive levels that the possesnow operate. This move toward independence willcreate additional problems for law enforcement,since drug quantities available for seizure will be-come smaller and the targets will therefore seem lesssignificant. These separate cells or crews will utilizethe same sources of supply as their predecessors andwill also have adequate manpower for their streetsales by smuggling illegal aliens from Jamaica. It isalso most likely that these youths will expand theirlegitimate business operations beyond the ethnicgrocery stores or record shops into more American-ized, large investment enterprises such as automobileleasing or dealerships, trucking or travel agencies. Infact, examples of this probable trend are beginning tooccur in Florida and New York.

Although powerful, secretive and mobile, Jamai-can posses are not invulnerable to law enforcementefforts. In a successful federal-local cooperativeeffort, in December 1990, virtually all of the 42alleged members of the Jamaican Gulleymen Possewere indicted by a federal grand jury in Brooklyn.The indictment named 35 people on narcotics con-spiracy charges, 16 for money laundering and threeon fraudulent passport charges. Included in theindictment was a State Department employee whoallegedly helped the gang members obtain fraudulentpassports. The case was broken with informationprovided by several gang members now serving lifesentences on guilty pleas to various crimes, includingmurder. The gang reportedly took in more than $100million from sales of heroin, cocaine, crack andmarijuana in New York, Washington and Dallas overthe last five years and carried out at least 10 murderson orders of its leader, Eric Vassell, currently be-lieved to be in hiding in the New York area.

In November 1990, a Burlington County grandjury indicted six people who allegedly operated aJamaican marijuana smuggling ring from a home inWillingboro. This group was supplying much of themarijuana to Shower Posse members and associateswho operate and staff Jamaican crack houses in WestPhiladelphia and the Germantown section of Phila-delphia. The Willingboro Police Department,Burlington County Prosecutor’s Office, State Policeand SCI cooperated in a yearlong investigation of theoperation, which at its height spent $60,000 to$80,000 to purchase about 200 pounds of marijuanaper week. The alleged leaders of the drug distribu-tion network were Dawn Patricia Ulett, her sisterSonya Henry and her husband Milton Anthony Hylton.From the “control point” in Willingboro, courierswere given money to purchase marijuana in Houston,New York, Tucson, Los Angeles, Jamaica andMexico. The marijuana was stashed in rental apart-ments in Philadelphia, before being distributed out ofHylton’s Philadelphia residence to customers in SouthJersey and Pennsylvania.

Willingboro is also the base for an alien smug-gling ring which supplies much of the manpower to

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staff the various crack houses for the Shower Possein Philadelphia.

Under questioning by SCI Counsel Gaal, Detec-tive George Joyner of the Camden Police Depart-ment testified about Jamaican posse involvement indrug trafficking in Camden:

Q. Is the Jamaican criminal activity inCamden organized?A. Yes. The term ... posse ..., picked up byour local drug ... sets, ... [originally came]from the Jamaican posses.

...Q. In what types of criminal activity are theJamaican posses involved?A. They deal basically in the sale of mari-juana and cocaine, and they’ve also beeninvolved in numerous weapon violations.

Q. Have you been able to identify theJamaican gangs that operate in Camden?A. [I]ntelligence information has identifiedelements of the two major [Jamaican] pos-ses ..., which [are] Spangler and Shower, butat this time the term posse, as an individualgroup, is fading away and what you areseeing now is the search for the money.Everything is developed on the profits.

Q. Do these Jamaican drug dealers interactwith any of the African-American sets orother operations in Camden?A. Yes, several of the Jamaican drug dealersdo interact with the sets in Camden by sellingmarijuana. In addition to their own sourcesof supply for cocaine in New York City theJamaican dealers in Camden have obtainedcocaine from members of the Junior BlackMafia operating out of Philadelphia, andthey also maintain their own marijuana sup-plies.

Q. Is there any particular set in Camdenwith which Jamaican posse figures haveestablisheed ties?

A. Yes, there appears to be a close relation-ship between one of the principal Jamaicandealers and the 24th and Hyde Street set.

Q. How do the Jamaican drug dealerslaunder their drug profits?A. Within the last two to three years theJamaicans involved in drug distribution havetripled their legitimate business operations.They own and operate several bars, clothingstores and small food stores in the Camdenarea.

Q. Approximately how many Jamaican possemembers or associates are involved in eithercocaine or marijuana distribution inCamden?A. I would estimate at least one hundredindividuals are involved with the Jamaicandrug trade in the Camden City area.

Commissioner W. Hunt Dumont asked Detec-tive Joyner to elaborate on the influence of theJamaicans in Camden:

Q. Do the Jamaican groups ... cooperatewith these other non-Jamaican groups inCamden? Do they divide up the territory oris this not as organized as that?A. They are extremely organized. They arenationally connected. As a matter of fact, Iwould even go as far as to say internationallyconnected as far as the United States. Theirnetwork is as far reaching from Camden asTexas, Florida, Baltimore, New York, Kan-sas City. I keep in contact with numerousofficers that are running into Jamaicanswho are showing up in their territory that aregiving Camden addresses, et cetera. Inreference to the specific group in Camden,they specialize in quiet takeovers.

Q. What do you mean by that?A. A quiet takeover, they do not have to comein and shoot up an area, beat uppeople, andthings like that to take over. They move in,

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I don’t know whether they negotiate, theybuy a property, they centralize themselves inan area, they attach themselves to the localsfrom the area and then begin to use them andthen at one point they become at a higherlevel and just fade out of the picture, but theyare still in control and this is what hashappened in the Camden area. It took some-where around the neighborhood of 10 yearsfor this to develop to this point.

NIGERIANS

Bernard J. Murphy, Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge of the Newark office of the FBI, testified atthe Commission’s public hearing about highly mobileNigerian criminals engaged in organized schemes todefraud banks and other financial institutions. Spe-cial Agent Murphy detailed several examples inwhich Nigerians, using high quality fabricated iden-tification, engaged in sophisticated frauds in NewJersey:

In early 1987 a group of New Jersey bankersrequested FBI assistance in investigating aseries of frauds which were being committedby Nigerians against New Jersey financialinstitutions. Upon our initial investigationthese crimes appeared to be widespread andisolated. However, a detailed examinationof the individual frauds revealed a complexscheme which employed similar styles, all ofwhich were interconnected.

A detailed examination of one of these fraudsrevealed that an individual using an aliasopened accounts in four banks in Marlboro,Old Bridge and Freehold, New Jersey. All ofthe accounts were opened with a minimalcash deposit, normally fifty to a hundreddollars, and [each] bank was provided witha home address, place of employment and aNew Jersey photo driver’s license for identi-fication. The customer also requested andreceived an automatic teller machine [ATM]card for [each] bank account. The banks

followed their normal procedure for newaccount verification, did not develop anyinvalid information which would cause themto close the accounts and, therefore, opened[the] accounts.

Shortly after the accounts were opened, aseries of checks drawn on banks in Florida,Georgia, Maryland and New York were de-posited into these accounts via the ATMs.The accounts were monitored remotely viaATM, and when the money was released intothe account the Nigerian visited severalbranches of each bank during a two to threeday period and withdrew the majority of themoney. [Finally, a]ll of the deposited checkswere later returned unpaid causing the banksto suffer losses.

The investigation revealed that the addressgiven by the Nigerian customer was, in real-ity, a self-storage facility. The self-storagefacility also offered private mail receivingservices. The employment that he had pro-vided was contacted by the bank, and it wasdetermined to be a telephone answeringservice that verified employment. The aliasname and the Social Security number usedby this individual was determined to be atrue person who was an executive with a NewYork financial institution.

In yet another case in May of 1988, anindividual attempted to open a bank accountin Middletown, New Jersey. An alert cus-tomer service representative questioned theindividual, who then fled the bank. Theservice representative obtained the licenseplate of his vehicle and contacted localpolice, who then arrested the suspect withina few blocks of the intended victim bank.Although this individual was alone when heleft the bank, he had a passenger in his carat the time of his arrest. The passenger waslater identified through fingerprints as aNigerian national who was a federal fugi-

23

tive. The original charges against the pas-senger were also for fraudulent activity. Thedriver of the vehicle posted a $10,000 bondand was released the same day.

Again, our later determination was that thename given by the driver was, in fact, analias of yet another Nigerian national. Thealias given to the Middletown Police De-partment [in Monmouth County] was thesame name used to defraud another bank inMillstone, New Jersey. Further investiga-tion determined that all the aliases were trueidentities of bank employees from New YorkCity.

An in-depth investigation by the FBI deter-mined the driver’s true identity, revealedthat he had used nine different aliases in ...Jersey City, Passaic, Belleville, North Ar-lington, Perth Amboy, Bellmawr, Edison,Iselin, Haddon Township and Blackwood,New Jersey, and had defrauded banks inthose areas of $225,000. It was also deter-mined that the driver had applied for andobtained credit cards from a local depart-ment store under the true person’s name andcredit history. He [had] obtained another$60,000 in cash and merchandise with thesecredit cards ....

In a little over a year the driver obtainedalmost $300,000 in cash and merchandisefrom New Jersey businessmen. We have noway of calculating the driver’s total finan-cial gain from his fraudulent activities, butwe do know of his extensive travel up anddown the East Coast and as far away asCalifornia. We also know that the checksdeposited by the driver were used by otherNigerians to commit similar frauds.

Another individual, while on bail for a$40,000 fraud committed against the Stateof New Jersey Department of Labor, en-gaged in an eight-month fraudulent spree

that netted him well in excess of $100,000using the Social Security accounts and truenames of New Jersey residents. Again, oneof the individuals victimized was a seniorexecutive at a New Jersey financial institu-tion.

These and similar investigations reveal apattern of widespread fraudulent activity,[including] bank fraud, credit card fraud,student loan fraud, unemployment fraud,insurance fraud, rental car fraud and thelike.

These frauds all have a common denomina-tor, the false identification card. The card isa prerequisite to all of the fraudulent activ-ity. Nigerian criminal elements will seek toinfiltrate major companies to obtain bio-graphical data on the company’s legitimateemployees. They will normally apply forpositions as security guards, cleaning per-sonnel or positions with temporary employ-ment agencies, even in white collar capaci-ties, such as accountants. The security guardsand cleaning personnel, for example, duringperiods of minimal presence by companyemployees, will attempt to obtain informa-tion on payroll and human resource records,which will, of course, contain biographicaldata on legitimate company employees. Ifthey are not successful in penetrating theseareas of the company, they will look forinformation on individual employees, nor-mally supervisory or management positionemployees, which will also enable them toobtain the biographical data and credit linesbased on the true employee’s biographicaldata.

I’ll give you three additional, what appearedto be unrelated, instances that took placeearlier this year which, upon first blush, didnot appear to be related. But I’ll try to tiethem together for you at the end of thisparticular segment to show you how ... cir-

24

cuitous the routes are and how many differ-ent kinds of criminal activities can takeplace in one particular scheme.

In March of 1990, accounts were opened attwo banks in Princeton, New Jersey, underthe name of Moneyline Investment. A seriesof checks drawn on an attorney trust accountin Georgia were deposited into the accountswith money withdrawn ... prior to checksbeing returned unpaid, causing a $25,000loss.

The month before ... an individual had at-tempted to get a $3,000 cash advance on acredit card in West Windsor, New Jersey. Atthat time an alert teller called the credit cardcompany for authorization and the customerspoke with the security department of thecredit card company. The customer wasasked a series of questions, one of which wasfictitious and designed to be so, and when heresponded, the security department told thebank to seize the card. The bank also seizedthe driver’s license used for identification.The individual fled the bank and the policeobtained a John Doe warrant for this indi-vidual.

A few months later, in September of 1990,the Plainsboro, New Jersey, Police Depart-ment arrested a woman who had attemptedto open a bank account under an alias name.The woman was later identified to be aNigerian from Maryland. In her possessionwas a check drawn on the same Georgiaattorney’s trust account, the one that wasused in Princeton under the Moneyline In-vestment account name. This woman webelieve was ... working in concert with theWest Windsor, New Jersey, John Doe.

Once the link between the West Windsor andthe Plainsboro incidents was developed, fur-ther investigation determined that this JohnDoe customer had obtained a safe deposit

box at yet another branch of the same bankin East Orange, New Jersey. Again in Sep-tember this John Doe customer went to theEast Orange bank to close his safe depositbox. The only warrant for him was the localJohn Doe warrant for the attempted cashadvances. Two local officers were in thebank parking lot taking a report on anotherincident and they took the individual intocustody. The same vehicle that had beenused at the bank in Plainsboro was located inthe parking lot.

In May of 1990, a set of Interceptor tires wasput on this vehicle and charged to a fraudu-lently obtained American Express credit card.At the time the tires were put on the car themileage was 56,000 miles. When this fellowwas arrested in mid-September the mileagewas in excess of 90,000 miles. He had put35,000 miles on the car in a little over fourmonths. How would this individual put somany miles on the car in four months? Whatdeveloped ... as a result of this arrest, was theidentification of mail drops in Alexandria,Virginia, the District of Columbia, Mary-land, and five more in New Jersey.

Additionally, it was determined that thisindividual had been employed through atemporary accounting service at a companyin New Jersey. While working for the com-pany he stole ten blank checks of a subsidi-ary company from the back of a checkbookand a legitimate accounts payable check inthe amount of $28.000. This check wasnegotiated at a bank in Virginia where afraudulent account had been established.One of the blank checks was also negotiatedin Massachusetts. Additional deposits in theMassachusetts accounts were drawn on afederal credit union in Bladensburg, Mary-land. In Bladensburg, Maryland, it wasdetermined that that credit union had beenvictimized, and a series of 700 checks werestolen from that institution. The credit union

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in Maryland suffered over $100,000 worthof losses before we caught up with them.

Special Agent Murphy described what he called“controlling cells,” operating in various regions ofthe country, that suggest the presence of centralizedleadership for Nigerian organized crime:

The information which is obtained by [cell]workers in similar scenarios is furnished toa cell leader, who controls access and distri-bution. The cell leader interacts and ex-changes information with leaders in otherstates. The exchange of information, checksand identification provides these groups witha constant supply of new information whichallows them to perpetrate new frauds with-out readily being detected.

...

We see people that are performing at differ-ent levels, different functions and much likesmurfs that are used in money laundering.There is a group that are doing that. Well,they have been doing it at the direction ofcell leaders and we know that they are ob-taining training in how to approach and howto manipulate the system.

Let met give you a very good example: theuse of the ATM. ... I indicated at one pointthat the subject of one of the investigationsmonitored the account from an ATM. ...[T]hey’ll go in with fairly good identifica-tion, fraudulent identification, make theirinitial deposits, get the system opened up,and then they sit back and from afar, outside,they test that ATM machine. And they’llknow within hours when that check clears.And as soon as it clears is when they hit,because there is a window of maybe a day ortwo days before the bank will release thefunds and when, in fact, the Federal ReserveSystem will clear the check. They know howlong that window is. They monitor it fromafar [because] if they mess it up, if they come

in too fast to the bank, they’ll get identified,so they monitor it from the outside. As soonas the funds are released, they go in, cashtheir checks and get out. You won’t find themdoing it four or five days later, because theyknow that the check will clear in that periodof time.

Special Agent Murphy summarized the exten-sive negative impact which Nigerian organized crimehas on our society:

Nigerians present a unique problem for lawenforcement, in that their fraudulent activi-ties are committed against government agen-cies where benefits can be obtained, againstfinancial institutions, department stores,credit card companies and insurance com-panies. They also impact heavily on thegeneral public with increased costs fromfrauds being passed on to them in higherinterest rates and taxes. The individual vic-tim whose personal credit history has beenvictimized faces a long battle to get hispersonal credit history back to normal withthe fraudulent charges deleted.

The Commission has learned that Nigerians arealso involved in organized smuggling of heroin intothe United States. In this country a person called a“God Father” controls four to six “mules” whotransport drugs and money. The typical smugglingprocess starts in Nigeria when the mule -- usually awoman or juvenile -- goes to a “Black Magic House”to receive instructions and swallow the contrabanddrugs, which are sealed in condoms for transport tothe United States. Nigerians obtain most of theirheroin from Southeast Asia where 70 percent of theheroin available in the United States is produced.Three out of five couriers arrested in Thailand inpossession of heroin are from Nigeria.

Historically, the source of heroin in the blackcommunity has been La Cosa Nostra -- trafficking inSouthwest Asian heroin. Today, the major source isethnic Chinese organized criminals dealing in South-

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east Asian heroin. Of course, the evidence of Nige-rian smuggling clearly indicates that Chinese crimi-nals are not the lone suppliers of Southeast Asianheroin in the United States.

COMMON CONCERNS ABOUT AFRO-LIN-EAL CRIMINAL GROUPS

Afro-lineal criminal groups are particularly dan-gerous because they exhibit all or some of the follow-ing characteristics.

BREEDING GROUNDS FOR DURABLE SYN-DICATES

Although many Afro-lineal criminal groups haveonly a fleeting existence, some of the more notorioushave enjoyed significant duration and power. If leftunchecked, each gang, set, posse or other incipientorganization has the potential to become entrenchedto the point where it may achieve a life of its own.This certainly occurred in the case of The Family innorthern New Jersey, once headed by Wayne (Akbar)Pray.

Narcotics trafficking, in particular, provides afertile breeding ground for criminal cartels. Just asProhibition during the 1920s promoted the rise of LaCosa Nostra families, the vast demand for illegaldrugs provides many opportunities for new groupsto accumulate power and markets through energy,resourcefulness and brute force. Newark’s PoliceDirector, Claude M. Coleman, summarized the prob-lem during the Commission’s public hearing:

[A] lot of [African-American] groups arewhat I refer to as freelancers, having veryfleeting operations. We take them out, thereare others that take their places .... [B]ut alot of them have achieved a level of sophis-tication and durability that we find disturb-ing and ... make it more difficult to detect, toapprehend and to prosecute.

Director Coleman noted that “as long as thedemand continues, we are going to have drug traf-

fickers,” but he emphasized that “constant attentionfrom law enforcement and from groups such as [theSCI] can prevent any one group from becoming toopowerful and ... too entrenched or too insulated frompolice detection.”

VIOLENCE

As established or aspiring drug trafficking groupsvie for available markets, they become extremelyviolent. Returns from the lucrative drug trade pro-vide ample funds to purchase devastating weapons.The criminal milieu breeds a lack of respect for life.This volatile combination leads to high rates ofhomicide and aggravated assault, as well as thedisruption of normal life in many neighborhoods.

On October 26, 1989, the front lines in a drug turfbattle engulfed two Essex County Police officers. Apolice captain and sergeant were severely woundedin Newark when they stopped their patrol car toquestion individuals who turned out to be heavilyarmed and grouping for a territorial fight with a rivaldrug dealer.

DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Donald Ashtondetailed the violence associated with The Family inEssex County under Wayne Pray:

[Pray] also reinforced his control over hisorganization and drug trafficking within itsterritory through violence. Pray hired thugsto intimidate or eliminate witnesses whomight implicate him in criminal activity.Witnesses in at least five homicide investiga-tions have asserted that Pray was directlyresponsible for victims being murdered be-cause they had attempted to obtain cocainefrom less expensive sources of supply orattempted to withdraw from his organiza-tion.

Elizabeth Police Detective Thomas Swan testi-fied how the E’Port Posse disposed of Mutah Ses-soms, one of its members who had been cooperatingwith police:

27

[I]n March of 1989, during the discoveryphase in the criminal cases stemming fromOperation Pioneer, the defense was able toobtain a statement which had been providedby Mutah. Soon afterwards Sessoms wasseverely beaten by five individuals after hehad left the Union County Courthouse, threeof whom he identified as Pretlow underlings,Shawn Hartwell, Bilal's second-in-command,and another by the name of Wendell Wilson,who would later help avenge the death ofRobert Pretlow. I warned Sessoms that hisidentity had been revealed, and we tookprecautions to make sure that he stayed outof Elizabeth. We provided him with funds,but because of his age, which was I believe atthe time, nineteen, he had a girlfriend that hecouldn’t stay away from. So he sneaked intoElizabeth at night, unbeknownst to us, andfinally on June 17, 1989, his mutilated,decapitated and dismembered torso wasfound in suitcases in Newark.

Detective Swan described the violence connectedwith the struggles for supremacy in the drug trade inElizabeth and parts of Newark among the E’PortPosse and other groups:

[On] January 8, 1989, Ricky Williams wasshot in the abdomen by [E’Port Posse mem-bers] Keith Cashwell and Andre Williams, ...because he posed a threat to the Pretlows.Bilal Pretlow ordered this shooting from theUnion County Jail, and it was relayed via[his second-in-command] Shawn Hartwell.Jeanette Griggs was severely beaten by BilalPretlow, Shawn Hartwell and others for sell-ing cocaine in the vicinity of Pioneer Homesfor someone other than the Pretlow organi-zation.

Shortly thereafter, on July 9, 1989, RobertPretlow was shot to death in Elizabeth byBobby Ray Davis, Walter Griggs, who wasJeanette’s brother, and Maurice Crowley,who was Jeanette’s boyfriend. Bobby RayDavis was a major supplier of heroin to

many New Jersey cities, extending into thestate prison system. He had decided toexpand his drug operation to include co-caine distribution to the Pretlow turf inElizabeth. On the day of Robert Pretlow’sdeath the Elizabeth Police stopped a cardriven by [Bilal] Pretlow, who was then outon bail, and containing Shawn Hartwell andIrving Bethea. All three fled the car, and ina garbage can which Pretlow had passedwas found ... a Tech-9 automatic pistol witha clip of 25 rounds. On July 10, 1989, whichwas the following day, Bobby Ray Davis wasshot to death in front of his home in Elizabeth[by] Thomas Pretlow, the oldest of fourPretlow brothers.... ... [Wendell] Wilson[was] charged with driving Thomas Pretlowto the Davis house where Pretlow allegedlyshot [Davis] in the head three times. We’vehad at least four other execution-style kill-ings attributed to the Pretlow organizationor its rivals. At the height of this group’sactivity we had shots fired in the downtownarea of Elizabeth every night.

Bilal Pretlow faces the death penalty in federalcharges for the alleged drug-related murders ofSessoms and Melanie Baker, a 16-year-old girl whoinadvertently stumbled on the location of one of theoutfit’s “stash” houses.

Camden Police Detective Leonard Hall testifiedabout the violence associated with the criminal setsin Camden:

With the involvement of young street dealersin the last few years their dealing is wideopen, on the corners, projects and what haveyou. This fact, coupled with keen competi-tion for turf, has led to violent confronta-tions on the street.

...

... [S]ome [sets] attempt to invade [others’]area[s] of operation to increase their drug

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sales. Frequently this results in drive-byshootings, to force one set to either relin-quish the area or to fight back by attackingthe other set.

In other instances the individuals often robthe young drug dealers as a means to obtainmoney without dealing drugs themselves.We refer to these individuals as stick-upboys. Recently in Camden we had a triplehomicide by a hired shooter originatingfrom Philadelphia who also double-crossedone set who had hired him to protect themand their operation.

Camden Detective Louis Muzyczek testifiedabout the availability of weapons to set members:

[They possess] Uzi machine guns, automaticpistols. The weapon of choice is the ninemillimeter automatic. We see sawed-offshotguns, and ... individuals in [different]sets are actually wearing bullet-proof vests.

Violence is also characteristic of Five Percentergangs. Monmouth County Investigator Jordan tes-tified how the violence centers around battles forturf:

[Five Percenters] will become very hostileto any rival gang or anyone who attempts totake over their drug turf, as it has beenoutlined by them. ... We have 68 gangs thatwe are dealing with in our county [including14 Five Percenter chapters], so there is a lotof rivalry there.

Five Percenter violence extends beyond turfbattles with other groups, as related by the disguisedwitness:

Q. What happens to any member who wishesto leave the Five Percenters?A. He will be subject to a “universal beatdown,” which is an assault or a beating andmay even be killed, depending on the cir-

cumstances....

Q. Even a killing could result, depending onthe circumstances?A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is the term “universal beat down” usedfor any other reason?A. Yes. Could be assault on a white person,who assaulted or questioned a black man. Itcould also be used against a Five Percenterfor failure to learn his lessons.

...

CHAIRMAN JAMES R. ZAZZALI: Mr. Wit-ness, you’ve indicated that a “universal beatdown” could include a murder, am I cor-rect?

A. Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: Without going intoany details, do you have knowledge of suchmurders?

A. Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: About how many?

A. Three, four.

Violence also occurs between Jamaican possesand other posses or African-American narcoticstraffickers. It takes place as one group or anotherdefends its drug-dealing turf or for political and otherreasons. A blatant example occurred in a park inOakland, New Jersey, on August 4, 1985. In a gunbattle between elements of the Shower Posse andelements of the Spangler and Dog posses, threepeople, including the leader of the Dog Posse, diedand 19 were wounded. Police seized 33 weapons atthe scene. More than 1,000 spent shell casings werefound.

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Illegal aliens from Jamaica are typically em-ployed to staff the Jamaican drug trafficking organi-zations. Their loyalty is insured by threats of violenceto them and their families. There have been docu-mented incidents of what is called “jointing” ofindividuals cooperating with law enforcement. Aninformant’s body is dismembered at the joints andpieces sent to his family in Jamaica.

Since 1985, approximately 1,400 homicides inthe United States have been attributed to posse drugdealing. In New Jersey, there have been 17 posse-related murders since January 1987. In excess of 200posse-related killings occurred in New York Cityduring 1988. In Philadelphia, there have been morethan 40 posse-related homicides since October 1986.The posses have engaged in indiscriminate shootingsprees, even though only one person was the target,and they often assassinate the entire family of atargeted victim.

DESTRUCTION OF NEIGHBORHOODS

Established and emerging Afro-lineal organizedcrime groups have disrupted everyday life in manyurban and suburban areas. They recruit youth into adisastrous way of life, destroy families, intimidatedecent people to the point where they feel likeprisoners in their own homes and have even beenresponsible for the murders of innocent bystanders.

In a statement submitted at the public hearing,Camden Police Chief George D. Pugh emphasizedAfro-lineal organized crime’s crippling effects onurban neighborhoods and society at large:

I perceive no greater threat to the rebirth,stability and quality of life in our urbancommunities than the organized groups ofyoung predators terrorizing our neighbor-hoods while engaged in illicit drug traffick-ing and its attendant violence, all under thecontrol and direction of well insulated indi-viduals. ... The crisis in the urban centers is

just the beginning; the problem has and willcontinue to infiltrate the suburban and ruralcommunities. I sincerely hope and pray thatthis hearing is the first step towards develop-ing and implementing a comprehensive policyand plan to effectively eradicate this ever-increasing cancer we have identified as youthviolence.

Camden Police Detective Leonard Hall elabo-rated on the adverse effects on neighborhoods thatbecome the turf of drug distribution rings in Camden:

[With] widespread [drug selling] opera-tions and the frequent drive-by shootingsand situations like that, the individual citi-zens in Camden have become prisoners intheir own homes. The young people, theyouth dealers, have no respect for the eld-erly, and a few innocent people have beenshot and even killed. People can’t even walkto the store basically like they would do in[normal] neighborhoods.

Newark Police Director Claude Coleman de-scribed the situation existing in some neighborhoodsin Newark:

... [S]ome of the decent people who live [inbuildings that become part of the territoriesof these criminal groups] become like pris-oners in these buildings. ... They are afraidto go in; they are afraid to come out; they areafraid to have visitors. They don’t get deliv-eries as other people would in normal neigh-borhoods. I think the quality of life in theneighborhoods has overall deteriorated. Thekids that play in the neighborhood becomeworkers for the people who are dealing drugsbecause they are attracted by the fast moneyand the fast cars and the so-called symbols ofsuccess -- the gold chains, the sneakers. Theywant these things, but the only way to getthem is to deal drugs, so it’s ready employ-ment for them. ... [T]here is the danger of[the criminals] serving as role models for the

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kids that they come in contact with.

In response to Commissioner Dumont’s inquiryabout the ages at which some youths participate indrug trafficking, Director Coleman testified:

Well, we’ve had some as young as nineserving as lookouts. ... They are all aroundthe block. As soon as someone comes aroundthe corner who they suspect to be a narcoticsofficer or a police officer, they start yelling,“Five-oh, five-oh” [using the name of theold Hawaiian police show on television],and they are actually serving as lookouts.

Somerset Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell describedhow one of Isaac Wright’s minions was enticed bythe trappings of the drug trade:

For example, during the guilty plea of [Willie(Chill Will)] Sirmans, he indicated that hefirst met Wright when Wright arrived at oneof these apartment complexes driving a whiteMercedes. We had surveillances going atthe time, and you could see on the surveil-lance tapes that it attracted all the kids to hiscar. Not that he ever sold any cocaine fromthat car, but that Mercedes was a statussymbol in that area. Sirmans indicated thatonce he became involved and he was foundto be reliable he had what was known as afranchise. That franchise entitled him to geta new Volvo automobile, which Wright pur-chased for him. Not to sell drugs for him --in Sirmans’ words it was for show. In addi-tion to that, he could keep anywhere fromthree to five thousand dollars of the moneyper week that he made. He kept, as heindicated during his plea, essentially what-ever he wanted, and he, therefore, never hadless than $500. This is a kid that’s, at thetime, 16 or 17 years old and going to school,and he’s driving a new Volvo on a forgedlicense, and he’s got at least $500 in hispocket. So that kind of an operation allows

for those kinds of role models. And in thosedisadvantaged areas you can see, I think,where kids would be drawn to that type of alife-style, [figuring,] “I can get all the thingsI can’t get any other way, and this is an easyway to do it.”

Detective Hall also described the recruitment ofyouths into drug distribution rings in Camden:

Some of the sets have what they call a look-out. Lookouts can vary anywhere from eightto 13 years old, and they are paid to look outfor the police or stick-up boys. They are paidbetween 50 and 60 dollars a day. Now thestreet dealers receive about $600 worth ofdrugs from the mid-level manager, and atthe end of the day, if he sells the entireamount, he’s permitted to keep $200, onethird of what he was given. In many cases the$600 worth of drugs has already been ...diluted by the [boss or] manager of theoperation, what we call stepped-on.

Camden Detective Louis Muzyczek comparedfor Commissioner Dumont present-day cocaine deal-ing to the heroin trade which predominated in thepast:

Just the fact that Camden’s population isonly 85,000, and ... it’s only three squaremiles, and we have 38 active drug sets, whichcan range from 10 individuals on one par-ticular set up to 50, that is quite a bit of youngpeople involved in narcotics. And I’ve beena police officer going into my seventeenthyear, and it was there in the beginning ... withheroin, and its much larger now ... with thecocaine flow throughout the city. Morepeople are involved. More young people areinvolved. Children that are going to theelementary schools are carrying what wecall beat bags, and they are actually roleplaying what they see on the corners at nightwhen they go home from the schools.

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Monmouth County Investigator Louis Jordanrelated how Five Percenters recruit and use juve-niles:

They use a lot of juveniles, which we see a lotof, mostly, who are familiar with the system.And you have to understand also that whenthese juveniles are approached by law en-forcement, they have been taught that theyare basically going to be smacked on thewrist and turned back into society. So wehave adults who are behind them, we find, alot of the time.

...

They do a lot of recruiting at our schools. Infact, a majority of it. Again, I will estimatewe are dealing with juveniles mostly. Re-cruiting is going on at the schools, them-selves, also in parks and on the streets.

...

[A] lot of it is done in the grammar schools....

[T]here is [also recruitment in the prisonsystem.]

Investigator Jordan told Commissioner Merinhow quick drug money breeds parental condone-ment of young drug traffickers operating in poorareas with high unemployment rates:

[W]e find when ... we arrest [a juvenile], ...we can get a lot of flak from the parent. Youhave to understand that if the parents aregetting a $300 or $400 check from the Stateand ... their child ... all of a sudden ... is outthere involved in drugs and bringing home$300 or $400 a day, that parent is not goingto turn that child in. And, not only that, theparent is probably going to give the author-ity that brought that child there, be it DYFS[Division of Youth and Family Services] orthe police, a very hard way to go.

BROAD IMPACT AND CONNECTIONS

Drug trafficking is not the only scourge of Afro-lineal organized crime groups. The Commissionlearned about gun running, homicides, robberies andextortion committed by these groups. It learnedabout enduring gambling operations, some under thecontrol of La Cosa Nostra and some operatingindependently. The SCI also learned about certainorganized Nigerians systematically defrauding banksand other commercial enterprises. The adverseimpact of these groups on our society has beensweeping and profound.

When asked by Chairman Zazzali to compare theharm caused by Afro-lineal organized crime to thatcaused by La Cosa Nostra, Director Coleman con-cluded that the former’s heavier involvement in drugtrafficking made its effects “much worse.” He added,“We’ve had gambling, which other groups haveengaged in, we’ve had prostitution, but those activi-ties have never had the effect that drug trafficking hashad.” Camden Detective Leonard Hall told Chair-man Zazzali that the drug trade is “the biggestbusiness within [Camden].”

In some instances Afro-lineal organized crimegroups have cooperated with criminal groups ofother ethnic backgrounds in order to obtain financ-ing, gain sources of supply or customers or avoidterritorial disputes. Detective Hall described theevolving relationship between African-Americangambling operations in his area and La Cosa Nostra:

In the past many of the black numbers opera-tors have been under the Bruno-Scarfo or-ganization or have edged off their bets tothat organization. With the demise of theBruno-Scarfo influence it appears that mostof the black numbers operations have be-come independent.

Cooperation among criminal groups is interna-tional in scope. DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashtontestified about the Colombian connection with TheFamily headed by Wayne Pray:

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[The Family] distributed both cocaine andmarijuana. Pray’s supplies of these drugscame from as far west as California and asfar south as South Florida. His primarysources for both were Colombians, affiliatedwith the Medellin cartel. One of his sourcesfor cocaine was Nelson Gomez, a member ofthe Paladinos, an organization located inMedellin, Colombia. The Paladinos’ pri-mary role is to execute drug traffickers whohave crossed the Medellin cartel. Theywere, in fact, enforcers for the Medellincartel. On at least one occasion, Pray,himself, traveled to Colombia. Pray dealtwith representatives of the Medellin cartellocated in South Florida, thereby purchas-ing his cocaine at a much lower price. Hewas able to originally meet the Colombiansbecause of his reputation for being able toobtain false identity documents.

While urban communities with large minoritypopulations suffer most at the hands of Afro-linealorganized crime groups, these organizations alsoprovide drug supermarkets for customers who live inthe suburbs. Much of the wealth accumulated bysuch operations comes from suburban, upper andmiddle class drug customers that patronize the drugtraffickers’ turfs. Newark Police Director Colemantestified about the suburban connection:

[C]ertainly the users ... are suburban. Someof the people we see coming into PrinceStreet, some of the other areas that I’vetalked about, ... [are] coming from ShortHills, Millburn and from other suburbanareas ....

Camden Detective Muzyczek also testified thatsuburbanites are a mainstay of the illegal drug mar-kets in that city:

The purchasers of these drugs are comingfrom the suburbs into the City of Camden.Camden City’s population could not supportall the drug activity that we see on a daily

basis and throughout the many years thatI’ve been working there.

Finally, Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell de-scribed the interaction between suburban customersand urban narcotic suppliers:

[O]ne of the things that we’ve noticed withrespect to our efforts is that urban areashave become essentially the shopping cen-ters, if you will, for narcotics. They presenta geography that makes it difficult for lawenforcement to operate, obviously, and itallows these groups to operate almost openly.And they attract the customers from thesuburban areas, so while Somerset is essen-tially a suburban county, we have NewBrunswick on one border and Plainfield onthe other. And we find that our citizens go toUnion and Middlesex County, buy drugs andbring them back to Somerset, and they arecreating a narcotics problem in SomersetCounty. But they are also allowing andcreating a narcotics problem in these urbanareas. And these groups become more or-ganized, because the organized nature of thenetwork allows for a more reliable supply,which results in a deeper addiction of morepeople, a greater demand, more money anda strengthening of the distribution ring. Themore established the group, the more likelythere will be unwholesome role models foryoung people, especially in the innercityareas.

CONCEALMENT (HIDING THE WEALTH,CORRUPTION, AURA OF RESPECTABILITY)

As in other criminal organizations, Afro-linealorganized crime groups strive to insulate their lead-ership from connections to the criminal activity.Newark Police Director Coleman described for Com-missioner Barry H. Evenchick the care which issometimes taken by street-level drug dealers:

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Well, [a drug purchase] might unfold withsomeone from the suburbs driving throughthe area, and he approaches a dealer whomight direct him to someone else. Thisperson may take the money [and then] directhim to someone else, who will give him thedrug.

...

The person who gives you the drug is goingto give you what you order. If you apprehendhim, he’s going to have that one drug on him.He’s not going to be arrested for a majordeal [nor] lose his “stash,” that is, the majorpart of his drugs.

DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashton detailedhow Wayne Pray of The Family in Essex Countyinvested illicit gains in legitimate businesses andinsulated his illegal activities from law enforcementscrutiny:

Q. Did Pray’s activities extend to investingillicit gains in legitimate businesses?A. Yes, sir. Pray used several businesses asfronts to create the appearance that he hadlegitimate sources of income and that he wasmerely an honest businessman. Some of hisfront businesses were the Golden Comb HairSalon, Garmal Auto Sales, Za-Key Associ-ates, which is a paralegal and financialconsulting firm, Mel-Ton Talent Promotionand Entertainment Company, an abortionclinic, and he touted himself as a boxingpromoter. During an eighteen-month pe-riod between January of 1987 and June of1988 at least one million dollars in assetswere purchased by or on behalf of Pray.

Q. Were there other ways in which Prayinsulated himself from the criminal activi-ties of The Family?A. Yes, sir. One of the methods utilized wasto exploit women who would carry out hisdrug transactions. He oversaw these ar-rangements, but he neither handled the money

nor the drugs directly.

Q. You earlier mentioned his reputation forbeing able to obtain false identity docu-ments. Could you elaborate on this?A. Yes, sir. Pray provided phony identifica-tion for several of his Colombian contactswho were traveling in the United States. Thisincluded fraudulent New Jersey driver’s li-censes which he obtained through suspectedcorrupt employees of the Irvington motorvehicle agency.

Special Agent Ashton also testified that whenPray promoted boxing matches he hired off-dutylocal police officers to provide security. AgentAshton attributed Pray’s “image within the commu-nity that he was untouchable” by law enforcement, inpart, to this police presence in his entourage, “whichwould give him a certain aura, and people would befearful of providing information.”

The Isaac Wright group from Somerset andMiddlesex counties and The Family of Roland (Pops)Bartlett, which operated in southern New Jersey,both utilized recording companies to launder profitsfrom the sale of drugs. Wright used the New YorkCity firm Express Records, and Bartlett used Dom-ino Records, also of New YorkCity, which he hadpurchased from the Genovese-Gigante LCN family.

Camden Detective Joyner described for Com-missioner Merin the infiltration of legitimate busi-nesses by drug traffickers looking for fronts or placesto launder illegal profits:

Q. You indicated that several of these[Camden] groups used legitimate businessesto launder their money. I think you men-tioned there were bars and laundry shops,that sort of thing. Do you know for a factwhich businesses those are? Can you tracethe ownership back to the posse members?

...

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A. The same names involved in the drugactivity are showing up on the licenses forthe purchases and rentals of the businesses.We have people that have histories goingback into the ’70s involved in different ac-tivities, especially with the Jamaicans thatare involved in legitimate businesses in theCamden area and Philadelphia area.

Q. Have you attempted to work with ABC,for example, so that prior to the time thelicense is granted in Camden they run theinformation by you, or you go to them to tryto get some of these bars de-licensed?A. This has been one of the problems, theinteragency coordination. A lot of times wedon’t find out about a business until it’sopened, established and moving. They takeover businesses. A lot of the businesses thatthey take over, it’s just a matter of changingthe license and that is just a short-term deal.We don’t know about it ahead of time. It’sdone.

Q. So might one of the recommendations beto have ABC contact the police departmentdirectly before it grants any licensing inCamden ...?A. Yes, both local and statewide.

Q. In terms of some of the other businessesthat are outside the jurisdiction of the ABC,the launderies or whatever type of commer-cial enterprise, is it possible to set up somesort of licensure operation or coordinationwith the Department of State, in other words,prior to the time that a business can beincorporated or prior to the time it receivesany other necessary papers from the state, isthere some communication or coordinationthat would be helpful at that level?A. Again, this is an issue that is hard to getahead of. You don’t realize its happeningunless you have someone working right inLicensing and Inspection, or checking [it],on a daily basis almost, that the takeover is

being done. A person comes in and appliesfor a permit or a license at a food store,sandwich shop, steak shop; it doesn’t raiseany suspicion [at Licensing and Inspection]that this is happening.

Q. If we, being the State, required that, priorto the time that any business would open,[there would be] a 72-hour waiting period inorder to give the police the opportunity toreview the names, would that be helpful?A. If the information for every businesscould be forwarded to the police -- to themunicipalities, the officers, our investiga-tive division, to check the names and see whothese people are, it would help possibly inidentifying just what is happening and theorganizations, how they are spreading out.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends the following ac-tions to more effectively counter the threat of Afro-lineal organized crime:

1. Spending programs should emphasizethe reduction of demand for the drugs whose salesprovide the profits which are the lifeblood of most ofthe Afro-lineal organized crime groups. In the longrun it will be cheaper and more beneficial for societyto spend significantly more for boot camps for youth-ful offenders, drug addiction treatment facilities andvocational training, even if it means that less moneywill be available for more prison cells. In addition,suburban customers of urban drug supermarketsshould face tougher sanctions and forfeitures.

2. Direct assistance to local law enforcementshould be increased so that more police can walkbeats and help urban residents reclaim their neigh-borhoods. Meanwhile, programs that encouragecommunity participation in efforts to stamp out drugtrafficking and other crime should be enhanced. TheState Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control shouldexpedite appeals of local license revocations forthose liquor establishments notorious as fronts for

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drug trafficking.

3. Law enforcement should devote a greaterproportion of its intelligence effort to Afro-linealorganized crime groups. Equally important, thisinformation should be routinely shared among lawenforcement agencies in a true spirit of cooperation.The Narcotics and Organized Crime Managementand Analytical Database (NOMAD) should be ex-panded by eliminating federal funding restrictionswhich deprive such systems of federal "drug war"funds.

4. Leaders of Afro-lineal organized crimegroups should be targeted, exposed and isolated.They should be prosecuted as "drug kingpins" anddenied bail if the government can prove they pose adanger to the community. If granted bail, their trialsshould be expedited. Their investment of illegalgains in legitimate assets should be traced. Finally,after incarceration they should be closely monitoredin order to curtail their influence over their organiza-tions.

5. Law enforcement tools, which have provensuccessful in the fight against La Cosa Nostra, shouldbe retained and expanded to counter Afro-linealorganized crime. Electronic surveillance is particu-larly helpful. Meanwhile, New Jersey needs a statelaw counterpart to complement the federal statutedealing with money laundering.

The Commission is well aware of the fiscalconstraints which limit the State's ability to fundsome of these recommendations. However, muchcould be accomplished without additional funding bysimply altering correction and treatment priorities,encouraging more flexibility in federal funding, im-proving cooperation among agencies and focusingmore attention on group leadership.

EMPHASIZE REDUCTION OF DRUG DEMAND

Our society should put proportionately moremoney into reducing the demand for drugs throughprevention, education and rehabilitation. Money

must be spent at the source of the drug problem --demand -- in order to avoid spending much greatersums for jails and the criminal justice system. SomersetCounty Prosecutor Bissell succinctly described theright combination of resources for victory in the waragainst narcotics trafficking:

... [A]s [the drug war] becomes a morecomprehensive effort, [with] ... law enforce-ment being stepped up to the point where ithas been, ... education and treatment andrehabilitation also ... elevated to the samelevel, then I think ... we can move evenfarther, ... and we will continue to havesuccess as long as everyone understandsthat this is not something that law enforce-ment is going to solve by itself. I don’t thinkanybody in law enforcement believes that.We need these other components. Educa-tion, treatment and rehabilitation are just asimportant as effective law enforcement.

More money should be provided for correctionsresources capable of reducing drug demand: bootcamps, drug rehabilitation facilities and vocationaltraining. Newark Police Director Coleman describedfor Commissioner Dumont the absence of facilitiesto deal with youths who enlist in drug distributionand auto theft rings:

The ones that ... [serve] as lookouts, wedon’t bother to arrest them, first of all -- [it’sa] very hard charge to prove. The other kidsthat are definitely engaged in the activity,whether it’s drug trafficking or auto theft, wearrest those, and they are handled throughthe juvenile justice system and, just like theadult system, there are so many kids involvedin there that they are released. There is noplace to put them.

Unfortunately, too, it seems that [judgeshave] fewer alternative dispositions ..., toincarceration, like reform school or juvenileschools ..., since those places are crowded.The kids that we are dealing with now are not

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going to be released to the YMCA or somelocal social group because those groups justaren’t able to take responsibility for the kids.

Director Coleman further explained that the criminaljustice system cannot cope with a solution basedlargely on arrests, prosecutions and incarceration:

I think that we’ve seen that the drug arrestsreally just led to a general breakdown of thecriminal justice system, where we are notseeing speedy trials, we are not seeing anyjustice at all. And it seems the more peoplewe arrest the more broken down the systembecomes -- really nowhere to put these peoplethat we are arresting. They are right backout. ... [T]here is simply no place to putthem. The more people we arrest ... the morecrowded the jails become, and almost all ofthe prisons now are under some form ofcourt order which says that you have toreduce the crowding in the jail.

He elaborated for Commissioner Merin:

Let me say with respect to the penalties, I’mnot sure if we toughen the penalties that thatis going to make a major difference [againstdrug traffickers]. ... I think when we start toinstitute mandatory penalties and start tomake them longer and longer, we just createthe need for more jail space and more prisonswhich kind of got us here in the first place.We don’t have enough jail space. It’s notbeing built fast enough to accommodate thepeople that we are arresting. A lot of thepolice officers would be satisfied if we couldget them six months as opposed to six years,as long as we got them something -- whenthey are arrested at least they went away forsix months. Right now they are not going anyplace because it takes too long.

Director Coleman’s concerns are punctuated byprojections for increased state and county prisonpopulations in the coming years. On February 26,

1991, Corrections Commissioner William H. Fauverreported to the Assembly Appropriations Commit-tee that the state adult prison population is expectedto increase by about 3,075 inmates (over 14.5 per-cent) during the next 18 months. The Commissioneradded that the state prison system is operating atapproximately 140 percent of capacity. Currentconstruction plans are not expected to reduce thenumber of adult state prison inmates (varying be-tween 2,800 and 3,000) who are housed in countyjails under an emergency order that has been in effectfor a decade.

There are some signs that the state government isserious about devoting a greater share of resourcesto demand reduction. Under a 1989 law creating aDrug Enforcement Demand Reduction Fund, theState has collected more than $20 million in manda-tory fines from drug offenders ranging from $300 to$3,000. In February of this year, $8.1 million of thismoney was made available to 300 municipal alliancesas seed money for their local education and publicawareness efforts against drug and alcohol abuse.The Governor’s Council on Alcoholism and DrugAbuse has formally approved the first allocations ofFund money to authorized spending programs inPassaic, Bergen and Burlington counties. All 21counties will eventually receive funds. The counties’shares are based on a formula which takes population(including the proportion of juveniles), incomes andnumbers of arrests into consideration.

A portion of the remainder of the $20 million inthe Fund has been earmarked for the State Depart-ment of Health for community drug programs. Therest is being held in reserve for future years.

As a further means of reducing the demand fornarcotics, law enforcement should put increasedpressure on suburban drug customers who frequenturban drug supermarkets to purchase their deadlywares. Increased seizures of the customers’ automo-biles would discourage drug use.

The present forfeiture law applies only to indict-able crimes. A proposal which would have allowed

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the forfeiture of any property directly or indirectlyused in or derived from a disorderly persons drugoffense has not moved in the Legislature since themajority of prosecutors expressed opposition. Theprosecutors were concerned that public support fordrug enforcement would be weakened if the punish-ment were too severe to fit the crime charged.Amendments being suggested to the bill’s sponsor,Senate President John A. Lynch, would allow theforfeiture of property involved in disorderly personsoffenses so long as the offenders were arrested forindictable crimes that were downgraded to disor-derly persons offenses. The Commission believesthat something of this nature should be worked outso that casual, suburban drug users supporting urbandrug supermarkets will face sanctions weightier thanmunicipal court fines or driver’s license suspensions.

A bill sponsored by State Senator Ronald L. Ricewould mandate a jail sentence for anyone who buys,sells or obtains an illegal drug from a juvenile.Senator Rice also has sponsored a bill that wouldmandate a jail term for anyone buying, selling orobtaining drugs in a municipality outside the onewhere he resides. The Legislature should study thesemeasures in relation to other mandatory incarcera-tion laws to determine which ones are useful. As-suming an ability and willingness to substantiallyincrease prison capacity and criminal justice systemresources, such measures may prove helpful in dis-couraging the most insidious forms of drug traffick-ing. In the absence of such a commitment, however,it would be more productive to devote scarce re-sources to more proven methods of demand reduc-tion.

INCREASE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AS-SISTANCE AND ENCOURAGE COMMUNITYPARTICIPATION

There should be more police walking the beatand patrolling in urban areas. The bulk of drug warlaw enforcement assistance funds should be pro-vided directly to the local level where the real war isbeing waged against drug rings. We should devotemore resources to community outreach programs

that support and involve civic groups eager to drivecriminal organizations from their neighborhoods.DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashton testified,“[W]e need to have a positive law enforcementpresence in the community, and we need to solicit thecommunity’s trust and support.”

Newark Police Director Coleman described howsome of this funding could be put to work on the locallevel. He delineated a program, involving Newarkand State police, called Operation Homestead, oper-ating in Newark on a limited basis:

We try to reduce the demand on drugs bybeing present in the community. ... We try towork and empower the community so thatwhen the police do leave, at least the neigh-borhood has been improved by our beingthere. It involves, too, bringing to bear muchmore different resources than the police ona particular problem. ... We’ve seen byarresting certain traffickers that others sim-ply just take their place. What we try to do isimprove the overall quality of that commu-nity, not just arrest the traffickers, but try tohelp those there who need treatment. [Wet]ry to organize the community, [so] thatwhen we do arrest one, no one rises to takehis place.

Since last year the Newark Housing Authority(NHA) also has conducted a program called Opera-tion Clean Sweep, a version of an anti-drug initiativedeveloped by the Chicago Housing Authority in1988 to combat drug activity through increasedsecurity and evictions, as well as rehabilitation of thehousing stock. Under the program police securebuildings by clearing them of people who do notbelong there. Housing Authority workers then cleanand repair hallways and apartments and install newbuilding entrance doors and locks. The federalgovernment allocated $250,000 to the NHA to con-duct the program at three high-rise buildings in theStella Wright Homes within the last year. Another$1.2 million has been given to complete the remain-ing buildings at the complex.

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Operation Clean Sweep should be just the start ofa more aggressive program to clear drug-dealinggangs out of public housing projects. The NHA hasa security plan calling for $13 million to be spent tosharply curtail crime at its 36 projects. $600,000 inlocal matching funds have been pledged by NewarkCity Council, but the State, which has been asked tosupply the rest of the money, has not promisedanything in light of its present fiscal crisis. The U.S.Department of Housing and Urban Development hasalso been asked to fund the proposal. The NHA,which presently employs 105 mostly-unarmed secu-rity guards, wants to hire 400 police to patrol itsbuildings. The full-time police patrols would alsoback-up tenant patrols called for by the security plan.

Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell testifiedabout how community activism helped to thwart theIsaac Wright cocaine trafficking network:

For example, right around the time of theWright investigation and those arrests, thepeople in Robeson Village got together anddeveloped their own community watch wherethey put up a guard station at the entrance tothe complex. And they wouldn’t let in anyvehicle that didn’t belong to a resident of thecomplex, because the problem was, as peoplelike Wright and his suppliers would arrive inthese cars, people would come out, buy drugsand go back in. It was destroying theirneighborhood. They finally took mattersinto their own hands in a peaceful way andtook control of their neighborhoods andwouldn’t allow this to continue. The effortgoes on today, and from what we under-stand, it’s had tremendous success in im-proving the quality of life in that area bykeeping these people that want to sell drugsout.

Monmouth County Investigator Jordan describedfor Commissioner Evenchick how responsible Afri-can-American leaders have involved themselves inan effort to slow the growth of the Five Percenters:

A lot of the community-based religious or-ganizations, as well as the community, itself,have only recently started to, in my observa-tion, take a step forward and say, “Okay,enough is enough; there are too many kidsand innocent people being killed out thereon our streets.” And you have to understandthat we have seen a large jump in terms ofactivity, crime, with respect to this particu-lar gang since 1980. Crime was relativelylow when they first came on the scene. Andwe keep active statistical records, and crimeis up all the way across the board withrespect to this particular gang, so the com-munity folk, educators, all of them are nowstarting to become concerned. The denial isstarting to stop, but some of the denial is stillthere.

Camden has also developed a program involvinglaw enforcement interaction with the community.Camden Police Detective Louis Muzyczek describedfor the Commission the activities of a small CamdenCity Police Youth Task Force, “which works tothwart the inducement of the city’s youth into thedrug trade”:

It was formed in October of 1989 with a two-fold mission. One, to eliminate shootingsand street corner violence and to prevent theproliferation of youth involvement in thedrug trade. We also work frequently with thegrade school children to educate them in anattempt to eliminate the peer pressure ofmiddle school and high school age youthswho are already involved in the city’s organ-ized drug trade.

...

We go inside. We go into the neighborhoods,we try to get the confidence of the parentsand the people that live in there to cooperatewith us on the black-on-black crime that wesee every day, the drive-by shootings. But weare severely understaffed.

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COMMISSIONER DUMONT: How under-staffed?

A. We started with three, and there arecurrently five of us [in the Youth Task Force].When I came on the Camden Police Depart-ment in 1974 we had approximately 465police officers. At that time ... the majornarcotic in the city was heroin, and ... it wasdone at a house; it wasn’t as open as it istoday. Seventeen years later we have ap-proximately 280 police officers, and we have38 drug sets, as opposed to four or five 17years ago. There is more crime out there,less police to fight the battle.

Camden Police Chief George Pugh highlightedthe need for more police officers walking the beat ininner-city neighborhoods:

Walking the beat by patrolmen, in my opin-ion, is the primary mechanism needed toreduce the open air drug markets we have inour cities today. Also, when we were able tohave beat patrols in the City of Camden thepublic perception relative to fear was thelowest in my entire career in the policedepartment. We urgently need the funds toput the policemen back on the streets.

In early 1990 police and school officials in Camdenalso formed a Committee on Gang Violence toincrease coordination and information-sharing be-tween police and school officials about potentialposse-related problems. Although most youth in thegangs or posses are not in school, their violencesometimes spills over into the schoolyards, and stu-dents are vulnerable to the enticements of their fastand flashy lifestyle. The group has distributed post-ers warning posses to stay out of the schools.

The State can assist overburdened municipalauthorities by continuing state/local cooperative pro-grams and expanding others. For example, the StateDivision of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) shouldcrack down on taverns which serve as drug distribu-

tion points, especially in urban areas. When a licenseholder appeals to ABC from a local license suspen-sion or revocation, the local action is stayed pendingthe appeal. This sometimes allows notorious drugdistribution premises to continue under the guise ofa licensed liquor establishment for quite some timewhile the appeal progresses. ABC should coordinatewith local authorities to expedite the appeal processfor the more disreputable licensees.

INCREASE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ANDSHARING

The vast majority of police intelligence resourcesover the years have been devoted to La Cosa Nostramobs. Insufficient attention has been devoted todeveloping strategic intelligence about Afro-linealorganized crime. While law enforcement shouldcontinue to focus attention on the LCN, it shouldcommit a greater proportion of its intelligence effortto Afro-lineal groups. As DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashton testified, “We need to recognize andidentify the existence of these criminal organizations,and we need to develop and share strategic intelli-gence.”

Law enforcement agencies must also share theirintelligence routinely in a true spirit of cooperation.The DEA’s Ashton noted, “It is important that wecommunicate and cooperate in these investigations.”

The Border Anti-Drug Team (BAT), describedby Somerset County Prosecutor Bissell, is a goodexample of successful cooperation that should beemulated. Efforts by groups such as ConcernedOfficers Organization on Gang Activities (CO3GA)should be encouraged.

The Narcotics and Organized Crime Manage-ment and Analytical Database (NOMAD) should beexpanded to more municipal police departments. Aspart of the Attorney General’s Statewide NarcoticsTask Force, NOMAD provides a computer databaseto assist its participants in assessing the scope ofillegal narcotics and organized criminal activity inNew Jersey. Present federal funding conditions,

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however, place restrictions on the use of federalgrants for such a project. This, and the absence ofsufficient state funds, has prevented the expansion ofNOMAD to significant local police departments.

In an effort to determine how familiar NewJersey law enforcement agencies are with Afro-linealorganized criminal groups operating in their areas,the Commission sent surveys to various law enforce-ment agencies throughout the State. Each agencywas asked to identify groups operating within itsjurisdiction, the memberships and structures of theseorganizations, their characteristics, and their meth-ods of operation, including their criminal activities.

A total of 65 surveys were distributed. Forty-nine agencies (approximately 75 percent) responded.Seventeen of the 49 responding agencies indicatedthat they did not have any information to report. SCISpecial Agent Bruce C. Best testified why the surveyresults were disturbing:

Some of the 17 [agencies] that reportedhaving no information are in localities whereother agencies reported significant activi-ties by Afro-lineal criminal groups. Whetheragencies are not sharing their intelligence,or do not wish to acknowledge that there is aproblem, is unclear. The result is that thecollective arm of law enforcement has notestablished the necessary unified effortagainst these criminal organizations.

...

[T]he fact that the response rate was onlyabout 75 percent indicates that the desiredlevel of cooperation among law enforcementagencies has not been achieved. This isdisturbing in view of the fact that our ownintelligence indicates that there are signifi-cant problems with Afro-lineal criminalgroups in several of the jurisdictions that didnot respond to the survey.

Special Agent Best summarized the wide vari-ations in recognition and coping with the problem of

Afro-lineal organized crime among law enforcementagencies throughout New Jersey:

[T]here is a widespread activity of thesegroups. There are some jurisdictions, in-cluding several that we’ve heard from [in thepublic hearing,] which are aggressive indeveloping information about them, coop-erative with other agencies to promote prose-cution and willing to share information. Onthe other hand, several agencies deny theexistence of organized Afro-lineal criminalactivity, and we find that they either havevery little information concerning the lead-ership, structure or membership or they arenegligent in sharing intelligence with otheragencies.

To deal effectively with certain groups, it isnecessary to have multi-jurisdictional cooperationon a national scale. For example, Nigerian criminalgroups involved in fraud schemes are highly mobileand use fictitious means of identification. Just as inthe case of Jamaican posse figures, mobility andconcealment of identity have caused significant prob-lems for law enforcement. The U.S. Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) created anational intelligence data base on the various aliases,nicknames and social security numbers utilized bythe Jamaican criminals. A similar program should beestablished for Nigerian criminals in order to linkindividuals to frauds perpetrated in diverse jurisdic-tions. Such a system, including photographic ele-ments, is especially important since Nigerian crimi-nals often use the identities of legitimate individuals.As local law enforcement is the first line of defenseagainst Nigerian fraud schemes, access to such anational data base should be permitted at the locallevel.

TARGET, EXPOSE AND ISOLATE LEADERS

Working cooperatively, law enforcement shouldidentify and target the leaders of organized criminalgroups for the most attention and the severest pun-ishment. Effective use of federal and state “drug

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kingpin” statutes should be a priority. When theleaders are arrested, they should be denied bail if thegovernment can prove that they pose a danger to thecommunity. If they are granted bail, their trialsshould be expedited so that they can be removedfrom the community as soon as possible. Courtsshould be given the resources to handle cases morequickly. After targeted leaders are incarcerated, theyshould be so closely monitored that they can have nocontinuing influence on their organizations.

DEA Special Agent-in-Charge Ashton connectedthe targeting of leaders to narcotic demand reductionefforts:

We need to vigorously pursue our demandreduction programs and quickly removecriminal leaders from the community beforethey have the opportunity to establish them-selves as role models for the young.

Special Agent Ashton described for Commis-sioner Evenchick the coordinated effort among fed-eral, state and local law enforcement that eventuallyled to the successful prosecution of Wayne Pray andthe serious disruption of his organized criminal group,The Family:

In general, I’d have to say that it was morea concerted, concentrated and cooperativeenforcement effort which directed and tar-geted Mr. Pray. My experience has beenthat if an individual is involved in criminalactivity and we target and direct our effortstowards him, we will develop the sources ofinformation and be able to take him or toarrest him. That’s what happened in thePray case. It was a more concerted effort, acooperative effort that we were able to de-velop informants and sources of informationwhich were able to lead us to his arrest.

Similar coordinated efforts have proven success-ful elsewhere. Since the creation in Philadelphia ofthe Violent Traffickers Project, which includes fed-eral, state and local officials, approximately 250

individuals have been indicted, over 200 have beendetained without bail, and the conviction rate is 100percent.

In July 1990, coordinated law enforcement, as-sisted by substantial information from people inaffected communities, obtained a federal indictmentin Philadelphia against 46 leaders and members of aJamaican-led organization called the Grandison Co-caine and Crack Organization. The alleged ringlead-ers, Derrick Anthony Grandison and Cecil EverardWalters, both Jamaican citizens who have been livingin the United States for several years, were chargedunder the federal “drug kingpin” statute, which pro-vides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 yearsin jail and a maximum of life inprisonment. Thegroup stored, manufactured, prepared and distrib-uted cocaine from 56 locations throughout Philadel-phia and three others in Brooklyn, Far Rockaway andStaten Island in New York.

The Camden Police detectives described for thecommissioners the difficulties encountered in focus-ing law enforcement resources on the leaders of thecriminal groups:

DETECTIVE GEORGE JOYNER: In refer-ence to the 1,200 [drug arrests made byCamden Police in 1989 and 900 made by theCamden County Prosecutor’s vice unit], wehave a high rate of recidivists. ... [T]he sameguys are arrested two or three times withinone year for the same activity. ... We don’thave a super criminal population. We havea group that is locked into that point. ...[W]e have the same thing over and over, asmall number of people continuously beingarrested and just repeat over and over andover, and these kids range from, how old?

DETECTIVE LEONARD HALL: Twelve.

DETECTIVE JOYNER: You’ll get 12 and14-year old kids who might get arrested twoor three times within a three-month period,so it’s not a large number of criminals, just

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a large number of arrests on the same crimi-nals.

COMMISSIONER DUMONT: What is theanswer to the recidivism?

DETECTIVE LOUIS MUZYCZEK: I thinkwe have to get down to the bone. We have togo after the individuals that are providingthe narcotics in the city, these people that areinsulated by other people working for them.... [W]e fill our jails up with just street cornerdealers. It’s a revolving door for them; wedon’t have the space. If we had the man-power to sweep our streets initially and thentarget the kingpins and work towards puttingthem away, they are the people that organizethese youth and impress them to go out anddo this. These are the people that we have toshow the public we are going after. If wedon’t have the drug kingpins who providethe source, we won’t have the cancer.

COMMISSIONER DUMONT: That says tome, though, you are not getting enoughcooperation from the people lower down.Either their sentences are not severe enough,that there is not enough pressure put on themto force them to cooperate against the king-pins [or] there is too much insulation there.

DETECTIVE MUZYCZEK: That’s correcttoo.

COMMISSIONER MERIN: Do you findthat there is a great deal of frustration withthe judicial system, people that will come inand get out on bail and have that lengthyperiod of time between the time they areapprehended and when they actually go totrial?

DETECTIVE HALL: Well, I do, becausebasically if you give a guy a year, ... he doesfour months. That means he’s finished withhis time, and four months later we got him

again .... [I]f he didn’t [plead guilty and]take a year[‘s sentence], he’s out there [onbail] for a year to a year and a half before hecomes to trial. So these guys are actuallylaughing at you. He gets caught with $2,000[one] day. If you let him out of jail and youcatch him five days later, [he’s] got 2,000more dollars in his pocket.

COMMISSIONER MERIN: How do youfeel about the concept of preventive deten-tion that would allow someone to be held injail until the trial comes up?

DETECTIVE HALL: That would be good,very good.

COMMISSIONER MERIN: I know [U.S.]Senator [Edward] Kennedy ... had intro-duced that proposal several years ago ....[I]t’s a controversial idea, and many peopleare coming to the conclusion that for thosekingpins, for those people that were leaders,it would be beneficial to keep them behindbars until their trial comes up.

...

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: ... [T]hat new Statecorrections facility [in Camden] was builtwhat, two and a half years ago?

DETECTIVE MUZYCZEK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: It was built to house450 people?

DETECTIVE HALL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: The population to-day is?

DETECTIVE HALL: 1,300.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: Gone from 450 to1,300 in a brand new facility in two and a

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half years. And there is a lawsuit over thatbrought by the Public Advocate against theAttorney General and the people in CamdenCounty, am I correct?

DETECTIVE HALL: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: The Special Mas-ter, Justice Schreiber, came down with arecommendation just two weeks ago ... tell-ing the county to take out how many, 450, Ithink?

DETECTIVE HALL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZAZZALI: Just trying to dem-onstrate, without passing judgment on anyissue on anyone, the multidimensional com-plex nature of the problem. I share Commis-sioner Merin’s feelings.

COMMISSIONER MERIN: I think at thebeginning of 1982 there were about 7,000State prison cells, and at the end of the 1980sthere were about 15,000. And clearly thereare more ... people that should be in prisonthan there are cells. And again I think thatone of the recommendations might be totarget those people that are going to spendtime ... in prison and make sure that it’s theleaders, it’s the kingpins, that are there andnot the people that maybe can be penalizedin a different fashion.

COMMISSIONER DUMONT: The prob-lem, though goes back to my point thatunless you penalize the people lower down insome form you are not going to get theircooperation to identify and prosecute thekingpins. At least you are not going to getthat form of technique to be effective. It isexceedingly complex.

Elizabeth Police Detective Thomas Swan em-phasized that for some time after initial arrests E’PortPosse members continued their violent cocaine traf-

ficking and turf wars:

They were rapidly able to make bail, despitethe fact they posed a danger to the commu-nity. Meanwhile, priority for trials wasgiven to incarcerated individuals unable tomake bail because they didn’t have the re-sources of an organization behind them.Therefore, the arrested members of the Pret-low gang continued to prey on the commu-nity for lengthy periods.

As part of the effort to thwart the ability of theleaders of organized criminal groups to accumulatewealth and power, authorities should devote moreresources to tracing the investment of illegal gains inlegitimate businesses. Taxation officials should bemore involved in this process in cooperation withother law enforcement officials.

RETAIN AND EXPAND ORGANIZED CRIMEFIGHTING TOOLS

Existing law enforcement tools, such as elec-tronic surveillance, which have proven so successfulin the fight against La Cosa Nostra, should be ex-tended to deal with equally dangerous groups thathave thus far not received equal attention. SomersetCounty Prosecutor Bissell related how electronicsurveillance and law enforcement cooperation helpedto defeat the Isaac Wright group and a would-besuccessor:

There is no question that we would not havehad the success in this operation without theavailability of that electronic surveillance,and we certainly need that. And we are goingto have to develop greater capability, be-cause while we have the capability withrespect to land line telephones and the like,they are now into a new generation of mobilecellular telephones, telephone pagers andthose kind of things.

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And I think the other aspect of it is also thecooperation, the need for cooperation be-tween law enforcement agencies. Certainlyour agency could not have conducted thisinvestigation by itself. We could not havebeen as successful without the willingness ofthe State Police to become involved and tohelp us essentially design the equipment thatwe needed and to find somebody to manufac-ture it for us. So, the combination of all thosethings allowed us not only to recognize thatwe had an organized group, [it] allowed usto target the group and allowed us to conductan investigation and bring that investigationto a successful conclusion. And, in addition,the continuing cooperation has allowed us[to continue to have successes.] For ex-ample, in the Franklin Township area therewas a group who came together shortly afterWright was taken from the scene and tried tofill the void that was created two or threemonths down the road by the absence of thisgroup. And the BAT [Border Anti-drugTeam] concept allowed us to identify thisgroup, to infiltrate it [and] to make arrests.

And all of those people have since beenarrested, convicted and ...incarcerated. Andthat Edgemere area in Franklin is a muchimproved area in terms of it being less sus-ceptible to narcotics trade today ....

In addition to maintaining the present law en-forcement arsenal for dealing with organized crime,additional tools should be considered by the Legisla-ture in order to fill any gaps. For example, NewJersey still does not have its own law against moneylaundering to complement the federal law dealingwith money laundering.

* * *

The SCI investigative team for the inquiry intoAfro-lineal organized crime was headed by

Deputy Director and Counsel Robert J. Clarkand Senior Special Agent Francis A. Betzler

and included Special Agent Bruce C. Best andIntelligence Analyst Debra A. Sowney.

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