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TRANSCRIPT
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CHAPTER VI:
AFTERMATH OF THE COUP 1953
Mossadeq’ Trial
Mossadeq was detained on 20 August 1953. His hearing was being
started on 17 September and was ended on 29 September 1953. Two days
later, 1 October, martial attorney issued a lawsuit against Mossadeq and
accused him to betray, but martial tribunal began its work after six weeks. On
21 December 1953, verdict of trial was issued and Mossadeq was sentenced to
3 years solitary confinement. Both Mossadeq and martial tribunal made an
appeal of the tribunal verdict. On 8 April 1954; the revision court was formed
and after one month, its end was declared. The first verdict was affirmed in this
court, too. 1 Regime was trying to prevent posing Mossadeq’s complaint in the
Supreme Court through some tactics and plans, because it was concerned of its
judicial consequences. Therefore, the revision case and other issues especially
appealing process was deliberately delayed until 3 August of 1956, exactly two
weeks before ending 3 years conviction of Mossadeq, the Supreme Court
verdict was announced to Mossadeq. After ending a 3 years imprisonment, he
was directly transferred to Ahmad Abad and was monitoring till end of his life.
Mossadeq’s trial should not be regarded as a special or non-special
judicial procedure, because this trial was continuation of political struggle of
the Shah and conservative ruling class from one hand and the national
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movement from the other hand. Hence, if Mossadeq was showing conformity
towards prison guards and regime agents, their behavior was different towards
him, too. If, Mossadeq accepted the coup he would have a peaceful and
respectful life. The reason of delaying his trial for four weeks was this. Regime
was trying to have a deal with him not before his hearing but during all his 3
years confinement. Four months interruption between issuing the court verdict
and formation of revision court was for reaching an agreement with Mossadeq.
Even postponing final investigation in the Supreme Court was for reaching an
unofficial agreement out of the court. Once, it was said that if Mossadeq
retook his appealing Shah would forgive him. It is evident that regime’s benefit
was in peace not political crying. Also, Shah was envying Mossadeq for his
publicity and independence. But, the old man was not going to appease with
Shah. The main reason of trial and sentencing to imprisonment and lifetime
banishing to Ahmad Abad was this.
Hearing
Hearing was generally done during 5 sessions and 19 hours and 35
minutes. It is seemed from studying the first hearing session, that regime was
examining Mossadeq’s views to settle the issue calmly. Official investigator
was an army colonel whose course was engineering but was not instructed in
legal and judiciary grounds. But, army attorney brigadier-general Hossien
Azmoodeh was present from the first sessions of hearings, and from the second
session he practically charged Mossadeq’s hearing. In the first session,
behavior of investigator and attorney was respectful with Mossadeq. Moreover,
Mossadeq was regulating respectful behavior, which was his characteristics;
meantime, his behavior was in legal frame and was not influenced. With ending
the session, attorney convicted Mossadeq to plot against the constitution and
intriguing against monarchy and issued his arrest order. Mossadeq meantime
receiving announcement wrote under it; “I strongly deny above accusations
which are untrue and unfair and I do complain to my illegal arrest which is
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baseless17و September 1953, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq.” 2
from the second
session, so, Azmoodeh personally undertook hearing affair. When he assured
Mossadeq was not going to deal, he confronted Mossadeq with the Justice
Minister of his Cabinet, Lotfi. Lotfi said he was not aware from Shah’s note
over removal of Mossadeq in unsuccessful coup of 16 and 17 August.
Azmoodeh asked Mossadeq why one of his cabinet ministers was unaware of
the Shah’s note. Mossadeq said he would reply conditional on writing in the
process-verbal. Prosecutor was refusing to give such a guarantee and
Mossadeq conditioned replying to that pre-condition. This struggle ended with
Mossadeq’s threat to go on food strike; but confronting and hostility of the
investigator and accused continued until end of Mossadeq’s confinement.
The third session was totally specified to hearing Mossadeq’s statements
and his performances and goals after receiving Shah’s note in 16 August. In
the fourth session, hearing turned violent. Prosecutor asked about bringing
down the Shah and the Reza Shah’s statues on 16 August and whether he had
issued orders on stopping these actions. Mossadeq’s reply had that normal
procedure. He said that he had not heard anything over bringing down the
Shah’s statue, but the Tudeh party informed him of subverting the Reza Shah’s
statue and he asked the National Front Parties to take those statues. He
supported this act for he considered Reza Shah as a dictator and usurper of
people’s property. If government prevented people’s action on removing these
statues, it would offend people’s right. If the Tudeh party removed the statues,
government had two ways: one, force them to install it that was bad on the
public or not to install them, which in that case government was at the same
rank of the Tudeh Party, so, government, asked democratic and liberal parties
to accomplish it. Regarding to this reasoning of Mossadeq prosecutor never
put on this debate again.
In fact, this was the last question of the investigator which Mossadeq
answered it. Hearing Mossadeq’s reply, prosecutor warned and spoke angrily
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to him. Mossadeq stated his question would be answered in the court.
Azmoodeh, again, warned him if he would not answer his questions, he would
act according to his legal duty, and then Mossadeq answered that, “go and act
based on your legal duty” and hearing ended here. On 1 October 1953,
Azmoodeh issued his lawsuit against Mossadeq and brigadier-general Riyahi.
Accusation was quite simple and brief: those two were accused of intriguing
people to armed revolt and according to the article 317 of penal law of army
punishment of it was execution. But, the lawsuit was so long and it was
provided another political struggle against Mossadeq in the court and out of it.
Mossadeq was convicted to betray and making terror and horror system during
his premiership and was trying to weaken people’s belief toward official
religion of the country. 3
They believed Mossadeq was asking those who
visiting him about the authorities activities and appointed conservative, weak
and disrespectful ones in pivotal and important positions.
Trial on Martial Tribunal
Six weeks after ending hearing, the Primary martial tribunal began its
work. Members of the court were consisting of some brigadier-general
including brigadier –General Teimour Baktiar and one major general. None of
them had judicial instruction or experience. Mossadeq suggest Lieutenant-
general Naghdi as his attorney but Naghdi did not accept. Informing of this
case Colonel Jalil Bozorgmehr contacted Naghdi and announced his readiness
for defending Mossadeq. Bozorgmehr was a noticeable and famous lawyer and
in army was famed for his merits and honest. Having 39 years old made him
one of the youngest army colonels who if did not undertake defend of
Mossadeq became brigadier-general nearby. Army prosecutor office officially
appointed him as Mossadeq’s defend lawyer. At the beginning, Mossadeq
performed cautiously and perhaps was thinking he would prefer loyalty to army
and Shah than attorney. Nevertheless, during trial, he completely relied on him
and in the revision; court of army paid him the attorney right and personally
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made Bozorgmehr as his attorney. However, Mossadeq was defending himself
in his way and was successful but Bozorgmehr, also, served him properly
including he was mediator between Mossadeq and his adherences and political
advisors out of the court.
Defending of Mossadeq had both legal and political aspects. At first, he
objected to his trial in the martial tribunal and said based on the Constitution,
government members should be tried by the Supreme Court. Defendant text
was prepared by Ali Shahid Zadeh, an outstanding lawyer who became
Mossadeq’s attorney at the time of referring his case to the Supreme Court, and
Bozorgmehr gave it to Mossadeq. Mossadeq read the defendant text himself.
As it was predictable, court rejected his objection and Mossadeq started
defending accusation cases. Prosecutor was claiming that Mossadeq had been
against the Constitution and had ignored his removal order by the Shah and
invited people to armed revolt. Mossadeq replied:
a) The removal order, which Shah had sent him, was a part of a coup and
he was informed before of it. The order was declared him at one a.m.
and simultaneously his residence had been under military siege, and
three political figures were stolen from their houses including the
foreign minister.
b) From writings of note, it was evident before Shah signed a white paper
and after, in his absence something had written on it over my removal.
c) He headed no armed or unarmed revolt but he was waiting to contact
Shah and clear about what he had received;
d) Removal order that Shah had issued was against the Constitution and so,
he rejected it, because Shah had no right of doing so, because Majlis had
not been officially dissolved. Meanwhile representatives who had
resigned could retake their resignations.
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In 1984, all trial procedures and reports and its documents was published
for the first time in two volumes. It seems all trial was for making a political
struggle against Mossadeq and the national movement Army prosecutor was
practically administered the Court. Even in rare cases that the court head was
pretending to neutrality, he threatened him. Even he did not refuse personal
attacks on Mossadeq like “baby servant of Qajar’s courts”. 4 Azmoodeh read a
letter from an unknown journalist who had offended Mossadeq’s attorney. He
was threatening to make the court sessions secret when Mossadeq embarked on
exposing especially about Pahlavi dynasty. Some mercenaries as spectators
were placed in the court and during the trial were offending Mossadeq like “a
law Doctor” who does know nothing of law. Mossadeq, also, addressed
Azmoodeh as “that man” not by his name or his military rank. Apart from
contempt the court by Mossadeq, he had a legal reason for it: Mossadeq in a
part of Judicial reforms of his government and democratizing laws,
qualification of martial laws had limited to some special cases like field trials.
Based on reformative program of Mossadeq, the army prosecutor office had
been dissolved, so, legally this office was not there. Martial prosecutor
presence was illegal, because after dissolving army prosecutor in his
government no other law had been legislated to abrogate it.
One of the cases which army prosecutor had used it several times against
Mossadeq was having no religious beliefs. His reason was his PhD thesis forty
years before and his apostasy sentences. In 1907, when Mossadeq was deputy
of the Finance Ministry, and was ardently following fighting against influential
and famous factors of corruption, his dissidents misinterpreted his PhD thesis
little and had accused him of apostasy and infidelity. The army prosecutor was
using advisory of conservative statement like Senator Ibrahim Khajeh Noori
and Ali Dashti and they gave him information over Mossadeq. 5
Emphasizing
of army prosecutor to convicting Mossadeq to apostasy was for encouraging
Qom clerics, Ayatollah Behbahani and Fadian Islam to cooperate with
government. Mossadeq got anxious of these convictions, because not only he
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was religious person but also he was afraid of assassinating by religious and
bias elements in the court. This concern was not baseless because during two
courts of Mossadeq, his government foreign minister, Dr. Hossein Fatemi, who
was arrested assassinated by some mercenaries, but could rescued like a
miracle. Later, he sentenced to death in a fake trial. Fatemi was injured before
execution for shots of Abde Khodaei, one of the young members of “Islam
Devotees” who was elected later as Tehran deputy in the Islami consultative
Parliament. The “Islam Devotees” (Fadian-e Eslam) had sworn to murder
Mossadeq from first of his premiership. Immediately after the 19 August coup,
the “Islam Devotee’s” leader who had been imprisoned two months before for
intriguing was freed by the coup regime.
Regarding to political nature of the trial, all the trial including the head of
court were going to show Mossadeq’s case as a political case not legal one. At
last, Mossadeq succeeded to prove the political nature of the trial through
restoring to various ways and tactics including threatening to go for food
strike, demanding, shouting on the court head. Mossadeq was insisting on the
point (that) his trial was doing aftermath a coup by American organization.
Proving this claim, he relied on some documents, which were providing by
Mossadeq’s friends and by his defense lawyer was reaching him. 10
In the
following, some part of his last defense in the 34th
session on 20 December
1953 is being narrated:
“Yes, my only sin, my large and very big sin is to nationalize the Iranian
Oil Industry and to shorten and cut off the Political and economic
influence and monopoly of the largest world empire from this country.
….In the price of demolishing I and my family and my life and wealth,
God helped me to abolish this dreadful system by aspiration and will of
these free people….My life, wealth and existence and some like me is
worthless for existence, independence and glory of millions of Iranians
and future generations. it is apparent from premise and legal procedure
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that I will die in jail and they will turn off my voice and ardent which I
have used for people goodness. …I bid farewell to the dear, brave and
elegant people of Iran and stress on their honorable way “not to afraid of
any event and be assure that God will be their aid and friend.” 6
In the last moment, a message from the Shah reached to the Court and
was read in the open session of court. Shah had said that if Mossadeq
personally asked Shah for forgiveness, Shah would acquit him. At once,
Mossadeq got angry and rejected the suggestion. Court convicted him to the
previous accusation, considered for him 3 years solitary confinement, and
prohibited to vote for execution, the verdict for such a crime. Based on law,
execution of individuals more than 60 years was prevented and the Shah
forgave some years of his punishment. Some days later, Mossadeq received
from Lord stokes the royal stumper of Britain in the labor cabinet, for
congratulation of Jesus Birth celebration in jail. Lord stokes had been leading
the ex-company delegacy for oil in Tehran. Stokes had written in his hand
script: “In the hope of bringing your country in peace and happiness in next
Christian year.” Supportive letters were being sent for Mossadeq from Arabic,
Asian, German, U.S. and Argentine. 7
Renewed Trial in the Martial Revision Court
Immediately after finishing the legal procedure, it was begun to provide
next term of struggle. According to those days legal procedure, a copy of the
court verdict was delivering to the accused and he was signing it in a private
place to say has seen the court verdict. Mossadeq wrote in this paper that, “I
appeal of this illegal vote which has been issued from an illegal court.” He
appealed without mentioning name of the Supreme Court.
Some days later, it became obvious that Mossadeq had used “appealing”
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word, purposely. Three lawyers of the Justice Court, Ali Shahid Zadeh,
Bahram Magdzadeh and Hassan Sadr, asked appealing from the Supreme Court
as Mossadeq’s lawyer and relying on legal procedures of army announced that
appealing of martial court verdict can be asked just of the Supreme Court.
According to some reasons, regime was not desire to have Mossadeq’s trial in
the Supreme Court and an independent investigation be done by the Supreme
Court. After creating some difficulties, the Supreme Court in a letter asked the
army prosecutor to “send Mossadeq’s file if you don’t need it.” The Supreme
Court was going to give his file to Mossadeq’s lawyers in order to study and
provide the ground for renewed trial. Prosecutor rejected the Supreme Court
request. Two month later, Mossadeq wrote a letter to the head of revision court
of army asked to send his file to the Supreme Court and through that court his
lawyers could study it. The Court head replied that, “Because your request on
sending file has no legal base, so this court cannot do it.”
Regime had not still stabilized and threatened of Mossadeq’s publicity.
Public support of people had strongly concerned the regime. The ruling class
was inclined to allow Mossadeq to live calmly in Ahmad Abad contingent on
leaving enmity and struggle. Even before trial, one of the army doctors said
him during his daily test if he would write a two lines letter to American
embassy, he would free at once. Now, this suggestion was given him
apparently. Yousef Moshar, one of the second rank representatives of the
National Front who later joint to opposed line, send a message through colonel
Borzorgmehr from Shah to Mossadeq and said him if he would agree, the trial
would end and banish to Ahmad Abad. Mossadeq again rejected this
suggestion of the Shah. 8 The file was sent to the revision court, but creating
difficulties were continued till March 1954. Two days before beginning the
court, Mossadeq and his lawyers in a letter to the court head – major-general
Javadi – asked to allow them act as Mossadeq’s defenses in the court. Javadi
only in reply to Mossadeq’s letter said that it was impossible. Mossadeq, again,
requested for presence of his defenses for consulting in the recess time. Javadi
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answered that: a) Defenses can present in the court sessions as spectator with
court permission; b) Permission for private talk in recess time is just with army
prosecutor. 9
The revision court was like the primary court from many aspects, that is to
say the army prosecutor could do everything, and the court head was trying to
hide his shame of this case. The revision court had totally 26 sessions and all
lasted one month. Mossadeq, again, objected to qualification of the court and it
was not accepted again. When the court entered accusation cases, Mossadeq
was more ready than previous court, to prove legality of his government
according to foreign and domestic evidences. Even once, he relied on a report
of Tribune Donasieun newspaper on 4 September 1953. It had been written that
Senator Khajeh Noori and others had prepared a lawsuit against him before,
which prosecutor used it in the primary court procedure. The same newspaper
in its number of 14 September exposed assassination plot to Dr. Hossein
Fatemi, the Foreign Minister, “Fatemi was assassinated by that general Shaban
Bi Mokh who was leader of thugs and hooligans at the time of arresting.”
Mossadeq in his last defense said that wanted to inform “Court and his
Civilians” his only goal during his entire political career had been:
“Yes, I during all my life had no more than goal and it was and is
Iranians can live with independence and glory and except majority will
no one rule on him. Glorious struggle of people against the ex-
company, which I was one of its leaders and now regarding God’s help,
I am, expressing my idea from jail, will end to the Middle East
monopoly. Aside from economic aspect, which loots our wealth, the
national movement had been created for removing this dreadful cancer
and people can use of real freedom and political independence. Who
does not know previous governments of mine were agent and captive of
political agents of the ex-company. …….I thank God in this gloomy and
sinister destiny, the trial has become an instrument that after 50 years
constitutionality, in public thoughts this important issue will set forth
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that in Constitutional regime and democracy removal and appointment
of a government head who is manifestation of a government authority is
depend on one person or on majority nation will”. 10
Appealing
Appealing request from the Supreme Court was a different case. All
judicial reforms of Mossadeq’s government, through Abdol Ali Lotfi the old
justice Minister and Mohammad Soruri the Supreme court head, was
demolished one night after the coup. Many of honest judges of the Supreme
Court were dismissed and replaced by de-famous ones. This was especially for
“Ali Heiat”, the new head of the Supreme Court, that government ultimately
forced to remove him based on Parliament approve. Apart all of these, these
courts still had high power and significant independence and especially the
Supreme Court, the highest judicial part of the country, had its independence.
In addition, for these reasons, both sides in the Mossadeq’s case was pressuring
to the Supreme Court. From one side, Shah and the coup government was
requesting to reject Mossadeq’s appeal and from the other side, Mossadeq’s
adherences were requesting to regulate law. Nevertheless, there was a
clandestine struggle. No one was active over Mossadeq’s file as himself. First,
file was referred to three branch of the Supreme Court. Branch judges, at once,
contacted privately with “Ali Heiat”, the Supreme Court head and stressed they
would not regard government consideration in this case. The file was sent to 9
branches with no reason. During 11 months, nothing was done on this file in
this branch. Their excuse was having many files and cases in turn. Ultimately,
on 10 July 1954; Mossadeq broke his silence, wrote to “Ali Heiati”, and asked
him about not summoning him for the lawsuit:
“From 5 September of last year that I offered my appealing I have been
waiting according to 452 article of penal trial principle to summon and
according to 451 article of the same law defend myself. All people saw
whenever I was going to defend myself, some of Taj club persons said
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and wrote offences against him in the newspapers and threatened him to
making the trial clandestine, so, I rejected to disclose”.
Iran’s Supreme Court, like other countries, had limitations and should
do in the frame of law. Various cases of law were given right to Mossadeq to
present in the court and according to legal articles, set forth an appealing
lawsuit. Mossadeq was ending his first letter as follows:
“My appealing is not a case that I can finish so I should say orally that it
is near two years that I have tolerated jail with my old age and weak and
inability of temper just for the day that present in the Supreme Court and
express whatever I have about my innocence.”
This was the last, simplest, more effective and exposing of proposing
political and legal lawsuit of Mossadeq against the Shah regime against public
thought. Hence, regime was trying to prohibit it. The Supreme Court head
wrote in answering Mossadeq: “Mr. Dr. Mossadeq….regarding to present you
at the time of Supreme Court for proposing, according to usual procedure of the
Supreme Court from beginning to present the accused was inviting for
elaboration to relevant branch….”. 11
Head of the Court did not answer any
later letters of Mossadeq addressed him or other judicial authorities and instead
he insisted on his defense in occasion interviews with newspapers.
Making differences and postponing was effective- for instance the nine
branch judges who should survey the Mossadeq case, other duties were
determined for them like extra files. These procedures made the old man tired
till his three years imprisonment ended and banished to Ahmad Abad.
Mossadeq who had understood the regime plot, went on for unlimited food
strike. Regime was compelled to justify its way. Flatters began to write in the
newspapers that name of Mossadeq was in the list of those who were going to
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be forgiven by the Shah for the 26 October celebration. Reaction of Mossadeq
was rapid and angrily and within a letter to “Ali Heiat” objected to this matter:
“As it was said in one of the martial court sessions, if His Majesty is
going to acquit and forgive me, because it is the biggest offence to a
servant of country I cannot accept it and I will end my life. Now, I say if
the branch wouldn’t invite me for presence in the court and take me the
right of any accused I will prefer death to live because I don’t have any
instrument to defend myself.” 12
Corresponding of Mossadeq from jail and wasting time by regime
continued. First, Mossadeq letters were sent for army prosecution and
prosecutor was studying them. Soon, it became apparent that in spite of explicit
text of law, they would not invite Mossadeq to present in the court. Also, his
defenses are not allowed to present in the court and propose lawsuit. Even for
visiting defenses, he should fight with army prosecutor and finally during one
year he just could see his defenses twice. He wrote several letters to “Ali
Heiat” and expressed necessity of his presence in the court based on political
and legal reasons. Even he referred to precedents of such a case in France,
Belgium and Switzerland courts. The 9 branch of the Supreme Court,
ultimately announced its brief vote on 5 May 1956 as follows which was
communicated (to) Mossadeq on 23 June 1956: “Considering all aspects and
regarding personal conditions of the appellant is not effective, the issued
verdict (by the revision martial court) is confirmed.” 13
Mossadeq read the news of the Supreme Court in the newspapers
(because it lasted seven days to communicate the court verdict to him through
army prosecution). Issuing this judgment caused defaming of the government.
The judgment had referred to no precedent appealing or its reason and had not
been relied on any legal article about affirming qualification of army legal
procedure and the primary courts.
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It was obvious the nine branch judges had been under pressure of
government and regime. Meantime they acquit themselves and held
government and regime responsible for all sins and faults. Disgracing of the
judgment was so much that Jamal Emami, old enemy of Mossadeq, had cited in
the Senate he wished they would be efficacious to appealing. Jamal Akavi, the
Justice Minister, who was famous till the time resigned in order to keep himself
aside from all dishonors and embarrassments. But, regime forced him to
dispense with his decision for two or three months and served in foreign state.
The Supreme Court head was ousted disgracefully with votes of both Majleses.
Mossadeq was angry but did not leave the struggle. Meantime, issuing a
declaration from Jail rejected officially the Supreme Court judgment, also
complained to the supreme disciplinary of judges against the 9 branch judges
and wrote letters to the Justice Minister (Jamal Akhavi who had resigned), and
complaint about the new head of Supreme Court who was famous for Gess-
Golshaeian Agreement. At the time of Mossadeq’s imprisonment, a law had
passed by the Majles which according it the Supreme Disciplinary of Judges
could not survey about technical problems like the Mossadeq’s case. The 9-
branch vote was kept in the army prosecution for 50 days and then conferred
Mossadeq. Now, it had remained 2 weeks to ending his conviction period and
his three years imprisonment. However, Mossadeq did not surrender and asked
for visiting with his defenses. He wrote a reproaching letter to army
prosecution for it’s deliberately delay in sending letters and court judgments
and asked for a visit with his defenses. The Supreme Court head personally
wrote him for having no legal prohibition over his visit with defenses. The
army prosecutor in an offensive reply wrote him he did not have any right to
use lawyer because now he was a convicted and his conviction had been
approved. Mossadeq received army prosecutor letter two or three days before
being free from jail that is to say in the early of August 1956. He was directly
sent to Ahmad Abad and spent rest of his life there. 14
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Section 2
The national Movement after the Coup
Resistance on the Coup
The 19 August coup shocked and frightened the national movement
forces, but the coup regime itself had frightened, too. Zahedi and his colleagues
in the army, conservative statesmen, landlords, and religious system all
believed to return the situation before 1948 that is to say both the Tudeh Party
and the National Front would be prevent and ex-communicate from the Majles.
Shah had a new plan for his autocratic ruling like his father, but he did not
expose his plan for conservative allies. Most of the National Front leaders in
Majles, Cabinet, Bazaar and political parties were banished. They were
included Shaygan, Nariman, Rzavi Seddighi, Lotfi, Shamshiri and Ayatollah
Zanjani’s brothers and many activists of the movement. Dr. Hussein Fatima
was hiding some months, but accidentally was arrested and during arresting
one of the coup regime agents assassinated him that had no result. He was
secretly tried in the martial court and was executed. Khalil Maleki arrested and
exiled to Falak-ol Aflak jail. Many of the Tudeh Party leaders and activists
were imprisoned in this Middle Age jail. 15
Bazaar reacted against the coup before all. The coup regime destroyed
ceiling of bazaar in retaliation of rallies and strikes of bazzaries. Trial of
Mossadeq had attracted people’s unanimity. Therefore, regime was trying to
reach an agreement with him out of the court. However, Mossadeq was
completely aware of political performance of trial and his conflict results in the
court were clear for the society. Even he referred to bazzar destruction by
regime in the court. Within first three weeks of the coup, resistance thought
against regime was formed. Khalil Maleki was simulating Iran to France at the
time of the World War II under occupation of Nazi German. However, soon he
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was arrested and had no role in forming to the National Resistance Movement.
Ayatollah Hajagha Reza Zanjani, his brother Ayatollah Seyyed Abolfzl
Zanjani, Mehdi Bazargan, Seyyed Mohmood Taleghani, Dr. Yadollah Sahabi
and some young activists who mainly belonged to the religious wing of the
National Front., did organizing this movement. The Third Force party and
group of Mohammad Nakhshab with new name of Iran’s people party had role
in organizing the National Resistance Movement. Later, Iran’s party and
young Pan Iranists of Daryush Forohar joint them. 16
On 12 November 1953; almost three months after the coup, first
organized coalition was appeared as a public demonstration against the Usurper
rule of Shah and Zahedi. Its reason was re-establishing political relation with
Britain before settling the oil issue. That day, bazzar was closed and in
different parts, self-stimulating rallies were done. However, it was not a power
showing off, but presence of dissent forces was showing. Martial law was still
there in Tehran and tanks were fixed in sensitive points of city. From beginning
of education year, Tehran University and Alborz College were not calm and
armed forces were always there. On 7 December, for student Day and coming
Richard Nixon, the then deputy president of America, some of students said
mottos against regime. Regime ordered fire to armed forces to prevent repeat
of such actions in Tehran at the time of Nixon staying in Iran. Three students
of Tehran University in Technical faculty were killed by shot. At the time, the
most important concern of the coup regime and the U.S. state was unrest of
Ghashghaee tribe in Fars and South parts of the country. Ghashghaees had a
threatening gesture one or two months before. Of course, they were not going
to move towards Tehran, but if their unrest became successful, it could make
disturbances in Tehran and other cities. Both Iran’s government and the U.S.
directly acted and convinced them. Still reason of Ghashghaees dispensing with
making upheaval and going Naser Khan Ghashghaee to Tehran is unclear. 17
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The National resistance movement coalition could not resist. Moreover,
tactical problems, personalities and their treats with each other was effective.
Iran’s Party left the coalition soon. This party did not come back to Political
activity till 1950, although during this period, two of its leaders – Allahyar
Saleh and Karim Sanjabi – had some objective enterprises. Reason of partition
the Third force was something else. Exactly after arresting and imprisoning
Khalil Maleki, two members of executive committee of the Party – Dr.
Mohammad Ali Khonji and Dr. Mosood Hejazi – started a conflict against him
and asked for his immediate expulsion. Their accusation to Khalil Maleki was:
a) Once Maleki had met the Shah (according to Shah’s request); b) Party had
received 50 thousands rials from religious foundation of Hazrat-e Masoomeh in
Qom. Of course, unanimous approving of the Party executive committee did
these two acts and also Maleki’s visit with Shah was done by before agreement
of Mossadeq and then Maleki in a report informed the Party executive
committee of that meeting. 18
In June 1956, Maleki was transferred from Falkol
– Aflak to Qasr jail in Tehran and after some weeks, he was released.
Meantime, internal research over Khonji – Hejazi’s criticizes was continuing
and finally these two along with other 9 left the party. When Maleki was in
jail, they were communicator with the National Resistance Movement.
Vacating them of the third force was like partiating the Party from the National
Resistance Movement. However, the Movement in 1955 was consisted just of
religious persons and the National Front activists.
Khonji and Hejazi’s action led to weakening mentality of members and
adherences of the Third Force. While, the party was on the verge of collapsing,
they did not continue jeopardizing conflict with the coup regime. Maleki
personally believed that all branching was due to enterprises of major general
Farhad Dadsetan, the head of regime security forces. Maleki was narrating a
published declaration without name that it had been confirming such a plot.
Although, it is clear that Khonji had no information of these plots and whatever
he did was his belief.
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Struggle with regime continued, but it was weakening day by day.
America and Britain announced their support of the regime from the first. In
November 1955, Iran was entered to Baghdad Treaty. Following to Abdol
Karim Ghasem Coup in Iraq in 1958, this treaty renamed to SANTO.
Immediately, after the coup, U.S. started its financial and military aids to
regime. In 1954, oil consersium agreement caused to escalate Iran’s annual oil
incomes. These incomes led to expend huge amount of money by regime for
military and security affairs. These expenses and non-military expenses caused
temporary economic flourishing and middle class benefited it. At the time, the
Tudeh Party was broken down and the Soviet Union was trying to establish
friendly relations. The Soviet Union began negotiation with Zadedi’s
government for paying their debts to Iran that had not paid to Mossadeq’s
government. Of course, in practice it was paid in Ala’s cabinet after Zahedi.
The Soviet Union welcomed the Shah’s visit from there and arranged a
magnificent welcome in Moscow. In 1959, it was Shah who engaged with the
Soviets and entered a bilateral defensive agreement with the US; instead,
America undertook to pay more financial aid to Iran. 19
In 1955, Shah released himself of Zahedi and solidified his control on
security forces and army. Finally, in 1957, elected Dr. Manuchehr Eghbal as
Prime Minister Major-general Teimour Baktiar, a cruel and ambitious military
man, established the Information and Security Organization of the country, by
Shah’s order. Bakhtiar before as military governor monitored activities of
secret and security police. There is no surprise that little resistances were
demolished, while public dissatisfaction towards regime was going to increase.
The National Resistance Movement was publishing leaflet of “Mossadeq’s
way” till 1958 semi-hidden. “Hashiye-bi Hashiye” was one of these leaflets,
which were occasionally publishing. 20
Maleki and some of the Third Force
activists focused on analytic notes. These notes were publishing first in “Life
battle” and then in “Science and life”.
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Objection to Consortium Agreement
The coup regime announced Mossadeq’s plebiscite and dissolution of
the seventeen Majles. Therefore, it was expecting the seventeen Majles re-
started its activity from beginning. But, this was the Majles that two third of its
representatives had resigned in support of voluntary referendum. Moreover,
parliamentary group of the National Front was among these representatives,
who some of them were in jail despite of Parliamentary immunity in prison of
the coup regime. For this reason, all previous declarations of the coup
government in illegal case of plebiscite was ignored and the eighteenth Majlis
election in 1954. At first, the second term election of Senate for selection 30
Senators was held. The Shah appointed 30 Senators. It was not allowed the
National Front to announce its nominees list. 21
But advocators of the National
Front knew vote to which otherwise full list of the National Front they had not
received nominees. Regime settled thugs and hooligans in ballot booths to
frighten voters. In any case, votes of the National Front candidates had not
been read and declared. Again, like the fourteenth to sixteenth periods,
landlord deputies from rural areas were entered the eighteenth Majles.
Nevertheless, candidates of cities and towns were determined by the regime
they were not completely under control of government which regime needed in
next years.
Experiment of regime power in the eighteenth Majles was done when
Ali Amini, then Finance Minister, offered the proposal of oil consortium
agreement for Parliamentary approving. In fact, the consortium Agreement was
granting another oil concession to foreign companies, that is to say despite oil
nationalization, all the fourteenth Majles policies, Negative Equilibrium and
not-granting north oil concession to the Soviet. Apart of this, conditions of the
consortium Agreement was much more worse than conditions which Lord
stokes had proposed Mossadeq in August 1951. AIOC had been in worse
situation, because it was forced to accept American oil companies’ presence in
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consortium due to America’s help in overthrowing Mossadeq and the National
Front. The National Resistance Movement, also, attacked on the oil Agreement
legally and politically.
“The National Resistance Movement emphasizes on Mossadeq’s way
and settling politically the oil issue and this is aspect of making Iran free
from foreigners interferences and providing freedom and independence
of Iran which is prior to any other affair.” 22
Simultaneously, long and objective letter signed by Dehkhoda, Zanjani,
Moazami, Saleh, Bazargan, Maleki and Shahpour Bakhtiar and some others
was distributed between Senators and deputies. This letter had been stressed on
precedents of the ex-company interferences and putting freedom and
independence of the country as scapegoat by the governments that are despite
nationalizing oil industry. This letter had been stated no chance or opportunity
had been given to people or national leaders or those who had been hidden or
were under monitoring. The Press and media didn’t say anything about it;
however, it had been signed by the seventeenth Majles speaker (Moazami), the
ex-head of Oil Company (Bazargan), ex-Ministers of the interior and justice,
some of religious leaders’ university professors and political parties head.
Expulsion of 12 professors including Moazami, Bazargan, Gharib, Sahabi and
Abedi was regime reaction. 23
.
The nineteenth Majles election in 1958 was held by fraud more than the
eighteenth Majles. In spite of previous period, the National front even could not
distribute secretly its nominees’ name. Those independent deputies who
entered Majles with government agreement like Derakh Shesh, was put aside
this term. In this election, Allahyar Saleh tried through sit-down in Majles
objected to election fraud. But, this sit-down did not prolong. An army vehicle
full of soldiers went to Majles court and took him forcefully out and put him
under control in his house. During 1954-60, there were objections like this and
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regime was embarking on arresting, banishing and expulsion of opponents
from governmental organizations.
With reducing threat of the National Movement and effective repression
of it and following to reduction of independent and loyal conservative
statement to regime, existing differences were drawn inside regime and
different lobby and pressure groups, different and opponent attitudes and trends
were appeared. From first, Shah’s goal was to increase his power by price of
demolishing conservative politicians’ power and this led to a gap between Shah
and conservative ruling class. First victim of this power struggle was Zahedi
who was put aside respectfully. He went and stayed in Switzerland rest of his
life. Dr. Amini was ousted from key position of Finance Ministry and
appointed as the Justice Minister. Ultimately, he was appointed as Iran’s
ambassador in the U.S. Shah’s problem with political leaders like Ali Amini or
Abdollah Entezam (first foreign Minister and then Oil company director), and
Abolhassan Ebtehaj (Program organization director) was not personality
differences or even power politics. They were self-organized and competent
technocrats and political leaders who were not ready to implement any order
blindly; they were dissent with increasing corruption and inefficiency of
organizations, while subjugated statesmen were encouraging or at least
tolerating this corruption or inefficiency.
Domestic dissatisfaction from regime had repercussion in the army,
too. In winter of 1957, major-general Qarani, G.2 head, was prosecuted and
was tried and convicted to an undeclared accusation. Apparently, he was trying
to do a coup in order to limit and define Shah’s power and establishing a
reformative regime. He had talked to many politicians including some of the
National Movement leaders. 24
Allusively, he had spoken of social and political
reforms and had castigated regime corruption, dictatorship and government
inefficiency. These politicians were not informed of Qarani’s intentions, but
Hassan Arsanjani, close colleague of Dr. Amini and his future cabinet
254
Agriculture Minister was deeply engaged. For this reason, Arsanjani was
arrested for a while and Dr. Amini was ousted from his position in Embassy. It
is not clear whether America had been engaged in this plot or not, but
considering to punishing style of agents in martial court, it can be said this plot
had been directly or indirectly enjoyed of American support. 25
These incidents did not disturb his mind at all. He had led the National
Movement through his continues struggle with regime inside jail. With ending
his conviction period, he transferred to Ahmad Abad and was controlled in his
house. The National Resistance was passing its descending route. He could do
less than jail, because he had been far of Tehran and there was no good
communication. His family was preventing him to do any jeopardizing
activity. He wrote first volume of his memoirs relating to 1881-1923 in jail.
Now he started second volume of his memoirs which finished in 1961. In this
volume, he elaborated exact incidents of oil nationalization and responded to
attacks and accusations of Shah in the book “Mission for My Country.” Now,
Mossadeq had been a live myth and the most popular person in Iran. It was
impossible to publish a subject with his name. But people made a political idol
of him. This was almost due to his behavior in trial process and martial court
and for people’s increasing discontent of regime and dictatorship and informing
of the coup procedures. Even, Tudeh’s had no way except turning back to
Mossadeq. Mossadeq was studying many especially about political memoirs,
historic interpretation and newspaper articles about oil nationalization. Still, he
was suffering from that old illness. Sometimes was in bed and sometimes was
playing tar. He was learned it from Agha Hossiengholi playing the tar.
Formation of the Second National Front and Socialist Society
Immediately after the 19 August coup, Iran’s economy came out of
recession and a flourishing period was started by American aid and enormous
oil revenue. Nevertheless, in 1960, all things changed and bankruptcy crisis
255
was threatening the fragile economic flourishing. 26
Shah and his bureaucracy
had been specified the most share of these revenues to themselves and new
middle class and traditional class benefited indirectly of economic splendor.
The second five years program did not achieve its social and economic goals.
Industry had not improved much and agriculture had a terrible situation, and
was under control of landlord and was administrating traditionally. In 1960,
huge expenses of regime inside and economic policy of “open doors” and much
imports caused economic crisis, which its features were strong inflation,
increasing unemployment and budget balance deficit, which was increasing
every year and formed a huge number. The Central Bank was facing problems
in implementing foreign exchange commitments. Following this economic
crisis events was occurred which was making ground for the 1979 Revolution.
Unconditional support of America from Iran did not prolong. In lobby
and influential circles, it was always criticism against America helps to Iran.
Deep corruption of governmental system was intriguing criticism of those
circles to the extent that America did not want to help financially Iran and
rescued Shah’s regime from bankruptcy. These criticisms and discontents
spread rumors in Iran that the U.S. was going to establish independent
government of Shah. Rumors were indicated of a deep change by a foreign
power. Follow to these rumors, regime dissidents were mobilized and at least
some changes were done. Prime Ministry of Dr. Ali Amini in 1961 was done
after this process, and if the second National front was ready to manipulate this
chance and assumed power. One, two years before, Khalil Maleki had tried to
encourage the National Movement leaders to start a private and un-official
organized contact. Maleki had told Mossadeq in a letter in March 1962 that,
“At last according to explicit words of Mr. Saleh, their Irani party friends
prevented of making unity.” In addition, continues:
“I suggested Mr. Saleh the least and said certainly a time would be there
for political activities and in this recession period, it is the leader’s duty
to examine and analyze different issues till making enough time. Then I
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asked Mr. Saleh: If today a chance is made, do you know what to do?
He replied that he didn’t know what to do” and if some duties are
suggested to me, I should reject or not. Anyway, it could be some small
sessions for debate but it was not formed; till “free election” heat
suddenly brings out everyone.”
It is clear that the National Movement leaders did not have any hope to
political activities in years before 1960. Even, Maleki suggested officially to
national leaders to install Iran’s Socialist society. According to him,
considering domestic and international circumstances, a “relevant clear and
exact doctrine” is necessary and according to him for improving this doctrine
establishing an organization was seemed necessary. Such a social ideology
could be nothing except democratic socialism. In Maleki’s belief, a socialist
society should be installed that its founder believes to “work and attempt as
feature of Iran’s future society not based on social inherited or acquired
privileges”. 27
The Second National Front
In 1960, the nineteenth Majles was finished and Shah in a speech
announced next election would be free. This was the chance that Khalil Maleki
had anticipating. Two ordered political parties “Melliun” and “Mardom”
which had been established some years before, was allowed by Shah to
participate in political debates and election competitions and campaigns. Ali
Amini and other “Monfaredins” and independent conservatives found a chance.
Allahyar Saleh nominated from Kashan and regarding to freedom of election,
his representation was definite.
Now, the national movement leaders were understanding about finding
grounds of renewed activities. Un-official contacts were begun. Many of these
contacts and visits were doing in Allahyat Saleh’s house, however, he was
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engaging with election campaign in Kashan. In one of these visits – in absence
of Saleh – a short declaration was compiled and published and formation of the
Second National Front was declared. Gholam Hossein Sedighi, Karim Sanjabi,
Bager Kazemi, and Mehdi Bazargan were the first rank of the front leaders;
Daryush Foruhar, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Keshararz, Shapour Bakhtiar,
Yadollah Sahabi, Ayatollah Taleghani were considered as second rank leaders
of the front; Razi, Karim Abadi, Khonji, Behnam and Ghani Zadeh were third
rank leaders of the front. Those who signed the declaration or later joint it
formed the first “Senior Council of the Second National Front.” Later, it
renamed to “Central Council.”
Remained national resistance movement individuals joint to the front as
their leaders did. They had some complaints about some groups of the National
Front before especially Iran’s party leaders. Finally, discontents separated from
the Second national Front and informed “Iran’s Freedom Movement” in the
early 1960. On the other hand, Khalil Maleki and other old activists of the
Third Force who were not consulted decided to establish a new organization.
Its name was “Socialists society of Iran’s National Movement”. Adding
“National Movement” to “Socialists Society” was for comprising all National
Movement. They issued a manifest, set fort their program, and hoped their
program to be accepted by all the National Movement by the second National
Front leadership. 28
This organization started publishing monthly “Science and
life” and weekly leaflet of “Science and Life” but it was arrested that year.
Socialists’ society did a large tactical fault by removing its old name
“Iran’s Zahmatkeshan party – Third force.” The Third Force was a familiar
name and had historic precedent and people were known it as the most
accepted party of the National Front in Mossadeq’s era, while new identity of
the organization was vague even for the National Movement. Thought of
accepting a new name for organization was held by young Iranian activists who
were resident in Europe. Those who were calling themselves socialism
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adherences were publishing a political leaflet titled “socialism”. Soon, after
forming socialists’ society of Iran, they also made a socialists society of
Iranians in Europe, which was an independent organization. Iranian socialists’
society in Europe was forming of three groups: 1) old activists of Third force
like Amir Pishdad, Naser Pakdaman, Abdollah Borhan, Hamid Mahamedi and
Manuchehr Hezar Khani; 2) ex-activists of the Tudeh party who’s its
prominent figure was Hamid Enayat; 3) some of the National movement
adherences. In the summer of 1960, it was seemed that the second National
Front was on the verge of assuming power. Nevertheless, not it did not do like
that but during next four years the front was oppressed; and the Third National
Front, which was established in those days, was ruthlessly suppressed by
regime. Now, Iran’s Party leaders, Khonji, and Hejazi who had the largest
responsibility of defeat one by one left jeopardizing politics scene.
Bazargan,Maleki, Sahabi, Taleghani, Forouhar and number of active students
who created the Third National Front by the leadership of Mossadeq were
imprisoned and convicted in the martial courts. Cabinet of Ali Amini fell
contemptuously. The 5 June revolt was repressed and Shah solidified his
power on all institutions and classes for the first time of his assuming power as
king.
The Twentieth Election of Majles
In September 1960, Eqbal’s cabinet was put aside. There was much
pressure on Shah. He preferred to show his trust persons responsible for all
disordering. Shah went more forward and said election had not held freely as
he wanted and recommended deputies to resign voluntarily and paved the way
for a free election. The National Front could not introduce its nominees for
election and its re-organized problems finished when election had been held in
the most part of the country. Now, Shah’s regime was in its weakest position
and it was a good chance that the National Front organized its election
campaign. At the time, Sharif Emami’s government was in power as result of
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struggle between three power centers – Shah, the National Front, Conservative
reformists by leadership of Ali Amini. While, the second National Front was
not enough ready to take part in political activities and regime was also pushing
on it and unjust discriminations were going on, this front was trying to boycott
the election and declare the results as a results of pro forma election. So,
through this lead public struggle against election fraud and solidify its
organization. They had extensive support of people. Front was providing its
staging power through showing people’s protection to domestic and foreign
power centers. Even, front could nominee some of its leaders in Tehran and
other cities, this was the way that Mossadeq and first National Front was
taking. 29
However, front did not choose any way and only published some
declarations and announced election had not been free. Amini manipulated this
chance and imposed its government to Shah.
From August 1961, the National Front did a series of public meetings.
Mehdi Bazargan was organizing all these meetings and none of the National
Resistance Movement leaders were taking part and agreed them. A large public
meeting was held in Jalalieh Square (present Laleh Park) and some thousands
activists of the National Resistance Movement, Third Force, Iran’s people party
(Forouhar) took part in it. Importance of these demonstrations was in the point,
after years of preventing holding political meetings Mossadeq’s name was
telling by people apparently. With coming October and starting education year,
Tehran University began its political activity after seven years imposing and
forcing silence. On 7 December, a calm rally was done in commemoration of
murdering 3 students of technical faculty at the time of coming Nixon to Iran.
Students had harsh speeches against regime, regime was not certain to dispatch
police and soldiers to University again. SAVAK spies in University were
recognizing activists’ students and were prosecuting them out of University.
Many students were imprisoned even for some days but in a tactical retreat
freed all of them.
260
There was no student union. Among students, main activists of the
National Front including some Marxist-Leninists like Bijan Jazani and
remained elements of the National Resistance Movement and socialist society
had their own organization.
The national Front did nothing for its organizing and taking part in
election in January and February 1960. Just sometimes, it was declaring of not
being free election through publishing declaration. The Front had introduced
two candidates for Isfahan and six ones for Tabriz including Bazargan and two
local leaders of socialist society. In addition, two local individuals’ members of
the Front nominated themselves in Shiraz. Awaking of dissidents’ resistance
against election fraud in Tehran, regime decided to postpone the capital
election. But at the time of election Front had not still announced its fifteen
candidates list and one of the reason was internal differences and struggle for
determining nominees. Disappointedly, the Front banned election, but Allahyar
Saleh as individual candidate entered election campaign from Kashan. There
was a shameless election fraud in Tehran. “Dad” and “Elm and Zendegi”
newspapers disclosed strongly regime frauds. Senior council of Front decided
to stay out in Court of Senate house in objection to these frauds. Regime asked
Seyyed Hassan Taghi Zadeh, the Senate House speaker, to dissuade the Front
leaders of staying out. 30
But he could not do anything so; regime imprisoned
front leaders in Senate court through closing doors.
Senior Council was caring to keep out two of its members. One, Karim
Sanjab for contact and Shapour Baktiar for University and students problems.
On 26 January 1960, it was informed to students’ activists to hold a large rally
not inside university, but out in streets. The order was reached to students’
activists, but students’ leaders of socialists’ society believed to defeating of
these rallies, because police had perpetual presence out of University.
261
Next day following these debates, the National front students decided to
talk to police in order to break the strike and going out of University and non-
violent demonstration in Tehran Streets without police interference. Police
accepted and students came out of University, but at the time of going out, they
faced with armed police and…., and some were arrested. An objective strike
which started successfully and had frightened regime, ended contemptuously.
If students were going on stay-in, the National Front could take important
privilege, because the time conditions were suitable for taking such privilege.
Later in 1970 and 1980s, it was claimed that Shapoor Bakhtiar had made this
decision despite his desire and in the direction of executive committee demands
of the National Front. This claim was baseless, because the five members
committee of the National Front had been created three months later of this
event. Anyway, from the national Front leaders just Sanjabi and Bakhtiar were
out of Senate House. 31
Failure of the Second National Front
The Second National Front had been founded on wrong basis and
programs and group competitions and personality problems inside the National
Movement. These factors made basic role in enduring these problems and
making new troubles. The Front publicity was due to credit and respect of Dr.
Mossadeq and some of its leaders like Sanjabi, Saleh, Sedighi, Bazargan in its
first days. During some months, three second rank of leaders, Shapour
Bakhtiar, Mohammad Ali Khonji and Masood Hejazi, took leadership of the
front. Bakhtiar was independent but strong technocracy element of Iran’s party
was manifesting at him. He was the main reason of gulfs and the National
front branching during Mossadeq’s ruling and driving away leaders such as
Kashani and Baghaee from Mossadeq. Iran’s party had been including of high
organized potentials. According to Bakhtiar, Iran’s party could efficiently
control the second National Front and used it as its public base. Bakhtiar’s
individual characteristics and attractive personality, from one hand and his
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good and close relation with Saleh. Sanjabi and Khonji (Iran’s party leaders
and three most prominent and recognized leaders of the second National Front)
from the other hand caused Bakhtiar to find much influence in the National
Front. His appointing as leadership of student part of the second National
Front helped him, because the strongest and most respected of the Front organ
was put under his control which was not his deserve.
Khonji and Hejazi who had leadership of nine remained leaders of the
third force after the 19 August coup, were convicting Maleki to betray. They
were so experienced in organized and theoretical problems and had no rivals in
the Second National Front. At the time, Khonji was official theorician of the
front and was responsible for domestic and foreign political instructive affairs.
The three members group of Bakhtiar-Khonji –Hejazi had common interest and
mutual dependencies and dominated on it until ending work of the Front in
1963. These three individuals needed to neutralize effect and influence of
strong organizations and powerful personalities inside the front and the
National Movement in order to achieve their goals. Therefore, they should put
Khalil Maleki, Socialist society, Bazargan and Freedom Movement under
pressure. When Socialist society officially asked for joining to the second
National Front, executive committee of the Front did not respond this request.
Bazargan and the National Resistance Movement was another case. Khonji
and Hejazi couldnot accuse him to betray; also, Bakhtiar couldn’t consider him
as secessionist. Bakhtiar had entitled Khalil Maleki as secessionist. But, Dr.
Sanjabi was desire of joining Khalil Maleki to the second National Front
leadership and was sorry of not joining him. Bazargan and the National
Resistance Movement had support of Ayatollah Zanjani and Ayatollah Firuz
Abadi and Bazzariz and national –religious society. On the other hand, a
misunderstanding had occurred between Iran’s party and National Resistance
Movement, so, Resistance Movement was continuously attacking Saleh and
Sanjabi and this was causing of struggle between 3 members of the Front with
the National Resistance Movement. In Spiring of 1961 the National Resistance
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Movement separated the Second National Front and announced its existence as
Iran’s Freedom Movement. Leadership of the Freedom Movement was with
Mehdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi and Ayatollah Taleghani. From this time
until founding the Third National Front, the National Movement was including
of three main organizations. National Front, Freedom Movement, Socialist
Society. Other remained parties in the front including Iran’s party, Iran’s
Nation party of Forohar, Iran’s people party, had not been dissolved, but were
not going beyond official organizations with least independent activity.32
The first and only congress of the second National Front was held in
January 1962 and 3 weeks before the Shah’s “White Revolution”. Through
this referendum, destiny of democrat opponents was determined for next 15
years. This congress could not end internal differences and make itself as an
effective political force.
National Movement and Amini’s Cabinet
Until holding the National Front Congress, two precious opportunities
had been lost by the front; opportunities that front could assume government
power. Of course, it prolonged much to understand the point by the front
leaders and activists; so, its power went on decline. The first opportunity was
in the first days of the second front formation and during renewed election of
the twentieth Majles election, and the second opportunity was in Amini’s Prime
Ministry period -1961 until August 1962 – National Front could appear as
substitute power of national cabinet. 33
In twentieth Majles, Allahyar Saleh was present as the only national
movement figure. Again, a dual ruling was appeared in Iran’s politics; Amini
was associated in Shah’s power. But after one or two month, his power was
weakened by uncorrect policy of the second National Front. The front tried
much to attack Amini’s government. Soon, Amini was facing with
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simultaneous opposing of Shah, Landlords, conservative religious leaders and
Assadollah Rashidian and Fathollah Forud and public by leadership of the
second National front. At first, Amini was going to make relation with the
front. Reports of the front activities were publishing in daily press of the
country. Amini allowed the front to hold a meeting in Jalalieh in June 1961.
After the 19 August of 1953 coup, it was the first time that the National front
was permitted for such an activity. Huge population gathered in Jalalieh and
one of crowd reason was rumors about presenting Dr. Mossadeq in the
meeting.
Socialist society analysis of existing condition can be briefed as follows:
Amini is representative of reformative faction of ruling class, and has conflict
with Shah. He is serious in implementing land reform program and is ready to
give more freedom for the National front and in the loss of Shah and
Landlords. On the other hand, he was afraid of Shah and would stimulate
landlord class against himself. Therefore, the National Front should organize
itself through manipulating new condition. This would be possible through
more modern programme like Land reforms, administering justice of Iran’s
nation in oil issue, non-alignment foreign policy, and democratic government.
Land Reform programme of socialists’ society was that government transfers
ownership of lands in each village to all peasants and given them technical
credits and services. Within some month, the freedom movement resulted that
the National Movement forces should not do anything in the direction of
Amini’s subversion. The second National front attacks to Amini’s government
had at least two reasons: one, this attack was easy and it didn’t rise Shah’s
enmity, landlord and conservatives religious leaders. But, instead, the front
adherents were welcoming these attacks, because they had not forgotten
Amini’s role as contractor of consersium accord in Zahedi’s government. Two,
three members group and their adherents inside the front were thinking of
cooperation with landlord representatives and circles like Lieutenant –general
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Teimour Bakhtiar which could rapidly overthrow “Amini’s government and
took part in a coalition government instead of Amini’s government.
The first open facing occurred when the National front demanded for
holding a meeting in Jalalieh square. The front was going to hold public
meeting in commemoration of Iranians historic revolt on July 21 and returning
Mossadeq to Prime Ministry in 1952. Amini reminded privately to the Front
leaders that Shah would not tolerate such an offence. Therefore, it was better
to hold it on days before 21 July and Amini promised not to let Shah hold
meeting in commemoration of the 19 August coup. The Front did not accept
and government prohibited the meeting and announced the front leaders would
be arrested for 24 hours in order to safe their lives. Front had not schedule for
organizing public, thus, socialist society came to preserve the National front
credit. This meeting was not so splendid and led to reduction and limiting
freedoms, which had been created some months before. 34
Events of 21 January
1961 which is famous in Iran to 21 January conspiracy had totally another
process. Lieutenant –general Teimour Bakhtiar, the disgusting head of
SAVAK, who had before tried to substitute Iran’s Shah, were disfavored by
Shah. But still he had remarkable influence in SAVAK and army and
Landlords and statement were with him. Also, Shah did not see that kind of
power and assurance in himself to get rid of him. Bakhtiar was ready to take
power any time and in any price. Ultimately, he lost his life for this
imagination and was murdered in Iraq in 1960. He was agent of Iraqi regime
and was acting against Shah, he was murdered by two secret agents of
SAVAK.
Bakhtiar was working with three groups: a) Army officers who were
constituting “adherent officers of the Constitution” and were Bakhtiar’s group;
b) Landlords and conservative statement opponent to Amini and his Land
Reform policy; c) Conservative religious leaders like Ayatollah Behbahani who
were opposing with Land Reforms. Two latest group still hoped Shah to rescue
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them from danger of Amini’s land reforms, but when Land Reform law of
Amini-Arsanjani was executed in 1962, so, some of them supported Teimour
Bakhtiar conditional on making no change in regime. Even, it was said that
Shah himself had role in these clandestine actions, because he was afraid of
Amini to take him the chance through full support of America.
Teimour Bakhtiar had almost good relation with his cousin Shapour
Bakhtiar. Shapour Bakhtiar still had been controlling student activities.
Teimour Bakhtiar needed many things to stroke regime, one of them was
acquiring national reputation, and it was at the hand of the National front.
Hence, full facing with Amini’s government was in the benefit of Teimour
Bakhtiar. Based on this strategy, one day before ending his directing period on
SAVAK, he made free the front leaders and notified some of them, they were
right in criticizing regime. Once, in a message to the front leaders reminded he
was a national figure, too, and if front helped him in assuming power, he was
ready to apologize Mossadeq for the 19 August coup. Nevertheless, Saleh,
Sanjabi, Hasibi, Sedighi and other front leaders were not those kinds of persons
who accept coalition with Teimour Bakhtiar. But, this point should be notified:
despite their personal publicity among public that could attract people’s support
towards front, but they did not have essential instruments for developing tactics
and front strategies. 35
Anyway, Amini asked Shah to banish Lieutenant –general Teimour-
Bakhtiar from country, and five days later he left Iran. From other hand, anger
and fury was dominated on the National Front and it was mostly for three
members group of Bakhtiar –Khonji –Hejazi. It was claimed they were
complicit with conspirators and even in possible cabinet of Lieutenant –general
Bakhtiar some posts had been promised to them. 36
Other accusation of
Mossadeq was towards the National Front council. It was predictable that front
did not do anything for inside research.
267
In August 1962, Amini resigned and two months later he was monitored
in his house. He was said to not go out Tehran. On the verge of unexpected
subversion of Amini’s cabinet, socialist society analyzed political
circumstances and through explicit estimation delivered blance sheet of the
National Front which is one of the most previous National Front history
documents. In its introduction, it had been said that a country would put its
seal on Iran’s future in passing stage. It had been reasoned that the National
Movement needed a strong and firm social base among workers, peasants,
craftsmen, national burgeois and educated developed forces, but achieving this
goal the National movement had done nothing. Following to elaborated
critique of the Front tactics and strategies, direct attack and challenge of the
Front against Amini’s government for postponing election spread. Amini did
not want to give any privilege for Land Reform issue and government fear of
controlling Majles majority by Landlords. Announcing public strike without
enough readiness was a big mistake:
“The day that retrogress agents and feudals assumed it as their victory
day and had determined their cabinet two, we entered an unknown event
and calamity of 21 January was created. More surprising that awaring
individuals had warned the NationalFront leaders about clandestine
conspiracies…but the Front leadership with an astonishing insist send
thousands of students under lashes and its result was just hundreds
injured and long closing of University and more suppress.We could
become a big and strong force at the time but our results show we are on
the verge of bankruptcy…If circumstances go-on like this, the National
Front will destroy as a political force, and instead of being as Iran’s
national movement struggle base, it will alter to an abandoned temple
which its most faithful would present just in their mourning ceremonies
and shake head for acquaintance and sorrow…” 37
268
The Second National Front Congress and White Revolution
Before collapsing Amini’s cabinet,Shah visited Washington and
threatened American authorities to resign of monarchy, unless they gave him
blank check. Americans assured him of making decision and acting freely.
Meanwhile, Shah wanted to be known as a reformative ruler in west, so, he
knew leaving Land Reform is impossible. At the time of Amini’s ruling, Shah
was in a tactical alliance with Landlord feudals and retrogress agents. Now,
(with green light of Americans) he could lead a complete revolution easily and
through it impose his autocratic and despotic ruling on all classes and
institutions. The National Front had not still chosen a stance on Land Reforms
and other social affairs. Only in October 1961, through a declaration wrote
since there had not been any European feudalism in Iran, so Land Reforms is
meaningless. At the time, regime had begun a spread propaganda for social
reforms including Land Reforms, Women Enfrachiment, and having share
workers in factories.
Revolution of the Shah and people, or six articles program of Shah on
6 January 1962 was put for referendum. Two weeks before referendum, the
Second National Front Congress including three official boards of Iran’s party,
Iran’s Nation party and Iran’s people party was held. Freedom Movement was
not officially present in congress, but their leaders presented at the beginning of
congress. Some of its members were present as other fields representatives.
Socialists’ society was not invited to Congress and it had no representative, but
powerful leader of one of its organization in Azarbijan as the region
representative was present in the congress. 38
Students to election fraud for selecting representation boards especially
accused Congress bagan from uncorrect angle. A 39 member’s central council
was selected by the congress and because Shah’s referendum was impending,
congress decided to compile a full political program which encompass most
269
issues. But, it delivered no certain policy and suggestion and it was the best
reason of uncertainty and non-commitment of the front leadership. This
deliberate and knowing opaque in the National Front program can be seen in its
foreign policy. No clear policy consisting of nullificaliant or alignment or non-
alignment had not been accepted as long-term policy. Instead, Iranian national
and independent foreign policy non-alignment – was rejected and it wanted to
assure Americans if they assumed power, they would be subjugated. Two
years before, Front did not want to declare about its contact with the Tudeh
party (really they did not have any contact) because they were afraid of making
disturb unorganized adherents of the above party among intelligentsia and
educated of Middle class. Now it was putting aside historic stance of the
National Front in foreign policy (non-alignment) without acquiring anything.
After that time, Shah was describing Iran’s foreign policy as “Iranian
independent national policy”.
Congress holders had asked Mossadeq to send a message for beginning
the Congress and after default election of Mossadeq as the head, his message
was read. At the time, Mossadeq was quite aware of inner struggles of the
front. Mossadeq had specified half of its message to importance of parties in
the National Front and had said that, “At the beginning of the Constitutional
Revolution, when still political parties had not been established in this country,
victory of the Constitutional Revolution was mostly due to associations that
people were organizing them.” Mossadeq stressed on the need “the Front
doors should be open to all individuals, groups and parties who are ready for
self-sacrifice and struggle on the way of subverting colonization and for
bringing all lovers of freedom and independence of Iran.” 39
But one year later,
Mossadeq complained the congress leaders had totally ignored his message.
This letter did not publish long time in Iran or abroad, till Tehran University
students who had leadership of dissidents inside the Front embarked on its print
and publish.
270
Two days before plebiscite on 26 January 1962, a declaration was
published by the front that after using some bombastic it was ending like this:
“Land Reforms, yes, I agree! Dictatorship, No, I disagree!” with this it had
neither banned the Shah’s referendum nor had said to advocators what to do.
People’s complaint and discontent of regime not only had not reduced but also
it had increased.
Leaders of religious community were also dissatisfied of the Shah.
Some like Ayatollah Milani and Ayatollah Zanjani were advocating the
National Movement; some like Ayatollah Khonsari and Ayatollah
Shariatmadari who were moderate conservatives had not such dissents with
land reforms but they were concerned of creating dictatorship; others like
Ayatollah Behbahani and Ayatollah Khomeini were opposing land reforms and
women enfranchisement and also had been annoyed of increasing trend of
regime towards putting aside religious leaders from the mainest political issues.
Qom was disturbed and for the first time police beat religious students. Tehran
University student were unrest, regime mercenaries came to University. They
had come by the name of “workers and free peasants” to express their anger
towards opposed students with reforms and their freedom. They beat students.
Public speeches of (Ayatollah) Khomeini against regime made him as the most
prominent leader of anti-despotic movement, which ultimately led to the 5 June
1963 revolt and regime suppressed them violently. 40
From many angles, this revolt was base of the 1979 Revolution; all civil
social classes and ideologies were taking part in it. All the National Movement
forces including bazzar, students, freedom movement and socialist society
supported it. Reason of non-presence of the National Front leaders in rallies of
5 June 1963 was being in prison leaders and front was preventing any rapid
decision. Hence, front never prohibited its adherences of taking part in rallies.
271
Mossadeq and the Third National Front
In February 1962, Short after Shah’s referendum, many of the National
front leaders were imprisoned. Maleki wrote his famous letter from jail to
Mossadeq in March 1962. Meantime criticizing the second National front, he
wrote:
“Result of all surprising mistakes of the National Front leaders led to
those events which all know. That is to say the Front lost the struggle in
this period and the ruling class succeeded to deceive peasants at present,
improve its relation with the Soviet and could convince President
Kennedy to congratulate the ruling regime situation and a knowledge
unclaimed leadership of the Shah.” 41
In 1960, regime which faced with problems both in foreign relations and
domestic affairs Shah sent Asadollah Alam to visit Maleki three times. Shah
had told Maleki that it wouldn’t make difference for him Saleh would be Prime
Minister or another person, but the National Front should clarify its view
towards the Constitution and the Tudeh party. Maleki delivered Shah’s
message to the Front leaders, but they took a negative position:
“At the time that ruling class was so unstable and shaky and every
privilege could be taken for the National Front, two words about the
Constitution and the Tudeh party could clear the Front domestic and
foreign position. However, leaders remained “these two cases silent till
they themselves had changed to supporter of the Constitution and
Constitutional monarchy and they had to give several declarations
against the Tudeh party and the Soviet’s affiliated radios for accusations
of the Security organization. But if they had been clarified their position
at first they did not have to such followings.” 42
272
Before, Mossadeq had attention towards front leadership tactics and its
inner challenges and indirectly he had wanted to settle them. His most
effective interference was in November 1962 that he wrote his views under a
photo and sent for the front leaders. This caused to stop talks between the front
leader and Asadollah Alam over forming coalition government. It was as
follows: Following to vacating Dr. Amini, Shah appointed one of his loyal
servants, Asadollah Alam. Then, he provided the ground for White
Revolution. The National Front still was strong and Shah was aware of his
despotic regime opponents and disagree landlords with land reforms. Hence,
he decided to achieve cooperation of the National front. His program was to
hermit front leaders and then started talks with them. The Front leader were
arrested for some weeks, Shah had sent his agent to prison to talk to Allahyar
Saleh. Saleh after consulting with his colleagues conditioned any talk after
making free the front leaders. Alam invited front leaders for lunch to his
house. Saleh did so, too. These parties continued. 43
The first suggestion of
Shah was the National Front leaders introduced two recognized figures for
Prime Ministry and Shah select one of them. They introduced Aboghasem
Najm and Mohammad Soruri. Najm was not acceptable by Shah, so, he
suggested Prime Ministry to Soruri. Soruri was the Supreme Court head in
Mossadeq’s government. But, Soruri rejected Shah’s suggestion. Then, the
Front leaders and Alam tried to form a coalition government. Mossadeq who
had understood events wrote under one of his photos:
“Offering to all those when there is public interests put aside their
personal differences and private interests, to all whom do not appease
others policy and do resist till reaching victory. To all whom are ready
to sacrifice what they have for freedom and independence of Iran.” 44
Allahyar Saleh paled when he received the photo by Hassan Enayat and
asked: “What is meaning of these words” who has appeased? “Each of leaders
was received like the photo and words and printed it in large scale and
273
distributed it among the National Front members. Talks to Alam cut off. When
Front leader were in jail, Shah’s regime announced in summer of 1963 that the
21 Majles election would be held in October. During Dr. Amini’s Prime
Ministry, National Front put all its energy to ask government for holding
Majles election. Now that all front leaders were in jail, students and activists
asked front leaders to take part actively in election. Nevertheless, they faced
with previous uncertainty. The front leaders replied: “Prisoners cannot express
their views.” They believed that executive board should lead all things, but
because they did not want to undertake any commitment told students that they
were free in making any decision. Any way, the National Front did not take
part in election and asked students and activists to go on vacation for one
month.45
With resignation of executive board, front central council embarked on
re-surveying of the country circumstances through holding gatherings in
autumn 1962 and resulted to more solidifying of Shah’s regime. Council gave
Allahyar Saleh full executive power and he declared that, “the National front
should take patience and refuse of any reaction towards regime action.” Two
months later in March 1962, student committee sent a message to Mossadeq for
anniversary of oil Nationalization day and New year, along with full report of
student activities. Mossadeq in a short letter responded, “it is pleasure that
respected board still consider affairs of Iran’s nation and has not suspend it.”
After this time, Mossadeq decided to interfere directly in national movement
affairs. Two days later, in a detailed letter to executive board of the National
Front organization in Europe he wrote and its news reached all the movement.
Mossadeq wrote as follows:
“…you have tried to dissolve parties and wherever you have succeeded
you have got a good result, but I think it has not been a good work…the
National front shouldbe considered as centre of the country parties
which all believe to one principle and that is freedom and independence
274
of the country. If parties and communities do not take part in the front,
it will be that it is now…and they cannot take a step for defending…I
was asked to send a message but it was not affected and they made Front
that can do nothing.” 46
Addressers of this letter asked Mossadeq to determine a leader for them,
but Mossadeq wrote blame worthy that in that case “nobody will obey”.
Exactly, one week later this event, central council and new executive board of
the front in Tehran wrote to “honourable leader” and it had been claimed that
parties had not been put aside of the front. it had been said to the freedom
movement it can be stayed in the front conditional on purifying and banishing
undesired elements, and send a report of that to central council of the front:
“….the only party that demanded to enter the National Front is the
Tudeh party, but for its disqualification the National movement never
could and can accept this party as its ally.” 47
At the end of the letter it had been written that front leadership was
facing with a larger avoided because from one side opposing with Mossadeq’s
views was not in the interest of country and movement, and from other side,
front could not perform against its beliefs and congress legislations which was
creator of that council. But, Mossadeq did not listen to threats. He answere
allusively to their detailed and long words about parties and organizations and
said that they had clearly more experience than he did; his little information
had been forgotten during these eleven years prison and isolation:
“…but at the time of congress formation you asked me to offer a
message, I obeyed and said in that message which the Front doors
should be opened on parties, associations and groups….and there was no
view towards the Tudeh party which have made it so large and have said
in the letter. The Tudeh party is that one in the first year of the oil
275
Nationalization was opposing harshly to it. But because its views was
not favorable for the society it remained quiet and dissident. My mean
of that message was to form parties, communities and groups that were
ready to sacrifice all things for freedom.” 48
The central council spoke again over details of congress combination
and justified it as demand of Iran’s Socialists society membership in the
National Front had been remained quiet for dissent vote of some members and
till now membership of the society had not been examined by the central
council. At the end, it had been resulted because Mossadeq is the National
Front leader, they were not going to challenge with him. But meantime, they
were not going to change their principles and regulations. Therefore, if
Mossadeq was not ready to accept this letter and previous letter of the council,
“Council cannot continue its work.” 49
Mossadeq sent a copy of their letter to student committee of the National
Front and they answered point by point to Mossadeq; members of Freedom
movement, not as members of political parties, but only as individuals could
take part in the congress; the Socialists society demand for membership did not
examine for three years. Inside dissidents of the front were not limited to some
individuals and groups, but it was consisting of all the National Front parties
(of course except Iran’s party and youth organization) including bazzar and
University. Mossadeq in a short response replied: “Now that I can do nothing
and I am in jail I want your success from God with sadness heart and crying
eyes.” Still, Mossadeq had not disappointed. Again, he wrote another letter to
the central council and attached responses and reactions of student committee,
Freedom Movement, Socialist society and other discontent parties. Mossadeq
stressed to end opposing with organs and parties member of the National Front.
At end he remained, it would be his last letter if they did not accept his
suggestion. They even did not respond his letter. Six weeks later on 2 June
1963, Mossadeq wrote a respectful and polite letter to Allahyar Saleh and
276
asked him to do something. Saleh responded he himself was not in a good
situation and regarding to the Front constitution “answer is that you have
received in official letters of the front council and executive board.”
Regime was strengthening day by day, freedom movement leaders were
being tried in martial courts and front could do nothing in the best situation.
Leaving politic scene slowly was an easy but humbling case and after they
made Mossadeq guilty for all his interferences. The National Front leader4s in
Europe who were close advocators of Front leaders in Tehran wrote a letter to
Mossadeq and accused him of “interferencing in the front affairs after years
vacating.” Mossadeq replied with his situation in Ahmad Abad fort, he had
never such an intention and just had offered some suggestions over constitution
and articles of the front. 50
In the same vein, the second National Front went on
decline. Those who behaved with Mossadeq humbling were protecting by
people for publicity and authencity of Mossadeq, and if he did according to
desire, he made an idol of him. Anyway, with collapsing the second National
front, most of its European and some of its Iranian members joint Maoist or
Marxist – Leninist branches.
The Third National Front
Mossadeq’s contact with the National Front forces and parties
continued. He decided to help these forces and parties in holding a new front
by his leadership. From 1960, he was receiving several messages from
different parties and student conferences both in and out of Iran. Personal
reports and letters were sending for him over the movement activities. All
these reports and letters were reaching him through his family members who
were allowed to see him sometimes in Ahmad Abad. Parties, groups and
persons were asking him for signed photos and were distributing those photos
in the movement.
277
Military guard was constantly fixed there and it monitored all visitors
and contacts of Mossadeq. When he began his direct interference in the
movement affairs, SAVAK was informed and reported Shah. Shah ordered to
intensify controls and pressure on old man. SAVAK head was going without
informing and was behaving as if he wanted to frighten a baby. He asked
colonel of Ahmad Abad guard head that why he had not full control on
Mossadeq’s corresponding. After that, he asked Mossadeq not to reply letters.
Mossadeq said to colonel for this they had to put him handcuffs, try, put him in
solitary confinement, or ask him in a letter to leave corresponding. More limits
Mossadeq’s life hard. Two months later in October 1963, Mossadeq asked a
specialist doctor to examine him medically, but his request was not accepted. 51
Freedom movement leaders – Mehdi Bazargan, Sahabi, Taleghani- were
in jail at the time. Two executive board members of Socialists society –
Manuchehr Safa and Abbas Agheli Zadeh – were also convicted in martial
court to three years prison. Many of the National Movement students and
activist were in custody. Maleki and other leaders of socialists society were
free but under strong control of police. Condition was so hard even small
private visits for establishing and organizing the Third National Front were
done hard. Attempts from both sides continued – Mossadeq and the National
Movement but process had been slowed. New front combination and its
constitution and regulations should be determined. Mossadeq was so cautious
this time no leaders who appoint himself as leader come inside the Third
National front. The new front constitution was compiled in the early 1965 and
Mossadeq agreed it. Writing style of the first article brings this feeling that
Mossadeq himself has compiled it:
“The Third National Front of Iran is assembling centre of parties and
political associations and clergy community and student community and
political organizations and Trade Union Associations and local unions
and groups which have their special aim and just have a common aim
278
with the Third National front that is Iran’s freedom and independence.
Therefore, nobody who is member of this association can enter the
National Front council.” 52
On 7 July, Khalil Maleki in a letter to Amir Pishdad, secretary of Iran’s
socialists society in Europe, wrote Iran’s party leaders had had much intrigues
against the Front, but their plan was not efficient and would not: “First
declaration of the Third National Front was welcomed. Great father
[Mossadeq] was quite agree to it and said it has no more or less.” Maleki added
about increasing misbehavior of regime with fighters: “This political closeness,
has weakened mentally condition of struggle, however, in my opinion identical
conditions are very suitable…we try to overcome troubles.” Here Maleki has
anticipation, which is incorrect:
“However, regime has threatened the Third National Front leaders
especially friends in (Socialist society) and has said formation of Front
is forbidden and it will be formed there is serious consequences, but
regime cannot do anything. Perhaps, regime has much confidence and
trust to itself and its acquired successes.”
Three weeks later, he and other leadership members of Socialists society
–Alijan Shansi, Reza Shayan, and Hossein Sarshar – were arrested to direct
order of Shah and were tried in martial court and convicted. Kazem Sami and
Foruhar from Iran’s people and Nation party were imprisoned, too. The Third
National Front before existence disappeared. Therefore, regime increased its
political dissidents mass, paved the way for Islamism, and took its result during
the 1979 Revolution. Because at the time National Front and its forces had ben
weakened so much and could not take leadership of revolution, if we put aside
advocators of pure Islam, the National Front performed better than other
political groups and parties. 53
279
Death of Mossadeq
One month before full attack of regime to the Third National Front,
Mossadeq’s wife passed away and her loss at the last days of his life affected
him so much. In response, one of his adherent condolence letters wrote:
“I suffer deeply of this deplorable loss. During more than 64 years my
dear wife tolerated everything. After my mother, she was my only hope
to life. I wished to die before her and I ask God to take me near her as
soon as possible and make me easy of this hard life.” 54
Now he became really alone, many of his close friends and colleagues
had left him, the Front had been again defeated, its leaders were in jail or were
tried in courts, his political contacts had been stopped. Pressures and limits of
regime was increased on him. There was no hope to future. On 26 March
1965, he wrote one of his friends:
“…More than 12 years life in two jails and now in Ahmad Abad, have
taken my energy and I always ask God to die and will be free of this
pitiful life. I cannot say more than this and make you sad.” 55
In autumn 1965, he became ill seriously. In November, he was escorted
with security forces to his house in Tehran and was cured in Najmieh hospital –
which his mother endowed it and his son Gholam Hossien was its head -. His
ill was larynx cancer. Shah did not accept his family request for his cure in
Europe. He in his last letter which is now available in Europe has thanked of
socialists Society executive board in Europe for their inquiries after his health
and has written his cure with power has made his digestive condition worse
than before. For curing cancer, that nerve illness has arise again and my
stomach bleeding is not stopping. Finally, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq died in
85 years old on 4 March 1967.
280
Public burial, obsequies ceremony was forbidden by regime, but people
all over the country were in mourning. He had made will to be bury beside the
21 July martyrdoms. Regime did not accept this request of his family. Regime
announced he could not be buried in any of public cemeteries. At last, his dead
body was transferred to Ahmad Abad and buried in his house that he had been
lived most of years exile. One year later, for his first death anniversary people
were going to Ahmad Abad but regime prevented thousands Tehrani’s move
towards Ahmad Abad. Next month, Khalil Maleki wrote to Pishdad:
“Almost one month before, for anniversary of dear Mossadeq, we were
going to Ahmad Abad, but at the beginning they prevented our
movement. At last, students said we are going to Dr. Mossadeq’s on.
We did this and put a wreath on his grave from side of socialist society.
Some people were there and police had arrested thousands. Our
colleagues who had not come with Dr. Mossadeq’s son was not allowed
to enter Ahmad Abad. But, students offered flowers and wreath to
Mossadeq’s grave. Iran’s Nation party of Foruhar and socialist society,
were only parties that had brought wreath.” 56
On 4 March 1979, almost one month after Shah’s regime subversion,
More than one million people even by foot reached themselves to Mossadeq’s
grave. This move was not so quite and hidden conflicts, which were forming
slowly, were shown.
The National Movement during Revolution: A short Review
Old forces of the national movement were surprised in the 1979
Revolution. Down falling of the second National Front and suppression of the
Third National front in 1960s caused to disappointment of many front leaders
and activists. Transformation of Shah’s regime from dictatorship to autocratic
281
and despotic one mad impossible activity for movement and following
democratic aims through compromising ways. Some changes led to propagate
Marxist and Islamist ideologies in and out of country and using secret and
forceful tactics were put in struggle with.
Economic development strategy of regime caused a small minority
become richer and depriving of people’s majority. Massive and uncontrol
migration of rurals to cities caused largely gap between existent realities and
Shah’s claims. At the time, even those who had a share of oil revenues were
dissatisfied of regime, one for considering these share as their rights and other
for their anger of a regime which was forcing them to be a party member just
for Shah’s order. Imposing officially American culture for the middle class was
intolerable. The U.S. un-criticizing treat with Shah’s regime escalated
worsening condition. Shah was American puppet in public mentality. Hence,
people were considering America as direct responsible for ethic, cultural,
social, political and economic instabilities.
Moreover, in the world changes were not in the interest of democratic
aims. Romantic, millennium, and promised solutions had more attraction.
Maoism, which had been refusing both America and the Soviet, was seeking
for pure Marxism – Leninism and had a revolutionary face, attracted many
inside and outside Iranians. Many of adherent youth and members of the
second National Front tended to Maoism. The U.S. mistakes in Vietnam
increased its public disgrace and caused revolutionary Marxism and Partisani
war to find adherents in Iran. Unconditional support of America from Israel
and armed struggle of Palestinians accelerated this movement. Specially,
regime had resented religious community from June 1963 and reaction against
anti traditional policies of regime was boosting over the society.
Briefly, huge oil revenues did not use in productive activities. It was
believed that America was trying to destroy the country through Shah’s regime.
282
Bloody suppression of all criticizers and discontents prohibited any
compromising performance in changing way. At this time, revolutionary
ideologies – Marxists and Islamists – had been dominating ideologies.
Authors, lawyers, justice lawyers, government staffs, old leaders of the
National Movement like Sanjabi and Bazargan, created the movement that
began in 1977 and overthrew regime in 1979. The National Front forces were
divided among freedom movement and other human rights group.
Undoubtedly, if Shah was achieving an agreement with these forces (especially
before September 1978) circumstances were other kind. Because, bazzar,
government staffs and the oil company, the pioneer forces in strikes and
providing finance for those strikes, did not want to continue the struggle till
death for an independent country by leadership Sanjabi, or Bazargan. Such a
state could attract unanimity of religious leaders like Ayatollah Shariatmadari
and Ayatollah Taleghani who were after Ayatollah Khomeini reputable.
Even in November and December 1979 that Shah suggested Sedighi
Prime Ministry, if Shah agreed with Sedighi’s suggestion over leaving all
executive powers to cabinet, Iran’s later changes would be another way.
Sedighi did not join the National Front till after revolution. He was a respected
figure and had the ability of doing that if Shah did accept his suggestion, there
was a great chance for succession. On the other hand, when Shapour Bakhtiar
accepted Shah’s suggestion, some weeks had passed and opportunity had gone.
He was not such a famous figure and his leadership in the second National
Front had caused the front activists looked him with suspect. And, because
before accepting Prime Ministry position had not consulted with the National
Front and executive board, he was officially put aside. Therefore, his action in
accepting Prime Ministry position was compromising with Shah’s regime than
a main process towards revolution. One month before, Sanjabi met Ayatollah
Khomeini in Paris and in a declaration considered him as unclaimed leader of
Iran. Later, Sanjabi was criticized for his act, but criticizers ignore the point
that his act was for pressure of activists and the National Front leaders and
283
other revolutionary forces. Most of those who rebuke Sanjabi welcomed the
declaration at the time. 57
The Interim Government of Bazargan which came to power after
revolution victory, had a short life and had been a disable and isolated
government. From beginning, the Islamic Republic party and all Marxist-
Leninist groups stood against it. Maybe, it can hardly claim the provisional
government and been an honourable one. But freedom movement, the National
Front and other groups and national individuals were the only organizations
and society members who were opposing with romantic radicals and
revolutionary justice. Bazargan government resigned in autumn 1979, for
Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s support of taking American diplomats as hostage in
Tehran. Of course, it had resigned in other cases too. Khalil Maleki, from
previous leaders of the National Movement, had passed away in hardship in
July 1969. Allahyar Saleh and Ali Shaygan in 1981 passed away in turn in
Tehran and the U.S. Taleghani and Zanjani died short after revolution.
Bazargan died in Tehranand Sajabi in the U.S. But till myth of Mossadeq is
alive. Disappointment of imaginery Marxists and Islamists has notified old and
new political activists towards principles and traditions of Iran’s National
Front.
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Section 3
Religion and the National Front
Ayatollah Kashani was a prominent religious figure of the national
movement. Moreover, he was one of the fundamental leaders of the movement,
which later separated and joint opponent camp. Fadaian-e eslam (The Islam
Devotees) who were supporters of the movement at the beginning, after
Mossadeq taking power separate. Following to unsuccessful assassination of
the Shah in February 1948, Ayatollah Kashani was prosecuted for complicity
impeachment and banished from the country; however, he had no role in the
real event. At the same time, Ayatollah Borougerdi sent a telegram for the
Shah, expressed his sadness over the event, and prayed for continuation of his
monarchy. During oil nationalization, Ayatollah Kashani supported it,
Mossadeq, and the National Front through issuing different declarations. He,
also, provided financial helps and organized radical clergies as back and cover
of the Movement. At the time, Ayatollah Borougerdi in Qom and Behbahani in
Tehran remained silent.
On 16 July, following Mossadeq’s resignation and Qavam’s Prime
Ministry, Kashani was the only cleric who stood against Qavam and the court,
whereas, other mujtaheds including Zanjani’s brothers – Haj Seyyed Abolfazl
and Haj Agha Reza – and Seikh Baha’edin Mahalati protected Kashani.
Ayatollah Boroujerdi remained silent and Ayatollah Behbahani’s disagreement
with Mossadeq and his government had been exposed before. In February
1952, discussion over legal power extension that Majlis had given the Prime
Minister put an end with Kashani’s attack on the Prime Minister. Nevertheless,
Boroujerdi and Behbahani kept their silence; perhaps, they were thinking it as
an internal issue of the National Front. On 28 February, when the Shah was
going abroad, Kashani and Behbahani supported the Shah in different and
separate declarations. Both had role in anti-Mossadeq rallies at the day. But,
Qom did issue no official pronouncement, may be, for not lasting the event
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more than hours. In July and August of 1953, Plebiscite of Mossadeq over
dissolving seventeen Majlis caused Kashani and Behbahani’s attack on
Mossadeq and his government, but, again there was no direct pronouncement
from Qom. Only, after returning the Shah from Europe and following the 19
August coup Boroujerdi, personally, sent a telegram for the Shah and
welcomed him. Meantime, Behbahani was so active in intriguing public to
attack Mossadeq’s house in 19 August. According to some recent evidences,
Kashani had an important role in subverting Mossadeq’s government through
taking money from America. Anyway, all three religious leaders were allied
against Mossadeq at the time and took part in his government overthrowing.
The small but active group of the Fadian-e eslam protected them.
Therefore, it can be determined three distinguishable procedures among
religious leaders and activists. Conservatives protected neither the oil
nationalization nor Mossadeq by the leadership of Ayatollah Behbahani. They
were politically in the line of the Shah and Iran’s ruling class. Radicals by the
leadership of Ayatollah Kashani were part of the National Front at first, but
later were divided into two groups; some remained loyal to Mossadeq and
others separated him. Moreover, at last, combatants who were the Fadian- e
eslam supported Mossadeq and oil nationalization until assuming power by
Mossadeq but after his premiership stood against the National movement.
Ayatollah Kashani’s Life
Seyyed Abolghasem Kashani was born in Iran or Mesopotamia in 1881.
He studied near his father who was a mojtahed, too. He, also, had been taking
part in Haj Mirza Hossein Tehrani and Akhund Mullah Mohammad Kazem
Khorasani’s sessions. He received his Ejtehad permit from a Mujtahed in Najaf
named Agha Zia-o Din Iraqi. Later, he became famous for his dissents with
Britain for Iraq’s occupation. 58
During the World War I, Kashani actively
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opposed with Britain for seizure of Islamic lands, as a result he arrested. In
1919, he escaped and came to Tehran.
In 1920s, he found Iranian Ulamma dispersed. Ulama were discontent of
the British and France dominance on the Middle East and Pan-Turanist and
Pan-Iranist policies of Turkey and Iran were a warning for them. They still
considered Qajar dynasty and rulers as their natural allies. But, they had no
integrity on the current events. Najaf was not more credit religious center of the
Shia World and Qom was not the most important at the time. Anyway,
Ulamma accepted the Pahlavi dynasty and implicitly supported it. Kashani
could contact important Tehran Ulamma including Behbahanis, Tabbatabais,
Ashtianis and Khoei, the Friday prayer leader, and Agha Jamal Esphahani, but
his main achievement was contact with Seyyed Hassan Modares. At the time,
Modares was the opposition leader of Reza Khan in the consultative Assembly.
In 1924, both Kashani and traditional religious leaders opposed with
republicanism of the Reza Khan. They were concerned about modernism
revival and decline of religious influence. Furthermore, they had been
concerned of the Soviet’s support of the Reza Khan. Kashani strongly
activated against republicanism of Reza Khan and organized some rallies out of
the Majles. These rallies led to tactical resignation of Reza Khan from Prime
Ministry and leaving republicanism temporarily. 59
The Shah Reza after failure established friendly relations with Qom
Ulama and pretended to being religious and instead achieved gifts and hopeful
messages from Ulamas. Hence, Ulama agreed to transferring monarchy from
Qajar dynasty to Pahlavi dynasty. This was caused to protect of Reza Khan’s
monarchy in the Majles by the present clergies and traditional clergy system
could not do anything against it. Modares, Mossadeq and others who opposed
this issue were left alone. One of the reasons of Kashani and Haeri’s presence
in the Constituent Assembly was this. Subsequent to the Majles vote, the
Constituent Assembly formed to legalize and legitimize transferring monarchy
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from Qajar to Pahlavi. The Constituent Assembly election was not free. Many
of religious figures became members of this Assembly but Kashani and Haeri’s
role were significant and important for they were previous sympathizers of
Mossadeq and opponents of Reza Khan. Haeri Zadeh was member of Modares
Parliamentary group till the Consultative Majles vote for holding the
Constituent Assembly. Later, Haeri Zadeh became the National Front lawyers
and Kashani’s adherence. Kashani and other religious leaders who were not
going to surrender new regime demands were dissatisfied of the current
procedures. According to his hotheaded adherences, he had no anti-Reza Shah
activities and it is an obvious evident of leaving political activities by him in
those era. During Iran’s occupation in September 1941, Kashani who was
suspicious to complicity with Germans, arrested. Following to freedom again
started his political activities until after unsuccessful assassination of the Shah
in February 1948 banished from the country.
The traditional religious leadership in Qom prohibited political activities
for religious leaders instead of objection to Kashani’s exile. Perhaps its reason
was Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s unconcern towards political activities. In addition,
Seikh Abdolkarim Haeri, the Boroujerdi’s teacher, was not desire to politics.
Indeed, Qom leaders’ decision in 1948 over preventing interference in Political
affairs was negation of Kashani acts and implicit support of the Shah. Even,
later refusing of Boroujerdi in supporting Oil nationalization was in accordance
with policy of traditional religious leadership system. Otherwise, Ayatollah
Behbahani had no doubt in expressing his political ideas if it was necessary.
He had been known as a mediator between Tehran ruling class and religious
system of Qom clergies. In a letter to Behbahani, Boroujerdi had written before
his death in 1950, had issued verdict (Fatwa) against land reforms. 60
But, he
was not a political and combatant leader. Kashani’s attitudes can be considered
and described radical against conservative attitude of Bourojerdi which was a
kind of silence. These are two different views but not towards politics.
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Kashani reacted against clergy’s decision in Qom and non-interference
in politics and in a declaration, which published in Beirout, objected to the
constituent Assembly decision on abdication power of dissolving parliament to
Shah and warned about Iran-Britain oil agreement. Then, he was chosen as
deputy of Terhran constituency however, he did not present in the mentioned
Majles. In June 1950; he was allowed to return Tehran, he issued some
pronouncements in protecting of Oil nationalization. In addition, Mossadeq
read two letters of his addressing deputies in the Majles. At the time, Kashani
was just a prominent religious leader who supported the National Front and Oil
nationalization. Boroujerdi, Behbahani and other significant religious leaders
all remained silent on the Oil issue. 61
But after Razm Ara’s assassination, they came in. Ayatollah Mohammad
Taghi Khonsari, Sheiykh Bahae-din Mahallati, Seyyed Mahmood Rohani,
Sheikh Abbas Ali Shahrudi and Seyyed Mohammad Reza Kalbasi in protection
of oil nationalization issued declarations. 5 Mahallati was more active than
others and stood till the end. Zanjanis brothers were supporters of the National
Movement from the beginning. These two brothers were famous Mujtaheds of
Tehran. Seyyed Mahmood Taleghani, Seyyed Jafar Ghorvi, Seyyed Zia-Din
Haj Seyyed Javadi and Jalali Musavi were clergy’s deputies of the seventeenth
Majles.
Fadaian-e eslam
This ardent Islamic activist had been attempting for establishing an
Islamic government in Iran and was showing a strong unanimity with Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhoods. Seyyed Majtaba Mir lohi who later became famous as
Navab Safavi, was Fadaian leader. Vahidi brothers, Ibrahim Karim Abadi,
Abdollah Karbaschian were also among leaders of this group. Terror was their
main weapon. They had no official connection with Qom, but they kept in
touch with second rank religious leaders of Qom. Then, they shot Dr. Hossein
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Fatemi and injured him. After Mossadeq event and active participation in the
coup for the Shah, again in 1955 embarked on assassinating Hossein Ala, the
then Prime Minister, which was unsuccessful. This caused to prosecution of
“Fadaian” and some of them were executed, too. Kashani was also under
control for sometime. Cleric system of Qom did nothing for both Fadaian and
Kashani. The Fadaian-e eslam, at first, supported Mossadeq and the National
Movement and Oil nationalization policy, but after assuming premiership by
Mossadeq, they cut off with Mossadeq and Kashani. 6 Their difference was for
ideological and theoretical issues. Fadaian was following an Islamic revolution
while Mossadeq and Kashani had no belief to it. Kashani’s response and
reaction to establishment an Islamic polity was quite brief:
“[British exploiters] are restoring another tactics to weaken our fighting.
These days, I receive signed letters and they ask me why we do not
prevent alcoholic drunks, why we do not send off women from offices
or why we do not order them to veil. Authors of these letters are direct
British agents or has some personal interest or are foolish.” 63
Fadaian, also, was speaking directly to Mossadeq and Kashani.
Fadaian’s leader announced their opposing with Kashani and Mossadeq’s
policies as follows:
“I made clear this point during visit with Kashani…. That our duty is
imposing Islamic laws, but Kashani brought some excuses and my
words and views had no impression on him…then we told Kashani:
your attitudes are not religious and your life way doesnot look like
religious people. You should change your attitudes and your children
should regulate Islami laws but he did not accept my words....there is no
doubt for me that our dear brothers in jail [seven Fadaian were arrested
after assassination of Razm Ara] has been kept in jail by Dr. Mossadeq
and Kashani and the National Front order…..” 64
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During all prime ministry of Mossadeq, Fadaian kept on their attacking
to Mossadeq, Kashani, Baghaei and other important leaders of the National
Front. They considered Kashani as British agent and claimed he had some role
in financial misuse. Even after confronting of Kashani with Mossadeq in
February 1952 and confronting with the National Movement after March 1952,
Fadaian did not close him. In June 1953, there were some rumors over
cooperation of Fadaian with Kashani, but they denied it in a declaration and
named their leader “Hazrate Navabe Safavi”. Meanwhile, they called Kashani
just as “Kashani” and through it contempt him.
Therefore, in the beginning of Mossadeq government, Qom was quiet.
Kashani and other radical Mujtahedin was supporter of government. Fadaian
called Mossadeq “liar” and were threatening him to assassinate. 65
Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh
Abdolghadir Azad, one of the dissent Front members in the fifteenth
Majles, two months after Mossadeq’s premiership clashed with the National
Front. But others like Makki, Baghaei and Haeri Zadeh stayed later times in
the front. It is not accidental that they along with Kashani clashed with
Mossadeq, because they believed not following Mossadeq and they all were
basic leaders of the movement after Mossadeq. In the sixteenth Majles,
Baghaei was the second deputy of Tehran after Mossadeq, so, generally he was
considered as Mossadeq’s substitution and second leader of the National Front.
Makki was elected as the first deputy of Tehran in the seventeenth Majlis.
Haeri Zadeh was not as young and famous and publicist as them, but he was an
old leader, a religious figure who was familiar with Kashani from some
previous decades. They simultaneously separated Mossadeq and for similar
reasons but their reasons were not religious.
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Dissents of Makki and Baghaei with Mossadeq started from July 1957.
At the time, Mossadeq unseated general-major Zahedi in the accusation of
disloyalty or ignoring his orders on the day of Harriman’s entrance to Tehran,
as a result some were injured and killed. Mossadeq got shocked when Baghaei
and Makki said they knew Zahedi as a better candidate for Premiership if any
event had been occurring. 66
This difference appeared for Matin Daftari.
Senator Ahmad Matin Daftari was Son-in-law and nephew of Mossadeq and a
prominent law professor. In the Reza Shah era, he was the justice Minister and
Prime Minister for a while. While, the Reza Shah could not tolerate any
independent thought or act, the Allied Forces arrested Matin Daftari, Kashani,
Zahedi and some others, because they were suspicious to having relation with
Germany. A document shows Matin Daftari used his influence on Mossadeq to
control Khuzestan governor to help the ex-oil company at the time of ousting.
Later, Mossadeq had to apologize the Khuzestan governor, Amir Alaei, for his
orders to him, because his orders were based on information that Matin Daftari
had been sending secretly to him. Those days, Makki was in Abadan and
Baghaei was publishing relevant document in “Shahid”. According to this
document, AIOC wanted Matin Daftan to monitor Amir Alaei’s actions and
operation and Matin Daftari did so. Mossadeq sent the governor from Abadan,
the ousting place to Ahwaz despite of frequent recommendation of Amir Alaei.
It had been discovered from documents in the Sedan house. Nevertheless, other
lawsuits and accusation of Baghaei to Matin Daftari is not serious. 67
After some months, it became obvious that Matin Daftari was going to
New York as a member of Iran’s delegacy along with Mossadeq to attend in
the Security Council session. Baghaei threatened of not going with them if
Matin Daftari would come with delegacy. But, Khalil Maleki asked Baghaei to
talk to Mossadeq in private. Mossadeq told Baghaei his selection was for his
wife pressure. Baghaei surrendered but none of them convinced.
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Discussion over government appointments gradually made their relation
vague. Makki and Baghaei was discontent of appointing Morteza gholi Bayat
as director of INOC and Dr. Fallah as director of Abadan refinery. Bayat was
Mossadeq’s relative and ex-Prime Minister was famous and publicity despite
Baghaei and Makki’s view. Bayat was not member of the National Front and
after the coup; he was retained in his position, and took part in talks, which led
to Consortium Oil Agreement. But, Fallah was suspicious to cooperation with
the ex-company. Appointment of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar as deputy of the Labor
Ministry had some debates. Bakhtiar in this position made two serious
mistakes. Baghaei and Makki insisted on him as a British agent but this claim
was baseless. There is no document on Kashani’s disagreement with these
appointments, but he had also some challenges with Mossadeq over these
appointments.
Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh, the dissent minority deputies of the
fifteenth Majles, expected better behavior of Mossadeq. Because, they started
the oil talks in Majles, they encouraged Mossadeq to take leadership of the
movement. They were his colleagues not his followers or puppets. But, they
saw all new members of Iran’s party were benefiting. They did not try to solve
the problem but stood against Mossadeq and made him force to consult with
others. However, Mossadeq was not as flexible as they expected but they also,
were quarrelling. Baghaei was more significant than two others were. He was
son of Agha Mirza Shahab Kermani, the great leader of Kerman in the
Constitutional Movement. He was naturally Kerman deputy in the Majles. He
was prior in politics and intelligence from his dissidents in Iran’s Party. He was
an adorable and cute leader who had undefeatable morale. He had a strong
rhetoric and was completely dominant on Farsi language and culture.
Physically, he was powerful and was not following wealth and power.
Nevertheless, instead, he was proud, obstinate and was using any instrument to
disgrace others for reaching a goal. His main complain of Mossadeq was for his
domineering behavior but he, himself could not tolerate dissidents beliefs. 68
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Disagreements and challenges were in the National Front leadership
from before, but before the 21 July revolt, it had not been appeared. According
to Dr. Fatemi, Sanjabi went on the verge of struggle with makki. On 9 July,
Baghaei sent a secret letter to leaders of Zahmat Keshan Party. He had spoken
of a betrary and powerful group, which had influenced inside the movement for
Dr. Mossadeq’s ignorance. Thus, the Party leadership decided to talk with Dr.
Mossadeq and gave him ultimatum. Those betray group, which Baghaei was
speaking, of them was the Iran’s party leaders and Shaygan. Dr. Fatemi, also,
was of this group because Baghaei considered him as British agent. 69
Both Kashani and Baghaei as the leader of the Zahmat Keshan Party had
important roles in events after Mossadeq’s resignation in July 1952. Kashani
asked for a mass strike and refused any agreement with the Shah and Qavam.
Baghaei emphasized the National Front representatives wouldn’t be satisfy
except returning Mossadeq as Prime Minister, and Zahmat Keshan Party
organized rallies in Tehran. However, it has been exaggerated of these groups.
But, we cannot say that Mossadeq could return without these attempts.
Mossadeq had backed with great and large support of masses, because after
some months, we see Kashani could not affect people against Mossadeq.
Mourning for the 21 July martyrdom had not still been ended that first rush of
Kashani to Mossadeq started. He asked Mossadeq about reasons of appointing
general-major vosugh, Nosratollah Amini Araki and Dr. Akhavi to
governmental positions. According to Kashani all of them were disqualified,
and threatened to go out of Tehran or possibly Iran and it showed seriousness
of conditions. Mossadeq replied that they were working without salary and
Amini Araki has been a prominent member of the Cabinet office.
Using “Civil affair” expression by Mossadeq caused Kashani’s
followers especially Hassan Ayat set forth big conspiracy theory of Mossadeq,
Qavam Britain and Freemasonry for preventing religion and religious leaders’
interferences in politics. Anyway, this theory is baseless. It is obvious that
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Mossadeq was going to have no interpretations about merits of his appointees.
There is no evidence of Mossadeq’s intention to put aside religious or
ideological persons from political participation. Kashani was elected as the
Majles speaker by Mossadeq, however, two individuals of the Front leaders
were nominated for the position (Mo’azami-Shaygan). Kashani’s threat was
just for not saying three appointments. Baghaei was not discontent of these
appointments but just wanted to show Mossadeq his power through intriguing
Kashani. 70
Kashani and Mossadeq had difference at least in one case. Some
months before, two sons of Kashani, Seyyed Mohammad and Seyyed
Abolmaali, nominated themselves for the seventeen Majles election, but none
of them was elected. Even, one of them had not reached to legal age like
Mossadeq in the first era of Majles. Main complain of Kashani over state
appointments was for appointing major-general Mohammad Daftari as director
of Customs and unseating Dr. Mahmood Shervin and director of pious
foundation. Daftari was Mossadeq’s relative and Kashani and Bahaei
contempted him as director of police Head quarters. Ousting Shervin was a big
stroke for Kashani. Ahmad Zirak Zadeh, the Iran’s party leader, had plotted his
ousting. Zirak Zadeh was so active in distribution of governmental posts
among his friends and colleagues of Iran party.
Division in the Zahmat Keshan Party
Baghaei confessed later of his hurry for exposing difference between
Mossadeq and Kashani after 1952. Baghaei was hospitalized for cure and
treatment in September for one month. Whether it has been true or not, he
found a chance for consulting with confident leaders of the Zahmat Keshan
Party and main dissidents of Mossadeq like Lieutenant-general Zahedi. Other
members of Zahtmat Keshan by leadership of Khalil Maleki got the point and
awarded. Maleki’s colleagues had no fear of rebuking Mossadeq government;
meanwhile, they regarded challenging with government as a loss for whole of
the National Movement.
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Following to abortive discussions and debates between Baghaei and
Maleki, a meeting was held on 9 October in order to examine differences.
Baghaei understood very soon he was in minority, so left the meeting and
resigned from the party. Four days later, some thugs and Islam Mujahedin
(Kashani’s activists) rushed the Zahmat Keshan party office. At the time, the
third force was formed. Baghaei retook his resignation and became leader of
remained persons. Three days before, major-general Hejazi and three brothers
of Rashidian were arrested in the accusation of help to a foreign embassy for
subverting government. Zahedi was engaged, too but because was a senator
had Parliamentary immunity and government could not arrest him.
Subsequently, Iran stopped its relation with Britain. None of previous, dissident
groups in the fifteenth Majles and Kashani had any direct contact with foreign
powers.But, based on evidences all-perhaps except Makki-allowed America
and Britain to subvert Mossadeq’s government.
At first, Baghaei hid differences inside Party and pretended to being
leftist of Maleki and other activists of Zahmat Keshan party. 71
Baghaei had not
visited Mossadeq from August and soon started his attacks against government.
Baghaei had rushed combination of new cabinet, especially appointing of
major-general Vosugh and Daftari. Then, he discussed over prosecution of
Qavam and social security proposal. Proposal of social security posed after
arresting Hejazi and Rashidian brothers in order to boost public order and
social security. However, Kashani and Baghaei attacked the proposal but set
forth not serious reasons. It is unfair if we call Mossadeq government a broken
one, because we have ignored its enterprises. There was freedom of the Press in
his government in which British Press also was not as free as it. Brothers of
Rashidian continued their anti-government activities without any punishment.
American Embassy was arranging an anti-government revolt; the Tudeh Party
was severely following to disgrace the government; thugs attempted on Prime
Minister twice in a day and nobody accused. The Police Headquarters’ director
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was robbed and killed and main charged –major-general Zahedi- sat down in
the Majles and stayed safe of prosecution. According to Mossadeq
Government clashed with the biggest empire on the world. Nobody like
Baghaei and his party were insisting on effective performing of law.
It can be easily proved that attacks of someone like Baghaei, Kashani
was for that Mossadeq had not behaved like their desire. Otherwise, there was
no basic difference. It would be a big mistake if we consider their difference as
an ideological one. No one of famous leaders of the Front had defended land
reforms as Baghaei. Moreover, Kashani had no opposition with reforms while
conservative cleric did not like him. Flexibility of Iran’s party leaders towards
the Tudeh Party for they had not recognized and known them as Baghaei and
Maleki. Baghaei cannot be forgiven, because even in the case of Qavam’s
prosecution, he was going to resent Mossadeq. He knew if Mossadeq had not
prosecuted, Qavam was not for relative considerations. It was tens of years
that Mossadeq had not seen Qavam and his brother Vosugh. In 1946,
Mossadeq embarked on a strong conflict against election fake by Qavam and
decided to leave politics in objection to those fakes and Qavam’s win. Of
course, public feelings had been aroused for martyrdom of 21 July against
Qavam but Qavam had done no illegal thing and the main reason of Mossadeq
in prohibiting Qavam’s prosecution was this.
Hence, principally there was a contrast in Bahaei’s performance. On the
one hand, he was insisting on Qavam’s punishment, was rebuking Mossadeq’s
government for its ignorance, and on the other hand was opposing with social
security proposal. This contradictory is solving when we know his goal in both
cases has been irritation of Mossadeq’s government. Practically, legal
affirming of this proposal postponed until March 1953 just for Baghaei’s
disagreement and after in July it was substitute with limits and powers law of
social security commission. 72
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According to this law, all suspicious persons to sabotage had to be
delivered to security commission and if they were recognized guilty, they could
be tried in ordinary courts. If commission verdict would be approved by the
court, too, guilty would be accused to 6 to 12 months jail or banish to a part of
country. Accusation of Baghaei just is correct in the case of establishing
Information and Security organization of the country (SAVAK), but word
“security” has been used in both. Baghaei used any chance at the time or later
to show intention has been counted as a crime in the law of Mossadeq. While,
it was not so and action of some to a plot was crime. Kashani’s attack to this
proposal meant supporting Baghaei. Their reasoning were not proportionate to
the case. Nevertheless, their attack to Mossadeq was for their resentment of
him.
Completing Gap in the National Front
Struggle and differences inside the Front on extension of Prime Minister
Power led to a full confronting in January 1952. Powers that Majles had given
the Prime Minister was not the kind of urgent powers that would require
suspending part of the constitution. Majles had given power to Mossadeq to
legislate and implement some laws within 6 months and at the end of this time,
parliament had the right of approving of refusal. In January 1952, Mossadeq
asked Majles to extend it for one more year. At the time, Majles was active and
all sessions were holding regularly. Baghaei, Haeri Zadeh and Makki despite
their previous support strongly opposed the bill. Meantime, Kashani was
selected as the Majlis speaker and legislative branch head in order to adjust his
attitudes towards government. But again, he was refusing taking part in the
Majles sessions. In a letter, he addressed Majles speaker commission and
asked them to refuse posing the bill in the Majles, because he believed it had
contradictory with the Constitution. Members of the speaker commission
respectfully wrote him could not do this. At last, the bill passed by Majles. 73
Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh clashed strongly with it, but because, voting
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for the bill was accompanied with confidence vote for government it was
approved. Regarding bazzar and Majles dissents with Kashani, he decided to
stop his opposition for a while. A visit was done between him and Mossadeq
but it was not effective in settling disagreements.
Traditional cleric of Qom and Behbahani in Tehran did not interfere in
Kashani-Mossadeq argument but their dissents with legal powers were obvious.
They made failed Mossadeq’s attempts in changing official position of
custodianship; however, Kashani was supporting Mossadeq in this case. They
also opposed to discuss women enfranchisement. Mossadeq and Kashani asked
left faction of the National Front not to insist on women enfranchisement
perhaps Qom cleric and ruling class of the court misused it against the Front
and government. Zahmat Keshan, third forces were trying to achieve women
enfranchisement. Khalil Maleki defended it within three articles titled “Women
rights, who are half of human being” Following this another articles was
published in the same newspaper. Representatives of “Pioneering women
Movement” dependent to the third force visited with Mossadeq. Mossadeq
emphasized for them, their demand could not be done at the time. 74
In mid of February of 1952, it was seemed that cleric leaders and
religious community of pro-national Front did not pay attention Kashani and he
had been retired. Perhaps, Rohani and Shahrudi had showed him unanimity
secretly. Mahalati, Zanjani brothers and Taleghani were supporting the national
movement. Kashani’s failure in harmonizing religious figures with himself
was important. Among present clergies in Majles no Mujtahed was present.
From the second Majles, it was like this, but, if these clergies were backing
Mossadeq in Majles, he would have a huge force. Jalali, Angji, Haj Seyyed
Javadi, Shabestar; and Milani were with the front and movement. Shams
Ghanat Abadi was Kashani’s speaker from the beginning, but he left Kashani at
the time of Zahedi, too. Kashani, increasingly had relation with traditional
clerics and conservative religious men in Qom but he did not belong to them.
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This point was also correct about Baghaei, Makki and Haeri Zadeh. Related
news about the Shah’s impending journey in 28 February was an important
watershed. Shah himself decided on this journey but it was as if Mossadeq had
been forced him to leave the country. Perhaps, Kashani was not engaged in
these affairs but Ayatollah Behbahani most possibly was engaged. Rallies
against Mossadeq and attacks of thugs to the Prime Minister house could not be
a self-stimulate event, but Kashani and Baghaei had thought Mossadeq was
going to send Shah out of the country sent their thugs. At the day, Kashani
wrote two letters in Shah’s backing and published two declarations, also. Some
parts of one of declaration are following:
“O’ people! Be aware! Our publicity and democrat Shah is going to
leave the country for betrayal decision of somebody ….aware if Shah
goes whatever we have will go with him. Arise and don’t let Shah goes.
Ask him to change his view. Today, our lives and independence depends
on Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – not anybody else-.” 75
It has been said that Behbahani was engaged in these affairs but it is not
certain. If, we just rely on documents, we see he and his circle had been quite
for a while. Indeed, they had been drastically activating against government.
For instance, Mohammad Taghi Falsafi a famous preacher who was telling
Behbahani’s view – had begun his activity against government from many
times before. In one of preaching sessions, when he rushed Mossadeq in the
Shah Mosque present people in the meeting aroused and he forced to escape.
This event was related to some time before appearing gap in the National Front
and even before the 21 July Revolt. Anyway, Behbahani did not remain quiet
on 28 February and along with Sheikh Bahaedin Noori (later Ayatollah Noori)
visited Shah and speech for people anti-Mossadeq. From the day onward,
Behbahani’s activity against government became more open and public and
Qom’s engagement in the cases became more evident.
300
In April 1953, brigadier-general Mahmood Afshar Toos, the Police
Head quarters head, had been robbed and was murdered in a cave out of
Tehran. Four retired brigadier –generals were prosecuted in this relation.
Baghaei who was deeply engaged in this regard, was not arrested for his
Parliamentary immunity. Zahedi sat down in Majles before arresting. At the
time, Kashani was Majles speaker, however was not presenting in Majles. This
time, he presented in Majles, kissed Zahedi, and said him he could stay in
Majles until he would desire and his presence would be auspicious. Then, he
recommended Majles staffs to cure their senior guest. Sometimes, it has been
said that Kashani – Mossadeq stalemate started from the time Mossadeq
decided to dissolve Majles and referendum. Definitely, this view is correct.
Now, it was obvious the clerics of Qom and Kashani were active against
Mossadeq’s government. During next months, rumors were heard over
impending coup. Mossadeq decided to dissolve Majles and holding new Majles
through referendum in July and August. His close advisors and friends
prohibited him of doing so. Kashani and Behbahani announced his decision
inconsistent to the Constitution and considered it religiously unlawful. Of
course, Mossadeq’s decision was improper but it was not on the contrary with
the constituent. Now, Kashani had put himself inside religious conservatives.
Kashani and clerics in Qom remained quiet during the 16 and 17 August coup.
Behbahani had a significant role in organizing thugs in the 19 August coup.
Recently, some evidences have been found that indicates Kashani had received
some money through Ahmad Aramesh from Americans with the goal
overthrowing Mossadeq government. These evidences are quite strong but are
not definite. 76
In 1979, exchanged letters between Mossadeq and Kashani at those days
were exposed by one of Kashani’s family member who claimed had been a
messenger between them. Kashani after some complaints of Mossadeq asked
him to be united and confront with the coup. But it is not clear; he was talking
301
of which coup. Mossadeq wrote in reply that, “your letter was received
through Mr. Hassan Agha Salemi. I am being supported by the people, End.”
There are doubts in correctness and credit of these letters. Some criticizers say
why Kashani’s letters, which has been in his hand script, has been remaining
near his family. Mossadeq letter is also in his way of writing, although it has
been typed. 77
It can be understood from the letter that Kashani was not
engaged in the 19 August coup and it is not reasonable. On 18 August, the
Shah’s coup against Mossadeq remained abortive during two days before. If,
Kashani’s mean had been the next day coup, it shows he knew about
impending affair and ascertained his information about the coup. Rationally, it
seems Kashani has wanted to have a role in full win of Mossadeq over the 16
and 17 August coup. There is no doubt, that traditional cleric had favorable
view towards the coup. Ayatollah Boroujerdi welcomed the Shah after his
returning to the country and left quietness. The next day, the “Islam Devotees”
called the coup Islamic Revolution in their publication and wrote:
“Yesterday, Tehran was shivering under manly walks of the army forces
and Muslims. Mossadeq, the old blood sucker monster, had to resign
for Muslims pressure…..all state centers were captured by Muslims and
Islam army.” 78
Two weeks later, Kashani announced in an interview that Mossadeq has
done a great betray and deserved death. 79
Qom clerics, Kashani and Islam
Devotees performed unanimously but this alliance prolonged a short time.
Other clerics and religious community by the leadership of Zanjani brothers
and Taleghanee in cooperation with the National Front Parties organized the
National Resistance Movement against the coup.
Cleric system used the coup and some years passed in this way until the
Shah embarked on land reforms and tried to make the power inclusive in his
hands and his challenges with clergies began. Cleric who had helped
302
establishment of the conservative regime again started their silence and let the
ruling class to purge with Mossadeq, the National Front, Communism, Baha’iat
and other enemies of Islam. Therefore, cleric reinforced its stance among
property owners without losing their traditional position in bazaar. However,
some parts of bazaar threatened to not paying Sharei payments to Qom.
Kashani was the full looser; meanwhile cleric of Qom did not accept him. He
lost his position among bazzar and could not achieve a position among property
owners. Neither Kashani nor Mossadeq could organize opponents against the
coup regime. Mossadeq was in jail and Kashani had lost his publicity. “The
Islam Devotees” had not any social position or power from the first that loose
it. That regime which helped them to assume power demolished them.
There were nobody to fight with Mossadeq except Kashani, Baghaei
Makki and Haeri Zadeh. It can be claimed that Kashani without Baheaei’s
backing could never fight against Mossadeq. Personality figures had important
role in these events. Haeri Zadeh was not as much as three other dependent to
principles, his publicity was less than others and after separated them and
waited for Zahedi’s help. Dissent of Makki with Mossadeq was not so much
deep and rooted. After the coup, he was surprised more than others were.
Kashani was seeking respect and according to him, Mossadeq’s contempt
behavior had resented him. He had a brave soul, which could lead him to last
point of sequestering. Baghaei had grown this attitude of him more, otherwise,
Kashani never quarreled with Mossadeq. Therefore, role of Baghaei both in
making and boosting gulf in the National Front and was a basic and pivotal
ones. Once in Parliamentary debates, Baghaei stimulated himself to Nazi dog
which bites both friend and enemy, and really it was true. At last, these three
made themselves resented than others. If Mossadeq were more accommodating
with them, the Front would not be lost too much. Once, Baghaei had wished
Mossadeq would appreciate individuals like him. This is true, but I wish he
would appreciate Mossadeq and his attempts.
303
Reference
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2. Jalil Bozorgmehr , ed “Mossadeq dar Mahkameh Nazami” ( Tehran : 1990 ) ,Vol I,
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3. ibid p 47
4. ibid Vol I, p 264
5. ibid Vol I pp.378-85, and Vol II, p 649-54
6. ibid Vol II pp 778-9
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13. ibid 402
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21. ibid Vol II, pp 707-13
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42. ibid p. 476
43. Iran Azad magazine, No 54, July 1988
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47. ibid p 26
48. ibid p 37-8
49. ibid p. 43-9
50. ibid p. 74-6
51. Jabhe, No 83, June 1985
52. ibid p88
53. Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” p. 482
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306
57. Nikki R. Keddie , The Roots of the Revolution : An Interpretative History of
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61. Shahrough Akhavi, “The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954,”in
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62. “Rohanit va asrar fash nashodeh” (Iran, Qom, 1979) pp 88-96
63. ibid p132 and Political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki”
64. Taraqi magazine, May 13, 1951
65. Homa Katouzian , Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran ( London : I.B.
Tauris , 1999 ), 299-300
66. “Mossadeq Memoirs” Vol II
67. Homa Katouzian, p 302
68. Baqaei “Dar Peshgah Che Kasi, va Ankeh Goft Nah” (Newjersi, Rafizadeh, 1984)
chapter 7
69. Gholamreza Najati “Jonbesh Melli shodan Naft” (Tehran,1986) Defaait
Dr.Fatemi.
307
70. Baqaei, chapter 7
71. Shahed, October, 14, 15 and 16, 1952
72. Baqaei, chapter 7 and Shahed, June 1953
73. Kayhan and Niroy Seaom, November and December 1952
74. M. Dehnavi “Majmoah Maktobat Ayatollah Kashani” (Tehran,chappakhsh, 1981)
Vol III, p 192
75. Abdolhossain Moftah “Rasti birang ast” (Paris, 1983); and Kayhan, February 28,
1953
76. Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, ed. Mark Gasiorowski and
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78. Nabard Malat, August 20, 1953
79. Kayhan, September 14, 1953