the coup 1953 - shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/1986/11/11_chapter 5.pdf ·...
TRANSCRIPT
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CHAPTER V:
THE COUP 1953
At the Same time, Britain had been turning the lawsuit over to the Security
Council was plotting to subvert Mossadeq. Soon after, Eden refused American
suggestion over settling Oil issue and told the U.S. Foreign Minister that, there are
more successors are superior for Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party and it is better to
return Mossadeq to his house. 1
Eden was decisive over not reaching any agreement with Mossadeq. British
Embassy intelligence staffs in Tehran and their Iranian agents were mobilized
against Mossadeq’s government. One of the chief strategies of British Foreign
Ministry was to frighten America of the point that Mossadeq was going Iran
towards the Soviet Union. CIA along with Britain collaborated such even
American government was misled and instigated to an inimical enterprise against
Mossadeq. 2
Rigid attitudes of Britain and becoming America’s stance more
rigorous led to spread and intensify Shah and conservative circle opposing with
Mossadeq, because they saw Mossadeq at downfall slope. This inclination was
encouraged when Britain and America pressed Shah to act against Mossadeq.
Vacillating of government on reacting to Shah and the Tudeh Party aggravated the
condition. They openly organized struggle against government. The government
indecisiveness led to terrifying of landowners, clergies and other conservative
groups. Appearing some dissidents inside the movement made the plot circle more
210
complete. Of course, they could not split the movement. However, opposing of
these inner dissidents seemed more legitimate that other groups but their perennial
quarrel -specially Bakhaei- was concerning government more and was making
governing more difficult. When we consider this spread spectrum of Mossadeq’s
opponent forces, we find out its endurance until the verge of 19 August Coup has
been abnormal. Middleton, the British charge d’ affairs in Tehran, had been
encouraging Zahedi from 1952 to act against Mossadeq. C.M. Woodhouse (MI6-
Britain) had been leading Ajax operation for overthrowing Mossadeq’s
government with cipher name. In October 1952, American embassy undertook
direct commanding of the operation in Tehran. Meanwhile, Iran’s government had
closed British embassy for its Plotting enterprises. 3 Attempts and plotting actions
of Britain will be elaborated in detail according to CIA official documents.
28 February of 1952
On 28 February 1952, a rumor was swiftly spread all over city on
Mossadeq had forced the Shah to leave the country. Bakhaei and Kashani united
their forces with military and non-military forces of the dissent right faction for
the first time to act harshly against Mossadeq. Evidences shows that opponents
were going to strike drastically to government, but it is not clear whether they had
Mossadeq’s assassination plot or not. The court interference in political and
official affairs was clear and common. Shah’s mother and his sister Ashraf did
most interference. Each of them had separate office. Ashraf had formed an
influential net of her puppets that was famed to “Ashraf Band”. Ashraf and her
mother started their plots against Mossadeq from the beginning of his premiership.
Mossadeq and the Jebhe Melli leaders warned these two women through Hossien
Ala, the Court Minister, but it had no result. Eventually, Mossadeq threatened to
consult with people, if Shah had no effective enterprise.
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Shah decided to counter act against Mossadeq. He had some reasons for it,
one, he himself was hostile to Mossadeq and had contact with internal and external
forces who were going to overthrow him. So, his mother and sister acts were on
his direction, other, Shah had not enough power in monarchial family and the
country, at the time, So he could do nothing to stop them. Moreover, any serious
action against their operation caused British and Iranian ruling class thought of his
disloyalty. Nevertheless, Mossadeq was frequently reminding that according to the
constitution “Shah should rein not rule”. Hossein Ala during a visit reminded
Mossadeq that Shah was going to go to Europe because he was resented of not
having anything to do. Mossadeq tried to assure Ala and renounce Shah of his
decision. 4 In deed, he did not want to engage with Shah because he wanted
endurance of the Constitutional monarchy system. Many of the Jebbehe Melli
leaders and the movement activists were aware of political dangers over existing
gulf between the Shah and government.
Dr. Abdollah Moazami one of the prominent leaders of Jebhe Melli and
Majles deputy and rich landowner and law professor of the Tehran University who
had mixed a dependent thought with moderate behavior. Mossadeq and the court
both stressed on their relation. Mossadeq had striven to settle existing differences
between Shah and government through several visits with Shah and Ala. As a
result, Parliamentary group of the National Front decided to send a delegation to
the Court in order to reach understanding. Members of this delegation consisted of
Moazami, Shaygan (Monfared), Karim Sanjabi and Ali Asghar Parsa, Haj Seyyed
Javadi, Milani and Jalali Mousavi three cleric parliamentary members of the
National Front. 5 Meantime, Ala reminded Mossadeq again that the Shah and
Queen Soraya were going to Europe for their problem of not having a child.
Mossadeq told Ala that Queen could go alone and if it was necessary Shah joint
her later. 6
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On 24 February, the seven member parliamentary group by head of
Moazami was invited to lunch to the court. This time, Shah also presented in the
party and delegation surprised and became glad of his passionate view towards
Mossadeq and the National Front (Jebhe-Melli). Actor Leaving the Party, they
decided to go directly to Mossadeq’s house & tell him about these good news. It
has been quoted three narrations over immediate consequences of this visit from
Mossadeq, Sanjabi and Moazami, which have differences in detail, but there is no
difference on main points.
Mossadeq said that, “when the seven members were in his house. Court
phoned Moazami. After answering and returning among others, he spoke in
private with Sanjabi. Then, he said it was about Shah’s intention for dispatching to
Europe, however, he did not want his decision became clear. Moazami said that
Ala and other court authorities were coming to Mossadeq’s house to discuss over
this trip. Entering Ala and his accompanies, the seven members went to other
room. Mossadeq recommended the court representatives to dissuade Shah of this
trip but they replied Shah had made his decision. Then, Mossadeq promised to
help them in journey procurement and kept secret it. Shah had insisted on keeping
secret this trip lest it caused concern and agitation among people. According to
Shah’s suggestion, trip was being done with car until Iraq’s border for people
could not prevent his trip. 7
In his book, “Mission for My Country”, Shah claims
his trip suggestion and persisting in keeping it secret both were by Mossadeq.
However, he says nothing about reason of his acceptance. In 6 P.M. of 28
February, subsequent defeat of thug’s attack to Dr. Mossadeq’s house, the Prime
Minister in private meeting Majles rendered elaborated report of that visit. On 6
April 1953, Mossadeq addressed people, expressed the entire event, re-stressed
that Shah himself was desire to going abroad, and insisted on keeping his trip
secret. The court issued a declaration against Mossadeq’s speech and claimed that
Shah’s trip suggestion was posed by three National Front deputies in Majles but it
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was not mentioned their names. 8 This claim is apparently incompatible with
Shah’s sayings in book. In order to have a logical understanding of 28 February
1952 events, it is necessary to know who has decided and organized Shah’s trip.
On 25 February, Ala informed Mossadeq of Shah’s trip date. It was
ordained that on 28 February at 13:30, Mossadeq went to the court for lunch. Ala
said ministers would be presented in the afternoon. At the same day, Gen Zahedi
was arrested for his complicity in a secret plot of Security operation. His arresting
was not related to Shah’s Journey. He was released without conviction. 9
Morning
of 28 February, Ayatallah Behbahani phoned Mossadeq and asked him about
rumors of Shah’s Journey. Mossadeq replied he had no interference in his decision
and he made this decision himself. Mossadeq surprised more when Shah himself
called him and asked him to come at 12:00 instead 13:30. Mossadeq fell into
suspicion and understood that Shah was not really going to go journey and
changing the program had been for killing Mossadeq in front of the palace by
thugs who were going to gather outside. 10
In the court, Mossadeq understood Shah’s abnormal and stressed behavior.
Shah informed Mossadeq along a delegation from Majles is coming in order to
talk to him over his journey. Short time after, Shah made Mossadeq aware of his
disagreement. Meantime, Mossadeq found Ayatollah Behbahani and Sheiykh
Bahaedin Nouri’s enterance. Kashani and Beghaei also did it on 28 February.
Nevertheless, Mossadeq who was unaware of all events received a message from
his home office about on immediate visit with Henderson, the American
ambassador. When he reached near the gate of Marmar Palace, he heard shouting
out of the palace that was chanting slogans against him. Swiftly, he found
everything and instead going out of main gate, went out of a small door and left
the court. When thugs found it, pursued his car but police prevented them.
Shapour Hamid Reza, Smaller brother of Shah, interfered and asked police not to
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prevent public move. Then, thugs attacked to Mossadeq’s house and his son,
Ahmad’s house. Mossadeq’s house had an iron gate but Shaban Bi Mokh with a
young colonel in a military jeep broke the gate .At this time the Third Force
activists ( Nirouye-Sevom ) by head of Jalal Ale Ahmed entered .So, thugs were
surrounded from inside by Mossadeq guards and from outside by Third Force
activists . On Mossadeq’s son recommendation, he and Fatemi, the Foreign
Minister, escaped from the roof to Army Staff. Mossadeq directly went to Majles
and reported all events to Majles that had been held secretly, and without viewer.11
He reminded in his radio speech on 6 April 1953 about his relations with shah and
said apparently, when the shah had heard his successful escape news had been sad.
Despite Mossadeq’s orders over investigation on insecurity, thugs and
rabbles did not give up to the law. Beside Shaban Bi Mokh and his thugs,
Bakhaie’s thugs, Tayeb Rezari, and Hassan Ramezan Yakhi who were working for
Ayatollah Behbahani were present and active in those events. In addition, some of
army commanders were engaging and present among thugs out of palace .Since
after, Mossadeq become more cautions on his security and health .Later, Ala was
removed from the Court Ministry, and Abolghasem Amini (Younger brother of
Dr. Amini) replaced him. After the event, Mossadeq never had private visit with
shah and in deed, cut off his personal relations with shah .Even for some private
by shah in his son house, Dr. Gholam Hossien Mossadeq , opposed . 12
On 7
March , Majles chose a eight members delegation including Moozami , Sanjabi
from the National Front ( Jebhe Meli ) , Makki , Bakhaie , Haerizadeh and Rafi
from opposition Front and Ganjei and Majd Zadeh from Monfaredin to survey
shah and prime Minister difference . They resulted the core difference was the
Shah’s right cabinet power according to constitution especially related to army
Force” They expressed their opinion as this: “According to the Constitution shah
has no responsibility and cabinet has power and responsibility in all executive
affairs including military and non-military.” However, discussing about this report
215
for approbation, Baghaei and Haeri Zadeh opposed it and said however, the
interpretation of constitution is credible but its approval by Majles is not in the
interest of the country. This report never approved and whenever it was going to
put for vote, opponent deputies had been leaving Majles and Majles had no
enough deputies for vote. 13
Murder of Chief of Police Head quarters
In April, another Plot was executed for Mossadeq forced to vacate.
Informing Shah and CIA interference, it was decided key and political authorities
to be abducted for making insecurity and agitation in the country. It has not found
any complete list of these people’s names, yet, but Afshare Toos, the Chief of
Police Head quarter, has been on the top of the list because of his key position and
his loyalty to Mossadeq. However, for his contact with Baghaei, he was trying to
reconcile Mossadeq and Kashani. So it was too easy to deceive and abduct him. 14
Baghaei and his close friend Hossien Khatibi and retired brigadier- generals
Monnazah, Bayandr and Morteze Zahedi and other mercenary officers of Army
staff had complicity in this plot. Khatibi was whom that Afshare Toos was
abducted from his house on 19 April. Despite their expectation, the plot was
exposed soon and all plotters except Baghaei who had parliamentary immunity
were detained. As soon as police suspected Khatibi, Afshr-e Toos was murdered in
a cave out of Tehran. Brigadier general Mozzayani was accused to issue the
murder order and major Baluch Ghoraei had implemented the order. After the
1979 revolution, Mozzayani arrested and executed but Ghoraei was released after
negation and refusal of Bahaeiat. At that time, nothing was said about inquiries
and trials and People was not informed, but in 1953 trials results were gradually
published in the Press.
216
In hearing, four mentioned brigadier- general illustrated, confessed and
signed the plot. All confessed decision was on Afshar-e Toos murder. Major
general Zahedi was engaged in this crime but as we saw before Ayatollah Kashani
Shield him in Majles. Since Khatibi’s arrest, Baghaei’s attach on government
intensified and claimed he himself had seen lashing of Khatibi in Jail, later, he
claimed it was his servant who was arrested and lashed in which he could not
speak, 15
But accusation against Baghaei was proposed when arrested officers said
his name. Three officers including Monnazah, Bayandar and Morteza Zahedi in a
confession specified that Baghaei had important and chief role in abduction and
murder of Afshar Toos. They had nothing about misbehavior in Prison and had no
objection. Mozzayani denied murder accusation but confessed to Afshar Toos
abduction and said Bayhaei had main role in the crime. Baghaei arrested on 17
August two days before 19 August, but there is no document that shows his
hearings. It was arranged that before fall down of Dr. Mossadeg’s government no
hearing and trial be done. After the Coup he was acquitted because still he had not
been convicted and other were sent to a pro forma trial and all were acquitted in a
funny way. Then nobody tried to find real criminals. In addition, Baghaei denied
abduction and crime accusation. He never said nothing about his contacts and its
nature with khatibi or engaged officers during 1953 until 1987 when he died in
one of Tehran’s hospital as prisoner of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Now, rumors about impending coup had been spreading everywhere .They
was chanting “We will change the coup to anti-coup” and through this slogan of
Tudeh Party they assured the Coup agents. Kashani had been quite and passive
after the 28 February event. The Tudeh Party and its press had overhauled and
adjusted its way towards government. Nevertheless, they did not act as an
opponent democrat Party. Public meetings and demonstration of Tudeh Party was
increased and spread. 16
Now, there are obvious documents of spending much by
CIA to hold these meeting just for proving to Iranians and the U.S. government
217
that Iran was going towards the Soviet Union. Government had largely been
ignoring these movements, maybe it had just passed economic problems and was
thinking now it could continue a gradual conflict with Britain and maybe it was
assured of its public base. Therefore, it was ignoring increasing internal and
external opposing and poisoning propaganda in the army force. Perhaps,
Mossadeq did not believe this situation had total difference with the 27 July case.
The 21 July uprising had caused government ignored realities and it continued
until falldown of the national government.
Referendum
Makki, Baghaei and their small group in majles were hyperactive. In spite
of reducing Mossadeq’s Sympathizers, still he had majority in Majles. One of not
important votes caused to react by Mossadeq and his plotter enemies used it and
led to the 19 August Coup. At the time, high board of Control on printing and
publishing banknotes was being chosen by the Majles to have high supervision on
mentioned operation by Iran’s National Bank. In June 1953, Majles chose Hossein
Makki instead of one of these board members. Later, Mossadeq has said several
times that with coming Hossien Makki to this board, he had been concerned of
Makki’s informing about publishing 3.1 billion rials banknotes during previous 9
months and informed public of it. Publishing banknotes was economically a
deliberate enterprise, legally was a legal act, and had preserved existing relation
between circulating money and foreign exchange supplies. Mossadeq, according
to him, had concerned about action of Makki and his Supporters and increasing
goods price and making inflation. It should be said these have been baseless
concern for Mossadeq.
After interpellalation, which was posed by Ali Zohri, Baghaei continued the
event. They interpellalated government for persecuting accused of Afshar Toos in
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Jail. Mossadeq was thinking that majority who had voted Makki maybe vote for
inefficiency of government and overthrow it. In his opinion, it was the end of
national movement and beginning a dictator ship and giving up on Britain in oil
issue, and even worse than this, legality of all above events. The national
movement was defeating with its weapon that is to say political weapon and
democratic and legal procedure. 17
Mossadeq was going to use his government
downfall by force and Coup as a win but if it was collapsing legally, it was a
disgraceful defeat. Therefore, concerning of non- confidence vote of Majles made
Mossadeq decisive to hold a new plebiscite over dissolution of Majles and
performing new election. He believed many of Present deputies had separated
their way of the National Front (Jebhe Melli). So public vote might make them to
understand and overhaul their Political attitude.
However, Mossadeq was not right. Majles vote in electing Makki for board
of Control on publishing banknotes was quite different with non-confidence vote
of government to it. Also, two third of Majles deputies were protecting Mossadeg
over plebiscite however they had doubt about Mossadeq’s decision over holding
plebiscite. Most of his closest colleagues and protectors including Dr. Gholam
Hossien Sedighi, Khalil Maleki, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, and Dr. Ali Shaygan told him
several times about not doing referendum. They were concern that putsches
manipulated that situation and making practical their intention, when Dr. Sedighi
told Mossadeq that Shah would oust him in absence of Majles, Mossadeq said: He
does not have the Courage. Khalil Maleki who could not dissuade the old man of
referendum stood up and told Mossadeq. This way that you go is to hell but we
will com after you until hell. “Dr. Abdollah Moazami who had been elected as
Majles speaker instead of Kashani resigned and left the capital in objection to the
referendum. 18
Government opponents including kashani, Baghaei, Makki, Haeri
Zadeh and others found an excellent opportunity. Through different
pronouncement and declaration, they called Mossadeq’s decision a dictatorship
219
and illegal decision and Behbahani and Kashani announced it illegal religiously. In
constitution of Iran, there was no article to allow government dissolves Majles
before ending its legal period hold new election. Of course, four years ago, Shah
could achieve Majles dissolution power through the Senate. However, there was
not article indicating opposing to plebiscite and Majles dissolution. Especially,
two third of representatives had voluntarily resigned. Therefore, it was no need to
referendum for dissolution and government should hold new election. If Mossadeq
did not Pay attention to this point and wanted to hold plebiscite, perhaps, he
wanted to show all people’s protection of him and his government. However, it
was another mistake. 19
Referendum was hold in an unsuitable atmosphere.
Achieving swifter results, rural areas were put aside. Because, voting, gathering,
and counting votes in two turns were prolonging. Government did its best to
prevent any election fraud. In addition, constituency of opponents and conformers
was apart. Result of referendum was positive and majority approved government
decision but, before reaching dissolution order to his Majesty, the “Royal Coup” in
17 and 18 August was done.
Coup
The usual story retailed in historical accounts, is that the British tried, but
failed, to convince Harry Truman of the wisdom of their coup plan, and managed
to get the U.S. on board, only after Dwight D. Eisenhower, elected President in
November 1952, had assumed office in January 1953. Nothing could be further
from the truth. As the official documents show, the U.S. decision to go for "regime
change" in Iran was made by Truman in November 1952, long before Ike took
office. In addition, it was the British agents, the Dulles brothers—Allen and John
Foster—who ran the operation with their British collaborate, while Eisenhower
remained in the background, almost in the dark.
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In June 1951, Truman reported to the National Security Council on the
British-Iranian crisis, arguing that if the British were to invade Iran, there would
be a danger that Iran could turn to the Soviets for help. In July, he dispatched
Averell Harriman to Tehran, to try to persuade Mossadeq to come to terms with
the British, but Mossadeq responded: "You don't know how crafty they are. You
do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they
touch." 20
Kashani's response was similar. Mossadeq was right: During the
Summer, the British slapped sanctions on Iran, confiscated Iranian assets,
sabotaged the Abadan refinery, and blocked Iran's trade with European nations. In
October, Truman dispatched Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George
McGhee to see Mossadeq, while he was in the United States, to offer a new
compromise: that a "neutral" British company could produce and distribute the oil.
Mossadeq predictably refused.
The turning point came in 1951, when Winston Churchill became British
Prime Minister again. He had no hesitations regarding regime change. Churchill
deployed Anthony Eden to the United States, to inform Dean Acheson of the
British decision to get rid of Mossadeq. In November, according to the
documented record 21
Truman made the decision to go with the British plot. In two
documents, NSC 136 and 136/1, written in November, after extensive debate in
the previous months, the doctrine was laid down that Truman would promote
direct intervention in Iran, through covert operations and even military forces. 22
The document spoke of "special political measures" needed to establish stability in
Iran, which referred to covert operations. A detailed plan for such covert
operations was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on Jan. 8, 1953,
which was 12 days before Eisenhower was inaugurated. 23
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Planning the Coup
The actual planning of the coup took place beginning November 1952 and
stretching through to June 1953. The events have been chronicled in a book
written in 1954, by one of the protagonists, Donald N. Wilber.24
He was in the
CIA's Near East and Africa Division (NEA). In addition to his 1954 book, he
reviewed the events in his memoirs, published in 1986. Then, there are the CIA
official documents 25
which were in part leaked by the New York Times, on April
16, 2000. 26
A preliminary meeting, in Washington, saw representatives of the
NEA, with British Intelligence. The key personalities were Christopher Montague
Woodhouse, who had been station chief for British Intelligence in Tehran, and on
the American side, Kermit Roosevelt, NEA Division Chief. At this meeting, it
was, in fact, the British who proposed a "joint political action to remove Prime
Minister Mossadeq," according to CIA documents. As noted, Truman okayed the
British plan in November 1952.
In March 1953, Undersecretary of State Gen. Walter Bedell Smith officially
"determined that the U.S. Government could no longer approve of the Mossadeq
government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no
National Frontists." The NEA and CIA were informed, and $1 million was
allocated to the Tehran station to be used by the Chief of Station and U.S.
Ambassador Loy Henderson. On May 20, the station received authorization to
spend 1 million rials a week (90 rials = $1) to buy up parliamentarians. In April,
the first CIA study was issued, "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq,"
and in it was the idea that a combination of the Shah and Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi,
backed by mobs in the street, could overthrow Mossadeq. The CIA made contact
with Zahedi, initially through his son Ardeshir, then with him directly.
Zahedi was a malleable figure, vulnerable to blackmail. During World War
II, he had supported Nazi Germany. British secret agent Fitzroy MacLean had
222
taken him to a prison camp in Palestine. A search of his residence had yielded a
treasure trove of German weapons, opium, and letters from German agents who
had landed in Isfahan, where he was military governor. Following the war, he was
released, and assumed posts as governor, before becoming Interior Minister under
Mossadeq. The two were political enemies, and Mossadeq tried several times to
jail him. Zahedi was the right man for the job. The first joint Anglo-American
planning session took place in Nicosia in late April 1953. Wilber, the covert NEA
consultant, met with British Special Intelligence Service Officer Norman Matthew
Darbyshire. They set up a three-way communications channel among Washington,
Nicosia, and Tehran, and preceded each to disclose to the other, whatever assets
they had in Iran. The main assets of the British (whose larger network had been
expelled by Mossadeq) centered on the three Rashidian brothers, Seyfollah,
Asadollah, and Qodratollah, who had a network extending to "the armed forces,
the Majlis, religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other
influential figures." The NEA gave two names to the Special Intelligence Service,
while keeping their actual assets, Djalili and Keyyan, secret.
By June 1, they had worked up a plan. The basic assumptions they shared
were: "that Zahedi alone of potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make
him worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the operation; that the
Shah would act only with great reluctance but that he could be forced to do so; that
if the issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the Shah rather than
Mossadeq; that the operation must, if possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-
legal instead of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned to fever pitch
against Mossadeq in the period just preceding the execution of the overthrow
operation; that the military aspect would be successful only if the station were able
to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to execute it; that immediate
precautions must be taken by the new government to meet a strong reaction by the
Tudeh Party." 27
223
These "basic assumptions" were to prevail in the following planning
meetings. The next meeting took place in Beirut on June 9, with Kermit Roosevelt,
who was the project chief, George Carroll of the CIA, Roger Goiran, Chief of
Station in Tehran, and Wilber. After meeting from June 10-14, Roosevelt and
Wilber went to London with a copy of the Beirut draft. There they met with
Darbyshire and Commander Maurice M. Firth of Special Intelligence Service, then
left on June 18. An official report was typed up, and known as Appendix B.28
The
final plan, codenamed TPAJAX, okayed by Kermit Roosevelt for the CIA and by
British Intelligence, was presented to CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, the State
Department, and Ambassador Henderson. The Special Intelligence Service
presented it to the British Foreign office. Approval came from the various offices,
on July 1, and July 11, 1953.
The final plan translated the basic assumptions, into a series of operational
thrusts: Propaganda operations must be launched against Mossadeq, accusing him
of corruption, anti-Islamic views, and sympathies with the Tudeh Party
communists. This required purchasing a stable of journalists, editors, and
publishers. Dirty operations were to be orchestrated in the streets, whereby thugs,
who were to be identified with Mossadeq, would beat up Islamic clerics. The aim
of such tactics was to drive a wedge between Mossadeq and his National Front, on
the one side, and his clerical allies, especially Kashani, on the other. In the
parliament as well, MPs were to be bought up, to oppose Kashani and oppose
Mossadeq. Demonstrations against Mossadeq in the streets, were to provide the
pretext for such MPs to hold a vote against him; if he refused to step down, the
plan was to have Zahedi arrest him, and then seize strategic centers in the capital.
To give Zahedi the forces he required, military officers had to be purchased.
224
Implementation of the Plot
CIA agent Carroll went to Iran in mid-July, tasked with studying the
military aspects of the plan. Wilber was responsible for psychological warfare.
This operation had already begun, with the issuance of anti-Mossadeq articles in
the (paid) press, and anti-Mossadeq cartoons, drafted by CIA cartoonists. The gist
of the anti-Mossadeq propaganda was that he was a patsy of the communists, that
the Tudeh Party was gaining strength, and that Iran could fall into the Soviet
sphere of influence. This was mainly for foreign consumption. Internally, the
major thrust was to split Mossadeq from his supporters. This meant to alienate the
religious establishment, especially Ayatollah Kashani, to counterorganize the
Majlis against him, and to whip up mob violence in the streets. As outlined in the
various planning meetings and documents, it was key to ensure the cooperation of
the Shah, in order to give an aura of legitimacy to the overthrow. The specific plan
was to get the Shah to sign two firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq,
naming Zahedi, and calling on the Army to maintain its loyalty to the Shah. All
official accounts of the coup show that the Shah represented a serious problem. He
was overridden by fear, vacillating, and weak. He did not trust the British, for
good reason, and was therefore focussed on getting guarantees that the United
States was behind the coup. The British, who had his profile, knew they had to
have U.S. cooperation.
In an attempt to soften him up, it was decided to deploy his twin sister,
Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, who had been living in Paris, to persuade her brother to
play the game. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, father of the "hero" of Operation
Desert Storm, was to get the Shah to sign the firmans, and a leading U.K. agent
was to assure the Shah that the entire endeavor was a joint U.S.-U.K. affair. If this
plan failed, then Kermit Roosevelt, as official representative of the U.S. President,
was to be deployed to get the Shah to put his signature on the dotted line. Once
225
signed, the firmans were to be delivered to Zahedi, who would move to take
power. Getting the Shah to play the game was no easy job. Asodollah Rashidian,
one of the notorious three brothers, called on Princess Ashraf on the Riviera in
mid-July, and, together with two "official representatives," overcame her lack of
enthusiasm about the mission to persuade her twin. Allen Dulles also travelled to
Switzerland to meet the Princess, and prevail upon her to play the game.
Reportedly, a mink coat and $5,000 helped her decide in their favor. 29
Neither the
Shah nor Mossadeq was happy at the news of her arrival, given that she was
known as an anti-Mossadeq figure, and had been banished. The Shah initially
refused to see her, but, once informed that General Schwarzkopf, an American,
was pursuing a similar mission, he relented. The meeting between the siblings
took place on July 29, but bore no fruit.
Schwarzkopf was trusted by the Shah, because of their good relationship
during the general's tenure as head of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian
Gendarmerie from 1942-48, a mission Iran had welcomed to counter British and
Russian presence. Schwarzkopf's new mission, as recounted by Wilber, "was to
obtain from the Shah the three papers… (1) a firman naming Zahedi as Chief of
Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in Zahedi which the latter could employ to
recruit army officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and (3) a firman calling
on all ranks of the army to support his legal Chief of Staff. It was felt that it would
be easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to issue a firman dismissing
Mossadeq." 30
The meeting between Schwarzkopf and the Shah took place on
Aug. 1, after Ashraf's departure. The Shah was so paranoid, that he insisted that
the general go and sit with him on top of a table in the middle of a grand ballroom,
where, he believed, they would be out of the hearing range of planted
microphones. He refused to sign the firmans, saying that he could not be sure of
the Army's loyalty, and that he wanted to determine the makeup of a future
Cabinet. The Shah's continuing preoccupation was to have assurances of American
226
support; he demanded that President Eisenhower indicate in some way that he was
in favor of the removal of Mossadeq. As Wilber relates, "By complete coincidence
and good fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors' Convention in
Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United
States would not sit idly by and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain." Kermit
Roosevelt exploited this statement, to put pressure on the Shah, who was still
vacillating. Schwarzkopf left the palace empty-handed, so another American had
to be deployed, this time as official representative of Eisenhower. The story of
Kermit Roosevelt's nightly visits to the Shah, to get him on board, are the stuff of
cheap novels. Kermit, a grandson of Teddy Roosevelt (and loyal to that faction of
the family), came out of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), like
Dulles, and was working in the Iran department of the CIA in November 1952. He
was selected to be the project chief for the coup. To enter the Shah's palace
unobserved, he would lie down in the back of a car, hidden under a carpet, and be
driven into the palace, then to emerge to conduct his private soirées with the
monarch. 31
Finally, after many of the visits by Roosevelt, the Shah agreed to sign
two (not three) documents: one firing Mossadeq and the other designating Zahedi
as Prime Minister.
This was Aug. 12. The propaganda campaign against Mossadeq,
orchestrated and conducted by editors and journalists who were richly
remunerated, was reaching a peak. Black propaganda was used to pit the religious
establishment against Mossadeq and the Communist Party. Wilber writes: "CIA
agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious leaders at Tehran by issuing
black propaganda in the name of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with
savage punishment if they opposed Mossadeq. Threatening phone calls were made
to some of them, in the name of the Tudeh, and one of the several planned sham
bombings of the houses of these leaders was carried out." 32
Meanwhile, the
military apparatus of the "Colonels' Conspiracy" was being put into place. Zahedi
227
named one Col. Aban Farzanega as staff planner and liaison with the United
States, in the person of CIA officer Carroll. On Aug. 13, Col. Sarhang Nematollah
Nasiri, a pro-Shah Army officer and chief of the Imperial Guards, delivered the
firmans, signed by the Shah, to Zahedi. The CIA station sent a cable saying the
new Zahedi government would need $5 million.
Coup Day
Aug. 16 was chosen as coup day. By mid-month, the situation in Parliament
had reached a state of chaos, as paid agents among the MPs had escalated their
smear campaign against Kashani, which culminated in calls for his ouster as
speaker of the Majlis. The anti-Kashani camp included several pro-Mossadeq
figures, and the Prime Minister intervened to shut down parliament through a
referendum. 33
Demonstrations were raging in the streets, in a classical gang-
countergang style. Protests against Mossadeq were arranged by the coup
managers, and pro-Mossadeq demonstrators were also encouraged to take to the
streets. Tudeh Party members who joined the latter, unwittingly provided the
pretext to slander Mossadeq as pro-Communist. Paid press agents put out the call
for the Prime Minister's resignation, on these grounds.
On the day designated for the coup, the demonstrations were organized
personally by none other than the U.S. military attaché, Robert McClure. The pro-
Mossadeq, pro-Tudeh demos were peppered with thugs and gangsters, who
launched physical attacks against the other side, again to discredit Mossadeq. The
carefully planned violence was the task of paid thugs, mainly from sports clubs,
and under the direction of one "Shaban the Brainless." 34
At the same time, pro-
Shah, anti-Tudeh demos, were characterized as manifestations of patriotic forces.
Through a lawful process, citizens who had no inkling whatsoever of the
orchestration, joined the protest marches of one or the other camp, to manifest
their political preferences. Thus, if, as documented, the CIA paid 6,000 or more
228
"extras" as in a play, thousands more joined in spontaneously. Mossadeq
responded by issuing a ban on all demonstrations. When the Tudeh Party sent a
delegation to him, asking that he provide arms to the nationalists and the
communists, he refused, saying he would rather be the victim of a lynch mob, than
provoke civil war. One military officer, Chief of Staff Gen. Taqi Riahi, was
informed of the coup plans, and alerted Mossadeq in time. 35
Thus, when Nasiri
went to Mossadeq's house the evening of Aug. 15, to arrest him, he himself was
taken prisoner by the pro-Mossadeq military, while Zahedi managed to flee.
The coup had failed, and the word spread fast. That night, spontaneous
demonstrations filled the streets, supporting Mossadeq and denouncing the Shah.
Seeing the situation compromised, the Shah quickly left, first for Baghdad, then
for Rome, with his wife. The CIA, informed of the fiasco, alerted its top agent,
Kermit Roosevelt, that he should leave the country, for his own safety. But he had
another idea. He believed the coup could work, and determined simply to try it
again after a few days. On Aug. 19, thousands of demonstrators moved obediently
into the streets, chanting "Death to Mossadeq" and carrying symbols of loyalty to
the Shah. The demonstrations were impressive, the result of outlays of much larger
sums of money. Thousands of dollars went to individual protesters, as well as to
larger groups organized through the sport clubs and circles of rowdies. Ten
thousand dollars was made available to Ahmad Aramash, an assistant to Ayatollah
Kashani, although whether or not it reached its destination, has been a matter of
dispute. Not only did demonstrators fill the streets, but violence was high, and the
organized thugs stormed eight government buildings. What proved decisive was
the publication of the firmans. The royal decrees, signed by the Shah, appeared in
the press that day, and radio news announced that Zahedi was Prime Minister,
Mossadeq had been ousted, and the Shah would return soon. General Zahedi
himself appeared on radio soon thereafter, to read out the texts of the two firmans.
Military units were dispatched to Mossadeq's home, where fighting ensued for two
229
hours. His residence was besieged, and in a vicious firefight, 50 people died. He
put up a principled resistance; when a colonel of the opposition tried to secure his
surrender, he had to report that "The old man was adamant in his resistance,
claiming that he was still the lawful head of the government and was not to be
bullied by a handful of rioting hooligans." 36
As his house was being destroyed by
gunfire and tanks, Mossadeq managed to escape. Zahedi ordered that all
demonstrations be banned, the borders closed, and pro-Mossadeq military be
arrested. Mossadeq later turned himself in to the authorities, while news had it,
that the Shah was returning from Rome. The coup had worked. Zahedi was
rewarded his $5 million for the successful operation, and got $1 million more, as
pocket money. Now, the enormously popular Mossadeq had to be dealt with
politically. After a ten-week stint in a military prison, he was tried on charges of
treason, because he had allegedly mobilized for a rebellion and had contradicted
the Shah. He was promptly found guilty and sentenced to death, later commuted to
three years in prison, followed by house arrest. Mossadeq's defense was a mere
statement of fact. "My only crime," he stated, "is that I nationalized the oil
industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political
and economic influence of the greatest empire on Earth." 37
Members of his
government were also arrested, as were the leading military that remained loyal to
him. Six hundred of the 6,000 of them were executed. Despite his defeat, his
illness, and his imprisonment, Mossadeq remained a compelling figure. Even in
death, his influence could not be cut off. He died on March 5, 1967. For fear that
his grave might become the site of political manifestations, he was allowed no
funeral, and was buried underneath the floorboards of a room in his house.
The `Settlement'
And the oil? The British, eager to maintain an aura of legitimacy, did not
take over everything, but moved, with others, into an international "consortium,"
230
which was designated as the contract agent for NIOC. In the consortium, British
Petroleum had 40%, five American oil companies made up another 40%, and the
rest was divided up among the Compagnie Française des Petroles and Royal
Dutch/Shell. The negotiations, led by the United States, since the British had been
so discredited, were handled by Herbert Hoover, then a special U.S. representative
within the State Department. The agreement, reached in August 1954, then ratified
by the Majlis and Okayed by the Shah, gave the consortium power over operations
and exports, through trading companies set up by the single members. Formally
speaking, the assets were said to belong to Iran, although that turned out to be an
empty formula. Two Iranians were allowed to be directors of two operating
companies. The NIOC, which still existed in name, as the Iranian entity, was
allowed access to financial and technical information, and Iranian personnel were
to receive training. The revenues Iran was to receive were much greater than
earlier: The profits were to be divided 50:50, as was the norm by that time in the
oil business. The British came out on top, although their monopoly had been
whittled down to 40%; BP was paid for losses, by both Iran and the other
consortium members, and was compensated by the British government through tax
breaks. Over the years, the Shah began to demand a greater share in his own
country's riches. Through the Iran Petroleum Act of 1957, the country established
the right to open up new kinds of contracts with foreign companies, including joint
ventures, and contracts for explorations done by the foreign entity. Later, Iran
entered state-to-state deals, often on a complicated barter basis, whereby it gained
increasing independence from the international oil companies. It was in response
to this move toward independence that key financial-political interests in the West,
especially under the Carter Administration, moved to support forces seeking to
overthrow the Shah.
231
Reference
1. Eden, Anthony, Memoirs: Full circle; Mc Ghee George, Envoy. And Recollections; Louis
British Empire, and chapter 9 and 11.
2. Richard Cottom’s first-hard witness in Lapping, End of Empire.
3. C.M Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London, Granda,1982): see also Kermit Roosevelt,
Countercoup The struggle for the control of Iran ( New York : Mc Graw- Hill, 1979), Lapping,
End of Empire; Gasiriowski, the 1953 Coup.
4. “Notghha va Maktobat Dr.Mossadeq”and “Mossadeq Memoirs”
5. Gholamreza Nejati “Jonbesh Melli Shodan” Tehran 1985, Mossadeq Memoirs,Vol II
6. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II chapter 7
7. ibid Vol II and chapters 2, 7
8. ibid Vol II and chapters 2, 7
9. Niroy seoam (Newspaper) February 26, 1934
10. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II chapter 2, 7
11. ibid Vol II
12. ibid Vol II
13. Etlaat, March 14, 1952 and Gholamreza Nejati “Jonbesh Melli Shodan Naf” Tehran 1985;and
Bakaie “Che Kasi Monharef shod”
14. Gholamreza Rahmani “Kohne Sarbaz” Tehran 1988
15.Bakaie “Ankeh Goft Nah”
16. Lapping, End of Empire
17. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II
18. Homa Katouzian “political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” Tehran 1981
19. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II
20. Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East
Terror (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 105..
21. Francis J. Gavin, Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953, p. 58.
232
22. Ibid., p. 80.
23. Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution (Chicago: Lake View
Press, 1982), p. 66.
24. Dr. Donald N. Wilber, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran," written March 1954,
published October 1969.
25. "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953," CIA archives,
iranonline.com
26. The Secrets of History. The CIA in Iran," New York Times, April 16, 2000.
27. CIA archives, op. cit.
28. Appendix B: "London" Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan," Wilber, op. cit.
29. Kinzer, op. cit., p. 7.
30. Wilber, op. cit.
31. Kinzer, op. cit.
32. CIA archives, V, p. 37. See Wilber, Appendix B for planned anti-Mossadeq propaganda. It
was to "hammer out the following themes: (a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR.
(This will be supported by black documents.) (b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he
associates with Tudeh . . . etc."
33. Zabih, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
34. Shaban the Brainless met with Kermit Roosevelt, and offered 300-400 of his gangsters,
promising they would beat up or fire upon anyone they were told to. All they needed was money
and weapons.
35. Riahi was asked by McClure what the position of the army was. He responded: "Iran and its
people are more important than the Shah or any government. The army is of the people and will
be supported by the people."
36. Abbas Milani, "Hurley's Dream," Hoover Institution, Hoover Digest, 2003, No. 3. Hurley
reported on a long discussion he had with Roosevelt, as the latter was leaving Tehran.
37. Kinzer, op. cit., p. 193