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Airfield Development and Activities Behindthe Lines

RECONSTRUCTION OFTHE AIRFIELDS2

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from U. S. Pacific Fleet,Base Development Plan, Iwo Jima, TF 51 AR;TF 52 AR; TF 56 AR; TF 56 TQM Rpt ; TF56 Air Rpt ; TF 56 Med Rpt, dtd 28Mar45 ;VAC SAR ; VAC C-1 PerRpts; VAC C-3 Rpt ;VAC C-4 Jnl; VAC Logistics Rpt; VACNGF and AirRpts ; 3d MarDiv G-1 PerRpts ;3d MarDiv G-4 Per Rpts, 27Feb-lApr45 ; 3dMarDiv G-4 Jnl, 23Feb-8Apr45, hereafter 3dMarDiv ~G-4 Jnl; 4th MarDiv D-4 Rpts; 5thMarDiv Casualty Rpts ; 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ;5th MarDiv SerTrps UJnl, 19Feb-8Mar45,hereafter 5th MarDiv SerTrps UJn1 ; 5th SPRgt AR; ComPhibGru 2 AR ; Iwo Comments ;Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; Newcomb, Iwo Jima ;Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World WarII ; Craven and Cate, The Pacific ; Gallant, TheFriendly Dead ; Carter, Beans, Bullets, andBlack Oil ; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ;Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chem-ical Warfare Service : The Technical Services-U. S. Army in World War II-Chemicals inCombat (Washington : Office of the Chief ofMilitary History, Department of the Army,1966), hereafter Kleber and Birdsell, Chemi-cals in Combat ; Leo P. Brophy and George J .B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service : TheTechnical Services-U. S. Army in WorldWar II-Organizing for War (Washington :Office of the Chief of Military History, De-partment of the Army, 1959), hereafterBrophy and Fisher, Organizing for War ;David E . Lilienthal, The Journals of David E .Lilienthal, The Atomic Years, 1945-1950, v . II(New York : Harper and Row, 1964), hereafterLilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years ; Depart-ment of the Navy, Building the Navy's Basesin World War II, v. II (Washington : U. S .Government Printing Office, 1947) ; William594

CHAPTER 8

While three Marine divisions wereinching their way northward againsttenacious resistance, an equally difficultbattle was being fought to the rear ofthe combat troops . Aside from the Japa-nese who, particularly during the earlydays of the operation, were able toblanket any part of the island withartillery and mortar fire, the biggestenemy was the time factor . The basicpremise on which the entire operationhad been planned was to secure the twosouthernmost airfields on the island asquickly as possible, and it was for thispurpose that Marines up front werehourly giving their lives . Unless the air-fields could be quickly put into opera-tion, the sacrifice of these Marines wouldserve little, if any, purpose .On D plus 5, men of the 31st Naval

Construction Battalion, commanded byLieutenant Commander Dominick J .Ermilio, began work on the southernairfield . This job initially had been as-signed to the 133d Naval Construction

Bradford Huie, From Omaha to Okinawa(New York : E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc .,1945) .'Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 31st NCB AR : 1st JASCO OpRpt,Iwo Jima, 27Nov44-19Mar45, hereafter 1stJASCO OpRpt ; 2d Sep Eng Bn URpts, 25-Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 2d Sep EngBn URpts ;3d JASCO AR, Iwo Jima, 7Nov44-16Mar45,hereafter 3d JASCO AR; 2d Bomb DisposalCo. UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19iFeb-22Mar45, hereafter2d Bomb Disposal Co UJnl .

AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE LINES

Battalion under Lieutenant CommanderRaymond P. Murphy, but the battalionhad suffered such heavy casualties onD-Day that it was still undergoing re-organization four days later . While, tothe north, the battle for Airfield No . 2was in progress, the Seabees, withriflemen covering them, were crawlingup the runway of No . 1 Airfield onhands and knees, probing for mines andpicking up the most jagged shell frag-ments that could wreak havoc with therubber tires of aircraft.Throughout the day, the Seabees and

elements of the VAC 2d SeparateEngineer Battalion, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Charles 0. Clark,sifted the dirt on the runways, oftenunder enemy sniper and artillery fire .By late afternoon of 25 February, the^,ngineers had filled, bladed, and rolled1,500 feet of the north-south runwayof Airfield No. 1, which was then readyfor use by small aircraft . This was thescene that took place at the airfield onthe following day

Down on Airfield No. 1 the first planescame in, two little OY-1s of the 4th Divi-sion (VMO-4), their wheels kicking upspurts of dust as they touched down .Dirty engineers and Seabees lined therunway and cheered as the little spotterplanes rolled to a stop. The Grasshoppers(Stinson Sentinels), or "Maytag Messer-schmitts," stayed only a few minutes andthen took off again, to fly over TurkeyKnob and the Amphitheater to spot tar-gets for the 4th Division. As they left,the first of the 133d Seabees' rollers andscrapers climbed up onto the runway.After a week of fighting, and heavy casu-alties, and reorganization, the 133d wasready to start on the job it had come for .'

' Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 193-194 .

595

Once the first spotter aircraft hadflown in from the escort carrier WakeIsland, others followed in rapid succes-sion. By 1 March, 16 planes of VMO-4and -5 had reached the island . Since theairstrip was still under enemy artilleryand mortar fire, many of the smallplanes sustained damage which had tobe patched up in frantic efforts . Of theseven aircraft which VMO-4 broughtashore, six eventually were so badlydamaged that they had to be surveyedafter the end of the operation .

Completion of the first 1,500-footstrip of Airfield No . 1 was but the ini-tial step in the restoration of the entirefield. The 2d Separate Engineer Bat-talion was charged with the recon-struction of the north-south and north-west-southeast runways, while the 62dNaval Construction Battalion, com-manded by Lieutenant CommanderFrank B. Campbell, was responsible forrebuilding the northeast-southwest run-way. Quarries available on the islandyielded an excellent sand-clay fill thatcould be used for the construction ofroads and was widely utilized inrehabilitating and extending AirfieldNo. 1. In fact, it was the use of thismaterial that had made possible theearly completion of the short strip forthe land-based observation planes .

Good progress was made in restoringthe airfield, except for the hours ofdarkness and those times when theenemy took the field under fire . On thelast day of February, Airfield No . 1invited emergency landings by carrieraircraft. This offer was promptly ac-cepted by a damaged torpedo bomber .From this time on, the popularity of

596

WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

HOLY COMMUNION during Mass atop Mt. Suribachi. (USMC 110322)

FIRST MARINE OBSERVATION PLANE lands on Motoyama Airfield No. 1 (USMC110595)


597

the airfield among carrier pilots rapidlyincreased. By 2 March, a 4,700-footrunway had been completed and thefirst air transport, a R4D of AirEvacuation Squadron 2, departed with12 wounded Marines on board. Notingincreased activity on the newly restoredairfield, the enemy concentrated hisartillery fire on the strip. For theremainder of the day, the field remainedinoperative, but subsequent evacuationflights became an almost daily occur-rence without any further serious enemyinterference .

A new milestone was reached duringthe afternoon of 4 March, when a B-29bomber, returning from an air attackagainst the Japanese homeland, made aforced landing, refueled, and continuedon its return flight. This was only thefirst of hundreds of the giant B-29swhich were to make emergency land-ings on the island for the remainderof the war .

As early as 28 February, planes ofthe Army Air Forces 9th Troop Car-rier Squadron had dropped more than9,000 pounds of supplies near the west-ern beaches . Beginning 1 March, air-drops were made over the southern air-field. The cargo dropped consisted ofbadly needed 81mm mortar shells,medical supplies, radio gear, and mail .Work on the two short runways wascompleted on 4 March . On this date, thefirst Marine transport, a R5C, pilotedby Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S . Mac-kay, commanding VMR-952, landed onthe island. The aircraft, carrying 5,500pounds of badly needed mortar shellsand ammunition from Guam, had stop-ped at Saipan before continuing theflight to Iwo . Once Airfield No . 1 had

• TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec E, p . 15 .

become operational, a variety of air-craft could be brought into the island .The value of Iwo Jima was furtherenhanced when, on 12 March, the 5,800-foot strip was completed . By this time,landings and takeoffs on Airfield No . 1had become a daily occurrence .

In addition to the aircraft using thesouthern airfield for bringing in sup-plies and evacuating the wounded,fighter planes were needed to assist theground forces fighting on Iwo . Theirmission was both an offensive and adefensive one. On the one hand, thefighters had to give the closest supportpossible to Marines fighting on theground. Their second mission, of no lessimportance, was to make continuoussweeps over Japanese islands in thevicinity of Iwo to preclude any reinfor-cement of the Iwo garrison, and at thesame time to eliminate any Japaneseair power still remaining in the Bonins .Above all, the enemy had to be pre-vented from interfering with theprogress of the Iwo ground operationor with the numerous supply shipsstanding by offshore .

During the first two weeks of the IwoJima operation, Colonel Vernon E .Megee acted as the Commander, Land-ing Force Air Control Unit. In thiscapacity, he came ashore on 24 Februarybut did not assume control of supportaircraft until 1 March, at which timehe also became Commander Air, IwoJima. The establishment of these func-tions ashore greatly facilitated coordi-nation and control of fire support forVAC,¢ particularly since Colonel Megee,using forward observers, developed a

598

system of close air support controlledfrom VAC Headquarters . ,'

This proved to be a very busy timefor the representative of Marine avia-tion, who was to reminisce later

You see, I had a dual status there really .In fact, I stayed Commander there even-let me see, we were supposed to have anAir Force Brigadier for that job but henever showed up until a couple of weeksafter the landing and during the interimI was the Air Commander, Iwo Jima . . . .And I had air defense responsibility andthe logistical responsibilities during thattime so I was like the proverbial paperhanger with the itch .'

On 6 March, Brigadier General ErnestMoore, USA, arrived on Iwo to as-sume his duties as air commander . Withhim came an initial complement of 28P-51 Mustang fighters and 12 P-61Black Widow night fighters of the 15thFighter Group . On 8 and 9 March, theforward echelon of VMTB-242 ar-

' Rogers ltr.8 Gen Vernon E. Megee interview with Hist-

Div, HQMC, dtd 17May67 (Oral History Col-lection, HistDiv, HQMC), p . 32 . According toUSAF historical sources, "On 10 January1945 General Moore recommended that ColonelMegee (as Landing Force Commander, AirSupport Control Unit) would continue to actas the Landing Force Aircraft Commanderduring the assault phase at Iwo until thearrival of the designated Landing Force Air-craft Commander, namely Moore. He statedthat Colonel Magee concurred in the plan sinceit would provide unity and continuity of com-mand. Moore also pointed out that he wouldbe needed on Guam to get aircraft prepared togo forward as scheduled, and it would be moreimportant for him to do this than to be onIwo during the assault phase . . . . On 6 March,General Moore led the air echelon of the 15thFighter Group to Iwo Jima, and upon arrivalthere promptly assumed the Air Commanderduty. Air Force Comment .


rived from Tinian . This squadron, com-manded by Major William W. Dean,began to fly air defense missions aroundIwo Jima day and night . Based on thesouthern airfield, the bomber squadronalso relieved carrier aircraft of anti-submarine patrol missions . After 23days of well executed and strenuousoperations, the Support Carrier Groupdeparted from Iwo .7On 11 March, 15 of the Iwo-based

P-51 fighters launched their first attackagainst nearby Chichi Jima . This wasonly the first raid of many to follow .Throughout the assault and occupationphase, Army Air Forces bombers basedin the Marianas conducted day andnight raids against Haha and ChichiJima with two raids being directedagainst enemy positions on Iwo Jimain general support of our forces . Air-craft from the Support Carrier Group,while it was still in the Iwo area, inaddition to their numerous daily localcommitments, also flew several strikesagainst Haha and Chichi Jima . Oncethe southern airfield became oper-ational, an increasingly large numberof B-29s sought refuge on the islandwhile returning from raids over Japan,often in a precarious condition . By 14March, D plus 23, 24 of the giantbombers had made emergency landingson the island ' s often under the verynoses of the enemy still holding out innorthern Iwo.

Even as Airfield No . 1 was becomingoperational and the number of aircraftusing its facilities increased, first stepswere under way to restore the second

' TF 56 AR, Encl F, p . 4 .8 ComPhibGru 2 AR, pp . 9-10,


599

B-29 SUPERFORTRESS, the first of many, makes emergency landing on Iwo Jima .(USAF 57013 AC)

4TH MARINE DIVISION observation post near wrecked enemy aircraft at northernend of Motoyama Airfield No . 1 . (USMC 110251)

600

airfield. Since the field, shortly to be-come known as the Central Airfield,was still under enemy fire during thelatter part of February and earlyMarch, little could be done by way ofactual reconstruction. As a first step,an abundance of mines and booby traps,which the enemy had left behind, hadto be cleared, an unenviable task thatwas handled by the 2d Bomb DisposalCompany, a Marine unit specializingin the removal of mines and duds .The company had already performeda similar job creditably at the southernairfield before restoration could getunder way. By 16 March, the CentralAirfield had been restored to a pointwhere it also became operational . Itfeatured one strip graded to 5,200 feet,another to 4,800 feet . 9As the assault phase on Iwo Jima

came to a close, attention turned to theexecution of plans for the developmentof the island as an important air base .To this end, once the objective was se-cured, a naval construction brigade wasorganized and additional constructionunits were employed. Original plans forthe development of Iwo Jima had calledfor three airfields and installations toaccommodate the garrison . The fieldswere to be designed to handle up to 90B-29s daily, as well as five groups ofescort fighters . The Central Airfield wasto be utilized for staging Superfort-resses en route from the Marianas toJapan. Airfields No . 1 and 3 were toserve fighters and smaller bombers. Al-ternate plans, however, were more am-bitious than the earlier ones and even-tually it was anticipated that the Cen-10 Ibid., p . 596.s Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p. 595 .

'Ibid., p . 521 .

tral Field would be turned into one hugecomplex featuring two B-29 strips, twofighter strips, and a combat service cen-ter. It was finally decided that once theisland was secured, the North and Cen-tral Fields would be combined, coveringmore than four square miles, just abouthalf of the surface of the island . 1 p

In rebuilding the Iwo Jima airfields,the engineers ran into complex andexasperating problems . Because of therecent volcanic origin of Iwo, layingout the runways or putting in subsur-face gasoline lines became a very diffi-cult undertaking when steam pockets orsulphur laden crevasses were encoun-tered. Construction of runways on thevolcanic rock also posed a major prob-lem and it became necessary to put thenaval construction units on a scheduleof two 10-hour shifts daily ."

By mid-July, the first B-29 runwayhad been paved to its full length of9,800 feet. The second strip had beengraded to 9,400 feet by the end of thewar but was never resurfaced. The oldrunway, running from west to east, be-came a 6,000-foot fueling strip. Thefighter strip on Number 1 Airfield waseventually paved to 6,000 feet and wasequipped with 7,940 feet of taxiwaysand 258 hardstands . The rough terrainin the area of the northern strip de-layed construction, so that by the endof the war it had been paved to 5,500feet for the use of fighters ; in addition,some 10,000 feet of taxiway had beengraded. Two large tank farms and fa-cilities at each field took care of thesupply of fuel .



The utilization of Iwo Jima as afighter base was to be greatly affectedby the overall war situation . The reduc-tion of enemy air strength in Japanproper proceeded so rapidly during thelate spring and early summer of 1945that in time fighter escorts from Iwowere no longer required for the B-29s .Nevertheless, some 1,191 escort sortieswere to be flown from Iwo, as well as3,081 strike sorties against enemy tar-gets in Japan . 12 The primary use towhich the airfields on the island wereput was as an intermediate landingpoint, particularly for big B-29s in dis-tress. By the time the war came to anend, about 2,400 of the giant bombershad made emergency landings on Iworunways, involving a total of 25,000airmen.

LOGISTICS, REAR INSTALLA-TIONS, AND NEWS COVERAGE13

A combination of enemy fire, deepvolcanic ash, and heavy surf resultedin grave supply problems during theIwo Jima operation. The early phase, inparticular, became a nightmare for theNavy beach parties and the Marineshore parties. In the days following the

'~ Air Force Comment .39 Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 3d EngBn AR; 3d Pioneer BnURpt, 25Feb-26Mar45, hereafter 3d PioneerBn URpt ; 4th MedBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-Mar45, hereafter 4th MedBn OpRpt; 4th SerBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-19Mar45, here-after 4th SerBn OpRpt ; 5th Eng Bn UJnl, IwoJima, 19Feb-24Mar45, hereafter 5th EngBnUJn1 ; 5th MedBn UJn1, Iwo Jima, 27Feb-18Mar45, hereafter 5th MedBn UJnI ; 5thPioneer Bn UJn1, Iwo Jima, 7-23Jul45, here-after 5th Pioneer Bn UJnl.

601

initial landings, the main emphasis wason meeting the urgent requirements ofthe combat troops . The supplies broughtashore in LVTs and DUKWs often weresent directly inland without any re-handling on the beaches. For the firstfive days, until roads capable of sup-porting wheeled vehicles could be uti-lized, LVTs, DUKWs, and the versatileWeasels took care of transporting thebulk of supplies from the beaches to theinland dumps.

The landing of ammunition and sup-plies took place under extremely diffi-cult conditions . Heavy swells causedextensive broaching of landing craft .With each wave, boats were pickedup bodily and thrown broadside ofthe beach, where succeeding wavesswamped and broached numerous land-ing craft. Other craft in successionhit the wrecks already beginning to pileup on the beaches until considerablewreckage had accumulated . The LSTsand LSMs sent to the beaches once thebeachhead was secured also had greatdifficulty in keeping from broaching .Tugs were in constant attendance totow them clear. Since unloading con-tinued day and night, the beach partieshad to work around the clock .

In order to facilitate getting suppliesto the combat troops, Marston mattingand armored bulldozers were utilizedon the beaches. The matting was oftremendous value in overcoming theobstacle created by the soft volcanicash on the landing beaches . The ar-mored bulldozers, equipped with steelplates to protect both the driver and themachine, were employed on the beachesto level sand terraces and carve out

602

exits . When fighting shifted to thenorthern part of the island, severalbulldozers were used to cut roadsthrough the rocky gorges characteristicof northern Iwo, notably in the 5th Ma-rine Division zone of advance .

In discussing the value of the Mars-ton matting and the armored bull-dozers, the Commander of the AttackForce Beach Party Group, Captain CarlE. Anderson, USNR, pointed out thatthese two items of equipment

. . . contributed materially to the suc-cess of the landing and the moving ofheavy equipment off the beaches, whichcould not have otherwise been accom-plished without almost insurmountablehardship."

The pioneer battalions were the basiccomponent of their respective divisionshore parties . The 133d and 31st NavalConstruction Battalions provided equip-ment operators and cargo handlers forthe 4th and 5th Marine Divisions . Inaddition, the Army's 442d and 592dPort Companies, assigned to the 4thand 5th Divisions respectively, and Ma-rine service and supply units were givenspecial tasks within the shore partyorganizations . Invaluable service wasalso rendered by the three Army DUKWcompanies which, like the port com-panies, were Negro units. Replacementdrafts furnished the largest source oflabor for ships platoons and shore de-tails, though their subsequent integra-tion into the depleted combat units leftmuch to be desired. As of D plus 3,units of the 8th Field Depot wentashore and were assigned to assist thedivisional shore parties, which were be-

"RAdm Carl E. Anderson ltr to CMC, dtd26Nov52, in Iwo Comments .


coming depleted from casualties andfatigue .

There were slow but steady signs ofprogress. On D plus 6, the day thatGeneral Erskine launched his drive upthe center of Iwo, engineers of the 5thMarine Division began the operation ofthe first water distillation plant on theWest coast. Cognizant of the geologicalcharacteristics that were peculiar to theisland, the engineers drove intake pipesinto the natural springs . The wateremerging from the ground was so hotthat it had to be cooled with sea water .One of the first amenities of civiliza-tion, the hot shower, thus became awelcome arrival on the island .

On the same day, the VAC ShoreParty assumed control of all shoreparty activities, a further indicationthat the situation on the beaches wasstabilizing. The general unloading ofcargo ships on the eastern beaches nowgot under way . As large quantities ofsupplies began to reach the shore, itsoon became evident that additionalbeaches on the west coast of the islandwould have to be utilized. Preliminarysurveys had indicated that conditionson the west coast were suitable forbeaching LCTs and smaller craft . ByD plus 8, beach exits and roads hadbeen constructed on western Iwo. Si-multaneously, a number of beaches, de-signated as Purple, Brown, White, andOrange, were established .

The Japanese, increasingly compelledto watch the beehive of activity alongthe eastern shore in helpless frustra-tion, saw an opportunity to interferewith operations on the western beaches .On 1 March, an ammunition resupplyship, the Columbia Victory, was ap-


proaching the west coast with a cargoof artillery ammunition when mortarfire from Kama and Kangoku Rocks,as well as northwestern Iwo, bracketedthe vessel. One shell exploded so closeto the ship that it wounded one manand caused light damage to the vessel .Anxious eyes were watching the Japa-nese artillery fire, including those ofGenerals Holland Smith and Schmidt,who viewed the action from VACheadquarters on the west beach . Morethan the loss of a ship was involved .If the Columbia Victory's cargo of am-munition blew up, the entire west coastof Iwo could go with it, along withthousands of Marines working on thebeaches. Keenly aware of the danger,the cargo ship reversed course and,miraculously evading additional nearmisses, headed back out to the opensea .15

As a result of enemy interference,the western beaches could not be openeduntil D plus 11, when Purple 2 wentinto operation . By 3 March, all assaultshipping had been unloaded and retiredfrom Iwo Jima, and Garrison ForceZero began to discharge its cargo . Thiselement consisted of troops of the garri-son force, commanded by Major GeneralJames E . Chaney, USA . The Zero eche-lon had been embarked in additionalshipping to arrive at the objective oncall after the assault ships, but priorto the first echelon garrison ships . 16General Chaney, together with his staffand elements of the Army's 147th In-fantry Regiment and men of the 7thFighter Command, had already gone

'~ CominCh 1-9 .TF 56 TQM Rpt, p . 6.

603

ashore on D plus 8 as the advanceechelon of Army ground and aviationtroops that would play an importantpart in garrisoning the island. Mean-while, the Army 506th AntiaircraftBattalion, having landed on D plus 6,was firing its 90mm guns at Kama andKangoku Rocks off the west coast, fromwhich the enemy had harassed theColumbia Victory . Men of the 5th Ma-rine Division advancing up the westcoast had already become the target ofmortar and rocket fire from theseislets .

While the Marines in the front lineswere pitting their bodies against a crueland remorseless enemy, the battle tosave lives was being waged with equaldevotion in the rear. American skill atimprovisation, coupled with determina-tion and medical know-how, were des-tined to save many lives . On PurpleBeach on the west coast, a Navy evacu-ation hospital opened on the eveningof D plus 6 with a capacity of 200 beds .At the 4th Marine Division hospital,located at the northern tip of the south-ern airfield, 17 doctors, operating infour surgical teams, worked around theclock. The Army's 38th Field Hospital,consisting of 22 officers and 182 enlistedmen, came ashore on 25 February .Working together with the Navy med-ical facilities, it was to make a majorcontribution in providing medical careto the wounded in the days to come .Hospital facilities on Iwo were furthersupplemented when the 5th MarineDivision Hospital went into operationat the southern tip of Airfield No. 1 .

In order to provide the best possiblecare for the wounded, time was of theessence. This applied particularly to the

604

availability of blood at the companymedical aid stations . Blood plasma hadbeen used in earlier operations, whereits life-saving capabilities had alreadybecome legend. On Iwo Jima freshwhole blood, recently drawn on the westcoast of the United States, packed inice and airlifted directly to the scene ofaction was used with excellent effects .Initially, whole blood was flown in byseaplane to a base established nearMount Suribachi at the southeasterntip of Iwo. Use of the seaplane basecontinued until 8 March, at which timeit was decommissioned and the sea-planes, which had also been used toconduct rescues at sea, were returnedto Saipan .

Once the southern airfield becameoperational, whole blood was flown intoIwo by casualty evacuation planes. Upto D plus 25, a total of 960 pints hadbeen flown in. Additional supplies ofblood plasma were obtained from thehospital ships . Before the Iwo opera-tion came to a close, the Landing Forcehad used up 5,406 pints of whole blood .The total used for the care of the Iwocasualties up to this date amounted to12,600 pints . 17

Before the Iwo Jima operation ended,Army and Marine air transports, con-sisting of C-46s and C-47s, airdropped78 tons of supplies and delivered an-other 40 tons by air freight. The cargoplanes involved were from the ArmyAir Forces 9th Troop Carrier Squadronand Marine VMR-253, -353, and -952 . 18

17 HQ FMFPac MedRpt, Iwo Jima, dtd 28-Mar45, p. 19, hereafter FMFPac MedRpt .

' VAC Logistics Rpt. Encl A, pp . 16-23 .


On D plus 9, the hospital LSTs,which thus far had provided emergencytreatment for the wounded, were re-leased and left the area, fully loadedwith casualties . At this time, shore-based medical facilities took over thetask of caring for the wounded . Seriouscases were subsequently evacuated di-rectly from the beach to hospital shipsand transports. By D plus 14, morethan 9,500 casualties had been evacu-ated to rear areas by transports andhospital ships, not counting another 125evacuated by air . 19 Plans called for theevacuation of the wounded to Saipan,where 1,500 beds were available and toGuam, which had beds for 3,500 . 20From the Marianas, the casualties wereto be transported to Hawaii by suchsurface ships as were available and byair as the condition of the men per-mitted .

Part of the activities carried on inthe rear involved the collection andburial of the dead . This task was per-formed by service troops, often underextremely hazardous conditions, sincethe dead were in close proximity to thefront lines. Carrying parties often be-came the target of enemy small armsand mortar fire . The ever present spec-ter of death on Iwo Jima was to giverise to this description by a veteran ofthe battle

As the struggle in the dust of Iwo Jima,in the rocks and ravines, continued nightand day, the act of war became a monotonyof horror, a boredom of agony and death ;it became a way of life, a task, a burden,

19 Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 113 .TF 56 MedRpt, p . 3 .


a work that was repetitious, galling to thebody and mind .

Death was so commonplace as to bewithout interest to the living, for the liv-ing were resigned to it . They no longerexpected to survive. Fear was not of death,but of mutilation . And there was no endto this ; no end to mutilating wounds

Because of the heavy casualties dur-ing the Iwo operation, burial of thedead posed a special problem . Disposi-tion of the dead was the responsibilityof the 4th Marine Division burial offi-cer, Captain Lewis Nutting, who oc-cupied a dual position as VAC burialofficer. Headquarters personnel, andespecially members of the divisionband, performed this sad but necessaryduty, which in time became a never-ending chore, as outlined here

All day long, men carried litters to thefield and placed them in neat rows. Twomen passed along the rows, taking finger-prints, if the right index finger remained .Other men picked up one dog tag fromeach body, leaving the other for burial . Ifthere were neither hands nor dog tags,and often there were not, the teams triedto establish identification by means ofteeth, scars, tattoos, birthmarks, clothingstencils, jewelry, or uniform marks . Some-times there was so little left that it wasnecessary to ascertain which section ofthe battlefield the body came from in orderto determine to which unit the man hadbelonged.

When a row was ready, the bodies werewrapped in blankets or ponchos and placedin a trench. The bulldozer covered themwith 6 feet of Iwo Jima sand, and agrader spread clay on top to keep it fromblowing away. The sounds of battle off tothe north were ignored . Since D plus 3,Captain Nutting's unit had suffered five

'Gallant, The Friendly Dead, p. 164.

605

casualties of its own . Even in the ceme-tery there was no security .'

The Japanese, on their part, ap-peared reluctant to abandon their deadon the field, presumably not for senti-mental reasons but in order to keepthe advancing American forces frombecoming aware of the true extent ofthe enemy losses. As a result, fre-quently under cover of darkness, Japa-nese carrying parties sneaked into thebattle area and removed the dead .Where the disposition of bodies provedimpractical, the enemy burned his deador buried them in pillboxes .As the campaign progressed, the

efficiency of the landing force organiza-tion increased . Improved coordinationof air, naval gunfire, and artillery wasachieved through the VAC artillery of-ficer, Colonel John S . Letcher, who al-ready had worked out detailed guide-lines back in Hawaii with the 4th and5th Marine Divisions . 23 In close team-work with members of the LandingForce Air Support Control Unit and thecorps air and naval gunfire officers,Letcher screened requests for support-ing fires with members of the threedivision artillery regiments. Some ofthe members of this coordinating groupcontinued to function on board theAuburn even after corps headquartershad gone ashore on 24 February . Onthe other hand, Colonel Letcher left the

^3 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 254-255 .For a detailed account of the procedure

laid down for obtaining various types of ar-tillery and air support, and the sequence inwhich such type of support was to be re-quested by the infantry, see Letcher ltr .

606 WESTERN PACIFIC OPERATIONS

155MM GUN on Iwo Jima at moment of firing . (USMC 110636)

MARINE ROCKET TRUCKS furnishing fire support for advancing infantry . (USMC111100)


Auburn at 1430 that date and half anhour later went ashore, where he re-mained until the operation had ended.

Along with the demands of the situa-tion, there were changes in the organ-ization of the shipping that stood byoff Iwo Jima. A new type of logisticvessel, the small craft tender, was in-troduced here. This vessel was a self-propelled barracks ship, later desig-nated as the APB . Two of these vesselswere employed at Iwo Jima on an ex-perimental basis . Actually, the vesselswere LSTs converted to meet the needsof the numerous small craft employedaround the island with insufficient en-durance for long voyages and longperiods at objectives. In order to effec-tively support the small craft, the con-verted LSTs each carried about 225tons of frozen and dry provisions,120,000 gallons of water, and about235,000 gallons of fuel ; they had berth-ing facilities for 40 transient officersand 300 men, a sick bay for 14 patients,and messing arrangements for 750 menon a round-the-clock basis . The shipsserviced by these tenders at Iwo in-cluded destroyers, destroyer escorts,destroyer minesweepers, landing ships,minelayers, patrol and landing craft,minesweepers, submarine chasers, andrescue tugs. From 19 February through7 March, the two APBs refueled andrewatered 54 vessels and reprovisioned76 . 24

The above does not by far representthe total accomplishment of the two

' Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil,p. 290 .

607

vessels, whose performance was to leadto the following observation

Perhaps the best thing of all was theway the tenders mothered the landingboats and their crews . Many of these werecaught at the beach when their own shipsmoved out of sight. Many were tempo-rarily disabled, some lost . These tendersberthed a total of 2,500 officers and men,and fed 4,000 on the scale of one man,1 day. It was a great help to a tired andhungry boat crew to have a place to eatand sleep. The tenders did not carrylanding-craft spares or repair facilities .The principal part of the maintenanceand repair work at Iwo was done by 3landing ships (dock), 3 repair ships, 1diesel repair ship, and 1 landing-craftrepair ship. The job was no small one,totaling work on 30 landing ships (tank),3 destroyers, 5 attack transports, 1 netship, and numerous landing boats . It hasbeen said that every small boat used inlanding on beaches had sustained damageof some sort, many of them more thanonce. The LSDs worked 24 hours a day onrepairs. The divers of the repair shipspractically lived in diving suits from sun-rise to 10 or 11 o'clock at night clearingpropellers and doing underwater repairand salvage work .=°

An account of developments on andaround Iwo Jima would not be com-plete without mention of the 3d Ma-rines. This regiment, commanded byColonel James A . Stuart, constitutedthe Expeditionary Troops Reserve . Asearly as D plus 9, 28 February, bothGenerals Schmidt and Erskine had re-quested commitment of this reserve tolend impetus to the lagging drive upthe center of the island . 26 This requestwas made at a time when the landing

Ibid., pp . 290-291 .1 CTG 56.1 Dispatch to CTF 56, 1732, 28-

Feb45 .

608

force already had sustained cripplingcasualties, and the loss of manpower,coupled with exhaustion of the men,was beginning to seriously impair thecombat efficiency of all three Marinedivisions committed on Iwo Jima. De-spite the energetic efforts on the partof VAC to get the 3d Marines landed,General Holland Smith felt compelledto repeat the argument of AdmiralTurner, Commander of the Joint Ex-peditionary Force, that the number oftroops already ashore was sufficient tocomplete the capture of the island andthat the employment of an additionalregiment would only add to the con-gestion . 27 This contention was to bestrongly disputed by the VAC opera-tions officer who was to make thiscomment

It was my considered opinion while onIwo Jima, having visited all parts of theisland in our hands, and keeping in closetouch with the situation, that the 3d Ma-rine Regiment could have been landedwithout in any way overcrowding theisland. Commitment of this well trainedand experienced regiment would haveshortened the campaign and saved uscasualties .'

The pros and cons of committing the3d Marines were to spark a controversy

'According to the VAC chief of staff : "Iwas present when General Smith discussed thiswith General Schmidt, and to the best of myrecollection General Smith stated categoricallythat Admiral Turner would not release the 3dMarines unless General Schmidt stated that hecould not capture the island without them .This, of course, General Schmidt could not do ."Rogers ltr.

LtGen Edward A. Craig ltr to Head,HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d ., in IwoComments, hereafter Craig ltr .


that has remained unresolved morethan two decades later . Members of thelanding force still consider with bitter-ness that "commitment of a fresh regi-ment at that time would have cheeredup the exhausted troops ashore andwould have permitted the final captureof Iwo Jima in much less time and withfar fewer casualties ." 29 According toone analysis of the situation

The consequences of using battle re-placements rather than landing the infan-trymen of the Third Regiment and short-ening the fronts of the units in the lineare, in retrospect, evident. Completing theassault was delayed . Key personnel in thefront lines were unduly exposed, andcasualties relative to the resistance en-countered began to increase both amongregular infantrymen and among the battlereplacements .'

In almost all respects, the conversionof Iwo Jima into an American militarybase was influenced by the small physi-cal size of the island. There were nobuildings, roads, wooded areas, fields, orstreams. But above all, there was littleroom in the rear area, such as therewas. Always close to the front linesand never more than two or three milesto the rear, the airfields, gun positions,supply dumps, and troops occupiedvirtually every inch of the island .

The lack of space in the rear had itseffect as much on the location ofmedical facilities as it did on theheadquarters of the three divisionsoperating on the island and VAC head-quarters. The medical organizationsdispersed their units into such areas

Rogers ltr .'0 Isely and Crowl, U.S . Marines and Am-

phibious War, p . 528 .


609

AIR VIEW OF Iwo Jima beachhead on D plus 11. (USMC 112223)

SHORE PARTIES prepare to haul supplies to the front line . (USMC 109635)

610

as were allotted "and with the helpof the ubiquitous bulldozer literally dugthemselves a place on the island ."31Portable plywood operating rooms wereset up in holes in the ground and cov-ered with tarpaulins to keep out thedust and cold. The engineers built roofsover sunken water reservoirs whichmade good operating rooms. Wardtents were set up in airplane revet-ments or simply in long trenches bull-dozed in the ground . The electric lightswent in, the field surgical units wereset up, the blood bank moved ashore,and by the time the transports left, asystem of excellent surgical facilitieswas in operation .

In his memoirs, General HollandSmith recalled his impression of thecommand posts on Iwo Jima which hehad occasion to inspect

I went ashore every second day, callingon Harry Schmidt at V Corps Headquar-ters, or on Rockey, Cates, and Erskine attheir Command Posts, and going forwardto watch the progress of the fighting .None of these Command Posts was theHotel Splendide the invading generalseizes for himself and his staff in fictionalwar. Cates' post, overlooking the sea nearthe fortified quarry, was a knocked-outJapanese pillbox, where the smell of de-composing enemy dead, buried in theruins, grew more loathesome every day .Erskine, just south of Motoyama AirfieldTwo, occupied an abandoned Japanese gunemplacement, with a tarpaulin slung overa 4.7-inch dual purpose gun . Over on theleft, Rockey had a ramshackle place upagainst a cliff, where the Japanese hadbeen flushed out recently."

Supply of the landing force was ahighly complex operation . Thus, the

21 FMFPac MedRpt, p . 21 .' Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p . 267 .


average daily expenditure of artilleryammunition right up to the final phaseof the campaign, exceeded 23,000rounds daily. Enough ammunition ofvarious types was unloaded across thebeaches to fill 480 freight cars, plusenough food to feed the entire city ofColumbus, Ohio, for an entire month .33

Expressed in definite numbers, for thenaval bombardment alone the total ofammunition actually expended came toa staggering 14,650 tons . This amountwas divided into 2,400 rounds of 16-inch, weighing 2,280 tons ; 5,700 roundsof 14-inch, 3,640 tons ; 1,440 roundsof 12-inch, 520 tons ; 11,700 rounds of8-inch high capacity, 2,020 tons ; 8,400rounds of 6-inch high capacity, 440tons ; 152,000 rounds of 5-inch highcapacity, 4,160 tons ; 17,700 rounds of5-inch star, 300 tons ; 12,000 rounds of5-inch, 270 tons ; 10,000 rounds of4-inch, 145 tons ; and 70,000 rounds of4.2 mortar, 875 tons . 34

In addition to ammunition, an amaz-ing quantity of fuel and other itemswere to be required for the capture ofthe five-mile long island. These in-cluded : 4,100,000 barrels of black oil,595,000 barrels of diesel oil, 33,775,000gallons of aviation gasoline, and 6,703,-000 gallons of motor gas ; plus about28,000 tons of various types of ammu-nition ; 38 tons of clothing ; more than10,000 tons of fleet freight ; more than7,000 tons of ship supplies of rope, can-

" CG FMFPac, Arty Anx to Encl. G, IwoAR ; New York Times Editorial, 25Feb45, p .8E, columns 2-3, as cited in Isely and Crowl,U. S. Marines and Amphibious War, p . 517 ." Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil,

p. 289 .


vas, fenders, cleaning gear, and hard-ware ; approximately, 1,000 tons ofcandy ; toilet articles, stationary, andship's service canteen items ; and about14,500 tons of fresh, frozen, and dryprovisions .35

General Holland Smith himself wasto remark later "that the amount of ef-fort that had gone into the capture ofthe barren island was staggering . TheNavy had put more ammunition on IwoJima than anywhere else in the Pacific .Marine artillery expended 450,000shells and we used huge quantities ofmortar shells, grenades, and rockets ."36

Closely connected with the expendi-ture of ammunition by shore-basedartillery and naval gunfire was the AirSupport Control Unit, in charge of thecombat air and antisubmarine patrol .The unit was composed of Marine andNavy officers and Marine enlisted tech-nicians and operators . Here the crampedspace available on Iwo Jima was an ad-vantage. In this case, the unit was lo-cated only 75 feet from the LandingForce Command Post. As a result of thisproximity, troop requests for air sup-port could be handled much more expe-ditiously than before .

For the coordination of artillery fireand air strikes, a brief of each air strikewas broadcast over the Corps ArtilleryFire Direction Control Net. Each airstrike was given a number and infor-mation obtained on number and type ofaircraft, direction of approach and re-tirement, minimum altitude, and otherpertinent data . Each artillery battalionthus was able to control its fire so that

~' I bid ., p . 291 .'6 Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 275 .

611

it did not interfere with strikes. A com-plete cessation of artillery fire becamenecessary only once or twice when air-craft delivered a low-level napalmattack . 37

Progress in developing the island didnot stop with the construction of newfacilities . In some instances, the veryshape of the island had to be changedto meet the requirements of the newoccupants. Even Iwo's most outstand-ing landmark, Mount Suribachi, was tobe affected by these changes. The Armygarrison troops planned to get varioustrucks housing radar, weather, andnavigational equipment for the comingassault against the Japanese home is-lands on top of the mountain . Beforesuch plans could be realized, it becamenecessary to construct a road to thetop, a project that had never been re-alized by the Japanese. On D plus 15,construction of a two-lane road, 35 feetwide, got under way, winding its wayup and around the mountain for nearlya mile. Early the following morning,the first bulldozer drove into the craterat the top of Suribachi. The Japanese,a number of whom were still living in-side the mountain after surviving thebattle for Suribachi, were powerless tointerfere with the road construction .They stole out of their caves only atnight in search of food and water andwere methodically eliminated whenspotted .

In the midst of the multitude of sup-porting headquarters and units oper-ating on the island, there was a specialcomplement of men, neither whollymilitary or civilian, whose job it was

3' ComPhibGru 2 AR, Pt 5, pp . 1-2 .

612

to photograph the action on the islandor write about it . They were represen-tatives of American and Allied newsservices, radio networks, and localnewspapers. The news reporters weregiven the widest possible latitude incovering the operation and thus couldbe found among the invasion force, inthe landing boats, and occasionally inthe foxholes .

In addition to the accredited civiliancorrespondents, each of the militaryservices had its own news writers andphotographers, including a specialNavy film crew which recorded theentire operation on color film . Radioteletype equipment was set up on thebeaches for the benefit of the press, anda Navy floatplane was made availableto carry copy, photographs, and news-reels directly to Guam, where this ma-terial was processed and flown back tothe United States. Another precedentwas established when, on D plus 7, Ad-miral Turner and General Holland M .Smith were interviewed on Iwo Jima ina live broadcast while the battle wasstill raging on the island .

The events on the battlefield receivedwide coverage and distribution inAmerican newspapers and magazines .None of the ferocity of the fighting waswithheld from the American public . Ascasualties mounted and the full impactof the cost in lives expended to securethe island began to hit home, plaintivevoices arose to question the need forsuch a bloodletting. Then as now, sin-cere and serious-minded Americans, ap-palled witnesses to the savage fightingthey could not stem, groped for a wayout, at least a more inexpensive way to


subdue the enemy. Among the expedi-ents suggested was the employment oftoxic gas .

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINSTCHEMICAL WARFARE38

Unknown to the public at large,the employment of chemical warfareagents in the Pacific Theater had al-ready undergone active considerationwhile the Iwo operation was still in theplanning stage . Through collaborationwith the Office of Strategic Services,forerunner of the Central IntelligenceAgency, a special report had been com-piled on the subject of gas warfareon Iwo Jima . 30 Its primary feature wasthe recommendation that Japanesetransmitters on the island be jammed .Once the enemy's communications hadbeen rendered inoperable and he wasisolated, the entire island was to be in-undated with gas . In late June 1944, thedirector of Research and Development,OSS, had made a special trip to Hawaiito discuss the project with AdmiralNimitz .

The difficulties of employing gas war-fare were twofold, both technical andmoral. During the early part of WorldWar II, the United States had thought

~'Additional material in this section is de-rived from : Frederic J. Brown III, ChemicalWarfare, A Study in Restraint (Princeton :Princeton University Press, 1968), hereafterBrown, Chemical Warfare .I A chapter dealing with this matter, known

as the Lethbridge Report, appears in the recol-lections of Stanley P . Lovell, former Directorof Research and Development, OSS, in hismemoirs entitled : Of Spies and Strategems(Englewood Cliffs, N . J . : Prentice-Hall, 1963),pp. 70-78 .


of the use of toxic gases only as aretaliatory measure . In this connection,the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb wasconsidered by chemical warfare officersas the most suitable munition for retali-ation. The peak stock of this item at-tained in the Pacific Theater in July1944 was 15,244 bombs with 541 .2 tonsof toxic filling. In the words of a chem-ical warfare service officer

This supply was token only . If, for ex-ample, this entire supply had been usedon Iwo Jima, which had an area of sevenand one-half square miles, it would onlyhave contaminated a little more than half,or four and one half square miles . Consid-ering the vapor effect of mustard and thefact that the entire island would not havebeen regarded as a target, the stockwould have been sufficient for one contami-nation. In the opinion of most chemicalofficers one contamination would have beenenough to end all enemy resistance on theisland. The question of resupply for otherobjectives would then arise ."

The second difficulty in employingchemical warfare against the Japanesecould be found in the attitude of mostof the nation's civilian and militaryleaders. In fact, military reluctance touse this weapon had its origin in theexperiences of the American Expedi-tionary Forces in World War I . In con-nection with the possible employmentof toxic gas on Iwo Jima, General Hol-land Smith made this comment

:1 am not prepared to argue this ques-tion. Certainly, gas shells smothering theisland, or gas introduced into caves andtunnels would have simplified our task,but naturally the use of this prohibitedweapon was not within the power of afield commander . The decision was on a

" Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat,pp. 269-270 .

613

higher level. It was in the hands of theAllied Powers, who alone could authorizeits use in a war which would have as-sumed even more frightful proportionshad gas been allowed ."

In the end, it was the Chief Execu-tive of the United States who had afinal voice in approving or disapprovingthe entire plan . Regardless of theirdivergent political views, both HerbertHoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt inthe years between the two world warshad been in favor of eliminating gas asa military weapon. In 1937, when veto-ing a bill that would have changed thedesignation of the Army ChemicalWarfare Service to that of ChemicalCorps, the President had expressed hisviews on this subject in no uncertainterms

It has been and is the policy of thisGovernment to do everything in its powerto outlaw the use of chemicals in war-fare. Such use is inhuman and contrary towhat modern civilization should standfor"

One of the official Army histories deal-ing with chemical warfare has pointedout in this connection that "gas war-fare had no advocates in high places ." 43While this may have been true duringthe early years of World War II, thereis some evidence that, as of early 1945,the atmosphere in Washington has be-gun to shift in favor of chemical war-fare . 44 Another reason for increased

41 Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, p. 276 ." Veto msg of Bill S.1284, as cited in Brophy

and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 21-22 ." Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat,

p. 653."In Brown, Chemical Warfare, the author

attributes this change to three factors : Ger-many's imminent collapse, removing the last

614

American readiness to accept initiationof chemical warfare towards the finalphase of the war may be found in theextremely heavy American casualtiessustained in the Western Pacific . Noneother than General of the Army GeorgeC . Marshall was to testify after the warhad ended that "following the terriblelosses at Iwo Jima, he was prepared touse gas at Okinawa."45

It is interesting to note that, at thesame time that American views towardsthe employment of gas offensively be-came more aggressive, the Japanese pol-icy shifted in the opposite direction .With the loss of the Marianas in thespring and summer of 1944, the homeislands had suddenly become extremelyvulnerable to American chemical attack .In the firm belief that the UnitedStates would not initiate gas warfare,and since Japanese ability to retaliatewas in any case too low, Japan, in mid-1944 :

. . . decided to discontinue productionof toxic agents and to recall all stocks ofgas munitions from the hands of troopsin the field. Thus, in mid-1944, theJapanese started a policy of disarmament .Readiness spiraled downward until hos-tilities ended ."

Thus we are faced with the strangespectacle of a hostile nation, pledgedto fight to the death, and confrontedby an immense military machine, dis-

Axis possibility of retaliating with gas againstan Allied population ; President Roosevelt'sdeath; and the over-riding importance ofbringing the war against Japan to a speedyconclusion .

"Quoted in Lilienthal, The Atomic EnergyYears, p . 199 .

10 Brown, Chemical Warfare, p . 260 .


mantling its limited chemical warfareapparatus as operations reached theirclimax. Stranger still, Japanese reason-ing apparently was based on the de-clared policy of the United States notto initiate gas warfare. The Japanesefailed to consider that, given differenttime and circumstances, such a policymight be subject to change .

With present knowledge, not avail-able to Allied planners in 1944, it be-comes clear that by the time the IwoJima operation got underway, Japanwas no longer in a position to retaliatewith chemical means in response to Al-lied action, with one minor exception 4 7All that prevented the employment ofgas on Iwo Jima was the President'saversion to gas warfare . Even thoughthe United States had not signed anyinternational instrument outlawingsuch warfare, national policy clearlylimited the conditions under whichtoxic gas might have been introduced .In consequence of this policy, heavycasualties to the contrary, Marineswould continue to assault Iwo Jima withrifle, hand grenade, and flamethrowersuntil all resistance had been overcome .In a matter of roughly three weeks

from D-Day, Iwo Jima had been trans-formed from a strongpoint in the Japa-nese defense system to an importantAmerican air base of strategic and tac-

""The Japanese troops on Iwo Jima hadbeen supplied with glass containers-I supposethey could be called gas grenades-which wasliquid hydrogen cyanide . These containers ofclear glass were a little larger than a baseball .When the container was broke the liquid re-leased cyanide gas. These could have beeneffective if they had been used inside pillboxesor caves or other closed spaces." Letcher ltr.


tical importance to the overall air of-fensive against Japan . The capture anddevelopment of the island denied itsuse to the enemy and at the same timeit served as an emergency haven for air-craft returning from raids againstJapan. In American hands, Iwo Jimarepresented an advance base for searchand reconnaissance . It further pro-vided a base within fighter range ofJapan. Furthermore, the island couldbe utilized as a staging point for bomb-ers, permitting greater bomb loads inlieu of gasoline, though the island wasnot much used for this purpose 4 8 IwoJima could also become a refuellingstop for short-range aircraft en routeto bases closer to Japan yet to be seizedbefore the general assault against the

I Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p . 597.

615

Japanese homeland got underway laterin the year.

This, then, was the significance ofthe fiercely contested island. This iswhy General Kuribayashi had decidedto adopt those tactics that would provemost costly to the invasion force andthat would cause the most delay in theconversion of the stronghold to Amer-ican use. After three weeks of bitterfighting, his intention has been partial-ly realized as far as taking a toll inAmerican lives was concerned . But,just behind the front lines, bulldozerswere shifting earth, changing the verylandscape of the island ; communica-tions were humming, and heedless oftenacious Japanese holed up in thenorthern part of the island, the taskof reconstruction was proceeding at anever-increasing pace .

iThe 5th Marine Division Drive on the Left

ADVANCE UPTHE WEST COAST2

As the battle for Iwo Jima nearedits climax, the full force of three Ma-rine divisions was employed to reducethe main enemy defenses near the Cen-tral Airfield . General Erskine's drive upthe center of the island to the northern

' Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : ComPhibPac AR,Iwo Jima, 12Jan-26Mar45, dtd 19May45, here-after ComPhibPac AR; TF 51 AR ; TF 56AirRpt; TF 56 G-3 Rpt ; VAC AR ; VAC G-2Rpts ; VAC C-s Jnl; VAC C-3 Rpt; VACNGF and AirRpts ; VAC Translations ; 5thMarDiv AR ; 5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl ; 5th MarDivD-2 Jnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter5thMarDiv D-2 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv D-2 Per Repts ;5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl ; 5th MarDiv CasualtyRpts ; 1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl, 9Jan45-15Mar45, hereafter 1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl ;13th Mar UJnl; 13th Mar AR ; 26th Mar UJn1 ;26th Mar AR, Iwo Jima, 1Jan-26Mar45, dtd20Apr45, hereafter 26th Mar AR ; 27th MarUJnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-22Mar45, hereafter27th Mar UJnl ; 27th Mar AR, Iwo Jima,190ct44-23Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, hereafter 27thMar AR ; 28th Mar UJn1 ; 28th Mar AR ; 28thMar R-2 Jnl ; Horie Rpt ; Iwo Comments ; Bart-ley, Iwo Monograph; Newcomb Notes ; More-house, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Morison, Victoryin the Pacific ; Henry et al, U. S. Marines onIwo Jima ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines andAmphibious War ; Conner, The Fifth MarineDivision ; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass ;Robert Leckie, Strong Men Armed ; Newcomb,Iwo Jima .

'Additional material in this section is de-rived from : 5th TkBn UJn1; 5th TkBn

616

CHAPTER 9

shore has already been narrated . In ad-dition to the men of the 3d Marine Di-vision who fought and died at suchlandmarks as Hills OBOE and PETER,Motoyama Village, and Hill 362C, Ma-rines of the adjacent 4th and 5th Di-visions were making similar sacrificesto the east and west respectively. Inthe sectors of the latter two divisionsthe landmarks may have varied in somerespects . They were to bear names likeHill 362A, 362B, Nishi Ridge, andBloody Gorge. Men of the 4th Divisionwould suffer at places appropriatelynamed the Meat Grinder, the Amphi-theater, and Turkey Knob . For all ofthem the enemy remained the samefanatical, utterly devoted to his mis-sion, bent on the destruction of the in-vaders who had dared violate sacredJapanese soil .

An attack by the 5th Marine Divi-sion on 24 February had resulted insizable gains by the 26th Marines,which by the end of the day advanced400 yards north of the 3d Division ele-

AR; 2/26 UJn1 ; 2/26 Obs Rpt, Iwo Jima18Feb-23Mar45, hereafter 2/26 ObsRpt ; 2/26AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, dtd 18Apr45,hereafter 2/26 AR; 3/26 UJnl ; 3/26 AR, IwoJima, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, hereafter3/26 AR; 1/27 UJnl ; 1/27 AR, Iwo Jima,19Feb-23Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter 1/27AR; 2/27 UJn1; 2/27 AR, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44-23Mar45, dtd 17Apr45, hereafter 2/27 AR ;3/27 UJnl ; 3/27 AR, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44-23Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 3/27 AR .

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE LEFT

ments on its right . The gains weremade at a heavy cost ; 21 officers and332 enlisted men became casualties onD plus 5 .3 In order to give the 9th Ma-rines a chance of straightening thelines, the 26th Marines was ordered toremain in place on 25 February .

On the morning of D plus 6, the 5thMarine Division held a line extendingfor 1,200 yards from west to east. Fromthe left to right, 2/27 held the cliffsoverlooking the western beaches ; thecenter of the line, protruding into en-emy territory, was held by 2/26 ; to theright of this battalion, the line slantedsouthward, held by 3/26 with one at-tached company of 1/26 . (See Map V,Map Section) . It had become evident bythis time that the high ground in thezone of action of the adjacent 3d MarineDivision exerted a paramount influenceon the further advance of the 5th Di-vision. No major progress could be ex-pected until General Erskine's divisionhad driven the enemy from this highground in the center of the island .While the 26th Marines consolidated

its positions on 25 February, the ad-jacent 9th Marines of the 3d Divisionattacked northward along its jointboundary with the 5th Marine Division .On this day, the 9th Marines failed tomake any noteworthy gains, and thesituation along Colonel Graham's rightflank remained substantially unchanged .Throughout the day, heavy enemy firefrom the right front raked the posi-tions occupied by the 26th Marines,greatly interfering with supply andevacuation. Nevertheless, the men ofthe 5th Division were to get one break

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 81 .

during the day. Around 1500, one ofthe spotter planes reported enemy ar-tillery moving north along a road fol-lowing the contour of the island onnorthern Iwo . Three batteries of the13th Marines immediately adjusted onthe target and fired nearly 600 rounds .At the end of this fire mission, the ob-server reported that three artillerypieces had been destroyed, several primemovers were burning, and an ammu-nition dump was ablaze .4 This was theonly time during the Iwo Jima cam-paign that the enemy ever offered sucha choice target . Hereafter, Japanese ar-tillery deployed to new firing positionsonly at night.

On D plus 7 General Rockey's divi-sion resumed the attack. Following a45-minute artillery and naval gunfirepreparation, the 26th Marines jumpedoff in the main effort. Almost immedi-ately, the attack ran into heavy resist-ance. The enemy poured fire from smallarms, machine guns, and mortars intothe ranks of the advancing Marines. Atthe same time, heavy artillery and mor-tar fire from the northern part of theisland hit the assault troops. As theMarines closed with the enemy, handgrenade duels ensued .

During the advance, the nature ofthe terrain underwent a subtle change.Thus far, General Rockey's division hadbeen operating in soft, sandy, and openterrain. As the 26th Marines movednorthward, the level ground gave wayto heavily fortified cliffs . Essentially,the 5th Marine Division now entered adifficult complex of ridges. In each case,the attack had to be carried up one

'13th Mar AR, p . 13 .

617

618

slope, across the top, and then downinto another ravine beyond . Above theridges, there loomed a major enemybastion, Hill 362A, just south of NishiVillage. This terrain feature impressedthe advancing Marines because its sin-ister presence overshadowed all otherobstacles in the area . The hill was rug-ged and rocky, devoid of all vegeta-tion on its southern slopes. To the north,as yet unseen by the Americans advanc-ing from the south, there was a sheerdrop of about 80 feet . The Japanesehad exploited this formidable obstacleto the utmost. The entire hill bristledwith caves of varying sizes, many ofthem serving as mortar and machinegun emplacements. The elevation en-abled the enemy to observe western Iwoall the way south to Mount Suribachi,and thus exposed to his view all Amer-ican activity in the front lines, as wellas on the western beaches .

Despite fierce enemy resistance, the5th Marine Division attack on 26February moved steadily towards Hill362A, still about 800 yards away, whosevery prominence made it a natural ob-jective. The three battalions in the maineffort were the 2d and 3d Battalions,26th Marines, commanded respectivelyby Major Amedeo Rea and MajorRichard Fagan, and 2/27 under MajorJohn W. Antonelli. Because of heavyautomatic weapons fire from an enemystrongpoint consisting of pillboxes andcaves, the advance of 2/26 was so slow-ed that in two hours gains of only 50yards were registered . Tanks of Com-pany B, 5th Tank Battalion, took a handin the fighting. At 1000, Company F of2/26, thus far held in reserve, was com-mitted. With the support of armor, the


infantry launched a spirited attackagainst the stubborn enemy position .The efforts of this company were quick-ly crowned with success . For the firsttime since 2/26 had come ashore, thebattalion came face to face with theusually elusive and unseen enemy . Inthe resulting pitched battle, the Japa-nese came out second best . Those ofthe enemy who sought to flee were killedout in the open . Catching the ordinarilywell entrenched enemy for once in sucha vulnerable position greatly boostedthe morale of the Marines engaged inthis action, "for no man likes to fightsomething he cannot see, and the sightof running Japs was, if nothing else,reassuring ."5

Advancing on the right and support-ed by tanks of Company A, 5th TankBattalion, 3/26 gained about 100 yards,smashing fortifications as it went alongand destroying numerous guns in theravines that led down from the plateauperpendicular to the route of advance .Gains made by the adjacent 9th Ma-rines helped 3/26 in its forward move-ment.

To the left of the 26th Marines, 2/27initially made rapid progress, gaining400 yards during the first two hours .For the remainder of the day, the bat-talion stayed in place in order to per-mit 2/26 to come abreast . The terrainin the zone of advance of 2/27 pre-cluded the employment of tanks . In-stead, 20 LVT (A) s of the 2d ArmoredAmphibian Battalion, under Lieuten-ant Colonel Reed M. Fawell, Jr., sup-ported the battalion attack from thesea. The 75mm fire from the armored

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 85 .


SOLIDLY EMPLACED tank of the Japanese 26th Tank Regiment after capture .(USAF 70317 AC)

MARINE COMBAT PATROL moves through jagged terrain in northern Iwo Jima .(USMC 142316)

619

620

amphibians knocked out several enemycaves, but in the choppy seas their firebegan to endanger friendly troops and,as a result, they were ordered to ceasefire . 6

When action halted on the eveningof 26 February, the lines of the 5thMarine Division still formed an arcwhose apogee extended some 400 yardsinto enemy territory. Gains for the dayamounted to roughly 300 yards. Mostimportant of all, the day's advance hadnetted the 26th Marines two Japanesewells, the last ones believed to be underenemy control. Henceforth, the Japa-nese would have to rely on such wateras they had been able to store or onrainfall .

Enemy reaction to the loss of thisvital resource was not long delayed .Following a rainy afternoon, the skiescleared. In bright moonlight, a com-pany-size force of Japanese assembledand started to move down the westcoast, presumably with the intention ofrecapturing the two vital wells. Menof the 26th Marines spotted a sizableenemy force heading for one of thewells near the cliffs south of Hill 362A .The Japanese represented a splendidtarget in the moonlight . Both artilleryand naval gunfire racked the enemyforce and dispersed it before it reachedany of the wells .

In another incident during this rest-less night, at the observation post ofCompany D, the company commander,Captain Thomas M. Fields, and a mem-ber of his staff observed three Japanesewalking boldly within 25 feet of them

8 5th MarDiv AR, Anx M, pp. 12, 15 .


with picric acid satchel charges . Thetwo officers routed the enemy with handgrenades, killing one of the intruders .?This was only one example of the ene-my's boldness in approaching or pene-trating the American lines . Marines upfront could never be sure of who orwhat was approaching them in thedarkness. One of the early incidentswhich occurred on D plus 2, involvedthe compromise of the password "Che-vrolet" in the area then occupied byCompany F, 2/26 . A sentry challengeda moving figure, who gave the correctpassword. Not satisfied with the pro-nunciation of "Chevrolet," the sentryrepeated his challenge . Once again thepassword was mispronounced. The sen-try fired and killed the intruder, who thenext morning was identified as Japan-ese .'

Confrontations of this type tended toincrease the vigilance of Marines onIwo Jima. At times, such alertness wascarried to the extreme and, a few nightslater, resulted in a humorous incidentinvolving the same company. Duringthe night of 25-26 February, CompanyF, 2/26, seized a Navajo Indian, whowas mistakenly identified as Japanese .'His poor English, made worse by a badcase of fright, made his position pre-

' 2/26 AR, p. 8 .8 lbid., p . 6 .'On Iwo Jima, as in other military opera-

tions in the Pacific Theater during World WarII, the U. S. Marine Corps employed speciallytrained Navajo communicators or "talkers,"whose language was not known to the Japa-nese and thus not open to enemy translation .In tactical situations where time was of theessence, precious minutes were gained sinceradio voice transmissions could be used with-out coding or decoding .


carious for a while . Fortunately, he es-caped physical harm ; his ordeal endedwhen he was finally identified by an-other Navajo Marine .

At 0630 on 27 February, the 27thMarines, with 1/26 attached, relievedthe 26th Marines . Ninety minutes later,following a half-hour preparation bythe 13•th Marines, reinforced by corpsartillery, Colonel Wornham's men jump-ed off with 2/27 on the left, 1/27 in thecenter, and 3/27 on the right . The 1stBattalion, 26th Marines, remained inregimental reserve . Shortly before thejumpoff, truck-mounted launchers ofthe 3d Rocket Detachment showered thearea directly in front of the lines witha heavy barrage of 4.5-inch rockets,then pulled back before the enemy couldretaliate. At the same time, naval gun-fire was brought to bear against Hill362A, followed by carrier aircraftwhich bombed and rocketed the hill .

Moving forward in the center, 1/27gained 200 yards before runningstraight into a heavily defended clusterof pillboxes . A half-track was able toknock out one of these strongpointswith its 75mm gun before its crew washit by well-aimed small arms fire . Adecision to move up 37mm guns forsupport could not be implemented be-cause no suitable positions could befound. Consequently, the task of re-ducing the formidable obstacle onceagain fell to small flamethrower-demo-lition teams who would reduce onepillbox after another in the slow, dan-gerous, but time-proven method .During the afternoon, when the

company advancing on the left of the1st Battalion encountered a heavily for-

621

tified area, the call went out for tanks .The arrival of a flamethrower tank, inparticular, was eagerly awaited. Whenit finally reached the scene of action, ac-companied by other armor, it receiveda mortar hit and was disabled beforeit had a chance to take part in the en-gagement. Nevertheless, the remainingShermans lent effective support. Theyfired with everything they had and thenmoved forward in concert with the in-fantry. In the course of this advance,several more enemy pillboxes, as wellas a dug-in tank, were put out of ac-tion. Once the momentum of the attackhad been regained, the Marines movedforward for an additional 200 yardsuntil they halted shortly after 1900 .Advancing on the left of the 27th

Marines, the 2d Battalion faced notonly a determined enemy, but extremelydifficult terrain . The cliff on the highground adjacent to the west coastbeaches was honeycombed with cavesand emplacements, most of them shel-tering mortars and machine guns . Insuch terrain the employment of tankswas out of the question ; furthermore,the few existing routes of approachwere heavily mined. Once again, thefull burden of the attack fell on smallinfantry and demolition teams, eachone advancing more or less independ-ently, taking its losses as it eliminatedone enemy strongpoint after another .Of necessity, such a movement is slowand extremely exhausting, yet steadygains were made and by • late afternoon,2/27 had advanced 500 yards.

On the right of the division line,3/27 moved against a ridge whichguarded the approach to Hill 362A .

622

Company G launched a frontal assaultagainst this ridge and was promptlythrown back. A group of 30 men at-tempting to outflank this position wasinitially repulsed ; a second try appearedmore promising. As the Marines ad-vanced up the slope they were hit by ahail of hand grenades thrown by theenemy from the reverse slope . Ten Ma-rines were killed on the spot, includ-ing Gunnery Sergeant William G.Walsh, who dived on a hand grenadewhich landed in a hole where he andseveral of the men had taken cover .As other elements of the companyreached the scene, the enemy wasdriven from the reverse slope, and theridge remained in friendly hands .

As D plus 8 came to a close, the 5thMarine Division had gained roughly500 yards through the heart of theenemy main line of resistance in someof the heaviest fighting in which anyMarine unit on Iwo Jima was to takepart. Losses throughout the day hadbeen heavy, some units being harderhit than others . In one instance, Com-pany A, 1/27, occupied a ridge only todiscover that it was exposed to heavyenemy rifle and machine gun fire. Thecompany suffered additional casualtiesfrom enemy hand grenades, thrownfrom bypassed positions in the flanksand rear. For all practical purposes,the Marines of Company A on top ofthe ridge were cut off . The 1st Platoon,in particular, was hard hit . By the timethe company was relieved by CompanyB, 8 men had been killed and 50wounded . 1° While the Company A losseswere unusually heavy, they serve as an

to Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, pp .86-87 .


indication of the 5th Marine Division'slosses since D-Day. By noon of D plus 8,the division had sustained 32 officersand 530 men killed, 134 officers and2,360 men wounded, and 2 officers and160 men missing in action, a total of168 officers and 3,058 men .'The 5th Marine Division had now

reached the 0-2 Line across its entirezone of advance, though the lines onthe evening of D plus 8 were not per-fectly straight . Not all of the action oc-curred in the front lines . Continuousvigilance was required to clear theenemy out of the previously capturedground . Japanese kept appearingseemingly out of nowhere. Only laterwas it determined that they could moveat will through a carefully constructedsystem of tunnels . As a result, beforea day's attack could get under way,some mopping up remained to be donein the rear area . Despite the gainsmade by the 27th Marines on 27February, an even more difficult opera-tion awaited 5th Marine Division unitson the following day .

THE ASSAULT ON HILL 362A 12

On the morning of D plus 9, the lastday of February, the 5th Marine Divi-

11 5th MarDiv AR, App 3, Sec VIII, p . 15 .1' Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 5th Eng Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 13Apr45, hereafter 5th EngBnAR ; 1/26 AR, Iwo Jima, 15Nov44-26Mar45,dtd 19Apr45, hereafter 1/26 AR; 1/28 AR,Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n .d ., hereafter 1/28AR ; 2/28 OpRpt ; 2/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19 Feb-26Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 2/28 AR ;3/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n.d ., here-after 3/28 AR.


sion was squarely up against Hill 362A,the highest elevation on western Iwo .The hill loomed forbiddingly above theMarines huddled at its approaches .Around the base of this hill mass, rockyoutcrops dominated every approach .The Japanese had fortified each one ofthese rocky spurs, which afforded ex-cellent fields of fire. For the attack on28 February, the 27th Marines hadbeen ordered to seize an intermediateobjective between the 0-2 and 0-3 Lines .

Initially, the mission of taking Hill362A had been entrusted to 3/27, while1/27 was to simultaneously attack anirregular line of ridges extending fromthe objective down to the westernbeaches. During the night, 1/26 had re-lieved 2/27 and was committed alongthe left flank of the regiment along thebeaches. Following a 45-minute prepa-ration by artillery, naval gunfire, androckets, and supported by carrier-basedaircraft, the 27th Marines jumped offat 0815 for what was to develop intoone of the bloodiest encounters on theisland .

From the outset, the enemy offeredstubborn resistance all along the regi-mental front. Advancing in the centerand on the right of the regimental line,1/27 and 3/27 encountered some ofthe heaviest small arms fire yet direct-ed against them . The 1st Battalion call-ed for and received tank support as ithad on the previous day, but the ter-rain in the zone of advance of 3/27 pre-cluded the employment of armor, andthe battalion had to rely strictly on itsown fire power. Advancing gingerlyacross 200 yards of difficult terrain, thetwo assault battalions reached the footof the hill around noon .

623

At this point, the attack began tobog down . In accordance with GeneralKuribayashi's orders, the Japanese re-mained in their positions and fought tothe bitter end. Those who were by-passed continued to fire into the rearof the advancing Marines. At such closerange, the enemy snipers were extreme-ly effective and inflicted heavy casual-ties on the assault force. In the courseof the afternoon, several patrols from3/27 probed the defenses on the hillitself, seeking for a way to seize it . Apatrol from Company I actually made itup the southwest slopes to the crest ofthe hill around 1630. However, sincecohesion between 1/27 and 3/27 hadbeen lost, the patrol had to be recalledin late afternoon and Company I pulledback about 100 yards, where it tied inwith elements of the adjacent 21st Ma-rines on the left of the 3d Marine Divi-sion .Far from being content with halting

the Marine advance, 50-100 enemytroops sallied forth from positions onHill 362A during the late afternoonand counterattacked the 3/27 lines . Thebrunt of this blow fell upon CompanyH, which engaged in desperate hand-to-hand fighting with frenzied Japanesebefore the latter were driven off .

By nightfall, men of the 27th Ma-rines were still stalled at the foot ofHill 362A, which towered above them,seemingly as impregnable as ever. Af-ter a day of extremely bitter action,which had cost numerous casualties,the overall regimental gain had beenabout 300 yards. To the left, 1/26 hadsent out advance detachments along thebeaches, but the northward movementof any large body of troops was seri-

624

ously impaired by the enemy's posses-sion of the adjacent high ground .

The night from 28 February to 1March turned out to be a very quietone for the exhausted 5th Division Ma-rines in the front lines . Four listeningposts had been established by 2/26along the beaches to frustrate any ene-my intentions of landing reinforcementson the island . Each listening post hadbeen augmented with one dog and itshandler from the 6th War Dog Platoon .Eventually, things became so quiet thateven the dogs found it difficult to re-main awake .13

Elsewhere on Iwo Jima, it was a dif-ferent matter . In the southern part ofthe island, in the vicinity of Mount Su-ribachi where they had been positionedever since that elevation was captured,the 28th Marines was preparing to movenorth to join the 5th Division drive .At midnight, the enemy began shellingthe positions of the corps artillery andthose of the 13th Marines . This bom-bardment continued at some length .Shortly after 0200, the 5th Marine Di-vision ammunition dump blew up witha tremendous roar, blazing fiercely forthe remainder of the night . At least 20percent of the division small arms am-munition supply was lost in the con-flagration, along with large quantitiesof heavier ammunition. One of the ex-ploding shells landed in the corps ar-tillery fire direction center but causedno casualties, though it did wreak havocwith the telephone wire . 14

In the course of the operation, VACHeadquarters itself came under fire a

13 26th Mar AR, App . 4, p . 9 .1` .BGen John S . Letcher ltr

13Mar53, in Iwo Comments.


number of times from mortars and ar-tillery. This shelling resulted in sev-eral casualties . On at least two occa-sions, all work in the operations tentsof the various staff sections came to astop and officers and men piled togetheron the ground as shells landed nearby ."

In the midst of the commotion causedby the exploding ammunition dump,the island's air alert system went off .The nerves of personnel in the south-ern part of the island were furtherstrained when exploding white phos-phorus shells were mistaken for gasshells and someone gave the gas alarmat 0300. Within ten minutes, the gasalarm was cancelled ; not so the airalert, which continued until 0430 . 16

As it turned out, there was some sub-stance to the air alert . No enemy planesappeared over Iwo Jima during thenight, but shortly before 0300 an enemyaircraft, skimming in low over thewater, dropped a torpedo near the de-stroyer Terry a few miles north of Ki-tano Point. The destroyer took evasiveaction and barely avoided getting hit bythe torpedo . However, a few hours later,while passsing the northernmost pointof Iwo Jima, the ship came under firefrom enemy shore batteries, whichscored hits on the main deck and for-ward engine room. Eleven destroyercrewmen were killed and 19 wounded be-fore the Terry, assisted by the Nevadaand Pensacola, made good her escape .In addition to the loss in lives, the shiphad suffered substantial damage." An-other vessel, the destroyer Colhoun, an-

"Craig ltr .to CMC, dtd

10 VAC OpRpt, p. 28 .17 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 64 .


chored off the northeastern coast of Iwoto repair damage sustained in a colli-sion, took several hits from enemy shorebatteries which wrecked a torpedo tube,exploded the air flask of a torpedo, andcaused other extensive damage. Oneman was killed and 16 were wounded inthe course of this action.'sAt 0630 on 1 March, the 28th Ma-

rines, with the 5th Tank Battalion and3/27 attached, moved forward throughthe 27th Marines in order to continuethe attack on Hill 362A. Between 0745and 0830, the objective and surroundingarea received a heavy shelling from allfour battalions of the 13th Marinesand the corps' 155mm howitzers . Off-shore, a battleship and two cruisersjoined in the bombardment . The volumeof fire was such that it was deemed best,in the interests of coordination, to ex-clude aircraft from the preparatoryfires. They would have ample oppor-tunity to support the attack later inthe day .

Shortly before 0900 the 28th Marinesjumped off with the 1st, 2d, and 3dBattalions from right to left. The at-tack moved ahead slowly under heavyenemy mortar and small arms fire . ToColonel Liversedge's men, the doggeddefense of Hill 362A was reminiscentof the action at the base of Mount Su-ribachi. The scheme of maneuver calledfor 1/28 and 2/28 to attack aroundthe right and left of Hill 362A respec-tively and link up on the north sideof the hill. Meanwhile, 3/28 was to ad-vance up the west coast to the left of2/28 .

" Ibid.

625

By 1030, both the 1st and 2d Bat-talions had reached the top of the ridgeand the ridgeline running east and westof Hill 362A. As they attempted to ad-vance beyond the crest, they discoveredthat a steep drop of nearly 100 feetinto a rocky draw confronted them . Tomake matters worse, heavy fire fromsmall arms, automatic weapons, andmortars hit the advancing Marinesfrom the adjacent ridge to the north,subsequently to become known as NishiRidge. The draw itself ran parallel tothe ridge line and was bisected by anantitank ditch that ran perpendicularto the hill. Covering the ditch werecleverly constructed positions in theface of the steep cliff, inaccessible fromthe top. Beyond the antitank ditch andthe draw, the ground leveled off forabout 200 yards before again risingsharply to form Nishi Ridge .

In order to keep the attack moving,Lieutenant Colonel Jack B . Butterfield,commanding 1/28, sent his reserve,Company A, around the right of Hill362A . This maneuver proved unsuccess-ful and the company came under suchwithering fire, accompanied by a showerof grenades, that it was stopped shortin its tracks. During this assault thecompany commander was killed . Asimilar attempt by Company B to getinto the draw proved equally unsuccess-ful, and the company commander waswounded. In this jumble of rock, bothcompanies suffered heavy casualties .Among these was Corporal Tony Steinof Company A, who had already madea name for himself on D Day . He setout with 20 men to clear the ridge ofsnipers. Only seven men returned from

626

this mission. Among the men of Com-pany B killed near the base of Hill362A this day were three who had raisedthe American flag on Mount Suribachi ;one of them had taken part in the firstand the two others had participated inthe second flag raising.Throughout the day, 10 regular

tanks and 2 flame tanks of Com-pany C, 5th Tank Battalion, gaveall possible support to 2/28 to the ex-tent that the terrain permitted, withfire on the cliffs and the high groundto the front. Shortly after noon, twoplatoons of tanks spearheaded an at-tack along the left flank of the batta-lion ; subsequently, one platoon waswithdrawn and shifted to the right ofthe zone of action of 2/28, just northand west of Hill 362A . Even with thesupport of tanks, 2/28 proved unable toadvance. The battle raged hot and heavyat close quarters ; in one instance, oneof the tanks bogged down, surroundedby 30-40 Japanese, some of them oc-cupying a cave only 10 feet from thetank. Fighting as infantry, the tankcrew was able to make a harrowingescape after disabling the gun andradio .

For the remainder of the afternoonof D plus 10, the 1st and 2d Battalions,28th Marines, remained stalled alongthe crest of Hill 362A and at the baseof the hill, where the enemy still heldout in caves . In the course of the after-noon, the boundary of General Rockey'sdivision was extended about 200 yardsto the east to facilitate the advance ofthe adjacent 3d Marine Division . Asa result, General Rockey committed3/26 on the right of the 28th Marines .


Shortly before 1900, 3/26 relieved 1/21and established contact with 3/9 on theright and 1/28 on the left . At the sametime, 2/26 displaced forward as 28thMarines reserve .

While the 1st and 2d Battalions, 28thMarines, were making little progressin the extremely difficult and well de-fended terrain, 3/28 was making asteady advance with two companiesabreast near the west coast. The bat-talion moved forward against moder-ate resistance until its assault elementson the left were ahead of those on theright, at which time they drew heavyfire from the right front. The battalionhad gained about 350 yards and sincethe regimental attack to the right hadstalled, 3/28 halted its advance .By the end of 1 March, Hill 362A

and a rocky ridgeline extending to thewest coast had been seized . In all, ele-ments of the 5th Division held a 1,000-yard front, which was exposed to heavyartillery and mortar fire from positionsto the north. In order to obtain betterobservation over the northwesterncoast of Iwo Jima, artillery observerswere placed on board an LCI(G) whichcruised up and down the northwestshore. This expedient was successfuland several enemy positions were lo-cated and silenced . 1

At the end of 1 March, the 5th Ma-rine Division had taken a total of 12prisoners ; it was estimated that 3,252of the enemy had been killed in the 5thDivision area of responsibility . 20 Casu-alties sustained by the division to this

'° 5th MarDiv AR, pp. 23-24 .20 I bid ., p . 24 .

THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE

date were 48 officers and 952 men killed,161 officers and 3,083 men wounded inaction, and 2 officers and 47 men miss-ing." The capture of Hill 362A and theridges on either side of it in a one-day operation had cost the 28th Ma-rines alone 224 casualties . 2 V

While General Rockey's men were en-gaged in reducing Hill 362A, the ad-jacent 3d Marine Division had pene-trated the enemy defense system in thecenter of the island and had pivotedto the northeast . This move threaten-ed to open a widening gap betweenthe 3d and 5th Marine Divisions. As aresult, for 2 March, General Schmidtdirected the 5th Marine Division tomake the main effort on the right whilemaintaining contact with General Er-skine's men. In order to carry out thenewly assigned mission calling for anexpansion of his boundaries, GeneralRockey committed the 26th Marines tothe right of the 28th. For the con-tinuation of the 5th Division attack onD plus 11, the fire of the 13th Marineswas augmented by half of the corpsartillery fires .23

At 0800 on 2 March, the 26th Ma-rines jumped off along the divisionboundary with 3/26 in the assault. Asthe battalion moved forward, a gaparose on the left, and Companies D andF of 2/26 were committed to regaincontact with 1/28. In the zone of ad-vance of the 26th Marines the Japa-nese made maximum use of cleverlyconcealed positions, whose approacheswere mined. Progress was correspond-

s I bid.z Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 53 .VAC Op0 10-45, dtd 1Mar45 .

LEFT

627

ingly slow. Even though the terraindid not favor the use of armor andabounded in antitank obstacles, 3/26 re-quested tank support, and tanks fromCompany A, 5th Tank Battalion, spear-headed the attack .

Companies D and F of 2/26 were inthe midst of blasting their way intoand through the enemy defenses whenthe battalion had to shift to the rightto close a new gap that had developedbetween the 3d and 5th Divisions . Inexecuting the shift, the two companieshad to disengage under heavy fire ; theywere further harassed by mortars andminefields . A solid line was finally form-ed in late afternoon just before night-fall. In order to fill the void createdwhen the two companies of 2/26 wereshifted to the northeast, it becamenecessary to commit 1/26 .

When fighting came to an end on Dplus 11, 3/26 had gained 500 yards. (SeeMap VI, Map Section) . Responsible forthese gains to a large measure were thedivision engineers, who moved alongsidethe assault units to clear minefields andopen supply roads in the rear . In frontof the 26th Marines, the enemy hadmined the approaches to his pillboxesand permanent fortifications ; withoutthe help of the engineers, the advance ofColonel Graham's regiment on D plus 11would have been doomed to failure .

In the left of the 5th Division zoneof advance, the 28th Marines jumpedoff at 0800 with its three battalions em-ploying the same scheme of maneuveras on the previous day . The 1st and 2dBattalions were to attack around bothsides of Hill 362A and join on the northside for a coordinated assault against

628

the next elevation 200 yards to thenorth. This obstacle, extending west-ward from the plateau almost to thewater's edge, was squarely in the pathof the 28th Marines . Beyond were thestark remains of what had once been asmall hamlet called Nishi . From it, theelevation took its name : Nishi Ridge .

As the two battalions jumped off,they encountered undiminished resist-ance. Every time the Marines movedinto the depression north of Hill 362A,they drew heavy fire from both the frontand the rear. Tanks from Company B,5th Tank Battalion, tried to give ef-fective support, but were severely lim-ited in their movements by the antitankditch extending across their front .

As a result, the 28th Marines madeonly little progress. The 13th Marinesgave all possible support to the infantry,concentrating its fire on enemy mortarpositions identified from the air andthrough forward observers . Finally,elements of the regimental weaponscompany succeeded in setting up three.50 caliber machine guns to cover thecaves that honeycombed the northernslopes of Hill 362A . Friendly mortarfire saturated the defile in front of theinfantry .

Eventually, armored bulldozers of the5th Engineer Battalion got close enoughto the antitank ditch to fill in a portionof it. This permitted the tanks to moveout and advance for 200 yards until theterrain narrowed and precluded anyfurther forward movement. Caught inthis type of cul de sac, the tank crewsfought with the enemy at closest quar-ters. At 1400, tanks of Company C re-lieved those of Company B, which wasbeginning to run out of ammunition .


En route to the front lines, the tanksof Company C, including a flame tank,blasted and burned enemy positions inthe steep northern face of Hill 362A,from which the enemy was still firinginto the rear of the advancing infantry .

The enemy made numerous attemptsto destroy the supporting armor withsatchel charges . Apparently, the ap-pearance of tanks in close support ofthe infantry in terrain that all but pre-cluded the effective employment of ar-mor confounded the Japanese. One of theofficers on General Kuribayashi's staffwas to make the following comment onthis subject :

When American M-4 tanks appeared infront of Osaka Yama (Hill 362A), Lieu-tenant General Kuribayashi was veryanxious to know how to dispose of thistank. Even our 47mm antitank gun couldnot destroy it, and at last came to the con-clusion that bodily attacks with explosiveswas the only way to destroy it."

Actually, the Japanese island com-mander may have overestimated thestructural strength of the M-4 tank,which was indeed vulnerable to 47mmantitank fire. Nevertheless, the Sher-mans were indispensable on Iwo, andwithout them the assault might havefailed. Ideally, a tank with heavier ar-mament and a lower silhouette, as wellas improved traction, would have beenmore desirable, but at the time of theIwo Jima operation only the Shermanswere available to the Marines engagedin the assault .While the tanks were keeping the

enemy to the rear occupied, CompanyE, 2/28, charged across the exposed ter-rain north of Hill 362A to the foot

' Horie Rpt, p . 8 .


of Nishi Ridge . Enemy reaction to thismove was immediate and, in the wordsof the regimental report, "All Hellbroke loose "25 as the Japanese foughtback from the cliff line to the north,from Hill 362A, and from a blockhousein front of and to the east of Hill 362A .Combined with the heavy enemy artil-lery and mortar fire was a counterat-tack by a large group of Japaneseagainst 1/28. This attack was repulsedwith 129 Japanese killed .Losses among the Marines of 2/28

also were beginning to mount . Shortlyafter 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Chand-ler W. Johnson, commanding 2/28, washit squarely by an artillery shell as hewas inspecting the front lines . The bat-talion commander was killed instantlyand the battalion executive officer,Major Thomas B . Pearce, Jr ., assumedcommand. For the remainder of the af-ternoon, reserve units mopped up in thevicinity of Hill 362A, whose northernface was giving the advancing Marinesinfinitely more trouble than the south-ern slopes had .While bitter fighting was raging

along the center and eastern portionof the division line, 3/28 was advancingalong a narrow front near the westcoast. Movement in this area was seri-ously impeded by numerous caves andheavy enemy artillery and mortar fire .The caves were attacked and slowlyneutralized with 37mm guns, heavymortars, and demolition charges ; a totalof 68 were blasted during the day . At0900 and again around noon, shells fall-ing within the battalion zone of ad-vance gave off a green-yellowish gas

28th Mar AR, p . 27 .

21 Ibid .

629

which induced vomiting and causedsevere headaches to some of the menexposed to it . A brief gas scare resulteduntil it became apparent that only thosemen in the immediate proximity of ashell burst were affected ; symptomslasted only for a short time . In the end,the ill effects were ascribed to the pres-ence of picric acid fumes .2s

At 1700, VAC ordered the lines to beconsolidated for the day. In the 5th Di-vision zone of advance, fighting con-tinued until nightfall, some of it atvery close quarters. For the night, 5thDivision Marines were generally dugin at the base of Nishi Ridge ; on thefar right, the 2/26 lines extended to thenortheast along the division boundarywhere they tied in with 3/9 near Hill362B. The biggest advance for the dayhad been made by the 26th Marines,which had gained 500 yards . There wereindications that the regiment was mov-ing into a different type of defensive po-sition than had been previously encoun-tered. There were fewer concrete forti-fications and more rock barriers andtank ditches . Even though the enemywas resisting as fiercely as ever, he wasabandoning some of his equipment .Items captured on D plus 11 were agenerator truck found behind oneridge and a large searchlight behindanother .As night fell, the enemy made sev-

eral attempts to infiltrate the 5th Di-vision lines. About 50 Japanese salliedforth near Hill 362A and some of thisforce succeeded in getting into the Ma-rine positions. Once the Marines be-came aware of their presence, bitter

630

hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in thecourse of which knives, sabers, pistols,and hand grenades were liberally used .The alertness of the Marines in deal-ing with the infiltrators led GeneralKuribayashi to report that "the look-out of American forces has become verystrict and it is difficult to pass throughtheir guarded line . Don't overestimatethe value of cutting-in attacks ."27

On the evening D plus 11, the battleof Hill 362A was over, but an evenbigger challenge was to confront Gen-eral Rockey's men for the followingday : the capture of Nishi Ridge andHill 362B.

NISHI RIDGE, HILL 362BAND BEYOND 28

On the morning of D plus 12, the5th Marine Division resumed the at-tack with basically the same formationsit had employed on the previous day .From the very outset, both the terrainand enemy resistance combined to makeit a difficult day . The 26th and 28thMarines were to make the main effort .In the path of the 28th Marines lay aseries of gorges and ridges ; in front ofthe 26th Marines the terrain was heavi-ly mined ; in addition, from stronglyheld Hill 362B, the enemy was able tosweep the area with fire. New roads

2' Hone Rpt ., p . 9 .' Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 133d NCB AR ; 2/13 UJnl, IwoJima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter 2/13 UJn1 ;2/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar45, n.d .,hereafter 2/13 AR; 3/13 UJn1, Iwo Jima, 19-Feb-17Nfar45, hereafter 3/13 UJnI ; 3/13 AR,Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar45, n .d. hereafter3/13 AR; 4/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 270ct44-21Mar-45, dtd 7Apr45, hereafter 4/13 AR .


would have to be dozed out before tankscould move in to support the advance .

The attack jumped off at 0745 . Sup-ported by 75mm half-tracks, 37mmguns, and a reinforced tank platoon,1/28 and 2/28 in the regimental centermoved out and almost immediately raninto heavy mortar and small arms fire .As the two battalions inched forward,the men soon came to close grips withthe enemy and numerous hand grenadeduels were fought. Within two hoursafter the jumpoff, Nishi Ridge had beenseized and the battalions prepared tomove into the rugged terrain beyond .As the advance gained momentum, the28th Marines swept down from NishiRidge into the remnants of Nishi Vil-lage, and by late afternoon had reach-ed a point about 200 yards beyond, de-spite mounting casualties, for enemy re-sistance never slackened. At the closeof the day, when the fury of the battlereceded, 1/28 made further gains whichbrought it ahead of the other two bat-talions. Since morning, 1/28 had gained500 yards, while 2/28 had scored gainsof only 150 yards, as had 3/28 alongthe coast .

By far the most spectacular fightingand resultant gains were made in thezone of advance of the 26th Marines .The mission assigned to the 26th Ma-rines for D plus 12 had been to ad-vance northeastward to relieve elementsof the 3d Marine Division near Hill362B. The line of departure for 2/26and 3/26 formed an inverted horsehoewith 3/26 on the left and 2/26 on theright. The two battalions moved outrapidly, even though both began takingcasualties almost at once. Company B


of the 5th Tank Battalion supportedthe 2d Battalion by covering the leftflank of Company F. Just as it had doneon D plus 7 when first committed inthe assault, this company smashed intothe enemy defenses with great forceand aggressiveness . Since, at the outset,the terrain was comparatively level andthus favored the employment of armor,the company commander was able toradio instructions to the armor througha tank liaison man assigned to the com-mand post of 2/26 . The assault swepton for about 300 yards before the openterrain changed into the deep gorgesand rock formations characteristic ofnorthern Iwo Jima. In these rocky bad-lands the battle continued, frequentlyman against man . The Japanese fiercelycontested the advance behind every rockand boulder but could not stop it. Insome of the most bitter fighting of theentire operation, every weapon at handwas brought into play.

By the time the forceful advance cameto a halt, Company F had advancedmore than 600 yards to the high groundto its front. Even then, the Japanesegrimly contested every foot of the fresh-ly seized ground, and numerous handgrenades continued to harass the Ma-rines from cleverly hidden caves andgullies whose presence had hithertobeen unsuspected. But the enemy wasmortal, and bazooka shells accuratelyfired into such defensive positions usual-ly eliminated this resistance in shortorder.

The 600-yard advance of 2/26 elimi-nated the horseshoe and for all prac-tical purposes, straightened the line .With the severe threat to its left flank

631

gone, 3/26 was able to launch an ad-vance of its own, which resulted ina 200-yard gain . While Company F wastackling the enemy at close quarters,Companies D and E launched an at-tack northeastward along the divisionboundary in order to seize Hill 362Band relieve 3/9 . The relief was com-pleted by 1430 and the two companies,from positions just southwest of thehill, prepared for the assault .

When it came, at 1600, the battle forthe hill proved to be a bloody one . Usingrocket launchers, flamethrowers, demo-litions, plus a goodly amount of sheercourage and will, the two companiesforced their way to the top . The south-ern and western slopes of the hill werehoneycombed with caves and pillboxes,each of which required an individualassault. By the time the crest of thehill was reached, both company com-manders and many of their men hadbecome casualties .The advance made by the 5th Ma-

rine Division on 3 March was almostspectacular under the conditions inwhich the battle was fought. The costof seizing this ground was correspond-ingly high. On D plus 12, the 26th Ma-rines alone had 281 casualties 2 9 . Totallosses for the 5th Marine Division on 3March were 9 officers and 127 menkilled or dead of wounds, and 15 officersand 357 men wounded .30 As of D plus12, total casualties for the division sinceD-Day numbered 4,960 officers andmen.S 1

26th Mar WarD, Mar45 .' 5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts, dtd 25Jun45 ." Ibid.

632

As the fury of the battle recededon the evening of D plus 12, the 5thDivision lines extended from the westcoast at a point roughly 200 yards northof Nishi Village along the northern edgeof Motoyama Plateau to the crest ofHill 362B. All along the front, thecasualty rate had reached alarmingproportions and it became necessary tosend men from headquarters and weap-ons companies into the line as riflemento bolster the tired and depleted units .Not all of the 5th Marine Division menwere able to get much rest that night .In the sector of the 28th Marines, therewere relatively few attempts at infiltra-tion. It was another story in the 26thMarines area, where the enemy in-filtrators appeared more aggressive andcrowded the 26th Marines throughoutthe night. Almost all of the nearly 100would-be infiltrators were killed .

Following an artillery preparationand rocket barrage, the 5th MarineDivision resumed the attack on themorning of D plus 13. As the menjumped off in the same formation theyhad employed on the previous day, theywere hit by intensive fire from smallarms and mortars . Once again, theMarines advanced into terrain dottedwith interconnected caves . The lineswere now so close to each other thatartillery support could be used onlyon special occasions . Because of a lowcloud ceiling, the air support which hadbeen scheduled for the day had to becancelled .

The low clouds soon gave way to in-termittent showers, which did little tolift the morale of the men who werestill exhausted in spirit and body from


the rigors of the preceding days' combatand lack of sleep caused by the con-tinuous Japanese infiltration attemptsof the previous night. The rugged ter-rain seriously limited the use of 75mmhalf-tracks and 37mm guns . With Japa-nese lurking all around them, the crewsof these vehicles felt progressively moreexposed to enemy fire . Beyond that, theenemy was beginning to take a toll invehicles with mines, skillfully emplacedin the few avenues of approach avail-able to the supporting armor.

Perhaps the biggest difference be-tween the success attained on D plus 12and the fighting on the following daywas the fact that the attacks were notclosely coordinated . Once again, thebrunt of the battle was borne by smalldetachments, moving more or less hap-hazardly against those enemy cavesand pillboxes that were unmasked . Asa result, only small gains were made,even though in this jungle of rocks thebravery of the individual Marine con-tinued undiminished. As on the previousday, losses were heavy and many of thecombat units were operating at halfstrength or less. The enemy was notice-ably more aggressive in the daytimethan he had been before, and the 26thMarines beat back several counter-attacks executed in company strength .Nowhere did the Japanese succeed inbreaking through the 5th Division lines,but the counterattacks served to takeadditional steam out of the drive of thefatigued Marines, and net gains for theday remained practically nil . As oneaccount of the day's operations put it,"The only successful move, in fact, wasmade by Division headquarters which


moved from its original location nearthe eastern beaches to a position northof Airfield No . 1 on the west side of theisland . 32 At about this time, GeneralKuribayashi shifted his headquartersfrom the center of Iwo Jima to a largecave in the northwestern section of theisland, between Hiraiwa Bay and theruins of Kita Village, where he preparedto make his final stand .

General Schmidt's order to his threedivisions that 5 March was to be utilizedfor reorganioation, resupply, and prepa-rations for the resumption of theattack on the following day reached 5thDivision units during the afternoon of4 March . At a time when physicalstrength and fighting spirit were begin-ning to flag, this order was more thanwelcome. Logically, the day of restwould be used, above all, to funnel repla-cements into the depleted ranks of thefrontline units . The exigencies of com-bat had already necessitated sendingsome men with specific and criticalskills, such as demolition personnel andbazooka or flamethrower operators intothe lines prior to 5 March . On the whole,except for small emergency details,replacements were sent forward whenthe combat battalions were out of thelines. Replacements, no matter how will-ing and well trained, always tended topresent something of a problem beforethey were wholly integrated. Thereasons for this were outlined in thefollowing report

Reports from infantry units indicatethat the average replacement, upon beingassigned to a rifle unit and immediatelysubjected to the type of fierce fighting en-

" Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 95 .

633

countered, was initially bewildered andterrified resulting from a mental attitudeof his being "alone," and not knowing hisleaders and companions on the battlefield .This lack of a sense of security, even whenamong battle-experienced troops, wasbrought about by his separation from con-tact with those with whom he had previ-ously trained and not yet having becomeassimilated into a fighting team. Thosewho did not readjust themselves quicklyhad a high percentage of casualtiesin their bewilderment they usuallylessly exposed themselves

For the resumption of the attack on6 March, General Rockey directed 1/26to relieve 1/27 and ordered the 27thMarines into reserve . At the same time,the 28th Marines was to reorganize sothat 3/28 would take over the sector of2/28. This would leave all three bat-talions of the 26th Marines in the line,the 28th Marines holding a front with3/28 on the left and 3/27 on the right,and the 27th Marines, less the 3d Bat-talion, in reserve .

In accordance with VAC orders, com-bat activity by 5th Division units waslimited to local attempts to straightenthe lines during the morning. Through-out the day, artillery and naval gunfirewere brought to bear on suspectedenemy positions, and carrier aircraftflew 18 missions. Within the 26thMarines sector, a few tanks engagedin reducing caves and other strong-points that were directly menacing thefront lines. Those tanks not actuallyengaged with the enemy received badlyneeded maintenance in the bivouacareas .

Despite general inactivity on the partof the Japanese infantry, the 5th

'5th MarDiv AR, Anx A, p . 14 .

sincecare-

634

Division suffered casualties throughenemy action even on this day of rest .One of the tanks operating near the26th Marines lines ran over a mine andwas disabled, another was hit by enemyantitank fire. Japanese mortars con-tinued to harass the Marines through-out the day, particularly when theenemy observed troop movements nearRoad Junction 338 northwest of Moto-yama Village. Even though this junctionwas situated in the 3d Marine Divisionarea, it constituted a supply road forthe 26th Marines and other 5th Divisionunits .A particularly unfortunate incident

occurred shortly after the relief of 1/27by 1/26. The 1st Battalion, 27th Ma-rines, was in the process of moving toan assembly area in the vicinity of RoadJunction 338 when an enemy shell hitthe jeep carrying the battalion com-mander, Lieutenant Colonel John A .Butler, who had been observing therelief. The battalion commander waskilled, and two other men in the vehiclewere wounded. Later that afternoon,Lieutenant Colonel Justin G. Duryea,the operations officer of the 27th Ma-rines, took over command of 1/27 .

While all three Marine divisions onIwo remained in place and prepared tocontinue the assault, several importantchanges occurred to the rear, indicativeof what had been accomplished and howmuch remained to be done . At the footof Mount Suribachi, the 133d NavalConstruction Battalion put into oper-ation six portable water distillationunits. The processed water was sent tothe front and there was enough tofurnish three canteens per day per man,


a vast improvement over what had beenpreviously available . As early as 3March, the situation from a naval view-point had become relatively quiet . Un-loading and evacuation progressedfavorably over both the eastern andwestern beaches . It thus became pos-sible for all of the assault shipping in-cluding the Defense Group and the JointExpeditionary Force Reserve to retireto rear areas .

On the morning of D plus 15, it wasbusiness as usual for all three assaultdivisions on Iwo . The only change fromthe norm was that the heaviest artil-lery barrage thus far fired preceded theattack. Shortly before 0700, 11 artil-lery battalions, a total of 132 guns rang-ing from 75mm to 155mm in caliber,unleashed a tremendous bombardmentof enemy positions in northern Iwo,followed by a rolling barrage. Offshore,a battleship, two cruisers, three de-stroyers, and two landing craft addedtheir fire to that of the land-based artil-lery, which in little more than an hourexpended 22,500 shells, some of themfalling within 100 yards of the Marineswaiting to jump off . At pretimed in-tervals, carrier planes strafed, rocketed,and bombed the enemy positions . Theportion of the island still in Japanesehands literally rocked under the punish-ment being meted out, and it appearedthat little could withstand such an ex-tensive pounding.

As soon as they jumped off at 0800,the Marines of the 5th Division, as wellas those of the two remaining divisions,discovered to their dismay that the bar-rage had done little to soften up enemyresistance . When the artillery fire lifted,


the Japanese, little the worse for wear,contested the advance of GeneralRockey's men from prepared bunkers,pillboxes, and caves . Marines attempt-ing to advance north from Hill 362B im-mediately drew heavy rifle, machinegun, and mortar fire interspersed withwhite, phosphorus shells. It was almostas if the heavy bombardment had neverhappened. The broken terrain all butprecluded close tank support and, in-stead of a big push, the advance couldbe measured in yards. The vigorousdrive to the 0-3 Line that had beenenvisaged could not materialize undersuch conditions and the attack soon bog-ged down. By the end of the day, the26th and 27th Marines had gainedbetween 50 and 100 yards ; the 28thMarines' advance bogged down alto-gether .

The only progress made could bemeasured, not in yards, but in the num-ber of enemy caves and emplacementsdestroyed. Engineers operating withthe 28th Marines were able to seal offnumerous caves. As in preceding days,the Japanese harassed the advance fromthe front, flanks, and rear. Casualtieswere correspondingly heavy. The typeof vicious close in fighting the Marineswere engaged in during this period wasreflected in the nature of the casualtiesevacuated to the rear . In the words ofone observer :

At the Fifth Division hospital, Lieu-tenant Evans was noticing a change in thetype of wounds coming in. They were badones, from close range sniper or machinegun fire. The earlier wounds, mostly frommortar bursts, had been numerous andragged, but not so penetrating. The wholeblood was being used as little as twelve

days after it was given on the West Coast,but often it could not help ."

After the heavy volume of artilleryfire on 6 March, expended with suchlittle effect, VAC limited the use ofammunition, particularly for harassingmissions. In his orders for 7 March,"',General Schmidt directed the 5th Ma-rine Division to seize the high groundoverlooking the sea with the main effortto be made in the northeastern portionof the division zone of action. Withinthis zone, the main effort was to becarried out by the 27th Marines, whilethe 26th and 28th Marines were toexecute limited objective attacks.-16

THE DRIVE TO THE SEA37

Just as General Erskine's division onthe right jumped off for a surprise at-tack without an artillery preparationearly on 7 March, so the 26th Marines,less 2/26 in VAC reserve, duplicatedthe maneuver on a minor scale . Jump-ing off 40 minutes prior to H-Hour with-out an artillery preparation, 1/26 andCompany H, 3/26, set about to reducethe stubborn enemy defenses that hadthwarted the regiment's advance on theprevious day. After overcoming moder-ate resistance, the battalion reached a30-foot knoll just north of Nishi Vil-lage. As Marines wearily surroundedthis hill, enemy fire all but ceased. Thesudden stillness was broken only when

" Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 247 .~' VAC OpO 14-15, dtd 6Mar45 .~° 5th MarDiv Op0 13-45, dtd 6Mar45 .'7 Additional material in this section is de-

rived from 1/13 UJnI ; 1/13 AR, Iwo Jima,270ct44-21Mar45, dtd 5Apr45, hereafter 1/13AR.

635

636

demolitions men blasted and closed onecave entrance, while machine gunnersmade short work of several of the enemywho rushed out of a rear entrance .Marines of Company H ran towardsthe top of the hill in a suspicious silencethat was most unnatural for Iwo, untilabout 40 had gathered on the crest .Then the unbelievable occurred

. . . The whole hill shuddered and the topblew out with a roar heard all over theisland. Men were thrown into the air, andthose nearby were stunned by the con-cussion . Dozens of Marines disappeared inthe blast crater, and their comrades ranto dig for them . Strong men vomited atthe sight of charred bodies, and otherswalked from the area crying . The enemyhad blown up his own command post, in-flicting forty-three Marine casualties atthe same time

All that remained of the ridge wasa mass of torn, twisted, and burningrock and sand. Smoke emerged from aragged hole so large that it might wellhave harbored a good sized apartmentbuilding. Many of the men, not directlyinjured by the blast but stunned by theconcussion, were staggering around ina daze. It remained for the commanderof Company H, Captain Donald E .Castle, to gather the remnants of hismen and lead them in a renewed at-tack .39

Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 252 .39 This was the first time that men of the 5th

Marine Division had become involved in adisaster of this type. A similar incident, on asomewhat smaller scale, involved 2/24 of the4th Division on Roi-Namur in November 1943 .Then, a large blockhouse used to store aerialbombs and torpedo warheads blew up as theMarines surrounded it . At the time, in an


Meanwhile, 3/26 had also jumped offand almost at once ran into such heavyresistance that continuous fighting atclose range, which lasted until night-fall, produced a gain of only 150 yards .Once again, even this meager advancehad to be paid for with heavy casualties .

The 5th Marine Division main efforton D plus 16 was made by 2/27, sup-ported by a company of 1/27. Follow-ing a 15-minute preparation by a bat-tery of the 13th Marines, the battalionjumped off for an attack that wascoordinated with elements of the 21stMarines operating beyond the divisionboundary. The objective was a stretchof high ground squarely astride theregimental zone of advance. Initially,good progress was made until the for-ward elements entered a draw directlyin front of the first of a series of ridges .At this point, enemy machine gun fire,coming from two directions, raked theexposed men, who sought in vain topinpoint the well-camouflaged positions .Casualties mounted as a 37mm gun wasarduously manhandled to a forward po-sition, from where it engaged the hid-den machine guns with undeterminedresults .

Throughout the day, fighting ragedat close quarters, each side makinggenerous use of hand grenades . In theend, the overall gain for the 27thMarines on D plus 16 was 150 yards,similar to the ground seized by the 26th .Even such a limited advance, executedagainst a firmly entrenched enemy force

instant, the battalion suffered more than halfof its total battle casualties for the operation .Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division, p . 29.


that contested every foot of groundwith knee mortars, grenades, and deadlyaccurate sniper fire, was a major ac-complishment. The task of the Marineinfantrymen might have been greatlyeased had tank support been available .As it was, the broken terrain was alto-gether impassable for armor . Duringthe afternoon, platoon-sized elements of2/27 attempted to outflank some of theenemy positions, only to be caughtby heavy flanking fire that all but iso-lated them from the main body . Awithdrawal became possible only withthe help of a smoke screen. Fightingcontinued throughout the afternoon andindividual enemy caves were assaultedand taken. But there was no way oftelling how many hidden tunnels ledinto these caves, or how long it wouldtake the enemy to restock them withnew men and weapons after the Marineassault squads had moved on .

The only sign of progress of the 5thMarine Division on 7 March occurredon the division's left wing . There, inthe zone of advance of the 28th Marinesnear the west coast, 3/28 and 3/27dispatched combat patrols before themain body launched a general attack .These patrols moved out at 0900, metwith little resistance, and reported thisfact back to the regiment . One hourlater, without any special artillery pre-paration, the main body moved out .There was scattered resistance, but notenough to delay the forward movementas 3/28 and 3/27 struck out in a north-easterly direction . In this instance, theextremely difficult terrain proved to bemuch more of an obstacle than thesporadic resistance encountered . In

637

order to maintain the momentum of theattack, numerous caves were bypassed,to be mopped up later by 1/28 and 2/28 .Mortar and rocket fire was directedwell ahead of the advancing Marines ;additional fire support came from adestroyer offshore .By 1530, the two battalions had

advanced about 500 yards over andthrough rocky gorges in terrain thatwas passable only for men on foot. In-cluded in the ground taken this day wasHill 215, located about 500 yards north-east of Nishi Village, only 750 yardsfrom the northern shore. The relativeabsence of enemy resistance in thissector was to be the most surprisingdevelopment of the day's operations .In addition to making the longestadvance yet in the 5th Division zone,the attacking units killed nine of theenemy in this area and captured one .4o

According to the battalion action report,"a little further advance might havebeen made, but the positions for thenight would have been weak, so thedefenses were laid out in the area in-dicated."41From the time the advance halted

for the day until dusk, all three bat-talions of the regiment dug in for thenight in the vicinity of Hill 215, whilesome of the Marines were engaged inmopping up in the immediate vicinityof the hill . In the midst of this activity,few Marines paid much attention to thefact that a stiff breeze had begun toblow from the north towards the Amer-ican lines. This nonchalance changed to

"3128 AR, 7Mar45 .Ibid .

638

near-panic when this ill wind was foundto be

. . . bringing with it eye-smarting sul-phur fumes and smoke from a burningenemy ammunition dump. Unit com-manders, always alert to the possibility ofthe enemy's employing poison gas, soundedan alert which brought hundreds of gasmasks into use . The alarm soon passed,however, and CT 28 went on with its re-organizing ."

The 5th Division advance on D plus16 had moved the lines forward from500 yards in the west to 150 yards alongthe boundary with the 3d Marine Di-vision, where resistance had been thestiffest. In support of the day's opera-tions, naval gunfire had played asignificant part. Following the tremen-dous expenditure of ammunition by theshore-based artillery on 6 March, VAChad restricted the use of the corps155mm howitzers to "deliberate de-structive fires against known enemytargets."43 The resulting gap in artil-lery support had been taken up bynaval gunfire. All naval gunfire controlparties received instructions to expend500 rounds per ship . On the basis ofdata furnished by the corps intelligencesection, the 5th Division intelligenceofficer, Lieutenant Colonel George A .Roll, assigned target priorities .'' Ad-ditional support was obtained throughair strikes, even though the shrinkingenemy perimeter and the proximity ofthe lines made such support a ratherrisky undertaking. Altogether, 119 car-rier aircraft flew 147 sorties . The em-ployment of napalm bombs was some-

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 101 .' VAC OpO 14-45, dtd 6Mar45 ."5th MarDiv D/3 PerRpt No. 17, dtd

7Mar45 .


what less than successful : of 40 carried,7 failed to release ; of the 33 released,7 failed to ignite .45 An additional67 500-pound bombs, 170 100-poundbombs, and 426 rockets were not sub-ject to technical failures, but no esti-mate as to their effectiveness againsta well dug-in enemy could be obtained .

The night of 7-8 March was charac-terized by relatively light enemy activity,though it was far from quiet. In thezone of action of the 5th Marine Divi-sion, the Japanese kept things livelywith small arms and knee mortar fireand hand grenades. Enemy patrolsprobed the Marine lines at variouspoints. The only determined attempt atinfiltration occurred in front of 1/26,where approximately 25 Japanese triedtheir luck. The attempt ended in dismalfailure when the enemy, tripping flaresin his stealthy approach, became a goodtarget and was mowed down by thealert Marines .

The operations order issued by Gen-eral Schmidt for D plus 17 was simpleand to the point. Instead of namingphase lines to be reached in the comingday's assault, the VAC commander di-rected all three divisions "to capturethe remainder of the island ."", For Gen-eral Rockey's division, these ordersmeant that the main effort wouldcontinue to be made on the right by the27th Marines, advancing to the north-east coast along the division boundaryparallel to the movements of the ad-jacent 3d Marine Division .

The terrain over which the 27th Ma-rines was to advance featured a series

' VAC AirRpt, Encl A, p . 5 .'° VAC OpO 15-45, dtd 7Mar45 .


639

of interconnected caves and tunnels .All approaches to these defenses wereheavily defended . Colonel Wornhamplanned to meet this challenge by hav-ing trails bulldozed into enemy terrain,over which the infantry could advanceinto close proximity of the enemy . Oncethere, Marines could reduce the Japa-nese fortifications at close range withtime proven methods . As added in-surance, tanks would support the in-fantry advance over the newly bull-dozed trails .

At the first glint of dawn, prior tothe jumpoff of 2/27 scheduled for 0750,Shermans of the 5th Tank Battalionslowly crawled forward from theirbivouac area over a previously recon-noitered route . In the rough, unfamiliarterrain, the tanks moved slowly and didnot reach the front until 0930. Mean-while, 2/27 had launched its assault onschedule, but little progress was madeuntil the tanks arrived . The armor im-mediately commenced cleaning out pill-boxes and emplacements, permitting theinfantry to move in close to caves inorder to seal them . The enemy opposedthe Marines with accurate small armsfire, grenades, and mortar fire . Despitethis opposition and the heavily minedterrain, elements of 2/27 by 1030 hadgained 100 yards . Company E, 2/27, re-ported killing 75 Japanese during thefirst two hours . 47

On the battalion left, Companies Dand F attempted an advance withouttank support and were soon halted byheavy machine gun and mortar fire . A15-man crew from Battery B, 13th Ma-rines, manhandled a 75mm pack how-

47 2/27 AR, p. 12 .

itzer and 200 rounds of ammunitionclose to the lines to provide badlyneeded fire support . This unorthodoxemployment of artillery raised the eye-brows of the 1/13 intelligence officer,impelling him to leave this statementfor posterity :

We thought this morning that this bat-talion had done everything it was possiblefor an artillery unit to do . We had landedunder machine gun, artillery, and mortarfire ; gone into position at night ; repelledJap pre-dawn counterattack on D plus 1 ;fired countless counterbattery missions ;had snipers in our position area ; partici-pated in regimental missions ; fired T .O .T .missions ; had our observers on land, onsea, and in the air, and we hauled ammoall night. But today we detached No. 4Baker and sent it forward to knock offsome Jap pillboxes. A report came backthat their fire on pillbox was very effec-tive. This was a new twist but the sameresult-Japs destroyed ."

The infantry received additional sup-port from rocket launcher crews whoblasted the Japanese in their holes andburied them alive . Despite the punish-ment doled out to the enemy, neithercompany made much progress, andgains were limited to less than 100yards .

In the center of the division line, the26th Marines failed to make even thatmuch progress. With 1/26 and 3/26still in the assault, Colonel Graham'smen found themselves facing a complexsystem of pillboxes and interconnectedcaves among the debris that was all thathad remained of Kita Village . In themidst of such forbidding defenses, theregimental attack barely got off theground and, at the end of another ex-hausting day, the regiment was still in

48 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 8Mar45, in 1/13 UJnl .

640

substantially the same position it hadoccupied prior to the jumpoff. A gain of400 yards laboriously carved out by1/26 during the day had to be re-linquished at dusk because it was un-tenable .

The 28th Marines on the division leftnearly equalled the previous day'sadvance. Moving along the coast againstinitially weak enemy resistance, 2/28actually advanced another 500 yards .Once again, opposition became morestubborn on the regiment's right where1/28 gained a respectable 300 yards .Both battalions covered the initial 100yards before serious resistance devel-oped, both from the front and the rear .Within the limitations imposed by theterrain, the attached 75s and 37mmguns of the weapons company supportedthe regiment, as did the 81mm mortars .Ahead of the advance, naval gunfireattempted to neutralize enemy positionsnear the coast, while carrier planesstruck twice at Hill 165, one of the lastsignificant obstacles separating the 5thDivision Marines from the northernshore. For these carrier aircraft, 8March was the last day of support forthe ground forces. Effective 9 March,such close support would become theresponsibility of the Army Air Forces .

The violent battle of attrition ragingin the craggy terrain of northern Iwoon D plus 17 was to have more thanits share of personal drama in the in-formal setting of war . Tragedy struckwithin the setting of Company E, 2/27,which in the course of the morning hadalready scored an advance of 150 yardsthrough engineer-tank-infantry team-work. Only a jumble of rocks separatedthe Marines of Company E from the


sea, but hidden behind every crag andin every crevice was an enemy deter-mined to block any and all egress by theadvancing Marines to the sea just eastof Kitano Point.

As bitter close fighting raged in thisinaccessible area, one man began tostand out among the rest of CompanyE. He was 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus,a former gridiron star at BaylorUniversity, now determined to over-come the final obstacle barring his menfrom the sea. Rushing forward at thehead of his platoon, the lieutenant wasknocked down by an exploding grenade .He got to his feet, shook off some of thedust, and rushed an enemy gun em-placement. A second grenade exploded,knocking him down again and shatter-ing his shoulder. Undaunted, the platoonleader got up, rushed a second enemyposition and killed all of its occupants .As his men watched, Lummus con-tinued his rush . When he called to hisplatoon, the men responded, now mov-ing forward with a deadly purpose. Asthe attack gained momentum, the entirecompany began to move, hesitantly atfirst, then with growing speed and as-surance .Lummus was still at the head of his

men, viciously slashing at the enemyin his path, when the incredible hap-pened :

Suddenly he was in the center of a pow-erful explosion obscured by flying rockand dirt. As it cleared, his men saw him,rising as if in a hole . A land mine hadblown off both his legs, the legs that hadcarried him to All-American football hon-ors at Baylor University. They watched inhorror as he stood on the bloody stumps,calling them on . Several men, crying now,ran to him and, for a moment, talked ofshooting him to stop his agony.


641

But he was still shouting for them tomove out and the platoon scrambled for-ward. Their tears turned to rage, theyswept an incredible 300 yards over impos-sible ground, and at nightfall they wereon a ridge overlooking the sea . There wasno question that the dirty, tired men,cursing and crying and fighting, had doneit for Jack Lummus . 4°

Lieutenant Lummus died later thatday and was subsequently awarded hiscountry's highest decoration . Even indeath his triumph over the enemy andthe slaughter that was Iwo Jima wascomplete. His devotion to duty andpersonal sacrifice had supplied theimpetus for the wild charge ." A mixtureof love and compassion for their leader,mixed with anger and frustration, hadsupplied the spark to an explosivemixture which set off a reaction that,for all practical purposes, was theAmerican equivalent of the traditionalenemy banzai charge .

Throughout D plus 17, tanks of the5th Tank Battalion supported the in-fantry assault units as best they could .Tanks of Company B, backing up 2/27,advanced into an important enemybivouac area replete with ammunitiondumps, motor vehicles, and trailers . Inthe course of this advance, tankersobserved at least 100 of the enemykilled, many of them wearing U . S. Ma-rine uniforms." Eleven regular tanksand two flame tanks of Company C, 5thTank Battalion, moved out in supportof 2/28 but soon were unable to keepup with the infantry advance when theengineers, who were checking the roadfor mines, were pinned down by sniper

4° Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 256 .°° 27th Mar AR, p . 13 .sx Co B, 5th Tk Bn AR, p . 7.

fire. As a result, tank support waslimited to four rounds of 75mm andhalf a load of flame fuel in this areafor the entire day . At about 1300, oneplatoon with a flame tank was dis-patched to the center of the divisionzone of advance to support 1/26 . Eventhough the area allegedly had beenchecked by the engineers, two of thetanks hit mines causing considerabledamage to both. These tanks had to beabandoned after the guns and radio hadbeen disabled . 52

As fighting came to a close on theevening of 8 March, the 5th MarineDivision had slashed deeply through theenemy lines and was within reach of thenorthern shore . It had rained intermit-tently throughout the day and the menwere utterly exhausted . However, theenemy was in little better shape, as in-dicated by the following report sub-mitted by General Kuribayashi on theday's action

Troops at "Tamanayama" and NorthernDistricts are still holding their positionthoroughly and continue giving damagesto the enemy. Their fighting situation be-lieving their country's victory looks god-like .'

Two hours later, the Japanese com-mander conceded :

I am very sorry that I have let theenemy occupy one part of the Japaneseterritory, but am taking comfort in givingheavy damages to the enemy ."

On the evening of D plus 17, the 5thMarine Division stood within reach ofvictory, but more than two weeks ofbitter fighting over the island's most

L7 Co C, 5th Tk Bn AR, p . 7 .' Horie Rpt, 1800, 8Mar45 .w Ibid.

642

treacherous terrain in northwesternIwo would be required before Japaneseresistance within the division zone ofaction was broken . During 9 and 10March, there was no forward move-ment, and General Rockey's men, withextreme exertion, were able to extendthe division left flank about 40 yards .At this point, the 28th Marines cameunder intensive fire from the highground that extended southeast fromKitano Point. This fire brought thedrive to the northeast to an abrupt haltin front of a long, low ridgeline over-looking a deep gorge. This canyon wasto become the final enemy pocket ofresistance on Iwo Jima, where GeneralKuribayashi and the remnants of hisgarrison would fight to the bitter end .In the northeastern portion of the is-land, between Tachiiwa Point and Mi-nami, in the 4th Marine Division sector,a second pocket occupied mostly bynaval personnel, would soon becomedepleted following a reckless banzaicharge .

By noon of D plus 18, within sight ofthe sea to the north, General Rockey'sMarines still faced an uphill battle insome of the worst ground on Iwo . There,the ridges and gorges were so steep asto be almost impassable even for menon foot. As in more accessible areas,caves and dugouts abounded. This phaseof the fighting, in the face of undimin-ished enemy opposition, is referred toin the official records as "a battle ofattrition" . 55 For a number of days tocome, the advance could be measuredin feet instead of yards .

w 5th MarDiv AR, p . 26 .


As on the previous day, anotherhuman drama, again involving the 27thMarines, was to be enacted in the frontlines on 9 March. During the earlyafternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Duryea,commanding 1/27, and Major Antonelli,commanding the adjacent 2d Battalion,went forward to check their lines . Theywere headed back to the rear when

. . . Duryea called to his runner, whowas sitting on a rock, and the youngsterreplied "I'm coming Colonel ." He took onestep and was blown to bits . He had set offthe detonator of a 6-inch naval shellburied in the ground to catch a tank .

A huge fragment of the shell tore offDuryea's left arm at the elbow and an-other smashed his left knee . Antonelli fell,blinded by sand . Duryea, still conscious,could not see his left leg, doubled underhim and thought he had lost it. Thinkingan attack was under way he shouted tothe others, "Come here, come here. Don'tgo away." He tried to roll over to get thepistol under his right hip, but could not .

A captain ran to get corpsmen, andthey bundled Duryea and Tony Antonelliinto stretchers. Duryea's left leg dangledoff the side, and a bullet pierced it, break-ing it ."

With the two battalion commandersout of commission, the executive officersof the two battalions, Major William Ii .Tumbelston and Major Gerald F. Rus-sell, assumed command. The detonationhad also wounded the company com-mander and another officer of CompanyE, as well as the intelligence officer of2/27. Major Antonelli, despite his eyeinjuries and a broken eardrum, refusedevacuation until he had issued ordersfor the resumption of the attack . Sub-sequently, the indomitable battalion

" Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 262-263 .


643

commander walked out of the divisionhospital and returned to his unit untilColonel Wornham personally orderedhim to return to the hospital . The fol-lowing day, Antonelli was back at thebattalion command post, where heremained during the daylight hours foranother week until Colonel Wornhamrequested his evacuation from the islandto prevent further injuries .57

Aside from routine operations on 9March, two developments occurred. Onewas indicative of progress made indeveloping Iwo Jima as an air base .The other showed to what extent thecombat units had been depleted . Dur-ing the difficult fighting along the northcoast, Army Air Forces P-51s went intoaction for the first time, strafing andbombing the enemy-held gorges inprecision attacks that drew admirationfrom the Marines on the ground .58Nevertheless, this impressive air sup-port failed to break enemy resistanceor morale, and the results remained in-conclusive .

At noon of 9 March, General Rockeydecided to bolster the dwindling combatstrength of his infantry units by send-ing personnel from the supporting armsto the front. On the morning of 10March, 100 men of the 13th Marinesjoined 3/28 as riflemen . About thesame number reinforced 3/26 . The 11thAmphibian Tractor Battalion furnished55 men for 3/27 and slightly more than

64 Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 108.`~ On 10 March, the VAC air officer reported :

"The precision low altitude work of the P-51swas particularly pleasing to the groundtroops." VAC Air Rpt, Encl A, p . 6 .

100 men from the 5th Motor TransportBattalion joined 1/28 .

While the Marines were still able toreinforce their frontline units, suchexpedient was denied to General Kuri-bayashi . In the narrow strip of coastseparating the 5th Division from thesea, the northern pocket had been com-pressed into an area less than onesquare mile in size . Caught in thispocket were General Kuribayashi andhis division headquarters, elements ofthe 2d Battalion of Colonel Ikeda's 145thInfantry Regiment, remnants of the CdBattalion, 17th Independent Mixed Reg-iment and a conglomeration of strag-glers from other units. Altogether, Jap-anese Army and Navy strength in north-ern Iwo came to approximately 1,500men.5s

At 0800 on 10 March, the 5th MarineDivision continued its attack againstenemy opposition that was undiminishedin ferocity. On the division left, the28th Marines made an advance of 200yards before it was stopped by fire froma ridge running generally southeast-ward from Kitano Point. The 26th Ma-rines gained roughly 100 yards in almostimpossible terrain . The 27th Marinesdestroyed numerous enemy caves andpillboxes in close-in fighting, but prog-ress was minimal. By the end of Dplus 19, after another day of heavy andcostly fighting, the lines of the 27thMarines were substantially the same asthey had been that morning .

Throughout the day, the 5th MarineDivision attack was supported by shore-based and naval gunfire, as well as air

' Horie Rpt, p. 10 .

644

strikes . Once again, the effectivenessof this support could not be accuratelygauged by the exhausted Marines onthe ground . It was obvious by this timethat it was becoming increasingly diffi-cult to make effective use of these sup-porting arms because of the rapidlydiminishing area held by the enemy . Atthe same time, the bombs and heavygunfire directed in heavy concentrationsagainst a shrinking pocket were boundto hurt the enemy . This is best con-firmed by the messages emanating fromGeneral Kuribayashi's headquarters onthe evening of 10 March . Beginning ona fairly confident note, the Japanesecommander reported that, "even thoughAmerican attacks against our northerndistricts are continuing day and night,our troops are still fighting bravely andholding their positions thoroughly ." 6 o

Changing to a more plaintive note, Gen-eral Kuribayashi continued

. . . 200 or 300 American infantrymenwith several tanks attacked "Tenzan"(northern Iwo in the 5th Division sector)all day. The enemy's bombardments fromone battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyersand aircraft are very severe, especiallythe bombing and machine gun firingagainst Divisional Headquarters from 30fighters and bombers are so fierce that Icannot express nor write here .Before American forces landed on Iwo

Jima, there were many trees around myHeadquarters, but now there are noteven a grasp of grass remaining. The sur-

' Ibid ., 1930, 10Mar45 .


face of the earth has changed completelyand we can see numerous holes of bom-bardments."

In its two-week drive up the coastof western Iwo Jima between 25February and 10 March, GeneralRockey's division had covered about3,000 yards from the vicinity of theCentral Airfield to a line that ran fromwest to east across the base of the north-ern tip of the island . In the course ofthis advance the division had sustainedmore than 4,000 casualties .62

Indicative of the severity of enemyopposition is the minute number ofprisoners taken by D plus 19 . Alto-getheer VAC had seized 111 prisonerssince D-Day. Of this figure, only 67were Japanese, the remainder consist-ing of Korean labor troops .03 At thesame time, 8,073 enemy dead had beencounted in the 5th Marine Division sec-tor.' On the evening of 10 March, noone could guess how much more bloodwould be shed before the battle for IwoJima was over .

6' Ibid."These losses consisted of 830 killed in

action, 2,974 wounded, 263 died of wounds, 5missing in action, and 220 cases of combatfatigue, a total of 4,292 casualties.

03 A breakdown of this total by divisions isas follows : the 3d Marine Division had cap-tured 49 ; the 4th Marine Division 28, and the5th Marine Division, 34 . Bartley, Iwo Mono-graph, p . 148 .

°4 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 11Mar45, in 1/13 UJnl .

The 4th Marine Division Drive on the Right

ADVANCE INTO THEMEAT GRINDER=

The first six days of the Iwo Jimaoperation had taken the 4th Marine Di-vision to the eastern portion of theCentral Airfield and Charlie-Dog Ridge,which had been secured at heavy coston 24 February. As of D plus 6, it be-

3 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : TF 51 AR; VAC AR;VAC G-2 Rpts; VAC C-3 Jnl; VAC C-3Rpts; VAC NGF and Air Rpts ; VAC Trans-lations; 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts ; 4th Mar-Div OpRpt; 4th MarDiv D-3 Jnl; 4th MarDivD-3 PerRpts; 4th MarDiv D-4 PerRpts ; 4thMarDiv OpOs, Iwo Jima, 24Feb-9Mar45 ; 4thMarDiv Translations ; 4th MarDiv DispatchSummaries, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-15Mar45 ; 4thMarDiv Support Gp OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 28Dec-44-17Mar45, dtd 4Apr45, hereafter 4th Mar-Div Support Gp OpRpt ; 1st ProvFldArtyGpG-1 Jnl; 23d Mar OpRpt ; 24th Mar OpRpt ;25th Mar UJn1; 25th Mar OpRpt ; 25th MarStrength and Casualty Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45 ; 25th Mar R-2 PerRpts, Iwo Jima,22Feb-16Mar45, hereafter 25th Mar R-2 Per-Rpts ; 14th Mar War]), 28Dec44-5Apr45 ; 14thMar OpRpt ; 14th Mar R-3 Rpts, 22Feb-14Mar45, hereafter 14th Mar R-3 Rpts ; IwoComments ; Bartley, Iwo Monograph ; More-house, Iwo Jima Campaign; Horie Rpt;Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely andCrowl, U. S . Marines and Amphibious War ;Newcomb, Iwo Jima; Newcomb Notes ; Hayashiand Coox, Kogun ; Henri et al, Marines onIwo Jima ; Proehl, The Fourth Marine Divi-sion ; Leckie, Strong Men Armed .

2 Additional material in this section is de-rived from : 2/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 15Jan-13Mar45, n.d ., hereafter 2/14 Op Rpt ; 4th

CHAPTER 10

i

came the division's mission to seize andhold that part of Iwo that lay east ofthe Central Airfield and to the south ofHill 362C. The ruggedness of the ter-rain over which General Cates' Marineswould have to advance equalled or out-did that encountered by the 3d and 5thMarine Divisions .

As might be expected, the enemy hadmade maximum use of the natural ter-rain features by digging caves, con-structing blockhouses, and tunnellingbetween ridges until the entire area washoneycombed with defense installationsrivaling every other sector on the is-land. Among a large number of non-descript ridges and canyon-like depres-sions, the following stood out and form-ed cornerstones of the main line of de-fense in the northeastern part of the

TkBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-18Mar45,dtd 18Apr45, hereafter 4th TkBn OpRpt ;1/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 31Dec44-16Mar45, n.d .,hereafter 1123 OpRpt ; 2/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima,310ct44-16Mar45, n.d ., hereafter 2/23 OpRpt ;3/23 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 18Jan45-16Mar45, dtd12Apr45, hereafter 3/23 OpRpt ; 1/24 OpRpt,Iwo Jima, 11Feb-18Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, here-after 1124 OpRpt ; 2/24 OpRpt, Iwo Jima,270ct44-18Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter2/24 OpRpt ; 3/24 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 1Jan45-17Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter 3/24 OpRpt ;2/25 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-17Mar45, dtd16Apr45, hereafter 2/25 OpRpt ; 3/25 OpRpt,Iwo Jima, 22Nov44-17Mar45, n.d ., hereafter3/25 OpRpt; 2d ArmdPhibBn, Iwo Jima,1OFeb-13Mar45, n.d ., hereafter 2d PhibBnOpRpt .

645

646

island : Hill 382, just east of the Cen-tral Airfield (Nidan Iwa to the enemy),situated about 250 yards northeast ofthe east-west runway. About 600 yardssouth of Hill 382, just west of the re-mains of Minami Village, was an un-sightly elevation which was to becomeknown as "Turkey Knob." Even thoughits height was not impressive, it shel-tered a large communications centermade of reinforced concrete. The top ofthis hill afforded an unobstructed viewof the entire southern portion of the is-land. To the southwest, the high groundgave way to a depression soon to be-come infamous as the "Amphitheater ."

On the evening of D plus 5, units ofthe 4th Marine Division held a line,facing east, extending from the CentralAirfield southward to the coast to thevicinity of the East Boat Basin. Fromtheir lines, the men could see Hill 382,the highest point in northern Iwo, sec-ond in size only to Mount Suribachi .The hill was readily identifiable fromthe remnants of a radar station, wherethe skeleton of a radio tower pointedstarkly skyward . The Japanese had hol-lowed out a sizable portion of the hill,which was bristling with field piecesand antitank guns. The guns them-selves were housed in concrete emplace-ments, often protected by as manyas 10 supporting machine guns. Someof Colonel Nishi's tanks, mounting47mm and 57mm guns, backed up theseformidable defenses .

The concrete blockhouse on TurkeyKnob was so soundly constructed as tomake it virtually immune to bombingand naval gunfire . The Knob dominateda broad, rocky area of a deceptively


innocent appearance, the Amphitheater .Prior to the naval bombardment, thisarea had been covered by heavy vegeta-tion and resembled a slight depressionin rolling terrain . The true extent andcohesiveness of this major enemy de-fensive area had not as yet revealeditself to the 4th Division Marines . Tothem, it looked just like a slight hollowin rolling terrain, though in reality "theAmphitheater was a veritable largescale booby trap, containing three tiersof deep prepared positions facing theiradvance."3

The failure of the advancing 4th Di-vision units to be aware of what awaitedthem on the rocky, cave-studded ter-rain of northeastern Iwo Jima was notdue entirely to a lack of intelligence .Observers had studied the terrain inthe zone of advance of the division frombattalion observation posts, from avessel close to the shoreline, and fromone of the reconnaissance planes ofVMO-4. A detailed intelligence reportcompiled on the basis of such observa-tion noted

The volcanic, crevice lined area is atangled conglomeration of torn trees andblasted rocks . Ground observation is re-stricted to small areas. While there aresundry ridges, depressions, and irregulari-ties, most of the crevices of any momentradiate from the direction of Hill 382 tofan out like spokes generally in a south-easterly direction providing a series ofcross corridors to our advance and emi-nently suitable for the enemy's employ-ment of mortars . The general debriscaused by our supporting fires providesperfect concealment for snipers and mor-tar positions. From the air, caves and

3 Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p. 61 .

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT

tracks are observed everywhere, but theenemy's camouflage discipline is flawlessand it is the rarest occasion that an AerialObserver can locate troops .'

The enemy force charged with thedefense of the Meat Grinder, whichconsisted of Hill 382, Turkey Knob, andthe Amphitheater combined, was the2d Mixed Brigade under Major GeneralSadasue Senda . This force consisted offive infantry battalions' an artillerybattalion, an engineer battalion, and afield hospital. Prior to D-Day, the 2dMixed Brigade Engineers had consoli-dated the three terrain features intoa closely integrated defense system,complete with extensive communica-tions and electric lights . Marines of the4th Division, preparing to move intonortheastern Iwo, faced the most ex-tensive and powerful defenses on theisland .

In the course of 25 February, GeneralCates' men prepared to advance intothe eastern bulge of Iwo Jima . Early onD plus 6, the 21st Marines which hadbeen attached to the 4th Division, re-verted to General Erskine and theboundary between the 21st and 24th Ma-rines became the left boundary of the4th Division. At the same time, the 23dMarines reverted from VAC reserve tothe 4th Division and prepared to attackafter passing through the left of the24th Marines . Plans for the assault onD plus 6 called for 3/23 to move outwith 1/23 following 600 yards behind .The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, was to

'4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 62, dtd 5-Mar45 .

6309th, 310th, 311th, 312th, and 314th Inde-pendent Infantry Battalions .

647

remain in reserve . In the adjacent sec-tor, the 24th Marines, with 2/25 at-tached, was to continue the advance with3/24 on the left and 1/24 on the right .The 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, was tobecome regimental reserve as soon as ithad been relieved by 3/23 . The 25thMarines, less 2/25, was to remain in di-vision reserve . The division main ef-fort was to be made on the left, wherethe 23d Marines was to maintain con-tact with the adjacent 3d Marine Di-vision .

The attack jumped off at 0930 . (SeeMap VII, Map Section) . Almost imme-diately, Colonel Wensinger's 23d Ma-rines, advancing in a column of battal-ions, encountered heavy mortar and ma-chine gun fire from pillboxes, bunkers,and caves. Progress was accordinglyslow. Enemy antitank guns and mines,as well as unfavorable terrain, made itimpossible to move armor to the frontin the 4th Division zone of advance . Theadjacent 3d Division was requested topermit tanks of the 4th Tank Battalionthe use of an approach route leadingthrough 3d Division terrain to the Cen-tral Airfield. Permission was grantedshortly before 1300 . Once the Shermanshad taken up firing positions along theleft boundary of the 23d Marines, theywere able to lend effective support tothe infantry, destroying antitank weap-ons, pillboxes, and enemy machine gunemplacements. Once these defenses hadbeen eliminated, an armored bulldozerof the 4th Engineer Battalion was ableto clear a route of advance for the tanksin the zone of action of the 23d Marines .Throughout the day, 3/23 continued tomeet heavy resistance as it gained a

648

foothold on the high ground at thenortheastern edge of the Central Air-field and pushed eastward along Char-lie-Dog Ridge . Heavy and accurate ene-my mortar fire that blanketed the run-ways of the airfield made it extremelydifficult for Colonel Wensinger's Ma-rines to maintain contact with the ad-jacent 9th Marines .The 24th Marines, with 2/25 at-

tached, made only little progress on 25February, slowed by difficult terrain,mortar fire, and interlocking bands offire from automatic weapons in pill-boxes, bunkers, and caves . Prior to thejumpoff, artillery, naval gunfire, andcarrier aircraft attempted to soften upthe Amphitheater and Minami Village .While the air strike was in progress,81mm mortars fired 200 rounds into thisarea. Offshore, LVT (A) s of the 2d Ar-mored Amphibian Battalion attemptedto support 1/24, but rough seas soonmade their withdrawal necessary .

Enemy resistance in front of 3/24came from the Amphitheater, while1/24 found its advance contested bystrong enemy defenses to its front . Fivetanks of Lieutenant Colonel Richard K .Schmidt's 4th Tank Battalion eventual-ly got into position to support the at-tack, but the rough terrain severely lim-ited the movement of armor. Havinggained roughly 100 yards, the two bat-talions were halted by heavy enemy firethat took a steady toll among officers andmen. Among those mortally woundedin the course of the morning was thecommander of Company A, 1/24 . Thebattalion intelligence officer waswounded and evacuated .

For the remainder of the afternoon,neither regiment made any significant


gains. An air strike against the highground facing 3/24 in the early after-noon temporarily reduced the volumeof the enemy mortar fire and enabledMajor Stout's men to move forward afew additional yards . In midafternoon,2/24, which had spent most of the dayin regimental reserve, was ordered torelieve 1/24 on the regiment's right .This relief, ordered at short notice, wasexecuted without casualties .

On the evening of D plus 6, the 4thMarine Division was poised for the at-tack into the enemy's strongest line ofdefenses in the division's zone of ad-vance. At this stage, even before the div-ision had launched a direct assault intowhat came to be called the Meat Grinder,its combat efficiency had already beenreduced to an estimated 55 percent bycasualties and battle fatigue .r, Yet Gen-eral Cates and the men under his com-mand were unflagging in their deter-mination to see the difficult job through .In commenting on the limited gains of25 February, the division sized up thesituation as follows

The combination of terrain skillfullyemployed to the best advantage by theenemy, terrain unsuited for tank employ-ment, the location$ of installations inareas which were . defiladed from our ar-tillery, and the stubborn fight to-the-deathattitude of the defenders had temporarilylimited the advance of this Division ; butthe Division prepared to continue theattack'

At 2200 on D plus 6, the rear com-mand post of the 4th Marine Divisionclosed on the USS Bayfield . In the courseof the evening, support ships fired night

'4th MarDiv OpRpt, 25Feb45 .7 1 bid .


missions. During the night, there waslittle activity in the 4th Marine Divi-sion sector. A small enemy patrol at-tempted to infiltrate into the 3/24 area,but all of the Japanese were eitherkilled or dispersed . The enemy firedsporadically into the division sectorwith rockets, mortars, and artillery .The 4th Division attack on the morn-

ing of 26 February was preceded by acoordinated preparation fired by thecorps and division artillery and navalgunfire support ships. Following theshelling, the 4th Marine Division re-sumed the attack at 0800 with five bat-talions abreast . Once again, on the di-vision left, Colonel Wensinger's 23dMarines attacked with 1/23 on the leftand 3/23 on the right . On the divisionright, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines,which had relieved the 24th Marinesearlier that morning, advanced at 0830with all three battalions . The half hourdelay in the jumpoff of the 25th Ma-rines was caused by the necessity of re-turning 2/25 from 24th Marines' con-trol and moving the battalion to theline of departure .

The division attack encountered thesame difficulties that had stymied itsprogress on 25 February . Enemy re-sistance from well organized and mu-tually supporting positions continuedundiminished . In front of the 23d Ma-rines, the enemy occupied a maze ofpillboxes, bunkers, and caves . All ave-nues of approach were protected bysuccessive minefields, which made it al-most impossible to commit armor insupport of the infantry . On the otherhand, enemy tanks dug in on the slopesof Hill 382 had a clear field of fire intothe advancing Marines . One of the ene-

649

my medium tanks, armed with a 57mmgun, occupied a stationary position in acrevice, from where it could fire at willalong the entire length of the mainrunway of the Central Airfield . Three47mm antitanks guns were emplaced inthe northern portion of Charlie-DogRidge, which also afforded an unim-peded field of fire at the same runway.

Despite bitter opposition, ColonelWensinger's Marines continued topush the attack throughout the day .Elements of 1/23, commanded byLieutenant Colonel Louis B . Blissard,drew heavy and accurate fire not onlyfrom Hill 382, but also from the ad-jacent 3d Division zone, where the ene-my still occupied strong positions to thenorth of the Central Airfield . To theright of 1/23, the 3d Battalion, com-manded by Major James S. Scales, metequally heavy fire, but managed to fightits way forward, eliminating well-em-placed and dug-in pillboxes and block-houses through the use of flamethrow-ers, rockets, and demolition teams .By late afternoon, the 23d Marines

had gained about 300 yards and seizedthe southwest slopes of Hill 382. Thisadvance partially denied the use of thisvital hill to the enemy. At 1700, the re-giment was ordered to consolidate, butone hour later Major Scales' men werestill engaged in close combat with theenemy and vicious fighting at closequarters continued until well into theevening. In addition to receiving firefrom the front and flanks, the Marinesoccupying precarious positions on theslopes of Hill 382 also drew scatteredsniper fire from the rear, which didlittle to ease the minds of the exposedMarines. When heavy enemy mortar

650

and rocket fire began to hit the south-western slopes in the afternoon, it be-came necessary to withdraw all unitsto the foot of Hill 382 .

The 25th Marines was to find the go-ing equally rough on D plus 7 . Follow-ing a rolling artillery barrage, ColonelLanigan's regiment, with 3/24 attached,jumped off with 1/25, under Major Fen-ton J. Mee on the left, 2/25 under Lieu-tenant Colonel James Taul in the center,and 3/25 commanded by Captain JamesC. Headley, on the . right .

Initially, the advance of 1/25 and3/24 into the Amphitheater proceededslowly but steadily against enemy smallarms fire. After an advance of about150 yards, the terrain became extreme-ly difficult . At the same time, Japanesemachine guns and mortars unleashedsuch a deluge of fire from well pre-pared and camouflaged positions nearMinami Village that the men were ef-fectively pinned down . Tanks of Com-pany A, 4th Tank Battalion, attemptedto reduce enemy pressure on the in-fantry but succeeded only in drawingadditional artillery and mortar firewhich resulted in the destruction of twoShermans just east of the airfield . Inthe jumbled terrain, artillery forwardobservers were unable to direct effec-tive counterbattery fire against the ene-my. Two spotter aircraft from VMO-4,which had just reached the island, madean attempt to spot the bothersome ene-my mortar and artillery positions fromthe air, but this effort was also unsuc-cessful due to skillful enemy camouflage .

With the left and center of the 25thMarines pinned down, Company C of1/25 made an attempt at 1400 to senda platoon, supported by three Shermans,


around the right flank to envelop enemydefenses on Turkey Knob . This attemptended in dismal failure when the Japa-nese became aware of the maneuver andshifted their mortar fire . The barragecaught the men out in the open andkilled several, including the platoonleader. The survivors of this ill-fatedplatoon were able to withdraw onlyunder cover of a smoke screen .

Along the division right flank, 3/25made a slow but steady advance againstheavy machine gun and rifle fire fromthe high ground on the left and cavesand pillboxes to the front . As CompanyL slowly moved forward, Company I,supported by two medium tanks and byLVT (A) s offshore, was systematicallymopping up near the East Boat Basin .In the wake of Company L's advancefollowed Company K, using demolitioncharges and flamethrowers on everyposition that might possibly shelter ene-my troops that had been bypassed .

As D plus 7, 26 February, came toa close, the 4th Marine Division helda very irregular line somewhat re-sembling the wings of a seagull. Onthe left, the 23d Marines had gainedroughly 200 yards . In the center of thedivision line, where 1/25 was directly infront of Turkey Knob and the Amphi-theater, gains were at best 75 yards .The most progress for the day had beenmade by 3/25 on the right which bylate afternoon had seized a line of cliffseast of the East Boat Basin for an over-all gain of nearly 500 yards. One moreaccomplishment accrued to 3/25 : inmopping up the area near the East BoatBasin, the battalion wiped out the lastnest of snipers that had interfered withshore party activities on the beaches


651

below. Even though the unloading wasstill carried on under the muzzles of theenemy artillery and rockets from north-ern Iwo still were capable of hitting anypoint on the island, at least the bother-some sniper fire had been eliminated .

The 4th Marine Division intelligencereport for D plus 7 outlined the sever-ity of the resistance that the divisionhad encountered, particularly in frontof Hill 382 and Turkey Knob, and noted"that the enemy is now fighting to thedeath in pillboxes, foxholes, andtrenches . . . and is not retreating as heapparently formerly had done."8

The enemy unit to which this reportreferred was the 309th IndependentInfantry Battalion . On D-Day, this bat-talion had been stationed near theSouthern Airfield and since then it hadfought a delaying action, graduallywithdrawing northeastward undersuperior pressure . On D plus 7, the at-tack by the 23d Marines had severelymauled the battalion and pushed itsoutheastward, where it found itself inthe path of the 25th Marines' advance .As a result, when the day ended, thebattalion had been for all practical pur-poses annnihilated .

After a day of exhausting action, 4thDivision Marines were in for a rest-less night. Enemy mortars and artillerykept both the division's front and rearareas under steady fire, paying specialattention to the division artillery posi-tions. Beyond any doubt, the accuracyof the enemy fire was aided by brightmoonlight which emerged after an af-ternoon of intermittent rain . Less ac-curate, but equally disturbing to the

1 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt, 26Feb45 .

peace of mind of 4th Division Marines,were the huge rockets wobbling overtheir positions and exploding far totheir rear. In the midst of this bedlam,there was small arms fire from the ene-my side .

Small groups of Japanese attemptedto infiltrate all along the division pe-rimeter. Around 0530, the sound of tankengines was heard in front of the 23dMarines and there were indications thatthe enemy was preparing to counter-attack. An artillery preparation intothe presumed enemy assembly arearestored silence. Offshore, support shipsfurnished harassing fires and illumina-tion. Aside from the enemy probes, nomajor attack developed and it was as-sumed that the artillery barrage haddispersed the possible counterattack . In-dicative of the bitterness of the actionthat continued through the long nightis the fact that in the area in front of1/25 alone, 103 enemy dead werecounted after daybreak9Dawn on 27 February, D plus 8,

marked the beginning of the second dayof the concerted 4th Division assaultinto the Meat Grinder . The lineup ofunits for the attack was substantiallythe same as on the previous day . Fromleft to right, the five battalions com-mitted were 1/23 and 3/23, and all threebattalions of the 25th Marines . The 24thMarines, except for the 3d Battalionwhich was still attached to the 25thMarines, continued in regimental re-serve .

The assault was preceded by a 45-minute preparation of the corps anddivision artillery. Even though, at this

9 25th Mar OpRpt, p . 8,

652

particular time, the corps artillery wasgiving priority to supporting GeneralErskine's 3d Division, Colonel Letcher,commanding the 1st Provisional FieldArtillery Group, ordered his 155mmhowitzers to expend 300 rounds as partof the preparation . For the remainderof the day, the corps artillery was au-thorized to fire up to 25 percent of thegeneral support missions for GeneralCates' division . The 4th Division objec-tive for D plus 8 was capture of Hill 382and advance to the 0-2 Line .Following a thunderous artillery

preparation, the 4th Division attackedat 0800. On the division left, the two bat-talions of the 23d Marines resumed theassault on Hill 382. While 1/23 attackednortheastward in order to envelop thehill from the north, the 3d Battalionresumed the assault up the southwest-ern slopes . Since the Japanese atop thehill enjoyed a perfect view of the Amer-ican lines, smoke was employed to screenthe reorganization and movement offrontline companies in the 3d Battalionarea. The enemy was not deceived, how-ever, and almost immediately, the ad-vancing Marines came under such se-vere fire that forward movement wasall but impossible . Nevertheless,throughout the morning, 3/23 launchedrepeated assaults up the southwesternslopes of the hill without making anysubstantial headway. Strong and deter-mined enemy resistance from the highground effectively pinned Major Scales'men down. Two of Colonel Nishi's tanks,emplaced in the recesses of Hill 382,further added to the volume of the ene-my fire. A new technique resorted toby the Japanese at this time was firing


rifle grenades in volleys, which tooka further toll of casualties among theexposed Marines .

By noon, the Japanese were still fullyin control of the hill. The 1st Battalion,23d Marines . was slowly gaining groundto the northwest of Hill 382 . Once hehad bypassed the objective from thenorth, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard, thebattalion commander, planned to attackup the reverse slope. Both battalions,but especially 3/23, had sustained lossesthat had reduced them to little morethan company strength ; some of thecompanies had shrunk to platoon size .Nevertheless, the assault continued. Inorder to assist 3/23 in its frontal as-sault, 2/14 fired a 30-minute prepara-tion beginning at noon, against Hill382. Following this barrage, the ex-hausted men of 3/23 jumped off . Thistime, some progress was made, as Ma-rines threw grenades and satchelcharges into the caves and other strong-points still held by the obstinate de-fenders. Once the Marines had advancedwithin striking distance of the twotanks, they were able to finish themoff with bazooka fire. Slowly and pain-fully, the assault force fought its wayup the hill .

Additional support for Major Scales'men arrived in two forms . First, shortlyafter 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard'sbattalion, having bypassed the hill, com-menced an attack up the reverse slope .Secondly, almost at the same time, en-gineers with a tank dozer began tocarve out a path over which some ofthe Shermans could come within strik-ing distance. Once they had gone intoposition, the supporting tanks took the

THE 4TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE ON THE RIGHT .

Japanese on the higher reaches of Hill382 under effective fire. This badlyneeded support, arriving at a crucialtime, reversed the situation. The Japa-nese on the hill found themselves vir-tually cut off. The deadly fire of theShermans forced them to stay undercover. As Major Scales' men approachedthe top of the hill, they discovered thatthe top had been hollowed out and thatit contained a solid wall of artilleryand antitank gun positions .

Here, among the ruins of the radarstation, the men of 3/23 came to gripswith the Japanese in vicious close com-bat in which no quarter was asked orgiven. Just when it appeared that theJapanese would be driven off, a heavyartillery and mortar barrage hit theadvancing Marines . With darkness ap-proaching, 3/23 still had not gained asolid foothold on top of Hill 382, andrather than risk an envelopment dur-ing the night, 3/23 was ordered to con-solidate on ground that would permitsolid contact with adjacent units to theleft and the right . As a result, MajorScales' men withdrew from the hill andspent the night in practically the samepositions from which they had launchedtheir attack on the morning of D plus 8 .

Progress on 27 February was littlebetter to the right of the 23d Marines,where the 25th Marines, with 3/24 at-tached, jumped off at 0800. On the regi-mental left, the advance of 1/25hinged on the progress made by 3/23 . Ifthe latter succeeded in seizing the crestof Hill 382, 1/25 was to advance norththrough part of the 3/23 zone of at-tack, then pivot southeastward to en-velop Turkey Knob while 2/25 was to

653

attempt an envelopment from thesouth. When it became evident by 1500that the advance of 3/23 was progress-ing much more slowly than anticipated,Major Fenton J. Mee, commanding 1/25, ordered the battalion forward, eventhough Hill 382 still had not been taken .The attack, supported by tanks and pre-ceded by a rocket barrage, initially gain-ed 150 yards across open terrain butcame to a halt before cover on the farside could be reached when heavy mor-tar and antitank fire, as well as intensemachine gun fire, hit the assault force .In addition to inflicting heavy casualtieson the infantrymen, the Japanese alsosucceeded in putting two of the threetanks supporting the attack out of ac-tion and damaging the third . Shortlyafter 1700, it had to be conceded thatthe commanding ground which formedthe day's objective could not be reach-ed before nightfall, and the battalionpulled back to its jumpoff positions .

In the regimental center and on theright, 2/25 and 3/25, attacking due eastgained between 200 and 300 yards . Af-ter having reached ground that wasfavorable for night defense, both bat-talions were ordered at 1600 to haltfor the day . Since it was still consideredpossible that the enemy might attempta flanking attack from the sea, elementsof 3/25 were held in reserve near theEast Boat Basin with the specific mis-sion of defending that area against anyfurther attack from the ocean .

As D plus 8 ended, an analysis of theprogress made that day showed clear-ly that the gains made were minimal .Summing up the situation at Hill 382,the 4th Division noted with some dis-

654

gust that "it was envisaged that thecapture of this terrain freak would be acostly and a time-consuming job ."10

THE BATTLE OF ATTRITION"

For 4th Division Marines, the nightfrom 27-28 February proved to be arestless one . Throughout the darkness,both the front and rear areas came un-der heavy mortar fire . For a while itappeared that the enemy had singledout the division command post forspecial punishment, and no less than15 heavy shells hit the CP prior to2200 . 12 At the same time, the enemyfired on the beach area with either 20mmor 40mm automatic weapons . Offshore,ships of Task Force 54 furnished nor-mal harassing and illumination fires .The enemy probed various sectors inthe 4th Marine Division lines, but nocounterattack developed .

Shortly before 0100, the 23d Marinesreported that enemy cargo parachuteswere dropping into the enemy linesabout 400 to 600 yards ahead of them .Strangely enough, none of the enemyplanes had been picked up by the Amer-ican radar on and around Iwo Jima .Nevertheless, the visual sightings weresufficient to spur American artillery intovigorous action . Concentrated artilleryand naval gunfire into the drop zone,

10 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 25."Additional material in this section is de-

rived from: 1/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Jan-15Mar45, dtd 27Mar45, hereafter 1/14 OpRpt ;3/14 OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-13Mar45, dtd27Mar45, hereafter 3/14 OpRpt ; 1/25 OpRpt,Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-17Mar45, dtd 19Apr45,hereafter 1/25 OpRpt ; 1st JASCO OpRpt,Iwo Jima, 24Aug44-18Mar45, hereafter 1stJASCO OpRpt ."4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 26.


though unobserved, was expected tohave resulted in the destruction of mostof the supplies that had been airliftedto General Senda's 2d Mixed Brigade,elements of which were still holdingthe crest of Hill 382 . The cargo re-ceived by the Japanese that night con-sisted of medical supplies and ammu-nition, dropped with paper parachutesfrom planes based elsewhere in theBonins. Some of these supplies, still at-tached to the flimsy parachutes, wererecovered several days later when Ma-rines entered the drop zone .

Objectives for the continuation ofthe attack on the last day of February,D plus 9, remained unchanged thoughsome of the regimental boundarieswithin the 4th Division underwent aslight change. On the left, the 23d Ma-rines was to continue the assault on Hill382 ; in the center, 1/25 and 2/25 wereto continue their envelopment of TurkeyKnob, while 3/25 along the coast wasto advance to the 0-2 Line .At 0815, following a 45-minute ar-

tillery preparation, the assault battal-ions of the 4th Marine Division jumpedoff. On the left, the 23d Marines, re-inforced with one company of the 24thMarines, resumed the attack with 1/23on the left and 2/23 on the right afterthe latter battalion had relieved 3/23 .The 2d Battalion, under Major RobertH. Davidson, attempted an advance in-to the area between Hill 382 and Tur-key Knob, while 1/23 again assaultedthe hill from the east. Following thejumpoff, 2/23 advanced about 200 yardsbefore it came under increasingly heavymortar and automatic weapons firefrom concealed bunkers and pillboxes .The 1st Battalion likewise drew fire


655

from automatic weapons and mortars,which brought its advance to a virtualstandstill . The 3d Battalion spent mostof the morning reorganizing and didnot start its push up the southwesternslopes of Hill 382 until later in the af-ternoon .

As a result, the only battalion of the23d Marines to make any appreciablegains in the course of the morning was2/23. At 1300, following a 10-minutepreparation, 1/23 launched a coordinat-ed attack with the 21st Marines of theadjacent 3d Marine Division . This jointventure resulted in a 300-yard advanceof 1/23 near the division boundary .Other elements of 1/23, attacking Hill382 from the east, destroyed two ofColonel Nishi's dug-in tanks and con-tinued the ascent to a point where theycould take the enemy on top of the hillunder fire. By midafternoon, Hill 382was virtually surrounded ; the noosearound the Japanese was further tight-ened when two companies of 3/23 werecommitted to reinforce the lines of thetwo assault battalions .

Despite the punishment he was tak-ing, the enemy atop Hill 382 continuedto fight as if nothing out of the or-dinary were happening around him . Inaddition to resistance coming from thehill itself, the Marines of the encirclingforce drew heavy mortar, rocket, andartillery fire from enemy positions hid-den in the jumbled rocks to the east ofthe hill. Behind the American lines, thesupporting weapons did all they couldto support the attack of the infantryagainst Hill 382 . In addition to firingpreparations before the jumpoff, the14th Marines shelled the area aheadof the infantry in an attempt to silence

enemy small arms and automatic wea-pons. Corps and division observersteamed up in an effort to pinpoint asmany as possible of the cleverly hid-den enemy mortar, artillery, and rocketpositions, a slow and time-consumingprocess that did not always produce im-mediate results .

The difficult terrain, combined withJapanese expertise in mining the ap-proaches to the front lines and the ex-cellent marksmanship of the enemy an-titank gun crews, severely curtailed theuse of tanks in close support of the in-fantry. Nevertheless, individual tankswere able to move forward to deliveroverhead fire, which was helpful butstill lacked the volume necessary to bereally effective. Finally, it was decidedthat the 4 .5-inch rockets of the 1st Pro-visional Rocket Detachment might pro-vide the massed firepower needed. Ini-tially, whenever the rocket truckswent into action, they invariably at-tracted immediate counterbattery firefrom the enemy entrenched on the do-minating heights blessed with the ad-vantage of unlimited observation . Inorder to compete effectively at such adisadvantage, the rocket launcher crewsemployed hit-and-run tactics . Rockettrucks would whip into position, firetheir launchers, and take off to pre-designated assembly points in the rearwith all possible speed . If a particularlyintensive barrage was desired, sixtrucks and launchers would fire once,reload with rockets carried on the ve-hicles, fire a second salvo, and thenhead for the rear. In this way, a doubleripple of 432 rounds could be deliveredin somewhat less than five minutes . 13

'3 4th MarDiv OpRpt, Anx C, p. 27.

656

By late afternoon of 28 February, itbecame evident that despite the deterio-rating situation of enemy troops on thecrest of Hill 382, capture of. this ob-jective would not be completed in theremaining hours of daylight . As a re-sult, the 23d Marines remained activewell into the night in an attempt toconsolidate its lines for night defense .The 1st Battalion, in particular, foundit extremely difficult to close the gapon the left with the 21st Marines . Thiswas finally accomplished under sniperfire from enemy pockets that has beenbypassed in the adjacent 21st Marines'zone of advance during the day . Gainsmade by the 23d Marines on D plus 9totalled about 300 yards on the left and200 yards on the right .As Colonel Wensinger's regiment

vainly struggled to complete the cap-ture of Hill 382 on D plus 9, the ad-jacent 25th Marines faced its own or-deal in its drive to seize Turkey Knob,the Amphitheater, and the area sepa-rating the Knob from the east coast .At 0815, the regiment, with 3/24 at-tached, jumped off in the same forma-tion it had maintained on the previousday. Two companies of the 1st Battal-ion, plus one company of 3/24, were toattempt an envelopment of TurkeyKnob from the north, while anothercompany was to advance along the lowground southwest of the Knob and at-tack eastward around the Amphitheateruntil it could link up with the north-ern pincers .

Following the usual preparation, ele-ments of the 1st Battalion moved intothe wooded area just north of TurkeyKnob and advanced some 50 yards . Atthis point, the enemy unleashed a tre-


mendous mortar and artillery barrage ;heavy machine gun fire from the frontand the left flank began to rake theMarines. Prompt counterbattery firecalled for by observers with the 1st Bat-talion failed to silence the enemy bat-teries . By noon, the situation of 1/25in the woods had become critical and thebattalion was suffering heavy casual-ties . Nevertheless, Major Mee, the bat-talion commander, ordered his men tohold the woods in order to enable thesouthern pincers to complete the en-velopment of Turkey Knob. As CompanyB, which was to make the envelopment,started its encircling movement, sup-ported by two Shermans, the enemy onthe high ground east of the objectivestarted to shower the force with handgrenades, at the same time raking themwith accurate machine gun fire . One ofthe tanks soon hit a mine and was dis-abled ; the other managed to pull back .At the fury of the enemy fire in-

creased and casualties mounted, the at-tack of Company B stalled . By 1645 itwas readily apparent that continuationof the attack in the face of such heavyenemy resistance during the limiteddaylight remaining would serve no use-ful purpose, and both pincers of 1/25pulled back to their respective start-ing positions. In the fading daylight,two tanks made their way forward to apoint northwest of Turkey Knob andfrom this vantage point opened fireagainst the enemy communications cen-ter atop the hill. The 75mm shells, toall appearances, did little damage to theconcrete structure and the shelling wasineffective .

To the right of 1/25, the 2d Battal-ion attempted to extend its left flank


to support the advance of the southernpincers of 1/25 . To this end, it had toseize the high ground directly to itsfront. Enemy fire, most of it comingfrom pillboxes to the left of the bat-talion zone of advance, pinned down theinfantry. The difficult terrain made itimpossible for the Shermans and half-tracks to give close support to the in-fantry. The attack soon stalled . At noon,the battalion commander, LieutenantColonel Taul, decided to improvise inorder to get the attack moving again .He requested and received permissionto have a 75mm pack howitzer rushedforward, to be used as a direct assaultweapon. A DUKW was used to trans-port the howitzer to a position just be-hind the front lines . There, the gunwas dismantled and the various pieceswere gingerly hand-carried into thezone of advance of 2/25, where thepiece was carefully reassembled . Oncethis feat had been accomplished, thepack howitzer pumped 40 rounds atthe concrete structure atop TurkeyKnob. Most of the shells bounced harm-lessly off the thick concrete walls anddid little, if any, damage to the com-munications center . However, it was notaltogether a wasted effort for the bat-talion reported that while "the directresult to the enemy was not readily ap-parent, the morale effect on the menof this battalion was of considerablevalue because after the howitzer wasfired our lines advanced approximately75 yards by 1900 ."14 Two hours later,under cover of darkness, the packhowitzer was again disassembled andreturned to its parent organization .

657

On the right of the 25th Marines'zone of advance, 3/25 jumped off onthe morning of D plus 9 at the sametime as the other battalions of the di-vision. Moving eastward roughly paral-lel to the east coast, the battalion hadgained about 100 yards by 1000 . At thattime, the advance of the adjacent 2dBattalion began to bog down, and 3/25,which was pacing itself by the progressof the unit on its left, also halted theattack. Since 2/25 on the left failed tomake any further progress for the day,neither did 3/25 . At 1800, units of the25th Marines were ordered to consoli-date for the night .In summing up the results of the

day's operations, the 4th Marine Divi-sion felt that, even though the enemywas still clinging to the crest of Hill382 and Turkey Knob, the day's limitedadvance had outflanked these enemystrongpoints. The feeling was that 4thDivision Marines could henceforth by-pass the Amphitheater and continuethe drive along the east coast of IwoJima. Despite the small gains made onD plus 9, the division intelligence of-ficer felt that the central defensive coreof resistance had been cracked . He af-firmed the possibility of an enemycounterattack, but assumed that theJapanese would be least likely to mountany major counterattack in the zone ofaction of the 4th Division because of thedifficult terrain.h Events were to provethis forecast only 50 percent correct .

Throughout 28 February, the assaultbattalions had received a variety of as-sistance from the supporting arms . Off-

` 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No . 57, dtd 28-"2/25 OpRpt, p . 8.

Feb45.

658

shore, gunfire support ships furnishedcall-fire missions, while smaller craftfired mortars in support of 2/25 and3/25. During the afternoon a destroyerapproached the east shore and beganshelling enemy positions on the highground in front of the 2/25 zone of ad-vance. Air support extended to the en-tire 4th Division sector, though halfof the napalm bombs dropped in frontof the 25th Marines in the course ofthe morning failed to ignite. A secondstrike, this time in support of the 23dMarines, took unduly long to be ex-ecuted. When the aircraft did arrive,they went into action against the wrongtarget area . 16

The night from D plus 9 to D plus10 turned out to be another restless onefor Marines of the 4th Division . Theenemy concentrated his artillery fireagainst rear installations of the 5thMarine Division and scored severallucky hits on the ammunition dumpsof that division . The resulting explo-sions coming from the rear did littleto reassure the men of any of the threedivisions. Some enemy mortar and ar-tillery fire also fell in the 4th Divisionarea, causing further disruption ofsleep. Alert Marines of 3/23 frustratedseveral enemy attempts to infiltratetheir lines, and 29 enemy dead werefound in front of the lines on the fol-lowing morning. Around 2200, the 25thMarines noticed that the enemy in com-pany strength was massing for a coun-ter attack near the coast in the 3/25area. Naval gunfire and shore-based ar-tillery promptly fired on and dispersedthis assembly .

19 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 55, dtd 28-Feb45.


Division orders for 1 March calledfor continuation of the attack againstHill 382 and Turkey Knob. Beginningat 0530, the 24th Marines was to re-lieve the depleted units of the 23d, with2/24 relieving 1/23 and 1/24 takingover the 2/23 sector. 1 T The relief wascompleted by 0630 without major in-cident and, following a 45-minute navalgunfire and corps artillery preparation,the attack against the key enemy de-fenses resumed . For 10 minutes prior toH-Hour, set for 0830, the division ar-tillery blasted enemy positions in thedivision zone of advance .

On the division left, the 24th Ma-rines jumped off, with the 2d Battalion,commanded by Lieutenant ColonelRichard Rothwell on the left and 1/24,under Major Paul S. Treitel, on theright. Almost immediately, 2/24 washit by heavy artillery and mortar fire .In order to keep his battalion from get-ting bogged down, Lieutenant ColonelRothwell requested supporting fire .Shortly after 0930, carrier aircraftdropped napalm about 600 yards infront of 2/24. The aerial assault was fol-lowed within the hour by a fire con-centration against the same area bythe corps artillery ; this fire was fol-lowed by naval gunfire . This counter-fire had a salutory effect and enemy op-position diminished to the extent thatelements of the battalion, in the courseof the afernoon, were able to makegains of 150 yards .

While part of 2/24, notably CompanyF, was engaged in attacking northeast-ward along the boundary with the 3dMarine Division, at times even cross-

" 4th MarDiv OpO 10-45, dtd 28Feb45 .


ing the boundary, the gains made byGeneral Erskine's men on 1 March ex-ceeded those of the 4th Division and,in consequence, a gap developed alongthe boundary. Colonel Walter I . Jor-dan, commanding the 24th Marines, at1430 had to commit two companies of3/24 into the gap in order to regaincontact with the 3d Division along theleft flank .

Somewhat farther to the south, thebattle for Hill 382 continued with un-diminished fury . The reduction of thebattered strongpoint fell to CompanyG, 2/24, which assaulted the hill withflamethrowers, bazookas, grenades, andwhatever else was at hand. Just as ele-ments of the 23d Marines had previ-ously fought their way to the top toengage in close combat with the de-fenders, only to be driven off, so it waswith the determined Marines of Com-pany G, 2/24 . The viciousness of thefighting that ensued has been depictedin these words :

At one time, Company G of 2/24 wasastride the top, but still there was noquarter . The attackers fought with riflesand grenades, with flamethrowers andsatchel charges . Still the defenders wouldnot give up, even though their own firefell on them from the ridges further east .These were the men from Kumamoto inKyushu, a historic battlefield of the 1877Civil War, and they would not give up .Not even when Major Kenro Anso died,burned from head to foot by a flame-thrower. He led the 3d Battalion, 145thRegiment, in defense of the hill . So greatwas his inspiration that at his death hewas promoted two full ranks to colonel .

As the afternoon wore on, the bat-tle for control of the hill continued

7e Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 212 .

659

without letup. While hand grenadesflew back and forth, assault squadswere blowing cave entrances, and flame-throwers were incinerating such Japa-nese as showed themselves . LieutenantColonel Rothwell, escorted by his com-pany commanders, appeared on thescene in order to conduct a personalreconnaissance, select positions for thecoming night, and make plans for theattack on D plus 11 . Despite heavy firethat was coming from nearly every di-rection, the reconnaissance party com-pleted its inspection and the battalioncommander left the hill unscathed. Asthe day ended, the remnants of MajorAnso's battalion clung to the crest ofHill 382, still full of fighting spirit de-spite the loss of their commander .

Along the southern slopes of the hilland near its base to the southeast, thefighting on D plus 10 waxed just asbitterly as it did at the top . Here, 1/24was attempting an envelopment of Hill382 from the south against heavy firecoming not only from the top of thehill but also from a patch of woodsdirectly in front and the high groundbeyond. As men of the 1st Battalioninched ahead, two tanks attached toCompany C provided covering fire. Justbefore noon, the company commanderwas wounded and casualties mounted toa point where smoke had to be employedto screen evacuation of the wounded .

Following a heavy artillery and mor-tar concentration, and led by a newcommander, Company C resumed theattack at 1300 . Within minutes, the newcommander was wounded and had tobe replaced. Despite all enemy opposi-tion, the company continued its doggedadvance and by 1700, when it began to

660

consolidate its positions, it had seizedsome of the high ground to the south-east of Hill 382 .

The biggest gains for the 24th Ma-rines on D plus 10 were to accrue alongthe 4th Division boundary, where 2/24made an advance of 400 yards to theeast. To the right, the dogged attackof 1/24 to the high ground southeastof Hill 382 culminated in a gain of 200yards. This forward movement, flankingHill 382 from two sides, all but sur-rounded the enemy atop the hill, thoughthis made little, if any, difference toJapanese determined to die there . Ofadded importance to the further ad-vance of the 24th Marines was the factthat from the high ground southeast ofHill 382, Company C was able to lookdown on the ruins of Minami Village .Thus it appeared that the day's ad-vance had served not only to outflankmost of Hill 382, but a portion of Tur-key Knob and the Amphitheater aswell .

To the south, the 25th Marines, at-tacking in the same formation employ-ed in previous days, also was in for ahard day's work . The regiment's planwas ambitious : to execute a double en-velopment of Turkey Knob, supportedby two companies of 3/23 which re-lieved elements of 3/24 that had beenattached to 1/25 for the past two days .As the 1st Battalion moved out, sup-ported by the companies of 3/23, itcrossed an open area prior to enteringthe woods to its front . Upon reachingthe edge of' the woods around 1000, 1/25encountered the same conditions thathad halted the advance on the previousday. Once again, Major Mee's men were


hit by heavy mortar, artillery, and ma-chine gun fire, which caused the ad-vance to bog down. Despite counter-battery fire and aerial spotting, it provedimpossible to put the enemy mor-tars out of action, nor were the aerialobservers able to spot to the cleverlyconcealed enemy artillery positions .

Fighting for the woods ragedthroughout 1 March, as Marines of 1/25pressed the attack . It was an unequalcontest with the enemy possessing theadvantage of cover, concealment, com-manding terrain, and superior firepower. In the end, the assault units of1/25 had to pull back to their jump-off positions. As the tired men begantheir withdrawal the enemy, in a finalgesture of defiance, subjected them toa heavy mortar and rocket barrage,which caused additional casualties . Thewithdrawal was accomplished with thehelp of a smoke screen, which also madeit possible to evacuate the casualties .Shortly after 1600, the Japanese addedinsult to injury by subjecting ColonelLanigan's command post to a severeshelling .

Since the remaining two battalionsof the 25th Marines were pacing them-selves in relation to gains to be madeby the 1st Battalion, they remainedmore or less in place when it becameapparent that the attack of 1/25 hadbogged down . Nevertheless, 2/25 didsucceed in gaining 100 yards along itsleft. For the most of the day, the di-vision reconnaissance company was at-tached to 2/25 in order to mop up therear area . From the 3/25 area, a tankwas able to destroy two enemy ma-chine guns, but no additional ground


was taken. Indicative of the artillerysupport furnished to the 25th Marinesby 1/14 on D plus. 10 are the followingfigures. The battalion fired 4,640 roundsfor 135 missions, of which 94 wereharassing, 31 were aimed at targets ofopportunity, 6 were for preparation, and4 were fired at miscellaneous targets ."'The figures listed above do not includethe defensive fires, which 1/14 startedat 1640, and harassing fires whichcontinued throughout the night .

As D plus 10 came to a close, the 4thMarine Division could book only verylimited gains for itself. After five daysof continuous assault into the MeatGrinder, all three of the mutually sup-porting cornerstones of the enemy de-fense system, Hill 382, Turkey Knob,and the Amphitheater were still in en-emy hands, and, with the exception ofHill 382, firmly so. With the heaviestassaults still ahead, the combat effici-ency of the 4th Division on the eveningof 1 March remained at 55 percent 20The night from 1-2 March passed

with few untoward incidents, exceptin front of 2/24, where small groupsof the enemy made various attemptsat infiltration, keeping the battalion ina general state of unrest. All of the 4thDivision units came under sporadicenemy mortar and artillery fire thathit the lines and rear area in a seeming-ly haphazard fashion. By way of re-sponse, the corps and division artilleryreplied to each enemy salvo with im-mediate counterbattery fire, the resultsof which could not be readily deter-mined.

19 1/1.4 OpRpt, p. 16, dtd 1Mar45 .° 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 30 .

661

Early on 2 March, General Cates' di-vision again resumed the battle of at-trition in the Meat Grinder . Thoughnone of the weary 4th Division Marineswas aware of it that morning, the finalbattle for the Meat Grinder was aboutto begin. The main effort was to bemade by the 24th Marines against Hill382, while farther south the 23d and25th Marines were to assault the Am-phitheater and Turkey Knob from thenorth and south . If the heavy enemyfire against Hill 382 from these twostaunch bastions of the enemy defensesystem could be eliminated, the hill it-self could be taken .

Following a 25-minute artillery prep-aration fired by the corps artilleryfrom H-Hour minus 30 to minus 15,and again from minus 10 to H-Hour, theassault resumed . On the morning ofD plus 11, there was one change inthe preparatory fires . Precisely at H-Hour, 0800, the division artillery un-leashed an intensive preparation, fol-lowed by a rolling barrage .

On the division left, the 24th Ma-rines with 3/24 on the right, 2/24 inthe center, and 1/24 on the left movedout for the attack. The 3d Battalion,commanded by Major Doyle A . Stout,advanced eastward along the divisionboundary northeast of Hill 382 and,while keeping contact with 3d Divi-sion elements on its left, advanced about300 yards. As the battalion fought itsway forward, enemy opposition stiffen-ed until all further movement becameimpossible .

It was in the regiment's center andon its right that the most desperatefighting for the day was to occur . It

662

fell to 2/24 to launch an assault againstHill 382 from the northeast, while 1/24enveloped the hill from the south. Atthe time they jumped off, the men of2/24 had spent an even more restlessnight than had other units in the di-vision . The front lines on Hill 382 hadbeen active throughout the night . Handgrenade duels and hand-to-hand fight-ing frequently erupted with smallgroups of the enemy that filtered outof recesses in the hill in front of theMarine positions, between them, andeven to the rear . In fact, two Marineshad received saber cuts during thenocturnal fighting . 2' Nevertheless, thebattalion attacked Hill 382 with vigor,even though it was immediately sub-jected to heavy machine gun, rifle,mortar, and artillery fire. Since Lieuten-ant Colonel Rothwell's men constitutedthe main effort, four Shermans and asection of the 1st Provisional RocketDetachment furnished support, in ad-dition to the division artillery. A.- thetanks and rocket launchers blasted thearea ahead of 2/24 with shells andflame, they were spotted by the enemyand taken under such heavy fire thatthe armor had to pull back . The rocketlaunchers were able to fire three mis-sions before they, too, had to be with-drawn .

By 1100, the frontal assault on Hill382 was beginning to bog down inthe face of interlocking enemy machinegun fire, as well as heavy mortar fire .The importance that the Japanese at-tached to the defense of the hill wasunderscored not only by the severity ofthe mortar fire but also by the unusual-

`1 2/24. AR, p. 16 .


ly large caliber of mortar shells em-ployed. As elsewhere on Iwo Jima, theartillery and naval gunfire furnished insupport of the attack was of little bene-fit to the infantrymen slowly inch-ing their way up the reverse slope ofHill 382, exposed to everything the ene-my was capable of throwing at themwith little else but their own organicweapons to answer .

As the attack was on the verge ofbogging down, Lieutenant ColonelRothwell assembled his company com-manders a short distance behind thelines and decided that one . platoon ofCompany E, accompanied by twotanks, was to make an attempt to out-flank the stubborn enemy defendersfrom the right . At this time, a platoonof Company E, commanded by 2d Lieu-tenant Richard Reich, had alreadyreached the top of the hill and waslocked in close combat with the enemyunderneath the radar antenna at thesame spot which already had seen vi-cious close fighting when the 23d Ma-rines was attempting to seize the hill .As Major Roland Carey, commandingCompany E, attempted to relay the or-ders for the flanking movement to hismen, he was hit by machine gun fireand had to be evacuated. The executiveofficer, Captain Pat Donlan, took overand prepared to see that his predeces-sor's orders were carried out .

Just as Captain Donlan was in theprocess of orienting his platoon lead-ers and issuing orders for the flankingmovement at the battalion commandpost, he was hit by a fragment of amortar shell exploding nearby . As oneof the platoon leaders, 1st LieutenantStanley Osborne, prepared to relieve


663

him, another large mortar shell scoreda square hit on the command post withdevastating results

Osborne was killed instantly, Donlan'sright leg was blown off below the knee,and two other officers were wounded, onemortally. Reich, still holding under theradar screen, was in command. He was theonly officer left in Company E ."

Despite the loss of five of its officers,Company E continued the assault onHill 382. When elements of Company F,commanded by Captain Walter Ridlon,joined forces on the hill with CompanyE, the doom of the defenders was seal-ed . By 1530, 2/24 reported the objec-tive secured . 23 Colonel Jordan, the re-gimental commander, had by this timeapparently grown somewhat leery ofoptimistic reports concerning the cap-ture of this particular objective, andin consequence, in describing the actionof 2 March, the 24th Marines reportedonly "that small gains were madethroughout the day all along the lineexcept in the vicinity of Hill 382 wherethe bitter opposition continued ."24 Theregiment did not officially record thecapture of Hill 382 until the followingday .

There was some truth to the commentthat enemy opposition at Hill 382 con-tinued, even though the Marines werenow in possesssion of the crest . In thewords of one account of the action on2 March, "the hill was overrun, but itwas not subdued ."25 A clue to this seem-ing contradiction may be found in a 4thDivision report for D plus 11, which

2" Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 215.2/24 OpRpt, p . 188 .

24 24th Mar OpRpt, p. 15 .Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 216 .

introduces a new element in assessingthe progress made by 2/24 on 2 Marchby pointing out

It appears that there are undergroundpassageways leading into the defenses onHill 382 and when one occupant of a pill-box is killed another one comes up to takehis place. This is rather a lengthyprocess.'

And that is precisely the way itturned out. For the remainder of Dplus 11, 2/24 mopped up the objectiveand consolidated its positions atop thehill. Because of the underground tun-nels linking various pillboxes andstrongpoints on the slopes of Hill 382,"the mopup proved to be an almost in-terminable process ."27 In fact, sealingthe caves around Hill 382 and the elimi-nation of isolated enemy holdouts wouldrequire several additional days . But forall practical purposes, one of the threestrongpoints of the enemy defensesystem in the 4th Division zone ofadvance had been eliminated, which leftthe remaining two, Turkey Knob andthe Amphitheater, somewhat more vul-nerable to attack .

Operations on D plus 11 to the southof Hill 382 also differed from those ofpreceding days. While the enemy atopHill 382 was treated to an exception-ally heavy preparation on that day,precisely the opposite was the case inthe 25th Marines zone of advance .There, Colonel Lanigan decided to em-ploy the element of surprise and launchan attack at 0630 without the benefit ofany artillery preparation . During theearly stages of the action, while the

"4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 57 dtd 2Mar45 .I Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 66 .

664

enemy was still off guard, 1/25 was toinfiltrate and seize the high groundnorth of Turkey Knob . Elements of 1/25and 3/23, the latter having been at-tached to the 25th Marines, were toexecute an envelopment from the north-west and the south .

The infiltration got under way at0630 and proceeded on schedule forabout 20 minutes. However, the Japa-nese soon recognized the multiple threatfacing them and at 0650 unleashed adevastating rocket and mortar barrageagainst the assault forces . As Marineshit the ground to escape the lethal shellfragments, enemy machine guns openedup at close range and raked the area inwhich the assault force was pinneddown. All need for further secrecy hav-ing disappeared, Marine artillery andmortars retaliated, and eight Shermansmoved forward in support of the attack .Once again, the large blockhouse atopTurkey Knob drew most of the support-ing fire. A large number of 75mm shellsand no less than 1,000 gallons of flame-thrower fuel were hurled against thisimpressive obstacle, but no immediateeffects of this fire became apparent . Theblockhouse appeared to be unoccupiedafter the tank attack, but it was as-sumed that the enemy would feed re-placements into it through tunnels assoon as the fury of the American as-sault diminished .Under cover of the heavy support-

ing fire, the envelopment of TurkeyKnob continued, though progress wasslow. By 1430, the two pincers of thedouble envelopment were only 65 yardsfrom each other, and for a while it ap-peared that the movement might still


succeed. However, as soon as the enemybecame aware of this latest develop-ment, he threw a tremendous barrageagainst Company B, 1/25, which hadbeen inching its way north to the highground from positions south of theAmphitheater. This murderous rocketand mortar fire, interlaced with a heavyvolume of small arms fire, inflicted over30 casualties on the company and forcedits withdrawal .21

In the center of the 25th Marines line,2/25 was to extend its left flank to as-sist 1/25, and for this purpose one com-pany of 3/23 was attached to the bat-talion. Since no appreciable gains weremade by 1/25 during the day, the 2dBattalion remained in place and spentthe day in mopping up enemy stragglersand reducing such fortifications in itszone as the enemy still occupied or hadreoccupied. Similarly, 3/25, nearest thecoast, remained in position during theearly part of the day . Enemy mortarfire into these positions caused severalcasualties, leading Captain James C .Headley, the battalion commander, tomake this comment

Throughout this period of time we weresuffering casualties from enemy mortarfire and our failure to advance while suf-fering casualties had a depressing effectupon the morale of the troops .'

During the late afternoon of 2 March,elements on the right of 2/25 and the3d Battalion finally were given permis-sion to advance to the high grounddirectly to their front . Surprisinglyenough, the enemy did not contest thisadvance, and the 25th Marines gained

2'25th Mar OpRpt, p . 12 .2D 8/24 OpRpt, p. 11 .


665

300 yards, enabling the regiment toconsolidate on the freshly taken highground .By evening of D plus 11, the 4th

Division line protruded both in the northand in the south, hanging back only inthe center where the Amphitheater andTurkey Knob remained to be taken .Overall, important progress had beenmade during the day with the seizureof Hill 382 and the unexpectedly easyadvance near the coast during the latterpart of the day . The fighting for Hill382 had been costly for 2/24, in par-ticular, which summed up the day'sfighting as follows

Today's fighting more intense than anyother day up until now . Enemy resistancevery heavy. Many pillboxes and strongemplacements to the direct front. Manyofficers, NCO's and experienced personnelwere casualties . Leadership now an acuteproblem. Enemy installations knocked outduring the day's advance : 8 machine guns ;15 cave entrances, from which fire wasbeing received, were sealed ; one 47mm gunin bunker knocked out. No count of enemydead, estimated to be over 1003 0

a division public relations photographertook pictures from an altitude of 1,000feet. This improvisation became neces-sary because "the sustained bombard-ment of Iwo Jima had so torn the faceof the land that pre-D-Day maps wereby now of little use in terrain apprecia-tion.-"The night from 2-3 March passed

without major incidents. It almost ap-peared as if the Japanese were begin-ning to feel the results of the prolongedbattle of attrition . Along the 4th Ma-rine Division lines, the only action oc-curred in front of 2/24, where theenemy attempted an infiltration. Oncethe presence of the intruders had beendiscovered, a lively firefight ensued . Itended when the enemy withdrew, leav-ing behind 20 dead. Four Marines of2/24 were killed in this action .32

For the continuation of the assault on3 March, General Cates made certainchanges in the disposition of his forces .At 0500, the 23d Marines relieved the25th and just before H-Hour, set for0630, 1/23 passed through 1/25 . The 2dand 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, wereattached to the 23d and retained theirpositions in the center and on the right .There were no changes in the 24th Ma-rines' sector, where Colonel Jordan'smen were preparing to continue the at-tack, except that Company L, 3/24, suf-fered 22 casualties while relieving ele-ments of the 9th Marines near the di-vision boundary .33

In an attempt to use the element ofsurprise, the 4th Marine Division attack

Throughout 2 March, Marines on theground had received excellent supportfrom the sea as well as from the air .Two battleships and one cruiser fur-nished general support, while destroyersand gunboats deployed near the easternbulge of the island to shell the rockydraws leading down to the sea . Carrier-based aircraft carried out six strikesagainst enemy positions in front of the4th Division. The pilots and observersof VMO-4 flew five missions, includ-ing a rather unorthodox one in which

"4th MarDiv OpRpt, Sec IV, p. 32 ." I bid.

"2124 OpRpt, p . 189 .

30 24th Mar OpRpt, p. 16.

666

was not preceded by any preparatoryfire. On the division left, the 24th Ma-rines jumped off against formidable newdefenses in its zone of advance, the bulkof which appeared to be concentrated onthe high ground to the northeast of Hill382, and in the vicinity of Minami Vil-lage. Initial resistance was heavy, andmortar, artillery, machine gun, and riflefire hit the assault companies as soon asthey began to move out. Directly in frontof 2/24 were pillboxes and reinforcedconcrete emplacements, including oneemplacement containing a high velocitygun .

Immediately following the jump-off,corps and division artillery began topound these defenses with some effect .The regiment, with 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24from left to right, slowly advancedagainst the enemy positions to its front .Some progress was made until the linesadvanced to a point close enough to workon enemy emplacements with demoli-tions and flamethrowers. Once thisclose-in fighting got under way, fierceaction ensued and the assault slowedto a crawl. The terrain consisted ofnumerous hillocks, mounds, and shal-low cross-corridors with vertical sides.Covered reinforced concrete and sand-covered log machine gun and rifle em-placements with firing ports coveringthe front and both flanks blocked theadvance. It soon became apparent thatthe line of defense to the north and eastof Hill 382 had a depth of over 300yards .

The difficulties accompanying anadvance into prepared positions of thistype were only too apparent. Due to thecharacter of the terrain, these defenses


were well protected from the support-ing artillery fire. Tanks and flame-thrower tanks, in particular, encount-ered major problems in getting intoposition. Once there, their fields of firewere limited so that they could effec-tively concentrate only on a few em-placements. As the infantry approachedthe enemy positions, the very close sup-port needed could be furnished only by60mm and 81mm mortars emplacedwithin 50 yards of the front lines. Ashortage of ammunition limited theemployment of the 81mm mortars, sothat these weapons were fired onlyperiodically and when dire necessitymade their close supporting fires indis-pensable .

As usual, the infantry bore the bruntof the fighting. Marines, equipped withdemolitions, portable flamethrowers, avariety of small arms, bazookas, andsmoke and fragmentation grenades,maneuvered into position in smallgroups and attempted to neutralize theenemy positions one by one . It was aslow, tedious, and costly process callingfor able leadership on the part of squadand fire team leaders, a number of whomwere killed or wounded and had to beevacuated .

By late afternoon, the center of the24th Marines had advanced 350 yards,with smaller gains along the northernand southern flanks . Throughout theday, the Shermans of Company B, 4thTank Battalion, gave as much supportto the regiment as the difficult terrainallowed . Rocket launchers employedtheir now customary hit and run tacticsto escape counterbattery fire from theenemy mortars and artillery .


When Colonel Jordan's regiment con-solidated on D plus 12, the 3d Bat-talion on the left had tied in withelements of the 9th Marines, while 1/24on the right held a narrow front withonly Company B in the line . After an-other day of fatiguing combat, the menwere even more exhausted than on theprevious day. Their condition wasgraphically outlined in a 2/24 report forthe day :

Men very tired and listless, lack leaders .Close support by effective close supportweapons, such as tanks and 37mm weap-ons not possible except in rare instances,due to terrain limiting fields of fire . Tanksupport is seldom sufficient to warrant thecasualties resulting from the counter-mortar fire"

Bitter fighting also marked the day'soperations to the south of the 24thMarines, where the enemy still retaineda strong hold both on the Amphitheaterand Turkey Knob . There, 1/23 was tomake the main attack southeastwardabove the Amphitheater and link upwith units on the left of 2/25 . If com-pleted, this envelopment would result inreduction of Turkey Knob and encircle-ment of the well-dug-in enemy troopsin the Amphitheater . In order to supportthe attack, Company C, 4th Tank Bat-talion and a platoon of the 4th EngineerBattalion were attached to 1/23 .

Following the artillery preparationwhich came after the jump-off, the en-emy initially appeared stunned and, inthe words of the regimental report, "theinitial phase of the attack progressedfavorably ."35 However, progress on the

~' 2/24 OpRpt, p . 191 .

~" 23d Mar OpRpt, p. 14 .

667

regiment's right soon lagged whenMarines drew fire from the concreteblockhouse atop Turkey Knob . In ad-dition, the enemy had mined the routesof approach . Any attempt to removethese antipersonnel mines was frus-trated by deadly accurate sniper fire .Nevertheless, by 1400 the attachedengineer platoon had cleared a pathover which flame tanks and infantrydemolition teams were able to get with-in effective range of the blockhouse . Asa result of the combined teamwork ofthese arms, the blockhouse atop TurkeyKnob was partially reduced in a slowand costly assault that continued dur-ing the latter part of the afternoon . Byevening of 3 March, however, whenunits consolidated for the night, theJapanese were still firmly in control ofTurkey Knob.While 1/23 was battling for pos-

session of the Knob, the remaining twobattalions of the 23d Marines remainedin position, except for Company K, 3/23,which, supported by tanks and 75mmhalftracks, assaulted stubborn enemydefenses along the southwestern portionof the Amphitheater . Towards the endof the day, Company I was moved intoa gap south of the Amphitheater be-tween 1/23 and 2/25. The 2d Battalionof the 23d Marines remained in corpsreserve for the day ; it occupied an as-sembly area between the Southern andCentral Airfields and could be movedanywhere within the Corps zone ofaction as required . For the remainderof D plus 12, 2/25 and 3/25 remainedin their respective positions on the di-vision's right, while 1/25 in divisionreserve underwent reorganization and

668

rehabilitation, and got some badlyneeded rest .

Throughout the day, the slight butnevertheless important gains made bythe 4th Marine Division had beenachieved with the help of the support-ing arms. Within the division, 2/14 hadfurnished direct support to the 23d Ma-rines, while 1/14 had reinforced thefires of 2/14. The 24th Marines had beendirectly supported by 3/14, while 4/14was in general support . The 4th TankBattalion had furnished such assistanceas the difficult terrain permitted . By theend of 3 March, 36 tanks were oper-ational, 12 had been destroyed, and 8had been damaged. 16 Ships of TF 54continued to provide supporting fire, butthe use of such support was restrictedbecause of safety factors dictated bythe location of the front lines .At the end of D plus 12, the combat

efficiency of the 4th Marine Division wasestimated to be 50 percent . All unitswere ordered to consolidate at 1700,prepared to continue the attack on thefollowing day . With the capture of Hill382, one of the main props of theenemy's defensive system in the 4thDivision sector had been knocked out,and despite heavy losses, it could beassumed "that the Division was nowfighting in the rear of the highly pre-pared defensive area in which the oper-ations for the past three days had beenconducted."a 7The night from 3-4 March passed

without major incident in the 4th Ma-rine Division zone of operations, exceptfor the sector occupied by the 24th Ma-

"4th, MarDiv OpRpt, p . 34 .°' Ibid.


rines. There, small groups of the enemyattempted unsuccessfully to infiltratethe lines of 3/24. The enemy placedheavy artillery and mortar fire intothe 24th Marines area throughout thenight, causing moderate casualties . Fourdestroyers provided illumination duringthe night .At 0730, 4 March, the 4th Marine

Division continued its attack with nochange in its formation or direction ofadvance. Prior to the jumpoff, the corpsand division artillery fired a half-hourpreparation, which was further supple-mented by naval gunfire . In contrast tothe preceding days, the weather on Dplus 13 was overcast and showers beganto fall in the morning. Because of theleaden skies and the limited visibility,all air strikes had to be cancelled . It alsowas a very poor day for aerial obser-vation .

On the ground, the battle of attritioncontinued . On the division left, the 24thMarines attacked in a generally south-easterly direction. The direction ofadvance was to be parallel to the cor-ridors. Once again, the assault turnedinto a step-by-step affair, as usual com-bined with heavy casualties and littlegain. Such progress as could be madewas achieved with the assistance of theShermans, which were employed withgood effect against the numerous pill-boxes and caves . Good results were alsoobtained from the flamethrower tankwhich scorched the enemy defenses .Even though the regiment advancedonly about 100 yards, the steady de-struction of the formidable enemy de-fenses sooner or later was bound tohave a concrete effect . Indicative of theregiment's effort is the fact that 2,200


pounds of explosives were employed onD plus 13 to blow cave entrances andexits .38

On the division right, the 23d Ma-rines, with 2/25 and 3/25 still attached,1/23 in line, and 2/23 in corps and 3/23in division reserve, made small gains inthe 1/23 zone of advance . The two at-tached battalions of the 25th Marineson the regiment's right had to sit it outin their positions, much against theirwill. As the division was to report theday's activities

BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 could have ad-vanced within their zones, but such anadvance was not deemed advisable becauseit would have overextended the lines . Theterrain in front of this RCT was the mostdifficult yet encountered ; observation waslimited to only a few feet, and it was im-possible to support the attack with any-thing heavier than normal infantryweaponsB'

By evening of 4 March, the combatefficiency of the 4th Marine Divisionhad dropped to 45 percent, the lowestyet since the Marines had gone ashoreon Iwo Jima. The enemy was still offer-ing stubborn resistance from closelyintegrated positions, and General Cates'men were more exhausted than ever .This circumstance, combined with themurky skies, the discomfort created bythe rain, and the ever present enemysnipers in front of, behind, and be-tween the lines should, by all normalyardsticks, have reduced the morale ofthe wet and tired Marines to a new low .

Yet, strangely enough, this was notthe case . There was no definite indica-tion that the enemy's morale was sag-

Ibid., p . 35.Ibid.

ging, and in his battered positions in theAmphitheater, he was clinging to everyfoot of ground as resolutely as ever .Nevertheless, there was a quiet feelingof optimism that perhaps, after all, theenemy might be beginning to crack .Perhaps it was brought about by thedecrease in the accuracy of the enemyartillery and mortar fire resulting fromthe accurate counterbattery fire fur-nished by the corps artillery. It was alsopossible that the loss of Hill 382 andthe severe mauling that Turkey Knobhad taken by this time had deprived theenemy's artillery observers of theirchoice observation sites .

The battle of attrition being wagedall over northern Iwo Jima was begin-ning to affect the enemy's power toresist, even though his spirit was ashigh as ever . In recognition of the bit-ter struggle waged by General Kuri-bayashi against overwhelmingly super-ior American forces, his superiors inTokyo sent a message addressed bothto him and Admiral Ichimaru, express-ing Japan's admiration for the battlethey were waging. Ichimaru replied"The enemy is hitting us hard, but wewill hit back ."40 For his part, GeneralKuribayashi had earlier stated de-fiantly "I am not afraid of the fightingpower of only three American divisions,if only there were no bombardmentsfrom aircraft and warships . This is theonly reason why we have to see suchmiserable situations ."41

Looking at the overall situation onIwo and the decimated remnants of hisgarrison, consisting of only 3,500 ef-

`° I bid ., p . 225 ."Horie Rpt ., p . 9.

669

670

fectives, General Kuribayashi saw clear-ly that his time was running short . Indesperation, he signalled Tokyo for helpon the evening of 4 March, calling forair and naval support. "Send me thesethings, and I will hold this island", hesaid. "Without them I cannot hold ."42But there was no response from theJapanese mainland, which itself wasreeling underneath the intensified Amer-ican bombing attacks . In view of totalAmerican air superiority in the Boninsand a mighty American fleet patrollingthe surrounding waters, Iwo Jima was,indeed, isolated. The defenders of IwoJima had the full sympathy of almostthe entire population of Japan, whoseattention was riveted on the fierce bat-tle in progress there . On its part

. . . the Army High Command had mean-while been conducting earnest investiga-tions into the possibility of mounting aneffective attack against the U . S. navalforces which were swarming around IwoJima. Air power on hand was small, how-ever, while overwater flight training wasinadequate ; hence a massive effort couldnot be staged

As for the Japanese Navy contingenton Iwo Jima, Admiral Ichimaru did noteven bother to radio for help. AdmiralToyoda, Commander in Chief of theImperial Navy, had sent word that theNavy would be ready for the next ex-pected American thrust by the end ofApril, but that all plans depended onthe outcome at Iwo. The message endedwith these words : "I regret that exceptfor full submarine support and someair support, we cannot send reinforce-

' Quoted in Leckie, Strong Men Armed,p. 456 ."Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 138 .


ments to Iwo . However, in view of over-all requirements, I earnestly hope youwill maintain calm and fight staunchlyby any means . "44

The meaning of this was clear andAdmiral Ichimaru, who had never ex-pected reinforcements in the first place,accepted the inevitable . Clearly, the Iwogarrison was on its own, and its pro-longed death throes would, in any case,be a lonely business .

REORGANIZATION ANDCONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK"

In accordance with General Schmidt'sorder that 5 March was to be a day ofrest and rehabilitation for all VACunits, no offensive action was plannedin the 4th Division sector on D plus14. Instead, the division was to re-organize so that by noon it would haveone regiment, less one battalion, avail-able to continue the attack on a limitedfront on the following day. The generaldirection of the attack on 6 March wasto be eastward. (See Map VIII, MapSection) .The regiment which General Cates

selected for the main effort was ColonelWensinger's 23d Marines . In order torelieve this regiment from its otherduties, the area on the division's rightreverted to the 25th Marines. The 2dand 3d Battalions of the 25th Marines,hitherto attached to the 23d, reverted to

"Quoted in Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 207 .' Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 4th SerBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima,27Dec44-19Mar45, dtd 2Apr45, hereafter 4thSerBn OpRpt ; 4th MedBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima,19Feb-15Mar45, n. d., hereafter 4th MedBnOpRpt .


the parent regiment. The 1st Battalion,25th Marines, relieved 1/23 in almostidentical positions held by 1/25 on 2March. Since 3/23 was still heavily com-mitted along the southern fringes of theAmphitheater, where it was moppingup previously bypassed enemy defensesand overcoming other stubborn pocketsof resistance, Colonel Lanigan com-bined the division reconnaissance com-pany, which had been attached to hisregiment as of 0700 on 5 March, withCompany L, 3/25, into a provisional bat-talion, commanded by Major Edward L .Asbill, executive officer of 1/25 . In thenorthern portion of the division sector,three companies of the 24th Marineswere pulled out of the line and stationedin the regimental rear area, where theywere to form a strong regimental re-serve. In order to further bolster the25th Marines, Company B of the 2dArmored Amphibian Tractor Battalionwas attached to the regiment . This com-pany was to patrol the beach areasnorth of the 3/25 sector and fire ontargets along the beach .

The reorganization within the 4thDivision area of responsibility was com-pleted by noon of 5 March, as scheduled .During the entire period of reorganiza-tion, beginning on the evening of 4March, the enemy did not initiate anyoffensive action, though his supportingarms remained active. During the nightfrom 4-5 March, only sporadic fire hitthe 4th Division zone, with the excep-tion of the 24th Marines' area . There,heavy mortar and artillery fire Wasreceived almost incessantly during thehours of darkness. Throughout D plus14, the 14th Marines continued to fire

on targets of opportunity and executedharassing fires . A total of 17 missionsemployed air observation . VMO-4 flew10 tactical observation missions . Onepilot was -wounded and evacuated. Bylate afternoon of 5 March, the squadronhad four aircraft that were still opera-tional. In addition to the artillery fireprovided by the 14th Marines on D plus14, elements of TF 54 fired call fire mis-sions throughout the day .4 °

It had, for all practical purposes, beena quiet day on Iwo Jima . There hadbeen no gains since there had been nooffensive action . Yet, as this day of restended, "there had been more than 400casualties on the line where there wasno fighting. The men got ready for thenext big push."47

Following the day of rest, the VACoffensive resumed on the morning of 6March . In order to obtain the maximumresults from extensive massed prepara-tions, General Schmidt had ordered hisdivisions to attack in echelon . Each at-tack was to be preceded by an intensiveartillery and naval gunfire preparation,in which the corps and division artil-lery, as well as the medium and heavyguns of the fire support ships, were tojoin .48 Altogether, not including thenaval gunfire, 12 artillery battalionswould unleash a devastating curtain offire against the enemy garrison thatstill blocked the path of the VACadvance. They would first fire for ap-proximately 30 minutes at the westernportion of the front, then shift thepreparation for a little over half an

"° 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 39.4 P Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 244 ." VAC OpO 13-45, dtd 5Mar45.

671

672

hour to the eastern half . Within theoverall assault, the 4th Marine Divisionwas to jump off at 0900, H plus 60 min-utes, with the main effort on its leftin conjunction with the adjacent 9thMarines of the 3d Marine Division .

At 0845, the coordinated fire of the132 guns and the naval gunfire shiftedto support the second phase of the VACattack along the eastern portion of thefront. The shore-based artillery alonehad expended 22,500 shells ranging from75mm to 155mm in a little over an hour .In the zone of action of General Cates'division, the full force of the barragewas brought to bear on the left in thezone of action of the 23d Marines .There, prior to 0600, the 23d Marines,less 1/23, had moved into position . Inpreparation for the assault, 2/23 hadrelieved 3/24 without enemy interfer-ence. The weather promised to be fairwith good visibility ; only a slight hazeobscured observation in the early dawn .

Following the earth-shaking artillerypreparation, which gave way to a roll-ing barrage, 2/23 jumped off at H-Hour,followed by the 3d Battalion at a 400-yard interval. As the assault battalionadvanced eastward towards the highground to its front, it became apparentthat the heavy volume of artillery firehad not incapacitated the Japanese whoemerged from their dugouts little theworse for wear and, in the extremelyrugged terrain, put up a spirited fightfor every yard of the way and defendedeach cave, pillbox, and emplacementwith the greatest tenacity.

As the advance gained momentum, inthe face of accurate fire from rifles andautomatic weapons to the front, the as-


sault companies moved forward about50 yards . On the left, where the terrainfavored the employment of armor, Com-pany G, 2/23, supported by four tanks,gained 300 yards . As the company pre-pared to move into a gap that had arisenbetween it and Company F, the enemycaught Company G in a murderous mor-tar barrage that caused numerous casu-alties and wounded the company com-mander. Fierce fighting continuedthroughout the day . At 1800, when 2/23dug in for the night, Company G on theleft still was 350 yards in front of theline of departure ; the remainder of the2d and 3d Battalions, 23d Marines, hadgained approximately 100 yards duringthe day.

To the right of the 23d Marines, 2/24and 1/24 jumped off abreast at H-Hour .Almost immediately, Colonel Jordan'sMarines found themselves in the sametype of terrain that had impeded themovements of the 23d Marines to thenorth. The ground was characterized bya series of jagged ridges and heavyundergrowth, both favoring the defend-ing force . Despite support from gunfireships and three heavy air strikes, enemyresistance continued undiminished . Af-ter a day of exhausting and costly fight-ing, the regiment gained 150 yards onthe left and even less on the right .

Since the Amphitheater and TurkeyKnob had, for all practical purposes, al-ready been bypassed prior to D plus 15,no frontal assault was launched againstthese positions, which still formed adeep salient in the 4th Division lines .Because of these protruding enemy posi-tions, the 23d and 24th Marines northof this salient attacked in an east-south-


easterly direction, while the 25th Ma-rines to the south were attacking gen-erally to the northeast . As a result, itappeared that all the 4th Divisionthrusts on 6 March were directed gen-erally towards the remnants of HigashiVillage .

For the three battalions of the 25thMarines, it was another day of waitingfor the left wing of the division to moveforward. Since no decisive gains weremade by the 24th Marines, 2/25 and3/25 stayed in position and conductedmop-up operations within their respec-tive areas. The only forward movementtook place in the 1/25 sector, where Ma-rines continued chipping away at enemyfortifications to the east of TurkeyKnob near Minami Village, supportedby flame and medium tanks and 75mmhalf-tracks . Once the armor had com-pleted its mission, the tanks were pulledback in order to prevent their exposureto the expected enemy counterbatteryfire .

By evening of 6 March, it was evidentthat the momentous artillery prepara-tion which had so promisingly usheredin the resumed offensive had failed ut-terly in crushing the enemy's will orcapacity to resist . At the time it con-solidated for the night, the 4th MarineDivision held a line extending forroughly 2,470 yards . A gap of 400 yardsstill separated the division's left flankfrom the right of the adjacent 3dDivision .

Once again, despite meager gains, thedivision's losses on D plus 15 had beenheavy. The division D-3 report for theday estimated combat efficiency at 40percent and added that "the result of

673

fatigue and lack of experienced leadersis very evident in the manner in whichthe units fight ." 4° Conversely, the enemyseemed to adapt himself readily to thechanging conditions on Iwo Jima bymaking widespread use of Americanequipment. Thus it was discovered dur-ing the day that five enemy bodies infront of the 4th Division lines werefully dressed in Marine uniforms . OneJapanese who decided to give Americanfood a try was to record in his diary :"I tasted Roosevelt's rations for thefirst time, and they were very good."No doubt, the frequently maligned origi-nator of the American combat rationswould have been pleased with thiscompliment .

The night of 6-7 March turned intoa veritable hell for many 4th DivisionMarines. The continuous and exhaust-ing action in preceding days had beenenough to wear down many of them,both physically and mentally. Instead ofthe rest which they so badly needed anddesired, the men were kept in a stateof upheaval all night by Japaneseactivity which, according to the officialreport, was "sporadic but costly" . 5 o

At 2130, several enemy mortar shellsfell in the lines of 2/23, wounding ap-proximately 30 men. While confusionengulfed this hard-hit battalion, theaction shifted to the right flank of the4th Division. There, shortly after 2200,enemy were reported moving in frontof 3/25. Immediate artillery fire wasbrought to bear on the enemy assembly,which was dispersed . Up to this time,

99 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 61, dtd6Mar45 .

G0 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 40.

674

all had remained quiet in front of 1/25,but as the night continued, an estimated40-50 Japanese infiltrated the battalionsector and sneaked into the foxholesoccupied by Major Mee's men. Anoccasional bursting hand grenadepunctured the quietness of the night-a solitary rifle shot, a deep grunt orgroan, and then stillness again . It wasnot until morning that an accurate tallyof the 1st Battalion's losses was pos-sible. Then it became evident that 1/25had lost one officer and 12 men killed ;the enemy had lost an estimated 50men." Conversely, 1/24 reported thatthis had been the quietest night in itssector .

Just as it appeared that this longnight was nearing its end, disasterstruck once more, this time in the 2/23area. Shortly after 0500, one of the big,inaccurate enemy rockets wobbled itsway into the 2/23 command post withdevastating results . The battalion com-mander, Major Robert H. Davidson, wasbadly shaken up by the blast and suf-fered a severe concussion ; the com-munications chief was killed, and thebattalion executive officer, the opera-tions officer, the adjutant, and twoclerks were wounded. With practicallyall the headquarters staff officers out ofaction, a skeleton staff was quicklyformed at regimental headquartersunder Lieutenant Colonel Edward J .Dillon, the regimental executive officer,who proceeded to 2/23 around dawnand took over the battalion .

H-Hour for D plus 16 had been set for0730. The 4th Division was to continue

" Ibid .


the assault in the same direction andwith the same lineup of units as on thepreceding day. There was to be nopreliminary artillery or naval gunfirepreparation, though neutralization fireagainst known enemy mortar and ar-tillery positions was scheduled between0800 and 0830 . Because of the disrup-tion caused by the enemy rocket hit onthe command post of 2/23, H-Hour waspostponed for an additional half hour .

Promptly at 0800 the 4th Divisionattack resumed, with the battered 23dMarines, less 1/23, in the main effort .The supporting neutralization fire ap-peared to be having a salutary effect,since there was little response from theenemy supporting arms . As a result,2/23, attacking along the 4th Divisonboundary, was able to make slow gainsin the course of the morning, particular-ly along the regimental left. In thecenter and on the right, on the otherhand, enemy resistance was as bitter asever, and there the advance quicklyground to a halt . By shifting the focalpoint of the assault quickly betweencompanies, comparable to a boxer whohits his opponent with a low blow andthen follows with a haymaker to theuncovered chin, the 2d Battalion wasable to catch the Japanese off balancelong enough to make a gain of 150 yardswithin an hour after jumpoff . Followingthis limited success, strong enemy posi-tions were encountered all along the bat-talion front and for the remainder of theday progress was minimal. Enemyresistance on 7 March consisted pri-marily of heavy machine gun fire andextremely accurate rifle fire from con-cealed positions in the rocky ridge for-


mations and draws along the front . Thevirtual absence of enemy artillery fireat the 23d Marines' front was notice-able, though the regiment still drew in-termittent fire from enemy mortars .

The 24th Marines resumed the attackwith 2/24 and 1/24 on the line andalmost immediately encountered heavyopposition, particularly on the rightwhere intense machine gun and mortarfire halted the advance of the 1st Bat-talion before it really got moving. Forthe remainder of the morning, theregimental advance could be measuredin yards as small demolition teamsblasted and burned the enemy out of hiswell concealed and strongly-held posi-tions. At 1245, the 14th Marines fired afive-minute preparation which signalleda renewal of the attack. Employing thesame tactics used during the morning,and with considerable air support, theregiment scored a gain of 50 yards be-fore 1700, when the lines were con-solidated for the day .

On the division right, Colonel La-nigan's 25th Marines continued mop-ping up the numerous stragglers in itsrear area. On the regiment's left, the1st Battalion, supported by regular andflame tanks, destroyed enemy emplace-ments to its front, while the ProvisionalBattalion continued the systematic re-duction of stubborn enemy defenses inthe bypassed Amphitheater and TurkeyKnob. Even though the 25th Marinesdid not seize any new ground on D plus16, its strategic location along the di-vision right would shortly change itsmission into a defensive one . As the23d and 24th Marines very slowly andinexorably continued their east-south-

675

eastward advance towards TachiiwaPoint on the east coast, they threatenedto envelop Captain Inouye's forces,which would be compressed in an areabounded by the sea in the east andthe 25th Marines to the south . For allpractical purposes, the northern wingof the 4th Division formed a hammerwhile the stationary 25th Marines wouldserve as the anvil. In all respects, thistype of maneuver closely resembled thelarge-scale German antipartisan opera-tions in Russia where precisely suchtactics often led to success .52

In anticipation of increased pressureonce this pocket was compressed,Colonel Lanigan took preparatorymeasures to enable his regiment to copewith any threat posed by the Japanesewhose encirclement was imminent .Engineers attached to the regiment laidantipersonnel mines across the front .Barbed wire was strung out along theline. The men sited machine guns, 37mmcannon, and 60mm mortars, waiting forthe Japanese to be driven against theregimental line . For the time being, themission of the 25th Marines would bea defensive one.

Activity during the night from 7-8March was not comparable to that ofthe preceding night and along the 4thDivision lines consisted mainly of mor-tar and small arms fire. Some of theenemy mortar shells fell into the posi-tions of 1/24 and in front of the 25th

"For further information on this subject,see Department of the Army Pamphlet No .20-244, Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet PartisanMovement (Washington : Department of theArmy, Office of the Chief of Military History,Aug 1956) .

676

Marines. At 0300, 3/24 returned to theparent regiment and two hours later re-lieved 2/24 in the line .

On D plus 17, the division main effortchanged from the left to the center, andthe direction of the attack shifted to thesoutheast. Within the shrinking arealeft to the Japanese on Iwo Jima, thedesignation of phase or objective lineshad become superfluous, and GeneralSchmidt's operations order for 8March was essentially "to capture theremainder of the island ." 53 No onefamiliar with the yard-by-yard struggleexpected enemy resistance to cease onthis day, or for a number of days tocome, but the tenor of the order gavea vague assurance that there was to bean end to the bloodletting. Facing theMarines of all three divisions were onlythe jumbles of rock and the sea, and adwindling number of highly motivatedJapanese determined to sell their livesas dearly as possible .

H-Hour on 8 March had been set for0750. However, in accordance with corpsorders, the 4th Marine Division jumpedoff at 0620, 90 minutes ahead of the 3dand 5th Divisions. The jump-off was car-ried out without any artillery prepara-tion, though for half an hour followingit the 14th Marines and the corps artil-lery fired successive concentrations insupport of the attack . In the zone ofadvance of the 23d Marines, there wasinitially only light resistance, the enemyapparently being confused by the earlymorning attack. Even though oppositionstiffened in time, gains were made inthe center of the regimental zone ofadvance, as 2/23 drove southeastward

' VAC OpO No. 15-45, dtd 7Mar45 .


in the general direction of TachiiwaPoint .

The 24th Marines, with 3/24 on theleft and 1/24 on the right, jumpedoff on schedule, but encountered farstronger resistance than the 23d Ma-rines to the north, mostly from enemyunits concealed in perfectly fortifiedpositions. Enemy opposition was charac-terized by extremely heavy fire fromsmall arms, knee mortars, and mortarsof larger calibers. Gains made duringthe day were negligible, though at theend of the day the regiment was tied inwith the 23d Marines on the left and the25th Marines on the right . Throughoutthe day, 2/24 remained in divisionreserve .

On the right flank of the division, thethree battalions of the 25th Marinesremained in position and continued tostrengthen the regimental lines in theevent that the enemy decided to counter-attack as he was driven into a corner .Behind the lines, various elements of theregiment and the division reconnais-sance company continued to mop up ;enemy stragglers were also rounded upin the vicinity of Minami Village .

In the course of D plus 17, Shermansof the 4th Tank Battalion gave suchsupport as was feasible to the regimentsof the 4th Division, though the move-ment of armor was restricted largely tothe few existing trails, most of themin the 23d Marines' area. There, severaltanks ran into a minefield and threewere destroyed. During the time re-quired to clear the minefield, the remain-ing tanks remained in place . In thecourse of an air strike, an auxiliary gastank filled with napalm was droppederroneously into the friendly lines . It


landed directly behind one of the Sher-mans, and napalm splashed all over thetank. Even though the outer surfacesof the Sherman caught fire, the crewwas able to evacuate the vehicle andput out the blaze with a portable fireextinguisher. There were no casualtiesand the mishap failed to put the Sher-man, at this point somewhat the worsefor wear, out of action .4

When the regiments of the 4th Di-vision secured for the night around duskof 8 March, the combat efficiency of thedivision was still clinging to a pre-carious 40 percent, but even this figurefails to convey the excessive number ofkey personnel, the driving force of anyunit, that had been sent out of the linessuffering from wounds or battle fatigue .The weather had turned cloudy andcold, and the men of General Cates'division shivered in their foxholes whileattempting to rest their weary bodiesfor the continuation of the struggle thatwould await them in the morning .

THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK-15

In the gathering dusk and during theearly evening of 8 March, somethingwas beginning to stir in front of the23d and 24th Marines. At first, therewas only the blur of muted voices andmovement, nothing definite that wouldindicate anything out of the ordinarywas brewing. But then the intensity ofthe enemy mortar, artillery, and rocketfire against the two Marine regimentsincreased, followed at 2300 by large-

64 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 43 .'Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 4th EngBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima,18Feb-19Mar45, n.d ., hereafter 4th EngBnOpRpt.

677

scale infiltration of the 2/23 and 3/24sectors .Had the Marines compressing the

Japanese naval force into the pocketnear Tachiiwa Point been able to lookinto the enemy lines, and had they beenable to gauge the background and vola-tile temperament of the Japanese Navycaptain commanding the 1,000-odd menabout to be trapped, certain inevitableconclusions would have become appar-ent almost at once . Captain Samaji In-ouye, commanding the Naval GuardForce on Iwo Jima, was a Samurai, anoisy, swashbuckling extrovert, a cham-pion swordsman, who was prone toboast of his prowess as a fighter, lover,and drinker in front of his subordi-nates . 56

It was totally incompatible withInouye's character that he would sitback in his dugout and idly watch hisforce being encircled . Also, he had feltdeeply emotional about the loss of MountSuribachi and, in his grief at the Amer-ican capture of this landmark, he hadnearly decapitated the hapless survivorsof the force that had straggled into hislines following the fall of the mountain .For the Japanese, ever since the attackon Pearl Harbor, the eighth day of eachmonth had a special significance, andInouye was only too well aware that 8March would be his last . He planned tomake it a memorable one for all con-cerned .Late in the evening, at 2200, he

gathered the remainder of his troops,a mixture of survivors from many Navy' A fascinating account of Inouye's back-

ground and mentality is contained in a letterfrom Fred Saito to Richard F . Newcomb, dtd5Feb64, in Newcomb Notes.

678

units on Iwo Jima. It was anything buta uniformly equipped force :

. . . many men had only bamboo spears,but some had hand grenades and rifles .There were a few machine guns, and somemen strapped land mines across theirchests, determined to blow up some Ma-rines with themselves ."

What Captain Inouye had in mindwas, of course, an all-out charge againstthe American lines . But, short of killingAmericans, there had to be a definitepurpose to the assault. Still preoccupiedwith the loss of Mount Suribachi,where the Stars and Stripes flutteringon the summit had kindled his angeranew every day, the Captain announcedto his assembled force the objectiveof the imminent assault was Suribachiitself. En route, after breaking throughthe American lines, the men were toblow up as many American planes asthey could on the airfields .Judged by the standards employed

earlier in the war on islands like Gua-dalcanal, and particularly when com-pared to the desperate Japanese all-outcharge on the Garapan Plain at Saipan,what Inouye had planned could best bedescribed as a mini-banzai . His objectivewas unrealistic, the Marines to his frontwere too alert, and above all, he lackedthe approval of his superiors for theaction he was about to take. As the at-tack got under way, the following situa-tion developed

The band started south, not in a wildcharge, but crawling slowly and quietly.One group got within 10 yards of 2/23'scommand post, where Lieutenant ColonelDillon was still in command, before thealarm was given. Then the sailors lobbedgrenades and charged, shrieking "Banzai!"

G7 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 257-258 .


In a moment there was chaos . The Marinesthrew up flares and star shells lighted thesky. Machinegun fire, rifles, and mortarsbegan to cut into them, but still the Japa-nese came on. Some of them carriedstretchers and shouted "Corpsman, corps-man" in fair English . Finally the hordesfaltered and broke, and no one knewwhere Captain Inouye was. He had lastbeen seen running and shouting, his swordwaving in the air .'

According to an account of Inouye'sorderly, who became separated from thecaptain in the melee, Inouye chargedahead with loud shouts, followed by hismen. As accurate Marine fire raked theranks of the charging Japanese, Inouyeshouted "Banzai, Banzai," at the top ofhis voice, and that was the last heardof him . As one of the Japanese was tocomment regretfully later : "It's a pityhe could not reach the American posi-tion for a full display of his finalswordsmanship ."59As the Japanese charged the bound-

ary between the 23d and 24th Marines,it was inevitable that some of themwould get through the Marine lines .There was vicious fighting throughoutthe hours of darkness . Some of the ac-tion eventually extended to the 24thMarines and, on a smaller scale, to the25th. Company E, 2/23, continued tobear the brunt of the counterattack,expending 20 cases of hand grenades,200 rounds of 60mm illumination shells,and an unknown quantity of machinegun, BAR, and rifle ammunition 6 0Company E faced a critical situationaround 0100, when ammunition beganto run out. Finally, additional loads'Ibid., p . 258." Saito ltr to Newcomb, 5Feb64, in Newcomb

Notes .'2123 OpRpt, p . 33 .


were sent forward in a jeep and trailer,which brought the badly needed sup-plies forward over an enemy infestedroad, with the aid of 60mm illumina-tion. The jeep drew several rounds ofenemy small arms fire but was able todeliver its badly needed cargo . Fire sup-port ships expended 193 star shells dur-ing the night, thus lessening some ofthe confusion that accompanied the ac-tion. In the flickering light the chewed-up volcanic ground became visible,filled with wriggling forms . Artilleryfire soon blanketed the area and manyof the would-be infiltrators halted intheir tracks .

But many of the attackers did getinto the Marine lines and, in the wordsof one account :

The night became alive with the noiseand lights of a determined fire fight. Redtracer bullets shot across the flats . Japrockets hurtled through the air, leaving aquarter-mile trail of golden sparks . Starshells of yellow and green hung in the sky .

The battle kept up all night . Individualmen in foxholes didn't know what washappening. They waited for Japs to appearand killed them as fast as they came. Menwith telephones whispered into their in-struments and tried to discover how strongthe enemy attack actually was . Machineguns chattered incessantly . Grenadespopped.'

As day dawned over Iwo Jima on 9March, the area in and around the 2/23positions, and to a lesser extent in frontof the 24th Marines, showed the signsof horrible carnage. Mopping up con-tinued until noon . A body count of en-emy dead revealed approximately 650at the focal point of the attack, whileanother 150 were discovered in the ad-

01 Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 291 .

679

j acent sectors . Among those who per-ished in the counterattack was CaptainInouye, who died as he had wished todie . The counterattack cost the Marines90 men killed and 257 wounded, a largenumber of men to lose in one night'sbitter fighting ; yet beyond any doubtthe cost would have been higher had itbeen necessary to ferret the enemy outof his dugouts one by one .

To the Japanese survivors of theslaughter, the arrival of daylightbrought little comfort. Stripped bothof the protective cover of darkness andleadership on which all of them somuch depended, the 200 sailors thathad survived the abortive banzai hud-dled in small groups, wondering whatto do next . It was apparent to all thatgetting to Mount Suribachi or any ofthe airfields was far beyond their capa-bilities. A lieutenant finally gatheredthem together and those who couldcrawled away from the place of car-nage, constantly harassed by the Ma-rines hunting for them. As to theirfurther operations

Their fighting was over. Each night thelieutenant sent out patrols of three to fivemen. They never returned . Others wentinto caves, and some died of wounds, ofsickness, or of thirst. Some drank urineand died .

The lieutenant lasted until April 29, theEmperor's birthday, when he told theothers, "We will steal a B-29 and fly tothe homeland. You others do as you pleaseafter we're gone." He left, accompaniedby the chief Navy medical officer, an en-sign, and a petty officer .'

There was to be one more sequel toCaptain Inouye's counterattack : Obvi-ously aware of General Kuribayashi's

62 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 259.

680

orders to stay in place and fight as longas possible, he had neglected to informhis superior, Admiral Ichimaru, of hisintentions. As a result

. . . on the night of Inouye's last charge,Admiral Toyoda again messaged AdmiralIchimaru, praising the brave acts of theNavy men and again begging them tohold out as long as possible . Ichimaru didnot know that Inouye had already sacri-ficed the last of the Japanese Navy forceon Iwo Jima

For the men of the 4th Marine Divi-sion, Captain Inouye's abortive counter-attack at one stroke eliminated a largesegment of the enemy force holding theeastern part of the island . With justabout all of this force out of the way,there no longer was any central direc-tion of Japanese forces in the east.Major General Senda, with a force ofundetermined strength, was still as-sumed to be blocking the 4th Division'spath between Higashi Village and thecoast. Enemy remnants were still incontrol of Turkey Knob, and a fewother pockets of resistance still existed,but by this time the enemy's capabilityto resist was drastically reduced .

Even though the mopup of survivorsof the counterattack continued through-out the morning of 9 March, the 4thDivision continued its attack in accord-ance with previously laid plans . At0700, following a 10-minute prepara-tion, the 4th Division jumped off . Onceagain, the division employed the samescheme of maneuver it had used in pre-vious days, with the 23d Marines on theleft, the 24th Marines in the center, andthe 25th Marines on the right . The23d Marines, with 2/23 in the assault,

03 Ibid., pp . 259-260 .


was able to advance in the center andto its right against resistance thatlacked the bite of the preceding days .However, the left of the regiment drewheavy fire from a ridge near the divi-sion boundary about 500 yards northof Higashi. By 0900, the ridge hadbeen seized in direct assault, and thebattalion slowly but persistently forcedits way forward . At 1500, 1/23 revertedto the regiment . Ordered to consolidateat 1700, Colonel Wensinger's men con-tinued the attack to improve their posi-tions and did not halt until half an hourlater. Gains for the day were a respect-able 300 yards . As the regiment dug in,it maintained contact with the 3d Ma-rine Division on the left and the 24thMarines on the right .

In the remaining division sectors, en-emy opposition was as strong as ever,and, in consequence, no additionalground was seized in the center and onthe right of the division . To some ex-tent, lack of progress in the center wasdue to depletion of manpower, whichmade it necessary to shuffle companiesfrom one battalion to another in orderto bring the assault battalion up toeffective strength . As part of the re-organization of 1/24, Lieutenant Colo-nel Austin R . Brunelli, the regimentalexecutive officer, assumed command of1/24, relieving Major Treitel . Becauseof the heavy resistance on its left flank,the 25th Marines, less 3/25 but with2/24 attached, remained in position .

During the night from 9-10 March,there was a relative lack of enemy ac-tivity. A small amount of light andmedium mortar fire at infrequent inter-vals harassed the 4th Division linesduring the night, and infiltration at-


.tempts remained on a large scale . Inorder to counter the threat still posedby groups of the enemy operating inthe division rear, the Provisional Bat-talion, which had been mopping up inthe Amphitheater and around TurkeyKnob, was disbanded and its missiontaken over by 2/25 . At the same time,a 4th Provisional Battalion, consistingof 37 officers and 498 enlisted men, wasorganized from units of the DivisionSupport Group. This unit, under thecommand of Lieutenant Colonel MelvinL. Krulewitch, had special responsibil-ity for mopping up behind the divisionlines and retained this mission until 12March, when it was disbanded . 64

At 0800 on D plus 19, the 4th MarineDivision continued its attack after acoordinated corps and division artillerypreparation, which changed into a roll-ing barrage as the men moved out.On this day, which was to be full ofsignificant developments for GeneralCates' men, the assault was made es-sentially by the 23d and 25th Marines .The 24th Marines reverted to divisionreserve. The 1st Battalion, 24th Ma-rines, was pulled out of the line andreplaced by 3/25. The 3d Battalion,24th Marines, remained in its previouszone of action but was attached to the23d Marines, while 2/24 remained at-tached to the 25th Marines .

The 23d Marines, with 2/23 on theleft and 3/24 on the right launched avigorous attack that encountered onlylight opposition on the right. The en-emy, entrenched in the rocky ridgesalong the left boundary of the division,replied with accurate and effective mor-

' 4th MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt, pp . 17-18 .

681

tar and small arms fire which reducedgains of 2/23 in this sector. Through-out the regimental zone of advance,small but determined groups of theenemy tried to impede the advance .Since the Japanese no longer held asolid line on commanding ground, theMarine assault elements were able tobypass such nests of resistance, leavingtheir annihilation to teams of engi-neers, tanks, and infantry, whichblasted and scorched such obstacleswith demolitions and flamethrowers .

As the regimental attack gained mo-mentum, an enormous amount ofground was taken by Iwo standards .By 1500, Colonel Wensinger's men hadadvanced no less than 700 yards andwere within 500 yards of the east coast .Having reached commanding groundin this area, the regiment halted in mid-afternoon. Patrols from 2/23, dis-patched during the remainder of theafternoon, reached the coast near Ta-chiiwa Point without encountering anyenemy opposition . A short distance tothe south, elements of 3/24 recon-noitered to within 100 yards of thecoast without making contact with theenemy.

On the division right, the 25th Ma-rines, with 2/24 and the Reconnais-sance Company attached, completed therelief of 1/24 by 0600. Following thisrelief, 3/25 took over the sector of 1/24 .In order to complete the encirclement ofthose enemy remnants still holding outin the Amphitheater and on TurkeyKnob, 3/25 was shifted to the north ofthe enemy salient, where, together with1/25, it would attack to the southeastparallel to the axis of advance of the23d Marines. Along the southern per-

682

imeter of the salient, 2/25 and 2/24were to advance generally to the north-east or east respectively, which wouldenable 2/25 to effect a linkup with thoseunits of the regiment attacking towardsthe coast from the northwest .

Jumping off at H-Hour on 10 March,3/25 and 1/25 attacked towards thehigh ground to their front from wherethe enemy still offered moderate toheavy opposition . It soon became ap-parent that the 3d Battalion would beable to move faster than 1/25 and, inconsequence, 3/25 was ordered to con-tinue regardless of its flanks . As theattacks of 3/25 and 2/25 converged, thedistance separating the two units dwin-dled until, shortly after noon, the twobattalions linked up . Overall gains forthe 25th Marines on D plus 19 were600 yards. More important than theyardage gained was the fact that Tur-key Knob was at last completely sur-rounded and all resistance remainingcould now be eliminated. As the 25thMarines consolidated for the night, itsleft flank was tied to the 23d Marinesabout 800 yards from the coast whilethe stationary right flank was stillanchored on the beach to the south .

The significance of the 4th Division'smovements and gains on 10 March wassummed up in one historical narrativein these words

It was now evident that the Japanesecounterattack had marked the turningpoint in the battle. Although bitter andcostly fighting continued for six moredays, particularly in the 25th Regiment'szone, organized resistance was now dyingout in the 4th Division area .

During the 14-day period covered in thischapter, the 4th Division, in constant


head-on assault, fought its bloody way fromCharlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, theAmphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Mi-nami and formidable defenses northeastof 382, almost to the coast. The slow butrelentless movement of this division frontcan be compared to the closing of a giantdoor. The right flank, which advanced lessthan 1,000 yards, acted as a hinge whilethe rest of the division (the door) turnedupon it and attacked northeast, east, andsoutheast to close and sweep trappedenemy toward the sea .'

The 4th Division assault on easternIwo Jima thus had broken the back ofenemy resistance by 10 March. In thewake of the division's advance, thereremained a staggering number of cas-ualties, whose bodies and minds boreample witness to the ferocity of thefighting. Between 25 February, whenGeneral Cates' men first attacked theMeat Grinder and 10 March, when theywere within a stone's throw of thecoast, the division had sustained 4,075casualties. A total of 847 Marines hadbeen killed or were dead of wounds ;2,836 had been wounded ; 1 was miss-ing, and 391 were suffering from com-bat fatigue . 66

As the three Marine divisions slowlyapproached the coastline in their re-spective zones of advance, it becameapparent to all on the island that timefor General Kuribayashi and his gar-rison was running out . In Japan, anx-ious eyes were watching the contest ofwills being waged for possession of IwoJima. To the military observers, the out-come was a foregone conclusion . Butthe nation's morale was precariously

a Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 176 .Ibid., p . 177.


perched on the faint hope that GeneralKuribayashi's masterful defense of theisland would give the business-mindedAmericans food for thought about thecost of a full-scale invasion of the homeislands . Thus, in Japanese eyes, theprolonged defense of Iwo Jima pursuednot only the immediate tactical objec-tive, but a vastly more far-reachingstrategic one .Few of the surviving members of

that garrison had any illusions leftabout the outcome of the war . OneJapanese captured in the 4th Divisionarea late on 9 March was better quali-fied than most others to comment onthe overall situation. A peacetime edi-tor and publisher of one of the largemetropolitan newspapers of Japan, heremarked that "this is not a winningwar for Japan-she cannot win, but she

683

is trying her darndest to lessen herdefeat."67That time was running out on the

mainland as well was strongly re-emphasized on the evening of 9 March,when more than 300 B-29s mounted oneof the biggest air raids of the waragainst Tokyo. This attack severelydevastated the enemy capital, servingnotice to all Japanese that they werenow open to American attack both fromsea and air ; that henceforth the citi-zens of Tokyo were as exposed toAmerican explosives as General Kuri-bayashi's diminishing garrison on IwoJima.

` Interrogation of Leading Private YutakaOyanagi, 10Mar45, by 1stLt G. A . Hoeck, 4thMarDiv Preliminary POW Interrogation Rpt#15, 10Mar45, in 4th MarDiv Translations.

Final Operations on Iwo Jima 1

ELIMINATION OF THE POCKETS-3D MARINE DIVISION AREA 2

On 11 March 1945, operations on IwoJima entered their final phase. Nolonger under any central direction,three more or less clearly defined enemypockets fought a battle to the deathin the zone of advance of each of the

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : TF 51 AR ; VACSAR ; VAC G-2 Rpts; VAC C-3 Jnl ; VACTranslations ; 3d MarDiv AR ; 3d MarDiv D-2Jnl; 3d MarDiv 'G-2 PerRpts ; 3d MarDiv G-3PerRpts; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 4th MarDivD-3 Jul ; 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpts ; 4th Mar-Div Translations ; 5th MarDiv AR ; 5th MarDivD-1 Jul; 5th MarDiv D-2 Jnl ; 5th MarDivD-2 PerRpts ; 5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl; 5th Mar-Div Casualty Rpts ; Horie Rpt ; Bartley, IwoMonograph; Iwo Comments ; Morehouse, IwoJima Campaign; Newcomb, Iwo Jima ; ' New-comb Notes; Morisbn, Victory in the Pacific ;Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima ; Isely andCrowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War ;Leckie, Strong Men Armed ; Smith and Finch,Coral and Brass ; Aurthur and Cohlmia, TheThird Marine Division ; Proehl, The FourthMarine Division ; Conner, The Fifth MarineDivision ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun .

Additional material in this section is de-rived from : 9th Mar URpts; 9th Mar UJnl ;9th Mar AR ; 21st Mar AR, Iwo Jima, 23Jan-16Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 21st MarAR; 21st Mar UJnl ; 21st Mar URpts; 1/9 AR;2/9 AR; 3/9 AR ; 1/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 29Jan-26Mar45, dtd 6Apr45, hereafter 1/21 AR ;2/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 30Jan-24Mar45, dtd12Apr45, hereafter 2/21 AR ; 3/21 AR, IwoJima, 15Jan-16Mar45, dtd 11Apr45, hereafter3/21 AR; 1/23 OpRpt; 3d TkBn AR.

684

CHAPTER 11

three Marine divisions . As the pocketsbecame more constricted, the nature ofthe fighting changed, mostly becausethe terrain no longer permitted the em-ployment of naval gunfire, air support,and in the end even artillery. Eventu-ally, as Japanese resistance neared theend, tanks and half-tracks furnished theheavy supporting fire needed to root outthe last of the obstinate enemy de-fenders .

On D plus 20, the only major oppo-sition in the zone of advance of the 3dMarine Division extended along thedivision's rough boundary, where en-emy remnants still occupied a ridgelineparalleling the coast to the east ofKitano Point. (See Map IX, Map Sec-tion) . A second center of resistance far-ther south, to the east of Motoyama Vil-lage, southeast of the Northern Airfield,and southwest of Hill 362C was a pocketwhich had already been under attackfor several days prior to 11 March .Named after the commander of 2/9,Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, this pock-et was honeycombed with caves andemplacements cut into sandstone . Thepocket itself was ringed by antitankguns and Colonel Nishi's dug-in lightand medium tanks, equipped with37mm and 47mm guns . The mostprominent occupant of the pocket wasColonel Nishi, who had thus far sur-vived the ferocious fighting on theisland .

FINAL OPERATIONS ON IWO JIMA

On 11 March, 1/9 and 3/9 were toexecute a converging attack from thehigh ground near the east coast intothe northeastern fringes of the pocket .Once the two battalions had linked up,they were to launch a concerted driveinto the pocket from the east . In thecourse of the morning, the 1st Battalionassaulted a ridge overlooking the pock-et and blasted its way to the top,demolishing caves and other positionsas it went along. The advance was sup-ported by Shermans from the 3d TankBattalion, whose fire either destroyedsuch enemy defenses as could be spottedor at least kept the occupants of strong-points underground to permit the ap-proach of demolition teams. The 3dBattalion was forced to assault similarterrain during -the morning withouttank support, which did not arrive untilan armored bulldozer had carved outa road for the Shermans during theearly afternoon . In mid-afternoon,shortly after 1500, the two battalionslinked up. For the remainder of the day,elements of both battalions mopped upalong the east coast, outposted thebeach, and established defensive posi-tions on the high ground east of Hill362C .

Even though no solid line of contain-ment surrounded the pocket from thewest or southwest, there was no ac-tivity on the part of the Japanesetrapped within, aimed at either evadingthe encirclement or launching a directassault against the Marines approach-ing them. Instead, the enemy followedthe orders issued by General Kuribaya-shi to the letter. Remaining withintheir relatively secure pillboxes, dug-

685

outs, caves, and stationary tanks, theJapanese contested every foot ofground, continuing to make the Ma-rines pay an exorbitant price for everyyard gained .

In order to support the advance of3/21, a 7.2-inch rocket launcher,mounted on a sled, was attached to thebattalion. This improvisation was theidea of the VAC ordnance officer, whohad four of the rocket launchersmounted on sleds when it was foundthat these weapons did not fit theM4A3 tank with which VAC was thenequipped. The sled mount appeared tobe the answer to the problem of gettingthis powerful supporting weapon intoterrain which was impassable fortanks . Each rocket launcher, equippedwith 20 tubes, was capable of delivering640 pounds of TNT in a salvo . Effectiverange of the launcher was 250 yards .A volley of rockets, exploding withina narrow area, could be expected tohave a gruesome and highly demor-alizing effect upon the enemy .

As 3/21 approached the confines ofthe pocket, meeting very heavy resist-ance all the way, a rocket launcher wastowed into action by a tank of CompanyC, 3d Tank Battalion. Altogether, 10volleys were fired into the pocket withundetermined results . Only too soon didit become apparent that the efficiency ofthe launchers did not match the visualeffect created by the exploding rockets .When the dust settled, the enemy stillsat securely in his defenses, little theworse for wear. An official report ofthis action was to note with discourage-ment : "Nearly 200 of the 7.2-inch rock-ets were thrown into this pocket and

686

still our infantry was unable to go inand occupy the ground ." 3

Elsewhere in the 3d Division zone ofadvance, General Erskine was able topull 2/21 out of the line for a muchneeded rest after elements of the 27thMarines, of the 5th Division had movedbehind the left flank of that battalion .To fill the gap thus created, 1/21 ex-tended its lines northward and tied inwith the adjacent 5th Division . At thesame time that 1/9 and 3/9 were con-verging on Cushman's Pocket from thenortheast, 3/21, then attached to the9th Marines, was approaching thepocket from the southwest .

For the remainder of 11 March, 3dDivision engineers and riflemen blastedcaves and dugouts. Because of theproximity of the battle lines, GeneralErskine's division did not receive anyartillery support that day, though 1/12stood by for call fires if needed . Similar-ly, there was no air support for thesame reasons, except that aerial obser-vation was used to report the move-ments of 3d Division units . Afternightfall the Japanese, employing hit-and-run tactics, emerged from theirhideouts and stealthily approaching theMarine positions, hurled a few handgrenades, and then attempted to dis-appear as quietly as they had come .Such tactics succeeded only infrequent-ly, and many of the infiltrators did notsurvive to tell of their exploits .

On the evening of 11 March, 3/21was facing eastward with a frontage of200-300 yards, while 1/9 and 3/9 werefacing westward with a frontage ofabout 600 yards . A distance of 500-600

3 3d TkBn, AR, 11Mar45.


yards separated 3/21 from the two bat-talions of the 9th Marines . The 2d Bat-talion, 9th Marines, was in division re-serve just east of Motoyama Village,where it was engaged in mopping upthe enemy units on the southern fringeof the pocket. At the same time, thebattalion formed a line some 400 yardslong which acted as a stop-gap for anyenemy troops seeking to escape west-ward from the encirclement .Early on 12 March, compression of

Cushman's Pocket continued, with 1/9and 3/9 again hammering from theeast while 3/21 formed the anvil alongthe western fringes . Lieutenant ColonelBoehm's 3d Battalion, advancing west-ward, apparently hit one of the develop-ing weak spots in the enemy lines andmade fair progress. The 1st Battalionto the south, on the other hand, raninto heavy resistance and was unableto keep pace with 3/9 . Finally, anarmored bulldozer carved out a pathover which the Shermans could moveto the front lines. Once the tanks hadarrived there, eager infantrymen ac-curately pinpointed the enemy positionfor the tankers, and, in the words ofthe official report, "successful work ineliminating these positions was done bythe tanks ."4

In the zone of advance of the 1stand 3d Battalions, 9th Marines, ex-treme difficulty was encountered withthe terrain which alternately featuredsteep banks and gulches filled with softvolcanic ash. The tankers constantlyhad to be on the alert for Japanesein the vicinity who were only too eagerto seek death if there was a chance of

`Ibid ., 12Mar45 .


blowing up an American tank alongwith themselves . Tanks bogged downin the difficult terrain proved irresist-ible objectives for suicidal Japanese,not to mention their attractiveness asstationary targets of opportunity forthe remaining enemy antitank guns . Inaddition to the above, the tankers foundit very difficult to maintain directionsince their movements were directedover the radio through remote control .Many of the enemy positions were socarefully camouflaged that as often asnot Marines were almost on top ofthem before they were spotted. Onceagain, flamethrowers and demolitionsproved their worth in this type of fight-ing. Progress was made on D plus 21,but in the rear of Cushman's Pocket,specifically along the crest of the ridgeoverlooking the east coast of Iwo Jima,resistance remained stubborn .

On the following day, 13 March, thepocket was further compressed when1/9 and 3/9 continued their drive . Onceagain, the progress of the attack wasimpeded by caves, pillboxes, emplacedtanks, stone walls, and trenches. Somasterfully had these defenses beencamouflaged that "only those immedi-ately in front of the troops could belocated . . . . Out of about 150 of thesepositions (by later count), we knewroughly twenty or thirty of them ." 5Nevertheless, despite the initial advan-tage accruing to the defenders, the Ma-rine incursion into the pocket could notbe stopped. Sherman tanks, particular-ly those equipped with flamethrowers,lent the necessary emphasis to the ad-

' Aurthur and Cohlmia, The Third MarineDivision, pp. 246-247 .

vance of the two battalions . The flametanks proved most effective in reducinga number of troublesome concrete em-placements. Still operating in veryrough terrain, the Shermans movedonly short distances at a time, and thenonly with the aid of an armored bull-dozer .

As far as the 9th Marines was con-cerned, the performance of the Sher-mans was of crucial importance . Theregimental commander, Colonel Ken-yon, considered them "to be the mostformidable supporting weapon at ourdisposal . . . tank support was the de-ciding factor in this action ."',

By the end of D plus 22, Cushman'sPocket had shrunk to a mere 250 yards .The diminishing size of the pocket en-abled the withdrawal of two units fromthe encircling force. On the morning of13 March, 1/21 relieved those elementsof 3/21 that were engaged on the line,and the latter battalion reverted to itsparent regiment . Having cleared its zoneof action by evening of the same day,3/9 was pulled out of this area early on14 March and shifted to the vicinity ofHill 362, where it commenced a syste-matic mop-up .The morning of 14 March marked

the beginning of the final drive aimedat eliminating Cushman's Pocket. Themain burden of the attack now restedon 1/9, which pressed forward through-out the morning and by midafternoonhad gained about 100 yards . Onceagain, the use of armor proved decisivein eliminating the stubborn enemy de-fenses. A flame tank belonging to Com-pany B, 3d Tank Battalion, was hit

9th Mar AR, p . 6.

687

688

by a rifle grenade which caused a smallexplosion inside the vehicle, woundingthe driver and assistant driver .

At 1530, 2/9 reverted from divisionreserve to regimental control . Shortlybefore 1800, the battalion passedthrough 1/9 and launched an attackinto the enemy position which by thistime had already shrunk to about 150square yards. Shermans of the 3d TankBattalion played a dominant role inreducing whatever stubborn resistanceremained, but a flame tank borrowedfrom the 5th Marine Division outdidall others. This tank was able to shoota flame about 125 yards and, accordingto the official report, it "proved to bethe weapon that worked when allothers failed . Its long flame range andthe area covered by one burst were thecontributing factors to its remarkablesuccess."' By the time the Shermansand flame tanks had roamed throughthe pocket, blasting and burning every-thing in their path, enemy resistancebecame sporadic and gradually beganto flicker out. The stage was now setfor the infantry to move in and finishthe job .

What might have turned into a rou-tine chore of mopping up turned in-stead into a rather protracted operationrequiring all the skill the attackingforce could muster . The action that 2/9saw for the remainder of 14 Marchwas subsequently described with thestatement : "Inconclusive hand to handfighting ensued until dark ." Hiddenwithin this sentence, however, was afactor which was to be brought out

' Ibid ., p . 7.'219 AR, p . 3 .


elsewhere, namely the combination ofphysical and mental exhaustion thatwas taking its toll among Marines onIwo Jima at this phase of operationsas surely as had shells and bullets ofthe enemy. Few Marines who had madethe initial landing were left during thefinal phase of the fighting . Their placeshad been taken by willing though in-experienced replacements, whose per-formance in combat left much to bedesired. As one Marine historian was toput it

By this stage in the operation a largepercentage of infantry troops were re-placements who lacked the combat train-ing and experience that prepared and con-ditioned men for closing with the enemy .Therefore, the skill and efficiency of as-sault Marines showed marked deteriora-tion after three weeks of personnel attri-tion of original D-Day troop strength .During the final days of 3d Division effortsto smash remaining pockets, armor supportmade success possible . Gun tanks, armoredbulldozers, and flame-throwing Shermanscombined their operations to give the ex-hausted infantry a very effective and muchneeded assist .'

In dealing with the same subjectmatter, the battalion report was tostate succinctly : "Almost all of the in-fantry were replacements. They lackedentirely the will to close with theenemy." 1° Needless to say, this state-ment was not intended as an indictmentof the men involved, but of the replace-ment system which forced men to joinstrange squads and platoons whoseteamwork was dissipated by heavy cas-ualties . For the individual Japanese,who fought to the end among friends,

° Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 181 .'° 2/9 AR, p . 3 .


death was an infinitely less lonely andimpersonal affair than for the averageMarine replacement .

While bitter fighting continued inCushman's Pocket, where one enemyposition after the other was eliminated,a different type of action took placejust to the east of -the pocket on one ofthe ridges overlooking the east coast .Initially, this ridge had been seized onD plus 16 in the conventional manner-direct attack with flamethrowers,small arms, and demolitions-by 3dDivision Marines, who blasted this ob-jective like hundreds of others and thenmoved on, leaving behind blackenedand battlescarred cave entrances thatlooked sinister even in broad daylight .Several days passed and the front lineshad moved on to the north when thisdesolate ridge came to life again .

The first indication that somethingwas going awry in this so-called reararea came when a heavy Japanese ma-chine gun, hidden somewhere in thepreviously cleared ridge, opened up onan unsuspecting Marine carrying am-munition and killed him . Other Marinesnear the ridge soon became startledvictims of the enemy fire from the ridgewhich grew in intensity as small armsjoined the machine gun. The next vic-tims were stretcher bearers and theirwounded burden. Eventually, tanks anddemolitions men arrived and the dan-gerous, time-consuming job of clearingthe ridge had to be repeated . To quoteone report :

Despite their preponderance of weaponsthe Marines found that there were toomany holes. They would attack one onlyto be shot at from another one half adozen feet away. Moreover, the ridge wasnot a straight wall but, in many places,

689

curved like an S . Entranceways protectedeach other, so that Marines would be hitin the back from holes guarding the onethey were assaulting . The inter-connectingtunnels inside the ridge also allowed theJaps to play deadly tag with the Marines .They would shoot out of one hole. By thetime Marines got close enough to thathole, the Japs had left it and were shoot-ing from another one twenty yards awayand higher up in the wall . The Marineshad to post guards at every hole theycould see in order to attack any one ofthem. The tunnels also curved and twistedinside the ridge . The Japs could escape thestraight trajectory weapons and grenadesthrown into the cave entrances, merely byrunning back into the interior ."

Finally, flamethrowers squirted theirlethal liquid into the caves, which be-came boiling infernos. A number of theJapanese who had reoccupied the ridgewere incinerated . Others, their clothingand bodies aflame, tried to escape, onlyto fall prey to accurate Marine bullets .In desperation, some of the enemytrapped inside the ridge blew them-selves up with hand grenades. Beforelong

. . . the scene became wild and terrible .More Japs rushed screaming from thecaves. They tumbled over the rocks, theirclothes and bodies burning fiercely. Soonthe flamethrowers paused . A Marine liftedhimself cautiously into view . There wereno shots from the caves . A Jap with hisclothes in rags hunched himself out of onehole, his arms upraised . The Marines stoodup behind the rocks and waved to him tocome out . The Jap indicated that therewere more who would like to surrender.The Marines motioned him to tell themto come out. ='

In all, 40 men emerged from theridge, many of them Koreans . Marines

71 Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 231 .12 ibid ., p. 232.

690

shouldered their weapons as the prison-ers were marched to the rear. Thetanks left the erstwhile battlefield andquiet descended over the area . Yet thispeaceful interlude was soon to be shat-tered again a few hours later when theJapanese, moving through undergroundtunnels, reoccupied the ridge . One ofthe first victims proved to be SergeantReid Chamberlain, a Marine with anunusual background. As a member ofthe U.S . Army, he had witnessed thefall of Bataan and Corregidor, but in-stead of surrendering to the enemy, hehad turned his activities towards theorganization and training of Filipinoguerrillas. He received a commissionin the U.S. Army and returned to theUnited States, where he promptly re-signed his commission and enlisted inthe U.S. Marine Corps .

En route to the forward positionsof the 21st Marines, Sergeant Chamber-lain was walking past the long, rockyridge, unaware that there were anyenemy in the vicinity. Suddenly, therewere several shots, one of which hitthe sergeant in the head . This incidenttook place in front of several Marinenews correspondents, some of whomalso drew enemy fire . When help ar-rived for the sergeant, it was too late .As one of the correspondents presentwas to put it later, speaking of theenemy

In an instant they had claimed one ofour best men. Chamberlain's wonderfulwar record had ended abruptly. After somany heroic deeds, it seemed an addedtragedy that he was killed while doingnothing but walking . There was nothinganybody could do about it ."

" Ibid ., pp. 250-251 .


Efforts to employ flamethrowersagainst the ridge during the fadinghours of daylight proved unavailing,since all of these weapons were com-mitted in the front lines . At dusk, ele-ments of the 9th Marines bivouackedon the ridge, which had become dor-mant again. Apprised of the situation,the commanding officer posted sentriesbehind the rocks facing the ridge, readyto fire on anything that moved .Hardly had dusk settled over the

area, when there was stealthy move-ment on the slopes of the ridge asindividual Japanese emerged from pre-viously undetected cracks and holes .Marines opened fire on these blurredsilhouettes . The results of this fire be-came quickly evident as some of theJapanese who had been hit groanedwith pain, others jerked spasmodicallyand then lay silent while the remainder,realizing that they were trapped, at-tempted to burrow their way back intothe ground. A few who managed to getback under cover committed suicide .

Shortly before midnight there was atremendous blast which hurled hugepieces of rock through the air andshook the entire area . Some of theMarines were buried in volcanic ashand debris up to their necks and had tobe dug out. Others were hit by chunksof concrete that rained down through-out the area. The ridge itself became amass of fire and disintegrating matter .While the Marines were still engagedin assessing what had happened andtrying to aid each other as best theycould, Japanese began to emerge fromtheir holes on the ridge, some of themdazed, others carrying antipersonnelmines tied around their waists . A group


of five Japanese, running along the wallof the ridge, was spotted by the lightof the flames and all were instantlykilled .

At dawn it became apparent that, de-spite the explosion and subsequent bit-ter fighting, the Marines had sufferedonly one serious casualty . There mighthave been more if men, who foundthemselves buried in debris and vol-canic ash, had not been rescued by fel-low Marines before they were smoth-ered. It was subsequently discoveredthat the enemy had used land mines andaerial bombs to blow up the ridge .

On 15 March organized resistance inthe 3d Division sector had just aboutended. General Erskine's division wasordered to relieve elements of the 5thMarine Division on the right of thatdivision and attack to the northwest . 14Early on 16 March, D plus 25, the 21stMarines took over an 800-yard sectoron the right of General Rockey's divi-sion. The boundary between the twodivisions now extended from a point400 yards east of Hill 362B to thenorthern tip of Iwo Jima near KitanoPoint .

Following the relief of 3/27 and 2/26by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 21stMarines, that regiment prepared to at-tack to the north in conjunction withelements of the 5th Marine Division . A20-minute preparation by the 3d and5th Division artillery, as well as the155s of the corps artillery, preceded thejumpoff, which was scheduled for 0815,and continued for 10 minutes follQwingH-Hour. The rolling barrage, which

"VAC OpO No. 23-45 with changes, dtd15Mar45 .

691

marked the final phase of the prepara-tory fire moved only 50 yards ahead ofthe assault units and then moved for-ward at 100-yard intervals in conjunc-tion with the advance. In addition tothe shore-based artillery, a destroyeroffshore shelled northern Iwo for nearlyan hour and then stood by to deliver callfires. Fighters stationed on the South-ern Airfield were available for air sup-port, but the restricted area in whichthe final operations on Iwo Jima tookplace precluded their employment .

The attack of 1/21 made good head-way against only light resistance . Onthe other hand, 2/21 encountered heavysmall arms fire and extremely difficultterrain, both of which combined to re-tard its advance. Japanese, fightingfrom caves and spider trap positions,offered their customary obstinate re-sistance. Some of them, obviously benton suicide, charged tanks or groups ofMarines with grenades and demolitioncharges. For the most part, such sortieswere marked more by fierce fanaticismthan cool logic, and most of them failedbefore the human bomb could inflictmuch damage on the Marines or theirarmor. During the early afternoon bothbattalions reached the coast near Kita-no Point. From that point, it becamea matter of mopping up such enemyas remained in caves and other shelters .By the end of 16 March, General

Erskine's men had completed the elimi-nation of Cushman's Pocket and, at thesame time, had completed their missionin helping out the 5th Marine Division .This action, for all practical purposes,ended combat operations of the 3d Ma-rine Division on Iwo Jima . Late on Dplus 25, General Erskine announced

692

that all enemy resistance in the zone ofaction of his division had ceased .'',In fact, even though Cushman's Pock-

et had been overrun, Colonel Nishi,commanding the 26th Tank Regiment,was still inside with about 450 men, allthat had remained of his command . Ofthese, 300 were wounded and few ofthem were able to move on their own .From their underground hideout, theJapanese could hear their erstwhilecomrades, now prisoners of war andworking for the Americans, calling onColonel Nishi to surrender . But suchappeals fell on deaf ears . Early on 19March, with only two days' food supplyremaining, Colonel Nishi ordered hismen to make a final charge against theAmericans. Only 60 were able to heedhis call. Sometime between 19 and 22March, Colonel Nishi died . Whether hewas felled by an American bullet or byhis own hand has never been clearlydetermined though his widow finds sol-ace in the thought "that he died at thefoot of the northern cliffs, and thatocean waves have scattered his re-mains."16

4TH MARINE DIVISION MOPUP 17

Following its impressive gains on 10March, which had taken some of itsassault units to the vicinity of the eastcoast, the 4th Marine Division con-

' 3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpt No. 31, dtd 16-Mar45 .

'° Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 267 ." Additional material in this section is de-

rived from : 23d Mar OpRpt ; 24th Mar QpRpt ;25th Mar UJn1; 25th Mar OpRpt ; 14th MarOpRpt; 1 123 OpRpt ; 2/23 OpRpt; 2/24 OpRpt ;1/25 OpRpt ; 2/25 OpRpt ; 3/25 OpRpt .


tinued the attack on the followingmorning. Jumping off with the 23d and25th Marines at 0730, the division con-tinued its advance to the coast . (SeeMap X, Map Section) . On the left the23d Marines reached its objective rapid-ly, overrunning such enemy resistanceas flared up in its path . In the wake ofthe regiment's advance, engineers sealedcaves and constructed a road . In lateafternoon, 1/23 relieved 2/23 and pulledback to the same positions held duringthe preceding night. Combat patrolswere dispatched into the beach areas tosearch out enemy stragglers or hold-outs .

The advance of the 25th Marines didnot progress as smoothly as that ofthe 23d. Almost immediately after thejumpoff, Colonel Lanigan's regimentran into heavy fire from rockets, mor-tars, and small arms . As a result, littleground was gained . An explanation ofthe stubborn resistance came duringthe afternoon when the interrogationof a captured Japanese revealed thatabout 300 of the enemy were holed upin caves and tunnels directly in frontof the regiment . The prisoner furthervolunteered that a Japanese brigadiergeneral was trapped inside the pocket ."'

In describing the area of the pocket,4th Division records had this to say

It was at once apparent that this areawas the final defensive position of theenemy in this zone. The terrain in thisarea was not normal in any respect ; itcould be classified only as a terrain freakof nature. However, it was well suited forthe construction of cave positions, and theJapanese had utilized this advantage to

- 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 68, dtd 11-Mar45 .


the fullest extent. Their scheme of maneu-ver was to hold up the advance as long asit was possible, and to inflict as manycasualties as they could before they wereforced to adopt their usual suicidaltactics ."

The terrain itself consisted of aseries of deep crevices and steep ridgesthat extended generally to the south-east towards the coast . Smaller gulliescutting through the area created a mazeof compartments and cross compart-ments. The rough rocky outcroppingsand scrubby vegetation that had sur-vived the extensive shelling providedthe Japanese with excellent cover andconcealment .

That the elimination of this smallbut tough pocket of resistance wouldbe a difficult and time-consuming opera-tion had already become apparent to4th Division Marines by the end of 11March. The presence of one of the bigfish in the pocket, General Senda, com-mander of the 2d Mixed Brigade, madeit virtually certain that the remnantsof that unit would fight to the bitterend with undiminished fanaticism . 20

Even though there was only a mar-ginal possibility that General Sendamight be persuaded to surrender, in-telligence personnel of the 4th MarineDivision decided on 12 March that suchan attempt was worth the effort. Aprisoner of war volunteered to lead adetail of Marines to the vicinity of Gen-eral Senda's presumed hideout duringthe early morning of D plus 21 . Under

19 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 50 .'For a detailed breakdown of General

Senda's military career, see Japanese De-fense Agency Comment .

693

sniper fire, which eventually caused acasualty, Marines set up an amplifier-speaker system over which an appealto surrender was to be broadcast. Formore than two hours the psychologicalwarfare team failed in its efforts tostart a power generator which wouldhave provided the electricity needed todrive the amplifier . A second motor-driven power plant failed to start anddue to this technical breakdown theentire operation had to be called off .Whether General Senda might haveheeded the appeal promising and guar-anteeing him and his men the best oftreatment, remains doubtful. Certainlynone of the other Japanese commandersapproached in this fashion on Iwo Jimaproved responsive .

Following the two-hour delay engen-dered by the abortive surrender appeal,Marines of the 4th Division launchedtheir attack into the pocket at 0900 with2/25, 3/25, and 2/24. The scheme ofmaneuver called for 2/25 to attackdown the draws toward the coast while3/25 and 2/24 were to support the at-tack with heavy weapons fire . This fire,furnished by bazookas, antitank gre-nades, and 60mm mortars, had to sub-stitute for artillery support. As of 12March, the limited area occupied by theenemy in the 4th Division zone nolonger constituted a practicable targetarea, and orders had been issued tosecure all 4th Division artillery .

The Japanese, firmly entrenched inravines, caves, and pillboxes, resisted intheir customary tenacious fashion, withthe result that only minimal progresswas made. The character of the terrainprecluded the employment of tanks,

694

forcing Marines to flush the enemy outof his emplacements one or two at atime. In addition to the slow progress,this type of fighting was, as usual, ex-pensive for the attacking force . By eve-ning of 12 March, the combat efficiencyof General Cates' division had droppedto a new low of 36 percent . 21 .The drive to eliminate General Senda's

pocket continued on 13 and 14 Marchalong the same lines as on the 12th .Progress throughout remained agoniz-ingly slow, due to the depletion of per-sonnel as much as enemy resistance .While the pocket was being reduced, the23d Marines began a systematic mop-ping up of its area from the beachtowards the regimental rear . At thesame time, the regiment took care ofother urgent business, notably the evac-uation of the friendly dead, the burialof enemy dead, and the general policingof the area.

By 15 March, the slow and deliberateadvance of the 25th Marines was begin-ning to bear dividends . Even though theenemy continued to offer desperate re-sistance, there were signs that hispower to resist had been considerablyreduced. Since 2/25 had become so de-pleted in strength that it required re-lief, 2/24 was ordered into the line . Aprovisional company composed of head-quarters personnel and members of the81mm mortar platoon of 1/25 wasorganized to take over the area pre-viously held by 2/24. Colonel Laniganordered his men to press the attack intothe pocket regardless of contact . At thesame time, flame tanks stationed on theroad paralleling the east coast of Iwo

' 4th MarDiv OpRpt, p . 53 .


fired northwestward into the inacces-sible draws with good effect .

This drive on D plus 24 resulted ina net gain of 200 yards. More impor-tant, it scored a deep penetration of theleft flank of the pocket, where GeneralSenda had established his strongestpositions. In the midst of this bitterfighting, repeated attempts were madeto induce the surrender of the Japanese,but none of them fell on fertile soil .The destruction of one cave after an-other, together with their occupants,continued .

Increased evidence that the pocketcould not hold out much longer wasreceived during the night of 15-16March, when a group of 50-60 Japaneseattempted to break out of the encircle-ment. Six of the enemy were killed andthe remainder were driven back intothe caves from which they had emerged .When the 25th Marines resumed the at-tack at 0630 on 16 March, the Marinesdrew rifle and machine gun fire, andhand grenades exploded all aroundthem . Nevertheless, the Japanese nowfought without any real organizationand such resistance as was offered camefrom small, isolated groups. By mid-morning, the assault battalions hadfought their way through to the beachroad and Colonel Lanigan declared allorganized resistance in his zone of ac-tion ended as of 1030 . 22

General Senda's body was neverfound ; prisoners volunteered that hehad committed suicide on 15 March . Asthe din of battle receded, all that re-mained in the hotly contested area werethe torn and battered terrain, large

'Ibid., p. 58 .


numbers of enemy dead, and the scarredand blackened cave entrances. In sixdays of bitter fighting, General Senda'spocket had finally been reduced. TheJapanese had fought practically to ex-tinction. The 4th Marine Division hadpaid for the ground with 833 casualties .

5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE TOKITANO POINT23

Elimination of the enemy centers ofresistance in eastern Iwo Jima left onlyone area in the hands of the Japanese .This was to be the final enemy pocketof resistance in the very northern partof the island, where General Kuribaya-shi with about 1,500 men was preparingto make his final stand . The Japanesepocket, squarely in the path of the 5thMarine Division's advance, occupiedapproximately one square mile betweenKita Village and Kitano Point on thenorthwest coast . Not by coincidence, italso comprised the worst ground on theisland .

The badlands of northern Iwo, as thisarea may well be called, consisted ofthousands of soft sandstone outcrop-pings . Here, the Japanese had dug inwith their customary efficiency. Eachunderground position had been pro-vided with multiple entrances and exitsto protect the defenders against fire andto permit their escape if one or more ofthe entrances were sealed . These de-fenses had been dug to such a depth thatflamethrowers could neither burn outtheir occupants nor exhaust the supply

Additional material in this section is de-rived from : TF 56 OpRpt; 26th Mar AR ; 27thMar UJnl; 27th Mar AR ; 28th Mar R-2 Jnl ;28th Mar AR ; 13th Mar AR ; 1/26 AR ; 2/26AR; 3/26 UJnl ; 3/26 AR; 3/27 UJnl; 3/27 AR .

695

of oxygen available within this defen-sive system .

In addition to the excellent cover, theJapanese also had the advantage of ef-fective concealment . Their uniformsblended closely with the color of thesandstone. They were familiar with themaze of tunnels that criss-crossed theentire area and could find their wayaround in the darkness as well as inthe daytime. Fighting this type of de-fensive action, General Kuribayashicould continue to hang on with theaustere means at hand. He had no logis-tics problem, for anything that had tobe moved, be it men or supplies, trav-elled underground. Such vital suppliesas ammunition, food, water and med-icine all had been stockpiled under-ground long before the first Marinesbegan to approach the northern portionof the island. In addition to his exten-sive preparations for combat, GeneralKuribayashi had seen to it that theknowledge of the entire defense layoutwas limited to very few of his men,most of whom were told only enoughto be familiar with the immediate de-fenses in their vicinity. As a result,few of the enemy knew anything aboutthe command setup of their own forcesand most of them did not know theprecise location of Kuribayashi's com-mand post .

For General Rockey's men, the battlefor northwestern Iwo meant a continu-ation of previous difficulties aggravatedby worsening terrain . Once again, theywould have to seize the forward face ofa ridge, fight their way across the crest,then continue to fight their way downthe reverse slope, all the while drawingfire from the front, the flanks, from the


ENEMY POSITIONS near Nishi Village under fire . Note burning M-4 tank at left .(USMC 142316)

PRISONER captured by 5th Marine Division near Hill 165 is escorted to the rear fo,interrogation. (USMC 114881)


rear, and, in some instances, even frombelow. The latter circumstance was per-haps the most demoralizing, as pointedout by one participant in the fighting

Perhaps worst of all, every Marinecommander fighting through this sand-stone jungle knew that underneath himwere healthy Japanese who would be outthat night to harass his rear, steal hissupplies, either recover or booby-traptheir own dead, and booby-trap his deadif he couldn't get them out first .And so the battle for Iwo Jima was

ending as it had begun, at close quarterswith Marine forces stripped of the advan-tages of their fire power, fighting anenemy who had been indoctrinated sincechildhood that the greatest honor he wouldever know was to die for his Emperor . Hecould not be threatened out of his positionby encirclement or by superior force ; hecould not be induced to surrender becauseof his hopeless position-tactically orstrategically, he had to be killed .'

The 5th Marine Division drive intothe biggest enemy pocket remaining onthe island got under way on 11 March .The attack was preceded by a 10-minutepreparation, which continued until 20minutes after the jumpoff. The half-hour barrage, fired by the 12th, 13th,and 14th Marines, as well as the corpsartillery, provided an impressive spec-tacle but once again, in accordance withprevious experience, was generally in-effective against enemy personnel whohuddled in well-protected cave positions .

As the division attacked, with the27th Marines on the right and the 28thon the left, the men faced a double foethe Japanese and the terrain, eachbeing equally formidable . The 27th Ma-rines, with 1/26 attached, was able tocarve out limited gains of 200 yards

' Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 107 .

and to continue the systematic destruc-tion of enemy cave positions . This wasthe job of small infantry-demolitionteams, which operated more or less ontheir own, blasting their way forwardas they went along . Operating on thedivision left, the 28th Marines en-countered similar difficulties as Ma-rines assaulted individual strongpointsguarding a rocky gorge to the front .The significance of this gorge, whichwas approximately 200 yards wide and700 yards long, was not yet apparentto Colonel Liversedge's Marines . How-ever, it was clear that the Japanese hadtaken great precautions to effectivelycover all approaches leading into thegorge with rifle and machine gun fire .

While the enemy generally remainedunderground and invisible throughoutthe day, the entire division front eruptedinto action shortly after nightfall andremained that way throughout thenight. Small groups of Japanese con-tinuously attempted to infiltrate theMarine lines. A few were successfulin reaching the 81mm mortar positionsof 3/27. Seven of the infiltrators werekilled in this attempt, one of them wear-ing a Marine uniform and equippedwith an M-1 rifle . 25 Around 2100, an en-emy concentration opposite the 28thMarines was broken up by an artilleryand mortar barrage which killed 26of the enemy . Sporadic rifle fire andgrenade duels continued for the re-mainder of the night .

The arrival of daylight on D plus 21returned the initiative to the Marines,who, once again, carried the battle tothe enemy. On this occasion, the day

' 5th MarDiv AR, p. 26 .

697

698

started off with several air strikesagainst enemy positions just south ofKitano Point. One of the 500-poundbombs aimed at a blockhouse missed itstarget, only to fall into the mouth of acave, where a tremendous explosioncaused not only this entrance, but vari-ous others connected to this cave sys-tem, to belch fire and smoke. A similarincident occurred during the early after-noon, when a 500-pound bomb hit a caveentrance and created a violent explosionwith smoke observed coming out ofcaves 200-300 yards away .

For the remainder of the day, thecourse of the fighting mirrored that ofD plus 20. The enemy continued to re-sist from caves, emplacements, andspider foxholes, frequently holding hisfire until Marines had approached towithin a few feet of his positions . Withthe support tanks, the 27th Marinesmade slow progress against a networkof pillboxes and prepared positions . Inthe course of this advance, between 15and 18 pillboxes were destroyed, butoverall progress still had to be meas-ured in a few yards . The Japanese alsohad learned a few tricks in recentoperations and, in order to escapeAmerican air strikes and artillery fire,attempted to hug the Marine lines .Backbone of the Japanese defensewere his machine guns, rifles, and kneemortars, all of which continued to exacta continuous toll in Marine lives foreach foot of the advance.

During the afternoon of 12 March,Company B of the Amphibious Recon-naissance Battalion scouted Kama andKangoku Rocks, situated close to thenorthwestern shore of Iwo Jima . Inter-mittently throughout the campaign,


Marines advancing up the west coasthad been harassed from suspected Japa-nese positions on these two islands .There was no doubt that even if theenemy had not permanently stationedartillery there, they harbored keen-eyedobservers who had helped to harassshipping approaching the western beach-es during the early phase of the opera-tion. As the Marines neared the twoislands on 12 vehicles furnished by the2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, theywere greeted by silence . It was decidedthat a landing on the island would bemade at 0900 on the following morning .These landings, carried out by 6

officers and 94 men, proceeded withoutincident. The Marines went ashore firston Kama Rock and subsequently onKangoku, the larger island . On thelatter, there was evidence of previousenemy occupancy in the form of severalcaves and stone emplacements, but noJapanese were present to offer anyresistance. Having completed its mis-sion, the reconnaissance company with-drew from the islands .

In a report issued on 12 March, the5th Marine Division intelligence officerestimated that at least 1,000 Japanesewere still defending the northern endof Iwo Jima and concluded : " . . . thereis no shortage of manpower, weapons,or ammunition in the area the Japanesehave left to defend ."26 Actually, thebattle was beginning to reach GeneralKuribayashi's very doorstep . As oneaccount was to relate it

On March 13, a patrol from the 26thRegiment came very near to Kuribayashi,peering into the cave in which he sat, near

=° 5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 22, dtd 12-Mar45 .


the eastern end of the Gorge . The Gen-eral's orderly quickly blew out the candlesand wrapped the General in a blanket ."Thank you," Kuribayashi said, andwalked deeper into the cave . The Marines,one carrying a flamethrower walked alittle way into the cave then turned andwent out. The orderly sighed .'

While the Japanese on northern IwoJima had been suffering badly in thebattle of attrition that was now reach-ing its climax, the Marines of all threedivisions had hardly fared any better .As assault troops of General Rockey'sdivision were beginning to close in onthe final enemy pocket, the men wearilyattacking the ridges above the gorgewere tired to the point of exhaustionand many of them found it difficult toremain on their feet. Few veterans ofthe early battles were left, and deathhad reaped a grim harvest among themen who had gone ashore on the island22 days before. Companies were nowreduced to platoon size . Most of theaggressive and experienced small unitleaders had long since become casual-ties. Gaps in the decimated ranks hadbeen filled with replacements wholacked combat experience that wouldenable them to fight and survive .

On 14 March it became apparent thatthe slow, step-by-step advance of the27th Marines finally had cracked thestrong enemy positions along the north-eastern coast of Iwo Jima . Since themain ridge lines in this area ran fromthe center of the island to the sea on thewest coast, General Rockey decided thatthe most practical direction of attackhenceforth would be from east to west .As a result, the 28th Marines wasordered to hold its present line while

n Newcomb, Iwo Jima, pp. 270-271 .

the 27th Marines was to shift its direc-tion of attack westward . In the centerof the division line the 26th Marinestook over a two-battalion front and wasordered to attack northward with 3/26on the left and 2/26 on the right .

Enemy resistance was less obstinateon D plus 23 than it had been duringthe preceding days and the 27th Ma-rines, with 2/26 attached, gained upto 600 yards . The attack was supportedby tanks which were able to assist theinfantry after armored tankdozers hadcarved routes of approach to the frontlines for them. The official report, speak-ing of the flame tanks, pointed out

. . . this was the one weapon thatcaused the Japs to leave their caves androck crevices and run . On many occasionsthe Japs attempted to charge our flametanks with shaped charges and other ex-plosives. Few of these attempts weresuccessful .'

Other developments on Iwo Jima on14 March gave clear evidence that theend of the long battle was approaching .In mid-morning, five Army Air Forcesplanes bombed and strafed Japanesepositions in front of 3/27 for whatproved to be the last air support mis-sion over Iwo Jima. The diminishingsize of General Kuribayashi's pocketrendered all further air support im-practical. Limited support until the endof the operation would continue to befurnished by artillery and destroyers,and even these supporting arms soonfound it difficult to furnish fire in thesmall area still remaining under enemycontrol .

While compression of the northernpocket was under way, a ceremony was

5th MarDiv AR, p . 27 .

699

700

taking place at 0930 on 14 March atGeneral Schmidt's headquarters . It wasnot an elaborate proceeding ; in fact,its stark simplicity underscored thesignificance of the long awaited event .In the presence of flag and general of-ficers of the fleet and landing force,assembled around a flagpole erected inthese stark surroundings, the officialflag raising on Iwo Jima was held .Among those present were General Hol-land Smith, Admirals Turner and Hill,and Generals Schmidt, Erskine, Cates,Rockey, and Major General Chaney, rep-resenting the Army Garrison Force . 29After the reading of an official procla-mation in which the United Statesofficially suspended the powers of gov-ernment of the Japanese Empire andtook over the occupation of the island,the flag was raised at the same timethat the one on top of Mount Suribachiwas taken down . Upon completion ofthe ceremony, General Holland Smithand his staff departed from the islandby air . 3 oThe night from 14-15 March was

marked by continuous enemy activitydirected against the 5th Division lines .Around 0200, close to 100 Japanese at-tempted to infiltrate the positions of3/27. In the ensuing firefight, 15 of theenemy were killed, most of them bymortar fire . 31 Around the same time, a

3° The VAC chief of staff recalled that "whilethe ceremony of raising the flag was in prog-ress near VAC headquarters, the ground wasshaking around us from the bombardment ofthe unsecured area by nearby Corps artillery ."Rogers ltr .

30 TF 56 OpRpt, pp. 10-11 .01 5th MarDiv AR, p . 27.

small number of Japanese approachedthe lines of 2/26 and started tossinghand grenades . At dawn, the actionshifted to 3/26, where 30 of the enemywere discovered attempting to entercaves southwest of Kitano Point. Halfof this group were killed, the remaindercommitted suicide . 32

The 5th Division attack continued on15 March. On the right, the 27th Ma-rines advanced 400 yards and reducedenemy resistance in this sector to spo-radic small arms fire. In the center, the26th Marines made smaller but equallysignificant gains, carving out an ad-vance of 200 yards . On the division left,in front of the 28th Marines, enemyreaction remained determined and for-midable. At this time, enemy resistancewas still centered in two areas : thesteep draw that extended northwest tothe sea across the front of the 28thMarines and the strong core of resist-ance in front of the 26th Marines, justeast of the draw .

Within the diminishing pocket, Gen-eral Kuribayashi and the survivingmembers of his staff were still in radiocontact with the Japanese on ChichiJima. They were also able to listen tothe "Song of Iwo Jima," especiallybroadcast from Tokyo for the Iwo Jimagarrison . Already on the morning of 15March, General Kuribayashi had an-nounced that the situation was verydangerous and that his strength wasdown to 900 men . 33 By the evening ofthe following day, his strength had beenreduced to 500. Clearly, the end was

" Ibid ."Horie Rpt, p. 10 .



drawing near . General Kuribayashisummoned the commander of the 145thInfantry Regiment, Colonel Ikeda, tosee how much longer resistance couldcontinue. When the regimental com-mander informed him that it would allbe over in another day or so, GeneralKuribayashi admonished him to be cer-tain that the regimental colors wereburned lest they fall into Americanhands .

Behind the Marine lines, additionalsigns of progress were becoming evi-dent as the naval construction engi-neers put the final touches on therestoration of the Central Airfield .Even though the runways remained un-paved, they were usable and the fieldwas about to become operational . Addi-tional gasoline storage facilities hadbeen completed, and the carpenters ofthe 5th Division were already busilyengaged in building crates in which thedivision's equipment would be shipped .At the southern end of Iwo Jima, a dirtroad leading to the top of Mount Suri-bachi had been completed and it wasnow possible to make the trip up byjeep or bulldozer .Reduction of the northern pocket

continued on 16 March. During thisfinal phase of the operation, GeneralRockey's division was supported byelements of the 3d Marine Division,which passed through the 27th Marinesand took over a sector on the right ofthe 5th Division. Attacking to the north,General Erskine's men reached thenorth coast shortly before 1400 .The 26th Marines, with 3/28 at-

tached, attacked with three battalionsabreast. The advance progressed slowly

against heavy rifle fire, as it proceededover rugged and rocky ground, whereall movement was extremely difficult .However, it was a sign of the progressthat had already been made that thevolume of enemy machine gun fire hadgreatly diminished, as had the numberof caves that were encountered . Never-theless, there was still an abundance ofspider foxholes and positions in therocky outcrops which permitted the en-emy to inflict a deadly fire from closerange. In the course of the day, the 26thMarines advanced 200 yards. The 28thMarines remained in position along thesouthern rim of the rocky gorge andcontinued the reduction of enemy de-fenses to its immediate front and flanks .Losses of the 5th Marine Division atthis time consisted of 89 officers and1,993 men killed, 249 officers and 5,710enlisted men wounded, and 3 officersand 128 men missing . Combat efficiencywas estimated at 30 percent . 34 The divi-sion had sustained a total of 8,162casualties in 25 days of fighting .

At 1800 on 16 March, Iwo Jima wasofficially declared secured. Three hoursearlier, the 13th Marines had fired itslast rounds, since the regiment's gunscould no longer furnish supporting firesin the limited area comprising the re-maining pockets of resistance . It nowbecame incumbent on the mixed 3d and5th Division assault forces to completethe occupation of the island with allpossible dispatch, a task easier con-templated than accomplished .

Following its relief by the 21st Ma-rines on 16 March, the 27th Marines re-

*4 5th MarDiv AR, p . 28 .

701

702

organized its badly depleted units intothree battalions, each consisting of tworifle companies and a headquarterscompany. A composite battalion, con-sisting of a headquarters company andfour rifle companies, was formed underthe command of Lieutenant ColonelDonn J. Robertson . A small remainderof the 27th Marines stayed in divisionreserve until the end of the operation .The unit mopped up in the rear areaand prepared to leave the island . Thecomposite battalion, numbering 460men, subsequently was to be attachedto the 26th Marines, where it wouldparticipate in eliminating the final en-emy positions on northern Iwo Jima .

All of the records dealing with thisfinal phase of the operation emphasizethe state of exhaustion in which themen found themselves . According to oneaccount :

That the Division still moved forwardat all was a credit to the men and theirleaders, but the fearful strain of days inthe line was showing up in every unit .Men were getting careless, exposing them-selves to fire when they were tired . Too,many of the men now were replacements,men who fought gallantly and broughtcredit to themselves and the Division, butwho were not, nevertheless, as highlytrained as the Division's original men hadbeen and for that reason probably tookslightly heavier losses''

A sustained effort was made on thepart of General Rockey's division tokeep up morale. Baked goods and fruitjuice were sent to the units in the line ;the wounded were evacuated and thedead buried with all possible dispatch .A division newspaper was circulatedamong the frontline units, and such

'Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p. 113 .


articles of clothing and toilet articles aswere available were sent up to the lines .Some of the more lucky Marines evenenjoyed the luxury of hot showers . But,despite such amenities, the report con-cludes "Iwo Jima remained an unclean,evil little island, an island that thesemen would never forget, however muchthey would have liked to ."36

Despite their ebbing strength andoften only through the application ofsheer will power, those men of the 3dand 5th Marine Divisions still able tomove on their feet and carry a, weaponnow entered the final phase of the battlefor Iwo Jima. Fought in a narrowcorner of the island, the final strugglewould prove every bit as difficult as theearly phase of the operation : deathcame no easier now than in the begin-ning .

With the end clearly approaching andunder steadily increasing pressurefrom the advancing Marines, GeneralKuribayashi on 16 or 17 March left hisheadquarters, housed in a large dome-shaped concrete structure, and movedto a cave occupied by Colonel Ikeda andAdmiral Ichimaru, the remaining seniorofficers of the Iwo Jima garrison fol-lowing the death of Major GeneralSenda and Captain Inouye in the 4thDivision sector . From this cave, situ-ated near the southeastern end of thegorge, the Japanese officers could dolittle but exhort their men to continueresistance to the last. This cave was stilllinked to Chichi Jima by radio, and thusthe final days of Japanese resistance onIwo Jima have become a matter ofrecord .

' Ibid., p . 114 .


BATTLE FOR THE GORGE ANDFINAL OPERATIONS 37

The final battle for Iwo Jima beganon 17 March, D plus 26, when 1/26reached the north coast and pivoted tothe southwest towards the gorge whichhad already been blocked by the 28thMarines for the past few days. (SeeMap XI, Map Section), It was here thatGeneral Kuribayashi had determined tomake his final stand, and he had chosenhis final position with great care . Thegorge, 700 yards long and 200-500 yardswide, would have been difficult to ap-proach even under normal conditions .Outcrops of rocks subdivided the ravineinto minor draws that greatly impededall movement. The Japanese commanderhad taken care to insure that all routesof approach leading into the gorge werecovered by machine gun and rifle firefrom positions that were all but in-visible to the approaching Marines .

Units of the 5th Marine Division pre-paring to offer the coup de grace to thefinal enemy position on the island wouldhave to use their last strength irr at-taining this objective . A brief break-down of casualties in this connectionspeaks for itself

Our own losses at this time had beenextremely heavy. The average battalionwhich landed with 36 officers and 885enlisted, now had about 16 officers and 300enlisted from the original battalion . Most

1; Additional material in this section is de-rived from : 1/28 AR ; 2/28 AR; 3/28 AR ; 5thPioneeer Bn UJnl, 7-23Mar45 ; U. S. ArmyForces in the Pacific Ocean Areas Rpt, IwoJima, Feb-Mar45, dtd 4Feb46 ; VAC ShoreParty AR; Clive Howard and Joe Whitley,One Damned Island After Another (ChapelHill : The University of North Carolina Press),1946 .

703

of the company commanders, platoonleaders, and squad leaders had becomecasualties and many platoons were com-manded by Corporals or PFC's . Assaultsquads were depleted .

Plans for reducing the final pocketcalled for the 28th Marines, with ele-ments of the 5th Pioneer Battalion andthe division reconnaissance company at-tached, to occupy a blocking positionalong the southern rim of the pocketwhile the 26th Marines, in conjunctionwith 3/28 and 3/27, was to advanceinto the gorge from the north and east .Because of the depleted strength of theunits and the condition of the men,assigned zones of action were relativelynarrow. In their drive against thepocket on 17 March, 3/26 and 3/28made slight gains in the northeasternperimeter of the pocket, but once againtheir progress could be measured inyards .

A drama of a different sort was en-acted on the island on D plus 26. Onthe preceding day, prisoners capturedby General Erskine's men had conveyedto their captors the whereabouts ofGeneral Kuribayashi and his staff, and,acting upon this information, GeneralErskine decided to make an attempt toinduce these officers to surrender . Reali-zing that a direct appeal to GeneralKuribayashi would be fruitless, GeneralErskine instead dispatched a messageto Colonel Ikeda, commanding the 145thInfantry Regiment . The message washanded to two prisoners of war who,carrying cigarettes and rations, pro-ceeded into the gorge, fully aware of theimportance of their mission. As theytrudged off on this unusual errand, thepair was handed a walkie-talkie over

' 5th MarDiv AR, p . 29 .

704

which they were to maintain contactwith the 3d Division Language Section .

As they slowly continued on theirjourney, the two emissaries crossedlines and soon made contact withgroups of Japanese, apparently with-out arousing anyone's suspicion. Sev-eral radio messages were received by3d Division personnel indicating thatthe prisoners were getting close to theirobjective. At this point, the couriersstopped all further transmissions . Oneof them, who had incurred a leg wound,dropped out, but the other continuedand six hours after embarking on hisbizarre mission, reached the headquar-ters cave. There, he turned the messageover to one of the sentries who passedit on to the regimental commander .Upon learning that Ikeda had takenthe message in to General Kuribayashi,the prisoner lost his nerve and beat ahasty retreat .

As soon as he had rejoined his fellowcourier, the radio trasmissions to the3d Division resumed and the Marineswere informed that the two were ontheir way back. Upon reaching the Ma-rine lines at the rim of the gorge, theprisoners thought themselves safe andwere more than slightly disturbed atthe rude reception accorded to them by5th Division Marines, who were un-aware of General Erskine's psycho-logical warfare effort. The situationwas finally straightened out before thetwo messengers came to any harm,though it took some convincing of theskeptical 5th Division Marines that thetwo Japanese were indeed working forGeneral Erskine .

The practical results of this surrenderattempt, as in previous instances, were


nil . None of the high-ranking Japaneseofficers on Iwo Jima surrendered, andthe battle of attrition continued to takeits slow and agonizing course . Eventhough nearly all of the Japanese onIwo Jima, under General Kuribay+ashi'sdynamic leadership, would fight to theend, there were some who heeded therepeated appeals to surrender . Ameri-can planes dropped propaganda leaflets,and the artillery fired shells filled withsurrender leaflets and passes. For theJapanese soldier on Iwo Jima, sur-render was not an easy matter . Hecould count on being executed by hisown people if caught with Americanpropaganda on his person. Surrendermight mean that he could never againreturn to his homeland and face hiscompatriots. And, last but not least, hehad no guarantee that the Marineswould honor their promise of fair treat-ment once he turned himself in to them .No wonder that the Japanese werehesitant to take the final and irrever-sible step in view of the uncertaintysurrounding it . A sampling of 65 pris-oners of war showed that 53 had beeninfluenced in their decision to give upby some contact with American propa-ganda . The remaining 12 had beendeterred by fear of their officers anddistrust of the Marines and were cap-tured under different circumstances . 39

Meanwhile, the Marines continued toclose in on General Kuribayashi'spocket. With the end in sight, the Japa-nese garrison commander addressed thisorder to his men on 17 March

1. The battle situation came to the lastmoment .

I VAC G-2 Rpts, pp. 19, 20.


2. I want my surviving officers and mento go out and attack the enemy tonight .

3. Each troop! Go out simultaneouslyat midnight and attack the enemy untilthe last. You all have devoted yourselfto His Majesty, the Emperor . Don't thinkof yourself.

4. I am always at the head of you all .'"'Strangely enough, there was no un-

usual activity during the night from 17-18 March, and nothing even resemblinga banzai charge occurred . From thispoint onward, the information concern-ing the last days of the enemy's battlefor Iwo Jima becomes increasinglyhazy. Most of what has remained passedthrough the hands of the Chichi Jimagarrison, which continued to receiveradio messages from Iwo that werefiled and subsequently turned overto the Americans. Thus, early on 17March, Chichi Jima was notified that"the 145th Infantry Regiment foughtbravely near 'Hyoriuboku' holding theirregimental flag in the center ." Later inthe day, Colonel Ikeda sent this crypticmessage : "Here we burnt our brilliantRegimental Flag completely. Goodbye."41

Iwo Jima became the scene of a wildcelebration on the evening of 18 March .It had nothing to do with the fact thatthe enemy was finally cornered in thenorthwestern portion of the island -andhis elimination now was but a matterof days. Instead, someone had leakedword that Germany had surrendered,and this item of news, entirely un-founded and nearly two months pre-mature, spread all over Iwo Jima likewildfire. As a result

. . . for about an hour the island was thehappiest spot on earth . Antiaircraft and

d0 Horie Rpt, p. 11 ." Ibid.

705

other units in rear areas opened up ajubilant barrage with machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, carbines, rifles, and pistols."

Before it was over, units all over theisland and the ships offshore had thenews. An end to the celebration cameonly when Condition Red was declared,a warning that enemy planes were inthe area. As one account has it, "TheFifth Division hospital treated threecasualties from `the German war' andthere were certainly others ."' -1 Follow-ing the excitement, Marines on IwoJima returned to the more normalroutine of routing individual Japaneseand thwarting the enemy's infiltrationattempts .As the advance continued on 19

March, enemy resistance became cen-tered around General Kuribayashi'serstwhile headquarters . The structureproved completely impervious to the75mm tank shells and likewise defiedall attempts to demolish it with 40-pound shaped charges . It would takethe assaulting Marines two days todestroy the surrounding positions andthen commence a direct assault on thecommand center. Engineers with bull-dozers sealed an entrance on the northside of the structure and several airvents. Finally, four tons of explosives,divided into five charges, proved suf-ficient to destroy this stubborn centerof resistance . Just who and how manyamong the Japanese perished within hasnever become known. However, the gar-rison commander and the high-rankingofficers were safely tucked away inColonel Ikeda's cave, and reports con-tinued to reach Chichi Jima, though

" Conner, The Fifth Marine Division, p . 117 ." Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 281 .

706

communications daily became moresporadic .Around 17-18 March, General Kuri-

bayashi sent his final message to Im-perial General Headquarters, in whichhe apologized to the Emperor for hisfailure to hold the island. The messagewas accompanied by a poem in whichthe garrison commander promised

My body shall not decay in the fieldUnless we are avenged ;I will be born seven more times againTo take up arms against the foe .My only concern isOur country in the futureWhen weeds cover here."

About the same time, but in a lesspoetic and more down-to-earth fashion,Admiral Ichimaru penned a rather vitu-perative letter to none other than Pres-ident Roosevelt, charging the latterwith a lack of understanding for Japan'sproblems and accusing the white race,and the Anglo-Saxons in particular, "ofmonopolizing the fruits of the world, atthe sacrifice of the colored races ." 4

Meanwhile, reduction of the pocketcontinued unabated . Tanks moved upto the front lines over paths cleared bythe tank dozers which themselves fre-quently came under attack by individ-uals or small groups of Japanese benton suicide . The slow but steady Marineadvance into the gorge was carried outunder the command of the assistantdivision commander, General Hermle,whom General Rockey had entrusted

" Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p. 272 .' Admiral Ichimaru ltr to President Roose-

velt, n.d ., in Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign,pp. 172-173. This letter was found by Marinesin a cave in the northern part of Iwo Jima ;the original reposes in the museum of theU.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md .


with operational control of all unitsengaged in the final mop-up at the gorge .From an observation post affording aclear view of the gorge, General Hermledirected the operation that would bringorganized enemy resistance in this sectorto an end .

On Chichi Jima, Major Horie learnedwith astonishment on 21 March thatGeneral Kuribayashi and his men werestill fighting. The durable garrison com-mander reported that his cave wasunder direct attack by tanks and de-molition teams . Of American attemptsto induce his surrender he mentioneddisdainfully that "they advised us tosurrender by a loud-speaker, but weonly laughed at this childish trick anddid not set ourselves against them ."4 °Major Horie radioed to Iwo Jima theinformation that, effective 17 March,the Imperial government had promotedKuribayashi to the rank of full gen-eral, Ichimaru to vice admiral, Inouyeto rear admiral, and Nishi to full colo-nel. The two latter promotions weremade posthumously, though most likelyall of them were intended that way .

On D plus 30, 21 March, the 26th Ma-rines, with 3/27 and 3/28 attached, con-tinued the assault as 1/26 and 3/27advanced into the gorge . At the rim,3/28 held its positions. Fighting on thisday, as on the preceding ones, was ex-ceedingly bitter. The Japanese refusedto yield ; in fact, there no longer wasany place for them to go but stand theirground and die. Thus, the Marines hadto eliminate them one by one. As on anearlier occasion, it was noticed thatmany of the enemy were wearing Ma-

"Horie Rpt, p. 11 .


rine uniforms and firing M-1 rifles . Inthe course of the day's advance, elementsof 1/26 made gains of 200 yards downthe gorge, but beyond that point re-quired the support of flame tanks . Itdeveloped that the terrain did not per-mit their employment, so that portableflamethrowers were used until the Japa-nese shot the liquid out of the tanks .When his equipment was hit, one of theoperators became a human torch andburned to death ; another was justbarely saved from suffering the samefate .

As D plus 30 ended, 1/28 had gained400 yards at the edge of the cliff, while2/28, after one of its patrols had elimin-ated 20 of the enemy, moved forward100 yards to the very edge of the cliff .On this day, Major Horie received amessage from Iwo Jima, informing him"We have not eaten nor drunk for fivedays. But our fighting spirit is still run-ning high."47 The end was now verynear, yet the battle for Death Valley,a name Marines had given to the gorge,continued. In a situation where theorthodox arms and tactics of warfareproved unavailing, other means had tobe improvised. In the words of one ac-count :

The Marines tried everything in thebook, and a good many things that weren't,to clean the Japs out of the gorge . Explo-sives were lowered over cliffs by rope toblast the Japs from their caves. Drums ofgasoline were emptied into canyons andset afire. Over-sized rockets were hauledup to the front on bulldozers and used toblow the Japs off hillsides . Aerial observ-ers dropped grenades on enemy positionsfrom their low-flying grasshoppers .

"Ibid., p . 12.

707

For four days men of the 5th Divisiontried to take Death Valley by direct as-sault. They failed, because any man whoset foot in the gorge was dead ."

Still, some progress was apparent asone enemy defensive position after an-other was whittled away . On 22 March,3/27, supported by tanks, tank dozers,and flame tanks, gained another 300yards. On the following day, D plus 32,Major Horie received one final messagefrom Iwo Jima which said : "All officersand men of Chichi Jima, good-bye . 1149For three more days, Horie tried tocommunicate with Iwo Jima, but therewas no answer and it was assumed thatall resistance on the island had ended .This fact had already been mournfullyannounced over Tokyo Radio by theJapanese Prime Minister, who bemoanedthe fall of the island as "the most un-fortunate thing in the whole war situa-tion ."50

By 24 March, the backbone of enemyresistance in Death Valley had beenbroken, and the size of the pocket wasdown to a square of 50 by 50 yards .On the following day, D plus 32, ex-hausted Marines of 3/26 and 3/28moved down into Death Valley andcompleted the task of mopping up, seal-ing caves and squeezing the enemy intoan area that was no longer defensible .Still, individual Japanese held out until25 March, when death-tired remnantsof the 26th, 27th, and 28th Marinesstaggered into the gorge and silencedwhat remained of enemy resistance . At

"Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima, p . 303 ."Horie Rpt, p . 12 .60 Radio address by Premier Kuniaki Koiso,

17Mar45, as cited in Newcomb, Iwo Jima,p. 274.

708

1045 on D plus 34, the gorge was de-clared secured and fighting on northernIwo officially came to an end .Withdrawal of Marine units from

Iwo Jima got under way on 17 March,when the VAC artillery completed em-barkation. Artillery of the three di-visions reembarked on subsequent days,except for 4/12, which stood by for sev-eral days, prepared to deliver fire onrequest. On 18 March, the 3d MarineDivision relieved the 4th and GeneralCates closed his CP on Iwo Jima . Onthe same day, men of this division em-barked. Two days later, the ships car-rying the division departed from theisland en route to their rehabilitationarea in Hawaii . The arrival of the 147thInfantry Regiment on 20 March broughtArmy troops into the picture . The regi-ment was attached to General Erskine'sdivision for operational control . As earlyas 7 March, General Chaney had as-sumed responsibility for base develop-ment and antiaircraft defense of all Iwoground installations. He had delegatedthe air defense of Iwo Jima to GeneralMoore effective that date . At 0800 on 26March, General Chaney took over asIwo Jima garrison commander, in effectassuming operational control of all unitsstationed on the island . General Moorecontinued as Air Defense Commander .

Just as it appeared that Iwo Jimawas about to become a garrison, ratherthan a fiercely contested battlefield, theJapanese decided to strike a last blowagainst the invaders who by this timehad victory all but within their grasp .Mopping up operations up to this timehad continued daily in northern andcentral Iwo, and day and night individ-ual Japanese had either been killed or


captured . As a precautionary measure,a LCI (G) patrolled off the northwestbeaches to prevent the escape of anyof the enemy by water during the hoursof darkness .

Early on 26 March, a force of be-tween 200 and 300 Japanese moveddown from the area near the NorthernAirfield over a trail skirting the west-ern coast of the island and launched afull-scale attack against Marine andArmy units encamped near the westernbeaches. Far from executing a howlingbanzai charge, the Japanese launched awell-organized attack which was car-ried out in echelon from three direc-tions. Carefully calculated to achieve themaximum confusion and destruction,the Japanese set about to do their deadlywork in silence . Beginning at 0515, andfor more than three hours, the enemyranged through the Marine and Armybivouacs, slashing tents, knifing sleep-ing airmen, and throwing grenades atrandom .

The units engaged and partly overrunwere the 5th Pioneer Battalion, elementsof the 8th Field Depot, comprising theVAC Shore Party, the 98th Naval Con-struction Battalion, elements of the 21stFighter Group, the 465th AviationSquadron, and the 506th AntiaircraftArtillery Gun Battalion . In the dark-ness, the fighting was confused and ter-rible. The chief difficulty, that of dis-tinguishing between friend and enemy,was compounded by the fact that manyof the attackers were armed with BARs,M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols, and oneeven with a bazooka . Other Japanesecharged with their swords, a sure in-dication that a sizable part of the as-sault force consisted of officers .


OFFICER BIVOUAC AREA of the 21st Fighter Group following the Japanese attackof March 1945 . Note bullet-marked tents. (USAF 47590 AC)

GENERAL VIEW of parking area on Motoyama Airfield No . 1 after its restoration.(USAF 57620 AC)

709

710

At the height of the attack, the Japa-nese penetrated to the Army 38th FieldHospital, where they tore out the tele-phone lines, slashed tents, and machine-gunned ambulances . In the midst of theprevailing turmoil, officers of the 5thPioneer Battalion organized the firstresistance, and there were instances ofgreat personal heroism and sacrifice .Initially, a firing line was established insome foxholes. Subsequently, as the dinof battle increased, other Marines ar-rived on the scene and Army flame tanksbegan to go into action . The 5th Pioneersorganized a skirmish line and, for thefirst time, the enemy was forced to giveground . Joining in the action was any-one who had a weapon, including air-men, Seabees, Army medical personnel,and members of the Corps Shore Party.In fact, the performance of the latterMarines earned them a special com-mendation from their commanding of-ficer who stated

The Corps Shore Party Commander ishighly gratified with the performance ofthese colored troops, whose normal func-tion is that of labor troops, while in directaction against the enemy for the firsttime. Proper security prevented their be-ing taken unawares, and they conductedthemselves with marked coolness andcourage. Careful investigation shows thatthey displayed modesty in reporting theirown part in the action .'

When it was all over, 196 Japaneselittered the area of the 5th Pioneer Bat-talion alone ; 66 of the raiders werekilled in the adjacent areas and a totalof 18 were captured . Rumor had it thatGeneral Kuribayashi had led the attack,

' Shore Party AR, dtd 30Apr45, in VACAR, App 10, Anx C, p . 13 .


and the efficiency with which it was car-ried out would lend some substance tothe report. The 40 swords gathered upon the field of battle after the actiongave evidence of the high percentageof officers and senior noncommissionedofficers that participated. Years afterthe war, a Japanese who had been takenprisoner during this final attack andwho had been subsequently repatriated,was to claim that one-legged AdmiralIchimaru .had taken part in the charge .But a body count following the battleand examination of the bodies failed toidentify either Kuribayashi, Ichimaru,or Ikeda, and their exact fate has neverbeen determined .

The final Japanese attack also provedcostly to the Americans in terms ofcasualties. The 5th Pioneers lost 9killed and 31 wounded in this action ;units of the VII Fighter Command had44 killed and 88 wounded .s2 At justabout the time that the last of the enemyraiders were being killed off on westernIwo, the capture and occupation phaseof the Iwo Jima operation was an-nounced completed . As of 0800, 26March, the Commander Forward Area,Central Pacific, Vice Admiral John H .Hoover, assumed responsibility for thedefense and development of the island .General Schmidt closed his CP and de-parted from Iwo Jima by air shortlyafter noon . The remainder of his head-quarters embarked on the USS Pres-ident Monroe .Embarkation of the remaining Ma-

rine units followed a schedule long

'VAC 'G-3 PerRpt No. 35 dtd 26Mar45 ;5th Pioneer Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 27Mar45, p. 2 .


worked out in advance . Thus, elementsof the 3d Marine Division began to em-bark on 27 March, when the 21st Ma-rines and the division CP went aboardship . The remainder of General Er-skine's men departed on the return runof ships carrying garrison forces to Iwo .On 4 April, the Army's 147th InfantryRegiment, commanded by Colonel Ro-bert F. Johnson, assumed full respon-sibility for the ground defense of theisland and the 9th Marines prepared toembark. The last unit of General Er-skine's division left Iwo on 12 April andarrived on Guam six days later . Duringthe final phase of the operation between11 and 26 March, the Marines hadsustained a total of 3,885 casualties .53

Total Marine casualties for the IwoJima operation came to 25,851 . 54The total number of Japanese who

died in the defense of Iwo Jima hasnever been definitely established, butnearly the entire garrison went downfighting. As of 26 March, the Marineshad taken only 216 prisoners," a largenumber of whom were Korean laborers .Nor did the fighting and dying on theisland end with the departure of theVAC Landing Force . Aggressive patrolsand ambuscades by the 147th Infantry

"Broken down by divisions, these casualtieswere as follows : 3d Marine Division : 147killed, 60 died of wounds, 505 wounded, and53 combat fatigue ; 4th Marine Division : 139killed, 87 dead of wounds, 442 wounded, and52 combat fatigue ; 5th Marine Division : 467killed, 168 died of wounds, 1,640 wounded, 3missing, and 122 combat fatigue . Above figuresderived from HQMC postwar statistics .

°" A detailed breakdown of Marine casualtiesby unit is shown in Appendix H .' VAC G-2 PerRpt No. 35, dtd 9Apr45 .

711

Regiment continued throughout Apriland into May, resulting in additionalJapanese killed and captured . Isolatedenemy strongpoints continued to holdout and had to be reduced, some of themmore than once .

During the first week of April, in anincident reminiscent of the unexpectedenemy attack of 26 March, about 200Japanese materialized just above theEast Boat Basin, where they attemptedto rush an infantry command post . Thisbattle continued all night and all of theattackers were killed, but not beforethey had succeeded in exploding 6,000cases of dynamite, which rocked the is-land and caused a number of casualties . 56Nor was this the end. Also during themonth of April, Army troops stumbledupon the field hospital of the 2d MixedBrigade, located 100 feet undergroundon eastern Iwo Jima . The surrender ofthe hospital proved to be somewhatcomplex, as outlined by this account

A language officer appealed to the Japa-nese to come out. After a long discussion,the senior medical officer, Major MasaruInoaka, called for a vote . The ballotturned out sixty-nine for surrender, 3opposed. Of the three nays, CorporalKyutaro Kojima immediately committedsuicide. The others came out, includingtwo more medical officers, Captain IwaoNoguchi and Lieutenant Hideo Ota. Cap-tain Noguchi, beset by remorse that hehad lived while so many died, later emi-grated to Brazil, unable to accept life inJapan G7

For the remainder of April and May,members of the 147th Infantry Regi-

" Headquarters, Army Garrison Force G-2Weekly Rpt No. 2, dtd 8Apr45, as cited inMorison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 69-70 .

17 Newcomb, Iwo Jima, p . 287.

712

ment accounted for 1,602 Japanesekilled and 867 captured ." As the fight-ing and dying gradually subsided, theutilization of the island as a forwardbase went into high gear. But even asbulldozers tore across ground that hadpreviously been so bitterly contested andaviation gas was beginning to reachIwo in large quantities, three large Ma-rine Corps cemeteries remained to offera mute eulogy to the men who hadfought and died there. Arriving on IwoJima on 20 April 1945, one eminentNavy historian counted 5,330 graves inthe Marine Corps cemeteries, but, in hisown words

. . . there were about 31,000 soldiers,Air Force ground crews and Seabees onthe island, very much alive, healthy andin high spirits . Army officers said theywouldn't trade Iwo for any South Pacificisland'

I Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment,Report of Operations Against the Enemy, IwoJima, dtd 11Jun45, as cited in Bartley, IwoMonograph, p . 193 .

1 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p . 70 .


There were many who would paytribute to the heroism of the Marineswho captured this key bastion of theJapanese inner defense ring, bristlingwith the most powerful defenses a cleverand crafty enemy could devise . None ofthem put it better than Admiral Nimitz,Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleetand Pacific Ocean Areas, who made thiscomment

The battle of Iwo Island has been won .The United States Marines by their indi-vidual and collective courage have con-quered a base which is as necessary to usin our continuing forward movementtoward final victory as it was vital to theenemy in staving off ultimate defeat .

By their victory the Third, Fourth andFifth Marine Divisions and other units ofthe Fifth Amphibious Corps have madean accounting to their country which onlyhistory will be able to value fully . Amongthe Americans who served on Iwo Islanduncommon valor was a common virtue G°

'Pacific Fleet Communique No . 300, dtd17Mar45.

Summary

The battle of Iwo Jima requires adetailed analysis because it was uniquein certain respects . First, it featured theemployment of three Marine divisions(less one regiment) under a singletactical Marine command, the largestbody of Marines committed to combatin one operation during World War II .Secondly, enemy resistance under Gen-eral Kuribayashi was such that Amer-ican casualties sustained in this opera-tion exceeded those of the Japanese . Outof the savage struggle for eight squaremiles of inhospitable island emergedconvincing re-affirmation of the factthat once air and naval superiority hadbeen gained over and around an objec-tive, Marines could make a landing, gaina foothold, and extend it until the enemywas driven into a severely restrictedarea. There, he could be annihilated,regardless of the size and number of hisguns or the quality of his defense . The

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thischapter is derived from : Fifth Fleet OpRpt ;TF 51 AR ; TF 52 AR; TF 53 OpRpt ; TG53.2 AR; TF 56 AR; VAC AR ; VAC NGFRpt ; 3d MarDiv AR ; 4th MarDiv OpRpt ; 5thMarDiv AR ; 1st Prov FdArty Gp AR ; Shaw,Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive ;Bartley, Iwo Monograph; Iwo Comments ;Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign ; Craven andCate, The Pacific ; Forrestel, Admiral Spru-ance ; Morison, Victory in the Pacific ; Isely andCrowl, U S . Marines and Amphibious War ;Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World WarII ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea .

1

CHAPTER 12

then Secretary of the Navy, James V .Forrestal, gave voice to his "tremendousadmiration and reverence for the guywho walks up beaches and takes enemypositions with a rifle and grenades orhis bare hands ."2 Yet it would be follyto assume that sheer courage alone,even when coupled with material supe-riority, was the decisive factor that ledto certain, if bloody, victory. EvenAdmiral Spruance's statement, that "inview of the character of the defensesand the stubborn resistance encoun-tered, it is fortunate that less seasonedor less resolute troops were not com-mitted," 3 only touches on one importantfacet within the overall picture .The reason Marines were able to

prevail against a firmly entrenchedenemy, who knew in advance of theimpending attack, can be found in de-tailed and meticulous planning . Theplans for the Iwo Jima operation pos-sibly were the most far-reaching for anyoperation in the Pacific area up to thistime in World War II . Preparations ex-tended not only to American bases inthe Marianas, the Marshalls, and theHawaiian Islands but all the way backto the mainland of the United States,"from whence came hundreds of newships to transport the troops to the

'Quoted in The New York Times, dtd 26-Feb45, p. 1, col 6, as cited in Bartley, IwoMonograph, p . 210 .

'Fifth Flt OpRpt, p . 3.

713

714

objective . Most of these ships wereunder construction less than six monthsbefore the target day, and some of thesmaller ones existed at that time onlyin blueprint form ."' In fact, with oneexception, the transports carrying the4th and 5th Marine Divisions to theobjective were either under construc-tion or being commissioned as late as31 October 1944 . 5 It is typical of thelong-range planning preceding Opera-tion DETACHMENT that many of theparticipating vessels had to be trans-ferred from the European Theater tothe Pacific prior to the invasion .

At Iwo Jima, as in similar operations,two command ships were employed sothat, in the event one command shipbecame a casualty, the commanderaboard the other could take over . In thiscase Admiral Turner, as ExpeditionaryForce Commander, was embarked in acommand ship with General HollandSmith as Expeditionary Troops Com-mander, while Admiral Harry Hill, asAttack Force Commander and GeneralSchmidt, as Landing Force Commander,were embarked in the other commandship. The VAC chief of staff was to com-ment on the command relationships atIwo Jima in these terms

The Navy was of course in commandafloat. The Landing Force Commanderassumed command ashore after setting upa command post there . General HollandSmith could have assumed commandashore by setting up a headquartersashore. He did not do so, nor to the bestof my knowledge did he ever issue anycommand to the troops ashore . In fact,he had only a skeleton staff, and as heremarked to General Schmidt the only

Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 93 .r'TG 53.2 AR, p. 2 .


reason he went on the expedition was incase something happened to GeneralSchmidt .'

When Admiral Nimitz coined hisphrase about the uncommon valor dis-played by Americans who served on IwoJima, he was referring not only to theMarines who did the lion's share of thefighting, but also to personnel of theU. S. Army and Navy, on the ground,at sea, and in the air, who supportedthem. According to one historical evalu-ation

Without supplies and medical care theassault would have ground to a halt, andwithout close air, naval gunfire, and ar-tillery support, there would have been noneutralization to permit the tank-infantrydemolition teams to advance .'

Based on sound doctrine, training,and experience, the participating serv-ices and arms developed excellent team-work that could not have been sur-passed . In view of the depth and extentof the Japanese defenses, naval gunfirehad only a limited effect. Long andmedium range bombardment accom-plished little, and even area fire failedto do much damage to undergroundenemy defenses. Following the opera-tion, Admiral Blandy was to make thiscomment in dealing with the preliminarybombardment

It was not until fire support ships, theirspotting planes, and the support aircrafthad worked at the objective for two days,had become familiar with the location andappearance of the defenses, and had ac-curately attacked them with close-rangegunfire and low-altitude air strikes, thatsubstantial results were achieved .8

° Rogers ltr.' Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am-

phibious War, p . 501 .8 TF 52 AR, p . 10,

SUMMARY

This statement leads directly into theonly deep-seated controversy to devel-op from the Iwo Jima operation, thatof the duration of the naval gunfiresupport.° This dispute still simmersmore than 25 years after the event, andit appears doubtful that it will ever becompletely resolved to the satisfactionof all concerned. The issues in this caseare clear

Previous amphibious assaults had am-ply demonstrated that against such de-fenses only deliberate, short-range de-structive fire would be effective . And bothMarine and Navy commanders knew thateven under the most favorable conditionsthis method of bombardment was ex-tremely time consuming .'"

Then, as now, the lines in the navalgunfire controversy were clearly drawn,and little room remained for compro-mise. Most of the Marines who foughton Iwo Jima give credit to the highdegree of precision which naval gunfirehad reached since the early operationsof World War II, but at the same timefirmly agree with one former Marineparticipant who commented that "un-doubtedly, longer bombardment before

' In his version of the Iwo operation, SamuelEliot Morison mentions an attack on Navystrategy and Marine Corps tactics launchedby a segment of the American press, accusingboth of being wasteful of American lives inpaying an exorbitant price for the seizure ofheavily defended objectives of limited useful-ness. Deplorable as was the loss of lives at IwoJima, the American public then, as now, cameto realize that the cost of victory is high .Despite expressions of public anguish at thelosses sustained at Iwo Jima, the value of theobjective for continued operations never wasin doubt, nor did the issue, for lack of analternate solution, ever assume the dimensionsof a public controversy .

10 Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 202 .

D-Day would have materially shortenedthe battle and saved many lives .""

It would serve no useful purpose atthis time to rekindle the barely sub-merged passions that have occasionallypopped to the surface regarding thissubject. Even minute inspection of allavailable data does not lead to concreteand infallible conclusions that wouldstand up to prolonged investigation .Thus the controversy simply becomesone of the vantage point occupied byeach of the participants at the time ofthe operation . To a Marine who wentashore on D-Day or later and saw thecarnage wrought by the Japanese shoreguns among his comrades, it becomesinconceivable that, regardless of timelimits and restrictions on ammunitionexpenditure, more was not done to as-sure that enemy shore defenses wereknocked out prior to the landings . Thisfeeling is born of a mixture of angerand frustration, known only to thosewho have been exposed to superiorenemy firepower for any length of time,bereft of the possibility to reply at onceand in kind . Little has yet been devisedto relieve the initial feeling of helpless-ness experienced by the rifleman whohits a hostile beach under the muzzleof still functioning enemy guns .

From the Navy's vantage point, thesituation was slightly different. In thefirst place, the Iwo Jima operation hadbeen tightly wedged in a time framebetween the invasion of Luzon and thecoming assault on Okinawa . Under suchpressure, perhaps the best that couldbe achieved was neutralization, not de-struction of the enemy artillery as

" Heinl, Soldiers o f the Sea, p . 484 .

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716

desired by the Marines. The naval view-point is summed up in this statement

There is no reason to believe that ten oreven thirty days of naval and air pound-ing would have had much more effect onthe defenses than the bombardment thatwas delivered . The defenses were such, byand large, that the only way they couldbe taken out was the way they were takenout, by Marine Corps infantry and demo-litions . . . . Aerial bombardment and navalgunfire simply could not reach under-ground into the maze of caves and tun-nels, yet these had to be cleared or sealedshut before the island could be secured asan air base on the Bonins' road to Tokyo .12

This line of reasoning carries littleweight with Marines who faced themaze of virtually untouched pillboxesand covered emplacements between theSouthern and Central Airfields andthose to the east and west of the latter .These defenses were situated in moreor less open terrain that was largely ac-cessible to direct fire at relatively shortranges from vessels standing offshore .It required the herculean efforts of menin eight days of costly fighting to reducethese fortifications . In the words of Gen-eral Harry Schmidt : "With additionaltime available for pre-D-Day firingnaval guns might have accomplishedmuch in this area to facilitate its cap-ture."1 3 The Navy has contended that

. . . heavy ammunition replenishment atsea had not been service tested and thebombarding ships were far from a supplybase and could not carry enough ammuni-tion for the prolonged bombardment de-sired by the Marines ."}

Neither the validity of this conten-tion nor the flow of time itself have

"Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 73 ." VAC NGF Rpt, pp. 21-22 ." Forrestel, Admiral Spruance, p . 168 .


done much to cool the passions of Ma-rines who underwent the trial by "fireand steel" on Iwo Jima . There simplyappears to be no way to equate the feel-ings of men who have watched theircomrades and friends torn apart byenemy weapons with the cold realitiesof logistics, statistics, and strategy .Thus, for the purposes of this history,the controversy must remain unsolved .

Let it be said for the record that, oncethe Marines had gone ashore, navalgunfire was furnished to the satisfac-tion of the landing force . In this con-nection, the positive must be ac-centuated. One account summed up thequality of naval gunfire support in thesewords

The cooperation of these vessels, fromthe largest battleship to the small, spe-cialized gunboats, was excellent . The na-ture of the terrain continued to limit theireffectiveness, however, and in most in-stances only neutralization was obtained.Supporting ships and craft were quick toobserve enemy activity and take it underfire after first checking with units ashoreto determine that the shelling would notendanger friendly troops ."

General Kuribayashi himself unwit-tingly paid tribute to the accuracy ofAmerican naval gunfire support whenhe passed word to his superiors that thepower of bombardment from ships re-quired reevaluation :

The beach positions we made on thisisland by using many materials, days andgreat efforts, were destroyed within threedays so that they were nearly unable tobe used again . . . .Power of the American warships and

aircraft makes every landing operationpossible to whatever beachhead they like,

" Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 203 .

SUMMARY

and preventing them from landing meansnothing but great damages ."

The same factors that limited the suc-cess of naval gunfire also proved ahindrance to the effectiveness of thepreinvasion air bombardment. Thebombing of Iwo Jima and adjacent is-lands over a period of several monthsby high-altitude B-24 bombers based inthe Marianas had prevented the Japa-nese from enjoying the unrestricted useof the two airfields on Iwo Jima . On theother hand, the increasingly heavy airraids did much to drive the enemy un-derground. In evaluating the results ofthis extensive bombing, Air Forcehistorians themselves conclude that,despite "the heavy going over the islandhad received, weather conditions andthe topography of Iwo Jima had ren-dered the results much less decisive thanhad been expected ." 17While bombers of the Seventh Air

Force had concentrated mostly on thedestruction or neutralization of theoperational airfields in the Bonins, Ad-miral Durgin's carrier pilots assaultedthose defenses that would interfere withthe amphibious assault and the sub-sequent push inland . Deficiencies in thearmament of the support aircraft andthe small size of the bombs they car-ried severely limited the effectivenessof these attacks . Even when a targethad been pinpointed, the bombs provedtoo small to smash buried blockhouses .The use of napalm, which was badlyneeded to strip enemy positions on IwoJima of their natural cover, also proveddisappointing when, in numerous in-stances, the liquid failed to ignite .

'° Horie Rpt, p . 13 .1- Craven and Cate, The Pacific, p . 584 .

717

On D minus 1, as the weather clearedand the carrier pilots had becomefamiliar with the terrain and the targetson the island, more was accomplishedthan during the two preceding days .Japanese defenses on the slopes ofMount Suribachi and emplacementsabove the East Boat Basin proved tobe particularly attractive targets for theNavy flyers, who not only bombed thesetargets but also strafed them with5-inch rockets . The latter were effectivedue to their accuracy but lacked thedestructive power required against theformidable enemy fortifications . Inevaluating the effectiveness of these airstrikes, the advance commander of theair support control units only al-lowed that they "conceivably weakenedthe areas commanding the landingbeaches ."13

Greatly contrasting with the incon-clusive results obtained from the aboveair strikes was the support furnishedby the pilots of Task Force 58 on D-Day .The Marine and Navy flyers, whoseheroic efforts were clearly visible toNavy personnel and Marines about tohit the Iwo Jima beaches, drew vocifer-ous praise. As long as Vice AdmiralMitscher's carriers remained at Iwo, thecarrier squadrons were able to furnishall the ground support requested, but onD plus 4, when the large carriers de-parted, a shortage of aircraft quicklydeveloped. Planes needed for groundsupport had to be diverted to such otherduties as antisubmarine patrols, strikesagainst other islands in the Bonins, andsea rescue operations .

As a rule, response of aviation torequests from ground units was quick,

18 TF 52 AR, Encl D, p . 4 .

718

though on many occasions more than anhour elapsed before the supporting air-craft appeared on the scene. Even then,the normally overcrowded Support AirRequest Net proved to be the weak linkin obtaining air strikes without undueloss of time . It is ironic that Iwo JimaMarines were denied the close supportthat was to become the trademark ofMarine aviation, while Army troops inthe Philippines at this time were reap-ing the benefits from exactly that typeof support furnished by Marine divebombers . 19 As in other campaigns, eachechelon intervening between the groundunit requesting air strikes and the pilotsfurnishing the support resulted in lossof time and attendant confusion . Onceagain, the crux of the matter was controlof support aircraft by the ground units,something that higher headquarterswere still most reluctant to grant . Atthe conclusion of operations in the Mar-shalls and the Marianas

Marine commanders pressed hard forincreased use of Marine air in close sup-port. They wanted pilots, planes, and acontrol system oriented to ground needsand quickly responsive to strike requests .The winds of change were in the air in thesummer of 1944 and refinements in closesupport techniques were coming . Opera-tions later in the year saw planes bomb-ing and strafing closer to frontline posi-tions and evidenced a steady increase inthe employment of Marine squadrons inthis task as well as in air-to-airoperations .'

In the case of Iwo Jima, it is signifi-cant that all three participating Marine

1D For the role played by Marine aviationduring operations in the Philippines, see PartIV of this volume .

Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pa-cific Drive, p . 584 .


divisions unanimously recommendedthat in future operations, the air liaisonparties be given more direct control overaircraft during close support missions ."The start made in this direction during1944 proved to be only the first step inan uphill and time-consuming struggle,some of which still had not been resolvedat the time of the Korean War .

Throughout the Iwo operation, airobservers played an important role .Fighter-type aircraft, flown by espe-cially trained pilots of VOC-1, aug-mented the float planes normally usedto spot naval gunfire . On an improvisedbasis, Marine artillery and tactical ob-servers operated from carrier-basedtorpedo bombers until the small obser-vation planes of the VMO squadronshad gone ashore . In spite of the dif-ficulties, the latter held their own. Onehistorical account was to sum up theirperformance this way

Like other Marines on Iwo, the VMOsquadrons had to prove they could take it.The little planes and their pilots andground crews were subjected to every-thing from kamikazes to artillery fire tofaulty launching gear, and all of these tooktheir toll .'

Aside from difficulties encounteredwith the overcrowded Support AirRequest Net, communications on andaround Iwo Jima functioned exceed-ingly well . The multiplicity of wire andradio nets complicated the situation, andthere were instances of enemy jammingand interference between sets . The per-formance of communications personnel

" 3d MarDiv AR, Anx G, App . 1, p . 3; 4thMarDiv OpRpt, Anx C, pp. 6-7 ; 5th MarDivAR, Anx G, App . 1, p . 3 ." Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World

War II, p . 348.

SUMMARY

was rated as excellent. Wire was widelyused and with good effect. Radio bridgedthe gap where wire could not be em-ployed. It was a far cry from the un-satisfactory radio equipment that hadbeen employed in the early operationsin the Pacific, notably at Tarawa. Theshort distances involved at Iwo Jima,as well as the very slow rate of advance,eased the burden of maintaining and ex-panding communications : there neverwas any serious breakdown. As inprevious operations, the Navajo talkersperformed an outstanding service, andtheir employment contributed material-ly to the effective and speedy transmit-tal of urgent classified radio traffic with-out danger of enemy interception . 23

Contributing to the overall successof the Iwo Jima operation was closecoordination between the supportingarms. The systems of coordination usedat the headquarters of the three di-visions were similar, though GeneralErskine's division maintained an in-stallation known as the "supportingarms tent,"' whose organization andfunctions have been described in thesewords

The basic method of coordination be-tween supporting arms was to achieveclose personal liaison on all levels . Targetswere freely interchanged according to themethod of attack best suited, and, when-ever operations were in progress or pros-pect, the artillery, naval gunfire, and airofficers were together or readily accessibleto each other by wire . Plans for scheduledfires or pre-King-Hour preparations werehabitually prepared jointly, and so pre-sented to the G-3, Chief of Staff, and theCommanding General . Much of the successachieved may be traced to the separatemaintenance of a "supporting arms tent,"

I VAC Sig Bn Rpt, p . 5.

so-called, adjacent to the G-3 Section . Inthis center, wire communications con-verged from the division switchboard,from the similar 5th Amphibious Corpsestablishment, from the division artilleryfire direction center, and from the navalgunfire and air radio centrals . It was thuspossible to establish any sort of commu-nications necessary, and to plan withoutinterruption, while being within a fewsteps of the G-3 Section .21

Throughout the operation, close liaisonwas maintained between the corps artil-lery, air, and naval gunfire officers andthe Commander, Landing Force AirSupport Control Unit, in the Joint Oper-ations Rooms on board the USS Auburnand subsequently through facilities ofthe supporting arms tent at VAC head-quarters ashore .25

The performance of the shore basedartillery at Iwo Jima deserves specialmention. Standard tactics, vindicated inprevious operations, were employed . Itquickly became evident, though, that the75mm and the 105mm howitzers of thedivision artillery battalions were farfrom adequate for the destruction of thetype of emplacements encountered onthe island. In fact, the 155mm guns andhowitzers of the corps artillery fre-quently had to score up to a dozen hitsin one place before they caused majordamage to some of the strongest enemyinstallations . 21 In performing its mis-sion, artillery was further handicappedby limited observation, which often pre-vented forward observers from seeingmore than 200 yards ahead . As a result,great dependence was placed on aerialspotting, particularly for counter-bat-

24

8d MarDiv AR, p . 53 .°VAC NGF Rpt, p. 38 .VAC Arty Rpt, p . 29,

719

720

tery and destruction fire. Despite suchlimitations, officers and men of the corpsand division artillery carried out theirmission in an exemplary fashion .From 23 February to 1 March, the

VAC artillery fired its maximum num-ber of missions, most of them counter-battery. During the first four days inMarch, normal missions were fired, butthe amount of ammunition expended hadto be reduced since expenditure ex-ceeded the inflow . After a breather on5 March, when no preparations werefired, both the corps and division artil-lery made a maximum effort on the fol-lowing day. On 6 March, a heavy time-on-target preparation was fired inwhich 11 division and corps artillerybattalions participated . Despite thehigher expenditure of ammunition,amounting to 2,500 rounds for the corpsand 20,000 rounds of 75mm and 105mmfor the division artillery, this massiveconcentration had no decisive effect .

In discussing the performance of theartillery during the Iwo Jima operation,General Schmidt underscored anotheraspect :

A feature of the employment of artilleryin the Iwo Jima operation not noted inthe report was that the bulk of the artil-lery ashore was sited around Airfield No.1. During the greater portion of the timeartillery was firing continuously (approx-imately 450,000 rounds fired during op-eration) at the same time Airfield No . 1was being used for aircraft operation tocapacity. This was also true even afterAirfield No . 2 began operating. It is con-sidered remarkable that no friendly planeswere hit and that aircraft operationswere not impeded by our artillery or viceversa. The method of control employedfor the protection of planes taking off orlanding was simply to have an individual


of the firing unit placed to observe whetherany aircraft were in the line of fire andto give warning if that were the case .'

Engineer support to VAC duringOperation DETACHMENT was gen-erally excellent. The task of construct-ing and maintaining roads in the VACarea was assigned to the 2d SeparateEngineer Battalion, which also accom-plished the preliminary work in restor-ing the Southern Airfield . It was thework carried out by this unit that en-abled small observation aircraft tooperate from this airfield by D plus 7 .The further completion of additionalstrips on this airfield was the shared ac-complishment of these Marine engineersand the 62d Naval Construction Bat-talion .

In addition to executing their impor-tant task of constructing roads, operat-ing water points, and erecting variousbuildings and supply dumps, Marineengineers also had a combat mission toperform. The latter was the respon-sibility of the division engineers whocleared mines, dozed trails that enabledtanks to approach the front lines, andperformed such other jobs as were de-signed to help the infantry advance overtreacherous terrain. Much of this workwas carried out under direct enemyobservation and fire . Engineers, in-dividually or in small groups, joinedthe infantry in demolishing the numer-ous enemy caves and strongpoints . Forthe hard-toiling engineers, there wereonly two bright sides to the operationthe sand-clay fill obtained from quar-ries on the island made excellent road

=' 1st Prov Fd Arty Gp AR, 1st Endorse-ment .

SUMMARY

construction material ; and "engineeroperations were further facilitated inthat no bridges were required . 1128The employment of amphibious

vehicles on Iwo Jima featured a greatervariety than had been previously used,including armored amphibian tractors,amphibian trucks, and sea-going jeeps .First to hit the beach were theLVT (A) s of the 2d Armored AmphibianBattalion, equipped with one 75mmhowitzer, one .50 caliber machine gunmounted in the turret ring, one .30caliber machine gun mounted in frontof the assistant driver, and one .30caliber machine gun mounted in frontof the howitzer loader. Once within ef-fective range of the beaches, theLVT (A) s were to open fire with allweapons. After going ashore, thesevehicles were to move about 50 yardsinland and protect the following as-sault waves by firing on targets to theirfront and flanks .

Almost immediately, the steep ter-races and the composition of the beachescaused the vehicles to bog down . A fewmade it across the first terrace only tobecome stalled on the second. Whileneither the LVT (A) s nor the followingLVTs containing the assault troopsdrew voluminous enemy fire, progress ofthe LVTs upon reaching the beaches al-so was stymied by the loose volcanic ashand the steep terraces . Since in manyinstances the beach was very narrowand the surf broke very close to the steepledge, many LVTs swamped . Some ofthe vehicles were thrown broadside onthe beach where sand and salt waterfilled them .

"I Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign, p . 144.

It soon became apparent that thevolcanic cinders and sand would not sup-port wheeled vehicles . Only the LVTs,caterpillar tractors, and other trackedvehicles had a chance of making it in-land across this treacherous ground . Asemphasized in one report : "Suppliesand equipment were hauled from shipsdirectly to the front lines, and had itnot been for LVTs the troops ashorecould not have been supplied during theearly stages of the landing .""" Becauseof their importance to the logistics ef-fort, it became necessary to use thesevehicles around the clock during theearly phase of the operation .

One of the new types of equipment tobe used by all three Marine divisionsduring the Iwo operation was the3V2-ton Clever-Brooks trailer, employedto haul cargo and medical supplies .Major difficulty was encountered inlaunching these amphibious trailers inthe rough seas and getting them acrossthe steep terraces . LVTs were generallyable to bring the trailers ashore, butattempts to have the DUKWs performthis service resulted in the loss of boththe trailer and DUKW. While com-ments on both the LVT and DUKWswere generally favorable, VAC con-cluded : "The amphibian trailers did notprove to be of any particular or specifichelp during the operation ."30

The amphibian truck, the DUKW, hadthe primary mission of bringing the di-vision artillery ashore on D-Day. Per-sonnel to operate these vehicles wasfurnished both by the Marine Corps andthe U.S. Army. The difficulty in land-

'Ibid., p . 133 .' VAC AR, Anx B, App. 4, G-4 Rpt.

721

722

ing the artillery resulted from the highsurf and the tactical situation ashore .While some of the DUKWs landed with-out difficulty, others were swampedafter exhausting their limited fuel sup-ply or developing mechanical problems .Others that were overloaded, sank al-most immediately after disembarkingfrom the LSTs. Many of the DUKWsran afoul of the steep beaches andbroached when the front wheels dugdown into the sand or volcanic ash andcould not get sufficient traction to pullthe vehicles forward . Following theinitial landings, DUKWs hauled sup-plies, especially ammunition, evacuatedthe wounded, and performed mail andmessenger runs .Another amphibious vehicle that

proved its worth during the Iwo oper-ation was a light cargo carrier, dubbedthe "Weasel ." This tracked carrier hadbeen issued to the three Marine di-visions participating in DETACH-MENT in November 1944 . At Iwo Jima,the Weasels hauled light supplies, evac-uated the wounded, and were used tostring telephone lines . Their versatiityin overcoming loose sand and the steepterrain made them the ideal all-purposevehicle, and they were soon pressed intoservice as messenger or command carsor for the purpose of hauling trailersand small artillery pieces over terrainthat wheeled vehicles could not nego-tiate. In addition to their versatility, theWeasels offered a poor target for theenemy because of their speed and lowsilhouette . The only difficulty encoun-tered with these vehicles was at sea,where the high swells occasionallyproved more than they could handle . Itis interesting to note that a total of 133


DUKWs were destroyed during the IwoJima operation, amounting to 53 per-cent of those employed ; only 9 Weaselswere lost in combat, accounting for 13percent of the number that were disem-barked. The remaining 61 vehiclesremained in operating condition untilthe Marines left Iwo Jima .31

One of the most successfully handled,yet difficult aspects of the Iwo Jimaoperation pertained to the treatment andevacuation of the wounded . The bitter-ness of the fighting, from the first to thelast day of battle, coupled with the largenumber of men simultaneously lockedin combat, placed an extremely heavyburden on the medical units, both ashoreand afloat . During the initial days ofthe operation, doctors and corpsmenalike occupied a precarious foothold onbeaches that were exposed to enemyfire of all calibers . As often as not, themedical personnel ashore became cas-ualties themselves, especially the corps-men attached to the combat units or thebeach evacuation stations . It was not arare occurrence for corpsmen to be hitas they carried litters with wounded tothe rear or cared for the wounded atthe evacuation stations . Casualtiesamong medical officers and corpsmenwere correspondingly high : 738, amongthem 197 killed . 32

In order to take care of the Iwo Jimacasualties, medical plans had been drawnup well in advance of the operation . Asa result, during the first nine days ofthe battle, once a casualty had arrived

"VAC AR, Anx B.' U. S. Navy Bureau of Medicine, Statistics

Division, World War II Casualties, dtd lAug-52, as cited in Bartley, Iwo Monograph, p . 195 .

SUMMARY

at one of the evacuation stations, hecould expect prompt evacuation to oneof the hospital LSTs that were lying2,000 yards offshore. These LSTs actedas collection centers from which thecasualties were forwarded to APAs andhospital ships . Initially, the transport ofcasualties from the beaches to the hos-pital LSTs was handled by landingcraft, LVTs, and DUKWs . However, in-creasingly rough surf eventually pre-vented the use of small landing craft,and amphibious vehicles were employedexclusively. The DUKWs, in particular,proved useful because they handled wellin the surf and alongside the big ships,and patients were more comfortable in-side the DUKWs than inside the wet,bouncing LVTs .38

In addition to the hospital shipsBountiful, Samaritan, and Solace, andthe hospital transport Pinkney, the LSVOzark was pressed into service as anauxiliary hospital ship . Together withtransports that were leaving the combatarea, these ships evacuated 13,737 cas-ualties . 34 An additional 2,449 men wereairlifted to the Marianas .

Because of the small size of Iwo Jima,distances from the front lines to bat-talion aid stations were invariablyshort. Nevertheless, the difficult terrainand constant exposure to enemy firemade even such short distances ex-tremely hazardous both for corpsmenand patients alike . At first, LVTs andWeasels were widely used in order tobring casualties to the beaches ; duringthe latter phase of the operation whenroads had been constructed that were

m TF 56 MedRpt, pp . 8-9 ."TF 53 OpRpt, Part VI, pp . 5, 12 .

723

passable for wheeled vehicles, jeeps of-tentimes carried casualties to the rear .

The availability of whole blood totreat the victims of extensive loss ofblood and shock undoubtedly savedmany lives. Such transfusions of wholeblood had not been used in any previousCentral Pacific campaigns . Landingforce medical facilities alone used morethan 5,000 pints . By D plus 25, 12,600pints had been used, nearly one pint forevery patient evacuated . 35 Once the situ-ation on the beaches had stabilized, hos-pital tents went up wherever a placefor them could be found, and as electricpower became available, the shorebased hospitals were able to operatearound the clock . In evaluating the effi-ciency of the medical care provided atIwo Jima, VAC was to report

The medical service for the Iwo Jimaoperation approached nearer the idealthan during any previous operations inthe Central Pacific Area, and it is firmlybelieved that the casualties received themaximum medical care possible commen-surate with the military situation .'

One of the most difficult problemsthat had to be overcome during Opera-tion DETACHMENT was that of sup-plying the landing force. Heavy surf,the deep volcanic ash, the enemy's com-plete coverage of the beaches with artil-lery, mortars, and small arms fire, andcongestion at the beaches all combinedto increase the complexity of logistics .Only the abandonment of carefully laidplans and timely improvisation savedthe day, making possible an uninter-rupted flow of supplies to the frontlineunits that kept the operation going .

VAC MedRpt, p . 12 ; TF 56 MedRpt, p . 19 .3 A VAC AR, Anx B .

724

Iwo Jima provided a testing groundfor the vehicles that shuttled back andforth through the heavy surf in an at-tempt to land badly needed cargo whenand where required. Beyond that, itbecame a proving ground for men ofthe beach and shore parties, the fre-quently unpublicized and unsung heroesof the battle of logistics . Previously,little had been done to provide theseparties with proper training, experience,and continuity of function. The forcethat went ashore on Iwo Jima includedbeefed-up pioneer battalions, whichwere further reinforced with men fromthe replacement drafts and divisionheadquarters personnel, as well as U. S .Army port troops .

Taken as a whole, this conglomera-tion of units performed well in a situa-tion which was considerably morecomplex than had been envisioned in theplanning for the invasion . It had notbeen intended to bring any of these men,except for advance elements, ashoreuntil the beaches were reasonablysecure. Yet circumstances dictated a de-parture from previous plans and morethan 10,000 of these service troops werelanded on D-Day . Once ashore, underthe most difficult circumstances, thesemen performed splendidly, though theirpresence added to the congestion andincreased the number of casualties .

As it turned out, between 60 and 70percent of the supplies unceremoniouslydumped on the beaches were salvagedand either moved inland or incorporatedinto the hastily established beach dumpsset up by forward elements of the di-vision shore parties which went ashorewith the fifth and sixth assault waves .These advance elements carried out


their mission in an exemplary fashiondespite the most adverse conditions im-posed by the terrain and the heavyenemy fire. The casualties among theseunits were correspondingly heavy, someof them being reduced to half strength .

In order to keep the logistics effortfrom foundering in the deep volcanicash, Marston matting and armored bull-dozers had to be pressed into service .Once again, the American penchant forimprovisation proved to be a decisivefactor in getting troops and supplies offthe crowded beaches . Marston mattingwas of tremendous value in serving asthe only usable roadways over whichvehicles could move inland during theinitial phase of the assault . The armoredbulldozer was employed on the beachesto level sand terraces and cut routes in-land. Their steel plates protected bothdriver and engine from enemy fire . Onnorthern Iwo, these machines and theirdrivers performed an equally impor-tant service in clearing roads into pre-viously impassable terrain under fire .

The movement of supplies across thebeaches was in no small way facilitatedby the presence of Navy cranes, as wellas other equipment designed to expeditethe unloading of the cargo vessels . Inthis connection, the expertise of TF 53and its commander proved invaluable .In line with his extensive logistical ex-perience, Admiral Hill was keenly awareof the requirements that had to be metand had at an early time recommendedthat ample cargo handling equipment beavailable for Operation DETACH-MENT. 37 Despite all preparations, the

BGen Leland S . Swindler ltr to CMC, dtd14May53, in Iwo Comments.

SUMMARY

tactical situation prevailing on Iwo Jimaon D-Day caused the beaches to becomeso congested that on the following dayunderwater demolition teams had to beemployed to assist in clearing lanesthrough the wreckage for incoming ves-sels .

It needs to be emphasized that, alldifficulties to the contrary, no acutesupply shortages developed for the as-sault troops, though in the days fol-lowing the landings units were livingfrom hand to mouth . Such shortages asdid develop involved 60mm mortar il-lumination shells, grenades, cylindersfor charging flamethrowers, and ord-nance spare parts . As an expedient,these items were flown to Iwo Jima fromSaipan, the first extensive use of airsupply by the Marines . 38

The timing of the logistics support atIwo Jima, an extremely importantfactor in an amphibious operation,proved to be well conceived and ex-ecuted. Liaison teams from the 8th FieldDepot, which constituted the VAC shoreparty, accompanied the 4th and 5thMarine Divisions ashore. As of 22 Feb-ruary, units of the field depot cameashore and rendered valuable service inassisting the divisional shore parties .Two days later, when VAC assumedcontrol ashore, the field depot took overand the unloading continued without in-terruption. At this time, the beacheswere still under enemy fire, whichcaused temporary work stoppages butproved unable to interfere seriouslywith the unloading. On D plus 6, 25February, general unloading got underway. The opening of the western beaches

VAC Logistics Rpt, pp . 12, 16 .

725

to small landing craft on 2 Marchremoved the entire unloading operationfrom the threat posed by variableweather conditions . Henceforth, themenace of heavy surf pounding theeastern side of the island could be over-come by switching shipping to the west-ern beaches .

In evaluating the overall success ofthe logistics effort at Iwo Jima, it ap-pears appropriate to comment

. . . the wonder is not that things wereconfused but that the vast quantities ofsupplies actually crossed the beaches soquickly. Expertly handled ship-to-shorecommunications and a high degree of co-ordination between Navy and Marinelogistical control personnel afloat andashore did much to overcome the difficul-ties inherent in the situation ."

The official VAC report dealing withOperation DETACHMENT echoes thissentiment and, speaking of the adver-sities facing the Marines that wentashore on Iwo Jima, concludes

The fact that these factors failed to im-pose any limitations on the conduct ofoperations reflects the highest credit on allconcerned. Without the tireless supportthrough unprecedented difficulties ren-dered by the expeditionary force and thesupply agencies of the landing force, thesustained assault of the Corps would havebeen impossible."

Finally, a word about the tacticsemployed on Iwo Jima both by the as-sault force and the defending Japanese .The small size of the island permittedlittle or no maneuverability to eitherforce, and once the first Marines had

8° Isely and Crowl, U. S . Marines andphibious War, pp. 519-520 .

40 TF 56 AR, Encl B, Comments and Recom-mendations, p . 4 .

Am-

726

gone ashore, the fighting that was totypify the entire operation was dictatedby General Kuribayashi, whose de-fensive organization "was the most in-telligent and complete one yet encoun-tered."41 Basically, the Japanese con-ducted a position defense which waseffective, intense, and notable for itseconomy of forces. There was no em-ployment of mobile reserves, nor wasthere a withdrawal through a series ofdefensive lines . All precautions hadbeen taken to assure that enemy troopswere not exposed to the American sup-porting arms . General Kuribayashi'sdefense was simple ; it was this verysimplicity that made it so effective .The enemy plan was based on the

concept that a maximum number ofweapons of all calibers were to fire moreor less continuously from well-con-cealed and -protected positions until theywere destroyed . Almost from the begin-ning of the operation the American sup-porting arms were handicapped by thegeographical limitations of the island,the character of the terrain, and thestrength of the enemy defenses . Theheavier Japanese installations, in par-ticular, often proved impervious to fieldartillery of light and medium calibersand required the destructive power ofmain battery naval gunfire . During thelatter phase of the fighting, the proxi-mity of the Marines to enemy positionsfrequently denied them the benefit ofadequate heavy fires or bombardment .Even though few underwater ob-

stacles interfered with the Iwo Jimalandings, the minefields ashore were the

" Ibid., p . 1 .


strongest yet encountered in the PacificTheater, indicative of the progress madeby the Japanese in this sphere of de-fensive warfare . The operation also sawthe first use of antipersonnel mines bythe Japanese in the Central Pacific 4 ''

The Japanese made more widespreaduse of rockets than in earlier operations,though on Iwo Jima their effect waslimited . Some of the rocket launcherswere installed in locations from wherethey could be fired at certain areas .Movable rocket launchers were kept incaves, moved outside and fired, thenpulled back into the caves . During theearly phase of the Iwo Jima operation,the Japanese fired large rockets towardsthe northern slope of Mount Suribachi .However, due to the inaccuracy of thisfire, the missiles went beyond the moun-tain and finally fell into the sea . Ifanything, these large weapons were welladapted for harassing fire, but theiraccuracy was doubtful .

In contrast to the relative inefficiencyof the enemy rockets, the Japanese artil-lery performed better than had beenanticipated by the invasion force . Co-ordination, volume, and accuracy of theenemy artillery fire, especially duringthe days immediately following the in-vasion, initially made it appear as if theJapanese were massing their fire, thustaking a page out of the book dealingwith American artillery doctrine . It wassubsequently determined that prior tothe American landings, the enemy had

"Detailed information on this subject canbe found in Military Intelligence, War Depart-ment, Minefield Patterns in the Defense ofIwo Jima, Intelligence Bulletin (Washington,D.C ., June 1945), pp . 15-19 .

SUMMARY

registered his artillery on critical ter-rain features against which he massedhis fire, rather than relying on currentobservation .

General Kuribayashi's use of mortarswas exceptionally skillful and very ef-fective. In fact, it was this weapon, andthe large number used, that inflictedmore casualties on the Marines thanany other support weapon. During thelatter part of the campaign, the Japa-nese apparently suffered a shortage ofmortar ammunition which restrictedtheir choice of targets to Marine weap-ons, vehicles, and large groups of per-sonnel. As with rocket launchers, theJapanese skillfully hid their mortars,either emplacing them on reverse slopesor moving them out of caves to fire, andquickly moving them back under cover .Among the weapons Marines en-

countered on Iwo Jima for the first timewere the 320mm spigot type mortar,new types of mobile rocket launchersand rockets, and 90mm and 120mmhowitzers .

The landing force also made use ofseveral innovations, sometimes on anexperimental basis. Thus the rollingbarrage, dating back to World War I,found renewed use during the operation .Generally, this type of artillery sup-port proved successful, though thetroops often did not advance as rapidlyas expected. This required continuousmodification of the barrage scheduleresulting in repeating fires in certainblocks and delaying the lifting of firesfrom others . 43 With respect to the util-ization of mortars, in accordance with

" TF 51 AR, Pt V, Sec C, p. 3 .

727

recommendations following operationsin the Marianas, an effort was made todevelop a craft mounting the 4 .2-inchchemical mortar . As a result, three 4 .2swere mounted on an LCI and success-fully employed on D-Day and there-after .

The effectiveness of the enemy mortarfire gave rise to the recommendationthat a larger mortar be adopted, andthat possibly a 120mm mortar battalionbe added to each division . Marines whohad been on the receiving end of enemy47mm gunfire felt that a 57mm gunshould be substituted for their own37mm piece. Similarly, a tank withthicker armor and heavier armamentthan the Sherman would have facil-itated operations on Iwo Jima . A greatmajority of the Shermans wereequipped with small flamethrowers thatproved their worth by squirting firethrough one or two of their machine gunports, but a tank capable of shooting aflame for about 100 yards from a tur-ret-mounted tube proved the most ef-ficient . In order to deceive the Japanese,who tended to concentrate their fireagainst any type of flamethrower, thesetubes outwardly were exact replicas ofthe 75mm gun .

In his letter to President Roosevelt,Rear Admiral Ichimaru somewhat con-temptuously referred to American ma-terial superiority as opposed to Japa-nese fighting spirit .44 While there canbe no doubt that such material supe-riority did in fact exist, it is equally

" RAdm Ichimaru ltr to President Roosevelt,n.d ., as cited in Morehouse, Iwo Jima Cam-paign, App. E, p . 172E .

728

clear that other important factors wereat work which the Japanese admiralpointedly ignored. Not least among thesewere the outstanding leadership anddiscipline of the men who came to takeIwo Jima or die in the attempt ; thephysical stamina and mental power ofendurance of these men, both temperedin months or years of thorough train-ing ; and the intangible, indefinablesomething known as esprit de corps ormorale, that induces men to give theirlast in a common cause .

Without all of the above qualities,the individual Marine could not havegone on to victory on Iwo Jima, a bat-tle that has been linked to "throwinghuman flesh against reinforced con-


crete ." 45 For the men of the landingforce that assaulted and captured oneof the strongest enemy bastions in thePacific, the operation was the supremetest. Judging by the performance ofthese men and the results attained, theinevitable conclusion can be drawn thata heavily defended objective can beseized by such a force regardless of itssize, the difficulty of its terrain, and thedegree of man-made defensive perfec-tion. An amphibious assault againstsuch an objective will be successful ifit can be isolated by surface and airsuperiority and prepared by naval bom-bardment and bombing .

'5 Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am-phibious War, p . 475 .

Conclusions

The ground operations discussed inthis volume, notably Peleliu and IwoJima, span the period of seven monthsfrom September 1944 to the end ofMarch 1945. Within the overall contextof World War II, this time span wasmost significant . In Europe, this periodsaw the advance of Soviet forces intoGermany proper, the collapse of theGerman allies in Scandinavia and theBalkans, and the slow but steadily ac-celerating drive of the Western Alliesinto western Germany.

An ingenious offensive in the Arden-nes and the introduction of new typesof rockets failed to halt the steamrollerthat was beginning to engulf the Reichfrom the west, east, and the south . Dis-sent within the ranks of the Germansthemselves had been all but snuffed outfollowing the abortive attempt onHitler's life in late July. The harshmeasures that followed in the wake ofthe Generals' Plot all but silenced thosewho might have raised their voicesagainst the continuation of a war thatthe overwhelming majority of the mil-itary, as well as the civilian population,already had to consider lost. The heavyAllied air raids, carried out in suchforce that entire cities were literallyobliterated from the face of the earthonly underscored the fact that time wason the side of the Allies . Despite reportsof the miraculous effect of those wonder

CHAPTER 13

weapons already existing and those yetto come, both pessimism and fear weredominant : pessimism as to what wouldhappen to the country and its peopleonce the Allies had won ; fear of deathfrom the air for the civilian populace ;fear of death or capture on the part ofthe military, particularly those facing amerciless enemy on the Eastern front ;fear of the numerous foreign workerswho, in many cases forcibly conscriptedand not always well-treated, posed anincreasing threat to internal security asthe ring closed around Germany .

Finally, there was fear of the rulingpolice and semi-military organizationswhose measures against military per-sonnel and civilians alike became evermore menacing as the strategic situa-tion deteriorated. During the late falland throughout the winter of 1944-1945, the German war machine stillfunctioned efficiently despite heavylosses in personnel and materiel, devas-tation from the air, increasing shortagesin raw materials, and covert populardiscontent . The German offensive in theArdennes, the last of the great Germanoffensives of World War II, representedbut the final gasp of a machine that hadwaged almost unlimited blitzkrieg dur-ing the initial years of the war . Whenthis offensive fell short of its goals andcould not be sustained, the end of thewar in Europe became a visible goal,

729

730

at the most only months away . As onehistory of that war was to sum it up

. . . the roads back over the Eifel ledstraight to the decimation and collapse ofthe German armies on the banks of theOder River, along the Danube, in the Ruhrpocket, and, at last, to the bunkers ofBerlin'

In comparison with operations inEurope, the war in the Pacific Theaterduring the latter part of 1944 andthrough the early months of 1945showed certain similarities as well asmarked differences . The vital gains interritory and raw materials made bythe Japanese during the early monthsof the war had realized for them mostof the tactical and strategic objectivesthey had embarked on . Beginning withthe American landings in the Solomons,prolonged operations in New Guinea,and the American recapture of islandsin the Aleutians, the Japanese situationhad very gradually deteriorated, thoughsuch setbacks were in no way overlyworrisome to the Japanese leaders whocontinued to maintain an optimistic out-look as to the eventual outcome of thewar. They hoped that, in time, a nego-tiated peace would permit Japan to re-tain at least some of the vital areas fromwhich she drew her raw materials .

The heavy American losses at Tarawaonly strengthened the Japanese beliefthat the United States would not bewilling to continue paying such aheavy price for each island that wouldhave to be seized before the war was

'Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes : Battle of theBulge-The U. S. Army in World War II(Washington : Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, Department of the Army, 1955), p .673 .


carried into the Home Islands . Mean-while, despite increasingly heavy inter-ference by American submarines withJapanese shipping, raw materials con-tinued to flow to Japan from the con-quered territories : urgently needed rub-ber arrived from Burma, Malaya, andIndochina ; vital food products andpetroleum made their way north fromthe Philippines and from the formerDutch East Indies ; and war plants inManchuria and Korea were producingat full capacity. The vast pool of Japa-nese manpower had been barely touchedby combat losses, though the caliberof the aviators was diminishing .

Both the Japanese military and thecivilian population stood solidly behindthe government, at whose apex was theEmperor against whom no voice of dis-sent could be raised. The entire popula-tion was in some way involved in thewar effort. There was absolute confid-ence in the leadership and the foreignpolicy pursued by the country. Theborders of Japan were secure . Therewere still the numerous island outpoststo the south and west ; much of theChinese mainland, especially the vitalcoastal areas, was under Japanese con-trol and the possibility of Russia'sentry into the war against Japan on theside of the Allies appeared remote . With-in the Home Islands, the entire nationwas functioning as a military-civilianteam under quasi-military rule . Therewere few foreigners in the Home Is-lands, aside from closely guarded Al-lied prisoners of war and civilian in-ternees, including missionaries, all ofwhom represented an infinitesimallysmall number that posed no threat tothe Japanese war effort . Their presence

CONCLUSIONS

in the country was not a factor inmaintaining the agriculture or industryof Japan .

The spring and summer of 1944 sawa rapid acceleration of Allied operationsin the Central Pacific, primarily anAmerican effort. Based on the bitter les-sons of Tarawa, U . S. Marines had per-fected their planning and refined theirtechniques until their drive into theMarianas "saw the flowering of a vitalskill, logistics planning, whose incred-ible complexity met the need to sustainmassive assaults and at the same timeprovide a continuous flow of men, sup-plies, and equipment for a host of exist-ing and future requirements ." 2

Noting the change in the strategicsituation in the Pacific brought aboutby American seizure of the Gilberts andMarshals, one postwar survey has notedthat

The United States position was firmindeed in early March 1944 . The initiativehad been won, adequate forces were insight, and it was possible to plan in or-derly fashion for future operations. Japan,on the other hand, was faced with the mosturgent need for devising means to counterthe unpredictable but obviously intendedblows at her inner perimeter, with forcesso limited that opposition with the slight-est chance of a favorable outcome couldonly be offered under ideal conditions .'

The stage was now set for an Amer-ican advance into the inner perimeterof Japan's defense. The possibility ofan American invasion of the Marianasin the spring and summer of 1944 hardlycame as a surprise for the Japanese,who nearly a year earlier had already

' Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pa-cific Drive, p. 583 .

1 USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 204 .

731

designated these islands as an "abso-lute strategic area within the absolutezone of national defense ."4 What didcause great surprise and consternationwere the might of the American navalbombardment, notably at Saipan, thegreat speed of the landing operations,and the overwhelming superiority of theAmericans in the air, which under-scored the loss of the well-trainedand seasoned aviators that Japan hadpossessed at the beginning of the war.

The success of the American landingson Saipan only nine days after theNormandy invasion, coupled with thesubsequent operations against Tinianand Guam, struck the Japanese withthe same impact that the Allied invasionof Europe had on the Germans . In eithercase it was less the initial success ofthe landings that confounded the de-fenders than the fact that the invasionforce could not be confined to the beachesor driven back into the sea . There wereseveral fringe benefits for the Amer-icans inherent in the Saipan operation .First, the fact that "it lured the Japa-nese carriers to defeat might alone beenough to call it the decisive operationof the Central Pacific Campaign ."5 Thecapture of Saipan provided the Amer-icans with a base from which giantB-29s would soon be able to launch adevastating air offensive against theHome Islands . The sea battle in theMarianas resulted in the loss of mostof the carriers and air strength of theCombined Fleet, which gave Americanaircraft full control of the air while theU. S . Navy dominated the Central

' Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 109.'Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Paci-

fic Drive, p. 583 .

732

Pacific. Without support from sea orair, Tinian and Guam were for all prac-tical purposes isolated plums ripe forthe picking. Since the loss of 300 navalaircraft had all but wiped out navalstrength in the Marianas and the Japa-nese Army had only few planes withsufficient range to fly from bases on IwoJima to Saipan, there was no hope thatJapan would regain command of theair over the Marianas . With this realiza-tion went any Japanese hopes of recap-turing either Saipan, Guam, or Tinian .

Beyond this, from the Japanese pointof view

. . . there appeared a wide gap in theabsolute zone of national defense in theCentral Pacific region. The advance of theU. S. Navy toward Japanese waters wasfacilitated by this breach, which threat-ened the very security of the homeland .Even more painful for Japan, the Ameri-can Air Force began to bomb the mainislands from bases on Saipan and Guam-raids which began on September 24 .1

Following the successful Allied in-vasion of Normandy, and in the weeksthat followed, it is interesting to notethat a group of German general officers,many of them members of the GeneralStaff, concluded that the war could nolonger be won and set about to removeHitler before attempting to reach anegotiated peace with the Allies. InJapan, at approximately the same time,the situation was directly reversed . Itwas recognized that, with the loss ofSaipan, the war situation had reached acritical phase. However, while the Em-peror and the senior statesman "grewanxious and perturbed," 7 the militaryradiated an air of optimism, which went

° Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 109.' Ibid.


so far as highly placed officers makingprofuse assurances "that our fleet hademerged victorious from the engage-ment (in the Philippine Sea) . They evendrank hilariously to the spectacularvictory."8

In Germany the question of continu-ing the war or finding a way to thepeace-table resulted in an ever widen-ing chasm between the Armed Forcesand the Nazi Party, with the formerfavoring an end to the war. In Japan,the military closed ranks in favor offighting to the last man, woman, andchild, if necessary, though major dif-ferences as to the further prosecution ofthe war remained between the Army andNavy. The dismissal of Tojo as Premieron 18 July preceded the assassinationattempt against Hitler by two days .Whereas the abortive General's Plotresulted in a major upheaval in theGerman ranks with numerous courtsmartials and summary executions in itswake, the transition from the TojoGovernment to a new cabinet took placein an orderly fashion, though it was farfrom routine. Never having been ques-tioned, the stature and authority of theEmperor remained unchanged . In orderto put and end to Army-Navy antago-nism, both the War Minister and theChief of Staff made efforts aimed atresolving the long-standing rivalries be-tween the two Services, though the timewas late.

While the drive across the CentralPacific was aimed directly at the Japa-nese Home Islands, General DouglasMacArthur was embarked on the roadto Tokyo over a more circuitous south-

-Ibid., p. 208 .

CONCLUSIONS

erly route which would take him fromNew Guinea to the Philippines. Ascompared to the European Theater, thisdrive might be likened to the Allied in-vasion of North Africa and the sub-sequent moves to Sicily and Italy. Wherethe seizure of North Africa and Italyhad been intended to open a door intoEurope through the supposedly "softbelly" in the south, MacArthur's stra-tegy of isolating Japan from her sourcesof supply in the Philippines and freeingthe inhabitants of these islands fromJapanese oppression, as he had prom-ised, was to serve as a stepping stonetowards the invasion of the Home Is-lands. Both in southern Europe, as inthe southern Pacific, the respective cam-paigns proved costly, arduous, and time-consuming. Neither the recapture of thePhilippines nor the plodding advanceup the Appenine Peninsula yieldedquick results that would have broughtthe war to a rapid end in either theater ;nor was there any clear agreement inearly 1944 where MacArthur would goonce the liberation of the Philippineshad been accomplished .

It is in the light of this overall situa-tion. that the seizure of the southernPalaus, Operation STALEMATE, mustbe viewed. During the early part of1944, the Palaus represented one of thekey strongholds in Japan's second lineof defense. Once New Guinea and theMarshall Islands had been seized by theAmericans, the Central Carolines hadbeen bypassed, and the Marianas hadfallen, the Palaus moved into the firstline of defense for Japan . They becamethe most powerful and strategic enemyoutposts halfway between the CentralPacific drive in the northeast and Mac-

733

Arthur's drive from the south . Since thePalaus were situated only 500 miles eastof the Philippine island of Mindanao,their permanent neutralization fromsea or air was impractical ; as result,the southernmost of these islands be-came the target of invasion .At the time Admiral Nimitz, General

MacArthur, as well as the Joint Chiefsof Staff, were in general agreement asto the necessity of securing the southernPalaus, notably Peleliu and Angaur, aswell as islands closest to Guam, notablyYap and Ulithi in the Northern Caro-lines. Possession of the smaller islands tothe northeast and south of Babelthuap,the largest and most heavily-defendedisland in the Palaus, would permit theneutralization of that stronghold . At thesame time that a joint force of Marinesand Army troops assaulted Peleliuand Angaur respectively, MacArthur'sforces prepared to assault Morotai,located about halfway between thewestern tip of New Guinea and Celebes,480 miles southwest of Peleliu . Seizureof Peleliu and Angaur to the north(with Morotai as a stepping stone inthe south) would effectively screen Gen-eral MacArthur's drive into the Philip-pines, at the same time providing vitalairstrips to the Americans from whichaircraft could neutralize enemy forcesand such air power as remained to theJapanese on adjacent islands .

The overall situation that had devel-oped by mid-summer made it possible toscrap the planned operation againstYap Island in the northern Carolines .The invasions of Peleliu and Morotaitook place on 15 September, followedtwo days later by the assault on Angaur .Fighting on Peleliu, in particular,

734

proved long, bitter, and costly, so muchso that at the conclusion of the oper-ation doubts arose as to whether resultshad been worth the effort, particularlyin view of the fact that last-minutechanges in plans for subsequent oper-ations, specifically the invasion of thePhilippines, "made it all but impossibleto fit the Palaus into the operationalrole originally planned for them ." Thecapture of Angaur also failed to provideimmediate support to MacArthur'sforces. Terrain difficulties and inade-quate gasoline storage facilities pre-vented the operation of bombers fromAngaur until 21 October, the day afterAmerican forces had landed on Leytein the central Philippines . 10 Even then,it was not until 17 November that thefirst bomber mission was flown againstthe Philippines from a field in thePalaus. In time, Angaur became animportant base for heavy bombers andan aircraft staging point, from whichoperations on Luzon could be supported .Aircraft based on Morotai did not flysorties against Leyte, but flew manymissions over Mindanao and other is-lands in the southern Philippines . After7 October, fighters based on Morotaiflew cover for Allied bombers en routeto Mindanao and the Visayan Islands .An unexpected dividend accruing to

American forces from the seizure of thePalaus was the capture of Ulithi Atollby Army troops. Seized in an unop-posed operation from 22-24 September,this atoll became an extremely valu-able base for the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Asthe war progressed, it became an im-

' Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p . 572 .70 Ibid., p. 573 .


portant staging area for the fleet andamphibious forces taking part in theinvasion of Okinawa . Generally speak-ing, seizure of some islands in the west-ern Carolines, including Peleliu, gainedfor the Allies valuable bases, though theaccelerating drive towards Japan madeit necessary to convert these newlyseized bases to uses other than thoseoriginally anticipated .

For the men of the 1st Marine Di-vision who assaulted Peleliu, the seizureof the island meant a hard and bloodycampaign. Of particular interest is theratio of forces employed by both op-ponents. At Attu in the Aleutians, theAmerican forces had enjoyed a numer-ical superiority of 5 :1 . The ratio was2.5 :1 in favor of the attacking forceat Saipan, and at Guam it amounted to2 :1 . 11 In the Palaus, the defending Japa-nese were considerably superior in num-ber to the invasion force. Yet the latterwas able to bring its full striking powerto bear against the objective, while themain Japanese garrison on adjacentBabelthuap was effectively blocked bythe U. S. Navy from giving any reliefto its hard-pressed comrades in armson Peleliu .

Completion of the operation in theWestern Carolines placed the UnitedStates in a favorable position for car-rying the war to the enemy at an ac-celerated pace . Since early summer of1944, the Japanese situation had de-teriorated alarmingly . Even while Ja-pan attempted to bolster her saggingline of defense, the Japanese air gar-rison in the Philippines had sufferedstaggering losses, as had Japanese ship-

" Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, pp. 110-111 .

CONCLUSIONS

ping, both through U.S. submarine ac-tion and later through carrier andshore-based air strikes .

The arrival of 1945 saw an almostcomplete reversal of the still fairlystable position of Japan just one yearearlier. The final months of 1944 hadfaced the Japanese with almost un-imaginable reverses that the nationcould no longer compensate for . Lossof the Philippines to General Mac-Arthur's forces was not only a very soreblow to Japanese pride, but more prac-tically

The Southern Resources Area, the prizefor which the war had been fought, wasgone and American fleets sailed with im-punity to the shores of eastern Asia . Allhope of future resistance had dependedupon oil and now the tankers were sunkand the oil cut off. The surface fleet wasgone, and so were 7,000 aircraft, expendedin four months defense of the last supplyline. Suicide attack, bleeding tactics, werenow the last hope of this shrunken em-pire, and even these economical methodsof defense suffered from the blockade's

From the Marine Corps point of view,the tactical development of close air sup-port had been one of the most dis-tinguishing features of the Peleliu oper-ation. The remarkable performance ofMarine aviators during the capture ofNgesebus Island had been but a forerun-ner of what Marine air was shortly toaccomplish in the Philippines in sup-port of Army troops . This developmenthad been slow in coming, the inevitableresult of the early wartime naval train-ing of Marine pilots, which devoted lit-tle serious attention to closely coordi-nated air attacks in support of groundunits. By late 1944 the winds of change

'B USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 289.

735

had begun to blow at a stiffer pace, andthe employment of Marine air for closesupport missions became a distinct pos-sibility. In anticipation of such a devel-opment, MAG-24, then stationed atBougainville, began the crash trainingof Marine pilots for close support .A radical departure from orthodoxmethods was the adoption of direct com-munications between pilots and ground-based air liaison parties. The perform-ance of Marine aviators on Luzon Islandand in the Southern Philippines was tobecome an outstanding chapter in a longhistory of excellent achievements, com-bining raw courage with skill andflexibility . The activities of Marine airin the Philippines constituted one of thefew opportunities that Marine airgroups had to show their skill in closeair support . Except for a brief periodof employment during the early days ofthe Iwo Jima operation, there would belittle occasion for the Marine flyers togive any further demonstration of theirclose support prowess. Only later, onOkinawa, would Marine pilots have afinal opportunity to perfect their closesupport tactics . 13

The early days of 1945 were bleakones for Germans and Japanese alike.In the case of the former, the Ardennesoffensive had failed and only furtherweakened the depleted divisions of theReich, which was now under aerial at-tack around the clock, while invadingarmies were striking at her interiorfrom three directions . For the Japa-nese, the fortunes of war had come full

13 For a detailed account of Marine Corpsoperations on Okinawa, see Frank and Shaw,Victory and Occupation, Pt. II.

736

circle. The spirit of optimism that hadstill filled the people of Japan with hopeduring the summer of 1944 had nowvanished. The news from the battle-fronts was all bad, and it could no longerbe kept from the populace . The thoughtof rebellion against the Emperor wasstill unacceptable to the Japanese, butthere were some effects, notably tomorale : "At home the bad news beganto be known and mutterings of nego-tiated conditional peace arose even inthe armed forces . Japan was defeatedit remained only necessary to persuadeher of the fact." 14

As the war situation deteriorated forthe Axis, the peoples of Germany andJapan realized that nothing short of amiracle could still save their situation .In Germany, the die-hard optimistslooked for a reversal of imminent defeatthrough the V-Weapons, whose devel-opment assumed ever grander propor-tions, though reality lagged far behindwishful thinking . As early as 1943, theJapanese received word that Germanywas working on atomic weapons, butnuclear physicists maintained that suchweapons were not far enough advancedfor use in World War II. Nevertheless,an attempt was made to employ sciencein a bid to solve the numerous militaryproblems .

During 1944, an increasing numberof scientists and technical experts werepressed into service in order to test anumber of unorthodox devices that wereto be employed in the decisive battle .Thus, the Japanese Army experimentedwith a thermal ray and bombs thatwould be guided to their targets by

11 USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p . 290.


sources of heat, notably American troop-ships. Actual experiments had been car-ried out during the summer of 1944, butthe onrush of events overtook the slowexperimentation before a multitude oftechnical problems could be eliminated .In the end, the "weapons of science"could not be put to any practical use,and "weapons for decisive combat thuscame to mean suicidal expedients," suchas the kamikaze." The only practicalJapanese secret weapon ever to be usedagainst the United States was a balloonbomb, which for about six months after1 November 1944, was released dailyfrom Japan. Purpose of the bomb wasa psychological one : "Americans wereto be made to feel uneasy because ofsurprise explosions scattered through-out the United States ." While a numberof these balloons actually reached theContinental United States, their effec-tiveness was practically nil ; only a fewgrass fires resulted from 9,000 incen-diary balloons launched .

The invasion of Iwo Jima must beviewed in the light of what the loss ofthe island would do to Japanese civilianmorale, coupled with the benefits the useof the island's three airfields wouldprovide to the Allied air effort againstJapan. Because of the serious losses in-curred in the Philippines and other cam-paigns, together with a breakdown inthe pilot replacement program and acritical shortage of fuel, the JapaneseArmy and Navy Air Forces were nolonger effective deterrents to Americanincursions at sea or in the air . On theother hand, the American potential forwaging war was at its height . The Amer-

1, Hayashi and Coox, Kogun, p . 118 .

CONCLUSIONS

icans were stronger in numbers, bettertrained, and moving forward with anoverwhelming offensive power. "UnitedStates domination of the Pacific OceanArea was complete and the time was athand to strike in earnest toward theheart of the Japanese Empire ." 16The Iwo Jima operation was wedged

in time into a very narrow period,barely preceded by the American land-ings on Luzon and shortly followed bythe invasion of Okinawa. The ambitiousplans for this decisive period almostexceeded the capabilities of a fullymobilized United States, particularlywhen the Tokyo carrier strikes were in-cluded. As a result, the landings at IwoJima took place under the shadow ofthe major invasion of Luzon in thesouth, the imminent assault against theRyukyus, and a carrier-based aerial as-sault against the Home Islands . Thisaccelerated schedule of events con-tributed to the reduction in the numberof days available for the prelandingbombardment of Iwo Jima. That theisland could be taken at all in view ofthe strength of its defenses and thecasualties incurred by the attacking Ma-rines is proof of the latters' courage,highly advanced state of training, andthe soundness of amphibious doctrinethat had become an integral part of Ma-rine Corps tactics .Control of Iwo Jima provided the

Americans with airfields 600 milescloser to the Home Islands, opening thedoors wide to a full-scale aerial assaulton Japan. The early months of 1945thus saw a further extension of Amer-ican power towards the inner defenses

'°USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 320 .

737

of Japan. Even as bitter fighting ragedon Iwo Jima, a huge American invasionarmada was already en route to Oki-nawa, which was ultimately to turn into"the most difficult operation undertakenin the Pacific by United States forces," 17though from the point of view of theMarine Corps, the Iwo Jima campaignremains aptly designated as "The Su-preme Test.""' A comparison of the IwoJima and Okinawa operations does notfall within the purview of this volume ;the latter operation has been most aptlydescribed elsewhere in this series . 19The seizure of Iwo Jima eliminated

a strong Japanese bastion of defensenear the Home Islands ; it provided theAmericans with forward airfields ; andthe U. S. presence on Iwo Jima was de-cisive in neutralizing other fortifiedenemy islands in the Bonins. As the warin Europe thundered to its conclusion,the inevitability of defeat following thefall of Iwo Jima was impressed on allJapanese. As the shadow of Americanairpower and the specter of an all-outassault against the Home Islands them-selves became a distinct possibility,Japanese diplomats began delicate man-euvers behind the scenes to save whatcould be salvaged from a misguidedand misconceived war . Japanese defeatsin the Pacific also were beginning tohave international repercussions, nota-bly with regard to the Soviet Union,which was beginning to waver in itsneutrality towards Japan . The horror ofatomic warfare was yet unheard of dur-

" USSBS, Pacific Campaigns, p. 324 .1e Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Am-

phibious War, ch 10 .'B See Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occu-

pation, Pt II .

738


ing these early months of 1945 . But the remains of Japanese dreams, and iteach succeeding American assault across was on islands such as Peleliu and Iwothe Central Pacific had driven the nails Jima that these dreams were finally laidof defeat deeper into the coffin that bore to rest .

Bibliographical Notes

This history is predominantly based on offi-cial Marine Corps records comprising thediaries, reports, plans, journals, and orders ofthe commands and units that participated inthe operations covered by this volume . Suchrecords of the other Services as were pertinentto the subject matter have been consulted andused. Activities on high strategic levels havebeen reconstructed with the help of the recordsof the Joint Chiefs of Staff or official publica-tions that derived a considerable portion oftheir basic data from JCS records .Since this volume deals with a number of

seemingly unrelated topics, ranging from anadministrative history of the Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, to major operations in the West-ern Pacific, not to mention aviation activitiesin widely separated areas, a large number ofsources had to be consulted . Some of thesewere pertinent to only one area or period oftime while others offered detailed informationon a scope encompassing the entire volume .Unless otherwise noted, all of the official rec-ords cited are on file with or obtainable throughthe Library and Documentation Sections, Ref-erence Branch, Historical Division, Headquar-ters, U . S . Marine Corps .

A number of published works of generalinterest have been consulted frequently duringthe preparation of this volume . The more im-portant of these are listed below .

In order to bridge the inevitable gaps andinadequacies that occur in the sources con-sulted, extensive use was made of the knowl-edge of key participants in the actions de-scribed. These men, representing all Services,generously offered time and effort in replyingto specific questions, making themselves avail-able for interviews, and furnishing criticalcomments on draft manuscrips of this volumeand preliminary monographs . The historicaloffices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force haveconducted a detailed review of draft chapters

and furnished much material of value to thishistory. The War History Office of the DefenseAgency of Japan has read and commentedon the passages dealing with Japanese opera-tions on Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and in the Philip-pines, providing valuable information that hasbeen incorporated into the narrative .

BooksWesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate,

eds . The Pacific : Matterhorn to Nagasaki,June 1944 to August 1945-The Army AirForces in World War II, v . 5 . Chicago : Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1953. The Air Forceofficial history covering the final year of WorldWar II with particular emphasis on the de-velopment and employment of the B-29bomber and operations in the Western andSouthwestern Pacific. This well documentedbook is a reliable source for the operations ofArmy Air Forces units in the Pacific and theirvital part in the defeat of Japan .Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl . The

U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Prince-ton : Princeton University Press, 1951 . An out-standing source of information dealing withthe adoption, development, and perfection ofamphibious warfare and application of thesetechniques during various phases of World WarII. The authors' critical comments on eachmajor operation and their conclusions are in-valuable for a clear perspective of warfare inthe Pacific Theater .VAdm E. P. Forrestel . Admiral Raymond A .

Spruance, USN-A Study in Command. Wash-ington : Department of the Navy, 1966 . Recordof a naval leader's service to his country inwar and peace. This well documented andillustrated biography not only tells the storyof a man and his brilliant career in the Pacificduring World War II but also outlines someof the major naval operations of World War II .

FAdm William F. Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan

739

740

III . Admiral Halsey's Story . New York :Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill' PublishingCompany, Inc ., 1947. The life and service ofone of the most prominent American navalcommanders in World War II . In addition togaining a close look at the human side of thisgreat naval leader, the reader is also presentedwith the background and development of someof the great naval actions in the WesternPacific during World War II .FAdm Ernest H. King and Cdr Walter M .

Whitehill . Fleet Admiral King : A Naval Rec-ord. New York : W. W. Norton & Company,Inc., 1952. An autobiography covering the en-tire span of service of this great naval leader,highlighting his part in the formulation ofAmerican strategy within the high-level com-mand structure employed in World War II .

FAdm William D . Leahy. I Was There . NewYork : Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Pub-lishing Company, 1950 . The autobiography ofanother high-ranking naval officer who servedas Chief of Staff under Presidents Rooseveltand Truman. In addition to highly relevantcomments on top-level Allied conferences whichthe author attended, a sizable portion of thebook deals with his most delicate prewar ap-pointment as American Minister to the VichyGovernment and his official and personalrelations with prominent Vichy persons .Samuel Eliot Morison . History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II, v.XII, XIII, XIV . Boston : Little, Brown andCompany, 1958, 1959, 1960 . These three vol-umes by Rear Admiral Morison, Leyte, June1944-January 1945, The Liberation of thePhilippines, 1944-1945, and Victory in the Pa-cific, 1945 give an excellent account of Navyoperations in the Southwestern and WesternPacific . Though prepared with Navy collabo-ration and support, these volumes neverthelessbear the personal imprint of the author, whosemasterful description of the naval operationsof this period is without equal .Robert Sherrod . History of Marine Corps

Aviation in World War II . Washington : Com-bat Forces Press, 1952 . An unofficial history,but prepared with substantial research sup-port from the Marine Corps, this work con-tains information on Marine aviation units notto be found elsewhere. It represents the most


comprehensive source in its field publishedto date .Robert Ross Smith . The Approach to the

Philippines-The War in the Pacific-UnitedStates Army in World War II . Washington :Office of the Chief of Military History, De-partment of the Army, 1953 . An excellentaccount of the strategy and tactics that wereemployed in laying the basis for the recaptureof the Philippines, specifically during amphib-ious and ground operations in New Guineaand the southern Palau Islands .United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. The Cam-paigns of the Pacific War, 1 vol. and Inter-rogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols . Wash-ington : Government Printing Office, 1946. Thethree volumes give an interesting account ofWorld War II as seen through Japanese eyes .Prepared shortly after the end of hostilities,this series is deficient in accuracy and per-spective. Yet the information and viewpointsprovide an insight into Japanese militarythinking, both through translation of perti-nent documents and through interviews .The War Reports of General of the Army

George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, Generalof the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding Gen-eral, Army Air Forces; Fleet Admiral ErnestJ. King, Commander-in-Chief, United StatesFleet and Chief of Naval Operations . Philadel-phia and New York : J . B. Lippincott Company,1947. Collection of the official reports of thechiefs of the armed services, issued duringWorld War II and the immediate postwarperiod. Excellent material for reviewing thebig picture of World War II operations .

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Official DocumentsThe operational span of ground operations

in this volume covers the invasion of the south-ern Palaus as a preliminary step in the re-conquest of the Philippines and the subsequentdecision to seize Iwo Jima in the Volcano-Bonins as an advanced base in the directionof the Home Islands . For the strategy andtactics employed by the United States duringthis crucial period of the war in the South-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

western and Western Pacific during the latterpart of 1944 and early 1945, a variety ofsources were required . These ranged fromrecords of the Joint and Combined Chiefs ofStaff as cited in previously published officialhistories to the minutes of CominCh-CinCPacConferences conducted during the summer of1944. In some instances, copies of reports andminutes portraying the evolution of Anglo-American strategy can be found in the files ofthe World War II Division, Federal RecordsCenter, The National Archives which has re-cently relocated to Suitland, Maryland .

Information on the status of Marine Corpsunits and personnel during the period coveredhas been derived from such tables of organiza-tion station lists and status sheets for air andground units as were readily available in thearchives of the Historical Division . Additionalsources of information were the monthlyFMF air and ground status reports preparedwithin the Division of Plans and Policies andthe Division of Aviation, HQMC, and theAnnual Reports of the Commandant of theMarine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy .

Japanese Sources

In appraising the strategic and tactical situ-ation from the Japanese side, our view isnecessarily limited by the factors of time,distance, availability of enemy persons andrecords, and linguistics. A full exploitation ofofficial Japanese wartime records on a scaleeven remotely resembling that of capturedGerman military records by the Allies provedimpossible. On the tactical level, few of theJapanese garrison commanders and their staffssurvived the fighting ; as a result, such infor-mation as was obtainable had to be gleanedfrom American intelligence surveys preparedby higher headquarters, mostly based on theinterrogation of the few prisoners that weretaken or such Japanese military records,mostly of a tactical nature, that fell intoAmerican hands .

Fortunately for the historian and researcher,during the immediate postwar period whilethe occupation of Japan was in full swing,General MacArthur's headquarters utilized itsavailable resources to initiate a study programwith the help of former Japanese officials .

741

This program culminated in the preparationof a series of monographs detailing Japaneseactivities in widespread areas of the Pacificand Asia . These early studies which variedgreatly in scope, quality, and accuracy under-went a further process of refinement in themid-1950s, at which time they were publishedin the form of monographs under the auspicesof the Office of the Chief of Military History,Department of the Army. A complete listingof these monographs is contained in Guide toJapanese Monographs and Japanese Studieson Manchuria 1945-1960 (Washington, 1961)prepared by OCMH, which also exercises cus-tody over this collection .

Of primary interest for the purposes of thisvolume were those monographs dealing withJapanese preparations for the defense of thePhilippines during the summer of 1944. Mono-graph No. 45 comprising the History of theArmy Section, Imperial General Headquarters,gives an insight into the prosecution of the waras seen through eyes of Japanese on the ele-vated level of command in an exhaustive studyof 382 pages . Monograph No . 48, Central PacificOperations Record, Volume I, (December 1941-August 1945) furnished considerable informa-tion on the defense of Iwo Jima, while No . 49,Volume II of the same title, was useful in pro-viding a general outline of the Japanese situ-ation in the Pacific for most of 1944 .

Books and Periodicals

The first three volumes of this series, PearlHarbor to Guadalcanal, Isolation of Rabaul,and Central Pacific Drive, as well as the last,Victory and Occupation, have served as auseful basis for the background informationthat had to be incorporated into the fourth,particularly with respect to the developmentand employment of amphibious doctrine . Anappropriate setting was arrived at with thehelp of the following :Ray S. Cline. Washington Command Post :

The Operations Division-The War Depart-ment-United States Army in World War II .Washington : Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, Department of the Army, 1951 . Anofficial Army history outlining high-levelplanning in the Operations Division of theWar Department during World War II . An

742

excellent source based on important primarydata.

John Miller, Jr. "The Casablanca Conferenceand Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs, v. 13,no. 4 (Winter 49) . A concise account of thishigh-level conference and its results .

Walter Millis, ed . The Forrestal Diaries .New York : The Viking Press, 1951. The per-sonal files and papers of the former Secretaryof the Navy and later Secretary of Defensedealing with top level planning, decisions, andconferences during the later phase of WorldWar II. An important source for evaluatingthe Administration's plans in the realm ofinternational affairs, the conclusion of the warin the Pacific, and the formulation of plans forthe postwar period.Louis Morton. "American and Allied Strat-

egy in the Far East," Military Review, v . 29,no. 9 (Dec49) . This article deals with plan-ning for the eventual drive across the Pacifictowards the Japanese Home Islands .Adm Raymond A. Spruance. "The Victory

in the Pacific," Journal of the Royal UnitedService Institution, v . 91, no. 564 (Nov46) . Abrief but well prepared look at World War IIoperations in the Pacific Theater stressingplanning and strategy .United States Army, War Department.

Handbook on Japanese Military Forces . TM-E30-480. Washington, 1Oct44. A basic sourceon the organization and equipment of Japaneseland forces with useful detail on weaponscharacteristics and textbook tactics .

PART II

FLEET MARINE FORCE,PACIFIC

Official Documents

The evolution of amphibious doctrine fromthe mid-1930s to the end of World War IIdirectly reflects on the size and shape of theorganization employed to implement this doc-trine. In tracing the origin and developmentof the Fleet Marine Force, pertinent informa-tion was obtained from the official files atHeadquarters, Marine Corps .. The materialfound fruitful for this purpose included theAnnual Reports of the Commandant of the


Marine Corps which, for the years under con-sideration, faithfully mirrored the increasingsize and complexity of the organization . Theevolution of amphibious doctrine is furtherreflected in Marine Corps and Navy manualsdealing with landing operations, issued be .tween the two world wars, again notably dur .ing the 1930s. Information on the develop-ment of landing craft and amphibious vehi-cles was obtained from Headquarters MarineCorps files and those of the Department ofthe Navy Bureau of Ships. For a look at FleetMarine Force organization and plans shortlybefore the United States entered the war, the"Report of the General Board on Expansionof the U . S. Marine Corps," of 7 May 1941,in the custody of the Operational ArchivesBranch, Naval History Division, proved ofgreat value .

Additional information was obtained fromVolume I in this series, Part I, "Introductionto the Marine Corps," which thoroughly dis-cusses this subject matter and the resultingMarine Corps posture on the eve of WorldWar II .In connection with the parallel growth of

Marine aviation several sources proved im-portant. Among these, the Marine Corps Avia-tion Status Sheets, prepared by the Divisionof Aviation; an Administrative History ofAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ; the WarDiary, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, andthe War Diary of Aircraft, Fleet Marine ForcePacific made a major contribution in follow-ing the expansion of Marine Corps aviation inWorld War II .

Unofficial Sources

The official material enumerated above wasfurther supplemented with letters of commenton draft manuscripts obtained mostly fromretired officers connected with the Fleet Ma-rine Force following its establishment andthose who played a part in it during thesucceeding phases of its evolution. Many ofthe men who occupied leading positions dur-ing the two decades covered are no longeramong the living. Nevertheless, their views,as expressed in statements, directives, andother correspondence have trickled down to usand have been carefully considered in thedevelopment of conclusions. An unpublished


draft entitled "FMFPac Administrative His-tory-The Development of FMFPac" in thecustody of the Documentation Section, Refer-ence Branch of the Historical Division servedas a valuable guide in the reconstruction ofthe organizational development .


Robert D . Heinl, Jr . Soldiers o f the Sea-The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 .Annapolis : United States Naval Institute,1962. An outstanding labor of love by an au-thor who combines great writing skill with hisintricate knowledge of the Marine Corps sceneboth in peace and war . Not always with thegreatest objectivity, the narrative providescomprehensive coverage of the organizationand operations of the Marine Corps includ-ing its struggles afar and at home .

Once again, Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marinesand Amphibious War provided valuable infor-mation on early amphibious doctrine and the

evolution of the Fleet Marine Force .Clyde H. Metcalf . A History of the United

States Marine Corps . New York : G. P. Put-nam's Sons, 1939. A valuable historical workshowing the triumphs and tribulations of theMarine Corps in time of war and peace . Ofspecial interest in this context for its cover-age of the lean years following World War Ito the beginning buildup in the late 1930sthat foreshadowed World War II .John H. Russell, Jr., "Birth of the Fleet

Marine Force," U. S. Naval Institute Proceed-ings, v . 72, no. 515 (Jan/46) . An authoritativecontribution by a former Assistant Comman-dant and later Commandan who was closely in-volved with the Fleet Marine Force in itsearly years .General Holland M . Smith, "Development of

Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy," Ma-rine Corps Gazette, v . 38, nos . 6, 7, 8, 9, 10(Jun-Oct48) . A five-part article written bythe man who made a major contribution to im-plementation of amphibious doctrine and thedevelopment of the Fleet Marine Force .

Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coraland Brass . New York : Charles Scribner'sSons, 1949. An autobiography in which theauthor discussses his noteworthy militarycareer with valuable comments on the military

743

operations of World War II and his part inthe development of the FMFPac .

PART III

.THE PALAUS : GATEWAY TO THEPHILIPPINES

Official DocumentsThe seizure of the southern Palaus as final-

ly executed in Operation STALEMATE IIresulted in the neutralization of the entireisland group . The high level planning thatpreceded this operation, one of the most vi-cious and costly to be fought in the Pacific,spanned the period of nearly six months, dur-ing which time the progress of the war inthe Pacific forced several revisions in thebasic operation plan . The planning and ex-ecution of STALEMATE II resulted in awealth of documentation ranging from min-utes of the CCS and JCS to detailed planson the corps and division level. On the tac-tical level, considerable information was avail-able in the form of war diaries, appendices,and annexes including reports of general andspecial staff officers and sections, unit jour-nals, and after action reports. While thesevary greatly in scope and content, they never-theless provide a comprehensive basis for anoperational narrative, since all fields rangingfrom personnel, intelligence, and operations tologistics have been covered . If anything, thesheer quantity of material available from of-ficial sources, extending from the corps downto battalion level often made the selection ofpertinent data a difficult undertaking. In thoseinstances where a conflict existed between ac-counts on different reporting levels, the ver-sion of the unit most closely concerned withthe action described has been utilized .

Unofficial Documents

In addition to the voluminous official sources,a number of unofficial documents were avail-able in the form of letters that passed be-tween various high-level participants in Oper-ation STALEMATE II, particularly in thecorrespondence between Generals Geiger andRupertus, and General Vandegrift, then Com-mandant of the Marine Corps . These letters arepart of a personal correspondence file whichthe Commandant maintained with general and

744

flag officers, and which ultimately came to beplaced in the custody of the Archives of theHistorical Division .During the preparation of the historical

monograph, The Assault on Peleliu, the author,Major Frank 0 . Hough, prepared numerousnotes in the form of a card file . These cards,though no longer complete, contain substan-tial information on all phases of STALE-MATE II and may be examined through theDocumentation Section, Reference Branch, ofthe Historical Division .MajGen Oliver P . Smith. "Personal Narra-

tive." The personal journal of the AssistantDivision Commander of the 1st Marine Divi-sion covering the period from 28 January-1November 1944, including very perceptive com-ments on the Peleliu campaign .

After the draft chapters of the above mono-graph had been completed, they were circulatedamong the higher ranking participants in theoperation for critique and comment . The re-plies received brought to light much additionalinformation of varying quality, ranging fromoutstanding to average, which were assembledin a folder designated as the Peleliu CommentFile. To these comments, dating back to theearly 1950s, must be added a similar critiqueof the chapters in this volume. Both com-ment files are in the custody of the HistoricalDivision, which will make them available tothe serious researcher .

Japanese SourcesCompared to the wealth of official records

available from American sources, those fromthe Japanese side are at best sparse. Amonga large cache of documents captured on Sai-pan a number dealt with Japanese defensivepreparations in the Palaus . These were ex-ploited, translated in the rough, and madeavailable to the assault units prior to theinvasion. The interrogations of the relativelyfew prisoners of war taken on Peleliu alsoprovide a source of information, though in-telligence obtained in this way is of a con-flicting nature, since prisoners frequentlymade their disclosures with a view towardspleasing their captors, so that material thusobtained must be viewed with a grain of salt .

On a more professional level, the U .S. Ar-my monograph series prepared in Japan in


the postwar period offcers a wide range ofmaterial not to be found elsewhere, particu-larly Monograph No . 48, Central Pacific Oper-ations Record, v. II . A recently published of-ficial Japanese History of World War II num-bering several volumes undoubtedly containsmuch information that could fill existing gapsin the narrative of this volume. Unfortunately,publishing deadlines and lack of resources forthe translation and exploitation of this ma-terial prevented its utilization .In the years since the end of World War

II, a number of books dealing with opera-tions in the Central and Western Pacific havebeen published in Japan . Some of these, ofvarying degrees of quality, have been trans-lated into English and are listed below .


Once again Craven and Cate, Matterhornto Nagasaki ; Isely and Crowl, U.S . Marinesand Amphibious War ; Sherrod, History ofMarine Corps Aviation, and Smith, Approachto the Philippines constitute invaluable sources .Other works which shed considerable light onthe Peleliu operation are :LtCol Kimber H. Boyer. "The 3d Armored

Amphibian Battalion-Palau Operation, 15September-20 October 1944 ." Quantico :Marine Corps Schools, Amphibious WarfareSchool, Senior Course, 1948-49 . A brief his-torical tactical study of the Peleliu opera-tion on the battalion level .RAdm Worrall R. Carter . Beans, Bullets,

and Black Oil . Washington : Government Print-ing Office, 1953 . Official history of Navy logis-tics in the Pacific during World War II .

Burke Davis . Marine!-The Life of Lieuten-ant General Lewis B . (Chesty) Puller. Bos-ton : Little, Brown, and Company, 1962. Thestory of one of the great fighting men of theCorps and the experiences of the 1st Marines,which he commanded, in the Peleliu assault .

Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D . Coox . Kogun .Quantico : Marine Corps Association, 1959 .Translated from the Japanese, this accountof the plans and activities of the JapaneseArmy High Command during World War IIwas prepared by a former staff officer in theImperial General Headquarters .Maj Frank 0. Hough . The Assault on

Peleliu. Washington : Historical Division,


HQMC, 1950. This official monograph containsa detailed account of Operation STALEMATEincluding interesting appendices on Japanesecave positions and the role of Marine Corpsaviation on Peleliu .George P. Hunt. Coral Comes High . New

York : Harper and Brothers, 1946. An ac-count of Pacific operations including Peleliufrom the company commander's point of view .More human interest than history, but never-theless important in portraying the feelingsof men in battle .George McMillan . The Old Breed : A His-

tory of the First Marine Division in WorldWar II . Washington : Infantry Journal Press,1949. A unit history describing the perform-ance of the units and men of the 1st Division,without which the complete story of the Pe-leliu operation could not be told .MajGen Paul J. Mueller (USA), Chairman,

81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee,et al. The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division inWorld War II. Washington : Infantry JournalPress, 1948. A detailed account of the 81stDivision's operation on Angaur Island andthe subsequent employment of its regimentson Peleliu .Jeremiah A . O'Leary. "Hell in the Umur-

brogol," True Magazine, v. 17, no. 101 (Oct45) .Human interest story of the ferocious fightingthat took place on Peleliu .

PART IV

MARINES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Official DocumentsBeyond the employment of the V Amphibi-

ous Corps Artillery on Leyte, the story ofMarines in the Philippines is primarily oneof Marine aviation in support of U .S. Armyunits. A variety of sources were consultedin order to obtain a balanced product. On thestrategic level, heavy reliance was placed onminutes and records of the Combined andJoint Chiefs of Staff, reports, plans, and of-ficial correspondence on the CinCPac level . Onthe tactical level, records of the U . S. SixthArmy proved valuable for the Leyte and LuzonCampaigns, while Eighth Army records wereconsulted for a reconstruction of operations inthe Southern Philippines. The bulk of thismaterial, including war diaries and journals

745

and after action reports of the U. S. Armycorps and divisions involved are in the cus-today of the World War II Records Division,NARS, Suitland, Maryland .Records of the Marine Corps consulted

are predominantly those of aviation units onthe aircraft group and squadron level . Thereis great variance in the coverage of eventsas to depth and scope between units, whichresulted in gaps that had to be bridged throughthe use of both official and unofficial publish-ed works .


Upon completion of a historical monographon Marine Aviation in the Philippines, thedraft manuscript was circulated for com-ment and critique to interested parties whohad taken part in the operation . Many ofthese individuals responded and their com-ments have been cited throughout this sec-tion. Similarly, the draft chapters of thisvolume were sent to key participants and tothe historical agencies of the other services,and the replies received have been used as ap-plicable in revising the narrative . All suchcomments are retained in the files of theDocumentation Section, Reference Branch ofthe Historical Division .

By no means all of the material uncoveredby draft comments has been used in this bookor in the historical monograph that pre-ceded it. The files contain much unpublishedinformation that may be of value to thefuture researcher or student of this phaseof Marine aviation activities, particularly withregard to the doctrine of Marine close airsupport that evolved from childhood to adoles-cence during this phase of the war .

Japanese SourcesOnce again, the number of official Japanese

sources is quite limited when compared tothe U. S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corpsrecords available dealing with this subjectmatter. Nevertheless, the OCMH monographseries does provide information in its Philip-pines Operations Record, Phases II and III,that bridges the gap to some extent . Additionalinformation is available from 35th ArmyOperations, 1944-45 and the interrogation ofsenior Japanese commanders in the postwar

746

era. On the higher level of command, Mono-graph No. 45, History of the Army Section,Imperial General Staff, 1941-45 provides valu-able clues in portraying the strategy em-ployed by the Japanese High Command dur-ing this period of the war .

Books and PeriodicalsIn addition to the overall sources, particu-

larly the previously cited Morison volumes onLeyte and The Liberation of the Philippines,Craven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn toNagasaki, and Sherrod, History of MarineCorps Aviation in World War II, the follow-ing were extensively consulted :Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. Marine Aviation

in the Philippines. Washington : Historical Di-vision, HQMC, 1951 . An official monograph de-picting Marine close support of Army unitsin the Philippines, outlining in detail thedevelopment of the Marine doctrine of closeair suport . The narrative covers the entireperiod of liberation of the Philippines fromthe Leyte landings to the end of the war .John A. DeChant . Devilbirds : The Story of

United States Marine Corps Aviation in WorldWar II . New York : Harper and Brothers,1947. Relatively brief but good description ofMarine dive bomber operations on Luzon .M. Hamlin Cannon . Leyte : The Return to

the Philippines-The War in the Pacific-United States Army in World War II . Wash-ington : Office of the Chief of Military His-tory, Department of the Army, 1953. Excel-lent account and official Army history of therecapture of Leyte, the first island to beliberated in the Philippines. Useful as a back-ground for the movements and operations ofthe VAC artillery on Leyte .

General Robert L. Eichelberger and Mil-ton Mackaye . Our Jungle Road to Tokyo . NewYork : The Viking Press, 1950. The marchacross the Southwest Pacific as seen throughthe eyes of the Commanding General of ICorps and subsequently of the Eighth Army.Based on an earlier series in the SaturdayEvening Post, the volume furnishes interest-ing details on Eighth Army operations in thePhilippines .Frank O. Hough . The Island War : The

United States Marine Corps in the Pacific .


Philadelphia and New York : J. B. LippincottCompany, 1947 . Relatively brief descriptionof Marine aviation activities in the Philip-pines is of primary importance in this con-text .

General George C. Kenney . General KenneyReports. New York : Duel], Sloan, and Pearce,1949. The personal history of the Commanderof the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pa-cific . A sizable portion of this book deals withthe Philippines and thus serves as valuablebackground material for this section .Capt Samuel H. McAloney, "Is Air Sup-

port Effective?" Marine Corps Gazette, v . 29,No. 11 (Nov45) . One of the members of anair liaison party discusses his experiences inobtaining close air support for Army troopson Luzon .Robert Ross Smith . Triumph in the Philip-

pines-The War in the Pacific-United StatesArmy in World War II . Washington : Officeof the Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1963 . The official Army historydealing with the liberation of the Central andSouthern Philippines was of great value forproviding the setting in which Marine avia-tion operated during the final phase of WorldWar II .Maj Bertram C . Wright, USA . The First

Cavalry Division In World War II. Tokyo :Toppan Printing Company, Ltd ., 1947. Thisdivision history furnishes an excellent accountof the drive that culminated in the liberationof Manila and the support given to the divi-sion by Marine aviators .

PART V

MARINE AVIATION IN THE WESTERNPACIFIC

Official Documents

The discussion of Marine aviation activitiesin the Western Pacific is largely based onthe records of the units concerned . Includedin the documents are special action reports,war diaries, and informal combat reports onthe wing, aircraft group, and squadron level .It should be remembered that the type of in-formation contained in the official documentsis but a reflection of the mission entrusted


to Marine aviation in the Central and WesternPacific, which in 1944 and almost to theend of the war consisted primarily of neutral-izing Japanese bases and involved little ofthe close air support envisioned by Marineplanners and subsequently used in the Philip-pines in support of Army units . There is alsoa wide variance in quality and detail of cover-age, depending on the skill of the personnel as-signed to the task and the value placed by thecommand on the importance of maintaining of-ficial records . Nevertheless, despite occasionalgaps, the overall coverage is adequate to per-mit a comprehensive view of the part playedby Marine aviation in the trek of the Ameri-can forces across the Pacific . All of the offi-cial records used are in the custody of theWorld War II Records Division, NationalArchives and Records Service, Suitland, Mary-land and may be obtained from that agency, orthrough the Historical Division, HQMC .


There is no body of letters and interviewsin the Marine Corps Historical Division ar-chives relating to air operations against thebypassed islands in the Central and WesternPacific as there is in the case of other cam-paigns which have been covered in historicalmonographs. A few pertinent letters amongthe papers acquired from the Sherrod aviationhistory project are of limited value to a his-tory of a wide scope .

During the preparation of this volume, thetwo chapters comprising this section were sentout to a number of individuals who had par-ticipated in the operations covered therein .In response, numerous written comments werereceived to round out the strategical and tac-tical picture . Certain key individuals in theircomments helped to clarify command prob-lems that were encountered during this phaseof the war in the area involved . Generally, asseen from the vantage point of time and ex-perience, the comments received proved an in-valuable source of information to supplementthe material found in official sources.

Japanese SourcesJapanese records used in this account con-

sisted primarily of monographs touching upon

747

enemy air operations and defensive prepara-tions in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus .Once again, an English translation of the of-ficial Japanese Army history of World WarII would have been invaluable, since officialWorld War II records dealing with this sub-ject matter were not available . Much of theinformation from the Japanese side was ob-tained from postwar interrogations of Japa-nese officials contained in the USSBS Inter-rogations, and the postwar writings of Japa-nese who had participated in these operations .

Books and PeriodicalsValuable background material for this sec-

tion was obtained from the previously citedIsely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibi-ous War ; King and Whitehill, Fleet AdmiralKing ; Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation inWorld War II ; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; andMorison, Victory in the Pacific . In additionto these, the following proved valuable in thepreparation of this sectionMajor Carl W. Hoffman. Saipan-The Be-

ginning of the End . Washington : HistoricalDivision, HQMC, 1950. A detailed historicalmonograph dealing with the Saipan opera-tion, of value as background material for theestablishment of an airfield that was to be-come of vital importance in the conduct of airoperations in the Pacific .Major Carl W. Hoffman . The Seizure of

Tinian. Washington : Historical Division,HQMC, 1951. Excellent account of the Tinianoperation, which furnishes valuable back-ground material for the subsequent use of theisland as a base from which the major at-tacks against the Home Islands were launchedthat brought an end to the war.Major Orlan R. Lodge. The Recapture of

Guam . Washington : Historical Branch, G-3Division, HQMC, 1954 . The official MarineCorps monograph concerning the Guam oper-ation, furnishing valuable background ma-terial for an appreciation of the air situationin the Central Pacific during the final phaseof World War II .Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Horikoshi, and

Martin Caidin . Zero! New York : E . P. Dut-ton & Company, Inc ., 1956. The title of this

748

well-researched and written work is mislead-ing, in that its scope goes far beyond a dis-cussion of the well known Mitsubishi fighter,its development, and its employment . Thebook dwells on Japanese air operations in thePacific throughout the war and provides avaluable insight into Japanese internal andforeign policy during the war years .

PART VI

IWO JIMA

Official Documents

Operation DETACHMENT probably re-ceived closer study in its inception and plan-ning, more detailed analysis by the numerousstaff sections of headquarters of varying levelsfor historical purposes, and extensive cover-age by the news and information media thanany of the Pacific amphibious assaults pre-viously executed in World War II . Since thiswas an all-Marine operation involving threedivisions at the very threshold of Japan, infact against a target administratively a partof the Home Islands, the importance attachedto DETACHMENT is reflected both in thevolume and quality of the available material .Where gaps are readily apparent in otheroperations, none appear in this instance ; tothe contrary, the data available for researchon Iwo Jima tends to be overwhelming . In-stead of being compelled to bridge gaps, theresearcher is nearly overwhelmed with a pro-fusion of action reports, unit diaries and jour-nals, operation plans and orders, dispatches,letters, and preoperation studies by units thattook part in the campaign. Mindful of criticismvoiced as to excessive casualties after Tarawa,every precaution was taken at Iwo Jima toavoid any gap in the planning of the opera-tion. This care is reflected in every facet ofthe planning phase, from the amount of intel-ligence collected to the evacuation of thewounded and burial of the dead .

In order to avoid repetition and to obtaina balanced account of the operation, thereports of the higher echelons were used toreconstruct the "big picture," while on thelower level the records of the unit most di-rectly involved in the action were utilized .


In addition to the voluminous records deal-ing with Operation DETACHMENT, the verylength and difficulty of the campaign gaverise to much soul-searching on the divisionand corps level, which is reflected in verydetailed reports on the performance of menand equipment under the conditions peculiarto the operation, as well as on organizationalproblems encountered. All of the official docu-ments pertaining to Operation DETACH-MENT are in the custody of the World WarII Records Division, National Archives andRecords Service, Suitland, Maryland .


The vast lode of official material is supple-mented by a large quantity of informationfrom unofficial sources. Thus, in the course ofpreparing the official monograph Iwo Jima-Amphibious Epic, its author, Lieutenant Colo-nel Whitman S. Bartley, requested commentsfrom individuals who had taken part in thecampaign . In response, approximately 175participants in the operation contributed tothe finished product through written commentsor personal interviews . The information thusobtained was used to supplement or corrobo-rate the hundreds of documents consulted dur-ing the preparation of the monograph . In thesame way, valuable information was receivedthat had never found its way into the officialrecords, though time and space did not per-mit all of the personal recollections and anec-dotes to be incorporated into the narrative .

Similarly, comments from participants inthe operation were solicited upon completionof the draft chapters of this work . The pas-sage of time had taken its toll among thesurvivors of the operation, but neverthelessmuch additional information was obtained inthis fashion which otherwise might never havefound its way into these pages . All of thecomments, both for the historical monographand for this volume repose in the files of theDocumentation Section, Reference Branch ofthe Historical Division .

Japanese Sources

There is some variety in the Japanesesources available for Operation DETACH-MENT. First, a number of enemy documents,


diaries, and letters were seized in the courseof the campaign, which were translated, forthe most part on the division level, and eitherfiled with VAC or forwarded to higher head-quarters. Additional information on the de-fense of Iwo Jima was obtained through theinterrogation of prisoners of war . For themost part, little information beyond that ofa limited tactical nature could be thus ob-tained with the exception that one of the pub-lishers of one of Japan's major dailies was,for reasons unknown, serving on Iwo Jimain an enlisted status . He was well versed inthe realm of the big picture of the Japanesewar effort and civilian morale in the HomeIslands, and from this vantage point wasable to contribute much to an overall appraisalof conditions in Japan during this phase ofthe war .

Time and resources did not permit thetranslation and use of the recently publishedofficial Japanese History of World War II,which, beyond doubt, would have contributedmuch to balancing the narrative from theenemy side of the hill. Comments by the WarHistory Office of the Defense Agency of Japanalso provided worthwhile information that wasincorporated into the narrative .Help in bringing to life the major Japa-

nese participants in the Iwo Jima campaignarrived from a totally unexpected source, andit is in this respect that the Iwo Jima chap-ters differ from others in this volume . Inwriting an excellent book on the Iwo opera-tion, which will be cited below, Richard F .Newcomb had numerous interviews conductedin Japan with members of the families ofthe long-deceased Japanese commanders, veter-ans of the campaign in Japan, and others whoin some way were either connected with theseindividuals or the planning for the defenseof the island . In making this voluminous fileavailable to the Historical Division for usein this volume, Mr. Newcomb made a majorcontribution to removing the shadow of ano-nymity that cloaks these men who fought hardand gave all for their country. This materialhas been alternately referred to in the narra-tive as the Newcomb File or Newcomb Notes ;a photostatic copy of it reposes in the archivesof the Historical Division .


The scope, size, and public awareness of theIwo Jima operation have resulted in muchpublished material on this campaign. As aresult, only those sources consulted on a largescale are listed below. Valuable backgroundmaterial was contained in the previously citedCraven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn toNagasaki ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines andAmphibious War ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ;Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea ; Smith and Finch,Coral and Brass ; Mills, The Forrestal Diaries ;and Morison, Victory in the Pacific .Robert A. Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia .

The Third Marine Division . Washington : In-fantry Journal Press, 1948. One of the divi-sion histories published in the wake of WorldWar II. Of primary interest in this contextbecause of coverage of the Iwo Jima operationand the division's part in it .Howard M. Conner . The Spearhead-The

World War II History of the 5th Marine Divi-sion . Washington : Infantry Journal Press,1950. An excellent account of the first majoroperation in which the division took part . Sincethis was the only campaign for the division,the author was able to devote more detail tothis narrative than is the case with the his-tories of the other two divisions on Iwo. Hehas put this advantage to good use .

T. Grady Gallant . The Friendly Dead . NewYork : Doubleday and Company, Inc ., 1964 .A participant's account of the horrors of thebattle that saw heroism, gallantry, and brutaldeath on an unprecedented scale .

Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr . "Target Iwo," U. S.Naval Institute Proceedings, v . 89, no. 7 (Jul1963) . Well written account of the factors af-fecting the preliminary bombardment of theobjective, prepared by one who was intimatelyinvolved in this aspect of the operation .Capt Raymond Henri. Iwo Jima-Spring-

board to Final Victory . New York : U. S. Cam-era Publishing Corporation, 1945 . Pictorialaccount with brief narrative of the Iwo cam-paign, outstanding for its pictorial coverage .Capt Raymond Henri et al. The U . S. Ma-

rines on Iwo Jima . Washington : The InfantryJournal, 1945 . The operation as seen throughthe eyes of five official Marine combat corre-

749

750

spondents. An interesting human drama ac-count of one of history's large, impersonalbattles . Also contains numerous interestingphotographs of the action .

Clive Howard and Joe Whitley . One DamnedIsland After Another . Chapel Hill : The Uni-versity of North Carolina Press, 1946. Thehistory of the U . S. Army Seventh Air Force,written mostly from a public relations pointof view. Nevertheless of value to this nar-rative because of its account of pre-invasionbombings of Iwo Jima .Robert Leckie. Strong Men Armed. New

York : Random House, 1962 . Well illustratedhuman interest account of the Marines inWorld War II ; its coverage of Iwo Jima addedconsiderable flavor to the narrative .

Capt Clifford P. Morehouse . The Iwo JimaOperation . Washington : Historical Division,HQMC, 1946. Detailed historical monographon the Iwo Jima operation containing someinformation on units and casualties not cover-ed elsewhere .Richard F. Newcomb . Iwo Jima . New York,

Chicago, and San Francisco : Holt, Rinehart,and Winston, 1965 . An outstanding reconstruc-tion of the battle as seen from both sides,covering both the operational aspects and thehuman side. This book and the author's notesmade a major contribution to the writing ofthis volume .Carl W. Proehl . The Fourth Marine Division

in World War II. Washington : Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1946. Well written and illustratedaccount of the division's exploits in WorldWar II, with good coverage of the Iwo Jimacampaign . The color photography is outstand-ing and the map work superior .

Saburo Sakai, Martin Caidin, and Fred Sai-to . Samurai! New York : Ballantine Books,1957. An account by one of Japan's air acesof his experiences on Iwo prior to the in-vasion. A much needed bit of writing thathelped to balance the account of the action .Col Donald M . Weller. "Salvo-Splash!-

The Development of NGF Support in WorldWar II ." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,pt 1, v. 80, no . 8 (Aug/54) . Valuable accountof the experiences of a Marine officer whoplayed a leading part in this aspect of Oper-ation DETACHMENT .


CONCLUSIONS

Official Documents

The period covered by the ground operationsin this volume extends from mid-September1944 to the end of March 1945 . The Peleliuand Iwo Jima campaigns which fall withinthis time frame were not isolated operations ;momentous events were under way in othertheaters of operations that eventually pavedthe way for final victory. The road to Peleliuand Iwo Jima had begun as a tortuous paththat led from Guadalcanal to Tarawa . Thelessons learned on each island and paid forwith the blood of countless Americans pavedthe way for the seizure of the Marshalls andMarianas, which in turn served as spring-boards for the continued advance into the west-ern Pacific .

In itself, this volume shows neither thebeginning of the war nor its conclusion . Thebloody battles fought in two major operationswere but signposts pointing the way to theheart of the enemy's defenses . With the in-troduction of new defensive tactics by theJapanese and progress made in the art andscience of amphibious warfare by the Marines,Peleliu was to become a struggle of endurance,Iwo Jima a contest of the will . Beyond theimmediate tactical results of these operations,there were political overtones, both in Japan,the United States, and the Soviet Union .Progress of the war in the Pacific influencedAllied operations in Europe, where events,in turn, had a measurable effect on Alliedresources in the Pacific .

Since the concluding part of this volumewas designed to bring the two major opera-tions described into balance with the big pic-ture of the war, the sources, of necessity, hadto be obtained from the policy-making level .These include the records of the Combinedand Joint Chiefs of Staff as cited in previ-ously published official histories, as well asthe minutes of such high-level and far-reach-ing conferences as those held at Teheran inNovember 1943 and Quebec in September 1944,not to mention the important Roosevelt-Nimitz-MacArthur meeting in Hawaii in late July ofthe same year. The Iwo Jima campaign nearlycoincided with the Yalta Conference, which


set the tone for the overall strategic concept'of the war, including that phase beyond theunconditional surrender of Germany to theultimate surrender of Japan to be broughtabout in cooperation with other Pacific powersand the Soviet Union .


The brevity of this part of the volume didnot permit the discussion of foreign policy andthe political overtones dictating strategy dur-ing the phase of the war to be covered in morethan very general terms . The unofficial docu-ments pertinent in this context are the numer-ous comments received on the draft chapters ofthis volume, as well as some of those sub-mitted on Volume III of this series, CentralPacific Drive and Volume V, Victory and Oc-cupation. All of these comments are filed inthe archives of the Historical Division .Books and PeriodicalsAmong the books most widely used in the

preparation of this section were the previouslycited Cline, Washington Command Post ;Craven and Cate, The Pacific-Matterhorn toNagasaki ; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Hal-sey's Story ; Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and

751

Amphibious War ; Hayashi and Coox, Kogun ;Leahy, I Was There, and Morison, Victory inthe Pacific. In addition, the following contrib-uted substantially to this section .Hugh M. Cole . The Ardennes : The Battle

of the Bulge-The U. S. Army in World WarII . Washington : Office of the Chief of theMilitary History, Department of the Army,1965. An excellent account of the last majorGerman counteroffensive of the war with re-sulting implications for the defeat of Ger-many.Benis M. Frank and Henry I . Shaw, Jr .

Victory and Occupation-History of U . S. Ma-rine Corps Operations in World War II, v . V .Washington : Historical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1968. The official Marine Corps historyof the Okinawa campaign and the occupationof Japan and North China .

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C . Nalty, andEdwin T. Turnbladh . Central Pacific Drive-History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations inWorld War II, v. III . Washington : HistoricalBranch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1966 . The officialMarine Corps history of the campaigns in theGilberts, Marshalls, and Mariannas, whichformed the basis for continued operations inthe Western Pacific .

Guide to Abbreviations

Corps Artillery Staff Officer, ATPersonnel (See G-1)

ATCArmy twin-engine attackplane, the Douglas Havoc Avn

Antiaircraft

AWSAntiaircraft Artillery

B-17Army Air ForcesAfter Action ReportAircraft Carriers

B-24Assistant Chief of StaffAir Defense Command ; As- B-25sistant Division Comman-der

AdmAdmiralAdminAdministrativeAdvAdvanceAFAir ForceAFBAir Force BaseAFPOAArmy Forces, Pacific Ocean

AreasAirDelAir DeliveryAirFMFPac . . . . Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force,

PacificAKCargo vesselAKACargo ship, attackAlexAlexandriaALPAir Liaison PartyAmmoAmmunitionAmphibAmphibian ; AmphibiousAmtracAmphibian tractorAN/VRCArmy-Navy Vehicle, Radio

CommunicationAnxAnnexAPArmor-piercingAPAAttack transportAPDHigh-speed transportAppAppendixArArmyARAction ReportArmdAmph . . . . Armored AmphibianArtyArtilleryAssltAssaultAsstAssistant

A-1 (etc)

A-20

AAAAAAAFAAR

752

. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AcftCarrsAC of SADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AntitankAir Transport Command

(Army)AviationAir Warning SquadronArmy four-engine bomber,

the Boeing Flying For-tress

Army four-engine bomber,the Consolidated Liberator

Army twin-engine bomber,the North American Mit-chell

Army twin-engine bomber,the Martin Marauder

Army four-engine bomber,the Boeing Super-Fortress

Browning Automatic RifleBatteryBattleship

"Betty"Japanese two-engine Mitsu-bishi bomber

Brigadier GeneralBattalion Landing TeamBattalionBombardmentBranchBrigadeBureauBulletinBureau of Medicine and Sur-

geryBuPersBureau of Naval PersonnelC-1 (etc)Corps Staff Officer, Person-

nel (See G-1)C-47Army twin-engine transport,

the Douglas SkytrainC-54Army four-engine transport,

-the Douglas SkymasterCalCaliberCAPCombat Air PatrolCaptCaptainCASClose Air Support

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B-26

B-29

BARBtryBB

BGenBLTBn

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BombBr . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .BrigBu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BulBuMed

APPENDIX B

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

CASCUCommander, Air SupportControl Unit

"Catalina"PBY patrol bomber made byConsolidated-Vultee

CavCavalryOCSCombined Chiefs of StaffCdrCommanderCECCivil Engineer CorpsCenPacCentral PacificCGCommanding GeneralChapChapterCinCAFPac .. . . Commander in Chief, Army

Forces in the PacificCinCPacCommander in Chief, Pacific

FleetCinCPOACommander in Chief, Pacific

Ocean AreasCinCUSCommander in Chief, United

States FleetCmcentimeterCMCCommandant of the Marine

CorpsCMCSCommandant, Marine Corps

SchoolsCmtCommentCNOChief of Naval OperationsCOCommanding OfficerCoCompanyCofSChief of StaffColColonelCom

Commander (Units)ComCenPacFor Commander, Central Pacific

ForcesComdCommandCominChCommander in Chief, U . S .

FleetConfConfidentialConstConstructionCPCommand PostCplCorporalCTCombat TeamCTFCommander Task ForceCTGCommander Task GroupCVAircraft carrierCVEEscort carrierCWOChief Warrant OfficerDDiaryD-1 (etc)Division staff officer, Person-

nel (See G-1)DADepartment of the Army"Dauntless" . . . . SBD, scout-bomber made by

Douglas

DDT

DEDefDepDetDETACHMENT"Devastator" . .

EnclEngrEnlEvacEx

F4F

FAdm

Fld

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ExOExTrpsF-1

F2A

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F5A

F6F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .FAirWestFAirWingFDCFEAFFEC

. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .

Flat . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .FltFMFFO . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

753

Insecticide made of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane

Destroyer EscortDefenseDepotDetachmentIwo Jima OperationTBD, torpedo-bomber madeby Douglas

DirectorDispatchDivisionDied of WoundsDatedAmphibian truckEchelonEditor ; editedEnclosureEngineerEnlistedEvacuationExecutiveExecutive OfficerExpeditionary TroopsForce staff officer, Personnel

(See G-1)Marine single-engine fighter,the Brewster "Buffalo"

Navy-Marine single-enginefighter, the GrummanWildcat

Navy-Marine single-enginefighter, the Chance-VoughtCorsair

Army photo plane version ofthe P-38

Navy-Marine single-enginefighter, the GrummanHellcat

Fleet AdmiralFleet Air, West CoastFleet Air WingFire direction centerFar East Air ForcesFar East CommandFieldMarshall Islands OperationFlotillaFleetFleet Marine ForceField order; forward ob-

server

DirDispDivDOWDtdDUKWEchEd

754

FRCFederal Records CenterFSCCFire Support Coordination

CenterFwdForwardG-1Division (or larger unit) Per-

sonnel Office(r)G-2Division (or larger unit) J2F

Intelligence Office(r)G-3Division (or larger unit)

Operations and Training JANACOffice (r)

G-4Division (or larger unit) JANISLogistics Office (r)

Garrison Forces

JASCOGeneral BoardGuard

JCSGeneral

JICPOAGeneral HeadquartersGeneral Order

JnlGovernment Printing Office

"Judy"GndGround

Group Pacific

JWPCGroup

"Kate"General Services Administra-

tion"Hamp"Japanese Mitsubishi fighter,

GarForG.BGdGenGHQGOGPO

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

GroPacGruGSA . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

identical to "Zero"HdHeadHEHigh ExplosiveHIPHigh FrequencyH&IHarassing and InterdictionHistHistory; historicalHistDivHistorical DivisionHMSHis Majesty's ShipHospHospitalHowHowitzerHqHeadquartersHQMCHeadquarters, United States

Marine CorpsHRSHistorical Reference SectionH&SHeadquarters and ServiceIGHQImperial General Headquar-

tersILIACIII Amphibious CorpsIJAImperial Japanese ArmyIJNImperial Japanese NavyIMACI Marine Amphibious CorpsIMBIndependent Mixed BrigadeIMRIndependent Mixed RegimentInInch(es)InclIncluding ; Inclosure (Army)

InfantryInformation

IntelligenceInterrogationInterviewIsland Command

Navy-Marine Corps single-engine amphibian, theGrumman Duck

Joint Army-Navy Assess-ment Committee

Joint Army-Navy Intelli-gence Study

Joint Assault Signal Com-pany

Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint Intelligence Center,

Pacific Ocean AreasJournalJapanese single-engine Aichibomber

Joint War Plans CommitteeJapanese single-engine at-

tack aircraftKIAKilled in ActionLbpoundLCCLanding Craft, ControlLCILanding Craft, InfantryLCI(G)Landing Craft, Infantry

(Gunboat)LCMLanding Craft, Mechanized

or MediumLCSLanding Craft, SupportLCTLanding Craft, TankLCVPLanding Craft, Vehicle and

PersonnelLDLine of DepartureLFASCULanding Force Air Support

Control UnitLight Machine GunLocated; locationLogistics; logistical

LSDLanding Ship, DockLSMLanding Ship, MediumLSTLanding Ship, TankLST(H)Landing Ship, Tank

(Hospital)LSVLanding Ship, VehicleLtLieutenantLtColLieutenant ColonelLtGenLieutenant General

InfInfoIntelInterIntvwIsCom

LMGLocLog

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .


LtrLVT

Letter NCBLanding Vehicle, Tracked NCO

LVT(A)Landing Vehicle, Tracked

N.d .(Armored)

M-1Standard issue rifle, U . S .,World War II

Medium Tank, U . S .Light Tank, U. S .

MAGMarine Aircraft GroupMAGsZamMarine Aircraft Groups,

ZamboangaMAHAMarine Aircraft, Hawaiian

AreaMajMajor

Major GeneralMarine(s)Marine Fleet Air, West CoastMarine Air Support GroupMarine Aircraft WingMarine Air Warning GroupMarine Aircraft Wings, Paci-

ficMarine Base Defense Air-

craft GroupMarine Base Defense Air-craft Wing

MCMedical Corps (Navy)Marine Corps Air Station

MedicalMemorandum

Marine Ground Control In-tercept Squadron

MIAMissing in ActionMIAPDMissing in Action, Presumed

DeadMIDMilitary Intelligence Divi-

sionMISMilitary Intelligence Sec-

tionMiscMiscellaneousMLRMain Line of ResistanceMmMillimeterMovMovementMPMilitary PoliceMphMiles per hourMSManuscriptMsgMessageMTMotor TransportNARSNational Archives and

Records ServiceNavNavy; naval

M-4M-5

MajGenMarMarFAirWest . .MASGMAWMAWGMAWPac

MBDAG

MBDAW

MCASMedMemoMGCIS

.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . ... . . ..

Naval Construction BattalionNoncommissioned officer

No dateNDNavy DepartmentNGFNaval GunfireNHDNaval History DivisionNoNumberNorSolsNorthern Solomons0Officer; order0-1Phase line designation0•BOrder of BattleObiObjectiveOCMHOffice of the Chief of Military

HistoryOfcOfficeOICOfficer in ChargeOpOperationOPObservation PostOPlanOperation PlanOrdOrdnance

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OrgOrganization(al)OS2UNavy single-engine float

plane, the Chance-VoughtKingfisher

OYNavy-Marine single-engineobservation plane, the Con-solidated-Vultee Sentinel

P ., ppPage; pagesP-38Army twin-engine fighter,

.the Lockheed LightningArmy single-engine fighter,the Bell Aircobra

Army single-engine fighter,the Curtiss Warhawk

Army single-engine fighter,the Republic Thunderbolt

Army single-engine fighter,the North American Mus-tang

P-61Army twin-engine nightfighter, the Northrop BlackWidow

PacPacificPackHowPack HowitzerPBPatrol BoatPBJNavy-Marine

twin-enginebomber, the North Amer-ican Mitchell

PBMNavy twin-engine seaplane,the Martin Mariner

PBONavy twin-engine bomber,the Lockheed Hudson

P-39

P-40

P-47

P-51

755

756

PB2YNavy twin-engine seaplane,the Consolidated Coronado

PB4YNavy-Marine

four-enginebomber, the ConsolidatedLiberator

PBY-5ANavy-Marine two-engine pa-trol bomber with amphi-bian boat hull, the Con-solidated Catalina

PerPersonnel ; PeriodicPFCPrivate First ClassPhibAmphibious; Amphibious

ForcesPhibsPacAmphibious Forces, Pacific

FleetPionPioneerPltPlatoonPOAPacific Ocean AreasPOWPrisoner of WarPrelimPreliminaryProvProvisionalPtParts(s)PubPublicPvtPrivateR-1 (etc)Regimental Staff Officer

(See G-1)R4DNavy-Marine

twin-enginetransport, the DouglasSkytrain

R5DNavy-Marine

four-enginetransport, the DouglasSkymaster

RAAFRoyal Australian Air ForceRBReference BranchRecReceptionReconReconnaissanceRecsRecordsRegtRegimentReinfReinforcedRevRevisedRJRoad JunctionRLTRegimental Landing TeamRNZAFRoyal New Zealand Air ForceRptReportS-1 (etc)Battalion (or regimental)

Staff Officer, Personnel(See G-1)

SARSpecial Action ReportSBDNavy-Marine single-engine

dive bomber, the DouglasDauntless

Signal CorpsScoutSection

SecNavSecretary of the NavySepSeparateSerSerialServServiceSgtSergeantSgtMajSergeant

SignalSituationMarine Service

SCRSetSee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SigSitSMSSNLFSpecial Naval Landing ForceSoPacSouth PacificSpecSpecialSptSupportSqdSquadSqdnSquadronS.SU. S. Merchant ShipSTALEMATE . . Palaus OperationStratStrategicSubjSubjectSumSummarySupSupport; SupplySupplSupplementSvcServiceSWPASouthwest Pacific AreaT/ATable of AllowancesTacTacticalTAFTactical Air ForceTAGOThe Adjutant General's OfficeTBFNavy-Marine single-engine

torpedo bomber, the Grum-man Avenger

TBMNavy-Marine single-enginetorpedo bomber, the Gen-eral Motors Avenger

TBSTalk Between Ships RadioTBXMedium-powered field radio

. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .


SB-24Army night bombing versionof the B-24

SB2CNavy-Marine single-enginedive bomber, the Curtiss-Wright Helldiver

SB2UNavy-Marine single enginedive bomber, the Vought-Sikorsky Vindicator

SCAPSupreme Commander AlliedPowers

SCATSouth Pacific Combat AirTransport Command

Major

Radio

Squadron


TBYPortable low-power fieldradio

TCSVehicle mounted, high fre-quency radio

T/ETable of EquipmentTFTask ForceTGTask GroupT.HTerritory of HawaiiTIOTarget Information OfficerTkTankTMTechnical ManualTNTTrinitro-toluol, a high ex-

plosiveT/OTable of OrganizationTOTheater of OperationsTOTTime on TargetTQMTransport QuartermasterTracTractorTransTransportTransDivTransport DivisionTrkTruckTrngTrainingTrpsTroopsUUnitUDTUnderwater Demolitions

TeamUSAUnited States ArmyUSAFUnited States Air ForceUSAFCPUnited States Army Forces,

Central Pacific AreaUSAFPOAUnited States Army Forces,

Pacific Ocean AreasUSMCUnited States Marine CorpsUSNUnited States NavyUSNIUnited States Naval InstituteUSNRUnited States Naval ReserveUSSUnited States ShipUSSBSUnited

States

StrategicBombing Survey

USSRUnion of Soviet SocialistRepublics

VVolumeVACV Amphibious Corps

757

VAdmVice AdmiralVBNavy Dive Bomber SquadronVehVehicleVFNavy Fighter SquadronVHFVery High FrequencyVicVicinity"Vindicator" . . Scout bomber, the Vought-

Sikorsky SB2UVLRVery Long RangeVMBMarine Bomber SquadronVMDMarine Photographic

SquadronVMFMarine Fighter SquadronVMF(N)Marine Night Fighter

SquadronVMJMarine Utility SquadronVMOMarine Observation SquadronVIMRMarine Transport SquadronVMSBMarine Scout Bomber

SquadronVMTBMarine Torpedo Bomber

SquadronVPNavy Patrol SquadronVSNavy Scouting SquadronW-1 (etc)Wing Staff Officer, Personnel

(See G-1)WarDWar DiaryWDWar DepartmentWesWestWesLandFor . . Western Landing ForceWIAWounded in Action"Wildcat"Navy-Marine single-engine

fighter made by GrummanWOWarrant OfficerWPWhite PhosphorusWpnsWeaponsWWWorld War"Zeke"Japanese single-engine Mit-

subishi fighter, also knownas Zero .

"Zero.'Same as aboveZofAZone of Action

APPENDIX C

UNIT SYMBOLS

758K.W. White

Military Map Symbols

UNIT SIZE

UNIT SYMBOLS EXAMPLES

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited 8 Septo those coming within the scope of this book,and those forecasting events to be treated inthe volume to follow .

19355 JunAviation Section of the Head-

quarters staff is takenfrom the Division of Oper-ations and Training and es-tablished as an indepen-dent section in the Officeof the Commandant .

9 JulMarine Corps Schools atQuantico, Virginia, pub- 50ctlishes the Tentative Land-ing Operations Manual .

1 SepHeadquarters, Fleet MarineForce, is transferred fromQuantico, Virginia, to SanDiego, California .

19361 AprDivision of Aviation estab-

lished at Headquarters Ma-rine Corps .

193727 Jan The 1st and 2d Marine Bri-

gades, the U . S. Army 1stExpeditionary Brigade, andthe 1st and 2d Marine Air-craft

Groups

conduct JunFleet Exercise No . 3 nearSan Diego, California .

19381 JulMarine Corps Reserve recon-

stituted to consist of aFleet Marine Corps Re-serve, an Organized Mari-ne Corps Reserve, and aVolunteer Marine CorpsReserve .

19391 SepWorld War II breaks out in

Europe .

lNov

. . . . . . . . . . . .. .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .

. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX D

The President proclaims a

each .Secretary of -the Navy putsall organized Marine re-serve ground units and avi-ation squadrons on shortnotice for call to activeduty .

Fleet.First Joint Training Force

(JTF-1), consisting of the1st Marine Division, the1st Marine Aircraft Group,and the U. S. Army 1stInfantry Division organ-ized at Quantico, Virginia,under the command of Ma-jor General Holland M.Smith .

Second Joint Training Force(JTF-2), composed of the2d Marine Division, theU.S. Army 3d Infantry Di-

759

"limited national emergen-cy". Marine Corps strengthincreased to 25,000 men .

1940Jun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Congress authorizes the Navy

to begin a 10,000-planeconstruction program, with1,167 aircraft allocated forMarine aviation . MarineCorps plans to organize4 groups of 11 squadrons

194115Mar . . . . . . .. . . . . . . The Fleet Marine Force is

divided, with the 1st Ma-rine Division at Quantico,Virginia, becoming part ofthe Atlantic Fleet and the2d Marine Division at SanDiego, California, becom-ing part of the Pacific

760

vision, and the 2d MarineAircraft Wing organized atCamp Elliott, San Diego,California, to become apart of the Pacific Fleet . 4Sep

7DecJapanese attack Pearl Har-bor .

19429AprEnd of American resistance

on Bataan .6MayJapanese capture Corregidor .23MayTraining Center, Fleet Ma-

rine Force, organized atMarine Barracks, NewRiver, North Carolina, toinclude all Fleet MarineForce units and replace-ments except the 1st Ma-rine Division .

7Aug1st Marine Division lands on 30DecGuadalcanal .

15AugMarine Aircraft Wings, Pa-cific, established at San Di-ego, California, under Ma-jor General Ross E. Rowell .

194314-23JanC a s a b l a n c a Conference .

Agreement reached to ad-vance toward Philippinesthrough Central and South-west Pacific, and to ter-minate hostilities onlyupon unconditional sur-render of Japan.

21JanMarine Fleet Air, West Coast(MarFAirWest) organizedunder Colonel Lewie G .Merritt at San Diego, Ca-lifornia .

26JanHeadquarters of the 2d Ma-rine Aircraft Wing estab-lished at Efate, New He-brides .

9FebEnd of organized Japaneseresistance on Guadalcanal .

12-25MayTrident Conference in Wash-ington gives general ap-proval to plan for a driveon Japan through the Cen-tral Pacific.

14-24AugQuadrant Conference at Que-

20Nov

21Dec

31Jan-7Feb

4Feb

17Feb

12Mar

28Apr

15Jun

. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

1944

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .


.. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . .

. .. . . . .. . . . . . .

bee. CCS decide to attackJapan along both Centraland Southwest Pacificroutes .

V Amphibious Corps organ-ized under Maj-Gen Hol-land M. Smith to train andcontrol troops for amphi-bious landings in the Cen-tral Pacific .

Marines land on Betio Island,Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Is-lands .

Dive bombers of the 4th BaseDefense Aircraft Wingcarry out an attack againstJaluit Atoll, the first suchtarget in the Marshall Is-lands .

Advance Headquarters of the4th Marine Base DefenseAircraft Wing establishedon Tarawa Atoll, GilbertIslands .

U. S. forces invade and cap-ture Majuro and KwajaleinAtolls in the Marshall Is-lands.

Marine aircraft carry outfirst photographic recon-naissance of the Japanesebase at Truk in the Caro-lines .

Combined Marine-Army forcelands on Eniwetok Atoll inthe Marshalls .

JCS direct seizure of South-ern Marianas, target date15 Jun 1944 .

The 1st Marine Division(Rein), commanded byMajor General William H .Rupertus, is relieved onNew Britain and preparesto move to Pavuvu in theRussell Islands .

The Marine V AmphibiousCorps under LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smithlands on Saipan in the Ma-

CHRONOLOGY

riana Islands . U. S. Navycarrier task force strikesVolcano-Bonin Islands infirst raid on these groups .First B-29 strikes launch-ed from China basesagainst mainland of Japan .FEAF established underLieutenant General GeorgeC . Kenney. AirNorSolsformed under Major Gen .eral Ralph J. Mitchell .

19-2OJunBattle of the Philippine Sea .Carrier aircraft of TF 58engage planes from enemycarriers and inflict crip-pling losses .

24JunU. S. Navy carrier task forceagain hits Volcano-BoninIslands, including IwoJima .

4JulRenewed carrier attacks14Julagainst Volcano-Bonins .

Joint Staff Study for Opera-tion STALEMATE (inva-sion of the Palaus) issued .

21JulIII Amphibious Corps landson Guam in the Marianas .

24Jul4th Marine Division lands onTinian in the Marianas .

lAugEnd of organized enemy re-sistance on Tinian .

10Aug

End of organized Japaneseresistance on Guam .

15AugIII Amphibious Corps, uponcompleting its operation inthe Mariannas, is commit-ted to invasion of -the Pa-laus .

15SepThe 1st Marine Division, un-der Major General Ruper-tus, lands on the south-western shore of PeleliuIsland. U. S. Army troopsland on Morotai, Nether-lands East Indies, and cap-ture airfield on that island.JCS decide to invade Cen-tral rather than SouthernPhilippines and advancetarget date for invasion of

761

Leyte from 20 Decemberto 20 October 1944 .

17Sep81st Infantry Division, aspart of III AmphibiousCorps, lands on Angaur .

23SepU. S. Army troops seize Uli-thi as advance naval base .

28SepThe 3d Battalion, 5th Ma-rines (Rein), under MajorJohn H. Gustafson, landson Ngesebus and KongauruIslands in the Palaus, sup-ported by VMF-114.

30SepPeleliu, Angaur, Ngesebus,and Kongauru declared oc-cupied .

30ctJCS directive orders occupa-tion of one or more islandsin the Volcano-Bonins .

90ctAdmiral Nimitz informsGeneral Smith that IwoJima is to be the objectivein the Volcano-Bonins .

120ctPeleliu becomes a Marine is-land command similar toGuam and Tinian .

140ctV Amphibious Corps direct-ed to prepare plans for theIwo Jima operation .

180ctLanding on Homonhon Is-land .

200ctU. S. Army troops invadeLeyte. The 1st Marine Di-vision (Rein) on Peleliu isrelieved by the U . S. Army81st Infantry Division .

21OctMarine Carrier Groups, Air-craft, Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, established at San-ta Barbara, California, un-der Colonel Albert D .Cooley. Marine 5th and11th 155mm Artillery Bat-talions as part of XXIVCorps Artillery in generalsupport of the U . S. Army7th Infantry Division onLeyte .

23-260ctBattle of Leyte Gulf whichends in U. S. naval vic-tory .

762

4Nov

5Nov

11-12Nov

16Nov

25Nov

24-27Dec

25Dee

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VMF-122, commanded by 5JanMajor Joseph H . Reinburg,supports U. S. Army land-ing on Pulo Anna Islandsouth of the Palaus . 24Jan

Marine Corsair fighter-bomb-ers based in the Marshallshit Nauru Island in theGilberts, setting a distancerecord for Corsairs withfull bomb loads .

U. S. Navy surface forcesrock Iwo Jima with heavybombardment .

Marine Corsairs from Pele-liu and Avengers from Uli-thi launch a coordinatedattack against Yap Island,west of Ulithi .

CinCPOA issues operation

15-16Feb

16Feb

16-18Feb

landing of U . S. Army onMindoro in the Philippines . 19Feb

U. S. Navy surface unitsbombard Volcano-Bonin Is-lands including Iwo Jima. 21Feb

Leyte declared secured .Eighth Army relievesSixth Army .

9Jan

lFeb

1-4Feb

13Feb

MAG-14 with VMO-251 andVMF-212, -222, and -223 23Febland at Guiuan, Samar .

. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

25Jan

27Jan

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .. . . . .

. .. . . . . . . . . . ..

U. S . Navy vessels shell IwoJima .

U. S. Sixth Army invadesLuzon .

U. S. naval surface forceshells Iwo Jima .

First Marine dive bombers .arrive on Luzon .

Marine dive bombers fly theirfirst mission in the Philip-pines.

Aircraft of Saipan-based Ma-rine Bombing Squadron612 begin nightly rocketattacks against enemyshipping and installationsin the Volcano Islands .

Marine dive bombers ofMAG-24 and MAG-32 pro-tect the left flank of the1st Cavalry Division dur-ing its drive to Manila .

Final rehearsals for IwoJima operation concludedoff coast of Tinian .

V Amphibious Corps Land-Force departs Marianas af-ter final rehearsals for as-sault on Iwo Jima .

TF 58 under Admiral Mits-cher launches two day airstrike against the Japanesemainland to divert atten-tion from the imminentIwo Jima operation.

Amphibious Support Force(TF 52) bombs and shellsIwo Jima in the course ofthe preparatory bombard-ment .

The 4th and 5th Marine Divi-sion seize foothold on IwoJima .

21st Marines of the 3d Ma-rine Division committed inzone of action of the 4thDivision. Enemy executeskamikaze attack on sup-port ships off Iwo Jima .

Combat patrol of the 28thMarines raises Old Glory

plan for invasion of IwoJima . Tentative date 3February 1945 .

3Dec

7Dec

VMF(N)-541 and VMF-115,-211, -218, and -313 ofMAG-12 arrive at Ta-cloban, Leyte, to provideair defense .

MAG-12 aircraft, under Colo-nel William A . Willis, sup-port U. S. Army landingsat Ormoc, Leyte.

8Dec U. S. Navy surface unitsshell Iwo Jima .

11Dec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major Marine air attack on

15Dec . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

Japanese convoy,Bay .

MAG-12 aircraft

Ormoc

support

CHRONOLOGY

25Feb

26Feb

27Feb

28Feb

2Mar

3Mar

4Mar

6Mar

7Mar

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

on Mount Suribachi .Manila falls to U . S. Armytroops .

3d Marine Division commit-ted on Iwo Jima . Generalunloading of cargo gets un-der way . Elements ofMAG-32 arrive on Min-doro, Philippines, to sup-port U. S. Army troops .

Two Marine artillery spotterplanes from the USS WakeIsland land on Iwo Jimaand become the first Amer-ican planes to land on theisland .

3d Marine Division capturesthe Central Airfield on IwoJima and seizes Hills Peterand Oboe .

U. S. Army troops invadePalawan in the Philippi-nes .

5th Marine Division capturesHill 362A on Iwo Jima .

Elements of MAG-12, MAG-24, and MAG-32 supportU.S . Army landings onMasbate, Burias, and Ti-cao Islands in the Philip-pines .

3d Marine Division clearsNorthern Airfield on IwoJima .

First B-29 bomber lands onIwo Jima after being dam-aged over Japan.

U. S. Army Air Forces 15thFighter Group arrives onIwo Jima with P-51s andP-61s .

Major General James E .Chaney (USA), IslandCommander, assumes re-sponsibility for Iwo Jimabase development, air de-fense, and airfield opera-tion .

3d Marine Division launches

763

predawn attack againstHill 362C and captures thisobjective later in the day .

8Mar4th Marine Division repelscounterattack during thenight 8-9 March .

9MarGeneral Holland M . Smithtransfers his command postfrom the Eldorado to theAuburn . Admiral Turnerand his staff on board El-dorado depart for Guam .

Real Admiral Harry W . Hillassumes duties of SeniorOfficer Present Afloat,Iwo Jima .

10MarMAG-12 and MAG-32 air-craft support U . S. Armylandings on Zamboanga inthe Philippines . Americantroops land on Mindanao inthe Philippines .

11MarIwo-based Army Air Forcesfighters assume responsi-bility for providing air de-fense and ground supportmissions when last Navyescort carriers leave .

14MarOfficial flag raising ceremonymarks proclamation ofU. S. Naval Military Gov-ernment in the VolcanoIslands. Commander, Expe-ditionary Troops, departsfor Guam .

15MarCorsairs of MAG-12 arriveon Zamboanga . Close sup-port of the U . S. Army41st Infantry Division getsunder way.

16MarCushman's Pocket on IwoJima eliminated. End oforganized resistance inzone of action of the 3dMarine Division .

Last enemy pocket in 4thDivision zone wiped out .

Iwo Jima declared securedat 1800 .

18MarU. S. Army troops invadePanay in the Philippines.

764

20Mar

23Mar

25Mar

26Mar

. . . . . . . .. . . . . .

. . . . . . . .. . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U . S . Army 147th Infantry lAprRegiment arrives on IwoJima for garrison duty .

Dive bombers of MAG-32move from Luzon to Zam-boanga .

5th Marine Division elimi-nates final enemy pocketof resistance on Iwo Jima .

Japanese launch early morn-ing attack against Marineand U. S. Army bivouacareas on Iwo Jima . Cap-ture and occupation phaseannounced completed as of0800 .

Commander, Forward Area,Central Pacific, assumesresponsibility for defenseand development of IwoJima .

Major General Chaney as-sumes operational controlof all units on Iwo Jima .

V Amphibious Corps com-mand post on Iwo Jimaclosed . Major GeneralSchmidt departs Iwo Jimaby air.

U. S. Army troops invadeCebu in the Philippines,supported by aircraft of 2SepMAG-12 .

14Apr

17Apr

18Apr

20Apr

22Apr

7May

25May

21Jun

6Aug

9Aug

. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .


Invasion of Okinawa getsunder way .

U. S. Army troops land inthe Sulu Archipelago andon Jolo Island in the Phi-lippines .

MAG-24 dive bombers fly lastMarine aviation mission onLuzon .

MAG-12, MAG-14, andMAG-32 support U . S. Ar-my landings on Mindanaoin the Philippines .

Last Marines depart fromIwo Jima .

Dive bombers of MAG-24move from Luzon to Mala-bang.

MAG-24 dive bombers beginoperations from Malabang .

End of war in EuropeanTheater.

JCS direct invasion of Japan,scheduled for 1 November1945 .

End of organized resistanceon Okinawa .

Atomic bomb dropped onHiroshima .

Atomic bomb dropped on Na-gasaki.

Russia invades Manchuria .Japanese sign instrument of

surrender in Tokyo Bay.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .. . . . . . . . .

.. . . . .. . . . .. . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fleet Marine Force Status 31 August 1944'

Units and Locations

Outside U.S.A .

Hawaiian Area

Oahu

Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPacTransient Center, FMFPac3d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPacHeadquarters Company, Supply Service, FMFPac6th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac8th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPacHeadquarters and Service Battalion, VACSignal Battalion, VACCorps Transport Company, VACAmphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, VACAir Delivery Section, VACHeadquarters, 2d Laundry Company VAC4th Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VACHeadquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific. . . .Marine Bomber Squadron 611, 2d MAWMarine Bomber Squadron 612, 2d MAWHeadquarters Squadron 3, 3d MAWMarine Observation Squadron 5, 3d MAWAir Warning Squadron 4, 3d MAWMarine Airborne Aircraft Warning Squadron 5, 3d MAWService Squadron 15, 3d MAWMarine Fighter Squadon 321, 3d MAWMarine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343, 3d MAWMarine Transport Squadron 953, 3d MAWHeadquarters Squadron, MAG-32Service Squadron 32, MAG-32Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142, MAG-32Marine Fighter Squadrdn 313, MAG-13j

See footnote at end of table .

USMC

Off

Strength

Enl

U

Off

1,3785,599205

1,125257

4,21142460153411528891246111046747751928233168229248292369350242296245

APPENDIX E

SN

Enl

14 1243 31338

93

301 58

411 138

229

80

00 120

00

00

02

01

81 8

11

18•

00

50

4•

01

81

80 09

13•

01

81I

8

765

766

Area Sub-Total

Units and Locations

Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-13Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-13Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 332, MAG-13

Area Sub-Total

Hawaii

2d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac1st Service and Supply Battalion, FMFPacHeadquarters Battery, VAC Artillery2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery10th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery11th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery12th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery26th Marines (Reinforced)27th Marines (Reinforced)Special and Service Troops, 5th Marine Division

Area Sub-Total

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .

Kaui

1st Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac3d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service,FMFPac

3d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

Maui

3d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac2d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service,YMFPac

Medical Battalion, VAC . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .1st Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC

See footnote at end of table.


Strength

USMC U N

Off Enl Off Enl

47 247 1 850 249 1 848 294 1 8

1,821 19,976 156 577

13 296 1 722 477 0 427 155 3 934 591 1 935 711 1 1233 724 1 1254 847 4 211 150 0 0

188 4,188 18 224199 4,461 19 219137 1,213 8 24

743 13,813 56 541

18 288 2 051 1,029 4 27

11 278 0 21 61 0 0

49 1,227 4 3263 1,230 3 3263 1,214 4 3256 1,219 4 29

312 6,546 21 154

16 347 1 3

6 268 0 01 90 28 2181 61 0 0

FLEET MARINE FORCE STATUS

Units and Locations

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less Company A),VAC

11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (plus Companies Dand E, less Companies A and C), VAC

Company C, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC1st Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion4th Marine Division

Area Sub-Total

Midway

6th Defense BattalionHeadquarters Squadron 23, MAG-23Service Squadron 23, MAG-23Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-23Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 333, MAG-23

Area Sub-Total

Southwest Pacific

Auckland, New Zealand

3d Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac

Russell Islands

4th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac30th, 31st and 32d Depot Companies, Supply Service,,FMFPac

2d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Prov), ILIAC1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC4th and 5th Marine War Dog Platoons, ILIAC5th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC6th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion,, ILIAC Artillery . . .1st Marine DivisionMarine Observation Squadron 3, MAWPac

Area Sub-TotalSee footnote at end of table.

Strength

767

USMC U SN

Off Enl Off Enl

20 319 1 9

21 523 2 96 133 0 0

32 252 14 028 568 1 11757 13,133 123 969

888 15,694 170 1,219

69 1,492 5 2225 337 6 1611 255 0 061 249 1 850 298 1 8

216 2,631 13 54

15 106 2 8

94 2,613 7 26

12 479 0 01 61 0 0

32 767 1 929 473 1 1024 462 1 93 191 0 01 43 0 01 44 0 0

60 1,321 4 31897 16,822 130 968

9 28 0 0

1,163 23,304 144 1,053

768

Units and Locations

Emirau

Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12Service Squadron 12, MAG-12Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-12Marine Fighter Squadron 215, MAG-12Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243, MAG-12Headquarters Squadron 61, MAG-61Service Squadron 61, MAG-61Marine Photographic Squadron 254, MAG-61Marine Bombing Squadron 433, MAG-61Marine Bombing Squadron 443, MAG-61Marine Transport Squadron 952, 2d MAW

Area Sub-Total

Green Island

Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14Service Squadron 14, MAG-14Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-14Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 235, MAG-14Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341, MAG-14Marine Bombing Squadron 423, MAG-14

Area Sub-Total

Guadalcanal

16th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac29th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac9th Ammunition Company, Supply Service, FMFPac1st Battalion, 29th Marines (Reinf)Headquarters, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC1st Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC3d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC4th Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, ILIAC8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC4th Joint Assault Signal Company, ILIAC3d Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC8th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC9th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, ILIAC3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery,IIIACSee footnote at end of table.


USMC

Strength

U N

Off En] Off Enl

39 311 6 2717 265 1 047 238 1 845 222 1 146 273 1 936 386 7 1610 249 0 053 470 2 867 411 1 869 410 0 066 375 1 8

495 3,610 21 85

39 364 7 2214 266 1 045 227 1 857 280 2 846 263 0 062 398 1 8

263 1,798 12 46

43 1,204 3 164 148 0 07 248 0 0

34 817 2 391 24 0 01 61 0 01 61 0 01 61 0 0

26 499 1 935 343 9 1151 32 0 0

34 678 3 939 730 2 1234 642 2 12

60 1,279 5 31


4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery,ILIAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery,IIIAC

29th Marines (Reinf)54th Replacement Battalion

Units and Locations

. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .

Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAWPac

Area Sub-Total

Ellice Islands

51st Defense Battalion

Munda, New GeorgiaMarine Air Base Squadron 1, 1st MAWMarine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241, 1st MAWMarine Bombing Squadron 413, 1st MAWMarine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244, MAG-14

Area Sub-Total

Torokina, Bougainville

Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAWMarine Fighter Squadron 222, 1st MAWHeadquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24Service Squadron 24, MAG-24Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133, MAG-24Marine Fighter Squadron 212, MAG-24Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-24Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236, MAG-24Marine Observation Squadron 251, MAG-24Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25Marine Transport Squadron 153, MAG-25

Area Sub-Total

Espiritu Santo, New HebridesMarine Air Defense Squadron 1, 1st MAWHeadquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAWAir Warning Squadron 3, 2d MAWMarine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232, 2d MAW

See footnote at end of table .

USMC

Strength

USN

769

Off Enl Off Enl

61 1,243 5 34

57 1,283 4 30198 3,886 18 205

9 612 1 99 28 0 0

655 13,879 55 521

54 1,326 6 32

15 380 4 1026 255 1 857 401 2 929 262 1 8

127 1,298 8 35

67 531 8 1132 221 1 630 365 7 2313 304 0 047 286 1 814 235 1 844 238 1 831 258 1 950 239 1 868 385 0 062 353 1 8

458 3,415 22 89

21 358 4 766 422 7 2818 248 0 641 295 1 15

770

Units and Locations

Marine Fighter Squadron 312, 2d MAWHeadquarters Squadron 11, MAG-11Service Squadron 11, MAG-11Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-11Marine Fighter Squadron 121, MAG-11Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-11Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 134, MAG-11Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541, MAG-11

Area Sub-Total

Noumea and Tontouta, New Caledonia

Transient Center, Forward Echelon, FMFPacHeadquarters (SoPac-Admin), Supply Service, FMFPa1st Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPacHeadquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25Service Squadron 25, MAG-25

Area Sub-Total

Central Pacific

Engebi

Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22Service Squadron 22, MAG-22Air Warning Squadron 1, MAG-22Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151, MAG-22Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22

Area Sub-Total

Eniwetok

10th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf),VAC Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG-22


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


C

USMC

OS

4723364847474729

470

173

383315

106

391212485149

211

6536

101

Strength

Enl

24959

578250249249312308

3,577

40810

664334348

1,764

365248201238311229

1,592

1,403308

1,711

U

Off

25

15

12

41

5

N

Enl

125

50

13231

0

249

298

37


Units and Locations

Guam

1st Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac5th Field DepotCompany A, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VACCompany A, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VACHeadquarters and Service Battalion, ILIACSignal Battalion, IIIACMotor Transport Battalion, ILIACMedical Battalion, IIIACAir Delivery Section, ILIAC1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, ILIAC3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, ILIAC2d Separate Engineer Battalion, ILIAC1st Marine War Dog Platoon, ILIAC2d and 3d Marine War Dog Platoons, ILIAC3d Joint Assault Signal Company, ILIAC1st Separate Wire Platoon, ILIACHeadquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, ILIAC1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion, ILIAC Artillery7th 155mm Gun Battalion, ILIAC Artillery9th Defense Battalion, ILIAC Artillery14th Defense Battalion, ILIAC Artillery3d Marine Division1st Provisional Marine Brigade1st Replacement DraftMarine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-12Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-15Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21Service Squadron 21, MAG-21Air Warning Squadron 2, MAG-21Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 131, MAG-21Marine Fighter Squadron 216, MAG-21Marine Fighter Squadron 217, MAG-21Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-21Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 242, MAG-21Marine Fighter Squadron 321, MAG-21Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-21


771

Strength

USMC U SN

Off EnI Off Enl

52 379 33 12364 1,447 4 163 138 0 05 130 0 0

171 1,261 17 8160 1,109 2 1132 609 2 111 151 35 3123 164 0 2

35 644 2 1036 777 2 1227 541 2 835 721 3 200 32 0 02 98 0 0

35 340 9 01 41 0 0

26 159 0 034 631 2 1637 664 2 1267 1,388 4 3171 1,488 4 25

872 16,057 139 988445 9,012 46 43386 1,462 60 41548 235 1 867 333 0 038 322 8 1914 277 0 010 161 0 347 328 1 846 234 1 847 229 1 745 239 1 847 328 1 848 230 1 737 310 1 8

2,694 42,669 384 2,610

772

Units and Locations

Kwajalein

Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG-15Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-15Marine Transport Squadron 353, MAG-15

Area Sub-Total

Majuro

1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf),VAC Artillery

Headquarters Squadron 4, 4th MBDAWHeadquarters Squadron 13, MAG-13Service Squadron 13, MAG-13Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231, MAG-13Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331, MAG-13Marine Observation Squadron 155, MAG-31

Area Sub-Total

Makin

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245, MAG-13Marine Fighter Squadron 111, MAG-31

Area Sub-Total

Roi-Namur

15th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac15th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf),VAC Artillery

Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31Service Squadron 31, MAG-31Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-31Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-31Marine Fighter Squadron 441, MAG-31

Area Sub-Total

Saipan

7th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac2d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, VAC



Strength

USMC U SN

Off EnI Off Enl

42 351 6 2159 322 1 1093 413 1 8

194 1,086 8 39

28 573 3 1490 635 11 2031 351 7 2215 288 0 051 299 1 849 295 1 844 248 1 8

308 2,689 24 80

51 285 1 853 347 1 8

104 632 2 16

5 197 0 0

48 1,164 4 2134 407 8 1812 308 0 084 283 1 848 258 1 849 309 1 8

280 2,926 15 63

90 1,780 5 341 61 0 0

33 771 2 14


Units and Locations

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC1st Amphibian Truck Company, VAC2d Amphibian Truck Company, VAC2d Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC2d Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery18th Antiaircaft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery2d Marine Division3d Replacement Draft4th Separate Wire Platoon, ILIACMarine Observation Squadron 2, 3d MAWMarine Observation Squadron 4, 3d MAWMarine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MAG-31

Area Sub-Total

Tinian

2d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac1st Separate Engineer Battalion, ILIAC2d Separate Wire Platoon, ILIAC

Area Sub-Total

Miscellaneous

Aviation personnel attached to Marine divisions,amphibious corps, and JASCOs

West Coast, U.S.A .

San Diego

Headquarters Company, Marine Training andReplacement Command, San Diego Area

Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air,West Coast

Area Sub-Total

Camp Elliott

Base Depot, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego


USMC

Off

1,451

46331

80

78

41

56

97

91

Strength

Enl

5845621741853915454

1,2151,412

17,4122,629

432829249

27,633

35972741

1,127

227

145

332

477

760

U

Off

174

4540

49

0

2

3

5

2

SN

Enl

773

1,118

105170

122

0

5

1

6

20

774

Units and Locations

Camp Gillespie

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 141, MBDAG-41

Camp PendletonHeadquarters Battalion, Marine TrainingCommand, SDA

Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDASpecialist Training Regiment, Marine TrainingCommand, SDA

Infantry Training Regiment (10 battalions),Marine Training Command, SDA

9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion5th Marine Division (less RCT 26 and RCT 27)5th Joint Assault Signal Company7th Replacement Draft8th Replacement Draft9th Replacement Draft10th Replacement Draft52d Defense Battalion8th Field Depot (Rear Echelon)Sound Ranging Sections (3-4-5)Marine Fighter Squadron 471, MBDAG-43

Area Sub-Total

CorvallisHeadquarters Squadron 35, MAG-35Service Squadron 35, MAG-35

Area Sub-Total

Camp KearneyMarine Photographic Squadron 154, Marine Fleet Air,West Coast

El CentroHeadquarters Squadron 43, MBDAG-43Service Squadron 43, MBDAG-43Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MBDAG-43Marine Fighter Squadron 462, MBDAG-43Marine Fighter Squadron 472, MBDAG-43


.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Strength

USMC US N

Off Enl Off Enl

48 302 1 8

172 1,847 45 256178 2,573 9 0

170 2,162 46 866

129 9,868 1 026 510 0 0

374 7,000 73 52535 365 0 014 536 12 10044 1,107 1 064 1,251 10 563 4,685 1 17055 1,278 7 3246 770 0 03 66 0 0

49 277 1 8

1,422 34,295 206 1,962

185 857 8 3022 302 0 0

207 1,159 8 30

59 427 2 8

64 804 7 278 319 0 0

47 252 1 352 257 1 248 254 1 0

219 1,886 10 32


El Toro

Headquarters Squadron 41, MBDAG-41Service Squadron 41, MBDAG-41Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 132, MBDAG-41Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 144, MBDAG-41Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 234, MBDAG-41Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 454, MBDAG-41Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 464, MBDAG-41Headquarters Squadron 46, MBDAG-46Service Squadron 46, MBDAG-46Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 474, MBDAG-46Marine Fighter Squadron 481, MBDAG-46Marine Fighter Squadron 482, MBDAG-46Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 484, MBDAG-46

Area Sub-Total

Miramar

Supply Squadron 5, Marine Fleet Air, West CoastHeadquarters and Service Squadron 2, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 6, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 7, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 8, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 9, 2d AWGMarine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 10, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 11, 2d AWGAir Warning Squadron 12, 2d AWGMarine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 15, 2d AWGMarine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 20, 2d AWGHeadquarters Squadron, Personnel GroupMarine Wing Service Squadron 1, Personnel GroupMarine Wing Service Squadron 2, Personnel GroupMarine Wing Service Squadron 3, Personnel GroupMarine Wing Service Squadron 4, Personnel GroupHeadquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33Service Squadron 33, MAG-33

Area Sub-Total

Oxnard

Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MBDAG-42See footnote at end of table.

Strength

775

US= U SN

Off Enl Off Enl

42 378 7 3016 277 0 047 307 1 548 313 1 246 307 1 246 324 1 331 316 1 272 341 6 1715 324 0 030 348 1 8

151 328 1 8155 350 1 830 364 1 8

729 4,277 22 93

16 299 0 012 105 0 014 259 0 613 251 0 615 258 0 616 255 0 614 166 0 416 255 0 618 261 0 613 167 0 414 167 0 4

270 215 28 012 1,124 0 65 1,167 0 1606 958 0 104 1,716 0 0

30 362 7 1611 258 7 16

499 8,243 42 256

48 274 1 8

776

Units and Locations

Mojave

Headquarters Squadron 44, MBDAG-44Service Squadron 44, MBDAG-44Marine Fighter Squadron 124, MBDAG-44Marine Fighter Squadron 213, MBDAG-44Marine Fighter Squadron 451, MBDAG-44Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MBDAG-44Headquarters Squadron 51, MAG-51Marine Observation Squadron 351, MAG-51Marine Fighter Squadron 511, MAG-51Marine Fighter Squadron 512, MAG-51

Area Sub-Total

Santa Barbara

Headquarters Squadron 42, MBDAG-42Service Squadron 42, MBDAG-42Marine Fighter Squadron 112, MBDAG-42Marine Fighter Squadron 123, MBDAG-42Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MBDAG-42Headquarters Squadron 45, MBDAG-45Service Squadron 45, MBDAG-45Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MBDAG-45Headquarters Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44)Service Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44)Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143, MBDAG-48Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233, MBDAG-48Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 943, MBDAG-48

Area Sub-Total

East Coast, U.S.A .

Camp Lejeune

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training CommandRange Battalion, Marine Training CommandCoast Guard Detachment, Marine Training CommandQuartermaster Battalion, Marine Training CommandSchools Regiment, Marine Training CommandSpecialist Training Regiment, Marine Training CommandInfantry Training Regiment (7 battalions), Marine



USMC

Off

32104949474838474645

411

417

Strength

Enl

458396246252243252309249242233

2,880

478338241249242392248303

00

239303223

U

Off

24

203,256

2890

57153397

811242

0750

1,2506,870

00

39000

SN

90

00

1,409000

Units and Locations

Training CommandCorps Evacuation Hospitals (I, II, III)10th Ammunition Company11th Ammunition Company7th Separate Infantry Battalion

Area Sub-Total

Norfolk

Marine Base Depot, FMF

Quantico

Infantry Training Battalion, MCSField Artillery Training Battalion, MCS

Area Sub-Total

Bogue

Air Warning Squadron 16, 1st AWGHeadquarters Squadron 93, MAG-93Service Squadron 93, MAG-93Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 934, MAG-93Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 941, MAG-93Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 942, MAG-93

Area Sub-Total

Cherry Point

Headquarters Squadron 9, 9th MAWMarine Wing Service Squadron 9, 9th MAWMarine Transport Squadron 352, 9th MAWMarine Photographic Squadron 354, 9th MAWMarine Night Fighter Squadron 531, 9th MAWHeadquarters and Service Squadron 1, 1st AWGAir Warning Squadron 17, 1st AWGAir Warning Squadron 18, 1st AWGHeadquarters Squadron 53, MAG-53Service Squadron 53, MAG-53Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, MAG-53Marine Night Fighter Squadron 544, MAG-53


USMC

Off

157073

18

829

20

3622

58

15251034356

125

Strength

Enl

7,4020

279294677

18,575

426

993582

1,575

26033019018818881

1,237

U

Off

079002

120

0

20

2

8

6315

1275917911110457

2932

429183434449166900245164290264307279

SN

Enl

777

11604

00

21

2,045

8

380

38

778

Units and Locations

Headquarters Squadron 62, MAG-62Service Squadron 62, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 453, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 463, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 473, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 483, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 621, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 622, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 623, MAG-62Marine Bombing Squadron 624, MAG-62Headquarters Squadron 92, MAG-92Marine Fighter Squadron 921, MAG-92Marine Fighter Squadron 922, MAG-92Marine Fighter Squadron 924, MAG-92Headquarters Squadron 94, MAG-94Service Squadron 94, MAG-94

Area Sub-Total

Congaree

Headquarters Squadron 52, MAG-52Service Squadron 52, MAG-52Marine Fighter Squadron 521, MAG-52Marine Fighter Squadron 522, MAG-52Marine Fighter Squadron 523, MAG-52Marine Fighter Squadron 524, MAG-52

Area Sub-Total

Eagle Mountain Lake

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 931, MAG-93Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 932, MAG-93Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 933, MAG-93

Area Sub-Total

Greenville

Marine Fighter Squadron 913, MAG-91


USMO

Off

1,057

171348454850

221

475030

127

42

Strength

Eni

68642415773453

4023253142361546160

35110743

7,551

45669158156161155

1,344

268274268

810

177

U

Off

32

9

111

3

1

SN

Eni

1908888

51

865

19

8

779

1 Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for August1944 held in the Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps . Units en route or ordered to theindicated area are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations .

Strength

Units and Locations USMC U N

Off Enl Off Enl

KinstonHeadquarters Squadron 91, MAG-91 16 190 5 19Service Squadron 91, MAG-91 8 169 0 0Marine Fighter Squadron 911, MAG-91 44 183 1 8Marine Fighter Squadron 912, MAG-91 44 180 0 8Marine Fighter Squadron 914, MAG-91 39 145 0 0

Area Sub-Total 151 867 6 35

NewportHeadquarters Squadron 34, MAG-34 26 487 6 22Service Squadron 34, MAG-34 10 265 0 0Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 334, MAG-34 49 279 1 8Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 342, MAG-34 49 295 1 8Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 344, MAG-34 49 295 2 8Marine Bombing Squadron 613, MAG-62 65 418 1 8Marine Bombing Squadron 614, MAG-62 66 423 1 8

Area Sub-Total 314 2,462 12 62

New RiverMarine Scout-Bomber Squadron 944, MAG-94 61 393 1 8

Oak GroveAir Warning Squadron 14, 1st AWG 16 248 0 6Service Squadron 51, MAG-92 11 271 0 8Marine Fighter Squadron 513, MAG-92 47 229 1 8Marine Fighter Squadron 514, MAG-92 48 218 1 8

Area Sub-Total 122 966 2 30

Vero BeachAir Warning Squadron 13, 1st AWG 18 256 0 6

Total FMF (Ground) Overseas 8,810 163,333 1,191 7,855Total FMF (Air) Overseas 4,477 31,696 208 1,070Total FMF (Ground) in U .S.A 2,412 55,499 331 4,070Total FiMF (Air) in U .S.A 4,980 39,376 208 1,031Total FMF Overseas 13,287 195,029 1,399 8,925Total IFMF in U .S.A 7,392 94,875 539 5,101Total FMF 20,679 289,904 1,938 14,026

Table of Organization F 100-Marine Division5 May 1944 1

1 All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units.

780

APPENDIX F

USMC USN Tot isUnit

Off Enl Off Enl Off Enl

Division Headquarters (66) (186) (4) (1) (70) (187)Headquarters Battalion 101 883 7 13 108 896

Headquarters Company (73) (394) (7) (9) (80) (403)Signal Company (17) (275) (17) (275)Military Police Company (6) (96) (6) (96)Reconnaissance Company (5) (118) (4) (5) (122)

Tank Battalion 35 585 1 9 36 594Headquarters & Service Company (14) (99) (1) (9) (15) (108)3 Tank Companies (each) (7) (162) (7) (162)

Service Troops 58 1,343 66 422 124 1,765Service Battalion (29) (702) (2) (18) (31) (720)Headquarters Company (9) (48) (2) (9) (11) (57)Service & Supply Company (13) (483) (9) (13) (492)Ordnance Company (7) (171) (7) (171)

Motor Transport Battalion (28) (501) (1) (9) (29) (510)Headquarters & Service Company (13) (171) (1) (9) (14) (180)3 Transport Companies (each) (5) (110) (5) (110)

Medical Battalion (1) (140) (63) (395) (64) (535)Headquarters & Service Company (1) (15) (28) (45) (29) (60)5 Medical Companies (each) (25) (7) (70) (7) (95)

Engineer Battalion 41 842 1 20 42 862Headquarters & Service Company (23) (263) (1) (20) (24) (283)3 Engineer Companies (each) (6) (193) (6) (193)

Pioneer Battalion 38 672 3 32 41 704Headquarters & Service Company (11) (81) (3) (32) (14) (113)3 Pioneer Companies (each) (9) (197) (9) (197)

Artillery Regiment 159 2,415 8 57 167 2,472Headquarters & Service Battery (23) (193) (4) (9) (27) (202)

2 105mm Howitzer Battalions (each) (33) (556) (1) (12) (34) (568)Headquarters & Service Battery (15) (133) (1) (12) (16) (145)3 Howitzer Batteries (each) (6) (141) (6) (141)

2 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions (each) . . (35) (555) (1) (12) (36) (567)Headquarters & Service Battery (14) (132) (1) (12) (15) (144)3 Pack Howitzer Batteries (each) (7) (141) (7) (141)

3 Infantry Regiments (each) 137 2,936 11 134 148 3,070Headquarters & Service Company (24) (218) (5) (14) (29) (232)Weapons Company (8) (195) (8) (195)

3 Infantry Battalions (each) (35) (841) (2) (40) (37) (881)Headquarters Company (14) (157) (2) (40) (16) (197)3 Rifle Companies (each) (7) (228) (7) (228)

Division Totals 843 15,548 119 955 962 16,503

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION F-100-MARINE DIVISION

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION-MARINE DIVISION

781

Weapons Number Transportation Number

Carbine, .30 cal ., M-1Flamethrower, portable, M2-2Flamethrower, mechanized, E4-5Gun :37mm, M3, antitank75mm, motor carriage, M-3,

w/armament, radio-equipped(TCS)

Gun, Machine :.30 cal., M1919A4.30 cal., M1917A1.50 cal., M2

Gun, submachine, .45 calHowitzer :75mm pack105mm

Launcher, rocket, antitank, M1A1Mortar :60mm81mm

Pistol, .45 calRifle, .30 cal., M-1Rifle, Browning, automaticShotgun, 12 gaugeTank, Army medium, with armament .Vehicle, recovery, M32B2

10,95324324

36

12

30216216149

2424172

11736

3995,436853306463

Ambulance :1/4-ton, 4 x 41/2-ton, 4 x 4

Car, 5-passengerStation wagon, 4 x 4Tractor :

miscellaneousTrailer :

1/4-ton, cargo1/2-ton, dump1-ton, cargo1-ton, watermiscellaneous

Truck1/4-ton, 4 x 41/4-ton, 4 x 4, with radio1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance21/2-ton, 6 x 6, cargo21/2-ton, 6 x 6, dumpmiscellaneous

521233

71

1351915574110

3238522411

1505368

Marine Task Organization and Command List'

782

III Amphibious Corps Headquartersand Service Battalion

(15Sept-140ct44)COLtCol Floyd A . Stephenson

'Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organ-ization titles, and periods of service were taken from themuster rolls of the units concerned, held in the DiaryUnit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Depart-ment, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units are listed onlyfor those periods, indicated by the dates below parent unitdesignation, for which they are entitled to campaign par-ticipation credit. This information is derived from musterrolls and the U . S . Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy andMarine Corps Awards Manual-NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev.1953) with changes (Washington, 1953-1958) . The musterrolls have been the final authority when there is a conflictof unit entitlement within the overall campaign period ascited by the Awards Manual. In the case of Marine airunits, many of which participated in the campaigns asflight or advance echelons only, the unit commander whowas actually in the combat area is shown where musterrolls reveal this information . In order to conserve space,only units of battalion and squadron size, or larger, andsizable separate detachments are listed for each operation,although smaller organizations may have participatedalso.

APPENDIX G

3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion(15Sep-140ct44)

COLtCol Richard A . Evans6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(15Sep-140ct44)COCapt John I. Fitzgerald, Jr .

7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion(6Sep-140ct44)

COLtCol Henry R. Paige8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(15Sep-140ct44)COLtCol Charles B . Nerren

8th 155mm Howitzer Battalion(15Sep-140ct44)

COMaj George V . Hanna, Jr.12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(15Sep-140ct44)COLtCol Merlyn D. Holmes

16th Field Depot(15Sep-140ct44)

COLtCol Harlan C. Cooper

MARINE GROUND UNITS III Amphibious Corps Troops(15Sep-140ct44)A. PELELIU (6 September-14 October 1944) COCol Max D. Smith

Expeditionary Troops 3d Base Headquarters Battalion(22Sep-140ct44)CG MajGen Julian C . Smith

CofSF-1

Col Dudley S. BrownCol Harry E . Dunkelberger

COLtCol William 0. Smith. . . . . . .. . . .. . .

F-2 LtCol Edmund J. Buckley1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

F-3 Col Robert 0 . Bare (15Sep-140ct44). . . . . . .. . . .. . .F-4 LtCol Jesse S . Cook, Jr . COMaj Albert F. Reutlinger (to 21-

Sep44)III Amphibious Corps Capt Arthur J. Noonan (from

(15Sep-140ct)) 22Sep44 to 100ct44)CGCofSC-1

MajGen Roy S . GeigerCol Merwin H. SilverthornLtCol Peter A . McDonald

LtCol Maynard M.(from 11Oct44)

Nohrden

3d Armored Amphibian BattalionC-2 Col William F . Coleman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (15Sep-140ct44)C-3 Col Walter A. Wachtler COLtCol Kimber H. BoyerC-4Col Francis B . Loomis, Jr .

MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST

Headquarters, 1st Marine Division

3d Battalion, 1st Marines(15Sep-140ct44)

CGMajGen William H . RupertusADCBGen Oliver P . SmithCofSCol John T . SeldenD-1Maj William E . Benedict

Sep44)LtCol Harold 0. Deakin (from

24Sep44)D-2LtCol John W. Scott, Jr .D-3LtCol Lewis J . FieldsD-4LtCol Harvey C. Tschirgi

Division Headquarters and Service Battalion(15Sep-140ct44)

COCol Joseph F . HankinsOct44 )

LtCol Austin C . Shofner (from30ct44)

1st Engineer Battalion(15Sep-140ct44)

COLtCol Levi W. Smith, Jr .

1st Medical Battalion(15Sep-20ct44)

COCdr Emil E. Napp, MC, USN

1st Motor Transport Battalion(14Sep-20ct44)

COCapt Robert B . McBroom

1st Pioneer Battalion(15Sep-140ct44)

COLtCol Robert G . Ballance

1st Service Battalion(15Sep-20ct44)

COCol John Kaluf

1st Tank Battalion(15Sep-140ct44 )

COLtCol Arthur J . Stuart

1st Marines(15Sep-20ct44)

COCol Lewis B . PullerExOLtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr .

Maj Bernard T . KellyR-3

1st Battalion, 1st MarinesCOMaj Raymond G . Davis

2d Battalion, 1st MarinesCOLtCol Russell E . Honsowetz

(to 23-

(KIA 3-

LtCol Stephen V . Sabol5th Marines

(15Sep-140ct44)Col Harold D . HarrisLtCol Lewis W. WaltMaj Walter S. Mcllhenny

Sep44)Capt Donald A. Peppard (from

17Sep44)

1st Battalion, 5th MarinesCOLtCol Robert W. Boyd

2d Battalion, 5th MarinesCOMaj Gordon D . Gayle

3d Battalion, 5th MarinesCOLtCol Austin C . Shofner (WIA

15Sep44)LtCol Lewis W. Walt (night 15-

16Sep44)Maj John H . Gustafson (from 16-

Sep44)

CO

COExOR-3

7th Marines(15Sep-140ct44 )

COCol Herman H. HannekenExOLtCol Norman HussaR-3Maj Walter Holomon

1st Battalion, 7th MarinesCOLtCol John J . Gormley

2d Battalion, 7th MarinesCOLtCol Spencer S. Berger

3d Battalion, 7th MarinesCOMaj E . Hunter Hurst

11th Marines(15Sep-140ct44)

COCol William H. HarrisonExOLtCol Edson L . LymanR-3LtCol Leonard F . Chapman, Jr.

1st Battalion, 11th MarinesCOLtCol Richard W. Wallace

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

COLtCol Noah P . Wood, Jr .

3d Battalion, 11th MarinesCOLtCol Charles M . Nees

(to

783

16-

784

4th Battalion, 11th MarinesCOLtCol Louis C . Reinberg

Island Command, Peleliu (1st Echelon)(15Sep-140ct44)

COBGen Harold D . Campbell

B. PHILIPPINES(200ctober-11December 1944)

Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps Artillery(200ct-29Nov44)

CGBGen Thomas E. BourkeExOCol Bert A . BoneCof SCol Harold C . RobertsA-1Capt George K. AckerA-2Maj Leo S . UngerA-3LtCol Floyd R. MooreA-4LtCol Richard H . Crockett

5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion(210ct-11Dec44)

COLtCol James E. Mills

11th 155mm Gun Battalion(21Oct-11Dec44)

COLtCol Thomas S . Ivey

C. IWO JIMA (19February-26March 1945)

Expeditionary Troops(19Feb-16Mar45)

CGLtGen Holland M. SmithCofSCol Dudley S . BrownG-1Col Russell N . JordahlG-2Col Edmond J . BuckleyG-3Col Kenneth H. WeirG-4Col George R. Rowan

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion,FMFPac

(19Feb-16Mar45)COMaj James L. Jones

V Amphibious Corps(19Feb-16Mar45)

CGMajGen Harry SchmidtCofSBGen William W . RogersC-1Col David A . StaffordC-2Col Thomas R. Yancey, USAC-3Col Edward A . CraigC-4Col William F . Brown

V Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion(19Feb-16 Mar45 )

Capt Cyril M. Milbrath

V Corps Troops(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COCol Alton A . Gladden

V Corps Signal Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Alfred F. Robertshaw

V Corps Medical Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLCrd William B. Clapp, MC, USN

2d Separate Engineer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Charles 0 . Clark

8th Field Depot(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol Leland S. Swindler

1st Provisional Field Artillery Group(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol John S . LetcherExOLtGol Marin H . FloomG-3Maj William D . Winters, Jr .

2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Earl J. Rowse

4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Douglas E. Reeve

V Corps Provisional LVT Group(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Harry W . G . Vadnais

2d Armored Amphibian Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Reed M . Fawell, Jr .

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Sylvester L . Stephan

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj George L . Shead

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Victor J. Croizat

CO



24th Replacement Draft(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Ralph E . Boulton

V Corps Evac Hosp No . 1(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCapt H. G. Young, MC, USN

11th Amtrac Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COLtCol Albert J. Roose


COCapt Charles R . Puckett

28th Replacement Draf t(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Michael V. DiVita


COCapt Donald J. Kendall, Jr .

31st Replacement Draft(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCapt Thomas B. Tighe

34th Replacement Draft(19lFeb-16Mar45 )

COCapt Neil A . Weathers, Jr .

Island Commander, Iwo Jima(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COMajGen James E . Chaney, USA

Headquarters, 3d Marine Division(19Feb-16Mar45)

CGMajGen Graves B . ErskineADCCol John B . WilsonCof SCol Robert E . HogaboomD-1Maj Irving R . KriendlerD-2LtCol Howard J . TurtonD-3Col Arthur H. ButlerD-4LtCol James D. Hittle

Division Headquarters and Service Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Jack F. Warner (to 14-Mar 45)

LtCol Carey A. Randall (from14Mar45)

3d Engineer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Walter S . Campbell

3d Medical Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCdr Anthony E . Reymont,USN

3d Motor Transport Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Ernest W. Fry, Jr.3d Pioneer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Edmund M. Williams

3d Service Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COLtCol Paul G. Chandler

3d Tank Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Holly H. Evans

3d Marines(19Feb-5Mar45)

COCol James A. StuartExOLtCol Newton B . BarkleyR-3Capt Paul H. Groth

1st Battalion, 3d MarinesCOLtCol Ronald R. Van Stockum

2d Battalion, 3d MarinesCOLtCol Thomas R . Stokes

3d Battalion, 3d MarinesCOLtCol Ralph L . Houser

9th Marines(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol Howard N . KenyonExOLtCol Paul W . RussellR-3Maj Calvin W. Kunz

1st Battalion, 9th MarinesCOLtCol Carey A . Randall (to 6-

Mar45)Maj William T. Glass (from 6-

14Mar45)LtCol Jack F. Warner (from 14-

Mar45)2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO'LtCol Robert E . Cushman, Jr .3d Battalion, 9th Marines

COLtCol Harold C . Boehm

785

MC,

786

21st Marines(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol Hartnoll J . WithersExOLtCol Eustace R . SmoakR-3Capt Andrew Hedesh

1st Battalion, 21st MarinesCOLtCol Marlowe C. Williams (WIA

22Feb45)Maj Clay M. Murray (from 22-Feb45, WiA 22Feb45)

Maj Robert H. Houser (from 22-Feb45)

2d Battalion, 21st MarinesCOLtCol Lowell E . English (WIA

2Mar45)Maj George A. Percy (from 2-

Mar45)

3d Battalion, 21st MarinesCO

D-4

LtCol Wendell H . Duplantis

12th Marines(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COLtCol Raymond F . Crist, Jr.ExOLtCol Bernard H . KirkR-3LtCol Thomas R . Belzer

1st Battalion, 12th MarinesCOMaj George B . Thomas

2d Battalion, 12th MarinesCOLtCol William T. Fairbourn

3d Battalion, 12th MarinesCOLtCol Alpha L . Bowser, Jr .

4th Battalion, 12th MarinesCOMaj Joe B. Wallen

Headquarters, 4th Marine Division(19Feb-16Mar45 )

CGMajGen Clifton B. CatesADCBGen Franklin A. HartCof SCol Merton J. BatchelderD-1Col Orin H. WheelerD-2LtCol Gooderham L. McCormickD-3Col Edwin A . Pollock

Col Matthew C . Horner


Division Headquarters and Service Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol Bertrand T . Fay4th Engineer Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)COLtCol Nelson K. Brown

4th Medical Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCdr Reuben L . Sharp, MC, USN4th Motor Transport Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)COLtCol Ralph L. Schiesswohl

4th Pioneer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Richard G. Ruby

4th Service BattalionCOLtCol John E. Fondahl

4th Tank BattalionCOLtCol Richard K. Schmidt

23d Marines(19Feb-16Mar45)

COCol Walter W. WensingerExOLtCol Edward J . DillonR-3Maj Henry S . Campbell

1st Battalion, 23d MarinesCOLtCol Ralph Haas (KIA 20Feb-

45)LtCol Louis B. Blissard (from

20Feb45)

2d Battalion, 23d MarinesCOMaj Robert H. Davidson (WIA

7Mar45)LtCol Edward J. Dillon (from

7-11Mar45)Maj Robert H. Davidson (from11Mar45)

3d Battalion, 23d MarinesCOMaj James S. Scales


COCol Walter I . JordanExOLtCol Austin R. Brunelli (to 8-

Mar45)None shown (8-16Mar 45)

R-3Maj Webb D. Sawyer


1st Battalion, 24th MarinesCOMaj Paul S . Treitel (to 8Mar45)

LtCol Austin R . Brunelli (from8Mar45)

2d Battalion, 24th MarinesCOLtCol Richard Rothwell

3d Battalion, 24th MarinesCOLtCol Alexander A . Vandegrift,

Jr. (WIA 23Feb45)Maj Doyle A. Stout (from 23-

Feb45 )


COCol John R . LaniganExOLtCol Clarence J . O'DonnellR-3Maj John H. Jones

1st Battalion, 25th MarinesCOLtCol Hollis U. Mustain (KIA

21Feb45)Maj Fenton J. Mee (from 21Feb-

45)

2d Battalion, 25th MarinesCOLtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr. (WIA

20Feb45)LtCol James Taul (from 20Feb-

45)

3d Battalion, 25th MarinesCOLtCol Justice M. Chambers (WIA

22Feb45)Capt James C. Headley (from 22-Feb45)


COCol Louis G. DeHavenExOLtCol Randall M . VictoryR-3Maj Frederick J. Karch

1st Battalion, 14th MarinesCOMaj John B. Edgar, Jr.

2d Battalion, 14th MarinesCOMaj Clifford B . Drake

CO

CO

3d Battalion, 14th MarinesLtCol Robert E . MacFarlane

(WIA 19Feb45)Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 19-

23Feb45)LtCol Carl A . Youngdale (from23Feb-lOMar 45)

Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 10-Mar45)

4th Battalion, 14th MarinesLtCol Carl A . Youngdale (to 23-

-Feb45 )Maj Roland J . Spritzen (from 23-Feb-10Mar45)

LtCol Carl A . Youngdale (from10Mar45)

Headquarters, 5th Marine Division(19Feb-16Mar45)

MajGen Keller E . RockeyBGen Leo D . HermleCol Ray A. RobinsonCol John W. BeckettLtCol George A . RollCol James F . Shaw, Jr.Col Earl S . Piper

787

Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj John Ayrault, Jr .

5th Engineer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol Clifford H . Shuey

5th Medical Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLCdr William W . Ayres,USN

5th Motor Transport Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COMaj Arthur F . Torgler, Jr .

5th Pioneer Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Robert S . Riddell

M C,

788

5th Service Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COMaj Francis P. Daly (KIA 22-Feb45

None shown (from 22-27Feb45)Maj Gardelle Lewis (from 27Feb-

45)5th Tank Battalion(19Feb-16Mar45)

COLtCol William R . Collins26th Marines

(19Feb-16Mar45)COCol Chester B . GrahamExOCol Lester S . HamelR-3LtCol William K . Davenport, Jr.

1st Battalion, 26th MarinesCOLtCol Daniel C . Pollock (WIA

19Mar45)Maj Albert V. K. Gary (from 19-Mar45)

2d Battalion, 26th MarinesCOLtCol Joseph P. Sayers (WIA

23Feb45)Maj Amedeo Rea (from 23Feb45)

3d Battalion, 26th MarinesCOLtCol Tom M. Trotti

Feb45)Capt Richard M . Cook (22Feb45

only)Maj Richard Fagan (from 23-

Feb45)27th Marines

(19Feb-16Mar45)COCol Thomas A. WornhamExOCol Louis C . Plain (WIA 19Feb-

45)LtCol James P. Berkeley (from

15Mar45)R-3LtCol Justin G. Duryea (to 5Mar-

45)Capt Franklin L. Smith (from5Mar45)

1st Battalion, 27th MarinesCOLtCol John A. Butler (KIA 5-

Mar45)LtCol Justin G . Duryea (from 5-Mar45, WIA 9Mar45)

(KIA 22-


Maj William H . Tumbelston(from 9Mar45, WIA 14Mar45)

Maj William H. Kennedy, Jr .(from 14Mar45)

2d Battalion, 27th MarinesCOMaj John W. Antonelli (WIA 9-

Mar45)Maj Gerald F. Russell (from 9-Mar45)

3d Battalion, 27th MarinesCOLtCol Donn J . Robertson


COCol Harry B . LiversedgeExOLtCol Robert H. WilliamsR-3Maj Oscar F . Peatross (to 14-

Mar45)LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr .

(from 15Mar45)

1st Battalion, 28th MarinesCOLtCol Jackson B . Butterfield

2d Battalion, 28th MarinesCOLtCol Chandler W . Johnson (KIA

2Mar45)Maj Thomas B. Pearce, Jr . (from2Mar45 )

3d Battalion, 28th MarinesCOLtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr .

14Mar45 )Maj Tolson A . Smoak (from 14-

Mar 45 )

13th Marines(19Feb-16Mar45 )

COCol James D . WallerExOLtCol Kenyth A. DamkeR-3LtCol Jack Tabor

1st Battalion, 13th MarinesCOLtCol John S. Oldfield

2d Battalion, 13th MarinesCOMaj Carl W. Hjerpe

3d Battalion, 13th MarinesCOLtCol Henry T. Waller

4th Battalion, 13th MarinesCOMaj James F. Coady

(to


15Mar44)Maj Lloyd E. Pike (from 16 Mar-

5Sep44)Col Lawrence T . Burke (from 6-Sep-17Nov44 )

LtCol Corey C . Brayton (from 18-Nov44)

3 Under each unit listed below there will appear a letterdesignation for each major area in which the unit oper-ated, and dates of major involvement . Following are thecampaigns and dates of entitlements, though individualunits may have continued operations beyond the cutoffdates, particularly during the final months of the war .A. Marshalls-Marianas-Bypassed

Islands 25Dec43-26Mar45B. Peleliu 6Sep-140ct44C. Philippines 100ct44-20Jul45D. Iwo Jima 15Feb-16Mar453 Headquarters, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing did not move

to the Philippines until August 1945, shortly before theend of World War II .

789

Marine Aircraft Group 11Advance Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44)Rear Echelon (B-25Sep-140ct44)

COCol Caleb T . BaileyExOCol John S . HolmbergGruOpsO . . . . LtCol Jeslyn R. BaileyCO, Hq-Sgn-11 . .

CO,SMS-11 . .

Capt Cornelius Cole II

Maj Leslie T . Bryan, Jr .

Marine Aircraft Group 12Advance Echelon (C-3Dec44-4July45)

Rear Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45)COCol William A. Willis (to 26Feb-

45)Col Verne J. McCaul (from 27-

Feb45)

MARINE AIR UNITSHeadquarters Squadron Detachment,

1st Marine Aircraft Wing" . .(C-10Mar-4Jul45)'

W-2Capt Charles J . Greene, Jr. (to

W-3

100ct44)Capt Thomas C. Andrews (from

110ct44 )Col Lawrence T . Burke (to 2 Feb-

44)CO, HQSqn-1 . . .. Capt Robert W. BaileAdvance Echelon, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing Col Carson A . Roberts (from 3-

Feb-12Apr44)(B-24 Sep-140ct44)CGAWC

MajGen James T . MooreBGen Harold D. CampbellCol John WehleMaj William K . Lations

Col Lawrence T. Burke (from 13-Apr-16Jun44)

LtCol Lee C . Merrell, Jr . (from16Jun-15Sep44)

Cof SW-1W-2 (None shown) Col Calvin R. Freeman (from 16-W-3 Col Ronald D . Salmon Sep44-1Feb45)W-4LtCol Walter T. BrownellCO, Hq

Maj Elmer G . Glidden, Jr. (from2Feb-14 Mar45)

LtCol Martin A. Severson (from15Mar45)

Sqn--2 . . . . Maj Charles C. Campbell4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing

W-4 Maj Melville M . Nenefee (to 30-.. . . . . . . . ...(Redesignated 4th Marine Aircraft Wingeffective 10Nov44) Sep44)

Maj Granville Mitchell (from 1-(A-25 Dec43-26Mar45 )

CO, Hq-Sqn-4

Oct44 )

Maj Melchior B. Trelfall (to 15-Oct44 )

CGBGen Lewie G . Merritt (to 15-May44)

BGen Thomas J. Cushman15May-20Aug44)

(from

Maj Charles C . Boyer (from 16-Oct-14Dec44)

MajGen Louis E. Woods (from21Aug44)

AWC (None shown to 20Aug44) LtCol Alfred C . Cramp (from 15-Dec44-24Jan45)BGen Thomas J. Cushman (from

2dLt Robert21Aug-310ct44 ) J. Brown, Jr . (from

CofS(None shown from 1Nov44)Col Frank H . Lamson-Scribner

25Jan-3Feb45)Maj George F. Webster (from 4-

Feb45)W-1Maj Maurice L. McDermond (to

790

ExOLtCol John L. WinstonGruOpsO . . . . LtCol Frederick E . LeekCO, Hq-Sqn-12 . . Capt Francis L . O'Melia

CO,SMS-12 .. Capt William B . Freeman

Marine Aircraft Group 13(A-31Jan44-26Mar45)

COCol Lawrence Norman (to 16Dec-44)

LtCol Chauncey V . Burnett (from17Dec44)

ExOCol Athur F. Binney (to 15Jul-44)

LtCol Avery R. Kier (from 16-Jul-4Sep44)

LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. from5Sep-80ct44)

LtCol Chauncey V . Burnett (from90ct-16Dec44 )

LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr . (from17Dec44-3Feb45)

LtCol Edward J . Moore (from 4-Feb-11Mar45)

LtCol John V. Kipp (from 12-Mar45)

GruOpsO . . . . LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (to 9-May44)

LtCol Avery R. Kier (from 10May-15Jul44)

LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from16Jul-4Sep44)

LtCol Paul R. Byrum, Jr. (from5Sep-80ct44)

LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from90ct-16Dec44 )

Maj James C. Otis (from 17Dec-44-10Mar45)

LtCol Edward J . Moore (from 11-Mar45 )

CO, Hq-Sgn-13 Maj Harlan Rogers (to 22Apr44)

Maj Stanley W . Burke (from 23-Apr-3Dec44)

Capt Clement F. Hahn, Jr . (from4Dec44)

CO,SMS-13 .. Maj David Ahee (to 9Jun44)

LtCol Corey C . Brayton, Jr . (from10Jun-7Nov44 )

Maj Joseph A . Gray (from 8 Nov-44)


Marine Aircraft Group 1 .4Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-15May45)Rear Echelon (C-23Feb-28May45)

COCol Zebulon C. Hopkins (to 17-May-45)

Col Edward A. Montgomery (from1-8May45 )

ExOLtCol Curtis W. Smith, Jr.GruOpsO . . . . Maj William C. HumberdCO, Hq-

Sqn-14 . . Capt Robert M . CrooksCO,SMS-14 .. Capt Droel H. Looney

Marine Aircraft Group 15(A-lApr44-25 Mar45 )

COLtCol Ben Z . Redfield ('to 31May-44)

Col Thomas J. McQuade (from 1-Jun-30Sep44)

LtCoI Ben Z . Redfield (from 10-Oct44)

ExOMaj Neil R . Maclntyre (to 31May-44)

LtCol Ben Z . Redfield (from 1Jun-30Sep44)

LtCol George D. Omer (from 1-310ct44)

LtCol Stanley W. Trachta (from1Nov44-28Feb45)

LtCoI Edward F . Knight (from1Mar45)

GruOpsO . . . . Maj Ridgway Baker (to 1Oct44)Maj Clifford R. Banks, Jr. (from

1-3,lOct44)LtCol Edward F. Knight (from 1-Nov44-21Jan45)

Maj Charles W . Sommers, Jr .(from 22Jan-5Mar45)

LtCol Desmond E. Canavan (from6Mar45)

CO,Hq-Sqn-15 Capt Louis F . Ferguson (to 15-

Oct44)Maj Melchior B . Trelfall (from 16-Oct44-6Mar45 )

Maj Peter Ficker (from 7Mar45)CO,SMS-15 .. Maj Thomas H. Ray (to 8Sep44)

1st Lt Thomas F. Wade, Acting(from 9Sep-5Nov44)

Maj Thomas H. Ray (from 6Nov-44)


Marine Aircraft Group 21

CO, Hq-(A-27Jul44-26Mar45)

CoCol Peter P . Schrider (to 6Sep44)Col Edward B . Carney (from 7-

Sep44)ExOLtCol James A . Booth, Jr. (to 2-

Oct44 )(None shown 3Oct-28Nov44)LtCol George D . Omer (from 29-Nov44-7Jan45)

LtCol Wilfred J. Huffman (from8Jan45)

GruOps0 . . . . LtCol Robert W. Clark (to 3Sep-44)

LtCol James A . Embrey, Jr. (from4Sep44-6Mar45)

LtCol John S. Carter (from 7Mar-45)

CO, Hq-Sqn-21 . . Maj Robert F'. Higley

CO,SMS-21 . . Maj Charlton B. Ivey (to 22Aug-

44)Capt Albert I . Haas (from 23Aug-44-3OJan45)

LtCol George E . Congdon (from31Jan45)

Marine Aircraft Group 22(A-19Feb44-26Mar45)

COCol James M. Daly (to 90ct44)Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. (from

10Oct44)ExOLtCol Richard D . Hughes (to 14-

Aug44)(None shown from 15-19Aug44)Col Edward B . Carney (from 20-Aug-17Sep44)

LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr. (from18Sep44-7Jan45)

LtCol Elmer A. Wrenn (from 8-Jan45)

GruOpsO .. . . LtCol Julian F . Walters (to 24Jul-44)

LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 25-Jul-3Aug44)

LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr. (from4Aug-17Sep44)

LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 18-Sep-9Nov44)

Maj Thomas C. Colt, Jr. (from1ONov44)

Sqn-22 . .

CO,SMS-22 . .

1stLt John W . Hackner, Jr . (to 20-Nov44)

Maj Alfred C. Cramp (from 21-Nov-18Dec44)

Capt Lindsay K . Dickey (from 19-Dec44)

Capt John A. Hood (to 15Aug44)Capt Arthur Blakeney (from 16-Aug44-25Jan45)

Maj Bruce Prosser (from 26Jan-45)


Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-8Apr45)Rear Echelon (C-22Jan-8Apr45)

(C-22Jan-4Jul45)

COLtCol Lyle H. Meyer (to 31May-45)

Col Warren E . Sweetser, Jr. (from1Jun45)

ExOLtCol John H . Earle, Jr .GruOpsO . . . . LtCol Keith B . McCutcheonCO, Hq-

Sqn-24 . . Capt J. Devereaux Wrather, Jr .CO,SMS-24 .. Capt Horace C . Baum, Jr . (to 21-

Jan45)Maj William K. Snyder (from 22-

Jan45)


(C--300ct44-lApr45)

COCol Allen C. Koonce (to 13Feb45)Col Harold C . Major (from 14Feb-

45)ExOLtCol John P . Coursey (to 13Nov-

44)LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from

25Nov44-SFeb45)Col Warren E . Sweetser, Jr.. (from9Feb45)

GruOpsO .. . . LtCol Theodore W. Sanford, Jr.(to 4Mar45)

LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from5Mar45)

791

792

CO, Hq-Sqn-25

Capt LeRoy M . James (to 210ct-44)

Maj Theodore E . Beal (from 22-Oct-9Nov44)

Maj Charles J. Prall (from 10-Nov44)

CO,SMS-25 .. LtCol Hillard T . Shepard (to 14-

Nov44)LtCol Albert S. Munsch (from 15-Nov44 )

Marine Aircraft Group 31(A-U644-26Mar45)

COCol Calvin R . Freeman (to 12Sep-44)LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (from 13-

Sep-13Dec44 )LtCol Martin A . Severson (from13Dec44-5Mar45)

Col John C. Munn (from 6Mar45)ExOCol Edward B . Carney (to 16Aug-

44)LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (from 17-Aug-13Dec44)

LtCol Richard D. Hughes (from13Dec44-15Jan45)

LtCol Gordon E . Hendricks (from16Jan45)

GruOpsO . . . . LtCol Ralph K . Rottet (to 16 Aug-44)

LtCol Richard D. Hughes (from17Aug-12Sep44)

LtCol Kenneth D . Kerby (from 13-30Sep44)

LtCoI Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (from1Oct-21Dec44)

LtCol Kirk Armistead (from 22-Dec44)

CO, Hq-Sgn-31 .. Capt Warren S . Adams II (to 9-

Apr44)Capt James C . Woodhull, Jr.(from 1OApr-31Dec44)

COCapt William L. Thompson (fromlJan--4Feb45)

Maj Leon A. Danco (from 5Feb45)CO,SMS-31 .. Capt Neil A. Vestal (to 14Mar44)

Capt John Zouck (from 15Mar44-18Feb45)

Maj Archibald M. Smith, Jr. (from19Feb45)

CO

CO,SMS-32 . .

CO

CO

CO

CO

Air Warning Squadron 1(A-20Feb44-26Mar45)Capt William D . Felder (to 20-

Dec44)Capt Edward R . Stainback (from

21Dec44)

Advance Echelon, Marine ObservationSquadron 1

(D-19Feb-8Mar45 )Lt Anthony E . Barrett, Jr .

. . . . . . . . . . .. . .


Marine Aircraft Group 32Group Echelon (C-27Jan-22Feb45)Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-22Feb45)Advance Echelon (C-10Mar-4Jul45)Rear Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45)

COCol Clayton C . JeromeExOLtCol John L. SmithGruOpsO . . . . LtCol Wallace T . ScottCO, Hq-Sqn-32 .. Capt Harold L . Maryott (to 17-

Mar45)1stLt Robert W. Mazur (from 18-Mar45)

Maj Jack D. Kane

Air Warning Squadron 3(C-17Apr-4Jul45)Capt Harold W. Swope (to 1Jul45)Capt Freeman R . Cass (from 2-

Ju145 )

Advance Echelon, Marine ObservationSquadron 3

(B-15Sep-140ct44)COCapt Wallace J. Slappey, Jr .

Air Warning Squadron 4(C-lOMar-4Jul45 )

Capt Charles T. Porter

Marine Observation Squadron 4(D-19Feb-16Mar45 )1stLt Thomas Rozga

Marine Observation Squadron 5(D-19Feb-16Mar45)1stLt Roy G. Miller


Marine Fighter Squadron 111(A-7Mar44-26Mar45 )

COMaj J. Frank Cole (to 6Apr44)Maj William E. Clasen (7Apr-270ct44)

Maj William T . Herring (280ct44-1'Mar45)

Maj Robert D . Kelly (from 2Mar-45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 112(USS Bennington)(D-15Feb-4Mar45)

COMaj Herman Hansen, Jr .

Marine Fighter Squadron 113(A-15Jan44-26Mar45)

COCapt Loren D. Everton (to 7Sep-44)

Maj Charles Kimak (from 8Sep-18Dec44)

Maj Philip R. White (from 19Dec-44-20Feb45)

Maj Hensley Williams (from 21-Feb45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 114Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44)Flight Echelon (B-26Sep-140ct44)

COCapt Robert F. Stout

Marine Fighter Squadron 115(C-17Dec44-4Jul45 )

COMaj John H . King, Jr. (to 29May-45)

Maj John S. Payne (from 30May-45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 121Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44)

COMaj Walter J . Meyer

Marine Fighter Squadron 122Ground Echelon (B-15Sep-140ct44)

Flight Echelon (B-1-140ct44)COMaj Joseph H. Reinburg

Advance Echelon Marine Fighter Squadron 123(USS Bennington)(D-15Feb-4Mar45 )

COMaj Everett V. Alward (to 25-Feb45)

Maj Thomas E . Mobley (from 25-Feb45)

CO

CO

CO

. . . . . . . . . ... . .

Marine Fighter Squadron 124(USS Essex)

(C-3-22Jan45 )(D-15Feb-4Mar45)Maj William A. Millington

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133(C-22Jan-4Jul45 )

COMaj Lee A. Christoffersen (to 8-Mar45)

Maj Floyd Cummings (from 9-Mar45 )

Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134Ground Echelon (B-30Sep-140ct44)

Flight Echelon (B-6-140ct44)Maj Russell R. Riley

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142Ground . Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45)Flight Echelon (C-27Jan-4Jul45)Capt Hoyle R. Barr (to 8Jun45)

Maj James L. Fritsche (from 9-Jun45)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151(A-29Feb44-26Mar45)

COLtCol Gordon H. Knott (to 300ct-44)

Maj Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr .(from 310ct-4Dec44)

Maj Bruce Prosser (from 5Dec44-25Jan45)

Maj Robert J . Shelley, Jr. (from25Jan45)

Marine Observation Squadron 155(redesignated MarineFighter Squadron 155,

effective 31Jan45)(A-1Nov44-26Mar45)

COCapt John P . Haines, Jr . (toJan45)

Maj John E . Reynolds (fromJan-14Feb45)

Maj Wayne M. Cargill (fromFeb45)

793

13-

14-

15-

Marine Fighter Squadron 211(C-5Dec44-4Jul45)

794

COMaj Stanislaus J . Witomski (to30Jan45)

Maj Philip B . May (from 31Jan-20Mar45 )

Maj Angus F. Davis (from 21Mar-45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 212(C-19Jan-14May45 )

COMaj Quinton R . Johns (to 27Apr-45)

Maj John P . McMahon (from 28-Apr45 )

Marine Fighter Squadron 213(USS Essex)

(C-3-22Jan45)(D-15Feb-4Mar45)

COMaj Donald P. Frame (to 28Jan-45)

Maj Louis R. Smunk (from 29Jan-4Feb45)

Maj David E . Marshall (from 5-Feb45)

Advance Echelon, Marine FighterSquadron 216(USS Wasp)

(D-15Feb-4Mar45 )COMaj George E . Dooley

Advance Echelon, Marine FighterSquadron 217(USS Wasp)

(D-15Feb-4Mar45)COMaj Jack R . Amende, Jr. (to 16-

Feb45 )Maj George E . Buck (from 17Feb-

45)Marine Fighter Squadron 218

(C-10Mar-4Jul45)COMaj John M . Massey

Advance Echelon, Marine FighterSquadron 221

(USS Bunker Hill)(D-15Feb-4Mar45 )

COMaj Edwin S. Roberts, Jr .

Marine Fighter Squadron 222(C-11Jan-14May45 )

COMaj Roy T. Spurlock (to 27Apr45)Maj Harold A. Harwood (from28Apr45 )


Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 223(C-19Jan-15May45)

COMaj Robert F . Flaherty (to 24Mar-45)

Maj Robert W. Teller (from 25-Mar-16Apr45)

Maj Howard E. King (from 17-Apr45 )

Marine Fighter Squadron 224(A-1Jan44-26Mar45)

COMaj Darrell D . Irwin (to 24Aug-44)

Maj Howard A. York (from 24-Aug-31Dec44)

Maj James W. Poindexter (from31Dec44)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231(A-4F644-lAug45 )

COMaj Elmer G . Glidden, Jr . (to 4-Sep44)

Maj William E . Abblitt (from 5-Sep44-3Feb45)

Maj Joseph W . White, Jr . (from3Feb45)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 233(C-26Jun-6Ju145 )

COCapt Edmund W. Berry

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236Advance Echelon (C-11Jan-4Jul45)Rear Echelon (C-28Jan-4Jul45)

COMaj Fred J. Frazer

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 24. 1Advance Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45)Rear Echelon (C-25Jan-4Jul45)

COMaj Benjamin B . Manchester, III(to 19Feb45)

Maj Jack L. Brushert (from 20-Feb45)

Advance Echelon, Marine Torpedo-BomberSquadron 242(C-8-16Mar45 )

COMaj William W . Dean

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45)Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-0u145)

COMaj Joseph W . Kean, Jr.


Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45)Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-4Jul45)

COMaj Vance H. Hudgins

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245(A-1Jun44-15Aug45 )

COMaj Julian F. Acers (to 23Sep44)Maj Robert F. Halladay (from 24-

Sep44-30Jun45)Maj John E. Bell (from 1Jul45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 251(C-2Jan-12May45)

COMaj William C . Humberd (to 9-Feb45)

Maj William L. Bacheler (fromlOFeb-14Apr45)

Maj Thomas W. Furlow (from 15-Apr45)

Marine Transport Squadron 252(D-3-9Mar45 )

COLtCol Russell A. Bowen

Marine Transport Squadron 253(D-3-16Mar45)

COLtCol John V. Kipp (to 9Mar45)Maj Jack F . McCollum (from 10-Mar45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 311(A-15May44-20Jan45)

COMaj Harry B . Hooper, Jr . (to 23-Oct44 )

Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 24-Oct44 )

Marine Fighter Squadron 313Ground Echelon (C-3Dec44-1Jun45)Flight Echelon (C-18Dec44-1Jun45)

COMaj Joe J. McGlothin, Jr. (to 26-Apr45 )

Capt Jay E. McDonald (from 27-29Apr45 )

1stLt John M . Lomac (from 30-Apr45 )

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331Flight Echelon (A-25Feb44-lAug45)Ground Echelon (A-2Mar44-lAug45)

CO Maj Paul R . Byrum, Jr . to 9May-44)

Maj James C. Otis (from 10May-15Dec44)

Maj John H. McEniry (16Dec44-2Feb45)

Maj Winston E . Jewson (from 3-Feb45)

795

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341Ground Echelon (C-22Jan-4Jul45)Flight Echelon (C-28Jan-4Jul45)

COMaj Christopher F. Irwin (to 3-May45)

Maj Robert J. Bear (from 4May-45)

Marine Transport Squadron 353(B-6-140 ct44)(D-8-16Mar45)

COMaj John R. Walcott

Marine Fighter Squadron 441(A-1Jan44-6Apr45)

COMaj James B . Moore (to 4Apr44)Maj Grant W. Metzger (from 5-Apr44-20Jan45)

Maj Robert 0 . White (from 21-Jan45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 422(A-24Jan44-25Apr45)

COMaj John S . MacLaughlin, Jr.MIA 24Jan44)

Maj Edwin C. Fry (from 25Jan-1Feb44)

Maj Elmer A. Wrenn (from 2Feb-31Dec44)

Maj Elkin S . Dew (from 1Jan45)

Advance Echelon, Marine FighterSquadron 451

(USS Bunker Hill)(D-15Feb-4Mar45)

COMaj Henry A. Ellis, Jr.

Marine Fighter Squadron 511(USS Block Island)(C-26Jun-6Jul45)

COCapt James L . Secrest

COMaj Ross S. Mickey (to 23May45)Maj James B. Maguire, Jr . (from24May-15Jun45)

Maj Clair C. Chamberlain (from21Jun45)

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541

Ground Echelon (A-15Sep44-28Aug45)Flight Echelon (A-24Sep-3Dec44)Flight Echelon (C-4Dec44-lOJan45)Flight Echelon (A-11Jan-28Aug45)

Marine Bombing Squadron 612(D-15 Feb-16Mar45 )

COMaj Lawrence F. Fox

Marine Bombing Squadron 613(A-23 Dec44-26Mar45 )

COMaj George W. Nevils

Marine Transport Squadron 952

(B-1-140ct44 )(D-1-16 Mar45 )

COMaj Malcolm S . Mackay


Marine Fighter Squadron 512

(USS Gilbert Islands)(C-26Jun-6Ju145)

COLtCol Peter D . Lambrecht (to 20-Jun45)

Maj Norman L . Mitchell (fromCOMaj Blaine H . Baesler 21Jun-7Jul45)

Maj Reynolds A . Moody (from8Jul45)

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532

(A-27Feb-230ct44 ) Marine Bombing Squadron 611CO Maj Everett H. Vaughan

Sep44)Capt Warren S . Adams II24Sep44)

(to 23-

(from

Ground Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45)Flight Echelon (C-30Mar-4Jul45)

COLtCol George A . Sarles (KIA 30-May45)

Maj Robert R. Davis (from 1-19-Jun45)

Maj David Horne (from 20Jun45)Marine Night Fighter Squadron 53.4

(A-4Aug44-15Aug45 )

Marine Casualties'

APPENDIX H

1 These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, Personnel Account-ing Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC . Figures for the Peleliu Operation were certified and re-leased on 1 June 1960 ; those for Iwo Jima in August 1952. Naval casualties were taken from NavMed P-5021 . TheHistory of the Medical Department of the Navy in World War 11 (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1953) .The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows : KIA, Killed in Action ; DOW, Died ofWounds ; WIA, Wounded in Action ; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed Dead . Because of the casualty reportingmethod used during World War II, a substantial number of DOW figures are also included in the WIA column .

2Includes Ngesebus.3 Includes bypassed Marshalls, Carolines, Palau, Philippines, and Volcano Bonin Islands, overall period covering

February 1944 - June 1945 .A See Footnote (1) above .6 Time frame identical to (3) above .

797

KIA DOW WIA MIAPD TO AL

Location and DateOffi-cer

En-listed

Offi-cer

En-listed

Offi-cer

En-listed

Offi-cer

En-listed

Offi-cer

En-listed

Marines

Peleliu(6Sep-140ct44)

66 984 18 232 301 5,149 0 36 385 6,401

Iwo Jima(19Feb-26Mar45)

215 4,339 60 1,271 826 16,446 3 43 1,104 22,099

Aviation' 66 49 3 6 91 212 44 32 204 299

Sea-duty 4 61 0 9 8 142 0 63 12 275

Total Marines 351 5,433 81 1,518 1,226 21,949 47 174 1,705 29,074

Naval Medical PersonnelOrganic to Marine Units`

Peleliu 1 49 0 11 11 238 0 0 12 298

Iwo Jima 4 183 0 22 19 622 0 0 23 827

Marine Aviation` 0 2 0 0 2 10 0 0 4 10

Total Navy 5 234 0 33 32 870 0 0 39 1,135

Grand Total 356 667 0 1,551 1,258 22,817 47 174 1,744 30,209

Unit Commendations

798

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVYWashington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIALUNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

APPENDIX I

consisting of

for service as set forth in the following

FIRST Marine Division ; First Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF ; U.S. Navy FlameThrower Unit Attached ; Sixth Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMF ;Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional), FMF ; Detachment Eighth Am-phibian Tractor Battalion, FMF ; 454th Amphibian Truck Company, U .S. Army ; 456thAmphibian Truck Company, U.S. Army ; Fourth Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF ;Fifth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF ; Sixth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF,

CITATION"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at Peleliu

and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944 . Landing over a treacherous coral reefagainst hostile mortar and artillery fire, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, seizeda narrow, heavily mined beachhead and advanced foot by foot in the face of relentlessenfilade fire through rain-forests and mangrove swamps toward the air strip, the keyto the enemy defenses of the southern Palaus . Opposed all the way by thoroughlydisciplined, veteran Japanese troops heavily entrenched in caves and in reinforcedconcrete pillboxes which honeycombed the high ground throughout the island, the officersand men of the Division fought with undiminished spirit and courage despite heavylosses, exhausting heat and difficult terrain, seizing and holding a highly strategic airand land base for future operations in the Western Pacific . By their individual acts ofheroism, their aggressiveness and their fortitude, the men of the FIRST MarineDivision, Reinforced, upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

For the President,JOHN L. SULLIVAN,

Secretary of the Navy

UNIT COMMENDATIONS

EXTRACT

GENERAL ORDERS)

WAR DEPARTMENTNo. 22

)

Washington, D . C., 14 February 1947Section

BATTLE HONORS - Citation of Unit XVXV -BATTLE HONORS .

The Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541 is cited for extraordinary performanceof duty in action against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 3 to 15 Decem-ber 1944. During a critical period in the fight for the control of the Philippine Islands,the pilots and ground crews of this unit signally distinguished themselves by the in-trepidity and unyielding determination with which they overcame exceptionally adverseweather conditions and operational difficulties engendered by lack of ground facilitiesand incomplete radar directional coverage . Their superb airmanship and daring re-sourcefulness displayed in outstanding night patrol and interception work, which fore-stalled destruction of airfield facilities, and in the completeness of cover provided fornumerous vital convoys and Patrol Torpedo boat patrols, effectively thwarted enemyattempts to prevent consolidation and further expansion of the foothold gained byUnited States forces in the Philippines . Achieving a record unparalleled at that time,the unit, composed of but 15 aircraft and 22 pilots, flew 136 sorties totaling 298 .6combat hours, destroyed 18 enemy aircraft in aerial combat without unit loss or damage,and on numerous occasions pitted consummate skill and accuracy against overwhelmingnumerically superior enemy strength . The extraordinary performance of the air andground personnel of the Marine Fighter Squadron 541 in overcoming the greatest ofaerial hazards and maintenance difficulties reflects the highest credit on themselvesand the military service of the United States .

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR :

OFFICIAL :

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,Chief of Staff

EDWARD F. WITSELLMajor GeneralThe Adjutant General

799

800


The President of the Unites States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIALUNIT CITATION to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE



CITATION :"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Philip-

pine Islands from December 3, 1944, to March 9, 1945 . Operating from the capturedairfield at Tacloban, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE employed Corsairs as bombingplanes to strike destructive blows at escorted enemy convoys and to prevent the Jap-anese from reinforcing their beleagured garrisons by landing troops and supplies onwestern Leyte. Undeterred by intense aerial opposition and accurate antiaircraft fire,these pilots provided effective cover for ground troops, shore installations and Fleetunits and, on several occasions, when ground troops were held up by heavy enemy fire,bombed and strafed Japanese positions, thereby enabling our land forces to advanceunopposed . As hostile resistance lessened on Leyte, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVEexpanded its sphere of operations to strike at enemy garrisons on the Visayan Islandsand southern Luzon and to support the Lingayen beachheads, neutralizing the enemy'slines of communication, his harbors, airfields and escape routes, and ranging far frombase to provide aerial cover for ships of the SEVENTH Fleet and merchant-shipconvoys operating in the area . During February and the early part of March, thiscourageous Group gave direct support to Guerrilla units fighting on Cebu Island andaided in their rapid advance and the ultimate neutralization of the island . Well sup-ported by skilled and dependable ground personnel, the gallant pilots of Marine AircraftGroup TWELVE caused the Japanese severe losses in airplanes, installations andsurface craft, contributing to the achievement of air superiority so essential to thesuccess of the campaign and thereby upholding the highest traditions of the UnitedStates Naval Service."

For the President,FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS,

Secretary of the Navy

UNIT COMMENDATIONS


The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIALUNIT CITATION to

ASSAULT TROOPS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, REINFORCEDUNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE


CITATION"For extraordinary heroism in action during the seizure of enemy Japanese-held

Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945 . Landing against resistance whichrapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beaches with artillery, rocketand mortar fire, the Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps inched aheadthrough shifting black volcanic sands, over heavily mined terrain, toward a garrison ofjagged cliffs barricaded by an interlocking system of caves, pillboxes and blockhousescommanding all approaches. Often driven back with terrific losses in fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Assault Troops repeatedly hurled back the enemy's counterattacksto regain and hold lost positions, and continued the unrelenting drive to high groundand Motoyama Airfield No . 1, captured by the end of the second day. By their individualacts of heroism and their unfailing teamwork, these gallant officers and men foughtagainst their own battle-fatigue and shock to advance in the face of the enemy'sfanatical resistance ; they charged each strongpoint, one by one, blasting out the hiddenJapanese troops or sealing them in; within four days they had occupied the southernpart of Motoyama Airfield No . 2 ; simultaneously they stormed the steep slopes ofMount Suribachi to raise the United States Flag ; and they seized the strongly defendedhills to silence guns commanding the beaches and insure the conquest of Iwo Jima, avital inner defense of the Japanese Empire ."

The following Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps, United States Fleet MarineForce, participated in the Iwo Jima Operation from February 19 to 28, 1945 :

9th Marines ; 21st Marines; 3rd Engineer Battalion (less detachment) ; 3rd Tank Battalion ;3rd Joint Assault Signal Company (less detachment) ; Reconnaissance Company, HeadquartersBattalion, THIRD Marine Division ; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 12th Marines ; Pilotsand Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 1 ; 23rd Marines ; 24th Marines ; 25th Marines ;Companies A, B, and C, 4th Tank Battalion; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Engineer Battalion ;1st Joint Assault Signal Company ; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, Head-quarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division ; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Pioneer Battalion ;10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Reconnaissance Company,Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division ; Companies A and B and Detachment,

801


Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion ; 7th Marine War Dog Platoon ;Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 4 ; Liaison and Forward Observer Par-ties, 14th Marines; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment ; 26th Marines ; 27th Marines ; 28th Ma-rines; 5th Engineer Battalion ; 5th Tank Battalion ; 6th War Dog Platoon; 5th Joint AssaultSignal Company; 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion ; Com-panies A, B, and C, 5th Pioneer Battalion ; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion,FIFTH Marine Division ; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, HeadquartersBattalion, FIFTH Marine Division ; 3rd Provisional Rocket Detachment ; Pilots and Air Observ-ers, Marine Observation Squadron 5; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 13th Marines ;Companies C, D, and Detachment, Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion .

For the President,JOHN L. SULLIVANSecretary of the Navy

UNIT COMMENDATIONS


The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS SIGNAL BATTALION


CITATION"For extremely meritorious service in support of military operations, while at-

tached to the I Marine Amphibious Corps during the amphibious assault on Bougain-ville, and attached to the III Amphibious Corps during operations at Guam, Palau andOkinawa, during the period from November 1, 1943 to June 21, 1945 . The first Ameri-can Signal Battalion to engage in amphibious landings in the Pacific Ocean Areas ;the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion pioneered and developed techniques andprocedures without benefit of established precedent, operating with limited and in-adequate equipment, particularly in the earlier phase of these offensive actions, andproviding its own security while participating in jungle fighting, atoll invasions andoccupation of large island masses . Becoming rapidly experienced in guerrilla warfareand the handling of swiftly changing situations, this valiant group of men success-fully surmounted the most difficult conditions of terrain and weather as well as un-familiar technical problems and, working tirelessly without consideration for safety,comfort or convenience, provided the Corps with uninterrupted ship-shore and bivouaccommunication service continuously throughout this period . This splendid record ofachievement, made possible only by the combined efforts, loyalty and courageous devo-tion to duty of each individual, was a decisive factor in the success of the hazardousBougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa Campaigns and reflects the highest creditupon the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion who actually participatedin one or more of the Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa operations are hereby authorizedto wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTALSecretary of the Navy

803

804


THIRD 155-mm. HOWITZER BATTALION


CITATION"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Jap-

anese forces on Peleliu, Palau Islands, from 15 to 29 September 1944 . Landing on anunestablished beachhead between 300 and 400 yards deep despite rugged terrain andfanatic opposition, the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion established a position acrossa 200-yard front and emplaced its weapons precariously on top of solid rock within 300yards of heavily entrenched, well concealed Japanese fortifications on commandingground. The Battalion effectively utilized its 155-mm. howitzers in the same method ofoperation as demolitions to pound hostile pillboxes, machine-gun positions and troopconcentrations with heavy fire and succeeded in annihilating the enemy, breaking downthe hillsides and closing the caves in the sheer coral cliffs with rubble . Ordered later tohold a defensive sector on the front lines, the men and officers of the Battalion func-tioned effectively as an infantry unit despite the lack of specific training, and reso-lutely held the line until relieved . Resourceful and daring in the unorthodox employ-ment of howitzers, the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion provided unfailing supportvital to the conquest of this strategic enemy stronghold, thereby upholding the highesttraditions of the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Third 155-mm . Howitzer Battalion during thisperiod are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWSSecretary of the Navy



UNIT COMMENDATIONS


for service as follows :

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP ELEVEN

"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Jap-anese forces during the Peleliu Campaign and the consolidation of the Western Caro-lines from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945. Performing valuable service duringthe early stages of the Peleliu Campaign by coordinating with ground units in unload-ing, establishing the air base and furnishing riflemen and stretcher bearers, MarineAircraft Group ELEVEN commenced air operations on September 24 while the air-field was still under direct enemy fire . Assigned the mission of providing close supportfor ground troops which necessitated utmost precision because of close in-fightingbetween the opposing forces, the officers and men evolved new and unique tactics asexemplified in the development of steep-angle glide-bombing with varied fuse settingsfor diversified targets; low-level precision skip-bombing of almost impregnable cavesin precipitous cliffs ; and the employment of napalm bombs without fuses to be firedsimultaneously by phosphorus shells from infantry weapons . By their resourcefulness,courage and skill, the flight personnel and ground crewmen of Marine Aircraft GroupELEVEN achieved an illustrious combat record in keeping with the highest traditionsof the United States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN, consisting ofHeadquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN ; Marine ServiceSquadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN ; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDREDFOURTEEN ; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE ; Marine Fight-ing Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY TWO ; Marine Night Fighting Squadron FIVEHUNDRED FORTY ONE ; and Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTYFOUR, from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNITCOMMENDATION Ribbon.

805

JOHN L . SULLIVANSecretary of the Navy

806


EIGHTH 155-mm. GUN BATTALION


CITATION :"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces on Peleliu,

Palau Islands, from 17 to 29 September 1944 . Landing heavy material over treacherouscoral reefs in the face of fanatic opposition, the Eighth 155-mm . Gun Battalion pushedforward to the southern edge of the airfield where the enemy was concentrating thefire of heavy mortars and anti-boat and anti-tank guns . Undeterred by infiltratingJapanese troops and intense mortar barrages, this Battalion went into firing positionand rendered effective support to the Eighty-First Army Division . Moving around theoutlying islands in LVT'S equipped with radar, this gallant Battalion prevented thereinforcement of hostile defenses on Peleliu and, in the later stages, denied routes ofescape to the remnants of the defending garrison . When the infantry was confrontedby an almost impenetrable barrier of man-made and natural defenses which withstoodthe onslaughts of tank and demolition squads and the fire of mortars, machine gunsand small arms, elements of the Battalion moved forward and boldly emplaced a 155-mm .gun in an unprotected position close to the enemy . Braving intense hostile fire whichcaused several casualties, this indomitable group courageously fired its weapon at point-blank range and succeeded in exploding concealed ammunition dumps, annihilating theenemy and completely eliminating the strong point, thus permitting the infantry toclear the area . By their valor, determination and fighting spirit, the officers and menof the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion rendered invaluable service in breaking downthe enemy's resistance and in hastening the conquest of this strategic Japanese strong-hold, achieving a gallant combat record in keeping with the highest traditions of theUnited States Naval Service ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion during this periodare hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWSSecretary of the Navy



UNIT COMMENDATIONS



MARINE BOMBING SQUADRON SIX HUNDRED TWELVE


"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during numer-ous offensive missions in the Central Pacific Area from November 1, 1944, to May 31,1945. Aggressive and courageous in the execution of their manifold assignments, thepilots and aircrewmen of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVEserved heroically despite severe weather and relentless opposition in a series of air-searescues, special experimental operations and highly successful night, low-level rocketattacks against strongly defended shipping and shore installations . By their expert air-manship and superb skill, they saved the lives of several B-29 crews, developed andtested valuable new technical equipment and destroyed or extensively damaged 29Japanese ships. This outstanding record of service and combat achievement, made pos-sible only by the teamwork and steadfast devotion to duty of the pilots, flight crews andmaintenance men of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE, is inkeeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service ."

The pilots, aircrewmen and ground crews attached to Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUN-DRED TWELVE during the above mentioned period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVYUNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

807


808





MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP THIRTY-TWO

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTHArmy in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands, Areas, from January 23to March 15, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day,Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO operated continuously against Japanese forces,flying a series of more than 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relent-less air and ground force opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetratednumerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammu-nition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectivelyreduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to our ground forces'sweeping victory in this area . The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft GroupTHIRTY-TWO reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of thesecourageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of theUnited States Naval Service ."

All personnel of the United States Armed forces serving with Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO during the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDA-TION Ribbon.


UNIT COMMENDATIONS




MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-FOUR

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTHArmy in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands Area, from January 23 toApril 10, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day, MarineAircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR operated continuously against Japaneses forces, fly-ing a series of more tha n 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relent-less air and ground force opposition . Dauntless and determined, these units penetratednumerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammu-nition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectivelyreduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to the sweeping victoryof our ground forces in this area. The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft GroupTWENTY-FOUR reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty ofthese courageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of theUnited States Naval Service ."

All personnel of the United States Armed Forces serving with Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOURduring the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATIONRibbon .

809


810



SUPPORT UNITS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPSUNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE



"For outstanding heroism in support of Military Operations during the seizureof enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945 . Landingagainst resistance which rapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beacheswith artillery, rocket and mortar fire, the Support Units of the FIFTH AmphibiousCorps surmounted the obstacles of chaotic disorganization, loss of equipment, suppliesand key personnel to develop and maintain a continuous link between thousands ofassault troops and supply ships . Resourceful and daring whether fighting in the frontline of combat, or serving in rear areas or on the wreck-obstructed beaches, they wereresponsible for the administration of operations and personnel ; they rendered effectivefire support where Japanes pressure was greatest ; they constructed roads and facilitiesand maintained communications under the most difficult and discouraging conditions ofweather and rugged terrain ; they salvaged vital supplies from craft lying crippled inthe surf or broached on the beaches ; and they ministered to the wounded under fireand provided prompt evacuation to hospital ships . By their individual initiative andheroism and their ingenious teamwork, they provided the unfailing support vital to theconquest of Iwo Jima, a powerful defense of the Japanese Empire ."

All personnel attached to and serving with the following Support Units of the FIFTH Amphib-iius Corps, United States Fleet Marine Force, during the Iwo Jima Operation from February19 to 28, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon .

Headquarters & Service Battalion; Medical Battalion ; Signal Battalion; Motor Transport Com-pany ; Detachment, 1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon ; Detachment, Signal, Headquarters,Air Warning Squadron 7 - Army Fighter Command; Detachment, 568th Signal Air WarningBattalion - Army; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army ; Detachment, 49thSignal Construction Battalion - Army; Detachment 44 - 70th Army Airways CommunicationsService - Army ; Detachment, Communication Unit 434 (Group Pacific 11) ; Landing Force AirSupport Control Unit No . 1 ; 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion ; 62nd Naval Construction Bat-talion ; 2nd Separate Topographical Company ; Detachment, 23rd Naval Construction Battalion(Special) ; 8th Field Depot (plus Headquarters Shore Party) ; 33rd Marine Depot Company ;34th Marine Depot Company ; 36th Marine Depot Company ; 8th Marine Ammunition Company ;Detachment, 8th Naval Construction Regiment ; Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1 ; 2nd BombDisposal Company ; 156th Bomb Disposal Squad -Army ; Company B, Amphibious Reconnais-sance Battalion, Fleet Marine Force ; A and C Platoons, 38th Field Hospital - Army; Joint In-telligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Intelligence Teams No . 22, 23, 24, and 25 ; Detachment,

811

Joint Intelligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Enemy Materiel and Salvage Platoon ; Detach-ment, 1st Platoon, 239th Quartermaster Salvage and Collection Company - Army; Detachment,Headquarters, Army Garrison Forces, APO 86 ; Detachment Headquarters, 147th Infantry -Army ; Detachment, Headquarters, 7th Fighter Command - Army; Detachment, 47th FighterSquadron - Army ; Detachment, 548th Night Fighter Squadron - Army ; Detachment, 386thAir Service Group (Special) - Army ; Detachment, Group Pacific 11 ; Detachment, Port Director ;Detachment, Garrison Beach Party ; Headquarters & Service Battery, 1st Provisional ArtilleryGroup ; 2nd 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion ; 4th 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion ; 473rd AmphibianTruck Company-Army ; Detachment, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 138th Antiair-craft Artillery Group - Army; Detachment, 506th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion - Army ; Detach-ment, 483rd Antiaircraft Air Warning Battalion - Army; 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts(less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units) ; Headquarters Battalion, THIRDMarine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company) ; 3rd Marine War Dog Platoon ; 3rd ServiceBattalion (less detachment) ; 3rd Pioneer Battalion (less 2nd Platoon, Company C), 3rd Med-ical Battalion (less Company C) ; 3rd Motor Transport Battalion (less Company C) ; 12th Ma-rines (less detachment) ; Marine Observation Squadron 1 (less detachment) ; HeadquartersBattalion, FOURTH Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rdPlatoons, Military Police Company) ; 4th Motor Transport Battalion ; 4th Medical Battalion ;133rd Naval Construction Battalion ; 4th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 4thEngineer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 4th Service Battalion ; 4th Pioneer Battal-ion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 442nd Port Company - Army ; 14th Marines (less detach-ment) ; 4th Marine Amphibian Truck Company ; 476th Amphibian Truck Company - Army;Marine Observation Squadron 4 (less detachment) ; Detachment, 726th Signal Air WarningCompany - Army (FOURTH Marine Division- Reinf .) ; 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts (lessAdvance Groups and those assigned assault units) ; Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH MarineDivision, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Com-pany) ; 5th Medical Battalion ; 13th Marines (less detachment) ; 5th Marine Amphibian TruckCompany ; 471st Amphibian Truck Company - Army ; Marine Observation Squadron 5 (less de-tachment) ; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army (FIFTH Marine Division .Reinf .) ; 5th Pioneer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C) ; 31st Naval Construction Bat-talion ; 592nd Port Company - Army; 5th Motor Transport Battalion ; 5th Service Battalion ;27th and 31st Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units) .

JOHN L. SULLIVANSecretary of the Navy



CITATION"For exceptionally meritorious service and outstanding heroism in support of ele-

ments of the EIGHTH Army during operations against enemy Japanese forces onMindanao, Philippine Islands, and in the Sulu Archipelago . After landing with theassault forces, Marine Air Groups, ZAMBOANGA, effected wide coverage of battleareas in flights made extremely hazardous by dense jungles, precipitous cloud-obscuredmountains and adverse weather conditions . The gallant officers and men of these Groupspenetrated hostile defenses to press relentless attacks and reduce vital enemy targets,disrupt communications and troop concentrations, and destroy ammunition and fueldumps despite intense antiaircraft fire over Japanese objectives . The vital servicerendered during these campaigns in providing convoy cover, fighter defense and closeaerial support of ground forces is evidence of the courage, skill and devotion to dutyof the pilots, aircrewmen and ground personnel operating as a well coordinated team,and reflects the highest credit upon Marine Aircraft Groups, ZAMBOANGA, and theUnited States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32 or 24 during theirrespective periods of service as designated are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COM-MENDATION Ribbon .

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWSSecretary o f the Navy


The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS, ZAMBOANGA

consisting of the following Marine Aircraft Groups :

Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE

March 10 - June 30, 1945Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY TWO

March 16 - June 30, 1945Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY FOUR

April 11 - June 30, 1945

Abuyog, 310, 321-322ACETYLENE Island, 181n, 183-184Acker, Capt George K ., 314Adams, Maj Hank, 248Admiralty Islands, 67, 83, 292, 315, 363, 407Advance Base Force, 14, 16Advance base warfare, 14AGGRAVATE, 181n, 183

Aineman Island, 414Ainsworth, RAdm Walden L ., 278Air activities

American, 43, 95, 99, 227, 236, 340, 363,368, 373, 381, 388, 718, 735

air alerts, 624air attacks, 172, 450, 455-456, 735air combat, 278, 378, 385, 434, 561air coordination, 305-306, 354, 377, 385air cover, 328air defense, 319, 326, 598, 708air drops, 597air escort, 601air freight, 604air gunfire, 280, 605, 719air liaison officers, 171, 352-353, 390air liaison parties, 106n, 277, 283, 306-308,342-344,349,351,353,356,368,370,378,718,735

airlift, 723air neutralization, 184air preparation, 210air observation, 281, 317, 320, 373, 600,

Indexair superiority, 670, 728air supply, 725air support, 63, 97, 101, 153, 180, 211, 256,

283-284, 303, 306, 309, 350, 354, 356, 373,384, 531, 538, 547, 555, 558, 611, 636,643, 684, 686, 691, 699, 717

330, 335, 400, 413, 451, 570air defense, 298air efforts, 337, 375, 396air garrisons, 340, 734air neutralization, 309air power, 309, 331, 405, 432, 597air strength, 298, 331, 336, 379, 393, 405,

813

bombing support, 190, 221, 728carrier-based support, 76-77, 106n, 283,

292, 306, 340, 424, 436, 489, 491, 737close air support, 17, 83, 99, 216, 283-284,

291, 304-307, 328, 332, 339-340, 343,347, 349, 352-353, 368, 370, 378, 384-385, 387-388, 390, 393, 397, 423, 435,440, 495, 512, 598, 640, 655, 699, 714,718,735

dive bombing, 305, 374, 388597-emergency landings, 325, 438, 464,

598,601fighter missions, 291ground controllers, 328, 385rocket strikes, 141, 506strafing, 190, 211, 221, 283

Japanese328,air attacks, 71, 190, 318-319, 325,

668, 671, 686, 719 450, 466, 539, 601, 731air support, 70, 670

Aircraftair observers, 660, 707, 718air offensive, 492

163, 368, 472, 474, 486air photography, American, 81, 184, 199, 210-211, 224, 262,air raids, 717, 729 264, 329, 350, 361-362, 376, 381, 393,air reconnaissance, 382, 486 412, 417, 422-423, 493n, 548, 554, 644,air-sea rescue, 103, 717 716,720air strikes, 135-137, 141-142, 157, 172, Types

177, 224, 226, 241-242, 249, 260, 282- B-24s (Liberators), 101-102, 193, 218,283, 306, 314, 327, 332, 335, 342, 346, 399, 459, 473, 485 485n, 487, 495-496,350-354, 366-367, 370, 372, 381, 383, 499, 504, 717386, 399, 412, 415, 423, 430, 435, 453, B-25s (Mitchells), 353, 412472-473, 485-486, 490, 500, 504, 534, B-29s (Super Fortresses), 429, 429n,551, 558, 562-563, 586, 591-592, 601, 438, 462-464, 476, 479, 487, 597-598,611, 638, 643-644, 648, 665, 668, 672, 600-601,679,683,731676, 698, 714-715, 717-718, 735 bombers, 43, 58, 325, 400, 407, 413, 430,

814

462,487,500,503-504,598,717,734C-46s (Commandos), 199, 604C-47s (Skytrains), 199, 326, 604C-54s (Skymasters), 427carrier-based, 5, 40, 64, 77, 82, 102-103,

108, 141-142, 152-153, 165, 232, 298,301, 422, 436, 495-496, 500, 530, 574,587, 595, 610, 621, 623, 633, 638-640,718

dive bombers, 43, 143, 340, 342-344, 346-347, 350, 352, 359, 370, 378-379, 382-383,385,393,407,412,422,718

escort fighters 439, 600-601(F'4Us (Corsairs), 99, 143, 211, 228, 256,

284, 326-332, 335, 339, 365, 368, 371-372, 375, 378, 383, 399, 401-402, 404,408, 412-414, 416, 428-429, 432-433,436,503

F6Fs (Hellcats), 100, 199, 326-327, 333,371,399,412,427,429,436,451-452

F6F-Ns, 429, 432FMs, 371fighter-bombers, 108, 386, 412, 416, 429fighters, 58, 172, 328, 350, 362, 379, 382-

383, 399, 404, 407, 413, 422, 429, 435,452, 495, 499, 503, 576, 597, 600, 691,718

floatplanes, 101flying boats, 367, 439J2F-6s, 429L-4s, 317, 370L-5s, 212medium bombers, 43, 325, 382-383, 429night fighters, 193, 199, 326-328, 330,

333, 371, 400, 411, 413, 422, 425, 429,526 2 560

OS2Us, 495OYs, 429, 432, 595observation planes, 101, 426, 429, 436-437,495,595,617,658,718,720

P-40s, 329P-47s, 423P-51s, 436, 464, 598, 643, 643nP-61s, 326, 328, 371, 526, 598PBJs (Witchells), 371, 373-374, 380,

387, 429, 436, 485PBYs, 199, 371R4Ds (Skytrains), 371, 408, 437-438,

INDEX

SBDs (Dauntlesses), 339, 342-344, 346,353-354, 356-357, 370-371, 378, 383-386,388,399,414

spotting planes, 317-318, 386, 436, 714TBFs (Avengers), 193, 318, 371, 426,

429,, 433-434TBMs (Avengers), 429torpedo bombers, 43, 422, 424, 426-427,

429, 432, 576, 595transports, 325, 356, 632-363, 401, 412,

422, 438, 480, 597, 604utility planes, 429

Japanese, 71, 259, 276, 278, 300, 312, 324,328,366-367,382,429,450,484,732

TypesBettys (medium bombers), 276, 356bombers, 407, 411, 413, 452carrier-based, 300dive bombers, 330fighters, 101, 327-330, 375, 400, 412, 451-

452float planes, 71, 228, 259heavy bombers, 300Lilys (light bombers), 374medium bombers, 276night bombers, 326night fighters, 326, 330torpedo bombers, 330, 451-452transports, 321-322Zeros (fighters), 399, 404, 412, 451-452,

495Airfield No . 1 (Iwo Jima), 449n, 459, 471, 479,

495, 504, 514-516, 518-519, 525, 528, 547,549, 551, 557, 560, 563-565, 571, 595, 597-598,600,603-604,633,651,716,720

Airfield No . 2 (Iwo Jima), 447, 449n, 459, 471,479, 509, 525, 548, 555-558, 561-563, 565-567, 569, 574-576, 586, 595, 597, 600, 616,644-647,649,701,716,720

Airfield No . 3 (Iwo Jima), 459, 574, 578, 581-586,600,684,708

AirfieldsAmerican, 58, 118, 152-153, 162, 173, 177,

179, 181, 187, 189, 192-193, 199, 204,212, 214, 217, 222-224, 227-228, 237,241, 259, 268, 273-274, 277-281, 287,298,314-315,319,323,325,339,361,363,365,463,485n,600-601,608

597 Japanese, 58, 117, 120-124, 126, 131, 134,R5Cs (Commandos), 437, 597 139, 141, 144, 156, 161, 180, 324, 336,reconnaissance planes, 415, 417 393,395-396,405SB2Cs (Helldivers), 371, 389, 418 AK-98, 316

INDEX

Akalokul, 58Akarakoro Point, 190Aleutian Islands, 6, 21, 23, 467, 730, 734Allender, LCdr Byron E ., 151nAllied

air effort, 736invasion fleet, 340invasion, North Africa, 733news service, 612planners, 614powers, 613prisoners of war, 730ships, 336

Allied Forces, 5, 54, 179, 301, 382, 440, 448,729, 730, 732, 734

Allies, Western, 729AMAZEMENT Island, 181,181n, 183AMELIORATE, 181n, 183-184 . See also Fala-

lop Island .Amiangai, 208Ammunition

American, 87-88, 128, 152, 240, 269, 279, 318,

.50 caliber, 414, 5515-inch, 61014-inch, 145, 563, 565, 61040mm, 261, 315, 497, 505gas shells, 613high-explosive shells, 145, 156machine gun, 87, 127, 173mortar shells, 597, 611napalm bombs, 224-225, 249, 254, 256, 271,283-284,370,378-379,385-386,416,432,436, 487, 499, 503, 506, 523, 530, 536,611, 638, 658, 677, 717

155mm howitzer, 587105mm, 152, 587, 672pyrotechnics, 258rockets, 241, 387, 418, 436, 481, 495, 497,

503, 505, 530, 534, 551, 565, 590, 611,623, 631, 638, 649, 674, 685, 707, 727,729

75mm, 155, 587, 615, 644, 650, 672, 70516-inch, 610smoke, 154, 160, 206, 209, 230, 262, 352,

815

497, 501, 568, 589, 635star shells, 152, 270, 281, 526, 589, 610,

678-679,725.30 caliber, 173tracer, 40812-inch, 61020mm, 261, 315, 578

Japanese, 226, 249, 530, 654, 695aerial bombs, 72, 193, 258, 375, 636naerial torpedos, 565-566antipersonnel bombs, 424armor-piercing shells, 123, 513artillery, 231, 367, 527, 545.50 caliber, 415, 420gas shells, 624illuminating, 258mortar, 526, 662, 673, 675, 727

Amoy, 293, 465Amphibious assault operations, 10, 13-17, 33-

34, 43, 71, 84, 168, 211, 278-279, 281, 286, 304,359, 448, 463, 478, 487, 505, 715

Amphibious doctrine, tactics, 10, 268, 737Amphibious exercises, 14, 162, 483Amphibious Training Command, 304Amphitheater, 568, 572, 595, 616, 646-648, 650,

656-657, 661, 663-665, 667, 671-672, 681-682Anderson, Capt Carl E., 602 ; RAdm, 602 nAngat River, 346Angaur, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62-63, 68-69, 79-80, 88,134, 161-163, 165-166, 168-169, 171-175,177-179, 181, 183-184, 187, 223, 279, 284-287, 430-431, 433, 733-734operation, 166, 173, 177-178, 180

Annapolis, Maryland, 14Anso, Maj Kenro, 659Antonelli, Maj . John W . A ., 508, 514, 618, 642-

6,43Apamama Island, 398-399, 413Apennine Peninsula, 733Apra Harbor, 426Arakabesan, 57Ardennes, 729

offensive, 735Arkansas, 493, 503Armor . See also Army Units ; Marine Units ;Weapons .American, 153-154, 158, 172, 212, 235, 272-

273, 512, 514-515, 517, 519, 534, 549,554, 565-567, 584, 592, 618, 621, 623,628, 631-632, 637, 639, 647-649, 662,672-673,676,687,691,727

Japanese, 123

476-477, 492, 523, 553, 601, 611, 678,689, 720, 722

artillery, 88, 127, 603, 610bombs, 108, 227, 408, 530, 534, 548, 551,

565, 613, 644, 6918-inch, 363, 587, 61081mm mortar, 152, 209, 523, 526, 563, 59715-inch, 587

816

Eighth Army, 332, 358-359, 365, 367, 374,382

Tenth Army, 38, 465I Corps, 20, 352X Corps, 310, 315, 319, 321, 337, 359, 381-

384,386-387XIV Corps, 303, 337, 342, 352

INDEX

259,264726th Amphibian Tractor Batallion, 254287th Artillery Observation Battalion, 314,

316-318,322506th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 603,

708154th Engineer Battalion, 254

Armstrong, PFC P . E ., 344nArmy Air Forces, 102, 307, 309, 325, 332, 359,

361, 366, 377, 386, 393, 396, 407, 436, 462, 464,486-487,496,500,640,699,712Units

Far East Air Forces, 301, 303, 324-325,359, 365, 388

Strategic Air Forces, 417Fifth Air Force, 78, 101, 301, 307, 312,

XXIV Corps, 63, 65, 301, 314-321, 323XXIV Corps Artillery, 314, 319, 323Americal Division, 375-3771st Cavalry Division, 301, 310, 334, 342-344,

346-348,351-352,3541st Infantry Division, 20, 34, 3533d Infantry Division, 346th Infantry Division, 352-3547th Infantry Division, 34, 310, 315-318, 321,

326,328,332-334,339,353,382,389Seventh Air Force, 396, 412, 473, 485, 717Thirteenth Air Force, 301, 309, 334, 359,

362, 366, 368, 377, 382, 384, 390

4009th Infantry Division, 34, 36, 31511th Airborne Division, 322, 35424th Infantry Division, 310, 365, 384, 387,

Fourteenth Air Force, 334Twentieth Air Force, 334VII Bomber Command, 485, 485nXX Bomber Command, 463-464V Fighter Command, 333VII Fighter Command, 603, 710XIII Fighter Command, 388308th Bombardment Wing, 339, 342-344,

39025th Infantry Division, 35431st Infantry Division, 381, 384-386, 39032d Infantry Division, 31037th Infantry Division, 307, 346, 35438th Infantry Division, 35440th Infantry Division, 354, 375-37641st Infantry Division, 359, 362, 366-368,

346, 349, 354 370-371,373-374,378-379,390310th Bombardment Wing, 331313th Bombardment Wing, 48715th Fighter Group, 598, 598n

43d Infantry Division, 35477th Infantry Division, 63, 181, 310, 328,

332,42721st Fighter Group, 70848th Bombardment Squadron, 412

81st Infantry Division, 63, 79, 96, 153, 162-163, 165, 170, 175, 177-180, 186-187,

419th Night Fighter Squadron, 368 250, 252, 254, 258, 260, 262, 264, 274,28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squad- 282, 284-286. See also Wildcats .

ron, 473 96th Infantry Division, 180-181, 310, 315-9th Troop Carrier Squadron, 438, 597, 604 316,318,321973d Aviation Engineer Battalion, 367465th Aviation Squadron, 70876th Fighter Control Center, 368

1st Cavalry Brigade, 354Infantry Regiments

20th, 31577th Fighter Control Center, 371, 383 33d,315

Army-Navy joint communications procedure, 124th,38535 147th, 608, 708, 711

Army Units 162d,374Chemical Warfare Service, 477, 613 163d,374(Field Service Command, 30 321st, 166, 168-171, 173-176, 178, 180, 186-Pacific Ocean Areas, 476 187, 190, 192-193, 197, 201-202, 204,Southwest Pacific Area, 291, 293, 293n 209, 217-218, 221-224, 237, 242, 246,Garrison Force Zero, 603 249, 251, 254, 261Sixth Army, 309-310, 315-316, 320-321, 325, 322d,166,168-173,176,178-180

334, 337, 339-340, 342, 348-349, 357-359 323d, 163, 168, 180-181, 183-184, 251, 257-

INDEX 817

Field Artillery Battalions 671, 674, 677, 718, 723, 726198th, 314, 316-317, 319 Asbill, Maj Edward L ., 671226th, 314, 316-320

Infantry BattalionsAsia, 294

Eastern, 7351/162,371 Southeast, 51, 294, 4631/321, 170-171, 173-176, 189, 192, 210, 254, Asias (village), 58-59, 148

256-257 Aslito Airfield, 423-4241/322,171-174 Atlantic Ocean, 21, 4441/323,250,254,256-257,262 Atomic warfare, 737 . See also Weapons.2/15,190,226 Atsuchi, Capt Kanehiko, 533n ; Col, 533, 533n,2/162,371 536, 537n, 538, 5422/321, 173-174, 176, 178, 189, 192, 195, Attu, 467, 734

197, 199, 201, 206-207, 214, 223, 250, Auburn, 605, 607, 619254,256-257 Auckland, New Zealand, 431

2/322,171-174,176,187,193 Aur Atoll, 4182/323,257,260-262 ' Auriga, 314, 3163/124,385 Australia, 291, 4443/321, 173-176, 187, 189, 192, 195, 198, Aviators . See Pilots .200,206-207,250,254,257 Axis, 736

3/322,171-174,197,1996th Ranger Battalion, 310

Aycrigg, Lt William A ., 403Azores, 43

710th Tank Battalion, 174, 187, 224, 228-229,240,254

471st Amphibian Truck Company, 475, 516295th Joint Assault Signal Company, 384

Babelthuap Island, 57, 60-62, 68-69, 79, 162-163, 166, 175, 190, 193, 222, 225, 232, 241-242, 262, 264-265, 281, 432-433, 733-734

442d Port Company, 602

710

Baker, Maj Harry F ., 437Baker, Col R . M ., 15Baldy Ridge, 224, 226, 228, 234, 237-238, 241-

592d Port Company, 60238th Field Hospital, 603,

Arnold, MajGen William H ., 377,463-464 ,242,244-245Artillery

American, 80-81, 84, 103, 129, 132, 135, 137,Balete Pass, 357Baliuag, 346

142, 151-153, 157, 161, 173, 175, 187, Balkans, 443, 729190, 195, 205, 208, 210, 224, 242, 244, Ballance, LtCol Robert G ., 84, 86

Baltic Sea, 443246, 254, 269, 272, 274, 281, 291, 300-301, 314, 316-320, 322-323, 379-380, 416, Bangkal, 379423, 484, 504, 508, 516, 521, 530-531, Bangkok, 463534, 538, 549-550, 552, 554-556, 560, Banika Island, 89-90, 95, 393, 400563, 565-567, 573, 576-585, 587, 589, Bard, Capt Elliott E ., 42591, 605, 611, 617, 623-624, 626-627, Basilan Island, 374632-635,638-639,648-652,654,658,661- Basilan Strait, 363, 366, 374663, 666-669, 671-674, 676, 679, 681, Basilone, GySgt John, 514684, 686, 691, 697-699, 704, 708, 714, 717, Bataan Peninsula, 348, 690719-722,726-727 Batangas Peninsula, 342

Filipino, 348127-128, 134, 141-

Bates, Lt Wesley C ., 512Battle for Leyte Gulf, 312, 321, 323, 443Japanese, 109, 115, 122,

142, 156, 177, 278, 350, 407, 453-454, Battle of Midway, 430454n, 456-457, 474, 493n, 497-498, 519- Battle of the Philippine Sea, 443520, 525-526, 531, 533-534, 538, 545, Baybay, 310, 321549-551, 553-554, 557-558, 561, 564, Bay field, 648566, 568, 570, 575, 582, 584, 586-587, Bayug Airfield, 325595, 597, 603, 617, 624, 626, 629, 647, Beach, Capt C . C ., 415n651, 653, 655-656, 658, 662, 666, 669, Beaches, 58, 72, 77, 79, 86-87, 94, 118, 121, 128,

818

131, 259-260, 274, 472, 482, 527, 603, 617,623, 717, 722, 724Blue, 163, 165-166, 168-169, 508, 519, 525,

557Blue 1, 316, 471, 471n, 508, 519-521, 548Blue 2, 471, 471n, 519-521, 525Brown, 602Green, 165, 169, 471, 513, 516, 526Green 1, 471, 508, 510Green 2, 173Orange, 79, 81-82, 106, 108, 119n, 137, 187,

232, 268, 602Orange 1, 80, 115Orange 2, 80, 115-117, 121, 129Orange 3, 80, 116, 119, 119n, 120, 131, 152,

233Purple, 187, 201, 228, 236, 251, 258, 268, 274,

602-603Purple 2, 603Red, 163, 165-166, 168, 176, 472, 508, 514Red 1, 471, 508, 512-513, 515, 552Red 2, 471, 508, 513, 515Scarlet, 193White, 79-82, 106, 108, 110, 144, 264, 268,

274,602White 1, 108-110, 112White 2, 110Yellow, 424, 508-509, 517, 525, 555Yellow 1, 471, 508, 517-518, 522, 526, 548,

552,560Yellow 2, 471, 508, 516-517, 519

Beachheads, 73, 85, 430 . See also Beaches .Beachmasters, 85, 87Beach parties, 282, 601 . See also Shore party

activities.Belgium, 6Bell, BGen Marcus B ., 187, 211, 264nBenedict, LtCol William E ., 97n, 109n,Berger, LtCol Spencer S ., 92n, 147, 229, 253,275

Berlin, 730Betio Island, 396-397, 401Biak, 71, 457Bismarck Archipelago, 438Bismarck Sea, 537Bivouac areas, 151Blackburn, Capt Donald D ., 348Blaha, Capt Nathan D . 424Blanchard, Capt Rolfe T ., 329n, 372Blandy, RAdm William H . P ., 63, 165-166, 181,278, 483, 492-493, 493n, 495-496, 498-502,714

INDEX

Blessman, 500Blissard, LtCol Louis B ., 649, 652Block Island, 435Bloody Gorge, 616Bloody Nose Ridge, 157, 223-225, 228, 279Blow, Maj Rex, 382Boats. See Landing Craft ; Ships .Boehm, Col Harold C ., 575, 575n, 582n, 588-

590,591n,686Bohemia, 9Bohol Island, 327, 359, 361, 375, 377Bollman, Capt Howard W ., 413Bombardments, 71, 102-104, 108, 112, 132, 145,153, 165, 211, 221, 227, 278-281, 335, 386,409, 452-453, 455, 486-487, 489, 491-493,493n, 495-496, 498, 501-506, 509, 517, 526,531, 533, 547, 565, 574, 576, 610, 646, 714,726, 728, 731, 737. See also Naval gunfire .

Bongao Island, 378Bonins, 64, 68, 102, 436, 444-445, 448, 450-

451, 459, 461-462, 462n, 463-464, 466, 472,475, 484-485, 505, 537, 597, 654, 716-717,737

Borneo, 6, 294, 309, 358, 366, 374, 378Bougainville, 284, 305-307, 335, 342, 346, 362-

363,388-389,393,467,735Bountiful, 723Bourke, BGen Thomas E ., 291, 300-301, 314,

316-318, 323 ; LtGen, 319nBowdoin, Maj George E ., 248nBoyd Ridge, 221, 229, 231-237, 241-242, 250,

254, 257, 260Boyd, LtCol Robert W ., 115,123Boyer, LtCol Kimber H ., 93Bozarth, Capt Clyde L., 276nBrant, Capt Robert E ., 123Brayton, LtCol Corey C., 415nBrisbane, 291-292, 301British whaling captains, 445Brodie gear, 436-437Brown, Col Dudley S., 61Brunelli, LtCol Austin R ., 680'Buckley, Col Edmond J ., 474Buckley, LtCol Joseph E ., 93nBuckner, LtGen Simon B ., Jr ., 465Burauen, 310, 316-317, 319-320, 322Buri Airfield, 322-323, 325Burma, 730Burnette, Maj Robert W ., 91Burrfish, 78Bushido, 69Butler, LtCol John A ., 305, 508, 634

INDEX 819

Butterfield, LtGen Jackson B., 508, 513, 625, 177n, 179, 185, 208-209, 218, 226-227,627 232, 253, 261, 265, 276, 300, 333, 350,

Byers, SSgt A. A., 344n 352, 376, 385, 396, 409, 415, 426, 453,Bypassed islands, 412, 415, 418 531, 533, 536, 538, 545, 562, 605, 626,Byrum, Maj Paul R., Jr., 399 629, 639, 665, 679, 689

Cabanatuan,343,346Cagayan,381

Catabato, 381-382Cates, MajGen Clifton B ., 467, 505, 517, 519,

521, 554, 557, 563, 579, 610, 645, 647, 652,Caldera Point, 366 661, 665, 669-670, 672, 677, 681-682, 694,California, 17, 437, 468, 500 700,708Campbell, LtCol Harold D., 42 ; BGen, 46, 98, Catmon Hill, 319n

265, 398, 430, 595 Caves. See Terrain.Camp Dunlap, 23 Cebu, 294, 358-359, 361, 363, 374-3 7 3, 388CampCamp

Elliott, 20-21Holcomb, 20

Cebu City, 375Celebes, 102, 294, 733

CampCampCampCampCape

Kearney Field,Lejeune, 20, 39Pendleton, 23, 468Tarawa, 482Esperance, 94, 165

437 Celebes Sea, 309Cemeteries, 712Central America, 8, 15Central Intelligence Agency, 612Central Pacific, 3, 23-24, 51-52, 54, 266, 293,

Cape Gallatin, 169 309, 318, 393, 395-398, 400-401, 405, 407,Cape Gloucester, 89, 94, 268, 275 414, 416, 432, 437-438, 440, 462-463, 466,Cape Isabel, 409 478, 491, 723, 726, 731-733, 7.38CapeCapeCapeCapisan,Carey,Cargill,Caribbean,

Ngaramudel, 173Ngatpokul, 168Pkulangelul, 172

370Maj Roland, 662Maj Wayne M .,

15-17, 21,417

36

Chamberlain, Sgt Reid, 690Chambers, LtCol Justice M ., 519-520, 559Chaney, MajGen James E ., 603, 708Chapman, LtCol Leonard F ., Jr., 92nChappell, Maj C . J ., Jr ., 42Charan Kano.a, 424-425Charlie Dog Ridge, 568, 645, 648, 682

Carleson,Carney,Caroline

Maj RogerCol Edward B .,Islands, 3, 6,

T., 4242916, 54, 67-68, 101, 395,

Chase, BGen William C ., 343-344, 347Chateau-Thierry, 468Centaurus, 101

412, 733-734. See also Western Caroline Chemical officers, 613Chemical warfare, 91, 612-614Chenango, 426Chesapeake Bay, 36, 304Chester, 493, 500Chichi Jima, 64, 445, 448-449, 451, 455, 462n,

Castle,Catskill,Casualties

Islands .Capt Donald E .,314

636

American, 113-114, 120, 124, 128, 130-132,136, 138, 141, 144, 147-148, 150, 154, 496,543 2 561,598,700 2 702 2 705-707161, 166, 179, 185, 189, 198-199, 208- Chidori Airfield, 449n, 453, 457209, 212, 216, 218, 225, Chilton, Cdr W . P ., 499227, 231, 236,242-243, 253, 257, 273-274, 281-282, China, 3, 6, 9, 16, 51, 62, 69, 293-294, 298, 309,284-285, 322, 336, 356, 375, 386, 390, 334,458,463-464,467408, 412, 438, 451, 471, 479, 504, 513, China-Burma-India Theater, 334517, 520-521, 525, 525n, 531, 536-537, China Wall, 221, 241, 248, 250, 256, 260-264545, 551, 560, 574-575, 597, 602, 604- Chinese, 54, 276, 730605, 608, 612, 614-615, 617, 624, 630- Christianity, 294631, 633-636, 636n, 644, 648, 659-660, Christmas Day, 438665, 689, 695, 699, 701, 703, 705, 710- Clark Field, 342, 357711, 715n, 722-723 Clark, RAdm Joseph J ., 451-453, 595

Japanese, 109, 113, 121, 126, 136, 138, 177, Clausewitz, 330

820

Coady, Maj James F ., 515Cobia, 455Cole, Col J . Frank, 395n, 400Coleman, Col William F ., 186n, 210n, 211n ;BGen, 221n

Colhoun,624Collins, LtCol William R ., 564-565Colorado, 409Columbia Victory, 602-603Columbus, Ohio, 610Combat efficiency, 185, 227, 592, 608, 661, 694Combat information center, 497Combat loading, 17, 83nCommandant of the Marine Corps, 15, 24, 27,

29, 36, 46, 253 n, 428Commander, Air, Iwo Jima, 597-598Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 362Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, 46Commander, Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, 29, 38,

47, 99, 477Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet,

48, 466, 473, 490, 490n, 491n, 492nCommander, Beach Party Group, 602Commander, Fifth Fleet, 491, 492nCommander, Forward Area, Central Pacific,

64,710Commander, Forward Areas, Western Pacific,

184Commander, Garrison Air Force, Western Car-

olines, 99Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 26, 28-30,

36,293, 421Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 26,

38-39, 60-61, 77-78, 83, 98, 101, 134, 301,417, 421, 464, 469

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 24Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, 486,

608Commander, Landing Force Air Support Con-

trol Unit, 503Commander, Marianas Area, 36Commander, Marshall-Gilberts Area, 36Commander, Service Forces, Pacific Fleet, 477-

478Commander, South Pacific, 99, 301Commander, Support Aircraft, 103, 108, 283Commander, Ulithi Fire Support Group, 183Commander, Western Pacific Task Forces, 62Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, 47Commanding General, Army Forces, Western

Pacific, 39

INDEX

Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops,Third Fleet, 64

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-cific, 28-29, 31, 47, 477, 482, 491n, 492, 492n

Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps,24, 490n, 491n

Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces,14th Naval District, 38

Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas,477-478

Commanding General, Samoan Force, 46Communications

American, 14, 17, 35, 151, 178, 204, 222, 241,274, 277, 350, 368, 370, 377, 383-384,402n, 411, 612, 615, 620n, 693, 703, 722-723,725

Equipment, 94, 130, 139, 368Radios, 207, 259, 277, 384, 390, 402, 404,

486n, 589, 612, 620n, 626, 719SCR-193, 308SCR-300, 277SCR-542, 308SCR-610, 277tank, 154

Japanese, 278, 455, 586, 612, 646, 656-657,Radios, 120, 202, 377, 449, 451, 456, 461,

487,702Communism, 8-9Congress, 445Connolly, RAdm Richard L ., 25Cook, Capt Richard M ., 558Cooley, Maj Albert D ., 42 ; Col, 47, 423Coolidge, President Calvin, 6-7Corregidor, 291, 296, 354, 690Court of International Justice, 4Craig, LtGen Edward A ., 608n, 624nCram, LtCol Jack R ., 436Crist, LtCol Raymond F ., Jr ., 573Crowl, Philip A ., 52, 279nCrown, Maj John A ., 119, 204Cuba, 14, 19Culebra, 19Cunningham, Maj Alfred A ., 41Cushman's Pocket, 686-687, 689, 691-692Cushman, LtCol Robert E ., 414, 416, 574, 577,

584,591

D-Day, 86, 273, 280-284Dagami, 316-317, 319-321Dagupan, 337, 339, 372Daly, LtCol James M ., 401, 411Danube River, 730

144, 152, 161, 168, 177, 185, 189, 192,199, 207, 217, 221, 227 234, 237-238,240, 242, 244-246, 249, 256-257, 262-264, 268, 276, 279, 284, 316, 346, 352,366, 379-381, 385-386, 407, 436, 453-454, 457, 474, 484, 491, 496, 499, 528,531-538, 546, 549, 564, 570, 573, 627,645, 684-686, 695, 697-698, 700-701, 714,717, 766, 731

antiaircraft, 102, 329, 400, 412, 415-417,424, 428-429, 433-434, 495, 499, 506,568

antiboat, 110, 116, 119, 121, 474-475, 497-498, 506

observation posts, 75, 550obstacles, 72, 268, 271pillboxes, 73, 75, 79, 92, 112, 116, 118, 120-121,134,136,138,145,152,154-157,163,169, 171, 173, 176, 198, 200, 208, 212, 268,271, 273, 350-351, 371, 379, 407, 453, 455,458-459, 473-474, 482, 485n, 486, 493n,500, 508, 510, 513-514, 517-518, 520,528, 530-531, 536, 538-539, 545, 548-550,554-555, 558, 560, 562, 566-567, 572,577, 590-591, 605, 610, 614n, 618, 621,627, 631-632, 635, 639, 643, 647-651,654, 663, 665-666, 668, 672, 685, 687,693, 698, 716

pockets, 693-694, 706rifle pits, 73, 136, 160, 171rocket positions, 655spider foxholes, 698spider-traps, 517, 528, 691, 701tetrahedrons, 72, 79, 138, 163trenches, 117, 120, 171, 376, 379, 566, 651,

687trip wires, 473tunnels, 75, 205, 221, 453, 456, 530, 538,

540, 566, 572, 586, 613, 622, 637, 639,645,663-664,689-690,692

antiinvasion mines, 72antitank, 72-73, 116, 120, 139, 141, 156,

171, 176, 205, 208, 268, 273, 346, 376,459, 474, 513-514, 566, 572, 584, 625,627-629,655

barbed wire, 72, 120, 163, 454beach, 71-72, 81, 108, 176, 267blockhouses, 104, 120, 134-135, 208, 211,

456, 459, 473-474, 485n, 486, 493n, 500,508, 510, 513, 517, 528, 530, 539, 545,548, 550, 562, 572, 629, 636n, 644, 649,698,717

INDEX 821

Dardanelles, 33 booby traps, 156, 178, 199, 257, 407, 426,Dardanelles-Gallipoli operation, 14 562, 600, 697Dark, Col Robert F ., 187, 192, 199, 250-251, bunkers, 135, 156, 171, 173, 273, 459, 528,

257 536, 545, 548, 558, 562, 572, 580, 590,Dato, 379 635,647-649,654,665Davao, 366, 381, 384-385 buried aerial torpedoes, 565Davis, Maj Raymond G., 145Davidson, Maj Robert, 508, 517, 654, 674

camouflage, 548, 550coastal, 321, 407, 493n, 496, 624-625

Day, Maj William R., 558Dead Man's Curve, 232-233

concrete fortifications, 73, 120, 135, 145,376,454-455,629,646,666

Deakin, Col Harold 0 ., 95n, 150n, 274n dugouts, 171, 192, 201, 212, 242, 379, 550,Dean, Maj William W., 598 :555,642,685-686Death Valley, 160, 221, 226, 232, 254, 261-263, emplacements, 75, 156, 160, 200, 280, 473,

707 486, 495, 523, 542, 550, 554, 567, 584,DeBell, Maj George J ., 233n 591, 618, 621, 635, 639-640, 665-666,Deep Passage, 409 672, 675, 694, 698, 716Defenses fortifications, 75, 134-135, 138, 145, 154-

American, 549 156, 165, 169, 171, 173, 185, 208, 216,antiaircraft, 101, 328, 330, 486n, 499, 708 274, 278, 448, 454-455, 458-459, 487,barbed wire, 675 531, 545, 627, 639, 673, 717emplacements, 666fire, 661field fortifications, 14

foxholes, 651machine gun positions, 119, 127, 134, 136,

172, 242, 261, 636, 647land mines, 14 mine fields, 251, 276, 375-376, 407, 479,sandbags, 246, 248, 256-257, 260, 508 498, 513, 517, 520, 550, 554-555, 572,

Japanese, 66, 71-73, 101-103, 112, 134, 137, 600, 627, 640, 649, 676, 726

822 INDEX

underground fortifications, 75, 154, 279,453, 455-456

Eleventh Naval District, 21Eli Malk, 57

DeHaven, Col Louis G ., 472, 521-522Deho, 379del alle, BGen Pedro A ., 428Demolitions . See Weapons.Denmark, 19Deputy Commander, Aircraft, Landing Force,

Eller, RAdm Ernest M ., 80n, 283,437nEllice Islands, 396, 398-401, 404Ellis, Maj Donald K ., 548Ellis, Maj Earl H ., 16 ; LtCol, 66nElmore, 278nEmirau Island, 363, 373, 416, 432, 435, 438

503 Emperor Meiji, 459Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, 30-31DETACHMENT Operation, 435, 465, 467-469,482,487,489-491,714,720,722-725

Engebi Island, 408-413England, 6English, 54English, LtCoI Lowell E ., 558, 582

de Villalobos, Ruy Lopez, 54Digos, 395

Engineers. See also Army units ; Marine units.American, 135-136, 156, 193, 204, 209, 224,

Dillon, LtCol Edward J., 674, 678 226, 231, 234, 258, 263, 271, 282, 325,Dipolog, 365-367, 371-372 337, 376, 383, 398, 484, 514, 520, 531,Director of Marine Corps Aviation, 41 554, 595, 600, 602, 610, 627, 640-641,Disarmament conferences, 5-6 652, 765, 681, 705, 720-721Disarmament treaty, 6Doe, MajGen Jens A ., 366, 373, 378

Japanese, 453, 647Eniwetok Atoll, 64, 83, 278, 314-315, 405, 408-

Doherty, Capt. Albert J ., 204 409,412-413,420,438,526Dominican Republic, 467Donlan, Capt Pat, 662-663Doswell, Maj Menard, III, 433Downs, 1stLt Willis A ., 374nDrake, Maj Clifford B ., 521-522

Enterprise, 560Equipment . See Supplies and equipment .Ermilio, LCdr Dominick J ., 594Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 467, 565, 573-574,

577-581, 583-585, 588-590, 592-593, 602,Drydocks, 83, 184 607, 610, 616-617, 627, 635, 647, 652, 659,Dulag, 310, 312, 314-317, 320, 325 686, 691-692, 700-701, 703-704, 708, 711, 719Dunn, Col Ray A ., 179 Espiritu Santo Island, 98-101, 430-431, 433,DuPage, 108, 278n 438Duplantis, LtCol Wendell H., 558 Essex, 335, 435, 503Durgin, RAdm Calvin T ., 492, 495, 500, 560, Estes, 493, 499

717 Ethiopia, 9Duryea, LtCol Justin G ., 634, 642 Europe, 5, 440, 729-731, 733, 737Dutch East Indies, 358, 730

East Boat Basin, 220, 353, 459, 469, 471, 474,

Europeans, 444-445European Theater, 714, 733Evans, Lt E. Graham, 635

500, 509, 547, 553, 555, 569, 646, 650, 711 Evans, Maj Holly H ., 574East Indies, 287, 294East Prussia, 443East Road, 145-146, 157-159, 189, 198-202,

Everglades, 35Everton, Maj Loren D ., 400, 412, 416Ewa, 21, 41-42, 45-47

206, 221, 224, 226, 228-233, 236-238, 240,251 Fagan, Maj Richard, 558, 618

Eberhardt, Capt Fred C ., 526Edgar, Maj John B ., Jr ., 521Edmondson, Maj Robert W., 424Efate Island, 98, 430-431, 730

Fais, 434Falalop Island, 433-434Fanshaw Bay, 424Far East, 6

Eichelberger, LtGen Robert L ., 332, 359 ; Gen,377, 386, 390

Farrell, BGen Walter G ., 46Fascism, 8

El Centro, California, 45Eldorado, 484

Fascist dictatorships, 4Fawell, LtCol Reed M ., Jr ., 505, 618

INDEX

Feehan, Maj Harvey A., 522Ferguson, Capt, 197Fertig, Col Wendell W ., 359, 381-382Fields, Capt Thomas M ., 620Filipinos, 296, 347, 350, 381, 387

Forces, 348, 381, 407Guerrillas, 348-352, 359, 361, 363, 365, 370-

371, 375-377, 379-384, 386, 690Fire direction centers, 153, 319, 611 . See also

Artillery.Fitzgerald, Captain John I ., Jr ., 93Five Brothers Ridge, 221, 224-226, 229-231,233, 240, 244, 246, 254, 256-257, 260-261,441

Five Sisters Hill, 157-158, 160, 221, 231, 237,248,250,256-257

Flag raising (Iwo Jima), 542-543, 543n, 545,593

Fleet Anchorage, 181Fleet War Plans Division, 465FLINTLOCK Operation, 401Flock, Lt Charles F., 370Florida, 35Flyers . See Pilots .FORAGER Operation, 61, 301, 422Formosa, 6, 51, 62, 276, 293, 297-299, 321, 324,

335-337,435,450,464-465,476Forrestal, Mr . James V., 442, 484, 564Fort Bragg, N. C., 35-36Fort, RAdm George H ., 63, 83, 95, 104n, 165,

186, 211, 278-280, 286 ; VAdm, 78nFort Stotsenburg, 342Forward observers, 153, 597, 628, 719 . See also

Artillery .Fourteen Points, 7Frame, Maj Donald P ., 435France, 4-7, 19, 443, 467Frank, Mr. Benis M., 90nFreeman, Col Calvin B ., 398, 401, 407-408Fremont, 165, 278French Samoa, 398Frogmen, 495, 497-498, 500Fukudome, VAdm Shigeru, 298Funafuti, 396, 398, 401-404Futrell, Dr. Robert F ., 486n

Gabbert, LtCol John T . L. D ., 389Gambier Bay, 405Garakayo Islands, 242, 250Garangaoi Cove, 173-174Garapan Plain, 678Garekoru, 59, 160, 190, 192-193, 195, 197-201

823

Gayle, Maj Gordon D ., 208, 242Geiger, BGen Roy S ., 42, 45-46 ; MajGen, 25,

61, 63-64, 79, 89, 104, 131, 165, 175, 185-187,211, 246, 252, 278-279, 286, 428, 433 ; LtGen,31-32

Gela, 281Geneva, Switzerland, 6Geneva Conference, 7Geneva Conventions, 377, 420German colonies, 3, 6, 55German General's Plot, 729, 732Germans, 395, 458, 675, 729-732, 735-736German Siegfried Line, 443German Sixth Army, 430Germany, 4, 8-9, 67, 408, 430, 443, 729, 732

736Gilbert Islands, 6, 23, 288, 395-396, 399-401,

404, 407, 415, 422, 443, 462, 731Gilberts-Marshalls Operations, 407Gilberts operation, 395-396, 399Glidden, Maj Elmer G ., Jr ., 405Godolphin, Capt Francis B ., 343n, 344nGormley, LtCol John J ., 119n, 121, 137Gorokottan Island, 262Goto, Major Ushio, 69, 163, 168-171, 176-177,

177n,179-180,Graham, Col Chester B., 471, 515, 557-558, 567,

569, 617, 627, 639Great Britain, 4-6, 19Great Depression, 9Green Island, 363Green, Maj Thomas C., 42Griffin, Maj David R ., 202nGrinlinton Pond, 257-258, 261Griswold, MajGen Oscar W., 352Guadalcanal, 44-45, 52, 61, 77, 89-90, 94-97,

99, 101, 165, 237, 253, 266, 268, 284, 291-293,305, 327, 389, 393, 410, 422, 428, 430-431,438-439,457,466,514,678

Guam, 6, 25, 30-32, 36, 60-61, 63-64, 79, 184,277, 279-280, 282, 310, 323, 388, 425-429,429n, 438, 444, 466-469, 473, 477, 480, 483-484, 489, 505, 538, 564, 578, 597, 598n, 604,612,711,731-734

Guimba, 342, 347Guiuan, 335Guiuan strip, 339Gustafson, Maj John H., 141, 212

H. L. Edwards, 190Haas, LtCol Ralph, 508, 517, 526Hague Conventions, 377

824

Haha Jima, 496, 598Haiti, 467Hale, MajGen Willis H., 414Halsey, Adm William F ., 62-63, 65, 66n, 82,

102, 181, 245, 278, 286, 291, 293, 293n, 301,303,309,325-326,335,420,430,435,465

Hanneken, Col Herman H ., 119, 130, 135, 137Hankins, Col Joseph F., 233Hanlon, Capt B. Hall, 492Hansen, Lt John E ., 402, 404, 536Harding, President Warren G ., 5, 7Harmon, LtGen Millard F ., 417, 464, 483Harris, SSgt Charles E ., 536Harris, Col Harold D ., 115, 122, 139, 141-143,

208, 237-238, 240, 240n, 241, 245, 254, 303 ;BGen, 115n

Harrison, Col William H ., 104-105Hart, BGen Franklin A ., 505, 556Hawaiian Islands, 6, 16-17, 23-24, 30-32, 45,

96, 162, 301, 314, 363, 400-401, 408-409, 436,438, 445, 462, 468, 477-478, 482-483, 604-605,612,708,713

Hawkins Field, 401, 404Headley, Capt James C., 559, 650, 664Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23, 27, 38, 221Heinl, Maj Robert D ., Jr ., 589nHellzapoppin Ridge, 305, 346, 389Henderson, Col Frederick P., 426nHenderson Field, 45, 393, 428Heritage, Maj Gordon W., 426-427Hermle, BGen Leo D ., 505, 516, 706Higashi, 445, 673, 680Higashi Rock, 495Higashiyama, 159, 260 . See also Walt's Ridge.Hall, RAdm Harry W ., 466, 502, 524, 700, 714Hill B, 222Hill Oboe, 576-577, 616Hill Peter, 574, 576-577, 616Hill Row, 205Hill 3, 214Hill 80, 202, 204Hill 100, 157, 199, 206-207Hill 120, 234, 244Hill 140, 244-246, 249, 254Hill 165, 640Hill 200, 146-147, 157Hill 205, 147Hill 210, 146-147Hill 215, 637Hill 260, 157Hill 300, 224, 260 . See also Kansokuyama .Hill 331, 589-590

INDEX

Hill 357 . 583-584Hill 362, 590, 687Hill 362A, 220, 581n, 616, 618, 621-623, 625-630

Hill 362B, 581, 582n, 583-584, 616, 629-632,635,691

Hill 362C, 445, 58211, 583, 585-586, 588, 591,616,684-685

Hill 382, 447, 455, 568, 572, 646-647, 649-663,665,668-669,682

Hilo, Hawaii, 477, 482Hiraiwa Bay, 474, 633Hirohito, Emperor, 732, 736Hitler, Adolph, 9, 729, 732Hjerpe, Maj Carl W ., 515Hobby, 402, 404Hodge, MajGen John R ., 63, 318Hoeck, 1stLt G . A ., 638nHoffman, BGen Hugh, 344nHolcomb, Gen Thomas, 19, 44Holland, TSgt R . B ., 344nHollandia, 292, 310, 327Home Islands, 39-40, 57, 428, 443-445, 448-

450, 463, 466, 484, 493, 496, 597, 611, 618,730-732 . See also Japan .

Hong Kong, 6, 294, 435, 451Honolulu, Hawaii, 476Honolulu, 132Honshu, 490Honsowetz, LtCol Russell E ., 147,157Hoover, President Herbert, 7, 246, 401, 414,

613,710Hoover, VAdm John H ., 184 ; Adm, 64Hope, Bob, 90nHopkins, Col Zebulon C ., 304n, 334Hori, Col Shizuichi, 457-458, 533n, 539n, 706,

706n, 707, 717nHough, Maj Frank 0 ., 52, 150nHouser, Maj Robert H ., 559n, 562, 588Hudson, LtCol Lewis C., 520, 548Hungary, 8Hunt, Capt George P., 110, 112-113, 144Hurst, Maj E . Hunter, 119-120, 137, 226, 229,

234; LtCol, 19711

ICEBERG Operation, 465, 572Ichimaru, RAdm Toshinosuka, 454, 461, 499,

499n, 564, 586, 669-670, 680, 702, 706, 706nIdaho, 493, 496, 498, 500, 563, 565IDENTICAL Island, 181n, 183-184Ikeda, Col Masuo, 453, 562, 566, 643, 701-705,710

265,285-286Inouye, Capt Samaji, 457, 543, 586, 675, 677-

680,702,706Intelligence

American, 163, 173, 177, 183, 209, 271, 280,

633-634, 636, 640-644, 646-647, 657, 669, 688,691, 693-695, 697-715, 715n, 716-719, 721-

Jack, Maj Samuel S ., 42Jaluit Airfield, 396Jaluit Atoll, 412-414, 416, 420

825

Jaluit Island, 399, 405, 412, 415Jaluit lagoon, 399Japan 4-6, 8-10, 16, 23, 30, 32, 51, 54-55, 62,

67, 76, 241, 265, 276, 293-294, 296-297, 300,326, 377, 405, 421, 430, 435-436, 348, 444-445, 448, 451, 453-454, 462-465, 476, 484,489-491, 495, 598, 600-601, 614-615, 669,683,706,711,730-737 .invasion of, 387-388

Japanese, 57-58, 66, 117, 119, 121, 136, 138,144-145, 147, 158, 160, 177, 190, 201-202,207, 209, 212, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225,227-228, 230-232, 234-235, 237-238, 240-242, 246, 249-251, 253, 256-258, 261-264,267-268, 270, 276-277, 279, 285, 287, 296-297, 300, 306, 310, 312, 314-315, 317-318, 320-325, 328-329, 332, 335-336, 340, 346, 348-352,356-357, 359, 361, 366-367, 370, 372, 374,376-377, 379, 382, 386-387, 389, 393, 395,399-400, 407, 409-11, 413, 415-418, 420, 426,430, 436, 445, 449n, 451, 474, 484, 490, 526,543, 558, 602, 613, 624, 670, 688, 697-698,700,710-711,735-737Army-Navy relations, 732bases, 52, 400, 417civilians, 55, 265, 381, 445, 450, 453diplomats, 737Emperor, 8, 485, 730Empire, 451, 700, 737food, 530, 695Imperial Government, 706installations, 101, 108, 143, 279, 383, 414,

417,490,498-500,514,550,719,726leaders, 443, 449, 730mandated territory, 57Military Academy, 457military doctrine, 457Minister of War, 324, 451, 732morale, 332, 414, 682, 736policy, 445, 614phosphate plant, 172-174, 208, 216Prime Minister, 707repatriation, 265Samurai family, 450secret weapon, 736strength, 163, 175, 180, 189, 258, 276, 285,

336,340,381,458n,472-473surrender, 178, 222, 265, 421, 693, 704-705thermal ray, 736Tokyo Prefecture, 445transportation system, 335war effort, 730

284,366,

335-336, 340, 343, 349,368, 469, 472, 475-476,

352, 359,489, 499,

Irwin, MajIslamicIsland Mail,Isolationism,Italy, 4-9,Ivey, LtColIwahig,

religion,

362

530,

Darrell

4095, 8,733

Thomas

523,570,638-639,646,651,693,698

294D ., 400

15

S., 314

Iwo Jima Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476,435-438, 444-445, 447-449, 449n, 450-454,454n, 455-459, 461, 462n, 463-469, 471-485,485n, 486-487, 490-497, 500-504, 506, 510,512, 514-519, 521-523, 525-528, 530-533,535-543, 545-548, 550, 552-556, 559-565,568-573, 577, 579-581, 586, 588, 592-593,597-598, 598n, 600-605, 607-608, 610-614,614n, 615-618, 620, 620n, 622-626, 628-631,

INDEX

Iloilo River, 375Inaoka, Maj Masauru, 711Independence,396Indianapolis, 281, 560Indochina, 453, 730Indonesia, 294, 358Infantry

American, 87,. 211, 240, 251, 273, 305, 307,317,352,366-368,371,374-375,379,385-386, 423, 521, 531, 565, 567, 574, 576,581-582, 584, 592, 608, 618, 621, 628,633, 639, 647, 649-650, 657, 681, 686,716, 720. See also Army units and Ma-rine units .

Inoue, LtGen Sadae, 68-72, 76, 156, 159, 163,169-170, 179, 180n, 190, 222, 232, 259, 263,

729,732,736-738Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476, 482, 564,482, 564, 579, 597, 601, 604, 617, 645, 710-711, 713, 715, 715n, 720, 722-723, 726, 735,737

Izu Shoto, 444

826

war production, 450weather station, 449, 456

Japanese UnitsImperial General Headquarters, 67-68, 70-

71,76,297-298,706Army, 208, 221, 276, 297, 332, 361, 371, 383,

407, 448, 457, 614n, 620, 726, 732, 736Kwantung Army, 67Southern Area Army, 76First Combined Air Force, 298 . See also

First Air Fleet, Fourth Air ArmyFourth Air Army, 298, 337Fourteenth Area Army, 298, 300, 340, 348,

358Twenty-Third Army, 451Thirty-First Army, 68, 76, 78, 449, 453Thirty-Fifth Army, 298, 3611st Infantry Division, 32114th Infantry Division, 6816th Infantry Division, 31530th Infantry Division, 35935th Infantry Division, 67-68100th Infantry Division, 359102d Infantry Division, 361109th Infantry Division, 433, 455, 475,

533n1st Amphibious Brigade, 682nd Independent Mixed Brigade, 453, 457-458,569,572,647,647n,654,693,711

53d Independent Mixed Brigade, 68-6954th Independent Mixed Brigade, 359, 361Infantry Regiments

2nd, 26415th, 68-6926th, 69841st, 32159th,68-69145th, 453, 562, 643, 701, 703, 705

26th Tank Regiment, 454-455, 590, 69210th Independent Antitank Battalion, 553nIndependent Infantry Battalions

309th, 569, 647n, 651310th, 572, 647311th, 572, 647n312th,647n314th, 572, 647n346th, 69

Infantry Battalions1/59,163,1752/15,69,193,1953/15,69,1353/17,643

INDEX

3/145,659Antiaircraft units

126th, 69144th, 69

Miscellaneous45th Guard Force Detachment, 69

Navy, 178, 208, 265, 276, 298, 300, 312, 319,329, 439-440, 443, 449-450, 454n, 670,677, 680, 732Air Fleets

First, 298Second, 298

Combined Fleet, 67, 76, 297-298, 407,499,701

Imperial Fleet, 64, 68, 297, 312, 319, 325,407, 461, 493

tFirst Mobile Fleet, 298Second Fleet, 298Third Fleet, 298Fifth Fleet, 298Sixth Fleet, 298Chichi Jima Naval Base, 449204th Naval Construction Battalion, 454214th Naval Construction Battalion, 75,

208Naval Guard Force, 457, 475, 677Special Naval Landing Force, 379Striking Force, 298Special Attack Unit, 537. See also Ka-mikazes .

MiscellaneousAngaur Sector Unit, 69, 166, 169Antitank Battalion, 454Cavalry, 451Chichi Jima Branch, Army Fortification

Department, 448Demolition detachment, 592Field Hospital, 647Garrison units, 138, 163, 169-170, 178,

222, 237, 278, 358-359, 361-362, 377,381, 387, 415, 448, 453, 493, 704Anguar, 163, 165, 175, 179-180, 184Chichi Jima, 449, 705Iwo Jima, 458n, 537, 670, 700, 702Leyte, 329Peleliu, 76, 134, 189-190, 214, 232, 265

Imperial Guards, 451Korean labor force, 69Naval engineers, 221Palau Sector Group, 68-71, 76Parachute units, 450Peleliu Area Unit, 222

INDEX

Shimbu Group, 352Special Counterattack units, 267Special Counterlanding Force, 134Stragglers, 376, 426, 664, 675, 692Suicide Squads, 156Suicide Swimmers, 561Suribachi Sector Unit, 533Volcano-Bonin Defense Sector, 475

Java, 297Jeans, Capt Cloyd R ., 402-403Jerome, Col Clayton C., 219, 304, 336-337, 339,

352, 356, 363, 366-368, 372-373, 382, 390 ;BGen, 280n

Jeru, Capt George E ., 85nJohnson, LtCol Chandler W ., 508, 539-540, 629Johnson, Capt Robert C ., 560Johnson, Col Robert F ., 711Johnston Island, 21, 438Joint Army-Navy Board, 16Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24, 38, 51, 60, 62, 65, 151,

286,292-293,303,462,465,733Joint Expeditionary Forces, 62Joint Intelligence Center (Pacific Ocean Areas),

30,60Joint Marine-Army training, 21Joint Navy-Marine planning, 83Joint Planning, 468Joint Staff Planners, 464Joint Staff Study, 50Joint Training Forces

1st, 202d,21

Joint War Plans Committee, 462, 464Jolo Island, 361, 378-380Jordan, Col Walter I ., 471, 519, 563, 567, 569,

659, 663, 665, 667, 672June, Col Frank M ., 433Jungle Warfare. See Tactics .

Kabacan, 381Kaempfer, Maj William P ., 548Kaido, Col Chosaku, 456Kalinin Bay, 401, 407Kaluf, Col John, 86n, 282nKama Rock, 603, 698Kamikazes, 323-325, 328, 331, 336, 340, 459,

537, 718, 736Kamilianlul Mountain, 210Kamilianlul ridges, 202Kaneohe, Hawaii, 398Kangoku Rock, 472, 603, 698Kansokuyama, 159, 235, 260 . See also Hill 300 .

827

Kauffman, Cdr D . L ., 498nKavieng, 303, 444Kazan Retto, 444KEENSET, 181n, 183-184Kellum, Maj William C., 433Kenney, LtGen George C., 291-292, 301, 303,

326, 334, 362 ; Gen, 65nKenyon, Col Howard N., 564, 573, 582, 584, 687Keokuk, 537Kessing, Como Oliver 0 ., 434Kibawe Trail, 387Kibbe, Cdr R . L ., 102nKimes, Maj Ira L ., 42KING II Operation, 310, 315King, Adm Ernest J ., 35, 293, 395, 397, 462-463,465

King, Maj John H ., 329Kingman, RAdm Howard F ., 278Kingsbury, Maj Robert T., III, 326nKinkaid,, VAdm Thomas C ., 303, 309, 326, 334Kiska Operation, 467Kita village, 445, 455-456, 633, 639, 695Kitano Point, 447, 455, 459, 577, 593, 624, 640,

642-643, 684, 698, 691, 695, 698, 700Knott, Maj Gordon H ., 411Koiso, Premier Kuniaki, 707nKojima, Cpl Kyutaro, 711Kolombangar.a Island, 393Kongauru Island, 211-212, 223, 250Korea, 730Korean civilians and laborers, 206, 209, 216,

222, 265, 276, 418, 420, 639, 711Korean War, 718Koror Island, 57, 62, 68, 71, 134, 166, 190, 232,

281,433Koror Town, 101Kossol Passage, 57, 103, 232Kossol Roads, 152, 287Koyatau, Riichi, 543nKrueger, LtGen Walter, 309, 321, 339, 348,351,357

Krulewitch, LtCol Melvin L., 681Kumamoto, 659Kuribayashi, Capt Tadamichi, 451 ; LtCol, 451 ;

Col, 451 ; BGen, 451 ; MajGen, 451 ; LtGen,450-451, 451n, 453-459, 475, 484, 493, 523,525-528, 533, 537, 539, 546-547, 551, 556,561, 568, 572, 584-586, 593, 615, 623, 628,630, 633, 641-644, 669-670, 679, 682-683,685,695

Kuribayashi, Yoshii, 451nKurihama, 484

828

Kurihara, SgtMaj Masao, 237nKurile Islands, 415, 443Kuroda, LtGen Shigenori, 298, 300Kurpoat, Sgt Henry S ., 516Kwajalein, 400, 405, 407, 409, 411, 417, 438,467

Kyushu, 39, 659

Lae, 451Lake Aztec, 176Lake Pinalay, 385Lake Salome, 174Lambrecht, LtCol Peter D ., 326Lanboyan Point, 365Landing barges, 195Landing craft . See also Ships.

American, 19, 35, 181, 184, 195, 241, 267,503, 508, 522, 548, 601, 607, 634, 725

TypesLCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), 108,

135,166,171,497-498,503,554,727LCI(G)s Landing Craft, Infantry (Gun-

boat), 132, 166, 496-497, 503, 626, 708LCI(M)s (Landing Craft, Infantry,

(Mortar), 166, 504, 523, 555LCI(R)s (Landing Craft, Infantry,

(Rocket), 315, 504, 530LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized), 88,

166,516LCPs (Landing Craft, Personnel), 85LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank), 35, 84,

272, 459, 602LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Person-

nel), 19, 34-35, 85, 88, 127, 166, 516,518, 522, 542

Japanese, 195, 258, 278Landing exercises and techniques, 17, 19Landing forces, 269, 731Lang, Lt Frank C ., 413Lanigan, Col John R ., 471, 509, 519-520, 549-551,555,649-650,660,663,671,692,694

Larkin, LtCol Claude A., 42 ; Col, 45 ; BGen,46 ; MajGen, 303, 388

Larsen, MajGen Henry L., 428Lauesen, Lt Christian F ., 402

LCI-392, 418, 420LCI-394, 420LCI-438, 497ILCI-449, 497LCI-450, 498LCI-457, 498LCI-466, 498

INDEX

LCI-469, 498LCI-474, 497LCI-479, 420LCI-484, 420LCI-491, 420

League of Nations, 4-5, 7, 9, 55, 66Leek, LtCol Frederick E ., 372-373, 373nLehnert, Lt Robert E ., 402Lejeune, MajGen John A ., 16Letcher, Col John S ., 652 ; BGen, 480n, 605n,

614n, 624nLethbridge Report, 612nLentze, 497Lexington, 40-42Leyte, 54, 181, 287, 291, 294, 301, 303, 309-310,

312, 315-327, 330-335, 339, 342, 358-359,361, 363, 366-367, 377-378, 381, 443, 443,461,734

Leyte Gulf, 300, 310, 312, 318, 330, 335-337, 366Leyte Operation, 314, 318, 320, 323, 328, 332-334,345,358

Lighthouse Hill . See Palomas Hill .Line of departure, 84, 505-506, 517, 522, 615,

649Lingayen, 337, 339, 342, 348Lingayen Airfield, 339Lingayen Gulf, 334-335, 337, 342Liscome Bay, 396LITHARGE, 181n, 183-184Little Slot, 221Liversedge, Col Harry B ., 471, 509, 512, 528,

530, 539, 545, 625Logistics, 82, 476, 716, 725London Naval Treaty, 7Los Angeles, Calif., 454Los Negros, 363LOSSAU, 183Loud, Cdr Wayne R ., 63Louisville, 106, 190, 278, 281Lovell, Stanley P ., 612nLow Countries, 19Lowery, Sgt Louis R ., 542LSM 216, 517-518LST 776, 436-437LST 477, 537LST 779, 543, 552LST 807, 560LST 929, 479LST 930, 479LST 931, 479LST 1032, 552LST 1033, 479

INDEX

Lummus, 1stLt Jack, 640-641Lunge Point, 537Luzon, 21, 62, 287, 291, 293-294, 296-298, 303,

312, 324, 327, 331-332, 334-337, 339-343,348-349, 351-352, 356-358, 361, 366, 368, 370,377, 382-383, 433, 435, 443, 457, 465, 734-73 -5,737

Luzon Operation, 332, 334, 348, 353, 357, 715Lyman, Col E . L ., 248n

MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 9, 24, 51-52, 54, 62,65, 181, 286, 296, 301, 303, 309, 326, 333, 336-337,342-343,358,386,390,465,732-735

MacFarlane, LtCol Robert E ., 521Mackay, Maj Malcolm S ., 437 ; LtCol, 438, 597Magai Channel, 183Main Valley, 221Major, Col Harold C ., 388Majuro Atoll, 400, 400n, 405, 407, 438Makin Island, 396, 398-399, 400n, 408, 412Malabang iField, 383Malabang landing, 373nMalacanan Palace, 343Malakal, 57, 281Malanaphy, Cdr Michael J., 492Malaya, 730Malayan, 55, 294Malaybaley, 385Maloelap Airfield, 396, 405Maloelap Atoll, 412-413, 415Manchuria, 9, 67-68, 454, 458, 463, 730Mangaldan, 337, 339-340, 342, 352, 356-357,

370, 373, 381-383Mangaldan. Field, 339, 354Manila, 294, 296, 303, 334, 342-344, 346-347,

349,351-354Liberation of, 348

Manila Bay, 296, 354Manila Bay, 423Manila, John, 514. See also Basilone, GySgtJohn .

Manus Island, 83, 315Maps and charts, Japanese, 472Marakina Watershed, 354Marcus Island, 283n, 444Marianas, 3, 6, 25-26, 30, 51, 54, 60, 67-68, 70,

292-293, 301, 395, 397, 416, 422, 428-429,436, 443-444, 449, 453, 462-464, 466-468,477-478, 483, 485, 495, 500, 504, 527, 559,592, 598, 600, 604, 614, 713, 717-718, 723,731-733

829

Marianas Operation, 26, 60, 62, 64, 84, 86, 153,424,465

Marianas Turkey Shoot, 423Marine units

AirAircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 27-

30,40,47,433Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, 46Marine Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 301,

303, 387, 388Marine Aircraft, South Pacific, 46Marine Aircraft, Defense Force, Samoan

Area, 46Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, 27, 30, 45-46

Marine Garrison Air Force, Western Car-olines, 431

Marine Air Support Control Units, Am-phibious Forces, Pacific, 48

Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 28, 44-47,99

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-47, 301,303-304,312,347,362,387-389

2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-42, 44-47, 98, 98n, 99, 212, 377, 388, 425, 430-431

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 46-474th Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 44-47, 398-

399, 401, 404n, 412, 414, 416, 420, 422,425

Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, ServiceGroup, 44-45

Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, 47, 423, 434-435

Marine Aircraft Groups, 340, 342Marine Aircraft Group 11, 42, 98, 100-101,

127, 282, 430Marine Aircraft Group 12, 326-333, 335,339, 342, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 372-373,

378,390Marine Aircraft Group 13, 398, 400, 407Marine Aircraft Group 14, 334-335, 339,359,362-363,375-376,390

Marine Aircraft Group 15, 413, 437Marine Aircraft Group 21, 42, 393, 426-

429Marine Aircraft Group 22, 401, 411Marine Aircraft Group 23, 45Marine Aircraft Group 24, 303-304, 306-

308, 335, 337, 339, 342-344, 347-349,354, 356-357, 362-363, 368, 373, 382,384,387-389,735

830

47,423Base Air Detachment 3, 42AWS-1, 411AWS-2, 429AWS-3, 363, 383AWS-4, 363, 366, 368AWS-5, 425Headquarters Squadron,

Wings, Pacific, 44-46HqSqn-11, 101HqSqn-12, 45VMB-413, 363, 388VMB-423, 388VMB-433, 363, 388VMB-611, 363, 373-374, 380, 386VMB-612, 429, 436, 485VMF-111, 42, 398, 400, 400n, 412VMF-113, 400, 411-412, 416VMF-114, 99, 101, 210-211, 226, 232, 241-242,256,259,283-284,430,432-433

VMF-115, 326, 329, 363, 368, 378VMF-121, 42, 99, 101, 430VMF-122, 99, 101, 228, 430VMF-124, 335, 435-436, 503

Marine Aircraft

INDEX

VMF(N)-542, 433-434VMJ-152, 42VMJ-252, 413VMJ-353, 397-398, 413VMO squadrons, 718VMO-1, 426-427, 429VMO-2, 424-425, 429VMO-3, 153, 432VMO-4, 424-425, 436-437, 595, 646, 650,

665,671VMO-5, 436-437, 595VMO-151, 42VMO-251, 42, 334-335VMR-253, 429, 438-439, 604VMR-353, 438, 604VMR-952, 437-438, 597, 604VMS-3, 42VMSB-131, 42VMSB-132, 42VMSB-133, 339, 346, 383, 385, 388VMSB-142, 339, 346, 353, 370, 380, 383VMSB-151, 398, 411VMSB-231, 42, 405, 412VMSB-232, 42

Marine Aircraft Group 25, 98, 430 VMF-151, 398Marine Aircraft Group 31, 398, 400, 407- VMF-155, 417

408 VMF-211, 42, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 378,Marine Aircraft Group 32, 303-304, 335, 383

339, 342-344, 347-349, 352, 354, 356- VMF-212, 334, 340, 363357, 359, 362-363, 366-368, 371, 373, VMF-213, 335, 435378, 388, 390 VMF-216, 427, 429

Marine Aircraft Group 41, 45 VMF-217, 427, 429Marine Aircraft Group 42, 45 VMF-218, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 383Marine Aircraft Group 43, 45 VMF-221, 42Marine Aircraft Group 44, 45 VMF-222, 334, 340, 363, 375-376Marine Aircraft Group 45, 433-434 VMF-223, 334, 363, 375-376Marine Aircraft Group 51, 47, 423 VMF-224, 398, 400, 408, 416Marine Aircraft Group 61, 327, 363, 388 VMF-225, 427, 429Second Marine Aircraft Group (Oahu), 20 VMF-241, 398Marine Aircraft Group (Dagupan), 339, VMF-251, 363, 375-376

350, 354, 356, 368 VMF-252, 42Marine Aircraft Groups (Mindanao), 368 VMF-311, 398Marine Aircraft Groups (Zamboanga), VMF-312, 433370-374,382,384,388 VMF-313, 326, 328-330, 363, 368, 378

Marine Aircraft Service Group 48, 435 VMF-321, 429Marine Aircraft Support Groups, 47 VMF-422, 398, 401, 403-404, 409-411Provisional Air Support Command, 47 VMF-441, 398, 400, 416Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, VMF(N)-531, 400

503, 605, 611, 719 VMF (N)-532, 400, 408, 411, 413, 425Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 45, VMF(N)-534, 427, 429

98n,433 VMF(N)-541, 99, 259, 326-328, 330, 333,Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 48 430, 432

INDEX 831

VMSB-236, 339, 370, 378, 380, 388 471n, 472-473, 476-480, 482-483, 489,VMSB-241, 339, 346, 353, 383-385, 388 491-492, 504, 522, 522n, 523, 525-526,VMSB-243, 339, 353, 363, 380 528, 547-549, 554-557, 560-561, 563-565,VMSB-244, 339, 353, 383, 388 565n, 567-569, 571-573, 577-579, 579n,VMSB-331, 398-399, 407, 412n, 418 580, 583, 585-588, 593, 597-598, 603,VMSB-341, 339, 353, 380, 383 605, 608, 608n, 610, 624, 629, 633, 635,VMSB-354, 420 638, 643n, 644, 647, 670-672, 685, 700n,VMI1B-131, 367, 429 711-712,714,719-721,723,725VMTB-134, 100-101 Administrative Command, 24-25VMTB-232, 433-434 Supply Service, 25VMTB-242, 429, 598 V Corps Artillery, 301, 314, 316-319, 323,

Ground 565, 574, 580, 605, 708, 720

27,30-31,36,38-39,46Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, 20, 467Department of the Pacific, 38Administrative Command, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, 26-27, 30Marine Garrison Force, 246, 475Amphibious Training Staff, FMFPac, 21Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMF-

Pac, 27Marine Supply Service, FMFPac, 477Service Command, FMFPac, 30Supply Service, FMFPac, 27-28, 30, 477Transient Center (Marianas Area), FMF-

Pac, 31Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, 16-17Marine Service of Supply, Amphibious

Troops, Pacific, 24

77-79,130,187,232,269,

83, 86, 89, 94, 96, 100, 106, 127,138, 158-159, 161-162, 165, 185,200, 209, 216, 218, 223, 225, 227,236, 240, 245, 249-251, 253-254, 266,271, 274-275, 277, 281-283, 283n,

284, 286, 430, 433, 7342d Marine Division, 19, 27, 34, 97, 266,395-396,425,464

3d Marine Division, 27, 389, 437, 464, 467-469,537,579,593,

471, 473, 478n, 483-484, 515, 525,553-555, 558, 563-565, 565n, 572-579n, 580-582, 582n, 583-587, 589-616-617, 623,626-627,630,634,638,

644n,645,647,649,652,655,659,672-673,676, 680, 684, 686, 688-689, 691, 701-702,704,708,711,711n,712

4th Marine Division, 27, 400, 407-408, 423,Expeditionary Troops, 83, 162, 181, 469, 425, 437, 466-469, 471, 471n, 472-473,

471, 474, 484, 607, 714 478n, 479n, 482-483, 498, 502, 505-506,Force Amphibian Tractor Group, 27 508-509, 517-518, 521, 523, 525-526,Force Antiaircraft Artillery, 27 528, 549, 551-552, 554-558, 560-561,Force Artillery, 27 ,563-564, 565n, 569-571, 595, 602-603,Force Reserve, 27 605, 616, 636n, 642, 644n, 645-647, 649-Force Service Troops, 27 652, 654, 657-661, 665, 668-677, 680-Fleet Base Defense Force, 17 683, 692-693, 695, 702, 708, 711n, 712,FMF Transient Center, 27 714,725I Marine Amphibious Corps, 3, 21, 23-25II Marine Amphibious Corps, 24

5th Marine Division, 25, 27, 64, 437, 467-469, 471-473, 478n, 479n, 480, 482-484,

X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps, 61, 498, 502, 505-506, 508-509, 512, 516-64,78-79 517, 521, 525, 528, 549, 551-552, 554-Redesignated III Amphibious Corps, 66 558, 560-561, 563-565, 565n, 567, 569,

III Amphibious Corps, 25-27, 30, 61, 63- 571, 573, 575-579, 579n, 580-581, 581n,64, 79, 88, 96, 162-163, 165, 168, 177, 582n, 583-587, 591-592, 602-603, 605,181,186-187,246,252,278n,430 616-618, 620, 622, 624, 626-627, 629-

V Amphibious Corps, 23-27, 30, 38-39, 61, 636, 636n, 637-638, 640-641, 643-644,162, 300-301, 425, 436, 466-469, 471, 644n, 645, 658, 676, 686, 688, 691, 695,

Fleet Marine Force, 10, 17, 19, 21, 23-29, I Corps Supply Service, 2532-33, 36, 38-40, 44, 47-48, 464, 466- III Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27467, -476, 489 V Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27

1st Marine Division, 19-20, 27, 34, 36, 63,Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, 17, 26-

832

697-698, 700-705, 707, 711n, 712, 714,725

6th Marine Division, 271st Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344n2d Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344n1st Marines, 80-86, 91, 110, 116, 122, 126,

130, 134, 141, 143-146, 148, 155-159,161, 186-187 . 189, 192, 201, 223-224,228, 237, 280, 467

3d Marines, 564, 565n, 573, 607-608, 608n5th Marines, 80, 91, 96, 115-116, 118, 122,

126, 128-129, 134, 139, 141-143, 146,148, 152, 155, 185, 201, 204-205, 207,210, 214, 218, 223, 236-238, 240, 242,249-250,252,254,593

6th Marines, 4677th Marines, 19, 80-81, 96, 118, 121, 126-

127, 129-130, 134, 138, 146, 148, 153, 155,185, 192, 200, 207, 216, 222-228, 233-234,236-238,252,269,276

9th Marines, 564, 573-578, 581-585, 587-588, 590-592, 617-618, 648, 665, 667,672,686-687,690,711

11th Marines, 80, 91, 94, 105, 129, 153,202, 207, 233, 250

12th Marines, 573, 579, 579n, 580, 587,589,697

13th Marines, 472, 482, 515-516, 521, 548,554, 579n, 617, 621, 624-625, 627-628,636, 643, 697, 701

14th Marines, 472, 545, 552, 560, 568, 579n,587,655,671,675-676,697

20th Marines, 40821st Marines, 305-306, 484, 515, 551, 554-559,561-563,565-567,573-575,578,580-588, 590-591, 593, 623, 636, 647, 655-656,690-691,701,711

22d Marines, 40823d Marines, 471, 509, 517-519, 521, 549-

551, 554-558, 647, 649-652, 654-656,658-659, 661-662, 665, 667-670, 672,67"78,680-681,692,694

24th Marines, 471-472, 519, 521, 557, 563,565, 567-569, 647-648, 659-661, 663,666-668,671,673,675-681

25th Marines, 471, 471n, 509, 519-521,648-551, 554-557, 560, 647, 649-651,656, 658, 660-661, 664-665, 669-670,673,67-5-676p678,680-682,692,694

26th Marines, 469-471, 484, 515, 549, 557-558, 561, 565-567, 569, 575, 616-618,620-621, 627, 629-636, 639, 643, 699-

INDEX

703,706-70727th Marines, 471-472, 509, 513-515, 548-

550, 554-557, 621-623, 625, 633-636, 638,642-643,686,697-702,707

28th Marines, 471, 482, 509-510, 512-513,516, 528, 530-531, 533-534, 536, 538-539, 542, 545, 547, 553, 624-628, 630, 632-633, 635, 637, 640, 642-643, 697, 699-701,703,707

29th Marines, 39Field Depots

1st, 283d,285th, 28, 4777th, 288th, 28, 478, 602, 708, 72516th, 28, 86, 99, 150, 225, 246, 282

Base Depots4th, 286th, 28, 477

1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, 652Amphibian Tractor Battalions

1st, 28, 92, 229, 252, 2712d,283d,284th, 285th, 286th, 28, 938th, 2810th, 2811th, 28, 643

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, 698Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions

1st, 272d,273d,274th, 275th, 277th, 27, 175, 1798th, 279th, 2710th, 2711th, 2712th, 27, 26514th, 2715th, 2816th, 2817th, 2818th, 28

Armored Amphibian Battalions1st, 282d, 28, 472, 505, 618, 648, 671, 698, 721

INDEX

3d, 28, 93, 242, 252Artillery Battalions

1/11,801/12,575,6861/13,515,6391/14,521-522,555,573,575,661,6682/11,80,116,123,195,2282/13,5152/14,521-522,652,6683/11,80,129,153,2693/13,515-516,5313/14,521-522,552,6684/11,86,248,252,2544/12,7084/13,515,574,5784/14,47-2,522,552,668

Base Headquarters Battalions1st, 283d,28

Defense Battalions, 19, 21, 4352d,28

Engineer Battalions1st Separate, 28, 114, 2042d Separate, 28, 595, 7201st, 152, 156, 204, 2403d,5734th, 6475th, 545, 628

Infantry Battalions1/1, 114, 144-147, 157-159, 161, 1891/5, 115-117, 122-124, 126, 139, 141, 143,201-202, 204-205, 209, 214, 216-217,236-237,240,250

1/7, 119, 119n, 121, 129n, 135-138, 159-160, 190, 200, 210, 212, 223-229, 231,236,250-252

1/9, 574-577, 581-582, 586, 590-591,685-688

1/21, 306, 558-559, 559n, 562, 578, 580,582-586, 588-589, 591-592, 626, 686,691

1/23, 508, 517-519, 526, 548, 550, 554,558, 647, 649, 652, 654-656, 658, 660,665, 667, 671-672, 674, 680, 687, 692,779

1/24, 519-521, 547-548, 550-551, 555,557, 559-560, 568-569, 647-648, 658,1660-662, 666-667, 672, 674-676, 680-681

1/25, 508, 519-520, 526, 547, 550-551,554-555, 559, 650-651, 654, 656-657,660, 664-665, 667, 671, 673-675, 681-

833

682,6941/26, 515, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567, 617,

621, 623, 633-635, 638-641, 697, 703,706-707

1/27, 508, 513-514, 549, 554-555, 621-623,633-634,636,642

1/28, 508-510, 512-514, 525n, 526, 530,534, 536, 538, 543, 545, 625-626, 629-630t 637,640,643,707

2/1, 110, 113-115, 123, 126, 134, 144-147,157-159,229

2/5, 117-118, 123, 126, 139, 141-143,201, 205-206, 208-209, 216-217, 232-233,237-238,241-242,244-246

2/7, 80, 119, 130-131, 138, 144, 146-147,157, 159-160, 190, 207, 224-231, 234,236,251-252

2/9, 574-575, 575n, 576-577, 581-582,585-586,590-592,684,686,688

2/21, 558-559, 562, 566-567, 578, 580,582-587,591,686,691

2/23, 508, 517-519, 550, 554, 558, 647,654-655, 658, 667, 672-674, 676-681,692

2/24, 519, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567-568,636n, 647-648, 658-663, 665-668, 672,675-676,680-682,693-694

2/25, 520, 547-548, 550-551, 555, 559,561, 567, 647-650, 654, 656-658, 664-665, 667, 669-670, 673, 681-682, 693-694

2/26, 561, 567, 617-618, 620, 624, 626-627 t 629-631,635,699-700

2/27, 508, 513-515, 549, 557, 561, 617-618,621,623,636-637,639-642

2/28, 508-510, 512-514, 530-531, 535-536, 538-540, 543, 625-630, 633, 637,640-641,707

3/1, 110, 113, 144-145, 147, 156-157,159-160, 187, 189, 192, 197

3/4,5223/5, 116-117, 119-120, 126, 128, 139,

141-143, 148, 201-202, 205, 210-212,214, 228-229, 231-232, 237, 240, 246,249-251,433

3/7, 116-119, 119n, 120-121, 134-138,141, 159-160, 192-193, 195, 197-200,224-225, 227-229, 231, 234, 236-238,252,697

3/9, 575, 575n, 576, 578, 580-583, 585-593t 626,629-631,685-687

3/21, 566-567, 576, 578, 580-581, 585-

834

3d,573,6025th, 703, 708, 710, 724

1st Seacoast Artillery Battalion, 281st Service Battalion, 86, 282Service and Supply Battalions

1st, 282d,283d,284th, 28

Tank Battalions1st, 88, 115, 124, 155, 228, 2723d, 484, 573-574, 578, 581, 591, 685, 687-

'6884th, 472, 509, 517, 519, 548-550, 555,560,647-648,650,666-668,676

5th, 472, 512-515, 531, 538, 549, 554,560, 565, 618, 625-628, 631, 639, 641

INDEX

288, 292, 315, 392, 395-396, 399-400, 400n,401, 405, 407-409, 411-414, 416-417, 420-422, 428, 449, 462, 466-467, 478, 713, 718,731,733

Masilay, 371Mason, Col Arthur T ., 172nMatsunaga, RAdm Teiichi, 451Matsushita, Maj Nagahiko, 533nMaui, 468, 482-483McAloney, Capt Samuel H ., 344n, 351n, 368,

378-379McBroom, Maj Robert B ., 89McCarthy, LCdr Daniel J ., 538McCaul, Maj Vernon J ., 42 ; Col, 304, 363, 388 ;LtGen,304n

McConaughy, Capt James L ., Jr ., 351-352, 379McCutcheon, LtCol Keith B ., 304, 306-307, 337,

587,591-592,685-687 Provisional Battalion, 675, 6813/23, 518-519, 547, 556, 558, 647, 649, 4th Provisional Battalion, 681651-655,658,660,664,667,671-672 Amphibian Truck Companies

3/24, 520-521, 567-568, 647-650, 656, 4th, 521659-661,665-667,672,676-677,681 5th, 516

3/25, 508, 519-521, 547-548, 550, 555, 2d Bomb Disposal Company, 600559, 561, 650-651, 654, 657-658, 664, Joint Assaut Signal Company (JASCO),667,669-671,673,680-682,693 103, 282, 332, 384

3/26, 558, 567, 617-618, 626-627, 630- 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, 277631, 635-636, 639, 643, 699-700, 703, War Dog Platoons,707 4th, 158

3/27, 515, 547, 549, 554, 621, 623, 625, 6th, 624633,637,643,691,703,706-707 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, 662,

3/28, 512-513, 530-531, 534-536, 538- 655540, 625-626, 629-630, 633, 637, 643, 3d Rocket Detachment, 621701,703,706-707 Demolition teams, 135-137, 156, 169, 209,

1st Medical Battalion, 148, 251 214, 216, 226, 262, 271, 531, 621, 633,Motor Transport Battalions 636, 649, 667, 685, 689, 697, 706

1st, 88, 252 Marine Detachment (Provisional), U . S .5th, 643

155m Howitzer BattalionsArmy Forces, Western Pacific, 39

Marine Detachment, Sixth Army, 391st, 27 Marine Detachment, Tenth Army, 382d, 27, 552 Marine Detachment (Provisional), Mari-3d, 27, 80, 153, 254 anas Area, 314th, 27 1st Division Military Police Company, 2335th, 27, 314-319, 320n, 322

155mm Gun Battalions7th Marines Weapons Company, 224, 227

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C .,7th, 27 20,1008th, 27, 80, 153, 254 Marine Corps Air Station, Mojave, Calif ., 45,9th, 27 47,42310th, 27 Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif . 1711th, 27, 314, 316-317, 319n Marine Corps Equipment Board, 17, 3512th, 27

Pioneer BattalionsMarine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va ., 17, 60Marshall, General of the Army George C ., 614

1st, 84, 86, 147, 152, 225, 282 Marshalls, 3, 16, 48, 54, 60, 67, 85n, 110, 279,

INDEX

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.,307-308

Moore, BGen Ernest, 598, 708Moore, Maj James B ., 400Moore, MajGen James T ., 47, 98-99, 430-431,433,598n

Moran, Lt Robert P ., 402-403

835

Nakagawa, Col Kunio, 68-70, 72, 146-148,156-157, 159, 161, 169, 179, 217, 219, 222,225, 229-230, 233, 235, 245, 248-249, 258,260-264 ; LtGen, 267

Nakayama, 146 . See also Hill 200 .Namur Island, 407. See also Roi-Namur .Nanomea, 396, 401-402, 404

343, 372, 382, 389 ; MajGen, 343n, 373n Moret Field, 367-368, 3.70-374, 379-384, 388McGlothlin, Maj Joe H ., 329, 401-402 Moret, Capt Paul, 42 ; LtCol, 367McQuade, MajMears, Capt

ThomasDwayne

J ., 42E., 510

Morison, Samuel Eliot, 715nMormacport, 101

Meat Grinder, 616, 645, 647-648, 651, 661, 682 Moro guerrillas, 379Medical Activities, 55, 83, 139, 142-143, 148, Morotai Island, 52, 62, 65, 293, 309-310, 381,

150-151, 185, 225, 227, 234-235, 238, 266, 733-734274-275, 398-399, 427, 431, 438, 477, 517, Mortimer Valley, 260525, 536, 545, 551, 557, 567, 569, 597, 602- Moses, Col Martain, 318604, 610, .613, 629, 635, 642, 648, 668, 677- Motoyama Plateau, 471, 571-574, 577, 579, 632678,682,689,699,721-723,761 Motoyama tableland, 580, 593

Mee, Maj Fenton, 5 ; LtCol, 525n, 555, 650, 6 ,53, Motoyama village, 445, 447, 449n, 459, 539,656, 660, 674 574,577-578,581,584-586,634,684,686

Megee, Col Vernon E., 47-48, 503-504, 504n, Mt. Bangkal, 379597 ; Gen, 598n Mt. Daho, 379-380

Melanesian, 55Merritt, Col Lewie G., 45 ; BGen, 388, 398,

Mt. Dato, 379Mt. Mataba, 353454

401, 414, 416 Mt. McKinley, 106,187Meyer, Col Lyle H ., 303, 307, 339, 356, 387 Mt. Olympus, 106, 108, 278, 314Micronesia, 16, 54-55Middle Village, 174Midway, 17, 21, 342, 401, 438-439

Mt. Oyama, 262Mt. Patikul, 379Mt. Suribachi, 453, 455-459, 469, 471, 473, 483,

Mille Airstrip, 396 487, 49 15-498, 500, 502-503, 508-510, 512-Mille Atoll, 400n, 405, 412-413, 415, 418, 421 513, 516, 525-526, 528, 530-531, 533, 533n,Miller, Sgt P . J ., 344n, 479 534-540, 542-543, 545, 547, 553, 564-565,Miller, Lt Roy G., 320, 436 593, 604, 611, 618, 624-626, 634, 646, 677-Millington, LtCol William A., 435-436, 503- 679,700,726

504,506 Mudge, MajGen Verne D., 343n, 344n, 347, 352Mills, LtCol James E ., 314 ; Col, 319n Mueller, MajGen Paul J., 63, 165, 168-169,Minami village, 445, 447, 459, 568, 642, 646, 171-173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 186, 211, 232n,

648, 650, 660, 666, 673, 676, 682 237n, 252, 254, 259n, 260-262, 263n, 264, 278Mindanao, 52, 64-65, 291-293, 303, 309, 321, Mugai Channel, 181

332, 356-359, 361-363, 365-366, 374, 380- Mulcehy, Col Francis P ., 46 ; MajGen, 47, 388388,390,733-734 Munda Airstrip, 428

Mindoro Island, 331, 334, 336, 358, 363, 381 Munday, Maj Jack R ., 123n, 129nMississinewa, 434Missoula, 540Mitchell, Maj Norman L ., 259Mitchell, MajGen Ralph J., 46, 301, 303n, 312,

Munich Settlement, 9Murahori, 1stLt, 190Murai, MajGen Kenjiro, 70, 259, 263 ; LtGen,

264314,326,334-335,362-363,387 Murphy, LCdr Raymond P., 595

Mitscher, RAdm Marc A ., 405, 493, 495-496, Murray, Maj Clay, 559n, 562Murray, 420717 ; VAdm, 64,102

Moluccas, 52Monte Cassino, 530Monitor, 314

Mussolini, Benito, 9Mustain, LtCol Hollis U ., 508, 519, 550, 555

836 INDEX

Nanpo Shoto, 444-445, 464Nansei Shoto, 465Napalm, 92, 92n, 136, 153, 169

Joint Expeditionary Force, 483Joint Expeditionary Force, 466, 483Pacific Forces

Napp, Cdr Emil E ., 90nNashville, 311Natives, 265, 317, 365, 398, 402, 404, 418, 420

Central, 23Southwest, 62

Service Force, Pacific, 477Natoma Bay, 423Nauru, 396, 399, 415

Fleet Air Wing 2, 398Transport Division, 28, 316

Navajo Marine Code Talkers, 620, 620n, 621, Transport Division 32, 484719 Amphibious Group 2, 476

Naval gunfire, 17, 34, 36, 63, 78, 83, 94, 103- Attack Groups105, 108, 112, 119n, 135, 137, 146, 153, 162, Angaur, 63, 165166, 168-169, 177, 190, 208, 210, 221, 278- Peleliu, 63279, 280-282, 288, 314, 368, 404, 475, 483, Ulithi, 181486-487, 489-493, 495, 501, 504-505, 512, Defense Group, 634.534, 536, 547-550, 555-556, 558, 562-563, Escort Carrier Group, 96567, 573, 576, 579n, 582, 584, 587, 589, 605, Fast Carrier Groups, 102611, 617, 620-621, 623, 633, 638, 640, 643, Fire Support Group, 64, 102-103, 278646, 648, 654, 658, 661-662, 668, 671-672, Mine Group, 492674,684,714-719,726 Submarine Offensive Reconnaissance Group,

Naval liaison officers, 282 102Naval liaisonNaval losses,Naval TreatyNaval WarNavy, 13, 24,

parties, 308312of 1922, 4, 6

College, 1541, 63-64, 278, 307, 325, 334, 342,

Support Carrier Group, 492, 495, 500, 598Transport Groups, 95Transport Group 3, 83Underwater Demolition Group, 492Air Evacuation Squadron 2, 597

388, 430, 436, 452, 670, 714, 732, 734 Destroyer Squadron, 54BureauBureauGeneral

ofofBoard

Aeronautics, 41Naval Personnel, 279

of the Navy, 14, 20, 40, 43

Interpretation Squadron 2, 473Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees),

89, 204, 274, 335, 398, 408, 484, 517, 526,Navy Units . See also Task Organizations . 564, 595, 600, 701, 710, 712U. S . Fleet, 17, 395, 735 9th, 560Atlantic Fleet, 19-20 15th, 89Pacific Fleet, 19, 23, 184, 734 31st, 479, 479n, 564, 594, 602Third Fleet, 63-64, 102, 245, 278, 293, 300, 33d, 152, 204, 272

303,309,334-336,430,435 51st, 433Fifth Fleet, 23, 68, 70, 77, 101, 422, 435, 466, 62d, 479, 595, 7.20

491,502 73d, 152, 204Seventh Fleet, 300-301, 307, 309, 326, 335 93d,335Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 20 98th, 708Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 21, 23, 467 133d, 479, 479n. 594-595, 602, 634Amphibious Support Force, 483, 492, 502 1054th, 152Attack Forces

Eastern, 63Photographic Squadrons

4th, 472Luzon, 336 5th, 472Northern, 25, 502Southern, 25Ulithi, 183

Service Squadron 10, 478Transport Squadrons

11,484Western, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283 15,584

Covering Force, 63-64, 483, 492, 498, 500, 503 16,484Fast Carrier Forces, 64, 101, 435, 495Fleet Naval Landing Forces, 25, 63-64, 425

Underwater Demolition teams (UDT), 78-79, 83, 103, 110, 165, 183, 207, 268, 490,

INDEX

493n,496-499,725UDT 13,495UDT 15, 500

VC-21, 283nVOC-1, 718Air Support Unit, 492Fire Support Unit One, 498Fire Support Unit Two, 498Gunboat Support Unit One, 492Gunboat Support Unit Two, 492Peleliu Fire Support Unit, 96Kossol Passage Detachment, 63, 103Shore-Based Aircraft, Forward Area, 414

Navy Yard, 270Nazi Party, 732Negro Marines, 150, 516, 602Negros Island, 294, 331, 358-359, 361, 374-378Nemoto, Captain, 264Netherlands, 6Netherlands Indies, 51, 55Nevada, 493, 496, 498, 500, 503, 624New Bern, N . C ., 41New Britain, 77, 89, 237, 266, 303, 363, 444New Caledonia, 367, 438Newcomb, Richard F ., 458n, 533n, 543n, 677n,678n

New Georgia, 305, 389, 393, 428, 430New Guinea, 51-52, 67-68, 97, 287, 291-292,

309, 432, 439, 444, 730, 733New Hebrides, 95, 98, 100, 430, 433New Ireland, 303, 363New London, Conn ., 14New Mexico, 336Newport, R.I ., 14-15New River Base, N.C ., 20Newton, VAdm John H ., 293New York, 493, 500, 503Ngardololok, 59, 142-143, 201, 217Ngarekeukl, 189-190Ngarmoked Island, 57,135-138Ngercheu Island, 265Ngeregong, 261-262Ngesebus Airfield, 73, 211Ngesebus Island, 58, 61, 73, 80, 148, 189, 202,

205-212, 214, 219, 222-223, 242, 250, 276, 281,84, 306, 73.5

Nicaragua, 16-17, 305, 467Nichols Field, 354Nimitz, Adm Chester W., 24, 26, 29-30, 38, 44-

47, 51-52, 52n, 60-62, 65, 98, 278, 286, 292-293, 326, 388, 395-396, 420, 427, 430, 462-466,491n,612,712,714,733

837

Nine-Power Treaty, 6Nishi, LtCol Baron Takeichi, 454-455, 459,

590-591, 628, 646, 652, 655, 684, 692 ; Col,706

Nishi Ridge, 616, 625, 628-630Nishi Village, 618, 630, 632, 635, 637Nisshu Maru, 455Noble, RAdm Albert G ., 381Noguchi, Capt Iwao, 711Norfolk, Va ., 3.5Norman, Col Lawrence, 398Normandy, 731-732North Africa, 733North Carolina, 20North Carolina, 493, 503Northern Solomons, 303Northrop Aviation, 326Norway, 19Noumea, 431Novaliches, 346Nui Island, 402-403Nukufetau, 399Nutting, Capt Lewis, 605

Oahu, 21, 183, 417, 477, 483Obata, Gen Hideyoshi, 449, 453Observers, Japanese, 128, 141Ocean Island, 415OCTAGON Conference, 65Oder River, 730Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 612Ofstie, RAdm Ralph, 278, 281Ogasawara Gunto, 444Okinawa, 30, 32, 39, 47, 184, 266, 277, 309, 377,

387-388, 465, 490, 572, 614, 715, 734-735,737

Old Baldy, 260Oldendorf, RAdm Jesse B ., 103-104, 106, 287n,

279-280Oldfield, LtCol John S ., 515Old Glory, 445O'Leary, TSgt Jeremiah A ., Jr., 235nOmmaney Bay, 336O'Neill, Capt Donald D ., 425Ormoc, 321, 325, 327-328, 330Orote Field, 426-428

,Orote Peninsula, 425-426Osaka Yama, 628 . See also Hill 362A.Osborne, 1slLt Stanley, 662-663Osuka, MajGen Kotau, 453, 457-458, 475Ota, Lt Hideo, 711Owi Island, 335, 432

838

Oyama, 260Oyanagi, Leading Private Yutaka, 683nOzark, 723

Pacific Islands, 55Pacific Ocean, 54, 439-440, 444, 713-714, 731,

737, 764Pacific Ocean Areas, 24, 29, 38, 41, 54, 60Pacific Theater, 21, 292, 504, 522, 588, 612-

613, 620n, 726, 730Pacific War, 54Pagan Island, 429Palampon, 332Palaus, 16, 47, 52, 54-55, 57-62, 64-68, 71,

76-78, 82, 96-98, 101-102, 105, 134, 162, 165,180, 183, 189, 193, 223, 227, 232, 245, 253,259, 265, 279, 286-287, 293, 326, 407, 430,433,457,733-734

Palawan Island, 358-359, 361-362, 365Palmyra Island, 21, 438Palo, 310Palomas Hill, 174, 176. See also Lighthouse

Hill .Palompon, 331Panaon Straits, 310Panay, 294, 358-359, 361, 363, 370, 374-376,

378Panay Islands, 328, 331Parang, 381-383Parangon, 381Parker, Capt Elton C ., 492Parris Island, S.C ., 35-36Parry Islands, 408-409Password CHEVROLET, 620Patikul, 379Patrick, MajGen Edwin D ., 352-354Patrols, 269, 611, 637, 692

antisubmarine, 100, 278, 433, 561, 598, 611,717

Pearce, Maj Thomas B ., Jr ., 629Pearl Harbor, 20, 26, 30, 32, 41, 44-45, 60-61,67, 94, 98-99, 220, 303, 315, 409, 423, 429,431, 449, 451, 465, 467-468, 476-477, 501,537, 677Japanese attack, 29, 40, 42, 44

Peatross, LtCol Oscar F ., 513nPeleliu, 3, 36, 57-59, 62-63, 66, 70-73, 75-81,

83-84, 86, 88-89, 92-94, 97, 100-106, 116,118, 120, 122n, 124, 127-129, 131, 135-136,138-139, 141-143, 150-51, 153, 155-156, 162,165, 169, 175, 177, 179-181, 184-197, 189-190, 192-193, 195, 198-202, 204-205, 207,

INDEX

209-211, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 227-228, 232-233, 236-237, 241-242, 244-246, 249-250, 253-254, 258-263, 265, 267-269, 271-273, 275-286, 288, 300, 306, 309, 326-327,333, 335, 430-431, 431n, 432, 438, 443, 445,489,505,729,733-734,738

Peleliu Airfield, 66, 95, 98-99, 115, 152, 165,185, 236, 263, 276, 430, 432, 438

Peleliu Island Command, 86, 89, 98, 134, 152,156,264-265,282

Peleliu Operation, 94, 96, 100, 153-154, 161,185, 190, 207, 214, 266, 270-271, 273-274,278, 280-281, 284, 285n, 287, 324, 433, 735

Pennsylvania, 145Pensacola, 493, 495-497, 563, 565, 624Peppard, Maj Donald A ., 237nPeralta, Col, 375Percy, Maj George A ., 562, 582Perry, Commo Matthew, 445, 484Philadelphia, Pa ., 14Philippines, 3, 6, 14, 51-52, 54, 65, 67, 70-71,

76, 102, 179, 181, 184, 279, 287, 291-294, 296-298, 303-304, 306-307, 309, 312, 324, 327,332-333, 335-337, 340, 342, 348, 354, 356,358-359, 361-363, 366, 375-377, 380-382,384, 387-390, 423, 433, 440, 443-444, 447,457, 461, 463, 465, 469, 718, 718n, 730, 732-736

Philippines Operation, 286, 291, 300, 307, 334,351,358p374,377,387,389-390,416

Photographs, 221, 275, 318, 382Pilots

American, 40-42, 48, 153, 225, 241, 274, 283,291, 301, 312, 314, 327-328, 330-335, 342,346, 348-349, 351-352, 354, 356, 359,362, 365, 367, 370, 374-376, 380, 383-390, 393, 396-397, 400-401, 407, 411-413, 415-417, 420, 422-424, 427-428,433-437, 440, 472, 485, 490, 493, 499-500,523,597,717-718,718n,735

Japanese, 399-400, 439, 452, 454Pinckney, 479, 723Pipes, Sgt Joe L., 516Plain, Col Louis C., 514Planning

American, 51-52, 57-58, 60, 98, 346, 483,485, 590, 542, 559n, 590, 593, 612, 721

Japanese, 300, 340, 450Plaridel, 346Poland, 8-9, 19Pollock, LtCol Daniel C ., 515, 549Polynesian, 55

INDEX

Ponape Island, 407, 412, 415-416

839

586, 592-593, 602, 608, 633, 688-689, 699,Pontoon causeways, 152 702,724Pope, Capt Everett P ., 157-158, 234 Rescue Activities, 401, 440Portland,Portugal,PrattPresident

2816, 8

& Whitney radialMonroe, 409-410,

engine,710

399

Research and Development, OSS . See Office ofStrategic Services .

Reservoir Hill, 350-351Reutlinger, Maj Albert F ., 93

Price,Prisoners

RAdm John D .,of War

Japanese, 134, 138,

398

175, 195, 199, 207-209,

Reynolds, Maj John E ., 417Rhineland, 9Richardson, LtGen Robert K ., Jr., 464

218, 222, 225, 236, 253, 258, 276-277, Ridderhof, Col Stanley E ., 388285, 361-362, 370, 418, 522, 551, 626, Ridge 3, 242, 245644,690,692-694,703-704,710-711 Ridge 120, 244

Korean, 209, 216, 276, 644 Ridlon, Capt Walter, 663Psychological warfare, 276, 417, 693, 704 Roach, Capt Phil E ., 510Puerta Princesa, 362 Roads, 202, 210, 325, 479, 634Puller, Col Lewis B ., 110, 112, 114, 129-130, Roane, Capt Eugene S ., Jr., 322

134,144,147-148,157,187 Robertson, Capt Armand, 95-96Pusan,Putnam,

Quantico,

Korea,Maj

Va.,

454Paul A., 42

14, 16-17, 19, 21, 35-36, 39, 41-

Robertson, LtCol Donn J ., 515, 549, 702Robinson, Col Ralph R., 60Rockey, MajGen Keller E ., 468, 512, 549, 554-

555, 557, 579, 581, 598, 610, 617, 626-627,42,304,388 630, 633, 635, 638, 642-644, 691, 695, 699-

Quarry, Iwo Jima, 525 702,706Quebec,QuebecQuezon City,

Canada,(QUADRANT)

65

354Conference, 60

Rocky Point, 168-169, 171Rodgers, RAdm Bertram J ., 483, 492, 498, 500,

502Quezon,

Rabaul, 303,

Manuel L., 296 Rogers, BGen Ford 0 ., 265Rogers, Capt John F., 402Rogers, Col William W ., 466 ; MajGen, 466n,393

Radar, 100, 259, 323-324, 326, 328, 330, 373, 522n, 565n, 579n, 608n, 700n, 714n,404, 408, 411, 425, 486n, 487, 572, 611, 646, Roi-Namur, 400, 400n, 401, 405, 407-408, 411,653,662 466-467,477,636n

Radar Hill, 205, 214, 216-217 Roll, LtCol George A ., 638RadioRailroads,

Tokyo,171,

499, 707171n, 172, 176

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 9, 19, 65,613, 614n, 673, 706, 706n, 727

Ramsey,Randall,Rea,ReconnaissanceRedfield,Rees, Col James

LtColLtCol

Maj Amedeo,

LtCol

Frederick A ., Jr.,Carey A., 574

561, 618activities, 318, 474Ben Z., 413E., 353

130n Rosenthal, Joe, 543Ross, Col Richard P ., Jr., 150nRota Island, 428-429Rothwell, LtCol Richard, 519, 558, 562Rowell, Col Ross E ., 41 ; BGen, 42 ; MajGen

44, 44n, 45, 45n, 46Reeves,Reich,Reinberg,Reinforcements

RAdm2dLt

LtCol

John W., Jr., 151Richard, 662-663

Louis, 248

Rowse, Maj Earl J ., 552Royal Air Force, 408Royal Australian Air Force Command, 301,

309,382American, 155

324-325,Royal, RAdm Forrest B ., 366Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 39-40Japanese, 190, 201, 281, 321-322,

328, 382, 453, 664, 670 Royal New Zealand Air Forces, 301, 362RENORentz,Replacements,

MajV Operation,

John N., 445n86, 139,

293n

147-148, 480, 483, 546,

Rozga, Lt Thomas, 425, 436Rue, Lt Charles C ., 370Ruhl, PFC Donald J., 535

840

Ruhr Pocket, 730Rupertus, MajGen William H ., 63, 77, 79, 83,

94, 97, 129-132, 151, 165, 185-186, 189-190,193, 199, 200-201, 204, 206, 210-211, 223-224, 228, 236, 242, 251, 253n, 266, 278, 278n,279, 284, 286, 433

Russell, Maj Gerald F ., 642Russell Islands, 77, 88, 100, 115, 186, 393, 400Russell, MajGen John H ., 17Russia . See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .Ryukyus, 297, 335, 444, 464, 737

Sabol, LtCol Stephen V ., 110, 113, 145Saipan, 25, 32, 51, 59-61, 71, 76, 78, 105, 168,

173-174, 176, 184, 263, 267, 275-277, 323,421,423-4 25, 428-430, 438, 443-444, 450, 453,457, 461, 464, 467-468, 472, 474, 476, 478,480, 484, 487, 489, 491, 498, 504, 573, 597,725,731-732,734

Saipan Operation, 26, 225, 423-424, 462, 466Saito, Fred, 533n, 543n, 677n, 678nSalt Lake City, 493, 498Samar, 65, 294, 310, 312, 317, 330, 334-335,

339,358-359p365,377-378Samaritan, 479, 537, 723Samoa, American, 21, 46, 398Sample, RAdm William D ., 278Samurai, 677

,San Bernardino Straits, 312Sanderson, BGen Lawson H . M., 420San Diego, Calif., 17, 21, 23, 41-42, 44-45,

328,431San Diego Union ( newspaper), 400San Fabian, 339, 356San Fernando, 342, 350San Francisco, Calif ., 286, 465Sangamon, 426Sanga Sanga, 378San Ildefonso, 346San Isidro, 331San Jose, Calif., 316-317, 353San Jose del Monte, 346San Pablo, 325San Roque Airfield, 367Santa Barbara, Calif., 45, 47, 423Santa Cruz,439Santa Maria, 346, 367Santee, 427Santo Tomas, 343Santo Tomas University, 347Sarangani Bay, 382, 384, 387,$'aratoga, 40-42, 537

INDEX

Sarles, LtCol George H ., 373, 386Saufley, 378Savory, Nathaniel, 445Sayers, LtCol Joseph C ., 561Sayre Highway, 385-386Scales, Maj James S ., 518, 649, 652-653Scandinavia, 729Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 466-468, 476, 482,

490-491, 491n, 492, 505, 515, 517, 547, 551-553, 563-564, 569, 576-577, 593, 603, 607,608n, 610, 627, 633, 635, 638, 670-671, 676,700, 710, 714, 716, 720

Schmidt, LtCol Richard K ., 509, 648Schrider, Maj Peter P ., 304, 425, 429Schrier, 1st Lt Harold G ., 540, 542Scott, LtCol Wallace T., 356, 373Sea Runner, 253Sea Sturgeon, 251, 253Seawolf, 78Secretary of the Navy, 484, 542, 713Selden, Col John T ., 131 ; BGen, 131nSenda, MajGen Sadasue, 458, 569, 572, 586,

647,654,680,693,693n,694-695,702Sengebau, Kulas, 265nService and Supply Activities . See Army units ;

Logistics ; Marine Units ; Supply and equip-ment .

Sevik, Lt Edward A ., 413Shanghai, 321Shanley, Capt James V., 235, 244Sharp, RAdm Alexander, 492Sharpe, 1stLt Winfield S ., 372Shepard, LtCol Charles E ., Jr ., 513Sherman, Capt Forrest P ., 465Shimbu Line, 351, 353. See also Japanese De-

fenses .Ships. See also Landing craft .

American, 86, 169, 323, 445, 493n, 499, 548,603, 714, 716

amphibious command ships, 475, 523, 714battleships, 82, 103, 165-166, 210, 278, 475,

493, 498-499, 574, 587, 625, 634, 644, 665barges, 87, 127, 184, 232, 269, 314, 367, 375cargo vessels, 82, 87, 478, 573, 603, 722carriers, 97, 102, 278, 281, 283, 293, 312,

317, 323-325, 336, 395, 397, 405, 407,423-424, 426, 429, 435, 437, 451-452,459, 475, 523, 537, 560, 565, 717

cruisers, 82, 103, 160, 165-166, 181, 210,278-279, 336-337, 400, 407, 459, 475,484, 489, 498, 504, 551, 554-555, 574,587,625,634-644,665

INDEX

LSDs (Landing Ships, Dock), 84, 88, 96,607

LSMs (Landing Ships, Medium), 379, 475,482, 509, 517, 520, 601

LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank), 84, 95-97,103, 129, 153, 162, 166, 187, 232-233,270, 329, 356, 366, 436, 475, 477, 479-480, 480n, 482, 484, 503, 522-523, 560-561,601,607,722

LST(H)s (Landing Ships, Hospital), 83,479,480n,517,522-523,560,604,723

LSVs (Landing Ships, Vehicle), 314, 732minelayers, 400, 530, 607minesweepers, 103, 165, 183, 335, 420, 491,

531, 597, 648, 651,

730barges, 166, 190, 259, 278, 420, 432, 526battleships, 312cargo vessels, 328-329, 399carriers, 300, 312, 731coast defense vessels, 321cruisers, 312destroyers, 312, 321, 328

841

127, 143, 148, 152, 204, 282, 478, 480, 483,523, 553, 592-593, 601-602, 708, 710, 724-725

Siari, 365Siberia, 67Sibert, MajGen Franklin C ., 381, 383Sicily, 281, 733Silverthorn, LtGen Merwin H ., 32n, 27nSindangan, 365Singapore, 294, 337, 382Siskin, Chaplain Edgar E ., 109nSlappey, Capt Wallace J ., 432Smith, Sgt E . Payson, Jr ., 373nSmith, LtCol John, 379Smith, Maj Holland M., 15, 19 ; Maj Gen, 20-

21, 23, 434n ; LtGen, 24-26, 29-31, 33-36, 304,

181,181nSmith, BGen Oliver P ., 77, 1.29-131, 211, 253 ;MajGen, 60n

Smith, Maj Perry K ., 142 ; Col, 363Smoak, Col Eustace, 588Smoke screenAmerican, 135, 231, 279, 322, 357, 385, 497-

498,637,660,652,660,666Japanese, 227, 592, 698

Smyth, PFC George, 562Solace, 479, 542, 723Solomons, 6, 67, 83, 87, 97, 291-293, 301, 326-

327, 334, 342-343, 362-363, 393, 423, 466-467,730

Song of Iwo Jima, 700Sorol, 434South -America, 8South China Sea, 334, 435South Pacific, 21, 23, 45-46, 398, 431, 733

tankers, 82tenders, 607transports, 19, 85, 87, 96-97, 162, 168, 181,

212, 251, 274, 328-329, 335, 367, 429,475, 498, 502-503, 522-523, 525, 540,552, 573, 597, 604, 607, 610, 714, 723,736

tugs, 601, 607Japanese, 278, 281, 324, 327-330, 333, 399,

423, 428, 433, 464, 466, 487, 489-492, 492n,501, 523, 542, 603, 608, 608n, 610-613, 700,714

Smith, MajGen Julian C., 61, 63-64, 76, 79,186, 211, 278 ; LtGen 80, 80n, 89, 162-163,

destroyer escorts, 312-313, 420, 607destroyer minesweepers, 607

escorts, 329submarines, 259, 312, 366, 396, 415, 417,

destroyers, 103, 108, 132, 162, 165-166, 434, 450, 484181, 190, 195, 210, 261, 278-279, 312, tankers, 447, 735329-330, 336, 378, 383, 400, 402, 404, tenders, 399407, 420, 475, 484, 493, 496-498, 504, torpedo boats, 366, 407530, 554-555, 591-592, 607, 634, 637, transports, 321, 328, 453644, 658, 665, 668, 691, 699 hip-to-shore movement, 119n, 269

escort carriers, 424, 432 Shofner, LtCol Austin C ., 116-118Sho-Go Operations, 297, 312, 321Shore fire control parties, 35, 277. See also Air

gunfire support ships, 81, 211, 493, 495-498, 501, 503-504, 523, 554, 649, 658,671-672,679,714 activities ; Naval gunfire .

liberty ships, 431 Shore party activiites, 17, 34, 84, 86, 88, 94,

495-496,607motor torpedo boats, 327, 361patrol craft, 84, 181, 261, 315, 497, 505,

607, 665, 716repair ships, 607submarines, 381, 444, 453-455, 473supply and support ships, 233, 253, 502,

842

Southwest Pacific Area, 24, 51-52, 101-102,291-292, 301, 303, 334-335, 358, 416, 438, 457

Spain, 8, 9, 54, 294Spanish American War, 14, 54Spatz, Lt Donald, 413Spearfish, 473Spritzen, LtCol Roland J ., 553nSpruance, VAdm Raymond A ., 23, 422, 435,

465-466, 469, 489-491, 492n, 501, 560, 713 ;Adm, 465n

Spurlock, Maj Roy T ., 327STALEMATE Operation, 52, 59-62, 162, 266,

278, 430, 733STALEMATE II Operation, 59, 62-65, 82, 84,

89,97-98,100-101,180,287,315Stalingrad, 430Stark, Adm H . R ., 40, 42-43Stars and Stripes, 207, 542, 564, 626, 678 . See

also Flag raising and Old Glory .Steele, 413Stein, Cpl Tony, 625Stephenson, Capt Edward V ., 578Stiles, Maj Wilfrid H ., 431St. Matthias Group, 373Stout, Maj Doyle A ., 568, 648, 661Stout, Maj Robert F ., 225, 432-433Strategy, 395, 715n, 716Streit, Maj Victor H ., 226Stuart, LtCol Arthur J., 88n, 122n, 124n, 154n,210n,272n

Stuart, Col James A ., 607Subic Bay, 21, 342Sudentenland, 9Suifuzan Hill, 235, 260Sulphur, 444, 455-456, 572, 579, 600, 638Sulphur Island, 444Sulu Archipelago, 358-359, 361, 363, 371, 374,

378, 389, 385Sulu Sea, 335, 368Sumatra, 297Supplies and equipment. See also Ammunition ;

Logistics .American, 85, 87, 128, 152, 273, 478, 478n,

522, 551, 553, 597, 601-602, 610, 612-613, 627, 722-725

aviation, 477-478cargo, 721, 724clothing, 610communications, 308, 368, 370, 379, 383,

389, 413, 515, 597, 719dumps and storage, 86-87, 122, 126-128,

151-152, 264, 269, 282, 318, 526, 551,

INDEX

553, 600, 608, 658, 701, 720, 724equipment, 92, 152, 184, 208, 266, 269,

272, 277, 325, 523, 611, 651explosives, 514, 531, 669, 711, 716food and rations, 83, 87, 128, 282, 398,

410, 477, 523, 553, 557fuel and lubricants, 87-88, 241, 476-477,

526, 536, 607, 610, 612-614, 641, 664,712,722

gas masks, 638matting, 333, 478, 601-602, 724smoke pots, 256spare parts, 155, 266, 277water, 87-88, 128, 129n, 135-136, 150,

190, 241, 257, 271, 275, 352, 398, 447,477, 480, 523, 553, 557, 602, 607, 634

Japanese, 382, 415, 457, 473, 654, 659dumps and storage, 150, 200, 275, 278, 281,

331, 353, 383, 493n, 562, 617, 638, 641gas munitions, 614signal, 259smokeless powder, 177, 584water, 258, 262, 530, 611, 620, 695

Support Air Request Net, 718Surigao City, 382Surigao Straits, 312, 327, 330Sutherland, LtGen R . K ., 293nSuwanee, 426 •Suzuki, LtGen Sosaku, 361Sweetser, Col Warren E ., Jr., 387-388Swift, MajGen Innis P., 352Swindler, CoI Leland S ., 478 ; BGen, 724n

Tachiiwa Point, 447, 459, 578, 642, 675-677,681

Tacloban, 310, 312, 314, 316, 325-328, 330-331Tacloban Airfield, 310, 330, 333Tactics

American, 715n, 725, 737amphibious patrols, 260armored support, 209, 518, 550, 564, 566,

635counterbattery fire, 202, 320, 554-555, 639,

656, 660, 666, 669, 673, 719-720gas warfare, 612-614harassing and interdiction fire, 153, 281,

414, 651, 654, 661, 671infiltration, 705jungle warfare, 305night attacks, 91, 588, 590sabotage, 349search and kill missions, 318, 401

INDEX 843

supporting arms coordination, 134, 282, TF 33, 63TF 38, 64-65TF 50, 466TF 51, 466TF 52, 523TF 53, 2.5, 502, 724

308, 320, 331, 333, 482,666, 684, 716, 719

555, 657-658,

174, 177,580, 592,

234,623,

175,533,

tank-infantry assault, 110,281, 514, 519, 536, 567,627, 687,714 TF 54, 483, 493, 498, 500,

TF 55, 25TF 56, 466TF 57, 399TF 58, 405, 408, 435-436,

503, 654,

475-476,

668,

489,

671,

493,

Japanese, 278, 315, 322Banzai attacks, 71, 122, 156, 169-170,261, 263, 457-458, 522n, 525-527,538,556,641-642,678-679,705,708

chemical warfare, 614counterattacks, 72, 115, 121, 126, 132, 147,

495-496, 501, 503, 523, 560, 564, 717TF 59, 11, 46

158, 170-171, 176, 198, 202, 205, 245, TG 32 .1, 63257, 267, 350, 556, 559, 679, 682 TG 32 .2, 63, 165, 181

counterbattery fire, 279, 655, 661 TG 32 .9, 63, 103counterlandings, 242, 261 TG 51 .5, 634guerrillas, 461 TG 52.2, 492, 495harassing and interdiction fire, 73, 320, TG 52.3, 492

726 TG 52.4, 492incendiary balloons, 736 TG 56.1, 466infiltration, 170, 174, 207, 220, 225, 249, TG 58.1, 451

261, 319-320, 322, 525-526, 539, 545, TG 58.4, 451556, 558, 585-586, 630, 632, 638, 661, TG 58.5, 560665, 677, 686, 697 TG 59.6, 431

rocket barrages, 660-664 TG 78 .1, 366sniping, 135, 141, 168, 172, 187, 201, 208, TG 78 .2, 381232-233, 246, 248, 251, 263, 320n, 351,426, 543, 560, 564, 578, 595, 623, 625,635, 637, 639, 641, 646, 649-651, 656,667,669

suicide attacks, 156, 323, 330-331, 335-33,6,435,735

tank attacks, 123withdrawal, 180

Tada, Col Tokechi, 232n, 263, 458, 508, 548,

TU 52 .2 .2, 492Tawi Tawi Group, 378Tennessee, 409, 493, 496, 498, 500Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 17Tenzan, 260, 644Terrain, 77, 723, 726

caves, 57, 70, 73, 75, 92, 104, 112, 134, 138,145-146, 154,201-202, 205,

156, 160-161, 177, 192, 198,208-209, 212, 214, 216-

550, 559, 650, 657 271,221-223,225-226,230,234,236,240-Takasago Maru, 420 242, 245-246, 248, 251, 256, 258, 261-Talevera, 342 265, 270-271, 276, 279, 351, 426, 432,Tanauan, 315, 320 453, 455, 459, 473, 493n, 508, 528, 530-Tanauan Airfield, 325, 331, 333, 339 531, 539-540, 542-543, 545, 548, 554,Tarawa, 32, 52, 78, 105, 287-288, 395-401, 560, 569, 572, 577, 580, 586, 589-592,

408, 438, 466-467, 487, 489, 505, 719, 730- 611, 613, 614n, 618, 620-621, 62 .6, 628-731 629, 631-633, 635, 639, 642-643, 645-

Taroa, 400 646, 468-650, 652, 663, 668, 672, 684-Taroa Airfield, 405 . See also Maloelap Airfield . 687, 689, 691-692, 695, 697-701, 704,Task Organizations

Central Pacific, 469706-707,716,720,726-727

escarpments, 721-722TF 18, 20 hydrographic conditions, 165TF 30, 63-64 jungles, 192TF 31, 63 promontories, 73, 119, 134-136, 136n, 137-TF 32, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283 138,146,153

844

ravines, 693reefs, 58-59, 78-79, 81, 84-88, 94, 103, 108-

190, 193, 195, 198, 200-201, 204-205,214,216-217,219

sand,721-722,724swamps, 141-142terraces, 721, 724tunnels, 695, 716volcanic ash and rock, 452, 455, 478, 483,

506, 509, 516-517, 519, 538, 557, 600-601,686,690-691,721-724

Terrar, Lt Edward F ., 426Terry, 624Texas, 493, 503Thompson, Lt Earl C ., 402Thurnau, Lt Theodore, 403-404Timor, 297Tinian, 25, 32, 36, 60, 184, 424, 429, 429n, 467-468,484,598,731-732

Titcomb Field, 383-384, 388Titcomb, Capt Jack, 344n, 351, 383Tobiishi Point, 539, 545Tojo, Gen Hideki, 430, 450 ; Premier, 732Tokyo, 67, 288, 294, 296, 377, 428, 435, 451,

458-459, 463-464, 487, 491, 493, 495, 537,560p669-670,683,700,716,732,737

Tokyo Bay, 421, 444Torokina, 301Totsuke, LtCol Ryoichi, 375Toyoda, Adm Soemu, 297-298, 300, 499, 499n,564,67O,680

Treitel, Maj Paul S ., 550, 560, 569, 680Trotti, LtCol Tom M ., 558Truk, 60, 67, 101, 292, 407-408, 449Tryon,101Tulagi, 95Tulagi-Purvis Bay, 83Tumatangas, 379Tumbelston, Maj William H ., 642Turkey Hill, 572Turkey Knob, 353, 568, 595, 616, 646-647, 650-

651, 654, 656-658, 660-661, 663-665, 667,669 9 672-673p675,680-682

Turner, RAdm Richmond K., 23 ; VAdm, 25,466, 475-476, 484, 489-491, 501, 608, 608n,612, 700, 714

Tuscaloosa, 493

INDEX

Twining, MajGen Nathan, 46Tutuila, 398

Ujelang Atoll, 416Ulithi Atoll, 52, 59, 62, 66, 162-163, 180-181,

184, 250, 254, 257, 286-287, 430-435, 443, 478,733-734

Umayam River Valley, 386Umurbrogol, 58, 73, 75, 108, 147-148, 156, 161,

190, 192, 200, 210, 219, 228, 237, 240, 248,258

Umurbrogol Mountain, 57, 145, 177Umurbrogol Pocket, 192, 206, 216, 218, 221,

224, 227, 231, 236, 240-242, 244-246, 249-251,254,257,259-262,270,284

Umurbrogol Ridges, 58, 146, 189, 199, 219,222-223,236-237,265

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 4-5, 8,443,675,729-730,737

United Press, 400United States, 4-8, 171n, 294, 296, 400, 429,

444, 451, 467, 480, 483, 604, 612-614, 700,734,736-737aid programs, 274Armed Forces, 9, 348, 351, 462, 644Army, 17, 23, 161, 187, 200, 248, 291, 303,

307, 332, 342-343, 361, 384, 393, 409,484,708,710-711,714,718,721,724

Marine Corps, 9-10, 13, 15, 19, 39, 52, 397,620n, 712, 721, 735

doctine, 333, 714history, 396morale, 664replacements, 688strength, 15, 19-20, 39, 44, 688training, 688, 714shipping losses, 324, 556units of fire, 83n

Urukthapel, 57

Valencia, 385Vandegrift, LtGen Alexander A ., 186n, 252n,

247 ; Gen, 24-25, 29, 253, 288n, 423Vandegrift, LtCol Alexander A ., Jr., 521, 568Vandegrift Letters, 158nVaughan, Maj Everette H ., 400 ; Col, 401nVegetation, 192Vehicles

American, 722Alligators, Roebling, 35ambulances, 274

110, 113, 119, 127, 129, 131, 148, 152,163, 183, 216-217, 241, 266, 268-270,272, 41, 478, 496

ridges, 134, 141-142, 146-147, 153, 185, 189-

INDEX

amphibians, 87-88, 94, 127-128, 130-131,139, 148, 156, 269, 273, 312, 721-723

amphibian tractors, 13, 17, 3'5, 78, 84, 92-94, 106, 108-109, 148, 187, 224, 266-267,274, 282, 315, 321, 432, 473, 483, 503,505, 508, 516, 548, 553, 573

amphibian trailers, 88, 127-128, 269, 477-478,482,721

amphibian trucks, 85, 87-88, 92-94, 103,109, 115, 127, 129, 131-132, 148, 228,269-270, 274, 277, 282, 344, 477, 479,482-483, 515-516, 521-522, 552-553, 573,601-602,657,721-723

armored tankdozers, 699bulldozers, 127, 138, 152, 168, 238, 242,

262, 480, 516, 521, 523, 459, 601-602,605, 610-611, 615, 628, 647, 685-688,701, 705, 707, 712, 724

cargo carriers (Weasels), 478, 482, 523,536,601,722-723

cranes, 724jeeps, 308, 344, 350, 368, 378-379, 384, 701LVTs (Landing Vehicle, tracked), 35, 85,

87, 92, 94, 104, 106, 108-110, 115-117,127-128, 130-132, 136, 139, 144, 148,151, 155, 166, 206, 210-211, 216-217,233, 240, 257, 262, 269, 271-273, 280,375, 447, 472-473, 478, 503, 506, 508,516,518-519,523,551,601,721-723

LVT(A)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Ar-mored) ), 35, 84-85, 92-93, 106, 108-109,114, 116, 129, 137, 146, 158, 195, 209-210, 212, 242, 266, 277, 472, 505, 508,569, 618, 620,648, 650, 721

LVT(F)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked(Flamethrower)), 155, 157, 201, 206,208,226,229-230,241,263-264

tank retriever, 156, 273, 518tractors, 109, 127, 506, 552-553, 721trailers, 722trucks, 151, 274, 350, 379, 513, 517, 522,

5'34, 655,wheeled vehicles, 447, 473, 478, 516-517,

721-723Japanese

armor, supporting, 177bulldozers, 459motor vehicles, 641prime movers, 617tanks, 687trailers, 641

845

Vella Lavella Island, 393Venable, Col Benjamin W ., 176Versailles Peace Conference, 7Versailles, Treaty of, 16Vicksburg, 493, 498VICTOR Operations, 358, 362

VICTOR 1, 358, 375, 377VICTOR II, 358, 375, 377VICTOR III, 359VICTOR IV, 359, 365, 378VICTOR V, 359, 380-382

Virgin Islands, 42Visayan Islands, 309, 734Visayan Sea, 327, 332, 358, 374Visayas, 65, 294, 298, 309-310, 321, 374, 377-

378Vogel, MajGen Clayton B ., 21Vogelkop Peninsula, 292Volcano Islands, 436, 443-444, 484, 462nVolckmann, Maj Russell W ., 348 ; Col, 349,

351; BGen, 348n

Wachi, Capt Tsunezo, 458nWachtler, BGen Walter A ., 82n, 240nWake Island, 6, 21, 42, 415, 420-421, 444Wake Island, 437, 493, 595Walker, Maj Thomas J., Jr ., 42Waller, Col James D ., 472, 515Wallis Island, 398-399, 411Walsh, Senator Joseph, 288nWalsh, GySgt William G., 622Walt, LtCol Lewis W ., 118, 123, 141, 210Walt's Ridge, 157-158, 160, 221, 224, 229-234,

237, 240, 244, 246, 248, 250, 254, 256-257,260

Walter Colton, 43.1War Dogs, 91, 143 . See also Marine units.Washington, 493, 503Washington Conference, 6, 15Washington, D. C ., 5, 279, 462, 613Washington, President George, 5, 445Wasp, 436Watson, Col Arthur P ., 257, 264Watson, Sgt Sherman B ., 539Wattie Ridge, 224, 233, 246Wattie, Lt. Robert T., 238Weapons

American, 195, 655, 689antiaircraft guns, 356, 477, 501antitank guns, 91, 116, 687

846

7274.5-inch rockets, 108, 503, 62 .1, 65514-inch guns, 50040mm guns, 166, 503, 654.45 caliber pistols, 708grenade launchers, 115, 124grenades, 144, 262, 514, 531, 569, 611, 614,

620, 636, 652, 659, 666, 678, 686, 689,693-694,713,725

guns, 156, 477half-tracks, 136-138, 200, 230-231, 531,

534, 548, 630, 632, 657, 673, 684howitzers, 94, 116, 124, 246, 248, 482, 521-

522,552,554-555,565,721M-1 rifles, 697, 707-708machine guns, 91, 108-109, 123, 272, 472,

566, 635, 698, 701medium tanks, 208, 233, 649-650, 673mines, 109, 134, 632, 656, 675, 691, 720mortars, 87, 92, 109, 121, 142, 144, 157,

166, 171, 173, 187, 230, 270, 272, 477,508, 523, 566, 575, 629, 635, 637, 698,727

naval guns, 209, 376, 423, 540, 716

INDEX

90mm guns, 603155mm guns (Long Toms), 154, 209, 228,

230, 248, 301, 719155mm howitzers, 301, 477, 625, 638, 652,719

105mm guns, 240, 242, 516, 634, 691105mm howitzers, 83-84, 129, 129n, 269-270,472,515,521,552,568,719-720

120mm mortars, 727rifles, 91, 109, 566, 613-614, 659, 689, 698rocket launchers, 627, 631, 639, 655, 662,666, 676, 685

rockets, 108, 166, 534, 637satchel charges, 652, 6597.2-inch rockets, 68575mm guns, 108, 209, 214, 217, 269, 516,520,534,621,634,640-641,727

75 mm guns (self-propelled), 135, 17675mm howitzers (pack), 84, 93, 116, 129n,246,261,272,521,639,657,719-721

16-inch guns, 50460mm mortars, 92, 126, 241, 270, 510, 568,

582, 666, 693tank dozers, 156, 273, 512, 520, 652, 706-

707tanks, 81, 85, 88, 91, 110, 115-117, 120,

123-124, 134-139, 141, 143, 145-146,153-161, 166, 168, 171, 173-74, 200-201,205-206, 209-212, 214, 217, 226, 229-

antiaircraft guns, 135, 415, 449, 493n, 549

atomic weapons, 204automatic weapons, 91-92, 126, 132, 144,

589bayonets, 223, 566bazookas, 91-92, 115, 124, 135, 152, 214,

216, 266, 271, 566, 578, 633, 652, 659,666, 693, 708

BARs, 266, 708demolitions, 91-92, 114, 134, 138, 216, 266,

590, 629, 631, 650, 666, 681, 687, 689,699,705

8-inch howitzers, 500, 504518, 568, 575,81mm mortars, 230, 270,

582,640, 648, 697.50 caliber machine guns, 272, 463, 628,

7215-inch guns, 500, 5045-inch rockets, 503, 717

152,flamethrowers, 91-92, 134-36, 138,155, 169, 176, 200, 204, 209, 216, 223,256-257, 262, 264, 266, 270-271, 273,514, 531, 536, 567, 569, 576, 578, 589-590, 614, 621, 631, 633, 666, 681, 687,689-690,695,699,707,725,727

flamethrower tanks, 238, 273, 512, 531,621, 626, 628, 641, 666-668, 673, 675,687-688,694,699,707,710

4.2-inch mortars, 108, 270, 503, 554, 610,

232, 235-236, 238, 241, 251, 256-257,262-264, 272-274, 277, 281, 353, 472-473, 483, 509, 512-515, 517-520, 531,534, 536, 538, 550, 553, 555, 558, 560,563-567, 569, 574, 576-578, 582, 584,590-591, 618, 621, 626-628, 630, 633-634, 639, 641, 644, 646-647, 649-653,655-657, 659, 662, 664, 666-668, 672,676-677, 681, 684-690, 693, 698-699,706-707,727

.30 caliber machine guns, 272, 771136-137,37mm guns, 108, 115, 123-124,

158, 251, 269, 531, 534, 568, 575, 621,629-630,632,636,640,667,684,727

toxic gases, 613-61420mm guns, 166, 463, 654white phosphorus grenades, 235, 567

Filipino, 348Japanese, 73, 109, 137, 156, 193, 221, 231,

240, 256, 267, 449, 454, 498, 518, 531,538, 553, 585, 587, 604, 617, 639, 655,666, 668, 675, 681, 689, 723, 726

INDEX

antipersonnel land mines, 667, 690, 726antitank guns, 177, 209, 249, 316, 353,

474, 493n, 513, 519-520, 536, 565-568,572, 574, 582, 587, 591, 634, 646-647,684

automatic weapons, 75, 117, 136, 205-206,209, 240, 256, 273, 320, 453, 456, 458,575, 618, 625, 648, 655

bamboo spears, 678bangalore torpedoes, 154chemicals, 142, 614, 614n, 620, 638coastal guns, 458, 474-475, 498, 500, 531demolitions, 154, 200, 320, 367,'526, 592, 691dual-purpose guns, 146, 474, 57280mm (naval) guns, 45481mm mortars, 267, 4545-inch guns, 135, 50057mm guns, 83, 646, 649, 727flares, 5334.7-inch gun, 61040mm guns, 144, 41547mm antitank guns, 73, 109, 112, 454,

-562,591,628,646,649,665,684,727grenades, 134, 249, 259, 320, 514, 526, 535,

542, 545, 614n, 622, 630-631, 637-639,656, 659, 678, 688, 691, 708

guns, 473knee mortars, 637-638, 676knives, 630light tanks, 684machine guns, 73, 112, 142, 160, 168, 177,

664-665,675,678,689,697,703medium tanks, 316, 684mines, 72, 79, 115, 119, 135-136, 152, 156,

672,674-677,681-682,692,723,727mountain guns, 146

847

naval mines, 36790mm howitzers, 727150mm guns, 497150mm mortar, 221, 267, 454140mm gulls, 533120mm howitzers, 449, 727pistols, 630rifles, 142, 177, 249, 449, 535, 568, 575,

662, 697, 703rocket launchers, 407, 454, 459, 726-727rockets, 142, 267, 453-454, 519, 527, 550,-592,649-651,655,677,692,726

sabers, 630satchel charges, 62870mm guns, 202, 24975mm guns, 73, 205, 268, 316, 4546-inch guns, 53060mm mortars, 510, 675small arms, 206, 209, 617, 623, 625, 692tanks, 122-124, 126, 267, 281, 316, 454-

4 -55,523,586,591,652,65537mm antitank guns, 73, 202, 205, 209,

268, 454, 591, 675320mm mortars, 454, 727torpedoes, 396, 452, 624-625, 636n20mm rockets, 26720mm cannon, 139, 249, 379, 415, 45425mm antiaircraft guns, 268, 449, 454200mm (naval) guns, 26.7

Weather, 233humidity, 55rain, 55temperature, 141

Weller, LtCol Donald M ., 489, 493, 499 ; Col,279n

Welles, 403Wells, lstLt George G., 540Wensinger, Col Walter W ., 471, 509, 517-519,549-550,647-649,656,670,680-681

West Coast, 400, 411Western Caroline Islands, 52, 55, 62, 97, 99,

151, 184, 429, 431-434, 455, 734 . See alsoCaroline Islands.

Western Pacific, 3, 59, 397, 465, 614West Field, 429nWest Indies, 19West Road, 189, 192, 195, 198, 200-202, 204,206, 209, 222, 224, 226, 228, 232-233, 236-238,240,242,246,249,254,

White, Maj Philip R ., 326nWhitehead, MajGen Ennis C ., 382White Plains, 424-425

160,320,512,

163, 193, 199,426, 473-474,519-520, 528,

249, 258, 267, 269,482, 486, 508-509,536, 545, 548-549,

564-566,584,641,647,726Molotov cocktails, 592mortars, 118-119, 122, 127-128, 134, 141,

154, 156, 160, 168, 177, 205-206, 231,353, 367, 453, 459, 513-514, 519-520,1523, 525, 527, 531, 533-535, 538, 549-550, 553-554, 557-561, 566-568, 573-575, 585, 587, 595, 603-604, 617-618,621, 624-629, 634, 639, 648-651, 653-656, 685, 660-662, 664, 668-669, 671-

226, 249. 449, 474, 493n, 518-519, 535,539, 549-550, 554, 563, 568, 574, 584,589, 617, 621-622, 650, 656, 660, 662,

848

Wickel, 2dLt James J ., 232n, 259n, 263nWildcat Bowl, 221, 256, 260-263Wildcats, 263-264, 399 . See also 81st Infantry

Division under Army units .Wildcat Trail, 210Wilkinson, VAdm Theodore S ., 63-64, 103-104,181,278

Williams, LtCol Marlowe C ., 558-559 ; Col,559n

Williams, BGen Robert H., 543nWillis, 2d'-Lt William A ., 112Willis, Col William A ., 326,363Wills, Maj Donald H ., 372Wilson, Lt Walter A ., 402, 404Wilson, President Woodrow, 3-5, 7Wintle, 420Withers, Col Hartnoll J ., 551, 555, 558Witomski, Maj Stanislaus J., 326nWoleai, 101Woods, MajGen Louis E ., 388, 41.6, 420 ; LtGen,

404nWorden, LtCol Waite W ., 66n, 70n, 129n, 132n,

153n, 180n, 190n, 248n, 285nWorld Disarmament Conference, 7World War 1, 3-5, 7-8, 14, 54, 448, 467, 504,

613, 727

World War II, 3, 55, 448, 467-468, 522, 543,588, 612, 620n, 713, 715, 729, 736

Wornham, Col Thomas A ., 471, 509, 513, 549,556, 621, 639, 643

Wotje Atoll, 400, 405, 412-415, 417-418Wright engines, 463Wright, Lt Frank J ., 512Wurtsmith, BGen Paul D., 333n

Yamashita, Gen Tomoyuki, 300, 377Yap, 54, 59, 62, 64, 68-69, 101-102, 180-181,

184,286,430,432-434,444,783Yap Air Base, 52Yap Operation, 63, 65, 181, 301Yokohama, 484Yokosuka, 449Yorktown, 399Youngdale, LtCol Carl A ., 552

Zambales Mountains, 342Zamboanga, 356, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 371-373,378-379,382,388,390

Zamboanga Peninsula, 361, 363, 365-366, 370-371,374,381

Zeros. See Aircraft, Japanese .Zonne, Maj Edmund L ., 397

* U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1971 0 - 400- 219

INDEX