al qaeda in irak and syria

8/10/2019 Al Qaeda in Irak and Syria

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Saudis Back Syrian Rebels Despite Risks

By ROBERT F. WORTH

JAN. 7, 2014

http://www.nytimes.!m/2014/01/0"/w!#$%/mi%%$ee&st/s&'%is()&*(sy#i&(#e)e$s(%espite(

&($&*(!+(!nt#!$.htm$n$-t!%&yshe&%$inesem-e%itth2014010"#-1

nsi%e

&'nh me%i& iewe#

n 3&m&s's !n T'es%&y, men he$pe% & w!'n%e% i#$ wh! s'#ie% wh&t &tiists s&i%

w&s &n &i#st#i*e )y +!#es $!y&$ t! 5#esi%ent B&sh &$(Ass&% !+ 6y#i&. B&ss&mh&)ieh/Re'te#s

em&i$

+&e)!!*

twitte#

s&e

m!#e

R8A3H, 6&'%i A#&)i& 9 On his eihth t#ip t! +iht with the #e)e$s in 6y#i&, in A''st,

A)' h&tt&) s&w s!methin th&t t#!')$e% him: tw! %e&% hi$%#en, thei# )$!!%(s!&*e%

)!%ies sp#&w$e% !n the st#eet !+ & #'#&$ i$$&e ne the e%ite##&ne&n !&st. He *new#iht &w&y th&t his +e$$!w #e)e$s h&% *i$$e% them.

A)' h&tt&), & 4;(ye(!$% 6&'%i h!spit&$ &%minist#&t!# wh! w&s p'#s'in )e&'se they we#e n!t 's$ims,? A)' h&tt&) #e&$$e% #eent$y

%'#in &n inte#iew he#e.

Related Coverage
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/robert_f_worth/index.htmlhttp://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/robert_f_worth/index.html


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video Video Feature: Watching Syria's War: Bodies ofExecuted Prisoners Discovered at aeda Base

aeda !rou" #eader in Syria Suggests $sla%ic Court toEnd Re&el $nfighting ()* +, -./0

t w&s !n$y then th&t A)' h&tt&) )e&n t! )e$iee th&t the


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&'nh me%i& iewe#

C$!thes !e#e% in %'st &+te# the &i#st#i*e. 6&'%is e p#!hi)ite% +#!m !in t! 6y#i& +!#


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!e#nments #eh&)i$it&ti!n ente# +!# The#e is & sh!#t&e !+ #e$ii!'s

!n%iti!ns +!# went t! 6y#i& t! p#!tet my !'nt#y.?

At times, his seti&n +ee$ins seeme% t! !'tshine his 'ne&se &)!'t the eDesses !+ s!me!+ his m!#e eDt#eme !m#&%es. He %i% n!t %eny th&t he h&% !+ten +!'ht &$!nsi%e

mem)e#s !+ the s$&mi 6t&te !+ #&= &n% 6y#i&, !# 66, the )#'t&$ With the !e#nments pe#missi!nI? &n%, & +ew yes $&te#, in

B!sni&. He h!se n!t t! +iht the Ame#i&ns in #&= >)e&'se the#e e t!! m&ny 6hiites

the#e,? he s&i%, with & $!!* !+ %ist&ste !n his +&e.

8et this is & m&n wh! $et'#es inm&tes &t the #eh&)i$it&ti!n ente# ee#y wee* &)!'t

ethis &n% w. The ente#, $i*e m&ny 6&'%i instit'ti!ns, h&s )een s!mewh&t em)#&sse%

)y the !nt#&%iti!ns !+ 6&'%i p!$iy with #e% t! 6y#i&. A$th!'h the ente#ine#&tes s!me men wh! h&e )een #este% +!# t#yin t! t#&e$ t! 6y#i&, $&st s'mme#

the nephew !+ A)%e$#&hm&n &$(H&%$&=, its %i#et!#, w&s *i$$e% whi$e +ihtin the#e. Hism!the# p!ste% st&tements !n Twitte# s&yin she w&s p#!'% !+ him.

!#e #eent$y, the ente# s'++e#e% &n een m!#e stinin %is&pp!intment in!$in !ne !+its )est(*n!wn #&%'&tes, & #e+!#me% Te##!#ists in !e.?

n N!em)e#, #. 6h&ye& s$ippe% !'t !+ 6&'%i A#&)i& t! 6y#i&, whe#e he is n!w +ihtinwith the s$&mi 6t&te !+ #&= &n% 6y#i&. He p#!'%$y t#'mpets his #et'#n t! We t#y t! p#eent it, )'t the#e e


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$imits t! wh&t we &n %!,? s&i% &ns!'# &$(T'#*i, & sp!*esm&n +!# the 6&'%i nte#i!#

inist#y. >8!' &nn!t p#eent &$$ y!'n men +#!m $e&in the *in%!m. &ny !+ them

t#&e$ t! !n%!n !# !the# p$&es, &n% !n$y then t! T'#*ey, &n% 6y#i&.?

Recent Co%%ents

%cgreivy

1K %&ys &!

5e#s!n&$$y, it is e#y h% +!# me t! )e$iee A$ &e%& isnLt +'n%e% )y the 6&'%is. 6&'%i

A#&)i&n is & p!$ie st&te whih eDists !n the...

%oe

1K %&ys &!

!#e th&n 1;0000 pe!p$e *i$$e% )y Ass&% #eime &n% m!#e th&n " mi$$i!n +$e% the

!'nt#y . #&n &n% #&= &n% Ass&% #eime is 'sin ee#y...

1"osgay

1K %&ys &!

The i%!me !+ 6&'%i A#&)i& nee%s t! +i#st !wn 'p t! its $&n%estin &tiiteis in the p&st

t! ! +!#w!#% &n% s'p!#t the 6hi&s &n% m!#e...

6ee A$$ C!mments

A)' h&tt&)s p&th t! 6y#i& w&s simi$ t! th&t !+ m&ny !the#s he#e &n% !ss the A#&)w!#$%. He #e&% &)!'t the 'p#isins in 2011, )'t it w&s 6y#i& th&t t!'he% his het. t w&sn!t


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&$&shni*! #i+$e m!st !+ the time, )'t s!metimes & he&ie# R'ssi&n(m&%e m&hine 'n

*n!wn in the +ie$% &s & 14.M.

@#&%'&$$y he )e&me %isi$$'si!ne% with the h&!s !+ the )&tt$e. He !+ten +!'n% himse$+&m!n men wh! !pen$y )#&n%e% the #'$e#s !+ 6&'%i A#&)i& &n% !the# 5e#si&n @'$+ st&tes

&s in+i%e$s, %ese#in s$&'hte#. He s&i% this )!the#e% him, )'t it %i% n!t st!p him +#!m#et'#nin t! the )&tt$e+ie$%.

W#ite A C!mment

n the en%, it w&s the s$&'hte# !+ inn!ents th&t m&%e him %ei%e t! ='it, he s&i%, &n% &)#!&%e# +ee$in th&t the #e)e$s &$!nsi%e him we#e n!t %!in it +!# the #iht #e&s!ns. >+

the +iht is n!t p'#e$y t! @!%, its n!t & #e&$ These pe!p$e e +ihtin +!#

thei# +$&s.?

B't the#e w&s &n!the# #e&s!n he &e 'p the +iht.

>B&sh h&s stte% t! p't 6'nnis !n the +#!nt $ine,? he s&i% !+ 6y#i&s $e&%e#. >This is &

)i p#!)$em. The #e)e$s %! n!t w&nt t! +iht them. The #e&$ w is n!t &&inst B&sh

himse$+, it is &&inst #&n. Ee#ythin e$se is


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8/24

38AA

F&$$'

the mi$it&nts seie% the ity !+ F&$$'F#!m 200K t! 200", t#i)esmen we#e &)$e t! )e&t A$ &e%& with the !!pe#&ti!n !+

Ame#i&n +!#es &n% the s'pp!#t !+ the #&=i !e#nment,? s&i% Os&m& &$(N'


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A+te# thei# s'ess, he s&i%, the 6'nni +ihte#s >we#e $e+t &$!ne in the st#eet +&in

#eene +#!m A$ &e%& &n% ne$et )y the !e#nment.?

6'nnis in ene#&$ h&e )e!me in#e&sin$y )itte# t!w% the !e#nment &n% wh&t they#e% &s #. &$i*is e++!#ts t! p'sh them t! the mins !+ s!iety, with $itt$e #!$e in

n&ti!n&$ %eisi!ns. n pti'$, the !e#nments he&y(h&n%e% se'#ity st#&tey, whihh&s !+ten in$'%e% m&ss #ests !+ 6'nnis, &n% the #est !+ 6'nni $e&%e#s !n s!metimes

+&$se te##!#ism hes, )e&me & #&$$yin p!int +!# 6'nni p#!tests $&st ye.

As & me&s'#e !+ the p!$i&ti!n )etween 6'nni &n% 6hiite $e&%e#s in #&=, #. N'The #e&s!n why we #et'#ne% t! #y !'# we&p!ns &n% +iht is )e&'se &e%et'#ne% t! !'# ities,? s&i% Ahme% A)' Rish&, & t#i)&$ $e&%e# in An) wh! w&s & #iti&$

&$$y !+ the Ame#i&ns.

He &%%e%, >we e !)$ie% t! %e+en% !'#se$es &n% !'# p#!ine, n!t t! +iht +!# the

Ame#i&ns !# the #&=i !e#nment.?

Othe# t#i)&$ $e&%e#s +ihtin the mi$it&nts s&y th&t they e n!t &$ine% with the

!e#nment, &n% th&t they h&e n!t &epte% &ny !e#nment &ssist&ne.

>&e%& *i$$e% my )#!the# &n% !the# mem)e#s !+ my +&mi$y,? s&i% 6hei*h A)%'$ imR&+i F&h%&wi, &n!the# t#i)&$ $e&%e# in R&m&%i. > wi$$ t&*e #eene.?

>This is !'# w,? he &%%e%, >&n% we %!nt w&nt t! )e &'se% !+ w!#*in +!# the!e#nment.?


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&'nh me%i& iewe#

6'nni 's$im 'nmen %'#in $&shes with #&=i se'#ity +!#es !'tsi%e F&$$'N!w the Aw&*enin is pt !+ the st&te, &n%!nsi%e#e% the s&me &s the my !# p!$ie in te#ms !+ )ene+its, s&$ies &n% #eti#ement.

Een thei# w!'n%e% wi$$ )e t#e&te% &t !e#nment eDpense.?

n the +&e !+ shp$y es&$&tin i!$ene $&st ye, the !e#nment )e&n #e&hin !'t t!

6'nni t#i)es !ss the !'nt#y &s pt !+ & n&ti!nwi%e !'nte#ins'#eny st#&tey, &n%h&s &e$e#&te% th!se e++!#ts &mi% the #isis in An). B't the e++!#t h&s )een +#&'ht +#!m

the )einnin, with +!#me# +ihte#s &'ht )etween thei# mist#'st !+ the !e#nment &n%

thei# +e !+ #eene *i$$ins )y A$ &e%&, whih &ppe t! h&e in#e&se% #eent$y. The

$&test epis!%e &me 6'n%&y m!#nin, when 'nmen &tt&*e% & he*p!int in 3iy&$&5#!ine, *i$$in +ie men.

n B&h%&%, & new #e#'itin &$$ h&s !ne !'t in A%h&miy&, & 6'nni(m&

neih)!#h!!% th&t w&s !ne & &e%& st#!nh!$%.

>The !e#nment &$$e% 's )&* & m!nth &!,? s&i% A)' &m, &n An) Aw&*enin$e&%e# in A%h&miy&. >nti$ n!w, they h&e ien 's n!thin )'t p#!mises 9 n! we&p!ns

&n% n! m!ney. We h&e %epen%e% !n !'#se$es een t! )'y 'ni+!#ms. They te$$ 's,

3!nt w!##y, ee#ythin wi$$ )e +ine. ?

He mist#'sts the !e#nment, &n% he s&i% he h&% )een p&t#!$$in with my 'nits, )'t w&sn!t &$$!we% t! een #y & we&p!n.


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>The Aw&*enin w&s &n Ame#i&n i%e&, &n% the #&=i !e#nment h&s #et'#ne% t! it n!w

)e&'se they e +&in the s&me sit'&ti!n the Ame#i&ns +&e% )&* in 200M,? A)'

&m s&i%. >They *n!w this is the )est i%e&, )e&'se it p#!e% t! )e s'ess+'$. B't the!e#nment, $i*e with ee#ythin it %!es, they %!nt *n!w h!w t! 'se the Aw&*enin in

the #iht w&y $i*e the Ame#i&ns %i%.?

6ep&te$y, the !e#nment is p'shin !the# +!#me# !m)&t&nts !nt! the )&tt$e+ie$% in

An) with &n!the# p#!#&m. n #eent yes, the !e#nment p'#s'e% & #e!ni$i&ti!np#!#&m with +!#me# +ihte#s +#!m #&=s my#i&% ins'#ent #!'ps th&t sp#'n 'p t! +iht

the Ame#i&ns. The !e#nment h&s )!'ht )&* ne$y 100,000 we&p!ns +#!m these

men, in eDh&ne +!# thei# sinin & st&tement th&t they h&% nee# *i$$e% #&=is Gh&in*i$$e% Ame#i&ns, th!'h, %i% n!t %is='&$i+y &ny!ne &n% p#!mise% t! n!t #et'#n t!

mi$it&ny.

N!w the !e#nment is #emin &)!'t 1,000 !+ these men &n% sen%in them t! An),

&!#%in t! Ame# &$(h'&i, & !e#nment !++ii&$ in he !+ #e!ni$i&ti!n p#!#&ms.

A%i$ A)% &$(&h%i, & +!#me# #&=i ie p#esi%ent wh! is !nsi%e#e% & m!%e#&te 6hiite

$e&%e#, s&i% the +iht in An) !'$% +in&$$y p'sh the &$i*i !e#nment t!w% & $&stin

#e!ni$i&ti!n with the 6'nnis, p!tenti&$$y )#e&*in #&=s pe#pet'&$ y$e !+ #isis.

>t is e#y %&ne#!'s,? #. &h%i s&i% !+ the An) #isis. >B't it &$s! !pens e#t&in!pti!ns.?

6ti$$, he !n+esse%, !+ #. &$i*is t#'e intenti!ns, >We %!nt *n!w his #e&$ p$&ns.?

Few &n&$ysts e !ptimisti th&t #. &$i*i is intent !n p'#s'in & %'#&)$e #e!ni$i&ti!n

with the 6'nnis, espei&$$y )e+!#e e$eti!ns in Ap#i$, when he wi$$ see* & thi#% te#m. Heh&s p#i&te$y t!$% Ame#i&n !++ii&$s th&t he )e$iees th&t we#e he t! !++e# p!$iti&$!mp#!mises t! 6'nnis n!w it w!'$% we&*en him p!$iti&$$y &m!n 6hiites.

>The t#i)&$ Aw&*enin w&s m&%e p!ssi)$e )e&'se A$ &e%& h&% th!#!'h$y &$ien&te% the

pe!p$e &n% the .6. !++e#e% n!t


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When he +in&$$y #et'#ns t! F&$$' wi$$ s&y p#!'%$y th&t w&s in )&$&.?

The Rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq and

the Threat from Prime MinisterMaliki

ByAnthony H. Cordesman

Jan 13, 2014

No one can deny that al Qaeda is a violent extremist threat wherever it

operates. It poses a threat in terms of transnational terrorism in the United

States and Europe, and a far more direct threat to the people who live in

every area it operates. It has consistently been horribly repressive, violent,

and often murderous in enforcing its political control and demands for a

form of social behavior that reflect the worst in tribalism and offers almost

nothing in terms of real Islamic values.

Like all extreme neo-Salafi movements, al Qaeda is also an economic and

social dead end. It does not offer any practical way of operating and

competing in a global economy, it is too dysfunctional to allow meaningful

education and social interaction, and it finances itself largely through

extortion in ways that cripple the existing local economy. Moreover, it does

not tolerate competition even from other Islamist fighters. In Syria, it has

provoked its own civil war with other hardline Islamist movements a civil

war it now seems to be decisively losing to other Sunni rebel factions.
http://csis.org/expert/anthony-h-cordesmanhttp://csis.org/expert/anthony-h-cordesman


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It is precisely that type of behavior, however, which should lead U.S.

officials, analysts, and media to do a far, far better job of reporting on

exactly what has really happened in Anbar, and in cities like Fallujah and

Ramadi. Bad as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is, far too much of the evidence

points to Prime Minister Maliki as an equal threat to Iraq and to U.S.interests. Ever since the 2010 election, he has become steadily more

repressive, manipulated Iraqs security forces to serve his own interests,

and created a growing Sunni resistance to his practice of using Shiite

political support to gain his own advantage.

He has refused to honor the Erbil power-sharing agreement that was

supposed to create a national government that could tie together Arab

Sunni and Arab Shiite, and he has increased tensions with Iraqs Kurds.

As the U.S. State Department human rights reports for Iraq, AmnestyInternational, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

make all too clear; Malikis search for power has steadily repressed and

alienated Iraqs Sunnis on a national level. It has led to show trials and

death sentences against one of Iraqs leading Sunni politicians including

former Vice President Taqris al-Hashimi, who has been living in asylum in

Turkey since being convicted nad sentenced to death in absentia by an

Iraqi court. It has shifted the promotion structure in the Iraqi Security

Forces to both give the Prime Minister personal control and has turned

them into an instrument he can use against Sunnis.

Al Qaeda in Iraq - nor its recent incarnation the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - has not

risen up as a rebirth of the opposition the U.S. faced in 2005-2008. In spite

of attempts by the Maliki government to label virtually any major Sunni

opposition as terrorists, the steady increase in that opposition orginated

primarily in the form of peaceful and legitimate political protests against

Malikis purges of elected Iraqi Sunni leaders, and a regular exclusion of

Sunnis from the government including the Sons of Iraq in areas likeAnbar. It came because Maliki used the Iraqi Security Forces against

segments of his own population in the name of fighting terrorists and

extremists. It came because of the failure to use Iraqs oil wealth effectively

and fairly resulting with an economy that the CIA ranks Iraq 140th in the

world in per capita income. The opposition to Maliki's government also

resulted from corruption so extreme that in December 2013 Transparency


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International ranked Iraq the seventh most corrupt country in the world,

with only Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Afghanistan, North Korea, and

Somalia ranking worse than Iraq in terms of corruption.

Any analysis or news report that focuses only on al Qaedas very realabuses is little more than worthless it encourages the tendency to

demonize terrorism without dealing with the fact that terrorism almost

always only succeeds when governments fail their people. Just as serious

counterinsurgency can never be successful if it only addresses the military

dimension, counterterrorism cannot succeed if it is not coupled with an

effort to address the quality of the nations political leadership and

governance, and the legitimate concerns of its people.

Any failure to analyze Malikis actions since the 2010 election his

disregard for the Erbil agreement that called for a true national

government, his manipulation of the courts to create multiple trails and

death sentences for political oppponents, including one of Iraqs vice

presidents Tariq al-Hashemi; his use of temporary appointments to take

control of key command positions in the Iraqi Security Forces; his efforts to

bribe senior Iraqi Sunni politicians to support him with ministerial posts;

and his steadily increasing suppression of Sunni popular opposition and

protests is dishonest, lazy, intellectual rubbish.

It is the Maliki threat that actually reinvigorated al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and

gave the extremist group a toehold among some alilenated and

disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis. His increasingly violent repression of protest

camps and Sunni opposition in Anbar during 2013 culminated in efforts to

shut down protest camps with lethal force. When this provoked massive

opposition among Sunnis and key Sunni tribal leaders, he pulled the army

out of key cities and tried to rely on a police force that was seen as corrupt

and as a toolof the regime. AQI/ISIS fighters took advantage of the

resulting power vacuum and did so at time they were facing whatbecame major military opposition from other Sunni Islamist fighters in

Syria.

Since that time, Maliki has threatened the tribal leaders and people of

Fallujah and Ramadi with sending in the army to deal with al Qaeda in

ways that would kill large numbers of civilians and destroy much of their


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property. Unlike much of the reporting on the situation, he realizes that

AQI/ISISs control is marginal and faces major potential tribal resistance

resistance that has been limited largely because of anger at Maliki and his

actions. Once again, AQI is repeating all of its past excesses and mistakes

the same excesses and mistakes that have led to its recent defeats inSyria.

Proper reporting and analysis should be a net assessment of these facts

and a comparison of the Maliki governments actions relative to those of

AQI and the vast majority of Iraq Sunni who now have reason to be angry

with both. It would push as hard for reform in Iraqs leadership and

government as for efforts that can defeat AQI/ISIS without causing a

massive rise in Sunni anger, endorsing more Maliki government

repression, and creating more seeds for civil conflict.

At the same time, proper reporting and analysis on U.S. policy options

should take account of the dilemma the Obama Administration and

Congress faces. There are no good options in Iraq. The Maliki government

controls the security forces, it has all the money it can possibly need from

Iraqs oil revenues, it can manipulate the courts and Iraq's parliament, and

it can play Iran off of the United States if the United States puts too much

pressure on the Maliki government and particularly if the United States is

too open in official criticism of Malikis actions.

In fairness, the United States also has done more at the official level than

many media reports and analysts have done outside it. Key U.S. officials

like Secretary Kerry and Anthony Blinken have publically stressed the

need for basic reforms by the Maliki government within the limits imposed

by realpolitik. Key Senators have pushed for limits on U.S. aid to Iraq and

changes in the behavior of the Maliki government.

When Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Brett McGurk

visited Iraq last week, he met with national and local leaders from across

the political spectrum to discuss the security situation in western Iraq. A

press release from the US Embassy in Baghdad noted that:

McGurk's itinerary included meetings with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,

Speaker Osama Nujaifi, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, Deputy Prime


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Minister Saleh Mutlaq, Deputy Prime Minister Husayn Shahristani, head of

the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, Ammar al-Hakim, and members of the

Council of Representatives from the Iraqiyya and State of Law blocs. He

also conferred with prominent leaders from Anbar province, including

Governor Ahmed Khalaf, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, and former Minister ofFinance Rafa al-Issawi.

In all of these meetings, DAS McGurk confirmed the enduring U.S.

commitment to the Government and people of Iraq in their efforts to isolate

and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). He noted the

encouraging trend in Ramadi where local leaders, working with tribes and

supported with resources from Baghdad, have pushed ISIL to the outskirts

of the city. He further noted the planning to separate ISIL and other militant

groups from the population in Fallujah using a similar strategy while also

accounting for the unique circumstances there. The United States, heemphasized, will provide all necessary and appropriate assistance to the

Government of Iraq (GOI) under the Strategic Framework Agreement to

help ensure that these efforts succeed.

In addition, McGurk stressed with all of these leaders that long-term

stability requires a close fusion of security and political measures, as well

as guarantees from the GOI that courageous and patriotic Iraqi citizens

who stand to fight ISIL and other extremist groups be recognized and

ultimately incorporated into the formal security structures of the state. Hefurther emphasized to all parties the importance of pursuing political

initiatives and addressing the legitimate grievances of all communities

within the framework of the Iraqi constitution.

Both media and analysts need to be far more realistic and objective in

evaluating the fact there is only so much the Obama Administration and

Congress can do. Sending in U.S. forces now would mean taking sides in

what threatens to become a far more intense Sunni versus Shiite civil

conflict. Providing counterterrorism aid without tight controls on theweapons involved would enable the Maliki government to use them

against the Iraqi people.

The Administration seems to have realized this in in making its initial

response to the crisis that began in December 2013. Sending in a few

precision-guided Hellfire missiles with limited lethality and value only


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against point targets plus some limited-performance reconnaissance

drones that left the Maliki government dependent on broader and quieter

U.S. intelligence aid was such an approach.

So does trying to find ways a U.S. advisory team could control latertransfers of systems like the AH-64 weapons that could only be delivered

and operated months after the December/January crisis peaked, as well

as sending in small advisory teams.

The U.S. government cannot stand by and let AQI/ISIS gain more power,

and it has to provide some aid in counterterrorism. At the same time, it

needs every bit of outside leverage that is possible to push the Maliki

government towards reform and equitable treatment of Sunnis and Kurds,

and that lays the groundwork for demanding an honest outcome from

Iraqs upcoming election and an outcome that moves back toward the level

of national unity called for in the Erbil agreement.

These are actions that require the best possible reporting in the media,

and equal depth of analysis from outside analysts and NGOs. To date, far

too much of the output from both has had narrow and often partisan focus

on counterterrorism and the threat from AQI/ISIS. The Maliki threat is at

least if not more important.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the

Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Note:

These issues, and a history of the Maliki governments actions, are

presented in detail in a CSIS report entitled Iraq in Crisis, available on the

CSIS web site at

www.csis.org/files/publication/140106_Iraq_Book_AHC_sm.pdf.

Council on Foreign Relations

>>

> Daily News Brief

>January 6, 2014

> Sponsored by

>Top of the Agenda: Tactical Setbacks for al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq
http://www.csis.org/files/publication/140106_Iraq_Book_AHC_sm.pdfhttp://www.csis.org/files/publication/140106_Iraq_Book_AHC_sm.pdf


18/24

>After the al-Qaeda franchise Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS)

took over swaths of Iraq's Anbar Province, Sunni tribesmen joined forces with

the Iraqi military to retake part of the city of Ramadi, where air strikes over

the weekend reportedly killed two dozen militants (Reuters). The army on

Sunday prepared to lay siege to the city of Fallujah while Prime Minister Nurial-Maliki exhorted tribesmen there to expel the militants (BBC). Across the

border in northeastern Syria, where many have come to resent al-Qaeda's

cooption of the revolution, rebel groups that have joined forces to rout ISIS

made gains against since launching an offensive on Friday (LAT).

>Analysis

>"Extremist organisations have found a ready audience in Iraq, where [Prime

Minister Nuri al-]Maliki's policies continue to alienate the Sunni population.

Sunnis, who consider themselves the true Iraqis and still have trouble

accepting the indisputable fact that they constitute a statistical minority in thecountry, would be difficult for any Iraqi government to appease. Mr Maliki has

worsened the situation by allowing and encouraging purges of Iraqi

politicians in the name of de-Baathification and largely discontinuing the US-

initiated policy of working with Sunni tribal leaders and their militias - the so-

called Sons of Iraq - to isolate al-Qaeda," writes Marina Ottaway for the BBC.

>"What Iraq needs now is what it saw in 2007 when Gen. David Petraeus

orchestrated a full-blown counterinsurgency strategy. Such a strategy has

many facets, but one of the most important is a political 'line of operations,'

which in this case means fostering reconciliation between the prime ministerand tribal leaders of Anbar. The U.S. lost most of its leverage to do that when

it foolishly pulled its troops out of Iraq at the end of 2011 after the failure of

halfhearted negotiations overseen by Vice President Joe Biden. Selling Iraq

Hellfire missiles, as the Obama administration has just done, is a poor

substitute. It is positively destructive because it only further inflames the

situation and creates the impression that the Americans are siding with

militant Shiites in a sectarian civil war," writes CFR's Max Boot in the Wall

Street Journal.

>"The al-Qaeda narrative that only violent jihad and terror can bring change

to the Muslim world came under attack as dictators were toppled from Tunis

to Cairo to Sanaa by mostly peaceful protest. It was Awlaki who predicted

al-Qaeda's comeback. Writing in his English-language journal Inspire, Awlaki

described the Arab Awakening as a 'tsunami' of change that would inevitably

benefit al-Qaeda. He said the hopes of reformists and democrats would be


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shattered against counter-revolutionary plots by reactionaries and that the

breakdown of law and order would benefit the global jihad," writes Bruce

Riedel for al-Monitor.

>

>Daily News Brief Sponsored By:>

>

>Kerry Signals Openness to Sideline Role for Iran at Geneva II

>U.S. secretary of state John Kerry indicated for the first time Monday that

the United States might be open to Iran's participation from the sidelines in

the Syria peace talks, which are slated to take place January 22 near

Geneva (WaPo).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. Islamic State

in Iraq and Greater Syria)

Authors:Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor, andZachary Laub,Associate Writer

Updated: October 29, 2013

Introduction

Origins

Leadership

Funding

Membership

Staying Power

Introduction

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a jihadist group of predominantly Sunni fighters, rose toprominence in the ashes of the U.S.-led invasion to oust Saddam Hussein. The

insurgency that followed provided the group with fertile ground to wage a guerrilla

war against coalition forces and their domestic supporters. In the face of

successful U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the Sunni tribal awakening, AQI's
http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/jonathan-masters/b16706http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p1http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p2http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p3http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p4http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p5http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p6http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/jonathan-masters/b16706http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/zachary-laub/b19316http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p1http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p2http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p3http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p4http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p5http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link18-20140103&sp_mid=44747522&sp_rid=aXN0YW5jZWxAeWFob28uY29tS0#p6


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campaign of violence has diminished since peak years of 2006 and 2007, but the

group remains a threat to stability in Iraq and the broader Levant.

Since the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in late 2011, AQI has accelerated

the pace of attacks on mainly Shiite targets in what analysts say is an attempt to

reignite conflict between Iraq's Sunni minority and the Shiite-led government ofNuri al-Maliki. A surge in violence in mid-2013 has resulted in some eight

hundred civilian deaths per month, according to theUnited Nations. Meanwhile,

the militant group has expanded its reach into neighboring Syria, rebranding itself

as the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant), as its jihadists challenge both the Assad regime and other opposition

groups.

Suspected al-Qaeda militants accused of bomb attacks and armed robbery in

Kirkuk, Iraq. (Photo: Ako Rasheed/Courtesy Reuters)

Origins

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS)

is a Sunni Muslim extremist group that seeks to sow civil unrest in Iraq and the

Levant, with the aim of establishing a caliphatea single, transnational Islamic

state based onsharia law. Established byAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Arab of

Jordanian descent, AQI rose to prominence after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
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2003.Zarqawi, after being released from a Jordanian prison in 1999,

commanded volunteers in Herat, Afghanistan, before fleeing to northern Iraq in

2001. There he joined withAnsar al-Islam(Partisans of Islam), a militant Kurdish

separatist movement, where he led the group's Arab contingent. Many analysts

say this group, notal-Qaeda, was the precursor to AQI.Ahead of the 2003 invasion, U.S. officials made a case before the UN Security

Council linking AQI with Osama bin Laden. But a number of experts say it wasn't

until October 2004, when Zarqawi officiallyvowedobedience to the al-Qaeda

leader, that the groups became linked. The U.S. State Department designated

AQI a Foreign Terrorist Organization that same month. "For al-Qaeda, attaching

its name to Zarqawi's activities enabled it to maintain relevance even as its core

forces were destroyed [in Afghanistan] or on the run,"observedBrian Fishman, a

counterterrorism fellow at the New America Foundation.

According to a 2011 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,Zarqawi had prepared carefully for the invasion, developing afour-pronged

strategy[PDF] to defeat the coalition: isolate U.S. forces by targeting its allies;

discourage Iraqi collaboration by targeting government infrastructure and

personnel; target reconstruction efforts through high-profile attacks on civilian

contractors and aid workers; and draw the U.S. military into a Sunni-Shiite civil

war by targeting Shiites.

Two decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)the transitional

government established by the United States and its coalition partnersearly in

the U.S.-led occupation are often cited by some critics as factors that helped feedthe insurgency and provide breeding ground for AQI and several otherSunni

extremist groups in Iraq. CPA ordernumber onebanned members of Saddam

Hussein's Ba'ath party from all government positions;number twodisbanded the

Iraqi army and security services, creating hundreds of thousands of new coalition

enemies, many of them armed.

Leadership

In July 2005, bin Laden and his number two at the time,Ayman al-Zawahiri,believed AQI's increasingly sectarian attacks on Shiites would erode public

support for al-Qaeda in the region, and questioned Zarqawi's strategy inwritten

correspondence. Fishman says the relationship eventually broke down when

Zarqawi ignored al-Qaeda instructions to stop attacking Shiite cultural sites.

However tenuous the relationship between the al-Qaeda core and its Iraq affiliate,

it ended in June 2006, when a U.S. air strike killed the AQI founder. The hit
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9237/http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126http://www.cfr.org/publication/9863/http://www.twq.com/06autumn/docs/06autumn_fishman.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/uk-iraq-insurgents-idUKTRE81S0YI20120229http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/uk-iraq-insurgents-idUKTRE81S0YI20120229http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-one-de-baathification-iraqi-society/p30235http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-two-dissolution-entities/p30236http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-ayman-al-zawahiri/p9750http://www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-ayman-al-zawahiri-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9862http://www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-ayman-al-zawahiri-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9862http://www.cfr.org/publication/9237/http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126http://www.cfr.org/publication/9863/http://www.twq.com/06autumn/docs/06autumn_fishman.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/uk-iraq-insurgents-idUKTRE81S0YI20120229http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/uk-iraq-insurgents-idUKTRE81S0YI20120229http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-one-de-baathification-iraqi-society/p30235http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-two-dissolution-entities/p30236http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-ayman-al-zawahiri/p9750http://www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-ayman-al-zawahiri-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9862http://www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-ayman-al-zawahiri-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9862


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marked a major victory forU.S. and Iraqi intelligence,and a turning point for the

organization.

In the aftermath,Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian-born explosives expert and

former confidant of al-Qaeda deputy Zawahiri, emerged as the group's new

leader. In October 2006, Masri established the Islamic State of Iraq to increasethe terrorist's group local appeal and embody its "caliphate," or political arm. An

Iraq native, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was placed at ISIS's helm. For a while, U.S.

officials believed Masri and Baghdadi might be the same person, but in April

2010 the White House ended the confusion, announcing that anIraqi-led

operationkilled both men near Tikrit.

AQI is currently led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The U.S. governmentbelievesAbu

D'ua, as he is known, resides in Syria, highlighting the extent to which AQI has

exploited opportunitiesbeyond Iraq's borders.

Funding

Experts say supporters in the region, including those based in Jordan, Syria, and

Saudi Arabia, provided the bulk of past funding. Prior to his death, a great deal of

operational funding was provided by Zarqawi's support network. AQI has also

received financing from Tehran (despite the fact that al-Qaeda is a Sunni

organization), according to documents confiscated in 2006 from Iranian

Revolutionary Guards operatives in northern Iraq.

But the bulk of al-Qaeda's financing, experts say, comes from internal sources

like smuggling, extortion, and other crime. AQI has relied in recent years on

funding and manpower frominternal recruits[PDF]. In Mosul, an important AQI

stronghold, the groupextorts taxesfrom businesses small and large, netting

upwards of $8 million a month, according to some estimates.

Membership

The makeup of AQI has evolved greatly over the years, transitioning from a group

with a significant ratio of foreign fighters--many drawn initially fromZarqawi's

networks (PDF)in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and later merged with recruits fromSyria, Iraq, and its neighbors--to a group dominated by native Iraqis. The

Washington Postreported that 2006 marked a year of "dramatic changes" in AQI

membership, shifting it from a predominantly foreign force to an "overwhelmingly

Iraqi organization."
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/06/08/world/20060609_IRAQ_FEATURE.html?ref=abumusabalzarqawihttp://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/06/08/world/20060609_IRAQ_FEATURE.html?ref=abumusabalzarqawihttp://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/p01s04-woiq.htmlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-vice-president-iraqhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-vice-president-iraqhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213032.htmhttp://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/state_department_con.phphttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Master_9204_29Jan10_FINAL_SIGNED.pdfhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/al-qaeda-mosul-iraq-sunnis-minorities.htmlhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701373_pf.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/06/08/world/20060609_IRAQ_FEATURE.html?ref=abumusabalzarqawihttp://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/p01s04-woiq.htmlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-vice-president-iraqhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-vice-president-iraqhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213032.htmhttp://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/state_department_con.phphttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Master_9204_29Jan10_FINAL_SIGNED.pdfhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/al-qaeda-mosul-iraq-sunnis-minorities.htmlhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdfhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701373_pf.html


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Experts note that it's difficult to assess AQI's size, and approximations have

fluctuated greatly over the years. Terrorism analysts estimated some 15,000

fighters before numbers dropped off precipitously with the onset of the Sunni

tribal backlash in 2006 and the U.S. troop surge of 2007. According to CSIS,

more than 11,000 AQI fighters were killed or captured by early 2008.As the Pentagon prepared to withdraw its final contingent of troops in late 2011,

defense officials estimated AQI had some 800 to 1,000 fighters remaining.

However, less than a year later, Iraqi officials saidAQI ranks doubledto some

2,500, noting that counterterrorism operations "had been negatively affected by

the U.S. pullout."

Staying Power

Many analysts say heavy-handed actions taken by the Maliki government to

consolidate power in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal have alienated much of the

Sunni minority and provided AQI with potent propaganda. In 2012 and 2013,

violence attributed to AQI intensified, highlighting the group's attempts to exploit

widening sectarian cleavages. According to a report by theCongressional

Research Service[PDF], there were roughly a dozen days in 2012 on which the

group executed multi-city attacks that killed at least twenty-five Iraqis. On at least

four of those days, coordinated attacks left more than a hundred Iraqis dead.

Since Sunni protests in Anbar and other provinces began in December 2012,car

bombingsand suicide attacks intensified, with coordinated attacks regularly

targeting Shiite markets, cafes, and mosques. Over six thousand civilians were

killed between November 2012 and September 2013, the United Nations

estimates, with Baghdad bearing the brunt of violence. Meanwhile, most Sunnis

have denounced the bloodshed.

In July, ISIS fighters orchestrated bold attacks on two prisons outside Baghdad

(Abu Ghraib and Taji) that freed more than five hundred inmates, including top al-

Qaeda militants. Interpol described the incidents as "a major threat to global

security."In August, theInternational Crisis Group warnedthat the country

verged on civil war.Meanwhile, the civil war in neighboring Syria is drawing Sunni jihadist fighters to

join the rebellion against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which is dominated by

the Alawite sect, a minority Shiite group. ISIS has been active in Syria's northern

and eastern provinces, where it has taken administrative control of some towns,

providing services while imposing its ultraconservative brand of Islamic law.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/09/al-qaeda-iraq/1623297/http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/09/al-qaeda-iraq/1623297/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iraq-violence-security-absence.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iraq-violence-security-absence.htmlhttp://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1205:un-releases-casualty-figures-for-september&Itemid=633&lang=enhttp://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/N20130724http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/N20130724http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/144-make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-and-the-state.aspxhttp://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/09/al-qaeda-iraq/1623297/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdfhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iraq-violence-security-absence.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iraq-violence-security-absence.htmlhttp://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1205:un-releases-casualty-figures-for-september&Itemid=633&lang=enhttp://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/N20130724http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/N20130724http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/144-make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-and-the-state.aspx


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While al-Qaedalinked groups in Syria have feuded among themselves and with

the secular opposition, the Free Syrian Armysigned a trucewith ISIS in late

September, an acknowledgment of their efficacy on the battlefield.

Washington has responded to al-Qaeda's resurgence in the region by increasing

theCIA's supportfor the Maliki government, including assistance to elitecounterterrorism units that report directly to the prime minister. At the same time,

the significant jihadist spillover into Syria has given the Obama administration

pause as it moves to provide limited arms to the rebellion against Assad. Briefing

the UN Security Council in July 2013, UN envoy to Iraq Martin Kobler

characterized thespiraling regional dynamics: "[Iraq and Syria] are interrelated.

Iraq is the fault line between the Sunni and Shia worlds."
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/20/syrian-rebel-s-bigtentstrategycollapsing.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735304578354561954501502.htmlhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45428&Cr=Iraq&Cr1=http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/20/syrian-rebel-s-bigtentstrategycollapsing.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735304578354561954501502.htmlhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45428&Cr=Iraq&Cr1=

al qaeda in irak and syria

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