alliance in international relations prof. jaechun kim

20
Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Upload: harry-houston

Post on 18-Jan-2018

219 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

 Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR Alliance in IR

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Alliance in Interna-tional Relations

Prof. Jaechun Kim

Page 2: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Alliance in IR

Importance of Alliance in International Relations

Important element of statecraft

Alliance politics has been a common practice in IR

Weak states enter into alliance, when they need protection against strong states.

Strong states form alliances to counter other strong states (to maintain proper balance of power).

Page 3: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR

Alliance in IR

Page 4: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Defining Alliance Coalition – “a set of members acting in concert at x

time regarding 1 to n issues” (Fedder 1968: 80); Al-liances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found during times of war or crises (Snyder 1990: 106). e.g., Coalition of the Gulf War in 1993, Coalition of the Willing in 2003

Alignment – occurs when states bring their policies into close cooperation with other states in order to achieve mutual security goals. Formal alliances strengthen existing alignments or create new ones. Alliances are subsets of the broader phenomena known as alignments

(Snyder 1990: 105).

Page 5: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Defining Alliance

Entente – more flexible association between states (Kann 1976: 611) No firm commitments exist between partners Simple recognition of the fact that cooperation between

them will make sense… cf. Triple Entente before WWI

Coalition < Alliance < Alignment cf. Entente

Some do use them interchangeably

Page 6: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Theory of Alliance (Formation)

REALIST THEORY OF ALLIANCE

Balance of Power Theory (Waltz 1976) States balance against power – “power” is the

most important variable States tend to balance against stronger states This is to ensure that no one states will domi-

nate the intl system maintenance of balance of power

Page 7: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Theory of Alliance (Forma-tion)

Two types of balancing• Internal balancing• External balancing – alliance!

Internal balancing is more reliable… ; Alliance is the product of compromise between states

Why not balancing against the US? (Although Waltz claimed that the US would be eventually balanced by one or more states… )

Page 8: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Theory of Alliance (Forma-tion)

Bipolar Stability vs. Danger of Multipolarity (K. Waltz)

• Alliance pattern is unstable under the multipolarity

• Buck-passing and Chain-ganging

Page 9: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Balance of Threat Theory (Walt 1987)

Refinement of Waltzian BOP Theory

States tend to balance against threats rather than against power.

Walt adopts Waltzian neorealist framework and agrees that Waltz’s theory is sound, but not suf-ficient…

Page 10: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Level of external threats is a function of four fac-tors

• Distribution of capabilities• Geographic proximity• Offensive capabilities• Perceived aggression intentions (Walt 1987: 22)

When states don’t feel threatened, they do bandwagon with the strongest state rather than balance against it… e.g., Bandwagoning with the US in the post Cold War era

Nonetheless, balancing is far more common than bandwagoning…

Page 11: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Scheweller (1994) – Balance of Interests

Balancing and bandwagoning are not oppo-site strategies; states choose them for differ-ent reasons!

Balancing is for self-preservation, while bandwagoning is for self-extension (balanc-ing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, while bandwagoning is driven by the oppor-tunity for gains (interests))

Page 12: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

States bandwagon with the stronger side be-cause it represents the “wave of the future.”

The presence of a significant external threat is not necessary for states to bandwagon; alliance choices are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger!

The most important determination of alliance decisions is the compatibility of political goals (in IR), not imbalances of power or threat.

Page 13: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Status-quo countries vs. revisionist coun-tries

Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coali-tion(alliance), even when it is the stronger side

Dissatisfied powers, motivated by opportuni-ties more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state!

Page 14: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Two types of bandwagooning

Jackal bandwagoning – ascent of powerful revisionist states or coalition attracts oppor-tunistic revisionist states…

Piling-on bandwagoning – status-quo coun-tries bandwagon with the strongest status-quo state or coalition

Bottom Line – “interests” is an important element of alliance behavior

Page 15: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Glenn Snyder (1984) – Alliance Security Dilemma

Security dilemma functions within alliances

2 risks of alliance security dilemma

• Risk of abandonment – danger that an ally does not come in help

• Risk of entrapment – danger of being dragged into a conflict that alliance partner gets involved in (though that conflict is not in the interests of your country)

Page 16: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Dilemma !

if a state tries to reduce a risk of abandonment by in-creasing its alliance commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of entrapment;

if a state tries to reduce a risk of entrapment by decreas-ing its commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of abandonment.

Alliance security dilemma is more severe in a mul-tipolar than in a bipolar system (because there are a number of plausible realignment options)

Page 17: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Morrow (1993) – Autonomy-security trade-off model Minor states get security benefits from their major alliance

partners at the cost of sacrificing autonomy; Major alliance partners get autonomy benefits at the cost of

providing security.

Autonomy

Security

Positionw/oAlliance

Source: Morrow (1991:914)

Page 18: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Alliance Transformationin the post-Cold War Era

Realism – if common threats cease to exist, so will the alliance!

Predicted that the Cold War alliances would fall apart

Nonetheless, most of the US Cold War alliances sur-vived the collapse of Cold War order

Page 19: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Liberal institutionalists – alliance is an institution!

Alliance takes on a life of its own, adapts to a new environ-ment, and adopts new missions!

e.g., NATO developed a host of institutional assets that are not just specific to the Soviet threats but general enough to tackle many post-CW security problems!

Page 20: Alliance in International Relations Prof. Jaechun Kim

Constructivists – identities and values are as much important as threat perceptions!

NATO allies grew to acquire similar values and sense of we-feeling that became the source of durability for alliance part-nership.

Case Study: Why do the US Cold War al-liances endure in Asia?