alliance in international relations prof. jaechun kim
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Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR Alliance in IRTRANSCRIPT
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Alliance in Interna-tional Relations
Prof. Jaechun Kim
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Alliance in IR
Importance of Alliance in International Relations
Important element of statecraft
Alliance politics has been a common practice in IR
Weak states enter into alliance, when they need protection against strong states.
Strong states form alliances to counter other strong states (to maintain proper balance of power).
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Therefore, alliance has been a very important subject of research in IR
Alliance in IR
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Defining Alliance Coalition – “a set of members acting in concert at x
time regarding 1 to n issues” (Fedder 1968: 80); Al-liances are formed in peace time and coalitions are often found during times of war or crises (Snyder 1990: 106). e.g., Coalition of the Gulf War in 1993, Coalition of the Willing in 2003
Alignment – occurs when states bring their policies into close cooperation with other states in order to achieve mutual security goals. Formal alliances strengthen existing alignments or create new ones. Alliances are subsets of the broader phenomena known as alignments
(Snyder 1990: 105).
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Defining Alliance
Entente – more flexible association between states (Kann 1976: 611) No firm commitments exist between partners Simple recognition of the fact that cooperation between
them will make sense… cf. Triple Entente before WWI
Coalition < Alliance < Alignment cf. Entente
Some do use them interchangeably
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Theory of Alliance (Formation)
REALIST THEORY OF ALLIANCE
Balance of Power Theory (Waltz 1976) States balance against power – “power” is the
most important variable States tend to balance against stronger states This is to ensure that no one states will domi-
nate the intl system maintenance of balance of power
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Theory of Alliance (Forma-tion)
Two types of balancing• Internal balancing• External balancing – alliance!
Internal balancing is more reliable… ; Alliance is the product of compromise between states
Why not balancing against the US? (Although Waltz claimed that the US would be eventually balanced by one or more states… )
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Theory of Alliance (Forma-tion)
Bipolar Stability vs. Danger of Multipolarity (K. Waltz)
• Alliance pattern is unstable under the multipolarity
• Buck-passing and Chain-ganging
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Balance of Threat Theory (Walt 1987)
Refinement of Waltzian BOP Theory
States tend to balance against threats rather than against power.
Walt adopts Waltzian neorealist framework and agrees that Waltz’s theory is sound, but not suf-ficient…
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Level of external threats is a function of four fac-tors
• Distribution of capabilities• Geographic proximity• Offensive capabilities• Perceived aggression intentions (Walt 1987: 22)
When states don’t feel threatened, they do bandwagon with the strongest state rather than balance against it… e.g., Bandwagoning with the US in the post Cold War era
Nonetheless, balancing is far more common than bandwagoning…
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Scheweller (1994) – Balance of Interests
Balancing and bandwagoning are not oppo-site strategies; states choose them for differ-ent reasons!
Balancing is for self-preservation, while bandwagoning is for self-extension (balanc-ing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, while bandwagoning is driven by the oppor-tunity for gains (interests))
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States bandwagon with the stronger side be-cause it represents the “wave of the future.”
The presence of a significant external threat is not necessary for states to bandwagon; alliance choices are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger!
The most important determination of alliance decisions is the compatibility of political goals (in IR), not imbalances of power or threat.
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Status-quo countries vs. revisionist coun-tries
Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coali-tion(alliance), even when it is the stronger side
Dissatisfied powers, motivated by opportuni-ties more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state!
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Two types of bandwagooning
Jackal bandwagoning – ascent of powerful revisionist states or coalition attracts oppor-tunistic revisionist states…
Piling-on bandwagoning – status-quo coun-tries bandwagon with the strongest status-quo state or coalition
Bottom Line – “interests” is an important element of alliance behavior
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Glenn Snyder (1984) – Alliance Security Dilemma
Security dilemma functions within alliances
2 risks of alliance security dilemma
• Risk of abandonment – danger that an ally does not come in help
• Risk of entrapment – danger of being dragged into a conflict that alliance partner gets involved in (though that conflict is not in the interests of your country)
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Dilemma !
if a state tries to reduce a risk of abandonment by in-creasing its alliance commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of entrapment;
if a state tries to reduce a risk of entrapment by decreas-ing its commitments, it ends up increasing a risk of abandonment.
Alliance security dilemma is more severe in a mul-tipolar than in a bipolar system (because there are a number of plausible realignment options)
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Morrow (1993) – Autonomy-security trade-off model Minor states get security benefits from their major alliance
partners at the cost of sacrificing autonomy; Major alliance partners get autonomy benefits at the cost of
providing security.
Autonomy
Security
Positionw/oAlliance
Source: Morrow (1991:914)
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Alliance Transformationin the post-Cold War Era
Realism – if common threats cease to exist, so will the alliance!
Predicted that the Cold War alliances would fall apart
Nonetheless, most of the US Cold War alliances sur-vived the collapse of Cold War order
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Liberal institutionalists – alliance is an institution!
Alliance takes on a life of its own, adapts to a new environ-ment, and adopts new missions!
e.g., NATO developed a host of institutional assets that are not just specific to the Soviet threats but general enough to tackle many post-CW security problems!
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Constructivists – identities and values are as much important as threat perceptions!
NATO allies grew to acquire similar values and sense of we-feeling that became the source of durability for alliance part-nership.
Case Study: Why do the US Cold War al-liances endure in Asia?