allott 2018 conversational implicature final

Conversationalimplicature NicholasAllott

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ConversationalImplicatureNicholasAllott

forOxfordResearchEncyclopediaofLinguistics

SummaryConversationalimplicatures(i)areimpliedbythespeakerinmakinganutterance;(ii)arepartofthecontentoftheutterance,but(iii)donotcontributetodirect(orexplicit)utterancecontent;and(iv)arenotencodedbythelinguisticmeaningofwhathasbeenuttered.In(1),Ameliaassertsthatsheisonadiet,andimplicatessomethingdifferent:thatsheisnothavingcake.(1)Benjamin:Areyouhavingsomeofthischocolatecake?Amelia:I’monadiet.

Conversationalimplicaturesareasubsetoftheimplicationsofanutterance:namelythosethatarepartofutterancecontent.Withintheclassofconversationalimplicatures,therearedistinctionsbetweenparticularizedandgeneralizedimplicatures;implicatedpremisesandimplicatedconclusions;andweakandstrongimplicatures.Anobviousquestionishowimplicaturesarepossible:howcanaspeakerintentionallyimplysomethingthatisnotpartofthelinguisticmeaningofthephrasesheutters,andhowcanheraddresseerecoverthatutterancecontent?Workingoutwhathasbeenimplicatedisnotamatterofdeduction,butofinferencetothebestexplanation.Whatistobeexplainediswhythespeakerhasutteredthewordsthatshedid,inthewayandinthecircumstancesthatshedid.GriceproposedthatrationaltalkexchangesarecooperativeandarethereforegovernedbyaCooperativePrinciple(CP)andconversationalmaxims:hearerscanreasonablyassumethatrationalspeakerswillattempttocooperateandthatrationalcooperativespeakerswilltrytomaketheircontributiontruthful,informative,relevantandclear,interalia,andtheseexpectationsthereforeguidetheinterpretationofutterances.Onhisview,sinceaddresseescaninferimplicatures,speakerscantakeadvantageoftheirability,conveyingimplicaturesbyexploitingthemaxims.Grice’stheoryaimedtoshowhowimplicaturescouldinprinciplearise.Incontrast,workinlinguisticpragmaticshasattemptedtomodeltheiractualderivation.Giventheneedforacognitivelytractabledecisionprocedure,boththeneo-GriceanschoolandworkoncommunicationinrelevancetheoryproposeasystemwithfewerprinciplesthanGrice’s.Neo-GriceanworkattemptstoreduceGrice’sarrayofmaximstojusttwo(Horn)orthree(Levinson),whileSperberandWilson’srelevancetheoryrejectsmaximsandtheCPandproposesthatpragmaticinferencehingesonasinglecommunicativeprincipleofrelevance.Conversationalimplicaturestypicallyhaveanumberofinterestingproperties,includingcalculability,cancelability,nondetachability,andindeterminacy.Thesepropertiescanbeusedtoinvestigatewhetheraputativeimplicatureiscorrectlyidentifiedassuch,althoughnoneofthemprovidesafail-safetest.Afurthertest,embedding,hasalsobeenprominentinworkonimplicatures.AnumberofphenomenathatGricetreatedasimplicatureswouldnowbetreatedbymanyaspragmaticenrichmentcontributingtothepropositionexpressed.ButGrice’spostulationofimplicatureswasacrucialadvance,bothforitstheoreticalunificationofapparentlydiversetypesofutterancecontentandfortheattentionitdrewtopragmaticinferenceandthedivisionoflaborbetweenlinguisticsemanticsandpragmaticsintheorizingaboutverbalcommunication.


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Keywordsimplicature,conversationalimplicature,pragmatics,inference,communication,speakermeaning,Grice,relevancetheory,neo-Griceanpragmatics1.ExamplesandDefinitionsSpeakerscanintentionallyimplysomethingdifferentfromwhattheysay.Consider(1)and(2):(1)Benjamin:Areyouhavingsomeofthischocolatecake?

Amelia:I’monadiet.(2)I’msurehe’sgladthatyouwaiteduntilhediedbeforeexpressingyouropinionofhim.

In(1),Ameliaassertsthatsheiscurrentlyonadiet.Shealsointentionallyimpliessomethingelse:thatsheisnotgoingtohaveanyofthecake.Thesentencein(2),anattestedexample,wasproducedasanironicreplytoanegativecommentpostedonanewspaperwebsiteunderanarticleaboutthedeathofapublicfigure.Clearly,theauthorof(2)didnotintendtoassertwhatonewouldthinkifonetookherwordsattheirfacevalue,andshedidintendtoconveysomethingquitedifferent.Inpragmatics,followingtheworkofPaulGrice(1975,1989),theword“implicature”isusedasatermforutterancecontentthatthespeakerintentionallyimpliesbutdoesnotsayorstate.1Moreprecisely,aconversationalimplicatureissomethingthat(i)aspeakerimpliesbymakinganutteranceand(ii)ispartofthecontentoftheutterance(or“speakermeaning”),2butwhich(iii)doesnotcontributetothedirect(orexplicit)utterancecontent(e.g.theassertioninassertiveutterances)3andwhich(iv)isnotencodedbythelinguisticmeaningofwhathasbeenuttered.

1.InGrice’soriginalusage,theterm“implicature”wastobereservedfortheactofimplicating,whileheproposedcallingwhataspeakerimplicatesan“implicatum”(Grice,1975,pp.43–44).Thelatterterm,however,nevercaughton.2.Thephrases“contentoftheutterance”/“speakermeaning”heremayneedtobereadinabroadsensewheretheyingeneralcovernotonlypropositionalcontentbutalsoillocutionaryforce(orsomethingsimilar),forreasonsshowninsection1.1.Ingeneral,then,utterancecontentwouldincludeasetofdirectlyexpressedforce-contentpairsandasetofimplicatedforce-contentpairs.ButseeSperberandWilson(1986,pp.243–254)foranalternativeapproachthatmodelscommunicatedillocutionaryinformationwithinpropositionalcontent.(Mythankstoananonymousreviewerforpushingmetobeclearaboutthis.)Notethatwemayneedtothinkofthesetsasfuzzybecauseofweakimplicatures(seesection4.4)andweakexplicatures(notdiscussedhere).3.Theexpression“direct(orexplicit)utterancecontent”isusedherefortworeasons.First,theGriceanterm“whatissaid”issometimesusedtorefertothewordsuttered,sometimestorefertoaminimalpropositionobtainedbydecodingthewordsused,disambiguatingambiguousexpressionsandassigningreferencetoindexicals,andsometimestowhatthespeakerasserts.Theterm“direct/explicitutterancecontent”unambiguouslypicksoutthelastofthese(forassertiveutterances).Secondly,thisterm,unlike“whatisasserted”or“whatisstated,”coversthenon-implicatedspeakermeaning/contentofnon-declarativesentencesandnon-assertiveutterancessuchas


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Amelia’sutteranceimplicatesthatsheisnothavingthecake.Clearlythisimplicatureisnotpartoftheencodedmeaningofthesentencesheuttered,giventhatutterancesofthesentenceindifferentcircumstanceswillnotingeneralconveythatimplicature(seesection4.2oncancelability).Whatismore,theimplicatureisnotpartofthedirectutterancecontent—whatAmeliastatedorasserted.Ifitturnedoutthatshewasnotonadiet,thensheliedtoBenjamin,butifshewasonadietbutintendedtohavecakeanyway,shedidnotlie,butdidintendtomislead.1.1 ImplicatureandForceNoteveryutteranceisastatementorassertion.Speakersalsoaskquestions,giveorders,makepromises,andmore.Inthestandardterminology,theseactsdifferinillocutionaryforce(Austin,1962;Searle,1969,1976;Bach&Harnish,1979;Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.243–54).Searle(1975)drewattentiontowhathecalledindirectspeechacts,utterancesthathaveanindirectillocutionaryforce.Forexample,in(3a),Ameliasayssomethingaboutwhatshewantsandindirectlyrequeststhatheraddresseepassthesalad.Anotherwaytomakethisrequestindirectlyisshownin(3b),wherethesentenceutteredisaninterrogative,theformwhosecentralpurposeistoaskquestions.(3)a.Amelia:Iwantyoutopassmethesalad.

b.Amelia:Canyoupassthesalad?Indirectspeechactsaregenerallyregardedasexamplesofconversationalimplicature,4withimplicatedillocutionaryforce.52.DistinctionsTheterminologyaroundimplicaturesissomewhatinvolved,anditisworthmakingafewclarifications.2.1 ConversationalandConventionalImplicaturesTheadjective“conversational”isusedtomarktwodistinctions.Griceandsomeothertheoristscontrastconversationalimplicatureswithconventionalimplicatures(Grice,1975,pp.44–45),wherethesearelikeconversationalimplicaturesinbeingintentionallycommunicatedimplicationsofanutterancethatdonotcontributetothepropositionexpressed,butunliketheminthattheyarepartoftheconventionalorlinguisticallyencodedmeaning.Aputativeexampleisthecontrastconveyedbytheuseoftheword“but,”asinexample(4):(4)Johnistiredbuthappy.Othertheoristshavearguedthattherearenoconventionalimplicatures:noimplicaturesarepartofencodedlinguisticmeaning(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.182;

questionsandcommands.Itisroughlyequivalenttorelevancetheory’sexplicatures(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.182)andBach’simpliciture(1994).4.Ontherelationbetweenconversationalimplicaturesandindirectspeechacts,seeBraun(2011).5.Similarly,(1)mightbeanalyzedasimplicatinganindirectrepresentativespeechact(indirectlytellingBenthatAmeliaisnotgoingtohavecakeordoesnotwantcake)oranactofindirectlyrefusinghisoffer(acommissive,perhaps),orboth.(Italicshereindicatetypesofillocutionaryforce.)


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Blakemore,1987;Wilson&Sperber,1988;Wilson&Sperber,1993;Bach,1999,2006,pp.29–30).2.2 ConversationalandNon-ConversationalImplicaturesForGrice,conversationalimplicaturesaredefinedasimplicaturesthatrelyonprinciplesgoverningconversationandothercommunicativeinteraction,andinprincipletheythereforealsocontrastwithnon-conversationalimplicatures.Ofthese,hesaysonlythattheywouldbearesultof“aesthetic,social,ormoral”maxims(Grice,1975,p.47),andthispossibilityhasnotbeenmuchexplored.(AnexceptionisLeech’sworkonmaximsofpoliteness:Leech,1983,pp.104ff;Leech,2014.)Inwhatfollows,whereveritisnototherwisequalifiedtheterm“implicature”willbeusedtoreferonlytoconversationalimplicatures.2.3 ParticularizedandGeneralizedImplicaturesGricesuggestedthattherearesentenceswhichwould“normally(intheabsenceofspecialcircumstances)”conveyacertainimplicature(Grice,1975,p.56).Consider:(5)Johnwentintoahouseyesterday.Utterancesof(5)willgenerallybetakentoimplicatethatthehouseJohnwentintoisnothisown.Gricecalledsuchimplicaturesgeneralizedconversationalimplicatures(Grice,1975,p.56).Incontrast,implicatureswhosecommunicationexploitsfeaturesofaspecificsituation,asin(1)and(2)above,areknownasparticularizedconversationalimplicatures(Grice,1975,p.56).Sometheoristshavearguedthatgeneralizedandparticularizedimplicaturesaredistinctkindsandrequireseparatetheoreticaltreatment.Inparticular,neo-Griceanapproachestopragmatics,whichhavefocusedonpragmaticinferencesthatrelyonthepresenceofaspecificlexicalitemorgrammaticalconstruction6,treatgeneralizedimplicaturesassuitedtodistincttheoreticaltreatmentfromparticularizedimplicatures(Gazdar,1979,pp.37–62;Horn,1984;Levinson,1987;Levinson,2000).Levinson(2000)furtherclaimsthatitisnecessarytodistinguishalevelofutterance-typemeaning,distinctfromsentence(-type)meaningandutterance-tokenmeaning.Hearguesthatwhileparticularizedimplicaturesarepossessedbyparticularindividualutterances(i.e.utterancetokens),generalizedimplicaturesinhereinutterancetypes.Onthisview,theimplicaturethatthehouseisnotJohn’sisapropertyoftheaction-typesayingsofthesentencein(5).SperberandWilson,Neale,andCarstonarguethatthereisnotheoreticallyinterestingcategoricaldistinctiontobemadebetweengeneralizedandparticularizedimplicatures(Sperber&Wilson,1987,p.748;Neale,1992,p.524n.18;Carston,1995):allimplicaturesdependfortheircommunicationbothonfeaturesofthecontextandfeaturesoftheutterance.Onthisview,thereisacontinuum.Implicatureswhichareclosertothegeneralizedendofthescalearethoseforwhichtherequiredfeaturesareeasytobringtomindinamoreorless“neutral”context.(Ontheinterpretationofsentencespresentedwithoutanyspecifiedcontext,seeBreheny,Katsos,&Williams,2006.)

6.ThiscategorydoesnotcoincidewithgeneralizedconversationalimplicaturesasGricedefinedthem.Utterancesof(2)willnormallybetakenasironic,forexample,withlittlehelprequiredfromspecialcircumstances,giventheabsurdityofusingthesentenceasastraightforwardassertion.Butitsimplicaturesarenotduetothepresenceofanyspecificlexicalitemorconstruction.


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Thetopicofgeneralizedconversationalimplicaturesiscontroversialinanotherway.Manypragmaticallyinferredcontributionstoutterancecontentthatareseenasgeneralizedconversationalimplicaturesbyneo-Griceanswouldbeanalyzedbyothers(includingrelevancetheoristsandtheGriceanphilosopheroflanguageKentBach)ascontributingtothepropositionexpressedandthus(bydefinition)notimplicaturesatall(Carston,1995;Carston,2002,p.258;Wilson&Sperber,2004,p.617).Onesuchexampleis(6):(6)Paul’sbookisgood.AnutteranceofthissentencewouldgenerallyconveysomespecificrelationbetweenPaulandthebook:e.g.“thebookthatPaulwrote,”“thebookthatPaulowns,”“thebookthatPaulhasjustbeentalkingabout.”Giventhatthegenitive-smorphemedoesnotdeterminethisrelation,itmustbepragmaticallyinferred.Levinsonanalysesthisasanimplicature,butCarstonarguesthattheconveyedrelationispartofwhatthespeakerassertsandassuchisnotimplicated(1995,pp.216,221,237).72.4 ImplicationsandImplicaturesImplicaturesareimplicationsofutterances,butnoteverythingthatcanrightlybeinferredfromanutteranceisanimplicature(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.194–195;Bach,2006,p.26).Fromthespeaker’schoiceofwords,thesoundofhervoice,andotherfeaturesofanutterance,ahearermaybeabletoinfermanythings:herplaceoforigin,heremotionalorphysicalstate,whethersheisguiltyofacertaincrime,andsoon.Obviously,speakersneednotintendtocommunicatesuchimplications.Whatismore,theydonotintendtoconveyallthelogicalimplicationsofthepropositionstheyexpress(forexample,thelogicaldisjunctionofthepropositionexpressed,p,witheveryproposition:porqorrorsor...).Itisthereforenecessarytodistinguishbetweenwhatisimpliedbyanutterance(inthecontextofutterance)andthesubsetoftheseimplicationsthatthespeakerintendstocommunicate,thatis,toopenlyconveytotheaddressee.Theimplicationsinthissubsetaretheimplicaturesoftheutterance(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.194–195;Sperber&Wilson,2008,pp.98–100).Thecondition“thatthespeakerintendstoopenlyconvey”comesfromadistinctbutrelatedstrandofGrice’swork,histheoryofmeaning(Grice,1957).Gricepointedoutthatwhileitischaracteristicofcommunicationthatproducersofutterancesintendotherstoentertaincertainthoughts,thatisalsotrueofdeceptionorcovertmanipulation.Whatdistinguishescommunicationisthatthespeakerhasthefurtherintentionthattheaddresseegraspthatthespeakerintendedtoconveythethoughtsinquestion.(Fordiscussion,seeSperber&Wilson,1986,pp.21–24;Neale,1992,pp.544–550;Green,2007;Wharton,2009,pp.18–47.)Assumingthatthisiscorrect,theremustbecaseswherethespeakerintendsherutterancetohaveaparticularimplicationandintendstheimplicationtobegrasped,butdoesnotintendthehearertograspthatshesointends.Oneexampleisintentionallyspeakinginacroakyvoice,hopingthatyourbosswillinferanillnessandsendyouhome.Thusitisnotsufficienttodefineimplicaturesasimplicationsofanutterancethatthespeakerintendsthehearertograsp.

7.Carston(op.cit.)alsopointsoutthatitishardtoseehowthiscouldbeageneralizedimplicature(asLevinsonclaims),giventhattherelationinferreddependsonthecontext.


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Twofurtherdistinctions,betweenimplicatedpremisesandimplicatedconclusionsandbetweenweakandstrongimplicatures,arediscussedinsection3.7andsection4.4respectively8.3.TheoriesofPragmaticInferenceAnobviousquestionishowimplicaturesarepossible:howcanaspeakerintentionallyimplysomethingthatisnotpartofthelinguisticmeaningofthephrasesheutters,andhowcanheraddresseerecoverthatutterancecontent?Thereisconsiderableconsensusonthegeneralcharacterofpragmaticinference.Workingoutwhathasbeenimplicatedisnotamatterofdeduction,likeamathematicalorlogicalproof;itisaninstanceofinferencetothebestexplanation(alsoknownas“abductiveinference”or“abduction”)(Bach&Harnish,1979,pp.92–93;Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.69–70;Hobbs,Stickel,Appelt,&Martin,1993;Allott,2008).Whatistobeexplainediswhythespeakerhasutteredthewordsthatshedid,inthewaythatshedid,andinthecircumstancesthatshedid.Insomecases,thebestexplanationmaysimplybethatsheintendedtoassertwhatthesentencenormallymeans(Bach,2006,pp.24–25).Butincaseslike(1)and(2),onecaninferthatwhatthespeakermeantdoesnotcoincidewithwhatshestated,andthatshemusthaveintendedtoconveysomethingelse:animplicature.Itisalsogenerallyacceptedthatthisinferenceismandatedandguidedbypresumptionsorexpectationsaboutspeakers’utterances(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.13–14;Bach,2006,pp.24–25)andthattheseexpectationsaregroundedinapragmaticprincipleorprinciples.However,differentpragmatictheoriesproposedifferentanswerstothequestionsofwhattheprinciplesareandwhatexpectationstheymandate.3.1 TheCooperativePrincipleandConversationalMaximsGriceproposedatheoryoftalk-exchanges(usuallycalledhis“theoryofconversation”)oneaimofwhichwastoexplainhowimplicaturescanbemeantandunderstood.AkeyassumptionisthatrationaltalkexchangesarecooperativeandarethereforegovernedbyaCooperativePrinciple(CP)andconversationalmaxims,forwhichhesuggestedthefollowingtentativeformulations(Grice,1975,pp.45–46):CooperativePrincipleMakeyourconversationalcontributionsuchasisrequired,atthestageatwhichitoccurs,bytheacceptedpurposeordirectionofthetalkexchangeinwhichyouareengaged.Maximsofquantity1.Makeyourcontributionasinformativeasisrequired(forthecurrentpurposesoftheexchange).2.Donotmakeyourcontributionmoreinformativethanisrequired.MaximsofqualitySupermaxim:Trytomakeyourcontributiononethatistrue.1.Donotsaywhatyoubelievetobefalse.2.Donotsaythatforwhichyoulackadequateevidence.MaximofrelationBerelevant.

8.Jary(2013)proposesafurtherdistinctionbetweenmaterialandbehavioralimplicatures.


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MaximsofmannerSupermaxim:Beperspicuous.1.Avoidobscurityofexpression.2.Avoidambiguity.3.Bebrief(avoidunnecessaryprolixity).4.Beorderly.Whilethemaximsarecastasimperativesaimedatspeakers,thekeyideaisthatspeakerswhoarerationalandwanttocommunicatewillingeneralabidebythesestandards,soahearercanrationallyhavecorrespondingpresumptionsaboutthespeaker’sutterances(Bach,2006,pp.24–25;Sbisà,2006,p.234).Tobemorespecific,theclaimisthathearerscanreasonablyassumethatrationalspeakerswillattempttocooperateandthatrationalcooperativespeakerswilltrytomaketheircontributiontruthful,informative,relevantandclear,interalia,andtheseexpectationsshouldthereforeguidetheinterpretationofutterances.Gricesuggestedthatanaddresseecaninferthepresenceofanimplicaturewhensuchexpectationsarenotmetorappearnottobemet,ontheassumptionthatthespeakeris,appearancesnotwithstanding,attemptingtobecooperative.Hisgeneralschemaforworkingoutimplicaturesis:

Hehassaidthatp;thereisnoreasontosupposethatheisnotobservingthemaxims,oratleasttheCP;hecouldnotbedoingthisunlesshethoughtthatq;heknows(andknowsthatIknowthatheknows)thatIcanseethatthesuppositionthathethinksthatqisrequired;hehasdonenothingtostopmethinkingthatq;heintendsmetothink,orisatleastwillingtoallowmetothink,thatq;andsohehasimplicatedthatq.(Grice,1975,p.50)

Sinceaddresseescaninferimplicatures,speakerscantakeadvantageoftheirability,Griceclaimed,conveyingimplicaturesbyexploitingthemaxims.Forexample,whatAmeliasaysin(1)seemstoviolatethemaximofrelation,giventhatitdoesnotanswerBenjamin’squestion.ButifonecouldassumethatAmeliahasimplicatedthatsheisnothavingcake,hercommunicativeaction(herutterance)wouldliveuptoBenjamin’sexpectationsafterall.Otherthingsbeingequal,thismeansthatitisreasonabletotakeAmeliatohavesoimplicated.IngeneralforGrice,

whatisimplicatediswhatitisrequiredthatoneassumeaspeakertothinkinordertopreservetheassumptionthatheisobservingtheCooperativePrinciple(andperhapssomeconversationalmaximsaswell),ifnotatthelevelofwhatissaid,atleastatthelevelofwhatisimplicated.(Grice,1989b,p.86)

3.2 ProblemswithGrice’sMaximsMostworkinlinguisticsonimplicaturesassumesthatthisaccountiscorrectinitsbroadoutline,butwronginthespecificsofthepragmaticprinciples.9Themainproblemisthatthemaximsdonotimplyanyparticularprocedurefordecidingwhatisimplicated.Onereasonisthatthedemandsthattheyplaceonthespeakermayclash,asGricenoted,andthemaximsprovidenoguidanceabouthowtoproceedwhentheydo.Gricelatersuggestedthatqualityisinacategoryabovetheothermaxims:so,forexample,qualityisapreconditionforquantitybecause“[f]alseinformationisnotaninferiorkindof

9.Conversely,themajorityofworkonconversationalimplicaturesinphilosophyoflanguagehasbeenwithinGrice’sframeworkorreactingagainstit,withlittlereferencetothedevelopmentoflinguisticpragmatics.


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information;itjustisnotinformation”(Grice,1989a,p.371).10Evenifqualitydoeshavethisspecialstatus,therearestillmanyotherpossibleclashesbetweentheothermaxims.Asecondproblemisthatthemaximsmayindicatethatanimplicatureexistswithoutprovidinganyguidanceonwhatitis.InGrice’sworking-outschema,thereisaleapthatisunconstrainedbythemaximstotheintroductionoftheimplicature,q,inthestep“hecouldnotbedoingthisunlesshethoughtthatq.”ThiscanbeseeninGrice’sanalysesofbothmetaphorandironyasflouting(i.e.,blatantviolation)ofqualitymaxims.Asliteralstatements,(2)aboveandthefirstsentencein(7)wouldbothbefalse.(7)ThisbookisaToyota.Thepublishershouldrecallit,issueanapologyandfixthepartsthatendangerthehistoricalrecord.(RobertS.Norris,commentingonahistorybook,inBroad,2010)

Soboth(2)and(7)violate(orseemtoviolate)thefirstmaximofquality.TopreservetheassumptionthattheCooperativePrincipleisinforce,thehearermayassumethatthereisanimplicature.Butthatisasfarasthemaximstakeus.Althoughthesamemaximisviolatedinthesamewayinbothcases,thefigurativemeaningconveyedinthetwocasesisrelatedinaverydifferentwaytothecontentofthewordsuttered,andtheexplanationforthishastobesoughtbeyondthemaxims(Wilson&Sperber,1981,pp.159–160).Afundamentalproblemisthatitisunclearwhetherthelistofmaximsiscomplete.Gricesuggestedthatmorecouldbeadded(Grice,1989b,p.273).Itiscrucialtoknowwhenthiswouldbejustified;otherwisewecouldaddamaximtodealwitheachnewphenomenonoreachutterance,anobviouslyadhocprocedure(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.36).Conversely,someofthemaximsmayberedundant.Aproperlyformulatedmaximofrelationmightaccountforimplicaturesduetotheoversupplyofinformation,makingthesecondquantitymaximunnecessary(Grice,1989b,p.34).Finally,theformulationofseveralofthemaximsisworryinglyvague,particularlythemaximofrelation,asGricenoted:

Thoughthemaximitselfisterse,itsformulationconcealsanumberofproblemsthatexercisemeagooddeal:questionsaboutwhatdifferentkindsandfocusesofrelevancetheremaybe,howtheseshiftinthecourseofatalkexchange,howtoallowforthefactthatsubjectsofconversationsarelegitimatelychanged,andsoon.(Grice,1975,p.46;seealsoGrice,1989a,pp.371–372)

ForamoredetailedcritiqueofGrice’stheory,seeWilsonandSperber(1981).Forgeneraldiscussion,seeLevinson(1983,p.97ff.);SperberandWilson(1986,pp.33–38);Grice(1989b,pp.369–372);Neale(1992,pp.520–541).3.3 ProblemswiththeCooperativePrincipleTheCooperativePrinciplehasalsobeencriticized,withKasherandSperberandWilsonarguingthatcooperationisnotnecessaryforcommunication(Kasher,1976,pp.201–202;Kasher,1982,pp.38–39;Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.161–162;Sperber&Wilson,1995,pp.267–268).TheCPtakescooperativeactivitiestobethosethathavesomepurposeordirectionthatissharedoratleastacceptedbytheparticipants.Thereisagreatdealofcommunicationthatmayfalloutsideofsuchsituations,asGricediscussedinlaterwork(Grice,1989b,pp.368–370),includinglegalinterviewsandcross-examination,wheretheaimsofthequestionerandthepersonsubjectedtoquestioningarelargely(andperhapsentirely)disjoint.Therearealsoone-offcommunicative

10Althoughthisiscorrect,itdoesnotentailamaximoftruthfulness;seeWilsonandSperber(2002).


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interactionswithnoobvioussharedpurposeordirection,aswhensomeonetellsastrangertogetoutofherwayinthestreet,ortobequietataconcert.Somepotentialimplicaturesdon’tgothroughinsomeuncooperative(orminimallycooperative)situations,afactthatmightbetakentovindicatetheCP(asLevinson,1983,p.121,takesittodo),sinceitsuggeststhatcooperationisnecessaryforimplicatures.Inothersituations,aresponselikethedefendant’s“Notmany”in(8)wouldimplicatethattheactionoreventinquestionhadoccurredonatleastsomeoccasions:(8)Counselfortheprosecution:Onmanyoccasions?

Defendant:Notmany.C:Some?D:Yes,some.(Levinson,1983,p.121)

Here,intheadversarialcontextofacross-examination,itcannotsafelybeassumedthatthedefendantiscommittedtomorethansheactuallysays.Hencethefollow-upquestion,whichwouldbeunnecessaryinamorecooperativesituation.However,thereisnogeneralbaronimplicaturesinnon-cooperative(orminimallycooperative)situations.Insomecircumstancesaninterrogatorcouldutter(9)andsucceedinimplicatingthattheprisonerwillsoonbeexecuted:(9)Enjoyyourcigarette!It’sthelastoneyou’lleverhave.Ascomponentsofwhataspeakerintentionallyandopenlyconveys,implicaturesonlyarisefromgenuinelycommunicativeactions.Thesemightbecalledcooperativeinamuchweakersense(Levinson,2006,p.4;Allott,2008,pp.15–16),inthattheyareintendedtobeinterpretablebytheaddressee.ButgiventhehistoricalimportanceofGrice’sCooperativePrincipletodiscussionsofimplicature,useoftheterminthisweakersenseislikelytoconfuse.Whatmakesitpossibletoexpressandinferimplicatures(and,arguably,tocommunicateatall)isthatspeakershaveaninterestinbeingunderstood.Sincespeakersaremoreorlessrationalbeings,theycanbeexpectedtochoosemeansthattheybelievewillservetheircurrentpurposes,andthereforehearerscanrationallyhaveexpectationswhich,asdiscussedinsection3.1,arecrucialincoordinatingonutterancecontent,includingimplicatures.Forimplicatures,cooperationmaybedispensable;rationalityisessential.3.4 LinguisticPragmaticsSinceGriceGrice’stheoryaimedtoshowhowimplicaturescouldinprinciplearise.Incontrast,workinlinguisticpragmaticshasattemptedtomodeltheiractualderivation(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.32;Carston,2002,p.108),albeitataratherhighlevelofabstraction:theoriesarecouchedintermsofprinciplesormaximsandtheheuristicsthatimplementthem,asiscommoninmodernlinguisticsandcognitivesciencemoregenerally,andnot(sofar)intermsoflower-levelbrainpropertiessuchasneuralactivationpatterns.Thebest-knownresearchprogramsinpragmaticsaretheneo-Griceanschoolandworkoncommunicationinrelevancetheory.Giventheneedforacognitivelytractabledecisionprocedure,bothproposeasystemwithfewerprinciplesthanGrice’s.Neo-Griceanwork(e.g.,Horn,1972;Gazdar,1979;Atlas&Levinson,1981;Horn,1984;Levinson,2000;Atlas,2005)attemptstoreduceGrice’sarrayofmaximstojusttwo(Horn)orthree(Levinson),whileSperberandWilson’srelevancetheoryrejectsmaximsandtheCPandproposesthatpragmaticinferencehingesonasinglecommunicativeprincipleofrelevance(Sperber&Wilson,1986;Sperber&Wilson,1995).Someother


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theoristshavetriedtoexplainsomegeneralizedconversationalimplicaturesasintegratedwiththegrammar(e.g.,Chierchia,2001).TherearealsoafewwhoretainamorespecificallyGriceanview(e.g.,Geurts,2010).3.5 Neo-GriceanPragmaticsNeo-Griceanaccountsofimplicaturesclaimthatgeneralizedimplicaturesaregeneratedbypragmaticprinciplesthatpullinopposingdirections:towardssayingasmuchasone(truthfully)can,andtowardssayingaslittleaspossible.ThesetendencieswerelabelledtheQ-andR-principlesbyHorn,whoarguedthattheQ-principle(whichwasinspiredbyGrice’sfirstmaximofquantity)isalignedwiththeneedsofthehearer,loweringhisprocessingcosts,whiletheR-principlelowersthespeaker’sproductioncosts.Levinson(2000)alsohasaQ-principlebutintroducesadistinctionbetweenanI-principle(inspiredbyGrice’ssecondquantitymaxim)whichgovernshowmuchinformationisproduced,andanM-principle(descendedfromGrice’smannermaxims)whichmandatestheuseofhigh-cost,unusual(“marked”)expressionstodescribeunusualsituations.Q-Principle(Levinson,2000,p.76)Donotprovideastatementthatisinformationallyweakerthanyourknowledgeoftheworldallows.I-Principle(Levinson,2000,p.114)Producetheminimallinguisticinformationsufficienttoachieveyourcommunicationalends.M-Principle(Levinson,2000,p.136)Indicateanabnormal,nonstereotypicalsituationbyusingmarkedexpressionsthatcontrastwiththoseyouwouldusetodescribethecorrespondingnormal,stereotypicalsituations.Neo-Griceansclaimthattheprinciplesmandatecertainheuristicsthatguideutteranceinterpretation:Q-heuristic:Whatisn’tsaid,isn’t.I-heuristic:Whatissimplydescribedisstereotypicallyexemplified.M-heuristic:What’ssaidinanabnormalwayisn’tnormal.(Levinson,2000,pp.31–33)Forexample,(6)abovewouldbeanalyzedasacaseofI-implicature.ThespeakerisnotexplicitabouttherelationbetweenPaulandthebook,sothehearerislicensedtoinferarelation,helpedbythecontext(e.g.,themostsalientormostplausiblerelationinthecontext).Theimplicatureof(5)discussedabovewouldbeanalyzedasaQ-implicature,onthebasisthatthespeakershouldhavesaidthatthehousewasJohn’sownifsheknewthattobethecase.(AlthoughitcouldarguablybeanM-implicature,wherethechoiceofamarkedexpressionindicatesanon-stereotypicalsituation.)Neo-Griceantheoryhasbeencriticizedformakinganartificialcategoricaldistinctionbetweengeneralizedandparticularizedimplicaturesandforfailingtoaccountforthelatter,andforconflatingimplicatureresolutionwithpragmaticinferencethatcontributestothepropositionexpressed(seesection2.3).AnothercriticismisthattheQ-principleisimplausiblystrong:speakersdonotgenerallymakethestrongeststatementsthattheycan.Instead,asGricesuggested,theyseemtoaimtomaketheirstatementsasstrongasrequiredforcurrentpurposes(Green,1995).


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However,neo-Griceanpragmaticshasbeeninfluentialinworkonimplicaturesinexperimentalpragmaticsandformalpragmatics,twoareasthathavebeenveryactiveinrecentyears.(Potts,2013isausefulintroductiontoformalpragmatics.Forexperimentalpragmatics,seesection5.)Agreatdealofformalworkonpragmaticsfocussesongeneralizedimplicatures.SomefollowtheleadofHobbsetal.(1993)inmodelingpragmaticinferencewithnon-monotoniclogic,i.e.,logicalsystemswherevalidinferencesaredefeasibledefaults.(Afamousexampleofanon-monotonicinferenceisthatfromTweetyisabirdtoTweetyflies,whichcanbedefeatedbylearningthatTweetyisapenguin.)Thosewhodosuchworkarguethatdefaultrulesarewellsuitedformodelinggeneralizedimplicatures,oratleastthosewhichdependonthepresenceofcertainlexicalitemsorconstructions.Forexample,thepresenceofsome,asin(10a),oftenconveyssomethingoftheformin(10b):(10a)Someofthefoodwasgood.

b)Notallofthefoodwasgood.SuchexampleshavebeenafocusofresearchsinceHorn(1972)introducedthem.113.6 RelevanceTheoryRelevancetheoryprovidesadetailedaccountofcommunicationgroundedinamoregeneraltheoryofcognition.Itdefinesrelevanceasapropertyofinputstocognitivesystemssuchthat,otherthingsbeingequal,aninputismorerelevantthemorepositivecognitiveeffectsithasandthelessprocessingeffort12isrequiredtoarriveatthoseeffects13.Thegeneralclaimaboutcognition,theCognitivePrinciple,isthatitisrelevance-seeking:CognitivePrincipleofRelevance:Humancognitiontendstobegearedtothemaximizationofrelevance.Utteranceinterpretationfallsunderthisprinciplegiventhatitisacognitiveactivity.Butcommunicativestimuliarespecial,becausetheyareintentionalcluesofferedbythespeaker.SperberandWilsonadoptGrice’sideathatutterancesraisecertainexpectationsinthehearerwhichguidethehearer’sinterpretationoftheutterance.Theypointoutthateveryutteranceiscompetingforthehearer’sattentionandothercognitiveresourceswithotherstimuli,andtheyarguethatthismandatesthe(verystrong)CommunicativePrinciple:

11.Orrather,reintroducedthem.JohnStuartMilldiscussedansimilarexample,asHorn(1989,pp.212)notes.Onthepre-Griceanhistoryoftheorizingaboutimplicatures,seealsoHorn(1996).12.Thephrase“processingeffort”referstoactualeffort,nottofeltorrepresentedeffort(Allott,2013,pp.66–68).Itisassumedinworkonheuristicstorelateto“searchingformoreinformation,performingmorecomputation,ortakingmoretime,”factorswhichtypically,butnotnecessarily,gotogether(Gigerenzer&Brighton,2009,p.109).Itmayultimatelycomedowntoenergyexpenditure.13.Asthisformulationimplies,relevance,likevirtue,isbothclassificatoryandgradable:someinputsaremorerelevantthanothers,butanyinputwithpositivecognitiveeffectsobtainablewithfiniteprocessingeffortisrelevanttosomedegree(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.39,79–80).Comparativerelevanceismoreimportantinthetheorythanabsoluterelevance,sincerelevancetheoryassumesthatingeneraltherearemanyrelevantinputswhichcouldbeprocessedandcognitivesystemshavetochoosebetweenthem.


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CommunicativePrincipleofRelevance:Everyactofovertcommunicationconveysapresumptionofitsownoptimalrelevance.Thatis,bytheactofmakinganutterancetotheaddressee,thespeakerissuesa(fallible)guaranteethattheutterancewillbeoptimallyrelevant,wherethatisdefinedasnotonlyworthprocessingbutmoreoverthemostrelevantutterancethatthespeakerwaswillingandabletomake.SperberandWilsonfurtherarguethatthismakesitreasonableforthehearertofollowaparticulartrial-and-errorcomprehensionheuristic,generatingcandidateinterpretationsinorderofaccessibilityandacceptingthefirstthatisoptimallyrelevant.(SeeWilson&Sperber,2004;Wilson,2009;Allott,2013,formorediscussionoftheframework.)Relevancetheory’sprinciplesarefundamentallydifferentinkindfromGrice’smaxims.Maximsaresupposedtoguidebehavior,whiletheCognitiveandCommunicativePrinciplesarepurelydescriptivelawsorgeneralizations:“Communicatorsneednomoreknowtheprincipleofrelevancetocommunicatethantheyneedtoknowtheprinciplesofgeneticstoreproduce”(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.162).WhereGricehadonedistinctionbetweenwhatissaidandwhatisimplicated,relevancetheoryhastwo:firstbetweenwhatislinguisticallyencodedandwhatispragmaticallyimpliedandinferred,andsecondlybetweenwhatispartofexplicitutterancecontentandwhatispartofimplicitutterancecontent.Implicaturesfallonthelattersideofbothdistinctions:theyareimplicitutterancecontentthatispragmaticallyimplied/inferred.Indeed,theyaredefinedinrelevancetheoryaspropositionscommunicatedbyanutterancebutnotexplicitly(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.182;Sperber&Wilson,2005,p.480).AsinGrice’stheory,pragmaticinferenceisinferencetothebestexplanationfortheutterance,butrelevancetheorypostulatesthattheinputtothatprocessiswhatislinguisticallyencodedbytheutteranceandthefactthatithasbeenuttered(not,asGricethought,thefactthatacertainpropositionhadbeenstatedinacertainway),andtheoutputoftheinferenceisacompleteinterpretationoftheutterance,includingboththepropositionexpressedandanyimplicatureorimplicaturesoftheutterance.Likemuchrecentworkinpragmatics,relevancetheorystressestheextenttowhichpragmaticinferenceinfluencesthepropositionexpressed.Itthereforeoffersadifferentanalysisofanumberofpragmaticinfluencesonutterancecontentwhichhavebeenclassedbyothertheoristsasimplicatures.Examplesincludewhatisexpressedbyuseofthewordandbeyonditslogicalmeaning(Carston,2002,pp.222–264),lexicalnarrowing(e.g.,theuseofmanin“Churchillwasaman”,meaningacertaintypeofman)(Wilson&Sperber,2004,pp.617–618),andtherelationexpressedbytheuseofgenitive-sasin(6)above(whichareallcategorizedbyLevinsonasimplicatures);andlexicalbroadening(Carston,1997;Sperber&Wilson,1998;Wilson&Sperber,2004,pp.618–620),includingmetaphor(Sperber&Wilson,2008)asin(7),disagreeingwithGrice’simplicatureanalysisofmetaphor.(Onthis“directexpression”viewofmetaphor,seealsoBezuidenhout,2001.)3.7 ImplicatedPremisesandImplicatedConclusionsAnotherimportantrelevance-theoreticinnovationisthedivisionofimplicaturesintotwocategories,implicatedpremisesandimplicatedconclusions(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.194–195).Consider(11):(11)Benjamin:WouldyoulikeaglassofthisChileanred?

Amelia:Idon’tdrinkcheapwine.


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AmeliaimplicatesbotharefusalofBenjamin’sofferandthatthewinethatheisofferingherischeap(toacertaindegree).Therefusalisanimplicatedconclusionofherutterance;thepropositionthatthewineischeapisanimplicatedpremise.Thekeyideahereisthattheimplicatedpremiseorpremisesofanutteranceandthepropositionexpressed(here,thatAmeliadoesnotdrinkwineofacertaindegreeofcheapness)takentogetherlogicallysupporttheimplicatedconclusion.OnehastoassumethatAmeliathinksthatthewineischeapinordertounderstandherutteranceasimplicatingarefusal.GiventhatAmeliaopenlyintendedthis,shehasimplicatedthisproposition.(ButseeRecanati,2004,pp.48–49,foradifferentview.)4.PropertiesofConversationalImplicaturesConversationalimplicaturestypicallyhaveanumberofinterestingproperties,includingcalculability,cancelability,nondetachability,andindeterminacy.Thesepropertiescanbeusedtoinvestigatewhetheraputativeimplicatureiscorrectlyidentifiedassuch,althoughnoneofthemprovidesafail-safetest.Afurthertest,embedding,hasalsobeenprominentinworkonimplicatures.4.1 CalculabilityThemostimportantpropertyofimplicaturesiscalculability:theycanbeworkedoutrationally,sincetheyareimpliedandinferred,andnotlinguisticallyencodedanddecoded.Aswehaveseen,theaddresseecan—inprinciple,andofteninpractice—inferwhatthespeakerintendedtoimply,takingintoconsiderationthesentenceutteredandthecircumstancesinwhichitwasuttered,giventhattheutteranceseemsnottomeetexpectations,andthattakingacertainimplicaturetobepresentyieldsanoverallinterpretationoftheutterancewhichisnonethelesssuitedtotheneedsoftheaddresseeandthesituation.Thismuchisgenerallyagreed.(AnexceptionisDavis,1998,2014.SeeGreen,2002fordiscussion.)CalculabilitywasforGriceadefiningpropertyofconversationalimplicatures:

thefinaltestforthepresenceofaconversationalimplicaturehadtobe,asfarasIcouldsee,aderivationofit.Onehastoproduceanaccountofhowitcouldhavearisenandwhyitisthere.(Grice,1981,p.187)

Calculabilityseemstobeanecessaryfeatureofconversationalimplicatures,butitisnotasufficientconditionforapieceofutterancecontenttobeaconversationalimplicature.Calculabilityisapropertyofpragmaticinference,andsuchinferenceisinvolvedinrecoveryofdirectutterancecontentinatleastthreeways.First,thelinguisticallyencodedmeaningofwordsutteredisatmost“putintoplay”bytheirbeinguttered.Thehearerstillhastoinferthatthismeaningisbeingintentionallyconveyed.Second,fromthepointofviewofthehearer,workingoutwhichencodedsenseofanambiguousexpressionisintendedrequiresinferencegovernedbypragmaticprinciples(Grice,1957,p.387;Katz,1972,pp.449–450;Walker,1975,pp.156–157;Wilson&Sperber,1981,pp.156–159),asforexamplein(12),wherethehearerhastoinferwhetherasportingimplementorasmallmammalismeant,andwhetherthepurchaseorthedecisiontookplacelastFriday.(12)MarydecidedtobuyabatlastFriday.Third,therearenon-implicated,non-encodedpartsofutterancecontentsuchas,in(13),theintendedreferentoftheindexicalpronoun“he,”theintendedreferencetime,andwhatthespeakerisstatingthatthepersoninquestionwastootallfor.Again,fromthehearer’spointofview,suchthingshavetobeinferred,buttheyare(bydefinition)notimplicatures,sincetheycontributetothepropositionexpressed.


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(13)Hewastootall.Thereisnoreasontothinkthatthesetypesofinferencearenotgovernedbypragmaticprinciples.Socalculabilityisnotrestrictedtoconversationalimplicatures,butisapropertyofpragmaticallyinferredutterancecontentingeneral(Carston,2002,p.185).4.2 CancelabilityCancelabilityisanotherpropertyofimplicatures(orrather,mostimplicatures)thatreflectsthefactthattheyarepragmaticallyimpliedandinferredandnotpartofthelinguisticallyencodedmeaningofthewordsorsentenceuttered(Grice,1961,1975,p.57,1978,1981;Carston,2010).Therearetwoaspectstocancelability,explicitcancelabilityandcontextualcancelability:

aputativeconversationalimplicaturethatpisexplicitlycancelableif,totheformofwordstheutteranceofwhichputativelyimplicatesthatp,itisadmissibletoaddbutnotp,orIdonotmeantoimplythatp,anditiscontextuallycancelableifonecanfindsituationsinwhichtheutteranceoftheformofwordswouldsimplynotcarrytheimplicature.(Grice,1978,pp.115–116)

Consider(1′):(1′)Benjamin:Areyouhavingsomeofthischocolatecake?

Amelia:I’monadiet.ButI’mgoingtohavesomeanyway.Herethesentenceaddedcancelstheimplicatureconveyedbythefirstsentence.Thisisanexampleofexplicitcancellation.Contrastthiswith(1′′):(1′′)Benjamin:Areyouhavingsomeofthischocolatecake?

Amelia:I’monadiet.??ButI’mnotonadiet.HerethesecondsentenceclasheswiththelinguisticallyencodedandassertedcontentthatAmeliaconveyedwithherfirstsentence.Thisishighlyinfelicitous.Incaseslikethistheadditionoftheclauseattemptingcancellationleadsto“logicalabsurdity”or“linguisticoffense”(Grice,1981,p.186),whilecancelinganimplicatureasin(1′)doesnot.Theothertypeofcancellationiscontextualcancellation.Animplicaturethatarisesinonecontextwouldnotariseinsomeothers.Consider(11′):(11′)Charlie:Isthisstuffanygood?

Amelia:[Helpingherselftoasecondglassful]Idon’tdrinkcheapwine.HereAmeliadoesnotimplicatewhatsheimplicatedin(11)(butdoesimplicatesomethingelse).Contextualcancellationisaratherobviouspropertyofparticularizedconversationalimplicaturessuchasthese.Generalizedconversationalimplicaturesarealso(mostly)cancelable,bothexplicitlyandcontextually;e.g.,consider(5)aboveinacontextinwhichanyonewhohasenteredaresidentialbuildingwithinthelast48hoursiseligibleforaprize.Cancelabilityisamoreusefultesthere,sinceforgeneralizedconversationalimplicaturesitislessimmediatelyobviouswhethertheyarepartofthelinguisticmeaning.Theircancelabilityindicatesthattheyarenot.


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Implicaturesarecancelablebecausetheyarenotpartofthelinguisticmeaningandareinferredaspartoftheexplanationforwhythespeakersaidwhatshedidinthewaythatshedid.Inferencetothebestexplanationisuncertain:itis“non-demonstrative”or“defeasible.”Eveniftheinputtotheinferenceistrue—thespeakerdidindeedutterthesentence,inthewaysupposed—theconclusionoftheinferencemaybefalse.Thebestexplanationfortheutterancemaybeadifferentimplicatureornoimplicatureatall.Indeed,thespeakermaynotevenhaveintendedtocommunicate;shemighthavebeentalkingtoherselforpracticingherpronunciation.Likecalculability,cancelabilityisnotasufficientconditionforsomethingtobeanimplicature,sincealltypesofcontributiontoutterancecontentthatarepragmaticallyinferredandnotlinguisticallyencodedareingeneralcancelable(Carston,2002,p.138).Gricenotedthatcancelabilityappliestolooseuse,suchastheuseof“blue”tocoverashadethatwouldnormallybedescribedasgreen(Grice,1978,p.116),andSadock(1978)pointedoutthatdisambiguationaswith(12)aboveiscancelable.Thesamegoesforotherpragmaticinferencecontributingtothepropositionexpressed(Wilson&Sperber,1981,pp.158–159),asin(13)above.Itseemsthatcancelabilityisalsonotanecessaryconditionforimplicatures,becauseimplicaturesmaybeentailedbythepropositionexpressed(Carston,2002,p.138;Bach,2006,p.24,butseeAtlas&Levinson,1981,pp.10–11;Neale,1992,pp.528–529,foranopposingview).Considerthedialoguein(14):(14)A:DidyouknowthatnoneofTheMarriageofFigaroisinaminorkey?

B:Whatdoyoumean?ThefirstariainthefourthactofFigaroisinFminor!(cf.Bach,2006,p.24)

Hereistheargument.ThepropositionBexpresses—thatthefirstariainthefourthactofFigaroisinFminor—entailsanotherproposition,M:thatsomeoftheoperaisinaminorkey.Intuitively,B’sutterancealsocommunicatesthatproposition—thespeakeropenlyintendsthehearertograspM.GiventhatMisnotthepropositionassertedanditismeantbythespeaker,thenitmustbeanimplicature.14However,giventhatMisentailedbythepropositionBexpresses,contextualcancellationisimpossibleandattemptedexplicitcancellation(asin14′)isinfelicitous:(14′)A:Didyouknowthatthere’snomusicintheMarriageofFigaroinaminorkey?

B:Whatdoyoumean?ThefirstariainthefourthactofFigaroisinFminor!??ButIdon’tmeantoimplythatanypartofFigaroisinaminorkey.

Soifthisargumentisright,notallimplicaturesarecancelable.4.3 NondetachabilityTotheextentthatanimplicatureisduetothespeaker’sexpressingacertainproposition,thespecificformofwordsusedtoexpressthatpropositionwillnotaffectwhethertheimplicaturearises.Grice’slabelforthispropertyis“nondetachability”:suchimplicaturescannotbegotridofbymerelyrephrasingtheutterance.Amelia’sreplyin(1′′′)hasthesameimplicatureasherreplyin(1)above.(1′′′)Benjamin:Areyouhavingsomeofthischocolatecake?

Amelia:I’mfollowingastrictregimewhereIeatonlylow-caloriefood.

14.Notethattheargumentassumesthatwedonotcommunicateallthelogicalentailmentsofpropositionsweassert.(Seesection2.4.)


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Nondetachabilityisneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionforimplicatures,however(Neale,1992,pp.529,fn.26).Itcannotbenecessary,becausesomeimplicatures—mannerimplicaturesinGrice’sframework,atleast—dependonthewaythatthespeakersayswhatshesays,andthesearenotdetachable(Grice,1975,p.58).Thustheutterancein(15a)doesnotsharetheimplicatureoftheutteranceofthenearlysynonymoussentencein(15b),andutterancesof(16b)typicallyconvey(weak)implicaturesnotcarriedbyutterancesofthetruth-conditionallyequivalent(16a).(15a)MissXsang“Homesweethome.”

b)MissXproducedaseriesofsoundsthatcorrespondedcloselywiththescoreof“Homesweethome.”(Grice,1975,p.55)

(16a)Mychildhooddaysaregone.

b)Mychildhooddaysaregone,gone.(Sperber&Wilson,1986,p.219)Nondetachabilityisnotasufficientconditionforimplicatures,sinceentailmentsofthepropositionexpressedarealsonondetachable.Forexample,rephrasing(17a)as(17b)doesnotdetachtheentailmentsin(17candd):(17a)Johnatetheapple.

b)TheapplewaseatenbyJohn.c)Theapplewaseaten.d)Johnatesomething.

4.4 IndeterminacyWhatisimplicatedbyaparticularutterancemaybeindeterminate.AsGricenoted,thisisduetothenon-demonstrativecharacterofpragmaticinference:

Since,tocalculateaconversationalimplicatureistocalculatewhathastobesupposedinordertopreservethesuppositionthattheCooperativePrincipleisbeingobserved,andsincetheremaybevariouspossiblespecificexplanations,alistofwhichmaybeopen,theconversationalimplicatuminsuchcaseswillbedisjunctionofsuchspecificexplanations;andifthelistoftheseisopen,theimplicatumwillhavejustthekindofindeterminacythatmanyactualimplicatadoinfactseemtopossess.(Grice,1975,p.58)

Mostdiscussionofimplicatureshasignoredorabstractedawayfromthisproperty,treatingeachutterance’simplicaturesasdeterminateandclear.SperberandWilsonhavearguedthatthereisacontinuumofcases,fromutteranceswherethereareafewfullydeterminateimplicaturestoutteranceswhichconveyanopen-endedarrayofwhattheycallweakimplicatures(Sperber&Wilson,1986,pp.195–200;Sperber&Wilson,2005,p.484;Sperber&Wilson,2008,pp.98–103),asintheirexample(18):(18)[Womantouncouthsuitor]Keepyourpawsoffme.(Sperber&Wilson,2008,p.101)

Thephraseyourpawsisusedheretorefertothesuitor’shands,butitsusealsoactivatesideasofanimalpaws,clumsinessandmore.Byusingit,thespeakersuggeststhattheaddresseeis“clumsy,gross,lustinglikeabeastandsoon”(Sperber&Wilson,2008,p.101).Thereisnoparticularoneoftheseimplicationsthatthespeakerintendsthehearertograsp.Rather,theaddressee“isencouragedtoconsideratleastsomeofthemandseethemaspartofthespeaker’smeaning”(Sperber&Wilson,2008,p.101);thisiswhatmakesthemweakimplicatures.


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Weakimplicaturesareproposedinparttoaccountforthewell-knownopen-endednessoftheinterpretationofliterarylanguageandfigurativespeech(seePilkington,2000),buttheyarenotconfinedtoeither(Sperber&Wilson,2008).4.5 EmbeddingTestAssertive,truth-conditionalcontentembedsunderlogicaloperators,andembeddingisthereforeoftenusedasanegativetestforimplicatures.Onthisview,ifsomethingembeds,thenthatisreasontothinkitispartofthepropositionexpressedandthustodoubtthatitisanimplicature.ThisiscalledtheScopePrinciple(Recanati,1989).Griceclaimedthattheextra-logicalmeaning(givenhereinsquarebrackets)conveyedbytheuseofandinexampleslikethosein(19)isimplicated.(19a)Johngotintobedandtookoffhisshoes.[inthatorder]b)Maryleftthewindowopenandathiefgotintothehouse.[throughtheopenwindow]

Butinoneoftheearliestcommentariesonthetheory,Cohenpointedoutthattherichermeaningappearstoembedunderlogicalwordssuchasandandif...then(Cohen,1971),andthisindicatesthatitisnotimplicated.Itisnaturaltoread(20)asclaimingthattheinsurancewillnotpayoutifMaryleftthewindowopenandathiefgotintothehousethroughthatwindowasaresult.(20)IfMaryleftthewindowopenandathiefgotintothehouse,theinsurancewon’tpayout.

Becauseofexampleslikethis,itisnowgenerallyagreedthatsomepragmaticallyinferredmaterialembeds.15Onereactionhasbeentoarguethatthisshowsthatthismaterialispartofdirect/explicitutterancecontentandthereforenotaconversationalimplicature(Carston1988,2002,chapter3;Recanati,1989;Wilson&Sperber,1998).Butanotherwaytoreadatleastsomesuchdata(advocatedbyGreen,1998)isasshowingthatsomeimplicaturesembed.Ifthisisright,thentheembeddingtestisnottobereliedon.165.ExperimentalWorkExperimentalpragmaticshasburgeonedinrecentyears.(Breheny,2011,andPhelan,2014,areusefuloverviews.)ImportantearlyworkbyNicolleandClark(1999)showedthatspeakers’intuitionsdonotclearlydistinguishwhatisimplicatedfromwhatisasserted.Therehasbeenagreatdealofworkonpragmaticenrichmentsthatariseduetothespeaker’suseofaweakertermthananothershemighthaveused,asin(10)above,so-called“scalarimplicatures.”(SeeNoveck&Sperber,2007,forreasonstodoubttheappropriatenessofthelabel.)Noveck(2001)foundthatunlikeadults,pre-schoolchildren(andevensomeuptotheageofnine)takesuchstatementsinapurelylogicalway,sothattheytreatsentencesoftheformSomeXsareYsascompatiblewith“allXsareYs”andmightbepasnotexcluding“mustbep.”Twopotentialexplanationsforchildren’sperformancehavebeendominant.Thefirstisthattheylackknowledgeofthealternatives,oratleastaccesstothem(e.g.,Chierchia,

15.AsSimons(2016,p.470,fn4)pointsout,thisisalso,perhapsmoreobviously,shownbyreferenceassignmentforindexicals.16.Onpragmaticallyimplied/inferredmaterialthatembeds,seealsoSimons(2016).


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Crain,Guasti,Gualmini,&Meroni,2001).Thesecondisthattheyfailtotakethealternativesasrelevant(Skordos&Papafragou,2016).Experimentalworksuggeststhatsuchinferencescanbefacilitatedinchildreneitherbyexplicitlypresentingthealternatives(Chierchiaetal.,2001;Ozturk&Papafragou,2014)orbyincreasingtheirrelevanceevenwhentheyarenotexplicitlypresent(Papafragou&Musolino,2003;Skordos&Papafragou,2016).Somerelatedworkshowsthatpragmaticinferencesthatexploitlexicalscalessuchas<some,all>and<may,haveto>arenoeasierforchildrenthanthosewhichreplyoncontextualscales,suchastheimplicaturein(21)thatBhasn’treadthewholebook(Papafragou&Tantalou,2004).(21)A:HaveyoureadTheMinimalistProgram?

B:I’vereadthefirstchapter.Otherstudieshavefoundthatcontextualinferencesareeasierthanlexicalones(Katsos&Smith,2010;Barner,Brooks,&Bale,2011).Lexicalscalesappeartobeoflessimportanceinprocessingthanpreviouslythought.Therehasalsobeenexperimentalworkonthedevelopmentoftheabilitytocomprehend“relevance”implicatures,thatis,implicatureslikethosein(1)and(11)abovethatwouldbeexplainedinGrice’stheorybyhismaximofrelation.Thesearealsodifficultforyoungchildren,buttheycanalsobemadeeasier,totheextentthatsomearegraspedbychildrenasyoungasthreeyearsold(Schulze,Grassmann,&Tomasello,2013).6.ModifiedOccam’sRazorandPragmaticInferenceImplicaturesandthedivisionbetweendirectlyexpressedandintentionallyimpliedutterancecontentaremainstaysoftheorizingaboutmeaning,astheyhavebeensinceGrice’sWilliamJameslectures,allowingatheoreticalunificationofapparentlydiversetypesofutterancecontent,includingsomefigurativespeech,indirectanswerstoquestions,andmore.However,aswehaveseen,anumberofphenomenathatGriceandearlytheoriststreatedasimplicatureswouldnowbetreatedbymanyaspragmaticenrichmentcontributingtothepropositionexpressed.Perhaps,then,thegreatestvalueofGrice’spostulationofimplicaturesistheattentionthatitdrewtopragmaticinferenceandthedivisionoflaborbetweenlinguisticsemanticsandpragmaticsintheorizingaboutverbalcommunication.Theexistenceofimplicaturesandotherpurelypragmaticelementsofutterancecontentimpliesthatthelinguisticmeaningofwordsandsentencesissimplerthanonemightotherwisethink.Itisnotthecasethateverythingthatisconveyedbyanutteranceofasentenceisduetotheencodedmeaningofthewordsusedorthewaythattheyareputtogether.ThisimpliesamethodologicalprinciplewhichGricecalledModifiedOccam’sRazor:“Sensesarenottobemultipliedbeyondnecessity”(alludingtoWilliamofOckham’s“Entitiesarenotbemultipliedbeyondnecessity”).Explanationsintermsofpragmaticinferencearemoreparsimoniousthanoneswhichpostulatelinguisticambiguity,sincetheycanbeexplainedbygeneralpragmaticprinciples,whiletheadditionallinguisticsenseorsensesarenotindependentlymotivated.Gricearguedinthisveinthatthewordsand,or,if,some,andallareidenticalinmeaningtotheoperatorsofclassicallogicandthattherichermeaningsconveyedinexampleslike(19)above(e.g.‘andthen’;‘andasaresult’)areimplicated.Althoughmanyhavesincearguedthatsuchexamplesinvolveenrichmentofthepropositionexpressedratherthanimplicature,ModifiedOccam’sRazorstillappliesaslongastheenrichmentisgovernedbygeneralpragmaticprinciples.


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FurtherReadingBach,K.(2006).Thetop10misconceptionsaboutimplicature.InB.J.Birner&G.L.Ward(Eds.),Drawingtheboundariesofmeaning:Neo-GriceanstudiesinpragmaticsandsemanticsinhonorofLaurenceR.Horn(pp.21–30).Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins.

Carston,R.(1988).Implicature,explicatureandtruth-theoreticsemantics.InR.Kempson(Ed.),Mentalrepresentations:Theinterfacebetweenlanguageandreality(pp.155–181).Cambridge,U.K..:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Carston,R.(1995).Quantitymaximsandgeneralisedimplicature.Lingua,96(4),213–244.

Carston,R.,&Hall,A.(2012).Implicatureandexplicature.InH.-J.Schmid(Ed.),Cognitivepragmatics(pp.47–83).Berlin:DeGruyterMouton.

pp85–108ofChapman,S.(2008).PaulGrice,philosopherandlinguist.Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan.

Davis,W.(2014).Implicature[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/implicature/].InN.Z.Edward(Ed.),TheStanfordencyclopediaofphilosophy(Fall2014ed.).

Grice,P.(1989[1967]).Logicandconversation:WilliamJameslectures.InStudiesinthewayofwords(pp.1–143).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

pp.368–72ofGrice,P.(1989).Retrospectiveepilogue.InStudiesinthewayofwords(pp.339–385).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.

Horn,L.R.(1984).Towardanewtaxonomyforpragmaticinference:Q-basedandR-basedimplicature.InD.Schiffrin(Ed.),Meaning,form,anduseincontext:Linguisticapplications(pp.11–42).Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress.

pp.299,309–317ofHorn,L.R.(1996).Presuppositionandimplicature.InS.Lappin(Ed.),Thehandbookofcontemporarysemantictheory(pp.299–319).Oxford:Blackwell.

pp.97–166ofLevinson,S.C.(1983).Pragmatics.Cambridge,U.K.:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Neale,S.(1992).PaulGriceandthephilosophyoflanguage.LinguisticsandPhilosophy,15(5),509–559.

Noveck,I.A.,&Sperber,D.(2007).Thewhyandhowofexperimentalpragmatics:Thecaseof‘scalarinferences.’InN.Burton-Roberts(Ed.),Pragmatics(pp.184–212).Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan.

Papafragou,A.,&Skordos,D.(2016).Scalarimplicature.InJ.Lidz,W.Snyder,&J.Pater(Eds.),TheOxfordhandbookofdevelopmentallinguistics(pp.611–629).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Sadock,J.(1978).Ontestingforconversationalimplicature.InP.Cole(Ed.),Pragmatics(pp.281–297).NewYork:AcademicPress.

Sbisà,M.(2006).TwoconceptionsofrationalityinGrice’stheoryofimplicature.InE.Baccarini&S.Prijić-Samaržija(Eds.),Rationalityinbeliefandaction:ProceedingsoftheinternationalphilosophicalconferenceheldinRijeka,May27–28,2004(pp.233–247).Rijeka:FacultyofArtsandSciences.

Searle,J.R.(1975).Indirectspeechacts.InP.Cole&J.L.Morgan(Eds.),Speechacts(pp.59–82).NewYork:AcademicPress.

Soames,S.(2004).Languageuseandthelogicofconversation.InPhilosophicalanalysisinthetwentiethcentury.Vol.2:Theageofmeaning(pp.197–219).Oxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.

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Wharton,T.(2013).Cooperativeprinciple.InL.Cummings(Ed.),TheRoutledgepragmaticsencyclopedia(pp.85–87).Abingdon:Routledge.


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Wilson,D.,&Sperber,D.(1981).OnGrice’stheoryofconversation.InP.Werth(Ed.),Conversationanddiscourse:Structureandinterpretation(pp.155–178).London:CroomHelm.

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allott 2018 conversational implicature final

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