almario vs ca_ 127772 _ march 22, 2001 _ j.pdf

3/7/2015 AlmariovsCA:127772:March22,2001:J.Quisumbing:SecondDivision

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/127772.htm 1/5

SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.127772.March22,2001]

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANDRIZALCOMMERCIALBANKINGCORP.,respondents.

DECISIONQUISUMBING,J.:

ThisappealbycertiorariseekstosetasidetheresolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsdatedNovember21,1996[1]andofJanuary7,1997,[2]inCAG.R.No.SP42312,whichdeniedthepetitionforcertiorari,prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon.FlorentinoA. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court ofMakatiCity,theRizalCommercialBankingCorporation(RCBC),andthePeopleofthePhilippines.[3]InvolvedinsaidpetitionweretheordersofJudgeJaimeD.DiscayaandJudgeTuasondatedOctober25,1995[4]andApril11,1996,[5]respectively,issuedinCriminalCasesNos.91676162whichpetitionerclaimedwereviolativeofhisconstitutionalrightagainstdoublejeopardybutwhichrespondentappellatecourtupheld.

Thefactualantecedentsinthesecases,asculledbytheCourtofAppeals,areasfollows:

PetitionerisoneoftheaccusedinCriminalCaseNo.916761,forestafathrufalsificationofpublicdocument,andCriminalCaseNo.916762,forestafa,withrespondentRCBCastheoffendedpartyinbothcases.

TheinformationswerefiledonOctober22,1992.AfterpetitionersarraignmentonMarch18,1992,pretrialwasheld,whichwasterminatedonOctober21,1994.Thereafter,thecaseswerescheduledforcontinuoustrialinDecember1994,andinJanuaryandFebruary1995,butthehearingswerecancelledbecausethePresidingJudgeofthecourtwaselevatedtothisCourtandnotrialjudgewasimmediatelyappointed/detailedthereto.

ThehearingsetforJune21,1995,waspostponedforlackofproofofnoticetoalltheaccusedandtheircounsel.ThehearingonJuly17,1995,uponrequestofprivateprosecutor,andwithoutobjectiononthepartofpetitionerscounsel,postponedtoJuly24,1995.However,forlackofproofofserviceofnoticeuponpetitionersthreecoaccused,thehearingsetforJuly24,1995,waslikewisecancelledandthecaseswereresetfortrialonSeptember8and25,1995.

OnSeptember8,1995,privatecomplainantfailedtoappeardespiteduenotice.Hence,uponmotionofpetitionerscounsel,respondentcourtissuedthefollowingorder:

Whenthiscasewascalledforhearing,privatecomplainantisnotinCourtdespitenotice.Atty.Alabastro,counselforaccusedRobertoAlmario,movedthatthecaseagainstthelatterbedismissedforfailuretoprosecuteandconsideringthataccusedisentitledtoaspeedytrial.



WHEREFORE,thecaseagainstaccusedRobertoAlmarioisherebydismissed.WithrespecttoaccusedSpousesSusencioandGuillermaCruzandDanteDuldulao,1stwarrantbeissuedfortheirarrest.

SOORDERED.

Uponmotionoftheprivateprosecutoranddespitetheoppositionofpetitioner,respondentcourtinitsOrderdatedOctober25,1995,reconsideredtheOrderofSeptember8,1995.Thepertinentportionofsaidorderreadsasfollows:

InHipolitovs.CourtofAppeals(G.R.No.10847879,Feb.21,1993)theSupremeCourtheldthattherightoftheaccusedtoaspeedytrialisdeemedviolatedonlywhentheproceedingsisattendedbyvexations,capriciousandoppressivedelays,orwhenunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrialareaskedforandsecured,orwhenwithoutcauseorunjustifiablemotive,alongperiodoftimeisallowedto(e)lapsewithoutthepartyhavinghiscasetried.Atleastthisrightisrelative,takinginto(the)accountthecircumstancesofeachcase.

Therehasbeennovexations,capriciousandoppressivedelays,orunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrial,oralongtimeisallowedto(e)lapsewithoutthepartyhavinghiscasetriedwhichwouldconstitute,accordingtotheabovecase,violationoftherightoftheaccusedtospeedytrial.Afterarraignmentoftheaccused,thepretrialwassetandthesamewasorderedterminatedonOctober25,1994.OnJune21,1995,thecasewassetforinitialpresentationofevidenceoftheproofofserviceofthenoticestotheaccusedandtheirrespectivecounsels.OnJuly17,1995,counselfortheaccuseddidnotinterposeobjectiontoprivateprosecutorsmotiontopostponeduetoabsenceofwitnesses.OnJuly24,1995,thetrialcouldnotproceedas,beingajointtrialofthreecriminalcases,thethreeotheraccusedwerenotpresent.Therewereonlythreesettingsfromthedateofterminationofthepretrialfortheprosecutiontopresentevidenceandthesamewerepostponedwithvalidreasons.

ThedismissalintheOrderdatedSeptember8,1995,didnotresultintheacquittaloftheaccusedsincetherightoftheaccusedtospeedytrialhasnotbeenviolated,anditsdismissalhavingbeenmadeuponthemotionoftheaccusedthereisnodoublejeopardy.

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theOrderdatedSeptember8,1995dismissingthecharge/caseagainsttheaccusedRobertoAlmarioisreconsideredandsetaside.

SOORDERED.

Petitionersoughtareconsiderationoftheaboveorder.ActingontheMotionforReconsiderationdatedNovember9,1995,respondentJudgeissuedhisassailedOrderofApril11,1996,thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,theMotionforReconsiderationdated9November1995isherebydeniedforlackofmeritconsideringthat,basedontheforegoingfacts,theproceedingsinthiscasehavenotbeenprolongedunreasonablynorwerethereoppressivedelaysandunjustifiedpostponementsinviolationoftheAccusedsconstitutionalrighttospeedytrial.

SOORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswithpreliminaryinjunctionagainstthepresidingjudgeofBranch139oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,RCBCandthePeopleofthePhilippines.InaresolutiondatedNovember21,1996,respondentappellatecourtdeniedthepetitionduecourseanddismisseditfor



lackofmerit.Petitionersmotiontoreconsideritwaslikewisedeniedforlackofmerit inaresolutiondatedJanuary7,1997.

Beforeus,petitionermaintains that theappellatecourterred insustaining the trialcourtwhich, inturn,hadgravelyabuseditsdiscretion,amountingtolackofjurisdiction,whenitreconsideredtheorderwhichdismissedthecriminalcasesagainsthim.Petitionerassertsthatthisreversalwasaviolationofthedoctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal caseswere initially dismissed for an alleged violation ofpetitionersconstitutionalrighttoaspeedytrial.[7]

The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases, double jeopardy had set in so thatpetitionersconstitutionalrightagainstsuchjeopardyhadbeenviolated.

ArticleIII,Section21ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:

Sec.21.Nopersonshallbetwiceputinjeopardyofpunishmentforthesameoffense.Ifanactispunishedbyalawandanordinance,convictionoracquittalundereithershallconstituteabartoanotherprosecutionforthesameact.

Section7,Rule117oftheRevisedRulesofCourtprovides:

SEC.7.Formerconvictionoracquittaldoublejeopardy.Whenanaccusedhasbeenconvictedoracquitted,orthecaseagainsthimdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouthisexpressconsentbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,uponavalidcomplaintorinformationorotherformalchargesufficientinformandsubstancetosustainaconvictionandaftertheaccusedhadpleadedtothecharge,theconvictionoracquittaloftheaccusedorthedismissalofthecaseshallbeabartoanotherprosecutionfortheoffensecharged,orforanyattempttocommitthesameorfrustrationthereof,orforanyoffensewhichnecessarilyincludesorisnecessarilyincludedintheoffensechargedintheformercomplaintorinformation.

xxx

Clearly,jeopardyattachesonly(1)uponavalidindictment,(2)beforeacompetentcourt,(3)afterarraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted oracquitted,orthecasewasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheaccused.[8]

Inthecasesatbar,theorderofdismissalbasedonaviolationoftherighttospeedytrialwasmadeuponmotionbycounselforpetitionerbeforethetrialcourt.Itwasmadeattheinstanceoftheaccusedbeforethetrialcourt,andwithhisexpressconsent.Generally,thedismissalofacriminalcaseresultingin acquittalmadewith the express consent of the accused or upon his ownmotionwill not place theaccused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency ofevidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9]Double jeopardymay attachwhen the proceedingshavebeenprolongedunreasonably,inviolationoftheaccusedsrighttospeedytrial.[10]

Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so thatviolationoftheright tospeedytrialof theaccused,hereinpetitioner,resulted. For itmustberecalledthatintheapplicationoftheconstitutionalguarantyoftherighttospeedydispositionofcases,particularregardmustalsobetakenofthefactsandcircumstancespeculiartoeachcase.[11]Boththetrialcourtandthe appellate court noted that after pretrial of petitioners casewas terminated onOctober 21, 1994,continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and February of 1995. Thescheduled hearings, however,were cancelledwhen the presiding judgewas promoted to theCourt ofAppeals,andhissuccessoras trial judgewasnot immediatelyappointed,noranother judgedetailedtohissala.



Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to theaccused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995,was postponed uponmotion of the privateprosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset,despite thepresenceofpetitionerandhiscounsel,becauseof lackofproofof serviceofnotice tocoaccusedDanteDuldulaoandthespousesSusencioandGuillermaCruz.[12]

Asobservedbyrespondentappellatecourt,delayinthetrialwasduetocircumstancesbeyondthecontrolofthepartiesandofthetrialcourt.Thefirstandthirdpostponementswereclearlyjustifiedonthe ground of lack of notice to accused, coaccused, and/or counsel. Another was made withoutobjectionfrompetitionerscounsel.However,onSeptember8,1995,counselforpetitionermovedfordismissalofthiscase,becauseoftheabsenceoftheprivateprosecutorduetoasevereattackofgoutandarthritis,althoughhehadsenthisassociatelawyeracceptabletothecourt.[13]Allinall,therewereonlythreeresettingofhearingdates.Thus,afteracloseranalysisofthesesuccessiveevents,thetrialcourtrealizedthatthedatesofthehearingsweretransferredforvalidgrounds.Hence,thetrialcourtsetasideits initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate court latersustained.

That therewas no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of thehearingswiththereasonsfortheirpostponementsortransfers.Petitionercouldnotrefutetheappellatecourts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial andappellatecourtshave takenpains todemonstrate, therewasnounreasonable,vexatiousandoppressivedelay in the trial. Hence, therewasnoviolationof petitioners right to speedy trial as therewerenounjustifiedpostponementswhichhadprolongedthetrialforunreasonablelengthsoftime.[15]

Therebeingnooppressivedelayintheproceedings,andnopostponementsunjustifiablysought,weconcurwiththeconclusionreachedbytheCourtofAppealsthatpetitionersrighttospeedytrialhadnotbeeninfringed.Wheretherightoftheaccusedtospeedytrialhadnotbeenviolated,therewasnoreasontosupporttheinitialorderofdismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardywhen thatorderwasreconsideredseasonably.[16]Foraspetitionersrighttospeedytrialwasnottransgressed,thisexceptiontothefifthelementofdoublejeopardythatthedefendantwasacquittedorconvicted,orthecasewasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheaccusedwasnotmet.Thetrialcourtsinitialorderofdismissalwasuponmotionofpetitionerscounsel,hencemadewiththeexpress consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, doublejeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule inPeople vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202)reiterated in People vs. Leviste,[17] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial courtpredicatedontherighttospeedytrial

Itistruethatinanunbrokenlineofcases,wehaveheldthatthedismissalofcasesonthegroundoffailuretoprosecuteisequivalenttoanacquittalthatwouldbarfurtherprosecutionoftheaccusedforthesameoffense.Itmustbestressed,however,thatthesedismissalswerepredicatedontheclearrightoftheaccusedtospeedytrial.ThesecasesarenotapplicabletothepetitionatbenchconsideringthattherightoftheprivaterespondentstospeedytrialhasnotbeenviolatedbytheState.Forthisreason,privaterespondentscannotinvoketheirrightagainstdoublejeopardy.

BoththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealswerethusnotinerrorwhentheyallowedreinstatementofthecasesagainstpetitioner.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. SP42312, datedNovember21,1996andJanuary7,1997,whichupheldtheordersoftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,Branch139,inCriminalCasesNos.91676162,areherebyAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioner.



SOORDERED.

Bellosillo(Chairman),Mendoza,Buena,andDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo,pp.8490.

[2]Id.at98.

[3]Id.at6781.

[4]Id.at4950.

[5]Id.at6266.

[6]Id.at8486.

[7]Id.at5.

[8]Peoplevs.Nitafan,302SCRA424,440(1999).

[9]Peoplevs.Bans,239SCRA48,55(1994).

[10]CommissiononElectionsvs.CourtofAppeals,229SCRA501,507(1994).

[11]Socratesvs.Sandiganbayan,253SCRA773,788(1996).

[12]Rollo,pp.8889.

[13]Id.at49.

[14]Id.at6266.

[15]SeeGuerrerovs.CourtofAppeals,257SCRA703,713(1996).

[16]Peoplevs.Leviste,255SCRA238,249(1996).

[17]Ibid.

almario vs ca_ 127772 _ march 22, 2001 _ j.pdf

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