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Man and World 19:21-53 (1986).

@1 986 , Martinus N ij ho ff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.

D A WN A N D D U SK: G A D A M E R A N D H E ID E G G E R O N T R U T H

F R A N C I S J . A M B R O S I O

Geo rg e to wn Un ivers i t y

Understanding certainly does not mean merely the taking over oftraditional opinion or the acknowledgment of what has beenenshrined by tradition. Heidegger, who had first identified theconcept of understanding as a universal determination of Dasein.means thereby precisely the charac ter of understanding as project,which is really to say, Dasein in its orientation toward its ownfuture. At the same time, I do not wish to deny that I for my part

have emphasized within the universal matrix of the elements ofunderstanding its direction toward the appropriation of what ispast and has been handed-down. Heidegger, too, like many of mycritics, may here feel the absence of an ultimate radicality indrawing out consequences. What does the end o f metaphysics as ascience mean? What is the significance of its ending in science? Ifscience climaxes in a total technocracy and brings on with it the"cosmic night" of the forgetfulness of being, the nihilism foretoldby Nietzsche, is one then permitted to look back toward the lastrays of dusk as the sun sets in the evening sky instead of turningto watch out for the first shimmer of its return? 1

In light of the pervasive influence of Heidegger's thought on Gada-

mer's philosophical hermeneutics, it is quite common, especially in the

United States, to encounter the view that Gadamer is a "disciple" of

Heidegger, one whose achievement lies primarily in having mapped out

in detail one of those "regional ontologies" which Heidegger's more

original way of thinking first opened up. Whatever limited plausibility

this "discipleship" view might have, Gadamer's statement above forces

us to recognize that, whether accepted or rejected, such a view cannotdo justice to the issue of his relation to Heidegger because it tends to

operate too much on the level of "philosophies" and too little on the

level of the "subject matter" (Sache) for thought upon which their

relation is centered. The difference of interest and emphasis with

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Heidegger to w hich G ada me r ca ll s our a t ten t ion ab ove i s no t the d i f-

f e r ence be twee n day and n igh t: t he two sha re a co m m on conce rn fo r

the s ame ques t ion , t he ques t ion o f t r u th . Ra the r , Gada mer speaks o fd u s k a n d d a w n : t w o d i f fe r e n t w a y s o f t u r n i n g t o w a r d t h e o n e " s u n "

wh ich no w l igh ts u p a ll tha t i s, revea ling i ts p resence , no w enfo lds a ll

in darkness , d rawing i t in to absence . The goa l o f what fo l lows i s to

comprehend the s t r i k ing app rop r i a t enes s o f t h i s me taphor a s a way o f

exp re ss ing the r e l a t ion o f Gadam er ' s t h ou gh t t o He idegger 's .

The pos i t ion taken here i s tha t th i s re la t ionsh ip , in bo th i t s s imi la r i ty

and d i f f e rence , mus t no t be t r ea t ed as a com par i son o f " ph i lo sop h ie s , "

and the re fo re a s an i s sue o f i n t e l lec tua l cu r io s it y abou t two " pos i-

t i ons , " bu t mu s t be en t e r ed in to in t he way one jo in s a conve r sa t ion ,

by tak ing up for on ese l f the ques t ion wh ich i s i ts essen t ia l sub jec t

ma t t e r , i n t h i s ca se , t he ques t ion o f the na tu re o f t r u th . On ly w hen the

c o m m o n g r o u n d w h i c h G a d a m e r a n d H e id e g ge r s ha re in t h ei r w a y o f

ask ing th is que s t ion has been d isp layed prec ise ly in te rms of the boun -

da ri es wh ich the " c r is i s" o f t he i r d i f f e r en t ways o f a t t end ing to i t f ir st

es tabl i shes and br ings in to v iew can the i r re la t ion o n th ose g roun ds be

adeq uate ly expressed . T o do th is , we sha ll cons ider th ree proposa ls .

F i r st , t h a t t he p r inc ipa l po in t o f s imil a ri t y be tw een Gadam er andHe idegger emerges in t he cen t r a l r o le wh ich the no t ions o f die Virtuali-

tdt des Sprechens, the v i r tua l i ty of l iv ing language , and das Ereignis, th e

even t o f App rop r i a t io n , p l ay in t he t h ou gh t o f each r e spec t ive ly r ega rd -

ing the ques t ion o f t r u th . Second , t ha t t he p r ima ry d i f f e r ence be twe en

them shows i t se l f as d i f fe ren t ways of speaking , a lmos t as d is t inc t "ac-

c e n t s " o n e m i g h t s ay , w h i c h t h e y d e v e lo p in a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s p o n d to

the ques t ion of t ru th . F ina l ly , th a t th i s re la t ion of s imi la r ity and d i f-

f e r ence be tween Gad amer and He idegge r i n t he ir way o f ask ing and

re spon d ing to t he ques t ion t ru th r evea ls some th ing e s sen ti a l abou t t he

na tu re o f t r u th i ts el f: nam e ly , i ts i nne r r e l a t ion to t he ques t ion o f

f r eedo m, a q ues t ion wh ich , it s e l f uns pok en and un tho ug h t , l ie s a t t he

cen te r o f t he i s sue we p ropose to cons ide r he re . The co nc lus ion we sha ll

r each is t ha t Gadam er ' s r e l a tion to He idegge r is mo s t wo r thy o f con -

s ide ra tion fo r wha t i t shows abo u t h ow th ink ing , one o f t he works o f

t ru t h , le t s us be f ree.

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Th i s s ec t ion will mak e a p r e l imina ry su rvey o f t he co m m on g round

which Gad ame r and He idegger sha re r ega rding (i) t he na tu re o f t r u th

as an event ; ( i i) the cen t ra l ro le of language in the occ ur renc e of th i s

event ; ( i i i ) the i r respec t ive ways of charac te r iz ing the des t ina t ion

toward wh ich the ques t ion o f t r u th occu r r ing a s l anguage is d i r ec t ed ;

( iv ) the s t ruc tura l s imi la r ity of these tw o charac te r iza t ions .

(i) Truth

Gada mer acknowledges t ha t t he r e fl ect ive fo rmu la t ion o f hi s he rme-

neu t i ca l p r ac t i ce wh ich Wahrheit und Methode represen ts "begins by

fo l lowing Heidegger" :

To pu t i t i n pu re ly fo rma l t e rms , t he p r im acy tha t l anguage andunde r s t and ing have in He idegge r ' s t hough t i nd ica t e s t he p r io r i t yo f t h e " r e l a t i o n " (Verhdltnis) over aga ins t i t s re la t iona l members

(Beziehungsgliedern) - t he I wh o un de r s t ands and tha t w h ich isunders tood . Never the less , i t seems poss ib le to me to br ing to ex-press ion w i th in herm ene ut ica l consc iousness i t se l f Heidegger 'ss t a t emen t s conce rn ing " Be ing" and the l i ne o f i nqu i ry he devel -o p e d o u t o f t h e e x p e ri e n ce o f t h e "Kehre". I have carr ied out thisa t t e m p t in Truth and Method. 2

I t is c lea r t ha t Gadam er ' s cha rac t e r i za t ion o f hu m an unde r s t a nd ing

in Wahrheit und Methode fo l lows Heidegger ' s ex is ten t ia l ana ly t ic o f

Dasein in Being and Time. The on to log ica l s t ruc tu re o f t em pora l i t y

(Zeitlichkeit) is the essence o f Dasein 's pr ivi leged (exis tent ia l) w ay o f

being. In-der-Welt-sein, in i ts radical f ini tude and his tor ical i ty , reveals

und ers t and ing to be cen t ra l to Dase in 's w ay o f coming- to-be- i t se l f in

au thent ic reso lve in re la t ion to the poss ib i l i t i es for be ing wi th o ther

beings i t has as a " thrown-project ." What is less c lear in Wahrheit und

Methode i s t he equa l ly He idegge r i an in f luence on the no t ion o f t r u th

wi th wh ich Gad ame r co r re l a te s th i s v iew o f unde r s t and ing . Fo r d i r ect

t e s t i mo ny r egard ing the way o f a sk ing the ques t ion o f t r u th wh ich

Gadamer and He idegge r sha re we mus t l ook to o the r sou rces . I n t hePre face to t he 1960 Rec lam ed i t i on o f Der Ursprung des Kunstswerkes

Heidegge r s ays , " Th e in t rod uc t ion ( to t hi s ed i t i on ) com pos ed by H . -G .

Gad am er conta ins a dec is ive h in t fo r th e reader of m y la te r wri t ings . '3

Conce rn fo r t he ques t ion o f t he " me an ing ( t ru th ) o f Be ing" un i fi e s

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Heidegger ' s ea r ly and l a t e r wr i t ings and g ives a new d i rec t ion to the

w o r k i n g o u t o f t h e Kehre, j u s t a s i t g ave t h e d i r ec t i o n w h i ch H e i d eg g e r

w o r k e d o u t i n Sein und Zeit. Fu r t h e rm o re , t h i s n ew d i r ec t i o n is t h e

o n e G a d am er s ee s h i m se l f as f o l l o w i n g i n Wahrheit und Methode.

C o n s e q u e n t l y , G a d a m e r f o l lo w s H e id e g g e r b e y o n d t h e tr a n s c e n d e n t a l

p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f t h e e x i st e n ti a l a n a l y ti c o f D a s e in t h r o u g h t h e

t u r n i n g i n h is w a y o f t h i n k i n g t o w a r d t h e n a t u r e o f t r u t h h a p p e n i n g as

ev en t . T h is l e ad s t o an o n t o l o g i ca l co n t ex t ap p ro p r i a t e t o ask in g t h e

ques t ion of the t ru th o f Be ing in i t s p r io r i ty to be ings , t ha t i s , w i th -

o u t r e f e ren ce t o b e i ng s . We a re l o o k in g , t h e re f o re , f o r a c l u e in G ad a -

m e r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n n o t o n l y t o t h e d i r e c ti o n o f H e id e g g er 's la t e r

t h o u g h t , b u t t o t h e d i r e c t io n o f G a d a m e r ' s o w n le a d in g q u e s ti o n in

Wahrheit und Methode as well .

I t a k e t h e " c l u e " r e f e r r e d t o b y H e i d eg g e r f r o m G a d a m e r ' s I n t r o -

d u c t i o n t o Der Ursprung t o b e t h e f o l l o w i n g :

T h e f u n d am en t a l s i g n if ic an ce o f t h e e s say o n t h e w o rk o f ar t , i ts eem s t o m e , i s t h a t i t p ro v i d es u s w i t h an i n d i ca t i o n o f t h e l a te rH e i d eg g e r 's r e a l co n ce rn . N o o n e can i g n o re t h e f ac t t h a t i n t h e

w o rk o f a r t , i n w h i ch a w o r l d a ri se s, n o t o n l y is so m e t h i n g m ean -i n g f u l g i v en t o ex p e r i en ce t h a t w as n o t k n o w n b e f o re , b u t a l soso m e t h i n g n ew co m es i n t o ex i s t en ce w i t h t h e w o r k o f a r t i ts e lf .I t is no t s imply the ma ni fe s t a t io n of a t ru th , i t i s i t se l f an ev en t . 4

G a d am er is r e f e r r in g h e re t o H e i d eg g e r 's ch a r ac t e r i za t i o n o f t h e w ay

t ru th se t s - i t se lf - to -work in a r t as the he igh t ene d s t r iv ing of wor ld and

ea r t h w h i ch g iv es t h e a r t - w o rk t h e sh i ni n g l u m i n o s i t y t h a t d i st in -

g u ish es it a s u n i q u e am o n g t h e w ay s i n w h i ch t ru t h o ccu r s a s an ev en t.

The rea l s ign i f i cance of Heidegger ' s charac te r i za t ion i s t he ins igh t i tg iv es u s i n t o t h e n a t u re o f t ru t h a s su ch . T h e s t r iv i ng o f w o r l d an d

ea r t h is b u t an i n s t an ce o f t h e co n f l i c t o f rev ea li n g an d co n cea l i n g ,

p re sen ce an d ab sen ce , t h a t is t h e t ru t h o f ev e ry b e in g . " A s u n h i d d en -

ness (aletheia) t r u t h is a l w ay s an o p p o s i t i o n o f r ev ea l m en t an d co n cea l -

m e n t . T h e t w o b e l o n g t o g e t h e r . '' s B e i n g co n t a i n s so m e t h i n g l i k e a

h o s t i l i ty t o i ts o w n p re se n t a t i o n s . E x i s t i n g t h i ng s d o n o t s i m p l y o f f e r

t h em se l v es t o u s a s p re sen t : t h e y a lso h av e an i n n e r d ep t h o f s el f-

suf f i c i e ncy tha t Heidegg er cal ls " s t and ing- in - i tse l f . '6 Co nse qu ent ly ,

t h e o p p o s i t i o n r e f e r r ed t o is n o t t h e s am e a s t h e co n f l i c t o f k n o w l ed g ea n d e r ro r . I f k n o w l e d g e d e p e n d s o n o u r o v e r c o m i n g er r o r, t h e t r u t h

w o u l d b e t h e p u r e l y i n g - o p e n o f b ei ng s t o r e a so n . 7 B u t t h e " c o m p l e t e

u n h i d d e n n e s s o f b e i n g s , " t h e ir t o t a l o b j e c t if i c a ti o n b y m e a n s o f c o r re c t

s u b je c ti v e ac ts o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y w h i c h t h e y a r e t o r n f r o m t h e d a r k

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rea lm of h iddenn ess in e r ror , l eads to a conc ept ion of t ru th as p resence-

to -m ind tha t nega tes th i s s tand ing- in- themse lves by w hich th ings she l te r

them selve s in their being. I t resul ts in a level ing of beings to th e f la tp l ane o f t he hu m an wi l l -t o - con tro l . On such a v iew , t r u th wou ld r epre -

sen t no th ing m ore t han t he hum an o pp o r tu n i ty fo r u s ing be ings. 8 Con-

sequen t ly , G adam er s ays:

. .. the c lo sednes s and conc ea lm en t o f t he work o f a rt i s t he gua ran -tee o f th e un iversa l thes is o f Heidegger 's ph i lo sop hy , nam ely , tha tbe ings ho ld t hemse lves back by com ing fo rward in to t he opennes sof p resence . The s tand ing- in- i t se lf ( repose) o f the w ork of a r t be-

toke ns a t the same t im e the s tand ing- in- i t sel f o f be ings in genera l . 9

The no t ion o f t r u th a s an even t means " p re senc ing , " t he way in

which be ings in genera l come in to p resence . The s t ruc ture o f th i s even t ,

t he w ay t ru th a s unh id denn es s happens , is the ab id ing opp os i t i on o f

revea l ing and concea l ing . A be ing ' s t ru th i s i t s Be ing , and the endur ing

tens ion of s tand ing- in- i t sel f whi le com ing forward in to p rese nce is the

t ru th o f Be ing , t he way i t " occu r s " as an even t o f t he p r e senc ing o f

be ings. Th i s way o f a sk ing t he ques t ion o f t r u th i n t e rms o f t he pr e -

senc ing of be ings ind ica tes the d i rec t ion in which Heidegger ' s l a te r

t ho ug h t w i ll go , t owa rd t he s t ruc tu r e o f p r e senc ing as such .

(ii) Language

Heidegge r conc ludes Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes with a s t r iking

observa t ion : t ru t h , as the c lea ring and concea l ing of what is , hap pen s

in be ing c om posed , as a poe t com poses a poe m. All art, as the le t t inghap pen o f t he adven t o f t he t r u th o f w ha t i s, is , a s such , essentially

poetry.l~ "Essen t ia l p oe t ry , " Heidegger te l ls us , is "pro jec t ive say ing . "

In re la t ion to the wo rk o f a rt , p ro jec t ive say ing re fe rs to the f ix ing in

p l ace ( compo s ing ) o f t he " f igu re" o f t he work , so t ha t i t comes t o

s tand in i t se l f ( repose) as a l igh t ing up of the o rd inary and fami l ia r ,

a l lowing t ru th t o emerge in t he newness o f pos sib il i ty , un t i l t hen

un though t , open to Dase in a s ex i s t ence . Ar t does no t cons i s t i n e i t he r

copy in g o r t r ans fo rming s om e th ing a l ready in be ing ; r a the r, i t is t he

pro je c t by which som eth i ng new com es for t h as t rue . 11 Essen tia lpoe t ry i nc ludes poesy , o r wha t we o rd inar i ly re f e r t o a s poe t ry , i ndeed

in a p r iv ileged way , bu t ex ten ds be yo nd i t to a ll genu ine forms of a r t

because a ll ar t is proje ct ive saying. Bu t s ince languag e is the ha pp en ing

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ty - s t ruc tu r e o f hum an unde r s t and in g wh ich cha rac te r ize s Dase in 's way

of o r ien t ing i t se lf as a th ro wn -pro jec t io n tow ard i t s poss ibi l it i es fo r

be ing , as wel l as the opp os i t ion of revea ling and concea l ing which is thes t ruc tu r e o f t he even t o f t r u th , come to be exp re s sed in Wahrheit und

Methode i n t e rms o f an on to logy o f l anguage . F rom th i s on to log ica l

pe r spec tive , Gadam er a t t em p t s t o show h ow l anguage a ll ows t ru th t o

o r igina te i n u nde r s t and ing , w i th ou t t h ink ing o f l anguage a s an en t i t y ]

th ing (be ing) , e i ther ob jec t ive ly o r sub jec t ive ly cons t rued , wh ich pro-

duces o r causes t ru th ' s occur rence . T he or ig ina t ive wo rk of language ,

t he occu r r ence o f t r u th as an even t o f unh idde nnes s , and t he h i sto ri -

cal p ro j ec t o f und e r s t and ing a s an ep i sode o f hu ma n ex i s t ence , t he se

three , Gadamer wishes us to rea l ize , these th ree a re no t th ree , bu t one .

The t h ink ing wh ich i s " on t he way to l anguage" i s a l r eady unde rway

a long a d i rec t ion of thought which has as i t s des t ina t ion the say ing of

the app rop r i a t enes s o f l anguage, t r u th , and unde r s t and ing in t he i r

be longing- toge ther .

(iii) Destination

I n a n " A d d e n d u m " t o Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes wri t ten in 1956 ,

twe n ty yea rs a f t e r t he o r ig ina l compo s i t i on , t o " exp la in some o f t he

l ead ing word s , " He idegge r r eminds t he r eade r t ha t because t r u th a s

the unh idde nnes s o f be ings means no th in g e ls e t han t he p r e sence o f

be ings as such , tha t i s, in the i r Be ing , t a lk in the essay abou t the fo und-

ing o f t r u th t ouche s on t he p rob lem o f t he on to log ica l d i f fe r ence , a

sphe re wh ich t he 1936 t ex t c au t ions, " ca nn o t be exp l i ca t ed he re . "

Regard ing the poss ib i l i ty o f such an expl ica t ion , Heidegger says in the

" A d d e n d u m " :

The who le e s say , " The Or ig in o f t he Work o f Ar t " de l ibe r a t e lyye t t a c i t ly moves on t he pa th o f t he ques t ion o f t he na tu r e o fBe ing . Re f l ec t ion on wha t art may be is com ple t e ly and dec ided lyde t e rm ined on ly i n rega rd t o t he ques t ion o f Be ing . Art is con-s ide red ne i t he r an a rea o f cu l t u r a l a ch i evem en t no r an appea ranceof sp i r i t ; i t be longs to the disclosure of Appropriation (das Ereig-nis) by way o f wh ich t he " me an ing o f Be ing" ( cf . Being and Time)

can a lone be d ef ined . What a r t may be i s one of the q ues t ions towh ich n o answers are given in t he essay. Wh at gives the impres-s ion of an answ er a re d i rec t ions fo r ques t ion ing .iS

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In t ouch ing upo n th e on to log ica l d i f f e r ence f rom the pe r spec t ive o f

the a rt work (no t t he a r t i st o r app rec i a to r ) , t he r e opens up a pa th

wh ich even at t ha t t ime , and mo re c lea rly f rom the pe r spec t ive o ftwenty years la te r , He idegger saw lead ing to clas Ereign is as the way in

wh ich a lone t he " me an ing o f Be ing ," h is o r ig ina l ques t ion , cou ld be

de f ined . The t h ink ing o f das Ereignis l i e s a t the cen te r o f Heidegger ' s

l a t er t ho ugh t . Ye t , a l t houg h Gadam er ce r t a in ly was aware o f t he 1956

A d d e n d u m w h e n h e p r e p a r e d h is I n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e n e w e d i t io n o f

the e ssay in 1960 , and He idegge r h imse l f i nd i ca te s t ha t t he In t ro duc -

t ion g ives a "dec is ive c lue" to the reader o f h is la te r wo rk , Ga dam er

makes no r e f e r ence t o das Ereignis i n h i s i n t e rp re t a t i on o f t he work ,

Der Ursprung. Why? To unde r s t and fu l ly t he s ense i n wh ich Wahrheit

und M e thode r e p r e s e n t s G a d a m e r ' s a t t e m p t t o f o l l o w o u t i n t e r m s o f

he rmeneu t i ca l consc iousnes s t he d i r ec t ion o f t he Kehre, i t i s necessa ry

to a sses s t he s ign i fi c ance o f t he appa ren t absence in Gadam er ' s t ho ugh t

in gene ral o f any exp l ic i t de ve lo pm en t i n t he ques t ion o f t he on to log i-

ca l d i f fe ren ce such as occurs wi th Heidegger in the sus ta ined e labora-

t i o n o v e r t h e y e ar s o f t h e n o t i o n o f das Ereignis.

I wish to sugges t tha t as a m at t e r o f fac t the re is a s ign if icant paral le l

i n G a d a m e r ' s t h o u g h t t o t h e n o t i o n o f alas Ereign is as Heidegger' s way ofth ink ing t he ques t ion o f t he on to log ica l d i f f e rence . Th i s is Gadam er ' s

n o t i o n o f th e Virtualit(t't des S pre ehens, the v i r tua l i ty o f l iv ing language .

T h e n o t i o n s o f das Ereignis an d die Virtualit(~t des Sprechens r ep re sen t

the de s t i na t ion t oward wh ich each t h inke r i s be ing l e ad in fo l lowing

h is le ad ing ques t ion - de s t i na t ion , no t i n t he s ense o f t e rminus , bu t

r a t h e r o f p o i n t o f r e fe r e n ce u p o n w h i c h e x p e c t a t i o n f o cu s es .

One o f t he p r inc ipa l He idegge r i an t ex t s conce rn ing das Ereignis is

Identitgl't un d D iffe ren z. 16 There He idegge r speaks o f t he " be long ing -

toge the r ( i den t i t y ) o f m an and Be ing . " Th i s be long ing - toge the r , how-

ever , is n o t t he cus tom ary me taph ys i ca l unde r s t and in g o f i den t i t y ,

wh ich emphas i ze s t he " tog e th e r " a s a nexus o r connexio, a necessary

o r e s sen ti al c onn ec t io n be tw een o ne t h ing and ano th e r , bo t h hav ing

subs t an ti a l ex i s t ence p r io r t o and ap a r t f r o m the i r t oge the rnes s . Ra the r ,

He idegger he r e g ive s p r ecedenc e t o " be lon g ing" a s de t e rm in ing t he

s en se o f t h e " h o w " o f th is " t o g e t h e r . " I t is t h e " b e l o n g i n g t o " o n e

ano the r o f ma n and Be ing tha t g ives i ts mean ing to t he i r un i ty o f

r e l a t i onsh ip . The r e l a t i onsh ip o f man and Be ing i s fundamen ta l ly aneven t i n t he s ense t ha t t hey em erge t oge th e r and have no s epa rat e ,

on to log ica l ly p r io r s t and ing -apa r t - f rom-one -ano the r . Ereignis as event

r e fe r s to t h e " l e t t i ng hap pe n" o f th i s be long ing - toge the r.

I t i s ou t o f t he t h ink ing o f Ereignis tha t Heidegger ' s fu l les t account

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of the na tu re of language comes . 1~ Heidegger says a t the conc lus ion

o f t h e A d d e n d u m t h a t t h e p r o b l e m a t i c c o n t e x t o f d is c us si o n r e ga r di n g

the r e l a t ion o f man and Be ing in Der Ursprung " c o m e s t o g e t h e r at t h ep rope r p l ace . . . whe re t he na tu re o f l anguage and poe t ry i s t ouched on .

a ll th is aga in on ly in regard to th e be longing- to ge ther o f Being and

Saying. ' i s Die Sage, "Saying," language in i ts essence, is s t i l lness; the

"c hi m e of s t i l lness" Heideg ger cal ls i t . ~9 Y et this s t i l lness is no t s tag-

n a n t i m m o b i l i t y , t h e a b se n c e o f v i b ra n t m o t i o n . I t is th e h a r m o n y o f

I d e n t i t y , o f m u t u a l i t y a n d a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o p e rf e c t ly a t t u n e d t h a t it

r ings ou t in a ton e so mel low tha t i t i s no sou nd bu t a song , an im-

pulse , com ple te in i t se l f, y e t ope n in tha t i t ca ll s a ll th ings in to the i r

be ing . Language i s the " song of Ereignis." It is das Ereignis, t he hap -

pen ing o f Iden t i t y , t he d i sc lo su re o f Approp r i a t ion , wh ich i s t he

mo ve m en t t oward open ing - say ing , t owa rd l anguage , t ha t opens up a

pa th t ow ard hu m an speaking . The re fo re He idegge r i ns is ts t ha t l anguage

is more than an ac t iv i ty o f man o r a naming / l abe l ing o f p r e -ex is t ing

ob ject s . On the con t r a ry , ma n speaks on ly in co - r e spond ing to t he

Saying of language . In fac t i t i s l anguage which "speaks" man, and

a ll hum an speech as co- responding a lways has the qua l i ty of be ing

f i rs t a l i s ten ing to wh at language says . Fur the rm ore , language does no tnam e wh at has a l ready show n i t se lf , bu t is i t se l f the op enin g up o f a

c lear space a nd the l igh t ing of t ha t which appears in i t. Because lan-

guage has i ts or igin in the s t i r r ing of das Ereignis t oward open ing -

say ing , language too has ' the charac te r o f an event , and the s t ruc tur e

o f t ha t even t is t he d i sc losu re o f Approp r i a t ion . The even t o f l an -

guage , t hough t now as t he " song o f E re ign i s " , i s t he p r ima l poe t ry o f

wh ich He idegge r spoke in Der Ursprung whi le t he t h ink ing o f t he Kehre

was s ti ll " on the way to language . " N ow language is un de rs t oo d as the

opening-say ing of das Ereignis, t he l e t t i ng happen o f be long ing - to -

ge the r , and conse quen t ly a s t he o r ig ina t ing even t wh ich found s t ru th .

Now in so fa r a s Wahrheit und Methode can be v iewed as Gadamer ' s

a t t em p t t o work o u t i n t e rms o f he rmene u t i ca l consc iousness t he li ne

o f t h ink ing He idegge r fo l lowed f rom the expe r i ence o f t he Kehre,

t ha t po r t r aya l r e s ts u l t ima te ly up on Gadam er ' s e l abo ra t ion o f an on -

to logy of language . The on t o lo gy of language is a t the cen te r o f Ga-

damer ' s spec i f ica l ly ph i losophica l concerns in Wahrheit und Methode,

and a t t he hea r t o f h i s o n to logy o f language l ie s t he no t i on o f dieVirtualita't des Sprechens, th e vir tual i ty of l iving language. I t is f inal ly

on ly by r ecou r se t o t he idea o f v i rt ua l it y t ha t Gad amer is ab le t o ca rry

ou t h i s " dec en te r ing" o f m e t ho d as t he app rop r i a t e pa th o f acces s t o

t ru th by c l ea r ing away the " on to log ica l o bs t ruc t ions o f t he sc i ent if i c

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con cep t o f ob j ec t iv i ty , " and iden t i fy ing unde r s t and in g as a " d isc ip line

o f ques t ion ing and inves t iga t ion wh ich p rov ides a wa r r an t fo r (ver-

biirgt) t ru th . '' 2~ This d isc ip l ine , which has th e charac te r o f a d ia logueo r conve r sa t ion , t akes i ts s t and in t he " ce n te r o f l anguage ." Gadam er ' s

e f fo r ts t o wo rk ou t t he inne r dynam ic s t ruc tu re o f t he way in wh ich

t ru th happ ens as an even t i n l anguage, and to show how th is even t is

" wa r ran te d" in it s t r u th in con t r a s t t o t he " gua ran tee" o f sy s t ema t i c

ce r t i t ude o f f e r ed by the me thod wh ich seeks s c i en t i f i c ob j ec t iv i ty ,

t akes t h e fo rm o f an e l abo ra t ion o f t he no t i on o f v i r tua l it y . It s eems

clear tha t in severa l impor tan t ways die Virtualit(it des Sprechens

para l le l s Heidegger ' s th ink ing of das Ereignis. That para l le l can be

s h o w n b y w a y o f t h e t h r e e f o l lo w i n g e x a m p le s .

(iv) Sim ilarity

The f i r s t e l emen t o f t h i s pa ra l l e l comes in to v i ew when we cons ide r

the way in wh ich G adam er t h inks o f l anguage a s " cen te r ing" t he hu -

m an r e l a tion to t he wor ld (die M itte der Sprache). This means tha t i t

is l anguage wh ich " cen te r s " t he even t i n wh ich man and w or ld come-to-be- toge ther . The s t ruc ture of th i s event i s a "cen te r ing" because

l anguage e ssen ti a lly cons t i t u t e s : a " po in t o f m ed i a t io n" ou t o f wh ich

m a n a n d w o r ld e m e rg e t o g e th e r ; a " c o m m o n g r o u n d " u p o n w h i c h th e y

m e e t ; t h e " m e d i u m " w i t h i n w h i c h th e i r re l at io n u n f o l d s.

Gadamer s ee s t h i s concep t ion o f die Mitte der Spraehe pref igured ,

a l t h o u g h s o m e w h a t d i m l y , i n A l e x a n d e r v o n H u m b o l d t ' s i n si g ht t h a t

l anguages a re " v i ews o f t he wor ld . " Gad ame r in t e rp re t s von Hu m bo ld t

as me ani ng by th is tha t as one grows in to mem ber sh i p in a l inguis t ic

co m m un i ty , one is i n t rod uced to a pa rt i cu la r a t t i t ude and r e l a t ionsh ip

t o t h e w o r l d. B u t G a d a m e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e o n t o lo g i c al g r o u n d o f

th is i n s igh t i s r ea lly t he r ecog n i t ion tha t l anguage has no in dep end en t

l i f e apa r t f rom the wor ld t ha t comes in to v i ew wi th in i t . " No t on ly i s

the wor ld 'wor ld ' o n ly insofa r as i t com es in to language , bu t language ,

too , has i ts rea l be ing on ly in the fac t tha t the wor ld i s repre sen te d

wi th in i t . Thus the o r ig ina l human i ty o f l anguage means a t t he s ame

t ime the fun dam en ta l l i ngui s ti c qua l i t y o f man ' s be ing in the wor ld . '21

Gadamer ' s c r i t i que o f von Humbo ld t he re fo l lows a s t r i c t l y He ideg -ge r i an l i ne . The work o f l anguage in med ia t ing man ' s r e l a t ion to t he

wor ld i s a genu ine ly on to log ica l " app rop r i a t ion" o f t he so r t He idegge r

spoke o f i n Identity and Difference, as opposed to a me taphys ica l

" c on ne c t i on " be tw een " th ing s" o r an ex t e rna l sub jec t ive or d i al ect ica l

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ach ievem en t - no t on ly does die Welt weltet only insofar as i t comes

in to language , bu t die Sprache spricht only as the com ing in to language

o f t h e w o r l d .I t is in te rms of th is co nce pt io n of die Mitte der Sprache as the

coeva l emerg ing toge th e r o f ma n and wor ld t ha t Gadam er th inks o f t he

e v e n t o f t r u t h as t h e u n h i d d e n n e s s (aletheia) of be ings . Tr u th , fo r Gada-

me t , is t he emergence in to l anguage o f t he hu ma n r e l at ionsh ip t o t he

world as a virtual w h o l e o f m e a n i n g . T h e n o t i o n o f die Mitte der

Sprache con t r ib u te s t o de t e rmin ing the mean ing o f v i r t ual i ty by empha-

s iz ing the on to log ica l p r ior i ty of the "c en t e r in g" wh ich language is to

any o f t he be ings wh ich appea r w i th in i t , t ha t is , t he p r io r i t y o f t he " r e-

l a t i o n " (Verhdltnis) t o i t s " r e l a t iona l member s" (Beziehungsgliedern).

The wor ld i s no t s imp ly the co l l ec t ion o f be ings t ha t appea r w i th in i t ;

r a the r , i t i s t he abso lu t e con d i t ion o f t he ir appea r ing and s t and ing fo r th

as the be ings they a re . In th is sense i t p recedes them abso lu te ly . I t i s

t h is qua l i t y o f on to log ica l p r io r i ty and " abso lu t en es s" w h ich the hu -

man re la t ion to the wor ld , occur r ing as an event o f t ru th in language ,

involves tha t i s the f i r s t essen t ia l de te rmina t ion of the meaning of

v i r tua l i ty in Gad am er ' s th ou gh t insofar as i t para lle ls Heidegger 's no t io n

o f das Ereignis:

In language the wor ld presen ts i t sel f . The exper ienc e of the wor ldin language i s "ab so l u te . " I t t ranscend s al l o f the re la tiv i ties o f thepos i t ing of be ing , because i t embraces be ing in i t se l f , in whateverre la t ionsh ip ( re la t iv i t ies ) i t ma y appear . Th e l inguis t ic qua l i ty ofou r expe r i ence o f t he wor ld i s p r io r a s con t r a s t ed wi th eve ry th ingtha t is recognized and addressed as be ing . The f un dam ent a l rela-t i on o f l anguage and wor ld does no t m ean tha t t he w or ld becomesthe ob jec t o f l anguage . Ra the r , t he ob jec t o f know ledge and o f

s ta te me nts i s a lready enc losed in th e ho r izo n of language .22

As the cen te r ing o f t he r e la t ionsh ip o f man and w or ld in t he i r

emerg ing in to be ing and be long ing toge the r , t he s t ruc tu re o f t he even t

of t ru th ha ppe nin g in language is "v i r tua l" in the sense tha t a l l be ings

wh ich appea r w i th in t he w or ld a r e a l ready " emb race d" and " enc lose d"

wi th in t he wor ld -ho r i zon o f language as the i r abso lu t e cond i t ion . I n

th is way , Gadam er fo llows He idegge r t oward a r ealm wh ich is " b ey on d

Being , " the rea lm of das Ereignis, i n wh ich a lone the i s sue o f t he on -

to log ical d i f fe rence can be ex pl ica ted .

T h e s e c o n d e l e m e n t o f G a d a m e r ' s d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e m e a n i n g o f

v i r tua l i ty tha t para l le l s Heidegger ' s th ink ing of Ereignis has to do

spec i fica lly wi th the s t ruc tu re of th e e vent o f t ru th . This s t ruc tu re i s

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t h e i n t e r p l a y o f t h e m o v e m e n t to w a r d t h e a p p e a r in g o f b e in g s a m i d t h e

ab id ing conc ea lm en t o f Be ing wh ich cha rac t e ri ze s all t r u th a s unh idden -

ness . In Heidegger 's essay Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, h e s p o k e o ft ru th s e t t ing i t s e lf t o wo rk a s a rt . The " wo rk o f t r u th" happ en ing in

the a r t wo rk re fe rs to the c lear ing of an ope n space , so to speak , wi th in

wh ich be ings can revea l themselves as what the y t ru ly a re , no t jus t " in

themse lves , " wha teve r t ha t m ay m ean , bu t i n t e rms o f t he ir p l ace in a

hu m an wor ld (Van Gogh ' s peasan t shoes , fo r example ) . Th is occu r r ence

o f u n h i d d e n n e s s , h o w ev e r , d o es n o t h a p p e n a s " st e a d y p r e s e n c e "

(stete Anwesenheit) in wh ich be ings a re la id bare , bu t is s imul tane ous ly

an even t o f concea lmen t , a ho ld ing - themse lves -back in wh ich be ingss tand wi th in themselves , tha t i s, in the i r Be ing . Because a r t i s essen t ia l ly

poe t ry , and " poe t i c i z ing " becam e fo r He idegger t he " open ing - say ing"

o f Ereignis, the e f fec t ive essence of which i s s i lence and to which hu-

m an speak ing is a co - r e spond ing , we expec t t o f ind a fund am en ta l con -

g ru i ty be tw een wh a t He idegge r s aid abou t t he s t ruc tu re o f t he even t o f

t r u t h a n d w h a t G a d a m e r w i sh e s u s to u n d e r s t a n d a b o u t t h e w a y t r u t h

is bou nd up wi th t he v i r t ua l i ty o f l anguage .

Th i s is in f ac t t he ca se . When Gada mer a sks how t ru th happ ens in a

l ingu is t ic wor ld , he f inds t ha t t h e un h idden ness o f be ings con ta in swi th in i t th i s sam e opp os i t i on of reveal ing and concea l ing , and th is

by th e ve ry na tu re o f language :

Every word breaks for th as f rom a cen te r and bears a re la t ion tothe who le , t h rou gh wh ich a lone i t i s a word . Every word a llowsthe who le o f l anguage to w h ich it belongs t o so und ou t , and the

wor ld a l so a l lows w hat remains un sa id , to which i t is con nec tedby r e spond ing and ind ica t ing , t o be co -p re sen t i n i t s momen ta ry

occur r ence . 23

Gad amer goes on to s ay th a t t h i s cha rac te r i st i c o f " mom en ta r ines s , "

language ' s occas iona l na ture as an h is tor ica l event , i s no t an imperfec-

t ion o f i ts exp re s sive pow er , bu t r a the r is a d ir ec t consequ ence o f t he

" l iv ing v ir tua l it y o f s peech , " such tha t i t b r ings a t o t a l i t y o f mean ing

in to p lay , w i th ou t be ing able to express i t to ta l ly . 24 The v i r tua l i ty o f

language in th is sense cor re spon ds to the re fusa l o f be ings to y ie ld

themse lves t o t a l ly t o u s in know ledge , w i thho ld ing themse lves , a s i t

we re , in t he i r B e ing and the reby e s tab l ish ing the ou te r l im i t and boun-

da ry o f kno wledge . Th e " wh o le o f l anguage , " t he wor ld -ho r i zon wi th in

wh ich be ings appe ar as what the y a re , i t se l f never com es in to language,

and a s a co nsequ ence the mean ing o f eve ry th ing said abou t t he m

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extends out beyond itself into what necessarily remains unsaid. This

relation of "responding and indicating" and the limit of knowledge it

establishes does not imply that truth is falsity or even "partial" falsity,nor is it merely the consequence of the finitude of human under-

standing. On the contrary, it speaks of the original superabundance of

meaning that comes into language, but never fully, in the event of

truth, and which itself accounts for the finitude of human under-

standing. The point here is one which is basic to both Heidegger and

Gadamer's thought, namely that the priority and initiative in lan-

guage, understanding, and the event of truth lies with Being rather

than with Dasein or with beings in general. This is the ultimate meaning

of human finitude in all its determinations, and thus Gadamer can say

with regard to language and truth:

All human speaking is finite in such a way that there is withinit an infinity of meaning to be elaborated and interpreted. This iswhy the hermeneutical phenomenon can also be illuminatedonly in the light of this fundamental finitude of Being, which iswholly linguistic in na tu re? s

Here we touch on the heart of the matter, but for the moment,

only in passing. How Gadamer and Heidegger att empt to th ink about

the "finitude of Being," which is always and only the Being of finite

beings, and yet which is at the same time the origin of the superabun-

dant "infinity of meaning" to be understood in human speaking, this

is, as we shall see, the critical point at which both similarity and dif-

ference flash be tween them. For the moment, however, we are still

stressing what is co mmon to them. 26

The final element of the virtuality of living language which we willconsider here is its characteristic of "founding" truth, in a sense very

similar to the one in which Heidegger spoke of the work o f art founding

truth . Specifically, we are concerned with the quality of "newness"

which the event o f tru th carries with it in its emergence into language.

This "'newness" of the event of truth considered from the center of

language is the third determination of what Gadamer means by virtuali-

ty as parallel to Heidegger's not ion of das Ereignis.

We need to recall here the priority Gadamer attributed to the "rela-

tion" over against its "'relational members," the I who understands and

that which is understood. This, we have now seen, is but a specific

application of the notion of das Ereignis which Gadamer recognizes

as lying at the heart of Heidegger's later work. Truth is at work in the

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h e rm en eu t i ca l p ro ces s i n b o t h i n t e rp r e t e r an d t ex t , o r r a t h e r , in t h e i r

u n i t y w h i c h i s m e d i a t e d b y l a n g u a g e , t h e c e n t e r g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h

t h ey m ee t . I t i s t h e co m m o n l an g u ag e - t r ad i t i o n w h i ch w o rk an d i n t e r -p re t e r sh a re t h a t o p en s u p an d is i t s e lf t h e c l ea red sp ace i n w h i ch t ru t h

occurs :

( F r o m t h e s id e o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r ) t hi s e v en t m e a n s t h e c o m i n gi n t o p l ay , t h e w o rk i n g i t s e lf o u t , o f t h e co n t e x t o f t r ad i t i o n in i tsco n s t an t l y n ew p o ssi b il it ie s o f m ean i n g (Sinn) a n d r e s o n a n c e , n e w -l y ex t en d ed . In a s m u ch a s t h e t r ad i t i o n i s n ew l y ex p re s sed i nl an g uag e , so m e t h i n g co m es i n t o b e i n g t h a t h ad n o t ex i s t ed b e f o re

and ex i s ts f r om no w on . 27

F r o m t h e s id e o f t h e i n t e r p r e te r , G a d a m e r e m p h a s i z e s t h a t t h e as-

s i m i l a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f s o m e t h i n g h a n d e d d o w n t o u s i s n o t a

" m e r e r e p e t i t i o n " o f s o m e m e a n i n g " i n i t s e l f " t h a t t h e t e x t m i g h t b e

t h o u g h t t o h o l d . R a t h e r , t h e t ex t f in d s v o i ce an d is a l l o w ed t o sp eak

b y e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e i n t e r p r e ti n g w o r d , i .e . t h e w o r d o f t h e in t e r p r e te r .

G ad am e r ' s m o d e l f o r th i s en co u n t e r - i n -l an g u ag e w h i ch is t h e d e t e rm i n a -

t i o n o f m ean i n g i n u n d e r s t an d i n g is co n v e r sa ti o n :

I t is no t Be ing in i t se l f t ha t is increas ing ly revea led wh en H om er ' sIliad o r A l e x a n d e r ' s Indian Campaign speaks to us in the ne w ap-p ro p r i a t i o n o f t r ad i t i o n b u t , a s i n g en u i n e co n v e r sa t i o n , so m e-t h i n g em erg es t h a t is co n t a i n ed i n n e i t h e r o f t h e p a r ti e s i n d iv i d -ually . 28

G a d a m e r ' s u s e o f t h e m o d e l o f c o n v e r s at i o n to d e s c r i be t h e w a y i n

wh ich t ru th occurs i s u l t im ate ly P la ton ic in o r ig in , 29 bu t fo r the p rese n t

o u r i n t e r e s t is f o cu sed o n t h e " n e w n ess " an d h i s to r i ca l " u n i q u e n ess "t h a t a t t en d s ev e ry g en u i n e ev en t o f t ru t h , an d t h e ro o t ed n e ss o f t hi s

n e w n e s s in t h e n a t u r e o f la n gu a ge . " N e w n e s s " h e r e is n o t s y n o n y m o u s

w i t h " n o v e l t y , " t h e m e r e l y d i f fe r e n t . T h e h a p p e n i n g o f t r u t h is n o t t h e

say i n g o f w h a t h a s n o t b een sai d r ecen t l y o r ev e r q u i t e i n t h is w ay , o r

h as b een n eg l ec t ed o r o v e r l o o k ed in t h e p as t , o r even t h e " d i sco v e ry "

a n d c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a p r e v i o u s l y u n k n o w n f a c t o r t h e o r y . U n d e r -

s t an d i n g a l w ay s h a s t o d o w i t h t h e p o ss i b i l i t i e s f o r h u m an ex i s t en ce

i n t h e w o r l d , an d t ru t h a l w ay s i n vo lv es t h e u n h i d d en n ess o f b e in g s as

such , t ha t i s , i n the i r Be ing . Now Gadamer ' s ins igh t in to the v i r tua l i ty

o f l an g u ag e a s f o u n d i n g t h e ev en t o f t r u t h i n i ts n ew n ess is h is r eco g n i -

t ion tha t l anguage i t se l f is t he o r ig in o f bo th be ings in the i r un h id de n-

ness and of Dasein in i t s possibi l i t ies for being in the world . I t i s or iginal

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newness in the sense that tradition as meaning handed-down and under-

standing as possibility for new meaning emerge from out of the center

of language and give birth to the historical "present" of human exis-tence. Language is this emerging together of man and world, truth and

understanding in their original potentiality for being historical. The

center of language as the point of origin for the event of truth which

founds history is the final determination of virtuality at which Gada-

met arrives by thinking through the significance of Heidegger's notion

of das Ereignis for his ontology of language. Das Ereignis, thought

from the center of language, becomes die Virtualitdt des Sprechens.

II

We are now in a position to inquire about the limits of the similarity

we have observed between Gadamer and Heidegger in their way of

asking the question of truth. This difference shows itself most clearly

in their different ways of speaking, in the different "accents" they

develop as they attempt to respond to that question. We shall proceed

in two steps. First, we shall broadly characterize the difference by wayof an inventory of examples of terms which, while reflecting the

structural parallel in the question the two share, also indicate a deci-

sive divergence of interests and emphases arising out of an inversion

of priorities which Gadamer carries out in appropriating Heidegger's

thought regarding the nature o f truth. Second, we shall consider the

significance of the difference more carefully by examining the primary

illustration of it, the way in which Gadamer and Heidegger respectively

put the notions of Virtualitiit and Ereignis to use to identify and com-

municate what each sees as most genuinely his own in his response to

the question of the meaning of truth.

Gadamer observes in Wahrhei t und Methode that Heidegger exam-

ined the problems of hermeneutics and the historicality of under-

standing only for the purposes of ontology, that is, only in terms of

his attempt to recover from oblivion the "question of the meaning of

Being" in its difference from beings, while Gadamer's own interest is

precisely how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological obstruc-

tions of scientific objectivity and methodologism, can do justice to thehistoricality of understanding.3~ This inversion of priorities between

the two, while not in itself constituting a direct conflict of viewpoint,

does point to a difference of interests and emphases which we can

hardly believe would be without considerable consequences. In fact,

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there ig at least one basic regard in which exactly such a consequence is

immediately and impressively apparent - Gadamer and Heidegger

speak in entirely different ways. Gadamer's language is that of a work-ing teacher and scholar concerned primarily with making himself clear

to his colleagues and students about the questions he views as "most

important to all o f us ," and, where possible, reaching agreement in

conversation with the philosophical tradition. It contains nothing

of the "po eti c" or "mys tical" use o f language for which Heidegger has

been so widely criticized. Heidegger, for his part, takes poetry as the

model for his own thinking and speaking. His concern is not so much

making himself clear as it is to let the subject matter itself speak in the

idiom most appropriate to it, with the result that his language takes on

the mysterious, almost riddling character of oracular utterance. No

value-judgment is placed on this most obvious difference between the

two here. Obviously, none should be in itself; certainly, at least not

until the significance of that difference has been understood.

The point to be observed is rather that in attempting to do justice

to the hermeneutical nature of understanding in terms of an ontology

of language, 31 Gadamer has reinterpreted the essence of Heidegger's

later thought in terms of the former's own guiding questioning. In sodoing a fundamental transformation takes place, and while it may still

be possible to indicate points of similarity between the two on this

level, or even establish one to one correspondences between certain

leading ideas, ultimate ly the differences are equally telling. The essence

of this difference of interest and emphasis between the two thinkers is

contained in the dictum which states Gadamer's central ontological

thesis, "Being which can be unders tood is language." This provocative

assertion is the basis for the claim to universality which he makes on

behalf of hermeneutics, and in terms of which he defends his philo-

sophical hermeneutics against the charge of being a linguistic idealism,

similar to Hegel's idealism of Absolute Spirit, in the sense that it re-

duces the actual reality of events and history in their con tingency and

absurdity to mere appearance. Commenting on the universal ontological

structure upon which philosophical hermeneutics is based, Gadamer

says:

The finitude of one's own understanding is the manner in whichreality, opposition, absurdity, and unintelligibility make them-selves felt. Whoever takes this finitude seriously must also takethe reali ty of his tory seriously ... This is the sense in which thestatement, "Being which can be understood is language," mustbe read. It does not refer to the absolute mastery of the one who

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unde r s t ands ove r be ing . On the con t r a ry , i t m eans tha t be ing isno t expe r i enced whe re some th ing is a t ou r d i spos i ti on , and to t ha t

degree i s conceptua l ized (begriffen), bu t r a the r whe re wha t i sh a p p e n i n g c a n only b e u n d e r s t o o d ? 2

Clear ly , Gadamer is no ideal is t ; equal ly c lear ly , the Heideggerian

Seinsfrage is here sub o rd ina t ed to t he ques t ion o f t he na tu re o f unde r -

s t and ing . " Unde r s t and ing" i s t he cen t r a l t e rm in Gadamer ' s d i c tum,

" Be ing wh ich can be u nd e r s to od i s l anguage ," and bo th the mean ing

of " be ing " and the mea n ing o f " language" a re to be in t e rp re t ed in

te rm s of i t . Here we see c learly d isp layed the d i f fe rence be t we en the

two : wh i le G adam er d raws on muc h o f bo th t h e ea rly and l a te r Heideg -ger' s on to lo g ica l tho ug ht , i t is in o rder to expla in the na ture of h is to r i -

ca l unders tanding , as Gadamer h imse l f p rac t ices i t in h is own herme-

neu t i ca l work o f i n t e rp re t a t ion . He idegge r , on the o the r h and , ha s bu t

one purpose in h is in te res t in unders tanding , f in i tude , h i s to ry , t ru th

and l anguage, nam e ly to t h in k the m ean ing o f Be ing . Fo r Gadam er ,

th is i s f ina l ly a normat ive bu t secondary concern .

The ques t ion mu s t be a sked a t th i s po in t : W ha t ar e t he consequenc es

o f such a t r anspos i t i on o f t he co n tex t o f ques t ion ing? Can Gadam er ' s

c la im for the l inguis t ica l i ty of unders tanding as a un iversa l on to log ica l

s t ruc tu re suppor t i t s e l f t h rough i t s t a c i t appea l t o He idegge r ' s t hough t

in t he mid s t o f such a t r anspos i t ion?

To a t tempt the beginnings of an answer to th is ques t ion , we sha l l

l is t in sum ma ry fo rm ce r ta in key e l emen t s o f Gadam er ' s " on to log ica l

sh i f t o f he rm ene ut ic s gu ided by language , '33 tog e the r wi th aspec ts o f

He idegge r ' s l a t e r t hough t t o wh ich in some sense t hey may be v i ewed

as cor respon ding . The ju x ta pos i t ion wi ll reveal the s ign if icance of

the d i f f e r ence wh ich the t r ansposed c on te x t o f ques t ion ing makes .

1. Die Mitte der Sprache. This cen t r a l t hough t i n Gadamer ' s on to logy

of language s ign if ies tha t language is the "c en t e r , " m idd le groun d , o r

p o i n t o f m e d i a t i o n b e t w e e n m a n a n d w o r l d. " C e n t e r " i n th e s e ns e o f

the i r common o r ig in ou t o f wh ich they emerge in t he i r o r ig ina l un i ty ;

" m i d d l e g r o u n d " w h i c h t h e y b o t h o c c u p y a n d w h i c h s u p p o rt s b o t h ;

" po in t o f me d ia t ion " a s t he m ed i um o f conve r se in wh ich the ir r el a-

t ionsh ip a t ta ins to unders tanding . The para l le l here wi th Heidegger ' s

c o n c e p t o f das Ereignis as the or ig ina t ing event o f the be longing-

tog e the r o f m an and Being is unm is takab le . The d i f fe rence lies in the

fac t tha t , fo r Gad ame r , language i t se l f is the or ig inat ive source of

mean ing ; hi s q ues t ion ing ex t ends on ly t o Be ing tha t c an be unde r s tood .

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language living in the tradition for Gadamer. For Heidegger human

speech is a listening and co-responding to language as the song of

Ereignis.

5. Truth. Gadamer himself seldom mentions t ruth directly and nowhere

formulates a coherent characterization of it in his own terms. One

would suspect that if queried directly he would refer to truth as un-

hiddenness (aletheia). Going further, his work could consistently yield

the interpretation, formulated more in his own idiom, that truth is the

emergence into language of man's relationship to his world as a (virtual)

whole of meaning. Truth is clearly an event for Gadamer and it is an

event of unconcealedness and concealment that takes its original place

in language. For Heidegger truth is, simply, das Ereignis, the disclosure

of appropriation. We shall return to this point presently.

From the five examples cited here, a commo n patt ern emerges. In

each case, a central aspect of Gadamer's thought parallels a dominant

theme in Heidegger's, but in each case there is a crucial difference:

the "sh ift" to a linguistically-founded hermeneutics on the basis of

an ontology of language is presented by Gadamer in terms of a Heideg-gerian "pa tte rn, " which in the transposed context of Gadamer's leading

question has lost its home, so to speak, its original embeddedness in

the Seinsfrage.

There is one major exception to this pattern, however - the vir-

tuality of the word. Heidegger speaks of the essence of language,

Sage, as the "song of Ereignis" and the "chime of stillness," while for

Gadamer Virtualftdt is the penumbra of the unsaid which always sur-

rounds and shelters what is said, the center from which the word

"breaks forth in its inner dimension of multiplication." Virtuality of

the word for Gadamer is that which holds the essence of language,

conversation, constantly open to its new and inexhaustible potentiali-

ties for meaning. The truth to which understanding attains in language

has its proper "being" in the "whole of meaning," which can never be

brought into words but to which the word is related by "responding

and indicating." The virtuality of the word alone in Gadamer's shift of

hermeneutical understanding to the ontological plane in language re-

tains the traces of that movement that first stirs language and givesto it its quality of inexhaustible richness, and its character as originative

of meaning. It alone in Gadamer's ontology of language recalls the

"chime of stillness," the primal nature of Saying, and its origin in

das Ereignis.

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Is t he re an amb igu i ty lu rk ing he re in Gadame r ' s t h ink ing abou t

l anguage? In con t r a s t t o He idegger , does no t G adame r ' s fo rm u la fo r the

"sh i f t " in h is thought to the on to log ica l leve l , "Being which can be

un de r s too d is l anguage , " i nd ica t e t h e los s o f t ha t mo s t o r ig ina l on -

to log ica l d imens ion wh ich the no t ion o f Ereignis f i r s t opens up in

regard to bo th Being and language . Ereignis designates a realm "be-

yo nd " Be ing . The h um an r e l a t ionsh ip t o t he w or ld emerges in to lan -

guage in t he conve r sa t ion be tween the one who seeks unde r s t and ing

and tha t wh ich , s t and ing in t he t r ad i t i on , is t o be und e r s t ood on ly in

so f a r t h i s conve r sa t ion has been t aken u p in to t he a t t en t ive dyn am ic

o f l is t ening and r e spond ing to t he m ore o r ig ina l open ing - say ing o fEreignis. In t h i s fo rmu la t ion , i t appea r s t ha t Gadamer may have f a i l ed

t o c o n f r o n t t h e r ad ic al m e a n i n g o f h u m a n f i n it u d e b y p r e m a t u r e l y

c los ing o f f t he on to log ica l ho r i zon o f hi s t hough t , dem arca t ing i ts

bound a r i e s w i th t he con cep t o f t he v i r t ua li t y o f l anguage, it s s il ence

abo u t i ts ow n e f f ec t ive e s sence , and the reby l imi t ing tha t t h ink ing to t he

h o r i z o n o f th e " w o r l d , " w h i c h is " t h o r o u g h l y a n d f r o m th e g ro u n d u p

l ingu i s t i c and the re fo re unde r s t andab le . I s t h i s no t r a the r t oo sha rp a

d iv i s ion be tween wha t i s t ho rough ly unde r s t andab le and tha t wh ich i s

g e n u i ne l y " b e y o n d w o r d s , " b u t n o t b e y o n d a t t e n ti v e li st e ni n g a n dr e s p o n d i n g w h i c h d o e s n o t s e ek so m u c h t o u n d e r s t a n d t h r o u g h t h e

m o v e m e n t o f q u e s t io n a n d a n s w e r as i t d oe s to t h i n k ? D o w e e n c o u n t e r

i n G a d a m e r 's n o t i o n o f v i r tu a l it y t o o c o m f o r t a b l e a r e c o g n i ti o n o f t h e

f i n it u d e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h k n o w s s e c u re l y f r o m t h e o u t s e t t h e

l imi t s o f i ts co nf in em en t and is con ten t , in i ts des i re to avoid the

"speechlessness" of the la te r Heidegger , to forge t what might l ie be-

y o n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e ca u s e it d o e s n o t k n o w h o w t o p u t i t as a q ue s-

t i on , and because th e w ords w i th w h ich i t m igh t answer begga r imag ina -t ion?

Bu t he re we shou ld be cau t ious ; i t wo u ld be t oo ea sy at t h is po in t

t o m a k e " c o m p a r a t i v e j u d g m e n t s " a b o u t " p h i l o s o p h i e s ," a c ti n g as i f

w e u n d e r s t o o d t h a t in t e rm s o f w h i c h a l on e s u ch j u d g m e n t s c o u l d b e

m a d e - t h e " t r u t h " o f t h e su b j ec t m a t t e r t o w h ic h o u r q u e st i o ns a re

poin t ing . A be t te r way prese n ts i tse l f i f we a l low ourse lves to be gu ided

by Gad amer and He idegge r t hemse lves . Chrono log ica l ly , the s topp ing -

p lace we have r eached in ou r fo l lowing o f t he r e l a tionsh ip o f Gadam er ' s

though t t o He idegge r ' s co r r e sponds rough ly to t he pub l i ca t ion o fUnterwegs zur Sprache a n d o f Wahrheit und Metho de. 34 T o p i c k u p

the t r ace o f t he d i r ec t ion wh ich ou r i nqu i ry shou ld fo l low f rom he re

rega rd ing the d i f f e r ence be tw een them, we mu s t l o ok to t he s t eps ,

adm i t t ed ly t en t a t ive ye t r evea ling, wh ich each th inke r h imse l f t oo k a t

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th is jun c tu re , a l lowing ourse lves to b e re mi nde d o f the rea l i s sue be-

tween the m, t he ques t ion o f t r u th . We beg in w i th Gadamer .

I n t h e F o r e w o r d t o t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f W a h r he it u n d M e t h o d e ,1964, an inva luable tex t fo r the ins igh t i t g ives in to Gadamer ' s own

se l f -unders tanding , he spec i f ical ly addresses the d i f fe rence be tw een

himsel f and Heidegger . S ign i f ican t ly he does th is in te rms of " t ru th . "

T h e t e x t b eg in s w i th t h e c i t a t io n a b o u t " d u s k a n d d a w n " q u o t e d at

t he ou t se t o f th i s s tudy and p i cks up a s fol lows :

I t s eems to me , howeve r , t ha t t he ones idedness o f he rm eneu t i ca lun iversa li sm possesses the t ru th of a cor rec tive . I t en l igh tens the

m o d e r n v i e w p o i n t o f m a k i n g , p r o d u c i n g , a n d c o n s t r u c t i n g c o n-cern ing the necessary co ndi t ion s un de r wh ich i t it se l f s tands .. .

Wha t ma n needs is no t on ly t he unswerv ing pos ing o f u l t ima teques t ions, b u t j u s t a s mu ch the s ense o f wha t is doab le , wha t i sposs ib le , what is approp r ia te here and now . Of al l peop le , theph i lo sophe r , I t h ink , mu s t h imse l f be aware o f t he gap be twe enhis c la ims and the rea l i ty in wh ich he s tands . Th ou gh he m ayalways be ca l led up on to draw rad ica l conc lus io ns f rom every-th ing , th e ro le o f p rop he t , Cassandra , p reacher , o r even know-i t -a ll does no t su i t h im.

Herm eneu t i c consc iousness . .. s eeks t o coun te rpose to t he w i llo f m an , wh ich m ore than ever is mou n t in g in a u top ian o r e scha t-o log ica l consc iousness a c r i t ique of what has gone before , s o m e -

t h i n g o f t h e t r u t h o f r e m e m b r a n c e : wh a t st il l y e t a n d e v e r a ga inis re al. 3s

Obvious ly , a g rea t dea l could be sa id abou t h is imm ense ly r ich and

persona l ly fe lt s ta tem ent . Th e i ssue, apar t f rom cr i t ic i sms and re -

jo inders , is c learly th e que s t ion of t ru th ; spec if ical ly wh at Gada me r

call s he re t h e " t ru th o f r em em bran ce . " Wha t he w i shes t o say tu rns ona po ignant , as wel l as anc ien t , metaphor for t ru th , the sun . In the face

o f H e id e gg e r' s " r a d ic a l " a n n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e " c o s m i c n i g h t " o f t h e

fo rge tfu lnes s o f be ing , t he n ih il ism wh ich Nie t z sche had fo re to ld and

wi th wh ich tw o gene ra t ions o f Eu ropean th inke r s , i nc lud ing Husse rl ,

Wi t tgens te in , Sar t re , Marce l, Jaspers , Mer leau-Ponty , Bul tm ann , Ti l lich ,

and o f cou r se He idegge r and Gadamer t hemse lves , had been in t ima te ly

and pas s iona t e ly conce rned , Gadamer r e sponds wi th t he image o f two

poss ib le reac t ions to the spread ing darkness and a ques t io n , " I s one

pe rm i t t ed then to lo ok back toward the l a st r ays o f dusk as t he sunset s in t he even ing sky in s t ead o f t u rn ing abou t t o w a tch ou t fo r t he

f i rs t sh i m me r of i t s re tu rn ?" I s th i s fina l ly the way Ga dam er sees h is

tho ug ht in re la t ion to Heidegger 's : an awe- insp i red l ingering wi th wha t

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t h e p u rp o se o f t h e l e c t u re is " t o s ay so m e t h i n g ab o u t t h e a t t em p t t o

t h i n k B e i n g w i t h o u t r eg a rd t o i ts b e i n g g ro u n d ed i n t e rm s o f b e in g s. ''37

H e i d eg g e r is r em a i n i n g w i t h t h e o n e q u es t i o n , d i f fe r en t f ro m G ad am er ' s ,w h i ch h a s g u i d ed h i m f ro m t h e b eg i n n in g , t h e q u es t i o n o f t h e o n -

to log ica l d i f f e rence . But a l ready in Sein und Ze i t Heidegger had rea l -

i z e d t h e n e e d t o m o v e b e y o n d a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

ap p r o ach t o t h is q u es t i o n , t h ro u g h w h i ch h e h ad sh o w n t h a t B e in g is

T i m e i n t e rm s o f t h e t em p o ra l i t y o f D ase i n ' s ex i s t en ce . T h i s ap p ro ach

is n o t f u l ly a d eq u a t e t o t h e t a sk o f th i n k i n g B e i ng w i t h o u t r eg a rd t o it s

b e i n g g ro u n d ed i n t e rm s o f b e in g s , ev en th e o n t o l o g i ca l l y p ri v il eg ed

be ing of Dase in , fo r which i t s own be ing i s an i ssue . Consequent ly ,

Heideg ger says here tha t he can g ive a " l i t t le c lue " as to ho w to li s ten

to th is l ec tu re : "T he p o in t is no t t o l i st en to a se r ies o f p ropo s i t ions ,

b u t r a t h e r t o f o l l o w t h e mo vem ent o f showing. ' '3 ' As we shall see, this

a l ready sugges t s what Heidegger hopes wi l l show i t se l f , namely the way

i n w h i c h " o c c u r r e n c e " (Ereignis) h a p p e n s , t h e " s t r u c t u r e " , i f y o u w ill,

o f o cc u r ren ce . T h e o n l y w ay t o a l lo w a ll th i s t o ap p ea r is f o r t h i n k i n g

t o l et o c c u r r e n c e h a p p e n a s t h o u g h t , i.e . t o f o ll o w t h e m o v e m e n t b y

wh ich i t shows i tse l f.

T h i s m o v em en t b eg i n s w i t h t h e n am i n g t o g e t h e r o f t i m e an d B e i n g .B u t i m m ed i a t e l y l an g u ag e ( t h e l an g u ag e o f m e t ap h y s i c s , o f b e in g s , i n

w h i ch w e a re u sed t o t h i n k ) en co u n t e r s a d i f f i cu l t y :

Being is no t a th ing , t h us no th ing t em por a l , a nd y e t it is de te r -m i n ed b y t i m e a s p re sen ce .

T im e is no t a th ing , t hus no th ing whic h is , and ye t it rema insco n s t an t i n i t s p a s s i n g aw ay w i t h o u t b e i n g so m e t h i n g t em p o ra ll ike the be ings in t ime .

B e i ng an d t i m e d e t e r m i n e each o t h e r r ec i p ro ca l ly , b u t in su cha w ay t h a t n e i t h e r c an t h e f o rm er - B e in g - b e add re s sed a sso m e t h i n g t em p o ra l n o r can t h e l a t te r - t i m e - b e ad d re s sed a s abeing. As we give tho ug ht to a ll th is , we f ind ourselves adr i f t inc o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t e m e n t s ? 9

D i a l ec ti c is n o w ay o u t o f t h e se co n t r ad i c t i o n s . T h i s w o u l d r eq u i r e

say ing , "Being i s ; t ime i s . " Ra ther we say , " there i s Be ing ; there i s

t i m e . " We a t t e m p t t o sh o w h o w t hi s " t h e re is - i t g iv es (es gibt)"

can b e ex p e r i en ced an d seen :

Th e app rop r i a t e wa y to ge t t he re is t o exp la in wha t is g iven in the" I t g i v es , " w h a t " B e i n g " m ean s , w h i ch - I t g iv es ; w h a t " t i m e"me ans - I t g ives . Ac cord ing ly , we t ry to look ahead t o t h e I twh ich - g ives Being and t ime . 4~

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Fol lowing th is d i rec t ion , Heidegger reaches a po in t where he can say

tha t t he " I t " wh ich g ives Be ing and t ime can be on ly t ho ugh t i n t he

l igh t o f the k ind of g iving wh ich be longs to i t : g iv ing as des t iny ; g ivingas ex tendin g . 41 "Be ing" can be th ou gh t o f as the g i f t o f a l lowing

(be ings) - to - p resence , as unh idde nne ss , whic h i s re ta ined in the

g iv ing (and therefore i s d i f fe ren t f rom be ings) . As g i f t re ta ined in the

g iving , Be ing as g i f t o f a l lowing- to-presence is the g i f t o f a k ind of

g iv ing w hich g ives on ly i t s g i f t , bu t in th e g iv ing ho lds i t se l f back and

with draw s. Su ch a giving, Heidegger cal ls "send ing. '42 As such, the

g i ft o f Be ing is r em em bere d wi th rega rd to wh a t com es in to p re sence

(be ings) , and i s fo rgo t ten wi th regard to the g iv ing in w hich the g i f t is

r e t a ined . Th i s s end ing in it i at e s t he epocha l h i s to ry o f Be ing fo r t ho ugh t

(Heidegger : to ho ld back i s , in Greek , epoche) i n t he m u l t ip l e t r ans fo r-

ma t ions by wh ich the g i ft is r em em bere d and the g iv ing fo rgo t t en . Th i s

epocha l h i s to ry o f Be ing fo r t h oug h t is t he k ind o f g iv ing He idegger

calls "d es tin y. ' ,43

" T im e , " fo r i ts pa r t, m us t be t ho ug h t i n r e la t ion to Be ing a s a llow-

ing- to-presence . Presence , th e prese n t , a l ready bears it se l f in re la tion to

pas t an d fu tu re , bu t no t i n t he conven t iona l s ense o f s er ia l du ra t ion ,

success ive " no w s," bu t ra ther in the sense of las t ing , ab id ing . What isp re sen t conce rns u s hum an be ings as wha t , l as ti ng, comes toward u s .

P re sence means : t he cons t a n t ab id ing tha t ap p roaches man , r eaches

h im, is ex t end ed tow ard h im. 44 B u t p r e senc ing is no t co n f ined to w ha t

i s p r e sen t ; i n f ac t , t he manne r o f p r e senc ing o f pa s t and fu tu re i s p r e -

c ise ly absence : be ing no t -y e t -prese n t , be ing no- longer -presen t . Both

con cer n us by app roac hing us in a rec iproca l re la t ion which br ings

abo u t t he p re sen t . The un i ty o f time ' s th r ee d imens ions cons is t s i n

the in t e rp l ay o f each tow ard each , and th is i n t e rp l ay is i t s e lf a fou r t h

d ime ns ion o f t ime . I t i s t he in t e rp l ay o f p r e sen t , pa s t, and fu tu re , o f

p re senc ing in absence wh ich ho lds each o f t he m apa r t and , t hus opene d ,

ho lds t hem nea r t o one ano the r . Thus the g iv ing wh ich gives t ime is an

ope ning whic h nears, as ex tendin g . 4s I t keep s ope n w hat has been by

denying i t s advent as p resen t . What has no t ye t been i s he ld open in

t h e a p p r o a c h c o m i n g fr o m t h e f u t u r e b y w i t h h o l d i n g t h e p r e s e nt i n

the app roac h . 4~ The g iv ing of t im e has the charac te r o f den ia l and wi th-

ho ld ing :

Ti m e is not ; the re is, i t g ives t im e. Th e giving tha t gives t im e isde t e r min ed by deny ing and wi thh o ld ing nea rnes s. I t g r an t s t he

openn ess o f t ime- space and p re se rves wha t r ema ins den ied in wha thas been , w hat is wi thhe ld in ap proa ch . We ca ll th i s g iv ing wh ich

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g iv e s t r u e t i m e a n e x t e n d i n g w h i c h o p e n s a n d c o n c e a ls . A s e x -ten din g i t i s i t se l f a g iv ing, the g iv ing of a g iv ing is co nc eal ed int rue t ime . 47

Bu t h a v in g t h o u g h t t h e g iv in g w h i c h g i v es Be i n g a s " d e s t i n y , " a n d

the g iv ing wh ich g ives t ime as ex tend ing , have we shed l igh t on the I t

w h i c h - g iv e s Be i n g a n d t i m e ? H a s t h e p r o b l e m o f l a n g u ag e w e e n -

c o u n t e r e d a t fi rs t b e e n o v e r c o m e ? T o t h is e x t e n t : t h a t t h e r e ha s b e -

c o m e m a n i f e s t t h e w a y t h a t t h e t w o , Be i n g a n d t i m e , a re d e li v e r ed o v e r

t o o n e a n o t h e r i n w h a t is m o s t th e i r o w n . " W h a t d e t e r m i n e s b o t h ,

Be ing and t ime , in the i r ow n, tha t i s in the i r be long ing- tog e ther , we cal l

Ereignis, t h e e v e n t o f A p p r o p r i a t i o n . ''48 Ereignis n a m e s t h e m a t t e r - t o -b e - t h o u g h t , w h a t b r in g s Be i n g a n d t i m e i n to t h e i r o w n a n d h o l d s a n d

m a i n t a i n s t h e m i n t h e i r b e l o n g i n g - to g e t h e r . Ereignis n a m e s t h e " I t "

wh ich g ives Be ing and t ime . At th is po in t , how eve r , He ide gger b r ings

u s u p sh o r t b y t e ll in g u s t h a t t h is s t a t e m e n t is c o r r e c t , y e t u n t r u e - i t

c o n c e a l s t h e m a t t e r t o b e t h o u g h t a s A p p r o p r i a t i o n . 49 F o r n o w w e

se e m t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e " I t " n o t a s a b e i n g b u t a s a n e v e n t , r a t h e r t h a n

t h i n k i n g " I t " i n t e r m s o f A p p r o p r i a t i o n a s t h e e x t e n d i n g a n d d e s t in i n g

w h i c h o p e n s u p a n d p r e se r v e s. W e t h i n k w e k n o w w h a t a n e v e n t is , b u t

d o w e ? I m p a s s e ? N o , aporia; t he re i s more .

I n th i n k i n g Be i n g a n d t i m e a s A p p r o p r i a t i o n w e h a v e le a r n e d so m e -

t h in g a b o u t w h a t w e t h o u g h t w e k n e w - t h e w a y in w h i c h o c c u r r e n c e

h a p p e n s :

. . . namely , tha t to g iv ing as send ing the re be longs keep ing bac k

- su c h t h a t t h e d e n i al o f t h e p r e se n t a n d t h e w i t h h o l d i n g o f t h ep r e se n t , p l a y w i t h i n t h e g iv in g o f w h a t h as b e e n a n d w h a t w i ll b e .W h a t w e m e n t i o n e d j u s t n o w - k e e p i n g b a c k , w i t h h o l d i n g , d e n ia l- sh o w s so m e t h i n g l ik e a se l f -w i t h d r aw i n g , so m e t h i n g w e m i g h tc al l f o r sh o r t : w i t h d r a w a l . Bu t i n a s m u c h a s t h e m o d e s o f g iv in gt h a t a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y w i t h d r a w a l - s e n d i n g a n d e x t e n d i n g - l iei n A p p r o p r i a t i o n , w i t h d r a w a l m u s t b e l o n g t o w h a t is p e c u l i a r t ot h e A p p r o p r i a t i o n . s~

S u c c i n c t l y , A p p r o p r i a t i n g e x p r o p r i a t e s i t s e lf o f i ts e lf . I t w i t h d r a w s

w h a t is m o s t f u l ly it s o w n f r o m b o u n d l e s s u n c o n c e a l m e n t . By t h is

e x p r o p r i a t i o n , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o A p p r o p r i a t i o n a s su c h , i t d o e s n o t

ab an do n i t se l f - r a the r , i t p r ese rves w ha t i s i t s own . s l

By l o o k i n g t h r o u g h Be i n g a n d t i m e w e h av e c a u g h t a g l im p se o f w h a t

t h e e v e n t o f A p p r o p r i a t i o n m e a n s . Bu t is t h is m e a n i n g a n y t h i n g m o r e

t h a n a " t h o u g h t - c o n s t r u c t ? " W h a t ca n w e s a y a b o u t t h e r e su l t o f o u r

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attempt to think the meaning of the "It" which gives Being and time

as Appropriat ion?

Only this: Appropriation appropriates. Saying this, we say theSame in terms of the Same about the Same. To all appearances,all this says nothing. It does indeed say nothing so long as wehear a mere sentence in what was said, and expose that sentenceto the cross-examination of logic. But what if we take what wassaid and adopt it unceasingly as the guide for our thinking, andconsider that this Same is not even anything new, but the oldestof the old in Western thought: that ancient something which con-ceals itself in a-letheia? That which is said before all else by thisfirst of all the leit-motifs of thinking gives voice to a bond thatbinds all thinking, providing that thinking submits to the call ofwhat mus t be thought, s2

Ereignis, the event of Appropriation, thought as the "It" which

- gives Being and time, means the destiny of extending the Open

which allows beings to c0me-to-presence. Of the essence of this giving

which allows beings to presence is withdrawal. The unhiddenness of

beings is given only amid the concealing of the giving so that what is

most its own, the giving itself, is preserved. The giving which gives

Being and Time cannot give its own-most, and therefore is a finite

giving. This f ini tude which is itself of the essence of Ereignis is ex-

propriation, and belongs to it as much as the giving which allows beings

to presence. It is necessary, in a sense more ultimate than the necessity

of logic, which is always consequent to the relations which it governs.

Therefore, Ereignis as the giving which withdraws cannot be said in

statements according to the logic of metaphysics. The giving which

preserves its ownmost in giving by withdrawing is always only theSame in its allowing (beings)-to-differ. As a result, when we say the

Same in terms of the Same about the Same, we say the oldest of the

old, we say the unhiddenness which preserves itself so as to retain the

giving which is its ownmost in favor of the destiny which extends the

Open and allows beings to differ, i.e. to come to presence as what they

are. We say Aletheia, the happening of Truth which guides and binds

all thinking to the event of giving/withdrawing. The thinking which

is responsive to the call of the matter-to-be-thought, Ereignis/Aletheia,is guided by and bound to this matter in such a way that its task is to

cease all overcoming and leave metaphysics to itself, because in over-

coming metaphysics it remains guided by and bound to metaphysics

rather than to its own proper matter. In ceasing to overcome meta-

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physics thought is freed for its proper task, "unceasingly to overcome

the obstacles that tend to render such a saying (of It in terms of It

about It) inadequate," in the way that Heidegger sees the saying ofAppropriation in the form of the lecture remaining itself an obstacle

of this kind. The lecture itself has spoken merely in propositional state-

ments, and in this sense remains an obstacle to be overcome.

To cease all overcoming of metaphysics so as unceasingly to over-

come the obstacles to saying adequately the meaning of Appropriation

in terms o f It about It, the Same which is the oldest of the old, Ereig-

nis/Aletheia, the event o f t ruth which allows beings-to-differ in the

saying of the Same - a formidable task. Perhaps the sort of task, the

unswerving posing of ultimate questions, to which Gadamer wished to

counterpose the need, equally urgent, for a sense of what is doable,

what is possible here and now? Certainly both are necessary. Certainly

Ereignis/Aletheia and die Virtualiti~t des Sprechens are in some impor-

tant sense the "same" in that both attempt to say the way every event

of truth happens in language as unhiddenness, or the unconcealing of

beings occurring amid the perduring concealment of their coming into

presence. Yet it is equally certain that Heidegger and Gadamer speak of

truth quite diffe rently, each in a way appropriate to the task dictatedby the question which opens before them the way to their destination.

For Heidegger, that task is to leave-off overcoming the language of

metaphysics, its Seinsvergessenheit, and leave metaphysics to itself so

as unceasingly to overcome the obstacles to saying adequately the

meaning of Ereignis/Aletheia in its own terms as he attempted to do

in Zeit und Sein and demands be done again. For Gadamer, the task is

to coun terpose to the will of man, ever-mounting in utopian or eschato-

logical consciousness, a critique of what has been, the t ruth o f remem-

brance: what still and yet again is real. Virtuality is the inexhaustible

possibilities of saying anew the meaning that is at work in what has

been said or made or done by conversation with the work, once the

"middle ground" which the work and the one who seeks to under-

stand share has been entered. This middle ground is language embody-

ing itself as tradition in its questionability. Virtuality is the possibility

of appropriating tradition in an event of truth which happens in lan-

guage as conversation. Gadamer's task demands unceasing conversa-

tion with tradition. For Heidegger, despite the massive evidence of thefruitfulness of his own conversation with the tradition, this always re-

mains a secondary task; remembrance is only instrumental. Once at-

tention has been reawakened, it turns to listen, not to what remains

unsaid in what has been said, but to what is yet to be said in its own

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terms. Both tasks are "unceasing." Both listen to and say what is always

the Same in terms of the Same about the Same. Yet the manner of say-

ing is different: not in some trivial or idiosyncratic sense, but in a waythat itself pertains to the nature of the truth which happens in the

saying. Truth: saying the Same about the Same in terms of the Same,

differently. This is the subject matter which determines the relation of

Heidegger's thought to Gadamer's. What now, apart from this specific

relation, can we say about that matter itself. What do dusk and dawn

have to do with truth?

III

Gadamer has asked whether, faced with the coming-on of the "cosmic

night of the forgetfulness of being," one is permitted to look back

toward the last rays of dusk as the sun sets in the evening sky instead

of turning about to watch out for the first shimmer of its return. We

now have a clearer idea o f what this question means concretely for the

relation o f Gadamer to Heidegger in terms of the way each thinks and

speaks about truth. This relation is one of difference amid sameness,and we find that this characteristic pertains not merely or even primari-

ly to a relation between persons or "philosophies" but has to do with

the nature of truth itself. What is it about the event of truth that al-

lows it to occur as the saying of the Same about the Same in terms of

the Same, differently? As Ereignis/Aletheia for Heidegger and as die

Virtualita't des Sprechens for Gadamer? As the truth of remembrance

memorialized in the lingering with the fading light of dusk, as opposed

to the watchful a ttent ion that awaits the overcoming of dark forgetful-

ness by the dawn o f a new lighting? How do we say this inner charac-

teristic of tru th that allows the Same to differ? Perhaps by allowing it

to give itself to us in our thinking in a diffe rent word - now not truth,

but freedom. Perhaps the relation of Gadamer's thought to Heidegger's

is best understood not in terms of the question of truth but rather of

freedom. Perhaps the question of whether "it is permitted" to linger

with the dusk rather than turn to watch out for the dawn of truth can

only be answered when we recognize that all human being-free-from

and being-free-for, and therefore free- to-differ within the Same oftruth, is given by a giving which is also a "free ing."

In the context of Heidegger's thought, the suggestion we are making

here could be viewed as follows. The question of freedom is to be

thought in terms of Ereignis/Aletheia, understood as giving Time (ex-

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tend ing the Open) and Be ing (des t iny ) and the re by b ind ing and gu id ing

th ou gh t to i t se l f as the m at te r to -b e- thou ght . This "g iv ing" resolves i t-

s e l f t hen to t he ques t ion o f f r eedom as origin and destiny. Ereignis/Aletheia i s o r ig ina t ive g iv ing of Time and Being as the hor izon of pos-

s ib il i ty for h um an be ing- in- the-wor ld . I t f rees Time and Being by ap-

propr ia t ing them f i r s t to each o ther and then secondar i ly to Dase in , a l l

the whi le concea l ing i t se l f as the f ree ing-giv ing . Fre ed om is the w ork ing

ou t o f the i ssues of o r ig in and des t iny : a n or ig in wh ich is a g iving mo re

or ig ina l than the iden t i f ica t ion of an y causal com plex or agent ; a des ti -

ny wh ich is th e rece iv ing of a g iv ing m ore u l t im ate th an any f ina l de te r-

m ina t io n or des t in a t ion in the sense of an ending p lace . What i s re-

qu i red in ask ing ho w t ru t h can be a say ing of the Same d i f fe ren t ly is

the wo rk ing ou t o f the s t ruc tu re o f a g iving and receiv ing , a reveal ing

and concea ling , an o r ig ina t ing and des t in ing wh ich i s t he mo s t app rop -

r i at e wo rk and ow n-mo s t p l ay o f T ru th ha ppen ing as an even t.

Fo r Gadam er , t he ques t ion o f t r u th in it s i nne r r e l a tion to f r eedom ,

can be pu t i n t e rms o f die Virtualitat des Sprechens. As we have seen,

v i r tua l i t y names the inne r cha rac t e r o f die Mitre der Sprache, t he on -

to log ica l openness of language which a l lows conversa t ion wi th the

t rad i t io n to po in t to and ind ica te the limi t less poss ib il i ti es for me anin gtoward wh ich und e r s t and ing has it s bea r ing , w i tho u t be ing ab le t o

br ing in to language these meanings in the i r "wholeness . " This pos-

sibi l ity resides , in G ada me r 's view, in w hat he term s the " logical pr ior i-

t y o f t he ques t ion . " Eve ry " answ er" is expe r i enced by he rmene u t i ca l

consc iousness as an answer to a ques t ion , and therefore the " log ic"

which governs every hor izon of answer ing rece ives i t s de te rmina t ion

f rom the ques t ion which or ig ina tes i t . I t i s p rec ise ly in th is sense tha t

i t c an be s a id t ha t , fo r Gadamer , t he ques t ion i s " more t rue" t han any

answer to i t. T he charac te r i s tic o f f i rs t be ing " in que s t io n" f rees Under -

s t and ing fo r t he p o in t ing to and ind ica t ing o f a v i rt ua l who le o f mean-

ing whe re in t he t ru th o f eve ry answer is t o be sough t . The f r eeing o f

u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r t r u t h b y i ts e n t e ri n g u p o n t h e c o m m o n g r o u n d o f

l anguage opened to i t by the ques t ion wh ich o r ig ina t e s conve r sa t ion

be tween in t e rp re t e r and the work wh ich s t ands in t r ad i t i on , t he reby

des t in ing i t fo r the poss ib i l i ty of answers which found i t s h i s to ry ,

m e a n s t h a t die Virtualitdt des Spreehens n a m e s f o r G a d a m e r n o t

s imp ly the happ en ing o f t r u th in unde r s t an d ing bu t a lso t he be long ing -toge the r i n he rm eneu t i ca l consc iousness o f t r u th and f r e edom in a way

tha t is pe rhaps bes t c ap tu red by a s t a t em en t f rom ne i the r Gadam er no r

He idegger , bu t t he p oe t R i lke :

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...I want to beg you, as much as I can, dear friend, to be patienttoward all that is unsolved in your heart and try to love the ques-

tions themselves, like locked rooms and like books that are writtenin a very foreign tongue. Do not now seek to have the answers,which cannot be given to you because you would not be able tolive them. And the point is, to live everything. Live the questionsnow. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, livealong some distant way in to the answer, s3

Is it possible that the naming together of truth and freedom points

us toward another way of naming "the oldest of the old," in the idiom

of a different voice and tradition? Can that which guide s and binds

human existence to itself as its original destiny in the mystery of giving

and receiving, and which has sometimes been characterized as "eternal"

because it can as little be thought of "in time" as either truth or free-

dom, be given a d ifferent name which says the same, the mystery of

love? This is to suggest not that "love," as yet unthought and unspoken

here, is what Gadamer and Heidegger are "really" speaking of, but

rather that truth as the saying of the Same, differently, and freedom,

as the giving and receiving which allows this saying to happen, can be

thought in a superabundance of which the relation of Gadamer'sthought to Heidegger's is one unique yet humble epiphany. It would, I

think, come dangerously close to sentimentality to speak too easily

here of thinking and understanding as a work of love, but perhaps this

much can be said: the relation that exists between philosophers stands

on the ground first opened up by the human questions of truth and

freedom. To reduce the understanding of this relation to a comparison

of "philosophies" and to engage in debates about their "correctness"

or "errancy" is to betray the possibility for truth which such under-

standing offers. Such reductionism is born of the fear of a relativistic

permissiveness. It amounts only to intolerance of the human, and

constitutes a surrender of freedom to the shrinking effect of a mean-

spiritedness which is unwilling to pay the price of freedom's capacity.

This applies not only to the way we understand the relation of Gada-

mer's though t to Heidegger's, but also to the relation of hermeneutical

thought to that of Wittgenstein, for example, and the style of language-

analysis he practiced. The timely challenge for philosophy now is to

unders tand the difference bet ween such ways of thinking amid theirsimilarities, without minimizing or obscuring either, in the service of

that genuine human freedom which seeks the integrity of truth.

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NOTES

1. H.-G, Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundztige einer philosophischenHermeneutik (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1960) 2. Auflage, with author's Vorwort

to that edition, 1965. English translation, Truth and Method (New York:

Seabury Press, 1975) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming. For the sake of

convenient reference, I have generally followed this translation and given the

page number of the German text and then the English, except where philo-

sophical accuracy or clarity seemed to require otherwise, as in the case of this

citation from the Vorwort to 2. Auflage, p. xxv. I have indicated such depar-

tures as my own translation.

2. H.-G. Gadamer, "Zur Problematik des Selbstverst/indnisses," Kleine Schriften,I

(Ttibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967), pp. 74-75 . English translation by David E.

Linge, "On the Problem of Self-understanding," in Philo soph ical Herrneneutics

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 50.

3. Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960).

Translated by Albert Hofstadter as "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry,

Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 17-87. All

references are to this translation. The remark quoted here from Heidegger's

Preface is cited by Hofstadter, along with important bibliographical informa-

tion, in the References for this translation, pp. xxiii-xxiv. The "Introduction"

by H.-G. Gadamer mentioned is translated by David E. Linge as "Heidegger's

Later Philosophy," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 213-228. All references

are to this translation, hereafter cited simply as "Introduction."

4. Gadamer, Introduction, p. 224.

5. Ibid., p. 226,

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 225.

8. Ibid., p. 227.

9. Ibid.

I0. Heidegger, "Origin," p. 72.

11. Gadamer, Introduction, p. 228. What both Heidegger and Gadamer are re-

ferring to here, I would suggest, is the radical meaning of what has been tra-

ditionally recognized as the transforming power of metaphor, properly under-

stood. Poetic language is characterized primarily by its capacity to reveal new

possibilities for meaning in what unpoetic experience takes to be the ordinary

familiarity of the commonplace. "Metaphor" names the essence of this trans-

forming capacity not just in poetic language, but in all language in its origin.

Metaphor is the "original" way language "works ,"

12. Heidegger, "Origin," p. 73.

13. Ibid., p. 75.

t4. Gadamer, Int roduction, p. 228; emphasis added.

15. Heidegger, "Origin," p. 86

16, Martin I-Ieidegger, Identitii t und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), Englishtranslation, Identity and Difference, by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper

and Row, 1969). For an enlightening etymological discussion of the meaning

of Ereignis in Heidegger's thought, see Hofstadter's Introduction to Poetry,Language, Thought, pp. xix-xxii.

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17. See, in gene ral , He idegg er ' s Unterwegs zur Sprache (P fu l l ingen : Neske , 1959 ) ,

Eng l i sh t r ans l a t ion , On the Way to Language, e d i t e d b y P e t e r D . H e r t z ( N e w

Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 71 ). I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e a d e r i s d i r e c t e d t o t h ee s s a y , " T h e W a y t o L a n g u a g e , " i n t h a t c o l l e c t i o n w h e r e H e i d e g g e r m a k e s t h e

com m e n t in a no te on p . 260 (g erm an ; 129 eng l i sh ) : " I t m ay appear unbe l i ev -

ab le to m a ny tha t t he au th o r has been u s ing in h i s m an uscr ip t s t he word

Ereignis...for m o re than 25 year s . What i t r e fe r s t o , t hough in i t se l f som e th ing

s i m p l e , c o n t in u e s f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g s o m e t h i n g d i f f ic u l t t o t h in k . F o r t h o u g h t

m us t f i r s t d i sac cus tom i t se l f f rom s l ipp ing back in to the idea tha t he re i t i s

" B e i n g " t h a t i s c o n c e i v e d a s Ereignis. T he Ereignis i s i n t r in s i ca l ly d i f fe ren t i n

i t s ri c h ne s s f r o m a n y c o n c e i v a bl e m e t a p h y s i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f B ei ng . B e in g ,

on the o the r hand , can be though t , a s r egards the der iv a t ion o f i t s essence , i n

t e r m s o f Ereignis."

1 8. H e i d e g g er , " O r i g i n , " p . 8 7 ( " A d d e n d u m " ) .

19 . Heidegger , Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 262 (131) .

2 0 . G a d a m e r , Wahrheit und Methode, p . 4 6 5 ; t r a n s l a t io n m y o w n .

21 . Ib id . , 419 (401 ) .

22 . Ib id . , 426 (408 ) .

23 . Ib id . , p . 434 ; t r an s l a t ion m y own .

24 . Ib id .

25 . Ib id .

2 6 . T h e d i f f e r e n c e w i l l b e e x p l i c a t e d in s e c t i o n I I b e l o w i n t e r m s o f t h e c o n t r a s t

o f "Virtualitiit" a n d "Ereignis"; t h e s i m i l a r i ty r e si d e s p r i n c i p a ll y in G a d a m e r

a n d H e i d e g g e r 's sh a r e d i n s is t e n c e t h a t h u m a n f i n i t u d e c a n o n l y b e u n d e r s t o o d

i n t e r m s o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e h u m a n a n d B e i ng , a n d n o t

vice versa.

2 7 . G a d a m e r , Wahrheit undMethode, p . 438 (419 ) .

28 . Ib id .

2 9 . S e e G a d a m e r ' s e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f S o c r a t i c d i a l o g u e i n Wahrheit

und Methocle, p p . 3 4 4 - 5 0 ( 3 2 5 - 3 3 ) .

3 0 . G a d a m e r , Wahrheit und Methode, p . 250 (235 ) .

31 . See Par t I I I o f Wahrheit und Methode, " T h e O n t o l o g i c a l S h i f t o f H e r m e n e u -

t i c s G u i d e d b y L a n g u a g e , " w h e r e G a d a m e r ' s a t t e m p t s t o s t a te hi s m o s t b a s i c

p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m i t t m e n t s r e g a r di n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e h e r m e n e u t i c a l p h e -

n o m e n o n .

3 2 . G a d a m e r , Wahrheit und Methode, p . x x i ii ; t r a n s l a t i o n a n d e m p h a s i s m y o w n .

3 3 . A l t h o u g h t h e s e e l e m e n t s o f G a d a m e r ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s f o r m t h e

h o r i z o n f o r t h e s e c t i o n o f Wahrheit und Methode t ha t ca r r i es t h i s t i t l e (Par t

I I I ) , t h e y a r e n o t c o n c i s e l y p r e s e n t e d t h e r e . T h e f o r m u l a t i o n s t h a t f o l l o w a r e

s y n o p s e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t s c a r r i e d o u t t h r o u g h o u t t h a t w o r k , a n d i n c e r t a i n

cases, in o th er wo rks o f h i s.

3 4 . 1 9 5 9 a n d 1 9 6 0 r e s p e c t iv e l y ; G a d a m e r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Der Ursprung w as

a l so wr i t t en a t t h i s t im e .

3 5 . G a d a m e r , Wahrheit und Methode, p p . x x v - x x v i ; t ra n s l a ti o n m y o w n .36 . Mar t in He idegger , "Ze i t und Se in" , g iven as a l ec tu re on January 31 , 1962:

E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n b y J o a n S t a m b a u g h i n , On Time and Being, N e w Y o r k :

H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 72 . S e e " R e f e r e n c e s " t o t hi s v o l u m e f o r p u b l i c a t i o n

h i s to ry o f t he G erm an t ex t ', a l l c i t a t ions a re f rom th i s t r an s l a t ion .

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5 3

37. Ibid., p . 2.

38. Ibid.

39 . Ib id . , pp . 3 -4 .40. Ibid., p . 5 ; emp hasis ad ded.

41. Ibid., p . 19.

42. Ibid., p . 8.

43 . Ib id . , pp . 8 - 10 .

44. Ibid., p . 12.

45. Ibid., p . 15.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p . 16.

48. Ibid., p . 19.

49. Ibid., p . 20.50. Ibid., p . 22.

51. Ib id . , pp . 22 -2 3 .

52. Ibid., p . 24.

53. Rainer Maria Rilke, Letters to a Young Poet, t ranslated by M.D. Her ter Nor ton

( N e w Y o r k : N o r to n , 1 9 3 4 ) , p p , 3 3 - 3 4 .

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