AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

A STUDY OF

MARITIME SECURITY IN A POST 9-11 WORLD

PAPER SUBMITTED TO PROFESSOR SINE MARITIME LOGISTICS CLASS

NW550-KA

BY

JAMES ALBANI

STUDENT #1010653 12-February-2004

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 2. NEW FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS A. The IMO and the USGC address Maritime Security.

B. Enforcement of the new security regulations. C. What these regulations set out to accomplish.

3. SHIPBOARD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ISPS CODE:

SECURITY LEVELS, ASSESSMENTS, PLANS & OFFICERS

A. Ship security levels. B. The ship security assessment, (SSA). C. The ship security plan, (SSA) an overview. D. Major points of the ship security plan, (SSP). E. The ship security officer, (SSO).

4. SHIP MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO MEET THE

SECURITY PLAN

A. The ship security alert system. B. The automatic identification system, (AIS). C. IMO Hull numbering requirements. D. Additional possible modifications: CBR-D decontamination stations, deep shelter, etc. E. Considering access limiting modifications.

5. WHAT PRICE SECURITY?

A. Financial considerations. B. Added crew workload, fatigue and stress. C. The Guardian Mariner program. D. The cost of non-compliance.

6. SOME PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SHIPBOARD SECURITY

A. Controlling access. B. Controlling lighting. C. Establishing perimeter, zones, and barriers. D. Considering small arms for defensive purposes.

E. Foster an awareness and vigilance in the ships crew.

7. CONCLUSION 8. SOURCES CONSULTED

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1. INTRODUCTION From its beginning as a nation, the United States has always been faced with organizations, or factions that wished us harm. From religious fanatics who saw us as the great Satan, or as a result of foreign policy decisions made by one administration or the other, there has never been a shortage of groups wishing us harm. Until recently, most Americans were for the most part unaware how deep some of this hatred ran. All that changed with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. We as a nation were stunned by this new reality. A reality that showed just how much of a soft target, segments of our society are. Since September 11th, we have seen a myriad of government plans and programs enacted in an effort to minimize our nation’s vulnerability to terrorism. Some of these solutions that have been instituted seem to be more of a knee jerk result of political expediency, with questionable anti-terrorism value at best. While other security programs are more realistic in terms of what they hope to accomplish and how they hope to accomplish it. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 falls into the latter category. Congress, recognizing how shipping is our economic lifeblood, tasked the United States Coast Guard as part of the recently formed Department of Homeland Security, with developing a comprehensive plan that looks at, and addresses security weaknesses in our maritime infrastructure. From ship and cargo security, to port and terminal security, The Marine Transportation Security Act encompasses it all. Since shipping is inherently international in nature, the Coast Guard quickly realized that a national approach to maritime security would be futile. To that end they worked with the International Maritime organization, (IMO) to develop comprehensive maritime security measures. This resulted in the creation of the IMO’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). This code along with some associated IMO amendments is global in scope. The United States, as a signatory to IMO, helped in formulating the ISPS Code. Apart from some additional regulatory reporting requirements, the U.S. Coast Guards Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, essentially mirror’s the IMO code. It’s worth mentioning at this time, that all IMO member nation vessels must meet the IMO codes as a baseline, they are free to add additional requirements, as is the case with the Coast Guard requiring some additional reporting requirements. As previously mentioned the ISPS Code and the USCG’s Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 essentially mirror each other. In the area of shipboard security requirements they are identical. Since that ISPS Code is global in scope, I chose to focus on that code. Both the MTSA and the ISPS Codes are all encompassing, covering facility, port and terminal security as well as shipboard security. My research looks at the shipboard aspects of these new security regulations only. Perhaps at a later date, I will study the security aspects on the other side of the pier head. One cannot understand the needs of shipboard security without looking at the ISPS Code requirements, specifically

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the various elements required of a ship security plan. To that end, the first section of this paper will briefly outline the Ship Security Plan, (SSP) requirements. Instituting these regulations aboard ship should help foster an awareness in the ships crew of the need for the vessel to be able to protect herself against unlawful acts that may threaten her on the world’s oceans. The latter half of this report will look at other additional aspects of shipboard security, the more nut and bolts type of stuff from access control, lighting, training, drills, and arming of crewmembers, etc. I believe it is these latter security measures that will determine of your ship and her crew can repel an attack if they are ever called to do so. Finally, I will end my report with some additional insights and predictions for the future of shipboard security. Since the new ISPS Code and MTSA regulations will not be enacted till several months after this research is submitted, it is not possible to look at any actual shortcomings to these new regulations. They have to be given time to test their effectiveness. However, I am going to take the liberty and address what I see as possible inadequacies, and areas for improving shipboard maritime security. 2. NEW FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

A. The IMO and the USCG address maritime security. The attacks on the world trade center acted as a catalyst for change in the way the United States and much of the world looks at the terrorist threat. Two organizations that were forced to face security inadequacies that have long existed under their purview were the International Maritime Organization, (IMO) and the United Stated Coast Guard, (USCG). The IMO, which as a body of the United Nations, has long established many regulations and rules that focused on vessel and crew safety, such as the 1974 SOLAS Convention;(Safety of Life at Sea Convention). This convention set international safety standards that all signatories must meet. Similarly, as the world developed more of an awareness of the environmental impacts world shipping has on its oceans, IMO developed baseline requirements that ships must meet on the environmental front with amendments to the SOLAS Convention that address pollution and environmental issues. The United States, as a signatory to IMO falls under the rules and regulations that this organization develops. In many instances the United States will ad additional requirements on top of the IMO standards. The USCG, as the federal maritime agency is tasked with enforcement of these regulations.

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After more than a years worth of intense work by the IMO’s maritime safety committee, the IMO meeting at it’s headquarters in London adopted a comprehensive maritime security measure know as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, (ISPS Code) on December 13, 2002. This code is set to enter into force in July 2004, and will apply to all ships over 500 gross tons. 1

The IMO has had reasons to be concerned of threats to shipping from terrorism, piracy, and other unlawful acts committed on the high seas. International shipping has always faced bandits, pirates and terrorist acts. In more recent years, one may recall the 1992 pirating of the English tanker, Valiant Carrier off of Malaysia’s southern tip, 2 the 2002 bombing of the French Tanker Limburg, or the 1985 terrorist highjacking of the cruise ship Achille Laurio. These may seem like isolated incidents, yet they are not, since 1984 over 300 merchant ships have been attacked in the Persian Gulf Alone, and more than 200 crewmen have been killed. 3 Ship seizures, Piracy, and sabotage have occurred with alarming regularity for decades. Not much of a fuss is made about it overall, in fact the vast majority of these unlawful attacks and molestation of merchant ships goes unnoticed. Unless one is inclined to read some of the international shipping journals, one would assume these are isolated and rare incidents. The American media, being as it is, rarely mentions such incidents unless there is a US citizen, or National interest involved. As was the case of the Achille Laurio, in which an elderly American was taken hostage and murdered, or the latter in which the Limburg was attacked soon after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. B. Enforcement of the new security regulations. One might ask how is it that the IMO has any power to enforce the regulations and policies it implements? The answer is simple and effective. The IMO, as an organization is made up of the vast majority of the world’s seafaring nations. These signatories, or contracting governments as they are called, are bound by these regulations and policies they as a group create. IMO members, recognizing the need for safety regulations as an example, abide by them. The real issues arise with the few maritime countries that are not signatories to the IMO. These remaining nations, although not signatories to IMO realize that their ships are still held to the same standard when their vessels are calling on the ports of IMO signatory countries.

1. American Bureau of Shipping, Security Bulletin, Ship Security and the ISPS Code, September 2003 [bulletin on-line], accessed 8 December 2003, available at http://www.eagle.org/news/pubs/bulletins/security.pdf,1. 2. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), 39. 2.Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 7.

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As an example, the United States as an IMO member country, can deny a non-IMO members vessel entrance to it’s ports, and/or can seize the ship depending on the severity of violations to the IMO Regulations. That is not to say non-IMO member nations are denied access to American ports and by extension U.S. Markets, just that they are held to the same standard. In truth these non-signatory ships are quite often scrutinized more. The ISPS Code has a mandatory part A and a suggested part B that contains added guidance. The Coast Guard however has issued interim rules (33 CFR Subchapter H) required by the MTSA of 2002 that all ships entering the United States comply with both parts A and B of the code. 4 The American Bureau of Shipping recently estimated that there are almost 43,000 ships and mobile offshore drilling units, in service worldwide that will need to comply with these requirements. 5 Presently the vast majority of ships calling on U.S. ports are from IMO member nations. Although the Federal Government has yet to say it, with the implementation of the IMO’s International ship and Port Facility Code set to enter into force on July 1st, 2004, I would not be at all surprised to see our government specify all ships calling on U.S. ports will be a party to IMO standards. The reason I am confident in saying this is the fact that the, .U.S Coast Guard under the Department of Homeland security, was tasked with developing a federal maritime security plan. The Coast Guard’s Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 mirrors the IMO’s ISPS Code. That said, if a ship calling on Boston for example, is not in compliance with IMO, then it is not in compliance with the U.S. Coast Guard. In this new security threat environment we face with yellow, orange and red alerts, I would not want to be a master of a ship calling on said port and not be in compliance, at the very least my port visit would be a most unpleasant one, if I am allowed to enter port at all. C. What these regulations set out to accomplish. The IMO’s, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the USCG’s, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, along with some minor amendments to SOLAS relating to terrorism and piracy, should go a long way to deterring all but the most determined. The regulations when properly applied, will better prepare the ships crew to deal with minimum threats. However these requirements will in no way guarantee the vessel is safe and free from all forms of molestation. If one thinks about it, there exist no vessel in the world that is so well protected that it’s defenses cannot be penetrated.

4. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, vii, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf 5. American Bureau of Shipping, Security Bulletin, Ship Security and the ISPS Code, September 2003 [bulletin on-line], accessed 8 December 2003, available at http://www.eagle.org/news/pubs/bulletins/security.pdf,1.

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Consider the 2000 attack on the USS Cole as an example, a warship not a merchantman. To put it another way, no ship can ever achieve perfect 100% security, although they should aim for it. 6

3. SHIPBOARD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ISPS CODE: SECURITY LEVELS, ASSESSMENTS, PLANS & OFFICERS. General Shipowners are required under the code to perform a ship security assessment on each of their vessels over 500 gross tons. From the information gathered during the assessment, they develop and implement a ship security plan for each applicable ship in their fleet. If the ship is one of a class of ships of the same type, most components of the ship security plan can be adopted to all ships in the same class. Upon the implementation of the ship security plan, an onboard audit is conducted by the flag states member government, or other recognized security organizations, such as Lloyds of London or the American Bureau of Shipping, for example. If the audit verifies that the ship is complying with the ISPS Code, the vessel with be issued an International Ship Security Certificate that is valid for 5 yrs. 7

The aforementioned issuing of an international ships security certificate by member governments or by a recognized security organization is one of the sticking points of the new code. The Coast Guard has emphatically stated that it does not want foreign flagged ships to submit security plans to it for review. One of the reasons is the shear volume of work involved in reviewing and auditing even a small percentage of the estimated 40,000 required foreign flagged ship security plans. 8 As is often the case, congress piles on additional major new missions, but fails to provide adequate funding and personnel needed to accomplish it. The House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation has challenged the Coast Guard repeatedly over what appears to be an inconsistency. The USCG is unwilling, and quite honestly unable to audit foreign flag security plan. ______________________________________________________________ 6. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 11. 7. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 88, 19.1.1.2, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf. 8. Dennis Bryant, “At Sea with U.S. Maritime Security”, Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, November 2003, 23.

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According to one of the principle authors of the MTSA of 2002, Representative Oberstar (D-MN), that is what the MTSA of 2002 requires. He summed up his feelings on the house floor on April 2, 2003 saying: “We {Congress} did not intend the security of the Nation to be placed in the hands of flag of convenience registers. We expect the Coast Guard to review the plans firsthand.” 9. I submit the good Congressman has a point, but as the saying goes; show me the money. A. Ship security levels. The ISPS Code approaches the security requirements facing a ship at any particular time with three different security levels. Part A of the code defines threes security levels for international use. They are as follows: -Security level 1, normal; the level at which ships and port facilities normally operate; 10 -Security level 2, heightened, the level applying for as long as there is a heightened risk of a security incident; 11 and -Security Level 3, exceptional, the level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident. 12 The setting of these various security levels depends on a variety of factors, from such things as the ships registry, it’s cargo, the routes in which it operates, the political and economic stability in the region or lack of it, a known history of security incidents in the region, intelligence information indicating a possible security threat, etc. All factors must be considered when setting security levels. The setting of such levels is the responsibility of Contracting Governments. When a ship is at a port or proceeding to a port of a contracting government, the Contracting Government has the right, under provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various security control and compliance measures with respect to the ship. 13 To be more succinct, the U.S Government (as an IMO Contracting Government) through the USGC can dictate any security level it deems appropriate for vessels calling on its ports. Additionally it can require additional measures above and beyond.

9. Dennis Bryant, “At Sea with U.S. Maritime Security”, Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, November 2003, 23. 10. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 76, 2.1.9, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf 11. ibid, 76, 2.1.10 12. ibid, 76, 2.1.11 13. ibid, 99, 1.14

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One only has to look at LNG ships calling on Everett, Massachusetts Distri-Gas Facility to witness this first hand what some of these additional measures look like. These massive vessels discharge cargo approximately twice a week at this facility. Well in advance of the ships arrival, over 50 federal, state, and local agencies working together perform various security checks, etc. Before the ship arrives at it’s berth, the State Police Dive team performs an underwater sweep of the dock and surrounding waters. As the ship transits from the sea buoy up the Mystic River to the Distri-Gas Berth, a moving heavily armed security perimeter, made up of USCG ships and helicopters, Massachusetts state police and helicopters, Boston Fire and Police Boats, etc. escort it along the way. Hidden sharpshooters line the shores of the mystic river, keeping a watchful eye out. About a half mile from the ships berth in must go under the Tobin Bridge. Before the Ship passes under the bridge, the bridge is shut down to all vehicle and pedestrian traffic, thus preventing someone from dropping an explosive or other device from the bridge onto the ships deck. This last point perhaps of all of them shows how seriously these agencies view this particular ships security. The Tobin bridge is the main northern artery out of Boston, deciding to shut it down to enhance an LNG Tankers security while it passes underneath could not have been made lightly. If you are accustomed to Boston drivers, you will understand what I mean. My work brings me to ExxonMobils Everett, Massachusetts terminal, where I perform safety and environmental vetting of refined product tankers before they discharge their cargo. This terminal is only yards away from the LNG Terminal. As you can imagine, ExxonMobils terminal and ships calling on it, have instituted new security measures based on the new realities we face today. The ISPS Code and MTSA have sections that apply to terminals, the security improvements I have witnessed at this terminal, are a direct result of this legislation. Although we have heavy security at this petroleum terminal, it pales in comparison to the LNG terminal for obvious reasons. A security incident at the ExxonMobil terminal could do tremendous damage to the immediate local area. However, some computer simulations have shown that a major security incident at the Distrigas LNG facility could wipe out much of the greater Boston area. “The detonation of 125,000 cubic meters of LNG has been estimated to be the equivalent of a nuclear blast larger than the one that destroyed Hiroshima.” 14 As Americans we can liken these ships security levels to the color code security levels that the Department of Homeland Security issues from time to time, Yellow, orange, etc. The average citizen may not be aware of it, but when the security threat code increases, many actions occur, mostly behind the scene, to improve security throughout society. ________________________________________________________________ 14. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 69-70.

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When a security threat color code change is issued by the department of Homelands security, it will have a direct impact the action that vessels calling on U.S. ports must take, such as raising the ships security level from one to level two for example. B. The ship security assessment, (SSA) As it’s name implies a ship security assessment, looks at all security aspects aboard ship. Each shipping company designates a company security officer, (CSO) who is tasked with performing these assessments aboard ship. The company security officer does not necessarily have to personally perform the assessments, but he is ultimately responsible to see that they are performed. 15 My years at sea have taught me that those best suited to assess the security of a particular ship are those that know the ship the best; the officers and crew who sail her. I can see utilizing the ships officers to formulate the security assessment for their ship. Recognizing the time constraints already imposed on those aboard ship, perhaps the senior relieving ships officers; (master, first mate, chief engineer and first Engineer) could be tasked to help with the assessment when they are shore side, during there time off ship. The assessment should address several areas that have a direct bearing on vessel security; these are but a few of the major ones that are applicable to all ships. Taking into account the general layout of the ship, they should address physical security, ways to restrict or minimize access to the vessel, or to restricted areas of the vessel such as machinery spaces and the navigation bridge. The location and function of the various access points aboard ship should be reviewed, with an critical eye toward how potential intruders might utilize each to breach security. A review of the vessel structural integrity should be conducted, with an eye toward utilizing such structures as potential barriers to intruders. For example, saboteurs, having gained access on deck can hopefully be stopped from gaining access to the house, (i.e.: accommodation spaces, engineering spaces and bridge).

15. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 111, 8.1 September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 19 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf

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The assessment should look at current procedural policies regarding ships in it’s fleet. Faced with an unlawful boarding or attack, most of the world’s ocean carriers have a policy of non-resistance. Many company managers still believe it is better to peaceably succumb to a piratical attack than to oppose it. 16

Unfortunately such policy decisions can be fatal to the crews who have to follow it out. Another aspect of this assessment should look at personnel protection systems, i.e. Small arms for vessel defense. For most vessels this is non existent, except for perhaps a pistol locked in the masters safe, but this pistol usually is intended more to keep an unruly crewmember in line should the need arise, not for defense against piracy. Most shipping companies traditionally have been loath to the though of arming their crews, but that to is slowly changing. Historically, the only defense one had against unauthorized boarders was a charged fire hose; personally, I would much prefer a loaded firearm. Radio and telecommunication systems should be evaluated, including computer systems and networks. As in other shipboard emergencies, the vital link to the out side world should be evaluated for their suitability during security incidents, whether in be a rocket propelled grenade attack from a swift boat, or an attempted boarding at sea. Additionally, one should also access the vulnerability of such systems to unauthorized use or tampering. Finally as mentioned previously each ship should be reviewed for particular areas of weakness that if breached, damaged or used for illicit use, would pose a risk to the ship, her cargo or her crew. 17 Once the assessment is completed, a report is generated outlining how the assessment was performed, descriptions of any weaknesses found in the vessels security are included, as well as methods and procedures that will be instituted to rectify these security shortcomings. 18 It should be pointed out that all contracting governments and Recognized security Organizations (the USCG and ABS for example) have guidelines on preparing such assessments, that are much more in-depth than what I mentioned above. It is not the intent of this author to regurgitate these guidelines but merely emphasize some of their important points.

16.Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 14. 17. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 112, 8.3.1-6, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf. 18. ibid, 114, 8.12.

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C. The ship security plan, (SSP) an overview. Based on the findings and information detailed during the work up of the Ships Security Assessment, the Ship specific security plan can be developed. The plan when it appears in it’s final form should consider all shipboard activities, from pier side cargo operations, at sea-speed steaming, lightering at anchor, etc. Additionally, these particular evolutions must be considered in the context under which the ship operates. While a threat may exist to one degree or another, the degree to which a ship is exposed to a particular threat determines its risk. I.e.: considerations when a VLCC is at anchorage in Valdez, Alaska would be vastly different from the same ship anchoring off the island of Singapore. The same security threat exists (unauthorized boarding) in both anchorages, however the risk associated with the latter port is considerably higher. 19 As mentioned above, the ship security plan is derived principally from what was learned in the assessment stage, and it should be understood that a large component of the assessment requires analyzing and considering various scenarios involving differing degrees of risk to the ship, her cargo and crew. As such, the security plan even though not explicitly spelled out, involves a certain amount of risk analyzes and assessment. With the thought of risk analyses in mind, It’s worth looking at existing standards regarding unauthorized access, once certain ship perimeters are breached. With most shipping companies worldwide, the corporate policy is one of non-resistance against pirate attacks, armed boarding’s, etc. This was the company policy when I was a ships officer in the Exxon/Esso fleet in the 1980,s and 1990’s and it still is today. 20 Many ships that traverse waters known for such attacks post placecards throughout the accommodations that emphasize the point to the crew:

“REMEMBER THAT THE BEST DEFENCE AGAINST PIRATE

ATTACK IS VIGILANCE. IF YOU ARE THREATENED BY ARMED MEN, IT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO RESIST THEM. IF PIRATES

SUCCEED IN ENTERING THE ACCOMODATION DO NOT PLACE YOURSELF OR OTHERS IN FURTHER DANGER BY RESISTING

OR ANTAGONIZING THE ATTACKERS” 21

_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 19. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 65. 20. Captain Mark Neeson, Master of the Exxon Tankship S/R Puget Sound, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January 2004. 21. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), 21.

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Such direct signage does not leave much for interpretation. As a crewmember you would be going against company policy if you defended yourself, your shipmates or your ship. It almost seems absurd to think that is the approach the managers in the office want those on board to take. The whole premise of such logic is based on the assumption that those unauthorized boarders, do not want to harm the ships officers and crew, perhaps they only want to pirate the ship, or they want to commandeer it, or who knows maybe they just hopped aboard to share a nice hot cup of tea and a biscuit with the crew. It is not my intention to make light of a deadly subject, because it is deadly, just ask the 241 civilian mariners who where either killed, maimed or held hostage in 2001 alone. 22 These were seafarers, simply going about their business, doing their lonely, difficult and often dangerous job. The company managers will point to statistics to back up their policies. Perhaps, but consider for a moment if the ships officers and crew were trained in small arms, defensive tactics and the use of deadly force. The statistics might show a completely different picture. Ken Hawkes a renowned maritime security advisor suggested just that to an LNG shipping company he was advising on ship security. Concerned, as they should be for the security of their vessels, Mr. Hawkes suggested firearms and associated training of the crew be required on board as part of the security plan. “The shipowners rejected the proposal because they considered their crews to be placed at an unacceptable risk if asked to defend their vessels against hijackers and saboteurs. Strangely enough, they did not consider their crews unacceptably at risk if the hijackers or saboteurs were successful” 23

I feel these corporate policies of non-resistance will begin to change in the years ahead if the trend of maritime piracy and terrorism continues to increase as it has for the last 20 years or so. The reason I say this is that historically shipping companies have treated piracy as part of the cost of doing business. However, if those cost continue to sharply rise, other considerations will come into play. In certain parts of the globe, it is not unusual for a ship to disappear from the ocean with its entire cargo and crew, only to reappear months or years later with different crew, (the original crew most likely murdered and thrown overboard.), different flag, etc. The underwriters of the ship will indemnify the company for its loss. It’s bad enough if it’s a bulk ore freighter with Pakistani officers and crew costing the insurer $100,000,000 in claims for example. It’s a whole different story if the ship is a modern LNG or VLCC Tanker with European officers and crew. Now, lets take the latter ship and add to the mix an environmental catastrophe or the possible blocking of one of the worlds major shipping choke points, the Suez canal for example. _______________________________________________________________ 22. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), 11. 23. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 74-75.

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The possible scenarios are endless. The possible liabilities could be endless if such scenarios occurred as a result of shipboard terrorism. The maritime industry has not reached that point yet, but eventually the price will be to high to maintain this passive approach. If this policy change does not come from the underwriters, then perhaps it will come as a result of today’s ever changing global political climate. Already, many shipping companies that ship a high value, high target cargo employ some sort security detail, most likely a private armed maritime security force that rides the ship as supercargo. The Military Sealift Command; MSC when it charters a U.S. civilian crewed merchant ship to move DoD cargo, will usually employ a maritime security force known as the “Guardian Mariner” program. This security force is made up of members of the Puerto Rican National Guard trained in shipboard defense and security tactics. They ride the vessel as supercargo ensuring shipboard security. In fact at the time of this writing I am on navy orders and earlier in the day trained the civilian mariners of just such a ship in CBR-D refresher training. This ship, at it’s load port, just had a security detail of Guardian Mariners assigned to it. D. Major points of a ship security plan, (SSP).

If you had to distill the key facet of ship security down to a few succinct words or phase, then it would have to center around controlling access. Except perhaps for RPG’s, missiles, or other incendiary devices fired at a vessel from a distance, the vast majority of threats to shipping require the boarding of the ship by the perpetrators. Whether the act is piracy, hijacking, sabotage, or other acts of terrorism, they all require access to the ship for them to succeed. As such, the focus of a shipboard security plan must be centered on preventing unauthorized access to the ship. 24 Access ladders, gangways, ramps, doors, mooring lines, etc must all be accounted for in the ships security plan. Depending of the security level, access control might consist of checking visitor identification at the gangway, or it may involve securing all access points, gangways, etc. and denying access to everyone, and confining the crew to the ship. Additionally, the plan should identify the appropriate locations where access is restricted or prohibited commensurate with each security level. 25 ________________________________________________________________ 24. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 72. 25. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 116, 9.10, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf.

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While stevedore crews certainly need to have access to cargo holds, and the main deck, there is no reason they would require access to the accommodation or engineering spaces and therefore access should be denied. Restricted or prohibited areas include the obvious accommodation, bridge and machinery spaces. However, the plan should also include spaces containing security and surveillance equipment systems and their controls as well as lighting systems and their controls. One may also want to consider limiting access to spaces that house to HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) equipment as well as spaces that allow access to potable water tanks. 26 The latter two spaces being a consideration in the purposeful contamination of the ships ventilation and water with biological or chemical agents. Access can be restricted in a variety of ways, from guards or sentry’s, to locks, intrusion alarms, and surveillance equipment monitoring the area. A critical component of limiting and controlling access is that of developing an effective identification system. This is something that is usually implemented company wide and will most likely be handled by corporate shore staff or the ships agents. A means of recognition must be instituted with the issuing of identification cards allowing for both permanent and temporary identification cards for ships personnel and visitors respectively. 27 With this consideration in mind, it should be pointed out that the best identification is positive identification, i.e.: the ships gangway watch most likely knows every crew member well enough to visually identify him or her, having sailed with them for some time aboard ship. The International Maritime Organization, (IMO), recognizing the present lack of any good global seafarer and related port worker identification program is investigating the feasibility of developing a seafarers identify document, which include a document for professional purposes, a verifiable security document and a certification information document. 28 The development of such a global identification system would certainly help in identifying those persons who may be entitled access. To create a credible and verifiable identification system on a global scale is a daunting task, but is certainly something that merits further investigation.

26.American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 119, 9.21.3, .4, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf. 27.ibid, 116, 9.11. 28.International Maritime Organization, “IMO adapts comprehensive security measures”, 4, June 2002 [bulletin on-line] accessed 28 November 2003, available at http//www.imo.org.home.asp?flash=false.

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Those new crew members or other personnel requiring access to the ship during a port visit should be listed by the ships agent along with the reason to visit the ship on some form of a ships visitor register. This register should be received by the vessel prior to its entry into port, and must be verified by the ships master. I.e.: The agent has listed a radar repair contractor on the register to visit the ship, but the radars are working fine and no request by the ship was made for such a visit. The example just sighted should be given further consideration. It may be the radar tech is simply visiting as part of an annual maintenance check. If that’s the case, a phone call to the company will clear up the issue. Once the ship is in port it is the duty of an aware gangway to identify all those seeking access to the ship, and confirming that he or she is listed on the ships visitor register. If the person is not on the register, he should be denied access until such time that his identity and reason for gaining access can be confirmed. Additionally, if possible all visitors accessing the ship should be escorted to their destination aboard by one of the crew. We had a situation occur last year at the ExxonMobil Terminal that I work at in which four USCG inspectors where denied access to a vessel they intended to perform a surprise security check on. The gangway watch, undaunted by their uniforms and government identification denied these gentlemen access, until their identity could be confirmed by USCG Group Boston Headquarters. Since it was an unannounced visit, they were not on the visitor register. This might seem extreme, but it is this kind of vigilance that all ships should strive for. Just months before, in Seattle, a USGC automobile was broken into and several uniforms, id’s, etc were stolen. The ship security plan should contain the detailed organizational structure of security for the ship. 29 It will consist of the basic security measures to be taken based on the security level the ship is faced with, i.e.: level one, two, etc. All duties and responsibilities will be clearly spelled out with respect to shipboard personnel security roles. While this task sounds somewhat daunting, it is in reality something that all mariners are accustomed to whether in the merchant marine or naval service. Everyone aboard ship has a station bill that dictates there duties during an emergency, fire or abandon ship scenario. In the event of a fire, for example, the station bill for the master of a VLCC, is overall in charge on the bridge, while the job of the second engineer may be as a team leader, hose team one. All naval personnel are assigned similar duties, as during general quarter for example. As mariners we are used to thinking like this. Instituting a security bill that dictates the role that ships personnel play during various security levels should not be that difficult.

29. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 115, 9.2.1, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf.

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That same second engineer may be a member of the ships security rapid reaction force, trained and equipped to respond to an unauthorized intrusion to the vessel, just as he has been trained and equipped to respond to a fire aboard his ship. An important requirement of the ship security plan, is the procedures and safeguards needed to assure communication requirements are met at all times. 30 Again, citing the above VLCC example, just as the master on the bridge of the ship is in communication with the second engineer hose team one leader via handheld radio (walkie-talkie) fighting a fire aboard his vessel, he is also in communication with the outside world, perhaps requesting additional resources at the same time. If the ships security was compromised, the master could be in communication with the gangway watch or the ships security rapid reaction force via handheld radio and also in communication with resources outside the ship. Additional requirements dictate the type and level of training required of all crewmembers regarding shipboard security duties. Some crew members may only need occasional refresher and awareness training regarding basic security measures, controlling access, identification of personnel seeking access to the ship, etc. while other members of the crew may require, more advanced security measures such as physical shipboard security tactics, small arms training, rapid reaction force training, etc. The ships master and second engineer may have gone to advanced firefighting training for tank ships, while the ships messman is trained to proficiently handle a portable fire extinguisher. The objective of drills and training is to ensure that the crews are proficient in their assigned security duties at all different security levels. How the company management and shipboard senior staff approach security training and readiness will have a profound effect on how capable a ships crew is in responding to a security threat. They must instill a sense of vigilance at all levels, and the importance of these measures, noting that in the extreme, these measures may determine whether the ship and her crew will survive. This security thinking must be fostered and nurtured from the top down. Just as shipboard safety, drug or alcohol awareness programs find their home onboard, it is how management fosters and maintains these programs that determine whether they bear results or simply languish due to a half hearted or noncommittal effort on the part of management. Do you see a pattern developing here? There are many similarities in the way trained crews respond to emergencies aboard ship and the way they should respond to security incidents as well. ________________________________________________________________ 30. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 115, 9.7.2, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf.

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E. The ship security officer, (SSO). The ship security officer (SSO), or anti-terrorism officer as he or she is referred to aboard MSC contracted ships is that person tasked with implementing the ship security plan. This person can be any senior officer aboard ship; master, first mate, chief engineer or first engineer. In the past it was not unusual to assign such duties to the first mate. However, recognizing that on many ships the mate is already tremendously burdened with other ancillary duties, such as being the medical officer, safety officer, etc. It is not unusual to find a senior engineering officer tasked with the added role of ship security officer. Recognizing this, the nations largest marine engineers union, the Marine Engineers Benevolent Association, (MEBA) has formally developed ship security officer, (SSO) training for their senior level officers. 31 The important point here, know matter who is assigned the role of SSO is that they must be formally trained by a recognized training organization. Whether from a union school such as the MEBA, or from various programs now being offered by the federal or state maritime academies. The role of ship security officer is an important one and should be treated as such. The officer must have adequate training and knowledge of the ships security plan; in fact ideally the SSO was involved in the development of the ships plan. He must know the layout of the ship; it’s potentially weak or vulnerable access points. He must be familiar with conducting security inspections, physical search methods used to search personnel, baggage, cargo, etc. The SSO must be able to recognize when and how to carry out emergency security procedures. To sum it up the ship security officer is the “go to” guy or contact person in all matters regarding vessel security. He of course works in conjunction with other department heads and crew to reach the stated goal. The SSO’s job would of course involve the regular periodic training of this ship in all matter relating to ship security. The ISPS Code requires a minimum of one security drill a quarter, however that is just a minimum. If the ship is serious about it’s security, and sails internationally as most ships do. That minimum requirement is inadequate. A more realistic training and drill scenario would most likely be monthly. Fire and boat drills are required monthly by the USCG and the ship or it management may want to consider bringing the frequency of security drills up to a monthly level. Again, one has to look at the threat level. If a ship has been sailing coast wise on the U.S. west coast for several years the security plan and commensurate training will not likely have to be as robust as if the same ship was sailing regularly on a liner service through the Malacca Straits in the Indian Ocean.

31. Mr. Barry Van Vechten, Ship Security Officer Class Instructor, MEBA Engineering School, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January 2004.

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The training and drills should be made as interesting as possible. Setting up scenarios, role-playing, and the regular operation of defensive security equipment should be utilized in the course of the drills and training. A technique used very successfully at Exxon was in addition to the practical drill; a crewmember or two would be assigned the task of instructing the rest of the ship on a particular piece of safety equipment. It may be something as simple as having one of the AB’s give instructions on the use of a foam monitor or fire extinguisher. Perhaps the cook could explain the proper donning of an SCBA. I have seen recalcitrant shipmates realizing they are going to have to be able to intelligently discuss a piece of safety equipment in front of their shipmates at the next drill, become experts on that piece of equipment. Looking good and professional in the eyes of your shipmates is a big motivator, or perhaps put another way, peer pressure works. 4. SHIP MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO MEET SECURITY PLAN REQUIREMENTS A. The ship security alert system. One of the measures adopted under IMO, as a part of SOLAs, Chapter XI-2, Special measures to enhance maritime security is the requirement that all ships over 500 gross tons be fitted with a ship security alert system by 1 July 2004. 32 “The ship security alert system shall upon activation transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the administration”(SOLAS chapter XI-2-special measures to enhance maritime security, regulation 6 2.1) In other words, the system could transmit to the company security officer ashore or to another responsible party. The alert will identify the ship, its location, and indicate the ship is under threat or attack. At this point, the company security officer would notify the appropriate maritime security force, the USCG for example, etc. for possible response. The system is designed to be discrete, it does not raise any sort of alarm aboard ship, nor does it alert any other ship directly. The system will continue it’s alert until it is manually deactivated or reset. The security alert system must be capable of being activated from the bridge and at a minimum, one other location. B. The automatic identification system, (AIS)

Ships of over 300 gross tons will be required to be fitted with an automatic identification system, (AIS) The AIS is designed to provide information about a particular ship automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft. 33

32. John O’Malley, “Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz”, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003, 6. 33. ibid, 6.

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However, unlike the ship security alerts system, it does not indicate the nature of any shipboard emergency. It is solely a tracking device. C. IMO hull numbering Another new regulation soon to be implemented is the requirement that the ships identification number be permanently marked either on the ships hull, (port & starboard, or aft) or super structure. The identification number must be a minimum 200mm in height and the outline of the numbers are to be constructed of a raised welded bead, cut groove or center punched. Additionally, passenger ships are required to have their identification number on a flat horizontal surface of the ship plainly visible from the air. The regulation also requires that the ships number be permanently marked on a ships transverse bulkhead internally as well utilizing the same methods approved on the exterior of the ship, in such places as the engine room, pump room or hatchways. 34 D. Additional possible modifications: CBR-D decontamination stations, deep shelter modifications, etc.

Certain ships under direct or indirect government control are being given consideration in regards to chemical, biological and radiological defense, (CBR-D). These are ships that are owned or operated by Military Sealift Command, (MSC), the Maritime Administration, (MARAD) or are civilian owned, but under long term contract to the DoD. All the ships in these categories face the possibility of CBR exposure in the course of their work. Because of the military cargo they carry and the fact that many times they are entering hostile environments or wars zones, they face the same possible CBR threats that American forces working in the theater of operation face. While some of these ships carry the USNS designation, those owned by MSC, they are all crewed by civilian mariners. These ships whether government owned or contracted, have not been constructed with the features needed to defend against CBR threats. The vast majority of the MSC and MARAD ships though now government owned, began their lives as merchant ships, and as is typical of a merchantman, chemical, biological and radiological defense is rarely if ever considered during construction. Certain features are being considered on a ship-by-ship basis as each particular ship faces it next shipyard overhaul.

34. John O’Malley, “Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz”, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003, 6.

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These considerations include the following: The modification of an existing space or accommodation into a decontamination station, with the appropriate outer garment removal area, inner garment removal area, wash down, and medical check rooms. Presently, most ships traveling to areas of a known CBR threat must improvise by creating these spaces, utilizing plastic sheeting to create partitions or false bulkheads and garden hoses as wash down stations for example. Unlike many naval vessels that have HEPA filtering and pressurized ventilation throughout much of the ship, the typical merchantman has no sort of filtering or positive pressure air system. As a result if the merchantman is faced with a CBR attack it is certain that most of the ships house will be contaminated. The engine room because of the large volume ventilation used will most certainly be contaminated, as well as areas that have a high airflow such as the galley, lounges, etc. Another consideration is the space designated aboard ship as the deep shelter. Some structural modifications may be considered to make such a space more secure. Additionally, the installation of a fixed HEPA filter/blower arrangement in a deep shelter bulkhead would go a long way to having a secure positive air pressure space aboard ship, thus minimizing airborne contamination to it. Other engineering considerations include the ability to secure shipboard ventilation faster by wiring emergency ventilation shutdowns from additional locations, as well as improving mechanical closure devices on existing scuttles, ports and ventilation intakes. Again, these CBR defense considerations are only in regards to DoD owned or vessels under long term DoD contract. E. Access limiting modification considerations. Lastly, during a shipboard security assessment, it may be determined that certain access points, i.e.: ports, doors, scuttles, access ladders, etc. are not required for the ship to do it’s job, in fact may compromise the security of the ship, or are at best, difficult to monitor because of their location. Some ship owners may consider, that it is better to simply remove them, or weld them shut in the interest of limiting access. It is worth mentioning that most locking devices, the typical padlock for example, are at best delaying devices. Most locks can be quickly overcome with bolt cutters. 35 Therefore a padlocked access should not be considered impervious, as many boarding parties intent on piracy, sabotage or other acts of terrorism will most likely have a set of bolt cutters among their boarding tools.

35. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 117.

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5. WHAT PRICE SECURITY? A. Financial considerations. As is typical of any new rule or regulation however well written, there is always associated cost. The ISPS Code and MTSA of 2002 are no different; they do have a cost, a financial cost and an administrative cost. But, unlike most maritime laws and regulations that preceded them, these new security regulations are being welcome by most in the maritime industry. They realize that these regulations are necessary to address weaknesses in maritime shipping and infrastructure, and while they, the ship owners and operators will bear some of the cost, many in the industry consider it a reasonable and fair cost to bear. Some recent figures agree with that conclusion. Let’s look at the cost associated with meeting the new regulations. As mentioned above, by July 1st of this year, ships will be required to be fitted out with a ship security alert system. The cost and installation of this gear typically ranges from $4,0000 to $6,000 dollars. 36 Another requirement is the installation of an automatic identification system (AIS). This cost of this equipment varies but typically is in the range of $5,000 to $8,000 dollars. 37 The last requirement of the new regulations is the marking of the ships IMO hull number, both internally and on the hulls exterior. This minor steel work should not be much of a cost, perhaps a few thousand dollars. If we review these figures, it is not very expensive to physically fit the ship out to meet these requirements. One must also include the associated cost of developing the ship security assessment and from that the approved ship security plan. “Some experts are estimating the total cost per ship of ISPS compliance could exceed $20,000.” 38 As far as I’m concerned, this cost is a pittance for the amount of good it will do in making ships, their crew and cargo safer on the high seas. Worldwide, for all ships and Mobile offshore drilling units, the estimate for compliance of the new regulations is just over one billion dollars. 39

36. John O’Malley, “Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz”, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003, 6. 37. ibid, 6. 38. ibid, 8. 39. ibid, 9.

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B. Added crew workload, fatigue and stress. The ISPS codes and associated regulations as written are not intended to place a burden on the ships officers and crew. However, it will take some time to fully access if the code is creating hardship. Raising security levels will provide greater protection for the ship and her crew. However this is not accomplished without cost. Some cost can easily be quantified such as increased overtime and payroll cost for added watchstanders and security details. Other costs are more difficult to measure, for example, extra watches translate into less sleep, less liberty and a tired crew. 40 All ship operators strive to operate their vessels in a safe efficient manner while minimizing cost. One of the largest costs in ship operations is crew cost. Crew cost along with insurance and fuel comprise the loins share of a ships operational expense. All modern ship owners and operators have embraced automation, improved efficiency, and economies of scale to compete in the global maritime market. Today, it is not unusual to have a container ship or a VLCC fully manned with a crew of 18 or 20 persons. 30 or 40 years ago the same ship-type with only a fraction of the cargo capacity would have a crew double that number. The minimum crew size of many ships today, may be at odds with the ISPS code requirements, especially when the security level is ratcheted up as the threat increases. Under the ISPS code, as security levels rise, more is required of the ships personnel. In the three security levels that the code is built around, the first security level; level one, will not present any challenge to even the most minimally manned vessel. Level one is considered “normal” or the level at which the ship normally operates. 41 This level focuses around the gangway watch, limiting or preventing access to the ship through proper identification checks, etc. At security level two; also referred to as “heightened” level, additional measures are required aboard ship. One additional measure is the assignment of additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorized access. 42 During this heightened security level the crew should be more vigilant and ensure a tighter degree of access control to the ship.

40. Robert Farmer, Military Sealift Command Anti-Terrorism Officer Student Guide, (Freehold, NJ, MSC Training Center-East, 2002), 108. 41. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 103, 4.8, September 2003 [guide on-line] accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf. 42. ibid, 117, 9.16.1.

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Well, if the ship is required from the port state or administrative authority to go to level two, heightened security for a couple of hours, it should not be an issue. But under the code the ship must be able to maintain this level for an indeterminate period. Already, I can see fault lines developing from a manpower standpoint and we have now even gone to security level three yet. If the ship is required to maintain this heightened level of security for several days or perhaps a week, there may not be adequate manpower to perform the appropriate security detail and perform cargo operations at the same time. Remember, the job of the ship is to move cargo. Many modern ships only have a two person in-port deck watch, the mate and a crewmember, usually an able bodied seaman, (AB). More often than not the mate spends the watch inside the cargo control room, monitoring cargo operations from the cargo control console. The AB as he or she is called is on deck; checking, monitoring, and responding to the mate’s request as needed via handheld radio. If a second crewmember is not part of the watch, then this AB may also be the gangway watch. This typical scenario works well, it is efficient with the minimal use of manpower, but it does not make much of an allowance for other manning needs, including security needs. At level two there should be additional crew on deck performing security patrols. These patrols can be achieved in the short term, but in the long term, over many days, the manpower shortage will become apparent as crews become increasingly tired and fatigued. It should also be kept in mind that there are regulations requiring crew time off for rest. The USCG requires that all members of the crew have a continuous unbroken eight hours off watch for rest and sleep in a 24-hr period, and that the crewmember cannot work more than 16 hours continuously. This regulation is another outcome of the Exxon Valdez grounding. The regulation makes sense, as these long work hours increase ones chance of injury or accident. Level three is also known as “exceptional,” at this level, there is a highly probable or imminent risk of a security attack. Some of the requirements for this level include the suspension of cargo operations, the movement of the ship, or evacuation of the ship. 43 Depending on the degree of cooperation the vessel receives from the port or terminal, there may be additional manpower in the form of a port state security force. This will alleviate the ships crew from some security duties, so that they can perform whatever task the port state determines are needed at level three, i.e.: suspending cargo operations and getting underway or evacuation of the ship. There is no guarantee that port security will be available to assist the ship at this level, but according to the ISPS code they should be.

43. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 118, 9.17.5, .6, .7, September 2003 [guide on-line], accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf.

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Regardless of whether or not shore side security avail themselves to a level three security incident, aboard a ship visiting their port, the nature of level three incidents are such that they should be of short duration. “Security level three should only be set for the duration of the identified security threat, or actual security incident.” 44 If in fact this level remains in place for an extended period of time, in the absence of port security to augment the crew, it will negatively impact the ships personnel. Of course in the above scenario, I was considering a minimally crewed ship. If such a ship does have additional personnel assigned to it, then the manning level may never become an issue regardless of the security level and their duration. If the ship is operating in an area of heightened security concern, or in an area where the security levels fluctuate with regularity, the ship owner may decide to add additional personnel to the ships crew for primarily a security detail, or they may chose to supplement the crew with a privately contracted security team that will ride the vessel through dangerous waters or during times of heightened security as needed. Only until ISPS code has been implemented for several years, will we be able to look back and see if it has had any negative impacts on the crew, in terms of workload, etc. C. The guardian mariner program

Military Sealift Command has been supplementing its civilian ships force by utilizing army security details aboard its vessels during the ongoing hostilities in Iraq. During my present activation, I had the opportunity to interview Major Heribrto Roman of the Army National Guard out of Puerto Rico. 45 Major Roman is the Battalion Commander in charge of the Guardian Mariner program, as these ship security details are more commonly known. The Major explained to me that the program has only been in existence for about a year. The typical Guardian Mariner security detail consists of a twelve-member team that embarks at the ships load port. This security detail rides the vessel, and is tasked with protecting the ship from any security incident it may encounter both at sea and during cargo offloading at the ships destination.

44. American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, 103, 4.9, September

2003 [guide on-line] accessed 11-12 December 2003, available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf.

45. Major Heribrto Roman, Battalion Commander, Guardian Mariners, interview by the author, personal interview, Corpus Christi, TX, 4 February 2004.

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There are a total of fifty-five Guardian Mariner teams throughout the country. An army lieutenant typically heads each team. The teams are all made up of members the Army National Guard, all from the island of Puerto Rico. Each team member is given an additional 30 days of extensive small arms training on top of what he or she typically receives as a soldier. They are also trained in tactics particular to shipboard security. The Guardian Mariners operate as a self-contained unit, reporting on board with all their gear, and weapons, ready to defend the ship from a variety of security threats. The twelve-person team is armed with ten, M-16’s, two of which are equipped with N203 grenade launchers. The team’s heavier caliber weapons include two, SAW’s (squad automatic weapons) and two, 50 caliber, M242's. Additionally they are equipped with various signaling flares, rockets and other non-lethal warning devices.

Depending on the threat level, the security detachment may be divided into three details of four members, working a four-hour watch with eight hours off rotation. or, they may consist of two, six person details with six hours on, six hours off rotation. Needless to say, these security details afford an extra degree of protection that these ships require. All vessels assigned a Guardian Mariner detail are carrying military cargos, destined for hostile territories. D. The cost of non-compliance

The ISPS code requires that ships demonstrate a suitable approved security system or plan capable of switching between the three security levels on short notice. Many shipping companies have already met this requirement, while others are working to meet the July deadline. The price of non-compliance is a heavy one, the possibility of losing business, denied access to ports, etc. 6. PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SHIPBOARD SECURITY. General By following some fairly straightforward and reasonable physical security measures, most would be boarders can be deterred from attempting to board your vessel. In fact by following these steps those intent on boarding will plainly see that your ships is vigilant and aware to such threats, this in and of itself, may be enough of a deterrence, as would be pirates decide it is best to seek a less suspecting, softer target. I am going to touch on some of the basic measures that all ships should undertake. It should be obvious that these simple precautions should be part of any well thought out ship security plan.

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80% of all violence at sea occurs within 12 miles of shore. 46 In fact a ship is most vulnerable during periods of nonmovement, such as pier side, or at anchorage. 47 It stands to reason that it is much easier to board a vessel as it sways gently at anchor, than perhaps attempting to board while the ship is moving along at 20 knots in a heavy chop. So, it is at these times in particular that the ship must be most vigilant. With that in mind let’s look at some considerations. A. Controlling access. Access control was discussed in some detail in previous ship security plan section of this paper. However, it bears repeating because it is really what defines shipboard security. Would be terrorist, pirates, or saboteurs must get aboard if they are to succeed. Deny them access, and an attempted boarding will remain just that, an attempt. -In port, keep access limited to one secure gangway, raise the gangway at night, or anytime it is not in use. -Rig rat guards on dock lines, cables and hoses. 48 -Rig hawse pipe covers to prevent access through the hawse. 49 -Many companies now deploy oil containment booms around their ships at the dock to act as an outer perimeter barrier. Such a boom will stop or slow a boat attempting to come along side the ship; again the eye is toward access control or denial. This measure may have deterred the attack on the USS Cole. -At anchor consider using an anchor collar and or continuously running the anchor wash down water system to deter access up the anchor chain. -Control access through the proper use of locks, etc. Keeping in mind that locks should be considered delaying devices only. 50 B. Controlling lighting. Just as streetlights and other well-lit areas deter crimes ashore, the same can be said aboard ship. Lighting should be installed topside so that it allows complete topside coverage, with little or no shadows. The majority of attacks or attempted boarding’s occur at night. So with regard to shipboard lighting, the intention should be to keep the ship in light 24 hours a day if required, through well placed light fixtures.

46. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989), 135. 47. ibid, 26. 48. Robert Farmer, Military Sealift Command Anti-Terrorism Officer Student

Guide, (Freehold, NJ, MSC Training Center-East, 2002), 115. 49. Ibid, 115. 50. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime

Press, 1989), 117

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Ideally, the ship should have two separate lighting systems. The first would light the ships sides and adjacent waters, casting a blinding glare onto anyone approaching the ship, while at the same time making it difficult for the would be attacker to spot the security personnel on deck. The second lighting system would illuminate the deck itself. The importance of good lighting cannot be over emphasized. Poor lighting is akin to being blind. Good lighting puts the ships crew at an advantage in boarding situations, while poor lighting gives the would be pirates the advantage. When ships transit the more dangerous waters of the world, such as the Singapore or Malacca straits, it is standard practice to turn on all of the ships exterior lights, flood lights, spot lights, etc. 51 Everything the ship has is turned on as a deterrent. This of course goes against all maritime convention, as the ship is steaming along at sea speed in the middle of the night. But this simple deterrent works, as well as making itself highly visible, it puts would be pirates on notice that this ships crew are aware of the threat and vigilant. The darkened ship that steams past with only it’s regulation running lights, is the one that will be singled out as the soft target. It unknowingly has set itself up to become the easiest prey. C. Establish perimeters, zones and barriers. The basic premise of security whether ashore or at sea is constructed around perimeters or boundaries. Generally three boundaries are considered adequate. These three layers or zones are defined by barriers, through which the attacker must penetrate to reach his target. 52 Depending on the circumstances, these boundaries can take different forms; the containment boom, discussed in the access control section above might serve as an outer perimeter barrier, the ships hull might be the secondary boundary, and the ships house might be considered the inner perimeter. These barriers of course would vary based on the ships design; it’s location, etc. The idea behind perimeters and barriers is simple; they are established as demarcation points. They serve three security purposes, to detect the intruders, to delay their progress, and to destroy their ability to continue.

51. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High

Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002), 55-56. 52. Kenneth Hawkes, Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime

Press, 1989), 96-97.

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D. Considering small arms for defensive purposes. Though small arms were not a part of the recently enacted security regulations. In considering small arms as part of a shipboard security plan, the biggest consideration should be the trade routes and shipping lanes the particular ship travels. There are relatively safe routes where small arms may not be needed as part of a security plan; Jones Act trades routes for example. On the other hand, it would be folly for ships that travel into known areas of pirate and terrorist attack not to include small arms as part of their ship security plan. MSC, requires that a certain percentage of all civilian crews aboard their ships be small arms trained, at a minimum six crewmembers per ship. Those who are qualified in small arms training, (9MM pistol, M14 Rifle and 12 ga. Shotgun) also receive instruction in the use of deadly force, etc. These ships carry appropriate small arms to defend themselves if called to do so. By now, the reader has most likely concluded that I am a proponent of arming the crew. In the absence of any kind of defensive weapons aboard merchant ships, the crew is left at the mercy of the boarders, if they penetrate all the barriers and make their way into the accommodations. That is a position that no crewmember should have to be put in. I do not purpose that all personnel aboard be armed. There are clearly some that should not be entrusted with a weapon regardless of the threat. However, those crewmembers properly trained, vetted and made part of some sort of shipboard rapid reaction force is a reasonable measure, that in the final analyses could determine the survival of the ship. E. Foster an awareness and vigilance in the ships crew.

Lastly, but perhaps the most important of all is the fostering and nurturing of the ships security program. The commitment must be made, supported and sustained from the CEO on down. The necessary time and resources must be committed, not just to make shipboard security viable, but to make it thrive. Ship security should be made second nature. Just as ship safety and pollution control are today. It is the intent of these regulations to help keep mariners safer, but all these regulations are of little good if they are not embraced, by those they were designed to protect.

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7. CONCLUSION

It will be some time before the IMO and other maritime organizations will be able to look back and determine if the ISPS Code and associated regulations are working as intended. Are ships safer, and less prone to attack? If attacked will the AIS, automatic identification systems, and SES, security alert system allow security forces a chance to respond in time to save the crew and the ship? At the least, the addition of these pieces of security communications gear should make it much more difficult to commandeer a ship, with the intention of stealing it for future renaming and reflagging. Just as the black box on an aircraft allows agencies to track a plane in the sky, the AIS and SES will enable the same for a ship. The ship may be commandeered by pirates, it may be sabotaged, but it can at least be tracked, or if required interdicted by security or naval forces.

In conclusion, I believe that the ISPS Code, the MSTA of 2002, and associated regulations will go a long way to improving security aboard ship, the safety of the crew and cargo. These regulations will require careful review after being given an appropriate time to gauge their effectiveness. Any shortcomings should be addressed in future amendments. Just as terrorism is fluid and ever changing, regulations designed to combat them must be also. This is the first attempt at developing a truly international maritime security program. It’s a good first step, but it is only a step in the continuous process of evolving maritime security.

These new regulations do not guarantee maritime security, no laws or regulations ever will. They do however offer a reasonable degree of security at an acceptable cost.

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8. SOURCES CONSULTED American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for Ship Security, September 2003 [guide on-line] available at http//www.eagle.org/rules/downloads/111-shipsec.pdf. includes the “International Code for the security of Ships and of Port Facilities”, part A and B. Bryant, D. “At Sea with U.S. Maritime Security”, Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, November 2003 Burnett, J. Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002). Farmer, R. Military Sealift Command Anti-Terrorism Officer Student Guide (Freehold, NJ, MSC Training Center-East, 2002). Hawkes, K . Maritime Security (Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989). International Maritime Organization, IMO adapts comprehensive security measures, June 2002 [bulletin on-line] accessed 28 November 2003, available at http//www.imo.org.home.asp?flash=false. Neeson, M., Master of the Exxon Tank ship S/R Puget Sound, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January 2004.

O’Malley, J. “Yards Prep for Security Refit Blitz”, Marine Security Sourcebook, October 2003. Roman, H. Major, Battalion Commander, Guardian Mariners, interview by the author, personal interview, Corpus Christi, TX, 4 February 2004. Van Vechten, B. Ship Security Officer Class Instructor, MEBA Engineering School, interview by author, personal interview, New Orleans, 20 January 2004.