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Russian Power Projection and Power Ministries
A Study on Russian Power Ministry Influence
Author: Robert Granlund Supervisor: Lotta Wagnsson
1
CONTENTS
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Aim .................................................................................................................................................. 3
3. Research questions ......................................................................................................................... 3
4. Study outline ................................................................................................................................... 4
5. Definitions ....................................................................................................................................... 4
6. Background ...................................................................................................................................... 7
7. Case descriptions ........................................................................................................................... 10
8. Theory ............................................................................................................................................ 16
9. Method .......................................................................................................................................... 22
10. Choice of Method ...................................................................................................................... 23
11. Operationalization ..................................................................................................................... 24
12. Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 28
13. Selection .................................................................................................................................... 32
14. Limitations ................................................................................................................................. 33
15. Assumptions .............................................................................................................................. 33
16. Previous research ...................................................................................................................... 34
17. Evidence .................................................................................................................................... 35
18. Summary for crisis score ........................................................................................................... 44
19. Actor activity ............................................................................................................................. 45
20. Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 50
21. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 54
References ............................................................................................................................................. 56
2
1. Introduction
Russian foreign policy has had a large effect on societies throughout much of modern history. During
the Superpower era of the 20th century, Russia, as the dominant region within the Soviet Union,
wielded huge influence around the world. This influence came in the form of military, political,
cultural, and economic power. At its height, the Soviet Union would control governments in many
countries. The 1970’s, however, saw increasing stagnation in the Soviet economy, and by the end of
the 80’s it had started to lose control over its former zone of influence. As the Soviet Union
collapsed, Russia lost much of its former glory. What followed where ten years of economic chaos
and mismanagement, civil war in its northern Caucasus republics, and overall decay.
In 2000, the incumbent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, became President. He was replacing the first
democratically elected, and long serving (and frequently inebriated) leader, Boris Yeltsin. This change
in leadership would lead to what might be called a paradigm shift in Russian politics. Within Russia,
this led to, amongst other things, a more centralized government. Russian foreign policy changed
considerably. From being fairly invisible on the international arena during the 90’s, Russia has
increasingly adopted a confrontational foreign policy. This has been buoyed by high gas prices, which
have allowed increased spending on military and energy infrastructure, the two main avenues of
Russian foreign policy. What is more, low investments in energy diversification in Eastern Europe
have led to a dependency on Russian energy in this region, ensuring Russian influence here. Finally,
the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in large Russian minority groups in the newly established
republics. Apart from possible future irredentist problems, these minorities represent an opportunity
for Russia to exercise its influence.
The newfound energy-wealth has allowed Russia to be more pro-active in its dealings with other
states. This increased activity can, for example, be seen in that Russian Security Council vetoes in the
noughties have increased several times as compared to the nineties. Other examples showing a
more active foreign policy includes being able to restrict energy-supplies to Western Europe to put
pressure on gas-transit states, and sending troops into other sovereign states.
This study will aim to examine the intra-state actors that decide these foreign policies, and more
specifically, these intra-state (or subdivisional) actors at times of crisis.
3
As we shall see, though centralized, the Russian state is made up of several different actors. These
actors, which include amongst others the President and Prime Minister, will compete for influence in
deciding governmental policies. Examining historically which actors generate the most influence at
certain periods of bilateral relations crises may allow for future forecasts. Knowing which actor to
address could allow for focused lobbying in order to lessen negative externalities as a result of crisis.
Being able to do such forecasts would be of general relevance to the non-scientific community.
There are several theories which assume government output as being the result of organizational
activity. As this study examines this very activity in relation to crises, the academic relevance would
be to in a way test these theories. What is more, the results of this study may lay the foundation for
future research into correlations between Russian governmental organizations and Russian foreign
policy.
2. Aim
The purpose of this study is to examine the Russian foreign-policymaking actors in times of bilateral
relations crises. Russia has a number of hard power resources available when dealing with other
states. With increasing gas wealth, we can expect to see Russia use more power projection in the
future. It this therefore imperative that we identify which actors within the Russian state that can
and do have an effect on foreign policy. By looking at which intra-state actor (defined as power
ministry later on) is most active during certain bilateral relations crises, one should be able to deduce
the prime actors in Russian foreign policy. As will be explained later, it is assumed that such crises
allow for actors to ‘expand their territory’, thus being a good opportunity to examine these actors. By
examining actor activity during crises, one will be able to analyze influence during these crises.
As this is an extensive examination of Russian foreign policy actors, the actual study will be front-
heavy. The evidence, as well as the analysis, will largely be presented in tables and diagrams.
Consequently, it is imperative that the Method chapter clearly explains what is going on.
3. Research questions
In order to study the relationship between actors (power ministry) and foreign policy at times of
crises, this study will be divided up into three parts. These parts are reflected in the following three
research questions.
4
The first research question is: Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?
This will allow for classifying the various crises according to how much power Russia could project.
The second research question is: How active was each power ministry during the crisis?
This will identify actor activity during each crisis.
The third research question is: Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were
present and certain power ministries?
4. Study outline The outline of this study has been designed as follows. As we have seen, the study begins with an
Introduction. The introduction chapter is followed by a section establishing the Aim of the study,
closely followed by a section outlining the actual Research questions. The Definitions section
contains definitions of key words and concepts used by this study. The Background section describes
the different power ministries studied, and leads into the Case descriptions chapter. The Case
descriptions chapter looks at and describes the different crises cases used by the study. The Theory
chapter will describe the theory behind the processes, thus attempting to give an understanding of
why the chosen method should be valid. The Method chapter gives a short description of the method
used, as well as a discussion on other possible methods. What follows is the Operationalization
section. Here the operationalization of the study is described in detail. The Sources section contains a
discussion on the sources used. This is followed by the Selection chapter, which discusses the
inclusion of the different crises. The Limitations chapter discusses the study delineation. The
Assumptions section outlines the assumptions made by the study. This is followed by the Previous
research section, which looks at previous research done within the context of this study. The
Evidence chapter presents the evidence, both for the Crises Scores and the Actor Activity. The
analysis section analyzes the information, and presents it in circle diagrams. Finally, the Conclusion
summarizes the study.
5. Definitions
In this chapter we will give the definitions for the different words and concepts used throughout this
study.
Bilateral relation – This will be defined as essentially the relationship between two states.
5
Crisis – Crisis may be defined in several ways. The Oxford Dictionary defines crisis as a time of intense
difficulty or danger. This is clearly too broad a definition for this study as it would include
The crisis definition as defined by Rosenthal et al1 is that of situations when central decision makers
believe that:
1. Considerable properties and values are threatened
2. There is limited time available
3. The situation is characterized by considerable uncertainty
This definition is much more precise, and as we shall see later, better describes the types of crises
used by the study.
Bilateral relations crisis – A relations crisis as defined above, involving two states. An example of a
bilateral relations crisis could be the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which had the immediate effect of
chilling India-Pakistan relations.
Crisis Score –Russia has bilateral agreements and relations with almost all states2. With countless
environmental factors affecting bilateral relations, bilateral relations crises involving Russia and other
countries will therefore undoubtedly be different. In order to scientifically categorize these varied
crises, this study will examine the presence of hard power factors. The crisis score is calculated
through toting up the occurrence of three different hard power factors. These factors are military
presence, energy shut-off, and economic sanctions. The reasoning behind this will be further detailed
in the Method chapter.
Hard Power – Hard power is defined by Nye as being the ability to get others to do what they
otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward3. This study will refer to
the term hard power both as a concept and as a collective term for the three foreign policy tools as
identified in the Theory chapter.
1 Rosenthal et al. p.10
2 http://www.russianembassy.net/
3 Keohane & Nye p.220
6
Power ministry – Russian media often refer to the concept “power ministry” (silovye ministerstva).
Though largely undefined, the term refers to institutions and actors within Russia that are of critical
importance politically4. One early attempt at defining this has been to use it as a term for Russian
ministries and authorities that were concerned with ensuring internal and external security5. Bettina
Renz has since further defined power ministries as those ministries which maintain troops:
“Force structures are defined as ministries and other institutions within the federal system of
executive power that have under their command uniformed personnel and/or command of their own
militarized or armed formations6.”
Using this definition would reduce the meaning of power ministry to essentially those which control
security in Russia. As this study will examine those actors which are most active during bilateral
relations crises, they must have an element of foreign policy competence. This foreign policy
competence means that they should be able to influence a bilateral relations crisis. Consequently,
studying power ministries which lack foreign policy competence will be unnecessary. As many of the
power ministries as defined by Renz miss this competence (i.e. the State Courier Service of the
Russian Federation), the number of ministries of interest to this study shrinks.
Carolina Vendil Pallin defines power ministry as those ministries directly under the president. As the
leadership of many of these ministries is directly appointed by the president, it follows that power is
highly centralized. This could suggest that Russian ministry outputs would, by and large, be syncretic
with those of the Russian president. In other words, as the Russian president would likely only
appoint likeminded leaders for the ministries, their influence within their respective ministry would
ensure little friction with presidential policy. However, Allison and Zelikow’s second model7, where
governmental action is seen as organizational output, suggests that government policy will not
necessarily be shaped by a monolithic Leviathan. This will be further detailed in the Theory chapter.
One dilemma with Carolina Vendil Pallin’s definition, as regards this study, is the problem of
measuring activity. As will be explained later on in the Method chapter, this study will examine public
statements, in that actor activity will be assumed to be reflected in the number of public statements.
4 Vendil Palin p.55
5 Ibid. p.56
6 Renz p.561
7 Allison & Zelikow p.391
7
As some power ministries will not make public statements (i.e. the Main Intelligence Administration)
they will not be researchable within the context of this study. It should be noted however that these
power ministries carry more of a support role to the others (again, the Main Intelligence
Administration) and therefore would likely be of marginal interest to this study.
Based on the above discussion, this study will use the following definition for power ministry: A
Russian state organization with foreign policy competence, and has the capability, and a history of, of
making public statements. This narrows down the list of power ministries to the following ten:
The Presidency
The Prime Minister
Foreign Ministry
The Duma (Lower House)
The Federation Council (Upper House)
The Finance Ministry
The Energy Ministry
The Defense Ministry
The Emergency Situations Ministry
The FSB (Federal Security Service)
Throughout this study, these power ministries will be referred to as either power ministry or actor.
6. Background
This chapter will flesh out the background. It describes the different power ministries examined in
the study.
As we saw in the introduction, Russian foreign policy has become much more active in the last
decade. As gas-wealth has allowed Russian power to expand, other factors are encroaching on what
is considered Russia’s near-abroad. EU membership for the Baltic States means that Russia now has a
border with The European Union. The EU’s Eastern Dimension, as expressed in the European
Neighborhood Policy, calls for increased influence in this very area. NATO expansion has also been a
cause for concern, with missile shields being seen as a direct threat.
8
This chapter will attempt to flesh out the power ministries. Counter to established norms, the cases
will first be introduced here, and not in the Sources chapter. This is because the case descriptions can
also be seen as part of the background. The reasoning behind the selection of these cases will still be
found in the Sources chapter however.
These power ministries used are described as follows.
The President is the Russian head of state and shall determine the guidelines of the internal and
foreign policies of the state. The president shall represent the Russian Federation within the country
and in international relations.8.
The Prime Minister (Chairman of the Government) is appointed by the president, with the consent of
the Duma. The Prime Minister shall determine the guidelines of the activities of the Government of
the Russian Federation and organize its work9.
The Foreign Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is main ministry responsible for foreign affairs.
The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers. The State Duma is the lower house of the Russian
Federation. It consists of 450 members, and among other responsibilities consent to the
appointment of the Prime Minister (effectively the government)10. The majority party in the State
Duma throughout the time period studied has been the United Russia party, which has been aligned
with Putin.
The Federation Council represents the upper house of the Russian Federation. There are 166
senators. The Federation Council jurisdiction includes amongst others approving border changes and
deciding on the possibility of using military forces abroad.
In the context of this study, Duma and Federation Council statements will only be considered when
done in an official capacity (i.e. individual senatorial statements will be ignored)
The Finance Ministry is responsible for financial policy.
8 Russian Constitution Article 80
9 Ibid. Article 113
10 Ibid. Article 103
9
The Energy Ministry is responsible for energy policy
The Defense Ministry’s objectives are to deter the military and political threats to the security of
Russia; support the economic and political interests of Russia; mounting other-than-war enforcement
operations; and using military force11.
The Emergency Situations Ministry manages civil emergencies and disasters.
The FSB (Federal Security Service) is concerned with counter-espionage12 and intelligence
gathering13. It can be considered the main successor to the KGB14.
11
The Russian Ministry of Defense organizational mission 12
Vendil Pallin p.118 13
Ibid. p.121 14
Ibid. p.113
10
7. Case descriptions
The following short descriptions are presented in order to ensure that the reader obtains a general
idea of what each crisis was about. As stated, this section can also be considered as belonging to the
Selection chapter.
Ukraine 2004 – Orange Revolution
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine caused a shift in focus for Ukrainian foreign relations away from
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States towards the West15. With western Ukraine
being more pro-Europe and eastern Ukraine being pro-Russia, the internal Ukrainian discourse on
which side to approach economically and politically can be quite heated16.
For Russia, Ukraine is seen as being within its region of influence, and it is also seen essentially as a
buffer against NATO and EU influence. Many Ukrainians are also ethnically Russian. By losing political
influence in Ukraine, Russia would risk eventually having NATO on its doorstep.
The following description of the crisis is derived from a chronology of the Orange Revolution by Joerg
Forbrig and Robin Shepherd, for the German Marshall Fund17. By 2004 the presidential election in
Ukraine was promising to become the most contested election in over a decade. The main actors
involved in the election were Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent Ukrainian president who was retiring,
Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s anointed heir, and Viktor Yushchenko, the main opposition candidate.
Leonid Kuchma had spent much of his administration ensuring friendly relations with Russia, and
Yanukovych, an ethnic Russian, promised to follow that policy. This led in large part to president
Putin officially declaring his support for Yanukovych. The amicable relationship between Putin,
Kuchma, and Yanukovych could be seen in the latter two frequently travelling to Russia, and also
being invited to celebrate Putin’s birthday. Viktor Yushchenko’s party, on the other hand, promised
closer relations with the EU and the US.
On September 5, 2004, less than two months before the election, opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko is poisoned by dioxin. October 31 sees the first round in the presidential election.
15
Forbrig & Shepherd p.11 16
Ibid. p.19 17
Ibid p.11
11
Neither candidate manages to exceed the 50 percent threshold required to win. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation states its concern over the conduct of the first-round voting. The second-
round voting is held one month later, on November 21, amid talk of massive irregularities18.
Nevertheless, Putin hails Yanukovych as the victor. Three days later, Yanukovych is declared the
winner by the electoral commission. Yushchenko submits a formal protest to the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, large numbers of protestors are beginning to gather in the capital. By November 29,
Kuchma acknowledges the need for new elections. This view is in time also shared by Putin. On
December 3 the Supreme Court states that the elections are null and void, and sets the new election
date on December 26. This time around, Putin does not lend his support to any candidate. The
election rerun sees Yushchenko winning with 51.99 percent of the vote, as opposed to Yanukovych’s
44.2 percent. Yushchenko is sworn in as president on January 23, 2005.
Lithuania 2006 – Druzhba shut-off
Lithuania is a NATO member, and with Russian opposition to NATO expansion this has ensured that
relations with Lithuania have at times been testy19. The Lithuanian Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania was
established in the 60’s as the only oil refinery in the Baltics. This refinery was historically fed through
the Druzhba pipeline, which transported oil from Central Asia and the Urals, through Russia, to
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) members in Europe20. In 1999, the refinery was
privatized, and ownership was transferred to an American company, the Williams Companies. The
Russian petroleum company Yukos later purchased a majority stake in the refinery21. In 2003 Yukos
faced claims of tax-fraud and was forced to sell off much of its assets to attempt to avoid bankruptcy.
This meant that the Mažeikiai refinery was put up for sale again22. This time the potential buyers
included Russian government, through a state-owned company. Russia had earlier begun to purchase
energy infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and the Lithuanian government deemed it imprudent to
allow such critical infrastructure in the hands of Russia. This, in part, led to the Mažeikiai refinery
instead being sold to a Polish company, PKN Orlen. The deal was finalized in June 200623. One month
later, on July 29, 2006, Russia announced that the Druzhba-pipeline leading to Lithuania had
ruptured, and that it had to be closed down for repairs. This would cut supply of 324,000 barrels per
18
Åslund & McFaul p.223 19
de Haas p.53 20
ORLEN Lietuva Company History 21
Ibid. 22
STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline 23
Ibid.
12
day. Oil would now be transported by sea instead24. This meant higher costs for the refinery, and so
lowers profitability for PKN Orlen, and in the end higher energy costs in Lithuania.
Belarus 2007 – Energy dispute
Russian-Belarusian relations have been close since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a country
which borders Russia, and where the majority of people speak Russian, ties to Russia have remained
fixed. The 2007 energy dispute between Belarus and Russia had its roots in the Russian post-Soviet
energy policy. By supplying gas and oil below market price, Russia has ensured the loyalty of CIS-
members. Those countries receiving the subsidized energy have been able to maintain industries and
low heating costs. The difference in gas costs between Western and Eastern Europe could be quite
considerable. The Belarusian gas price in 2006 was less than US$50 per 1000 cubic meters, whereas
the European market price was US$230 per 1000 cubic meters25. This price discrepancy allowed for
Belarus to resell Russian-subsidized refined gas and oil products to Europe, and keep the margin, in
effect becoming a considerable money maker for the state. By December 2006, Russia had started
complaining about the situation, claiming that Russia was losing billions every year due to Belarusian
re-exports26. As such Russia stated it would begin drastically increasing the price starting 200727. In
the beginning of January 2007, Belarus rejected the price increase, claiming that it would start
charging a transit fee for gas headed for western markets. This fee, according to Belarus, would come
in the form of siphoned off oil. By January 8, Russia had cut off oil supplies to Belarus, effectively
reducing supply to the rest of the European markets too28. This led the following day to Belarus
sending a delegation to Russia to negotiate a solution to the problem. By January 10 the Belarus
government abandoned the transfer fees, and the next day gas transports were resumed. A week
later, Putin claimed that “Russia would use markets, and not politics, as the basis for its relations with
all countries”29.
24
STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline 25
RIA Novosti 2006-11-03 26
RFE-RL 2006-12-15 27
RIA Novosti 2006-11-03 28
RFE-RL 2007-01-07 29
RFE-RL 2007-01-18
13
Estonia 2007 – Bronze Night
Estonian-Russian relations have been tense since Estonia’s independence. Estonian NATO
membership has moved the western alliance’s borders very close to Russia’s second largest city, St
Petersburg. Many Estonians consider the annexation of the Baltics by the Soviet Union during World
War Two an occupation. Within Estonia, people with Russian ethnicity make up over 25 percent, thus
being a large minority. Stringent language requirements for citizenship have had the effect of
precluding many from the Russian minority of getting Estonian citizenship, essentially confining
Russian Estonians to the status of second class citizens30. For this minority, clearing away Soviet
symbols have been seen as an attack on their history. This is also the view of Russians in Russia
proper, who consider removal of Soviet and World War Two symbols revisionist. The Bronze statue in
Tallinn was a war memorial, which had been built over the graves of a number of unknown soldiers31.
Plans on moving this Soviet-era bronze statue located in central Tallinn had existed since
independence, however it was not until 2006 that these plans started to become reality.
Demonstrations began being held by the members of the Russian minority to block the relocation of
the statue to a nearby military cemetery. These demonstrations were noticed by the Russian state,
who officially sided with the minority32. In early 2007 the Estonian Parliament, the Riigikogu, passed a
law allowing for the reburial of World War Two soldiers, thus clearing the way for moving the
statue33. On April 26 that year, Estonian authorities cordoned off the area surrounding the statue.
This had the effect of leading to large numbers of people turning up to protest the relocation, and by
that night several riots had broken out. On the following morning of April 27, the bronze statue was
moved, and by now there were also large demonstrations outside the Estonian embassy in
Moscow34. The Russian response to the relocation was that of fury, with Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov claiming that this constituted an “inhuman action”, and warning that Moscow would
“take serious steps” against Estonia35. The Federal Council, Russia’s upper house, wanted Putin to
sever diplomatic relations with Estonia36.
30
RFE-RL 2007-05-08 31
Ibid. 32
Country Report: Estonia 2007 p.1 33
Ibid. p.1 34
RFE-RL 2007-04-27 35
Ibid. 36
Ibid.
14
Estonian government websites were by now beginning to be targeted by coordinated cyber attacks,
effectively shutting down government services in the highly connected country. The following days
would remain tense, and on April 30, the Russian State Duma sent a fact-finding delegation to
Estonia37. The chairman of this delegation also called on the Estonian government to resign38. As the
statue was removed to its new location, the demonstrations were slowly beginning to evaporate, and
by May 9, had largely disappeared.
UK 2007 – Litvinenko
Alexander Litvinenko was an ex-KBG and FSB agent who had sought asylum in the United Kingdom. In
November 2006, he became ill with radiological symptoms. As it turned out, he appeared to have
been poisoned earlier that day when meeting two other ex-KGB agents, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry
Kovtun39. When Litvinenko died later that month a murder investigation was initiated. The British
police identify Lugovoi as the man poisoning Litvinenko and begin calling for his extradition from
Russia. Russian authorities, however, decided not to extradite Lugovoi40. This would eventually lead
to the expulsion of four Russian diplomats from the UK on July 1741. This had the natural effect of
causing a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. Although Lugovoi was never extradited, the
actual crisis would slowly die down over the next couple of months.
Georgia 2008 – War
During the Soviet Union, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic administered areas in the north of
Georgia by the name of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (South Ossetia) and the Abkhaz
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazia). Though under Georgian administration, all these
areas, including Georgia, were tightly controlled by the central Soviet leadership in Moscow42.
As the Soviet Union collapsed, these regions came under nominally Georgian control43. As the
majority ethnic groups do not consider themselves Georgian, war broke out in the early 90’s
between South Ossetia and Georgia. This led to a cease-fire in 1992 which left control of South
37
RFE-RL 2007-05-01 38
Ibid. 39
RIA Novosti 2007-07-21 40
RIA Novosti 2007-07-24 41
Ibid. 42
Hewitt p.183 43
Ibid. p.188
15
Ossetia in the hands of an unrecognized Russian-backed government. In order to ensure the peace,
Russian peacekeepers were permitted to be in the area44. Nevertheless, these areas would still see
minor skirmishes throughout the 90’ and 00’s, and would represent some of the frozen conflicts left
in the wake of the Soviet Union45.
By 2008, the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvilli had stated interest in joining NATO, and also
finding support for that idea in the US administration46. This would several years later be confirmed
by Russian president Medvedev as constituting a considerable potential threat towards Russia47. By
that summer, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice would visit Tbilisi. As both sides were amassing
troops near the border, she would state that Russian behavior toward Georgia had “aggravated
tension” and urged both sides to show restraint48. On the night of August 7, 2008, Georgia sent
troops into South Ossetia, in order to reclaim the region49. After a successful initial Georgian
advance, Russian troops with support from South Ossetian elements would reverse the situation. By
August 9, the Georgian president accused Russia of launching “a full-scale invasion”50. It was
reported that Russian airplanes were bombing Black Sea target, and that Abkhazian troops,
supported by the Russian military, were advancing.
The following day the EU and the US demanded a stop to hostilities, and by August 12 Russian
president Medvedev ordered a stop to the fighting51. A Western-proposed six Point peace plan was
agreed upon. Smaller skirmishes did however still continue to break out, and there were reports of
looting. As the fighting died down, Georgia had suffered a heavy blow, with Russian troops reaching
as far as Gori, halfway through the country. Georgian military bases were occupied and emptied of
equipment, and a pipeline transporting Azerbaijani oil through the country was damaged. On August
17, Russian troops began to withdraw.
44
Hewitt p.190 45
Ibid. 46
RFE-RL 2008-05-10 47
RIA Novosti 2011-11-21 48
Ibid. 49
RFE-RL 2008-08--08 50
RFE-RL 2008-08-09 51
RFE-RL 2008-08-12
16
Ukraine 2009 – Gas-dispute
As with the energy dispute with Belarus in 2007, the 2009 Ukrainian gas dispute had its roots in post-
Soviet energy policy. Subsidized Russian energy was seen as giving Russia an advantage in its
relations with Ukraine. Failing to come to an price agreement before the contract ran out, meant
that on January 1 2009, Russia shut off supplies52. This meant that countries further down the
pipeline were effectively without gas too53. After several weeks of active diplomacy, energy supplies
were restored on January 1854. As the 2004 Orange Revolution had replaced a pro-Russian
government with a pro-Western one, this may have been a highly visible attempt at punishing a state
that was being intransigent.
Tajikistan 2011 – Pilot-row
The 2011 Tajikistan pilot row began as two pilots, one Russian and the other Estonian, en route to
Russia from Afghanistan, were ordered to land in Tajikistan. Once there they were arrested by the
authorities and charged with smuggling55. On November 8 2011, they were sentenced to 10 and a
half years in prison56. This was immediately protested by Russian authorities. As pressure mounted
between Russia and Tajikistan, Russia began to expel Tajiki migrant workers57. As remittances from
Russia represents a large part of the Tajiki economy, the authorities there began to cave, and on
November 22 the Russian and Estonian pilots were freed58.
8. Theory
This chapter will look at the theory behind the policy processes. As mentioned before, this study is
divided into three parts. The first part of the study will classify each crisis. There are many different
factors available for research when classifying crises, ranging from, amongst others, calculating
human and economic costs, to geographic locations, and to whether they were man-made or natural
crises. As this study will examine bilateral relations crises, many of these factors are rendered
inadequate. For example, short of war, the human costs will in most cases be absent or negligible.
52
de Haas p.129 53
Ibid. p.128 54
Ibid. p.129 55
RFE-RL 2011-11-09 56
Ibid. 57
RIA Novosti 2011-11-15 58
RIA Novosti 2011-11-22
17
In international relations, power is an often reoccurring term. As Keohane and Nye explain “power
can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes”59. Power can generally be seen as the ability of
an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do. This suggests that bilateral
crises are generally resolved in favor of the more powerful part, as the stronger part would be able to
force the weaker one to accept conditions and demands they would otherwise not agree to. As
Russia dominates most of its neighbors in terms of economic and demographic size, as well as
militarily, the power relation between Russia and other states can be of interest when classifying
crises. Joseph Nye has classified power into hard power and soft power. Hard power, according to
Nye, “can rest on inducements ‘carrots’ or threats ‘sticks’”60. This means that hard power generally
refers to economic, military and diplomatic factors. Soft power, on the other hand, refers to indirect
inducement factors. Essentially, one may say that it refers to the ability to influence behavior
through a non-coercive, and in many cases non-active, approach.
Wilson and Popescu have identified the following Russian hard and soft powers61:
Table 1 Table 2
Russian hard power is mostly based on “19th century paradigms”62, that is, military presence,
managed instability, and economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu note, the first two factors,
Russian military power and managed instability, have ensured a number of foreign policy goals. The
2008 South Ossetia conflict effectively stopped Georgia from becoming a NATO member63, and
Armenian dependency on Russian support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has had the effect of
59
Keohane & Nye p.10 60
Nye p.5 61
Wilson & Popescu pp.319-323 62
Ibid. p.321 63
RIA Novosti 2011-11-21
SOFT POWER
Russian Orthodox Church
Historical links
Media influence
Russia-supported NGOs
Russia-supported political parties
Cultural foundations
Visa-free travel
Access to relatively open labor market
Authoritarian public goods (i.e. law and order)
HARD POWER
Military presence
Managed instability
Economic coercion
18
making Armenia a de facto Russian economic satellite64. Other regions where Russia manages
instability include Transnistria and the Crimean peninsula, and to a lesser degree the Baltic States.
The third hard factor identified is economic coercion. As Wilson and Popescu explain, recent years
have seen Russia increasingly use this hard power tool in its international relations. This type of hard
power is mainly expressed through gas deliveries (e.g. prices and supply stops), though other types of
economic sanctions, such as the Russian ban on Georgian wines and water, have also occurred65.
Initially in the 90’s as the Soviet Union collapsed, policymakers hoped that by keeping low gas prices,
they would be able to keep the regional economies integrated66. This policy has had the further
effect of retaining Russian influence in the region. Basically, in return for providing cheap energy
Russia has received goodwill, political power, and economic stability. However, with the election of
Putin as Russian President in 2000, this policy has gradually changed. The new approach has been to
gradually hike gas prices for Eastern European and CIS states to levels seen in Western Europe.
According to Wilson and Popescu, high energy prices have generally been used as an instrument to
punish ‘unfriendly’ states67. They also note that as Russia “pushed for higher prices, it also offered the
target countries a political way out: either by ceding energy infrastructure or by fulfilling non-
economic Russian objectives”68. On the other hand, as Larsson observes, states which maintained
friendly relations with Russia were often allowed to keep subsidized gas prices69. Taking this policy to
its extreme, Russia has completely cut off energy supplies on occasion. As gas storage facilities in
Eastern Europe have been less than optimal, this has had the rather immediate effect of shutting
down industries and heating in the targeted country.
Russian soft power factors, as can be seen from the above table, are in many cases inherited from
earlier regimes. The Russian Orthodox Church can trace its roots to over a thousand years back, and
its influence has been spread through conquest, migration, and proselytizing. Russia’s historical links
with many of its neighbors similarly have their roots in conquest and migration. Due to these
historical facts, the Russian language enjoys a kind of lingua franca within the Russian near-abroad.
This enables Russian media to have a high degree of influence in these areas.
64
Wilson & Popescu p.322 65
RIA Novosti 2006-05-06 66
Wilson & Popescu p.322 67
Ibid. p.322 68
Ibid. p.323 69
Larsson p.79
19
With Russian gas-wealth, Russia has also established pro-Russia NGO’s, and directly or indirectly
supported political parties. When compared to the hard power factors however, evaluating these
soft powers and putting a definite value on them may be difficult as their effectiveness is hard to
gauge. Going back to hard power, according to the Rational Actor framework developed by Allison,
one may assume that if “a nation performed a particular action, that action must have been selected
as the value-maximizing means for achieving the actor’s objectives”70. This suggests that Russia has
used its hard power intentionally to influence crisis resolutions in its favor
Figure 1
As mentioned earlier, the notion that more
powerful states are likelier to benefit from
bilateral relations crises than weaker ones
allows for the idea that there is a relationship
between the amount of power used during a
crisis (and as the Rational Actor Model quote
above shows, power, if used, is likely always used intentionally) and the outcome of a crisis. In other
words this means that the more power is applied, the likelier the outcome will be beneficial. The
figure above illustrates the concept with hard power.
Classifying each crisis through the presence of different Russian power tools, will therefore indicate
how Russia intended the crisis outcome to end. The more power factors Russia employs, the more it
needs the crisis outcome to be beneficial. Soft power is difficult to quantify, whereas hard power can
relatively easily be quantified. By nature of their practicality, this study will therefore make use of the
hard power factors. Thus, by looking at the presence of hard power factors, one may be able to
classify a crisis. As we saw in the Definitions chapter, this crisis classification will be in the form of a
Crisis Score.
The second part of this study examines the power ministries influencing Russian governmental
policy. As governmental policy will affect the use of hard power, this will allow for an analysis of
which actors are publically most or least active during the differently classified crises.
70
Allison & Zelikow p.24
Conflict
resolution
Hard Power 1
Hard Power 3
Hard Power 2
20
Coalition A Coalition B
Strategy A1 Strategy B1
Decisions by Governmental
Authorities
Institutional Rules, Resource
allocation and Appointments
Policy outputs
Advocacy Coalition Framework
Governmental policies can generally be seen as the result of politicking between actors. This public
policy process has been the focus of many studies, and as a result there are several models. Sabatier
identifies71 these models as:
1. The Stages Heuristic
2. Institutional Rational Choice
3. Multiple-Streams
4. Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework
5. Advocacy Coalition Framework
6. Policy Diffusion Framework
7. Funnel of Causality
Figure 2
These theories have in common in that they identify actors as
influencing government policy. As an example we can look at
Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework72.
Of interest in this theory are the actor coalitions, and their
effects on governmental decisions. Basically, what this theory
states is that actors will group into coalitions with likeminded
actors, and develop a joint strategy. These strategies will be
the framework for government decisions. These
decisions are then tempered by institutional rules, resource
allocation, and appointments, to produce policy outputs. The
figure to the right is a simplified illustration of the process.
When applied to this study, the idea of coalition can be
simplified to that of actor (or power ministry). Introducing
elements of Allison and Zelikow’s Organizational Behavior
Model, where a state consists of organizations, allows for
looking at the motivation behind creating the strategies. The power ministries can be seen as
essentially subdivisions within the Russian state. These numerous subdivisions within the state, such
as the foreign ministry and defense ministry, will have different organizational missions, and thus
different operational objectives, special capabilities, and organizational cultures73. These will impact
71
Sabatier pp.6-10 72
Ibid. p.191 73
Allison & Zelikow p. 391
21
on the sub divisional perspectives of crises. As an example, in the US, the State Department, due to
its nature, is more likely to see the solution to a particular international crisis as being diplomacy,
whereas the Department of Defense, on the other hand, may favor a military approach. These
different organizational characteristics will have an impact on each actor’s strategy as they try to
influence government decisions. But why would a power ministry want to influence government
decisions?
According to Allison and Zelikow, organizations want to be healthy, and “most organizations define
the central goal of ‘health’ as synonymous with autonomy”74. A goal for these organizations,
therefore, is to expand in terms of budget, personnel, and responsibilities75. By positioning
themselves as highly visible organizations during certain crises, this can be interpreted as making a
land grab and wanting to have more influence in the resolution of the crisis. If an organization shows
itself competent in an area, this could eventually lead to expanded responsibility, which in turn could
eventually lead to increased autonomy. In short, the actors have imperialist tendencies and want to
grow, a sort of Nietzschean will to power. They grow through accumulating more responsibilities.
And they accumulate more responsibilities through showing that they have the competence in these
new areas. Times of crisis tend to be good opportunities to show competence. Depending on the
crisis, different power ministries may want to show their competence. By adapting the Advocacy
Coalition Framework, and instead of using advocacy coalitions as actors simplify it to simply
organizations as actors (as per the Organizational Behavior Model) we get a slightly different model.
Figure 3
In this model as
seen below,
different actors,
or organizations,
are distinguished
with different
organizational
objectives, capabilities, competence, standard operating procedures, and programs and repertoires.
These differences will color their view of the situation, as defined by the Crisis Score. Being
imperialistic, they will want to grow. By showing activity and attempting to influence governmental
decisions during times of crisis (with each crisis classified in this model through the crisis score), they
will attempt to show they are competent in dealing with these situations. In short, what this model
74
Allison & Zelikow p. 181 75
Ibid.
Crisis Score Actor A
Actor B
Actor C
Actor D
Policy
outpu
ts
Decisions by
Governmental
Authorities
Crisis outcome
22
suggests is that the decisions by governmental authorities are a result of actors competing for
influence.
9. Method
This section will describe the method used in order to study the Russian power ministries and their
power projection. Initially, this study attempted to examine actor activity in relation to crisis
outcomes. The outcomes would be measured on a positive and negative scale as seen from Russia.
Positive outcomes for Russia could be identified as those where Russia did not punish the opposing
state. If Russia was happy with the outcome, it would not feel the need to punish the opponent. Vice
versa, negative outcomes for Russia would be identified if Russia did in fact feel the need to punish
the opposing state. These punishments would come in the form of hard power. For instance, if Russia
felt a crisis outcome was bad and wanted to punish a state, they could turn off the gas tap,
implement economic sanctions, or send troops to or near the opponent. By measuring the difference
in troop levels or economic trade before and after a crisis, we could easily see if a state was being
punished.
As it turns out, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in 2007, and
therefore stopped reporting troop levels. As no open source indexes Russian troop levels and
locations frequently enough that it would be possible to compare these levels before and after crises,
measuring this hard power became impractical. As one of the three Russian hard power factors was
rendered uncollectable, the feasibility of classifying crises in accordance with their outcomes was
abandoned. Instead of probing crisis outcomes, it was decided that this study examines the actual
presence of hard power factors, and use this presence to classify each crisis accordingly. The
assumption here is that if Russia has a hard power conduit in a country, then Russia will always
actively use that hard power.
To repeat from the Research Questions section, the research questions are:
Which hard power factors were present in the crisis?
How active was each power ministry during the crisis?
Is there a correlation between crises where hard power factors were present and certain
power ministries, and inversely, where some power ministries absent?
23
10. Choice of Method This study will use an extensive approach in order to examine these research questions. As extensive
methods are useful in identifying possible correlations between variables, and with this study
ultimately interested in looking at possible correlations between Crisis Score and power ministries,
this method should be the most practical. Quantitative data relatively easily can be gathered from
open source sources.
Further quantitative approaches for studying the relationship between hard power and power
ministries might be to do organizational structure analyzes. Here one would look at the individuals
employed within the different power ministries and their relationships with key individuals in the
Russian government (in this case likely limited to Putin).
Using a qualitative approach to examine the correlation between crises and power ministries may be
possible too. In this case, one would have to focus on one or two typical cases, such as an energy
crisis. The cases chosen would then be classified (i.e. energy crisis), and each power ministry
analyzed. This intensive approach would theoretically allow for a much deeper analysis of the power
ministries as compared to the method as chosen by this study. However, it would require much more
detailed information from each power ministry. This is essentially the method’s main Achilles’ heel,
in that much of the required information for a qualitative study is confidential, or at least not
accessible. Without access to actual power ministry reasoning, the validity of the study would suffer.
Another qualitative method that would counter this problem would be to interview power ministry
members in order to identify power ministry activity. Assuming access to unbiased and central
individuals, such a study would likely be highly reliable. It would also likely be highly expensive and
time consuming.
24
11. Operationalization
Part one
The first part of the study will examine and classify each crisis.
The dependent variable in this study will be the Crisis Scores. These will be coded in an interval scale
ranging from zero to three. 0 (zero) will denote a crisis where Russia lacks any form of hard power. 1
(one) will indicate a crisis where one hard power factor is present. 2 (two) means two hard power
factors were present, and 3 (three) means all three hard powers as identified by Wilson and Popescu
were present. The following table demonstrates how the Crisis Score data will be set up. A low score
would imply that Russia will not get its will through, whereas a higher score would imply that it
would.
Table 3
CRISIS Military presence Energy cut-off Trade sanctions Crisis Score
Crisis A X 1
Crisis B 0
Crisis C X X 2
The following hard powers will be examined:
Military presence will be calculated through the presence of significant Russian military capabilities
in the host country at the time of the crisis. These could take the form of already established military
bases or other more ad-hoc presence. The key word here is significant, in that presence must be
enough to be able to constitute a possible threat. If there is a military presence this will be coded as
an X on the Crisis Score table, and if not then the box will remain empty.
The energy cut-off variable will be calculated through examining whether Russia cut of energy
supplies during the crisis. If Russia did cut off energy supplies during a crisis, that will be recorded as
an X in the table. If it did not cut off supplies, the box will be empty,
If a trade sanction is instituted during or in the aftermath of a crisis, this will be interpreted as a
punishment. If a previously instituted trade sanction is withdrawn after a crisis, this will be
interpreted as a reward. For the sanction to be an effective punishment it should hurt, and for it to
25
hurt it should show up in the trade statistics. If exports of goods to Russia the year after the crisis are
shown to have fallen significantly enough to show a dip, then that will be assumed as Russia
restricting trade with the state, which in other words would be a trade sanction. If trade has fallen
that will be recorded as an X in the Crisis Score table, and if trade has not been affected negatively
then the box will be empty.
For this study, each hard power is assumed to be equally effective, and will not be weighted against
the others. Once the crises has been examined and recorded on the Crisis Score table, the presence
of each hard power will be tallied up for every crisis, as seen in the column to the right.
Part two
Once the crises have been identified and classified according to their Crisis Score, we will look at how
active each Russian power ministry is in each crisis. These will be the independent variables in the
study. As detailed in the Theory chapter, organizations compete for influence. They do this by
highlighting their competence, and one way of making oneself noticed is through public statements.
Within the framework of this study, actor activity is assumed to be reflected in public statements,
with a high number of public statements being indicative of high activity, and low numbers
suggesting low activity. Consequently, by tallying up each statement per power ministry, one would
get an indication of how involved they are in the policy process of that particular crisis. Once
gathered, the data will be put in a data matrix as presented below:
Table 4
CRISIS A Power
ministry (a)
Power
ministry (b)
Power
ministry (c)
Etc…
Nov 11 0 0 0
Nov 12 0 1 1
Nov 13 1 0 0
Nov 14 0 1 0
Total 1 2 1
To repeat from the Definitions chapter, the power ministries used in this study will be: the President;
the Prime Minister; the Foreign Ministry; the State Duma; the Federation Council; the Finance
26
Ministry; the Energy Ministry; the Ministry for Emergency Situations; and the Federal Security
Service.
The study will consider statements starting one month prior to the central crisis date(s), and end one
month after the immediate crisis has ended. This will mean that the statement table will be rather
extensive, and not very accessible. In order to present the statement data in a relatively organized
fashion the data will be put into timeline diagrams. These diagrams will present the time period
examined on the X-axis, with statements by power ministries presented as peaks on the Y-axis. The
following diagram illustrates the presentation. In the following example, we see that Power Ministry
A made a statement on July 7, and Power Ministry B made statements between July 16 and 18.
Figure 4
A bar chart
would arguably
be better suited
to present the
data; however,
due to the
relatively large
time scale examined per crisis, the bars would be too thin to distinguish.
Part three
As noted, these diagrams simply present the statement data. The actual statement tables can be
found in Appendix B. In order to analyze the total power ministry activity for a given crisis, each actor
statement is added up respectively. This frequency table gives the total actor activity per crisis (using
the above example Power Ministry A would have made a total of three statements, and Power
Ministry B a total of seven). Having done this, we can begin analyzing actor activity for every Crisis
Score. This will be done through calculating mean percentage values per actor for every Crisis Score
Again using the previous example, we see that Power Ministry A made three statements and Power
Ministry B made seven statements. This translates to an actor activity of 30 % for Power Ministry A,
and 70 % for Power Ministry B in that particular crisis. As each crisis is unique, calculating these actor
activity percentages for every crisis will get a range of different values for every actor.
27
We then organize these crises actor activities in accordance with the Crisis Scores. This will give actor
activity in correlation with hard power (with a low Crisis Score corresponding to fewer hard power
factors present). The following two tables show an example of actor activity values. As they will be
grouped in accordance with the Crisis Score, there will be a separate table with different crises for
every Crisis Score (Crisis Score 0 through 3).
Table 5 Table 6
Having done this, we can easily analyze which actor or actors are most active during certain crises,
and, conversely, absent in others. The best method of visually presenting these results will be
through simple circle diagrams. Using the mean values from the example tables above, we get the
following diagrams:
Figure 5 Figure 6
What these diagrams tell us is that during bilateral relations crises where Russia has relatively few
hard power tools present, Power Ministry B dominates the agenda. In crises where Russia would be
able to use more hard power, Power Ministry A dominates.
Crisis Score 2
Power Ministry A Power Ministry B
Crisis C 60 % 20 %
Crisis D 80 % 30 %
Mean Value 70 % 25 %
Crisis Score 1
Power Ministry A Power Ministry B
Crisis A 30 % 70 %
Crisis B 50 % 60 %
Mean Value 40 % 65 %
28
12. Sources
This section contains a discussion on the sources used. There are five criteria which need to be
fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable76. The first criterion is concerned with authenticity. What
this means is that the source must not be fabricated. This can be a problem in older historical
sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts (“history is written by the victors”, as Winston
Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point out, data from authoritarian countries may
suffer from a lack of authenticity77. It is imperative for any study that the source is authentic. The
second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of the source to the event. Simply put, the
longer the time between an event and its reporting, the more likely that people involved would
forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the reporting of an event, the better. The
third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source is from an event. The big question
here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary source. Generally, primary sources
should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is concerned with tendentiousness, or
whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead distorted event reports. For this
criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a minimum. The fifth and final
criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of other sources, and should
not rely on other sources.
Part one
There are five criteria which need to be fulfilled in order for a source to be reliable78. The first
criterion is concerned with authenticity. What this means is that the source must not be fabricated.
This can be a problem in older historical sources, as well as after sources written after conflicts
(“history is written by the victors”, as Winston Churchill aptly put it). As Teorell and Svensson point
out, data from authoritarian countries may suffer from a lack of authenticity79. It is imperative for
any study that the source is authentic. The second criterion deals with the contemporaneousness of
the source to the event. Simply put, the longer the time between an event and its reporting, the
more likely that people involved would forget details. With regards to this criterion, the earlier the
reporting of an event, the better. The third criterion focuses on centrality, or how distant the source
is from an event. The big question here is whether the source is a primary source or secondary
source. Generally, primary sources should be better than secondary sources. The fourth criterion is
76
Teorell & Svensson pp.104-106 77
Ibid. p.104 78
Ibid. pp.104-106 79
Ibid. p.104
29
concerned with tendentiousness, or whether a source favors a particular point of view. Bias can lead
distorted event reports. For this criterion to be fulfilled, tendentious sources should be kept to a
minimum. The fifth and final criterion looks at dependence. A good source should be independent of
other sources, and should not rely on other sources.
For the first part of the study, classifying the various crises, a number of sources have been used.
Military presence
With regards to the Russian military presence source, ideally one would use a source released by the
Russian Ministry of Defense. As this information is of strategic importance, it is largely classified.
Instead, this study will employ a secondary source for this information. This data for Russian military
bases abroad has been collected and assembled by Dr. Margerete Klein of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP). Dr. Margerete Klein is a researcher at SWP Russian
Federation/CIS Division. The research paper, ‘Russia’s Military Capabilities – “Great Power”
Ambitions and Reality’ from 2009, examines Russian military expansion since Putin’s second term as
president 2004-2008. Of interest to this study is table 6 in that paper. This table presents Russian
military facilities and bases abroad. This information is compiled from data by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, and several news outlets. The table itself can be found in Appendix A.
As regards authenticity, this study has been published by the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs. This organization frequently reports to the German Bundestag and the German
Federal Government. Due to its high profile, this organization likely cannot afford to publish
unauthentic reports. The study was released in 2009, and as such should sufficiently fulfill the
contemporaneousness criterion. Ideally however, the data should have covered each year from 2004
to 2011 (the sample range of this study). The author of the report has not physically travelled to the
Russian military bases. This may have a negative effect on the centrality criterion, as her reporting
from other sources may include faulty data. Looking at the tendentiousness criterion, the
information gathered from the report only pertains to reporting actual military presence; the risk of
tendentious tendencies on behalf of Dr. Klein should therefore be minimized. As Dr. Klein uses other
sources to gather her information, the dependence criterion will be negatively affected. Overall, the
source should prove valid.
30
Energy cut-off
This data will be gathered through news agency reports of Russia shutting off energy supplies. As
completely shutting down energy-supplies to a country is a fairly big step, it is assumed by this study
that such actions would be reported. The news agencies used will be Radio Free Europe Radio
Liberty, and RIA Novosti. By using two independent news agencies as a source, this study ensures
that the risk of reports of pipeline shut-offs being missed are minimized. The news agency source
criteria discussion will be found further down
Sanctions
By using economic sanctions, states wish to express their dissatisfaction with an opposing part, and
influence change. Therefore it stands to reason that economic sanctions are implemented in a way as
to hurt the economy of the opposing country. Such sanctions should therefore turn up in the export
data of the targeted country. This study will look at the export of goods from each examined state to
Russia. The data will be collected from each country’s statistical agency. As these trade statistics are,
amongst other things, used to control import and export duties, it is of high importance for the states
that these figures are authentic. The export data collected will be for the year prior to the crisis, the
crisis year, and the year after the crisis. As the information will be sourced directly from that year,
the contemporaneousness criterion is fulfilled. Furthermore, as these data sets are self-reported,
they will also fulfill the centrality criterion. For tendentiousness, there is a small risk that the data
may be distorted in order to gain trade advantages vis-à-vis Russia. However, Russia would likely
corroborate this data with their import data to minimize unfair competition (i.e. dumping). The
export data depends on the national customs agencies fulfilling its task. This may potentially have a
negative effect on the dependence criterion. In the case of Tajikistan, their statistical agency seems
to have been defunded in 2008. Therefore, their data has been collected from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). As the data needed for Tajikistan extends into 2012, the study will use the IMF
estimate for 2012. One may argue that the IMF might prove an even less tendentious source than
the national statistical agencies; however it would lose on the centrality criterion.
Once collected, the data will be put into diagrams in order to show the trend lines. If the trend line is
positive (increases for every year) then the assumption will be that Russia did not implement any
economic sanctions. The data can be found in Appendix A
31
Part two
The second part of the study, analyzing actor activity, requires collecting public statements.
The data for actor activity will be gathered as public statements from Radio Free Europe- Radio
Liberty (RFE-RL), and RIA Novosti. These two sources publish reports in English, making it possible to
examine power ministry statements. By using two sources, one can cross-reference data to ensure
no statements are missed.
RFE-RL was initially established in 1953 by the US to contest Soviet propaganda in Russia. Since then
it has expanded to serve regions such as the Middle East, and South East Asia. It is funded by the US
Congress, and it has local news bureaus in 20 regions, amongst them Russia80. This Russian news
bureau presence should allow for increased reliability when reporting on public statements. RIA
Novosti was established in 1991 by the decree of Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Its initial
mission was to “To provide information support for the USSR’s state domestic and foreign policies and
proceeding from the interests of the democratization of the mass media”81. As a Russian state-owned
news organization, it is highly likely to publish governmental actor statements. As news agencies, it is
their task to ensure that their information is authentic. This should provide for the authenticity
criterion. The news reports used in this study all stem from the day or days when the statements
were made, which means that the contemporaneousness of the sources are good. As these agencies
maintain news bureaus in Moscow, their centrality is relatively good. By using two news agencies
which are funded by two historically diametrically opposed states, overall tendentious effects should
be minimized. As there generally should not be any middle-man sourcing when reporting on power
ministry statements, the dependence criterion should also be fulfilled.
Ideally, statements should be gathered directly from the power ministries (such as through news
archives on official websites). Not all power ministries examined have news archives stretching back
to 2004 though, and those that do have them do not necessarily have them in English. As machine
translation (i.e. Google Translate) has not yet reached the level where translations are consistently
accurate, this study has elected not to gather the statements directly from the actors. Other relevant
news agencies could include Interfax and general news outlets. By adding these sources one would
likely further minimize the possibility of missing statements. It is however assumed by this study that
80
RFE-RL FAQ 81
RIA Novosti About
32
using and cross-referencing RFE-RL and RIA Novosti should be sufficient to ensure scientific reliability
on the statements.
13. Selection
This section discusses the crisis sample used by the study. As mentioned in the Background chapter,
the case descriptions section earlier could equally well be presented here.
This study will examine eight cases. Initially, the study was to consider all bilateral relations crisis
cases involving Russia, however time constraints ensured that this had to be limited. As the total
number of Russian bilateral relations crisis in the last decade have been fairly low, the eight cases
chosen should still represent a large sample when compared to the total population.
Because Yeltsin-era and Putin-era Russia are considerably different, with political power having
become much more centralized during Putin’s administration, comparing governmental actor
activities across two different eras would likely yield contradictory data. As Russia is wealthier today
than it was in the 90’s, this has also allowed for more extensive use of hard power, meaning the
Crisis Scores would not be compatible. Due to these considerations, this study will ignore crises from
the 90’s. The crises that have been chosen are fairly representative of the total number of Russian
bilateral relations crises. The most common type of bilateral crisis involving Russia has been
concerned with energy, and there have been several energy disputes over the last decade. This study
has chosen three of these crises: Lithuania 2006, Belarus 2007, and Ukraine 2009. Apart from these
three energy cases, Russia has had such disputes with Moldova, Bulgaria, and Ukraine in 2006.
The war in Georgia 2008 was chosen because the relations-fallout from this conflict did fit very well
with the definition of bilateral relations crisis. Another Georgian case of interest was the 2003 Rose
Revolution. With neither of the actor activity sources (RFE-RL and RIA Novosti) publishing data prior
to January 2004 though, gathering this information would be difficult. As such, the Rose Revolution
crisis was rejected. The 2006 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a similar type of crisis, and as
information from that year was accessible, this case was added to the study.
The 2007 Estonia case represents what could be considered a managed instability case. This
instability stems from a large Russian minority within the country. Cases with similar demographic
33
undercurrents could arguably also be found in the other Baltic States too. However, as the Bronze
Night case caused the most uproar, and thus was the most reported, this case was chosen ahead of
any other similar Baltic cases.
The 2007 Litvinenko case is the only case involving a state outside Russia’s immediate zone of
influence. As it had considerable effects on the bilateral relations between Russia and the UK, it was
added.
The 2011 Tajikistan pilot case was added as it did create a crisis in bilateral relations between the two
states. Furthermore, in an effort to create a more diverse sample, adding a Central Asian country was
ideal.
The Jilin 2005 chemical plant explosion in China, which led to harmful chemicals leaking into the
drinking water of Russian cities downriver was considered, however as the industrial accident caused
no noticeable relational problems between Russia and China, this case was discarded. The 2010
Russian-American spy swap was also considered. As this case did not seem to have any noticeable
effects on bilateral relations, it too was discarded.
Considering that actor activity data cannot be gathered prior to January 2004, the sample range
(2004; 2006; 2007; 2007; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011) makes for a fairly even temporal spread.
14. Limitations
This section establishes the delineations of the study. The time range surveyed in this study ranges
from 2004 to 2011, and the cases chosen have all been bilateral relations crises involving Russia and
some other country. This temporal limitation has been chosen as this is the time period covered by
the sources. As the main target of interest in this study is Russia, it holds that the study should limit
itself to looking at crises where Russia was involved. These time and national delimitations mean that
any generalizations drawn from this study will really only be applicable to Russia post-2004.
15. Assumptions
Here we establish the assumptions made by the study. First of all, it assumes that public statements
reflect internal activity, with a high number of statements suggesting high internal activity, and fewer
34
statements meaning lesser internal activity. Actors that make no public statements are assumed
uninvolved in that particular crisis.
Secondly, it assumes that all power ministries are equal; in that they are all central actors and that
there are no peripheral actors.
Thirdly, this study assumes that if hard power factors are present during a crisis, Russia will actively
use them.
Fourthly, the study assumes that the three hard powers examined are of equal worth (e.g. they are
equally effective in affecting change). As they are considered of equal worth, they will not have to be
weighted.
16. Previous research
This section looks at scientific research of importance to this study. As much of this research has
already been presented in earlier chapters, this section will act as a summary for previous research.
There have been copious amounts of research looking into the Russian state. As noted in the
definitions chapter, Bettina Renz and Carolina Vendil Pallin, amongst others, have identified and
defined the different power ministries that make up an important part of the Russian state8283.
Furthermore, as Paul Sabatier’s policy process study shows, one may assume that a state’s public
policy can generally be seen of as the output of different actors (or actor coalitions) within a state84.
Graham Allison developed the Organizational Behavior Model85. This model has been used to analyze
the American government during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It connects the policy process with
organizational theory, and allows for explaining the reasons behind power ministry activity.
Searching for Russian policy process studies on the EBSCO database and on Google Scholar do not
yield any apparent results, which may indicate that the area is not particularly researched. Research
identifying the major sub-divisional actors in forming Russian foreign policy might have been of use
to this study.
When it comes to the actual Russian foreign policy, again there is a large number of studies looking
at this. Marcel de Haas has identified an increase in the use of hard power by Russia under Putin.
During Putin’s second term as President, de Haas notes that the increased revenues from oil would
82
Renz p.561 83
Vendil Pallin p.55 84
Sabatier p.191 85
Aliison & Zelikow p.143
35
allow for more power projection86. According to Donaldson and Nogee, the most visible change that
“Putin brought to Russia’s foreign policy was a heightened level of presidential activism”87. This would
suggest that the most important power ministry in Russia would be the President. Furthermore,
Wilson and Popescu have identified the Russian neighborhood policy, and defined the hard power
resources available to Russia. Their study is partially based on the concept of hard and soft power as
developed by Joseph Nye88.
Searching the EBSCO database and Google Scholar does not reveal any quantitative studies on power
ministries and Russian foreign policy. This strongly suggests that the research topic is fairly original,
and that more research may be needed.
17. Evidence
Here we present the evidence. This chapter will begin by looking at the first part of the study,
identifying the crises scores for each crisis. As explained in the Method chapter, we will look at each
crisis and identify which hard power factors were present. Once every crisis has been reviewed we
will summarize the information and establish each Crisis Score.
Once that is done we will go on to the second part of the study, presenting the actor activity data as
outlined in the Method chapter. As mentioned, these will come in the form of timeline diagrams,
where a peak would signify a statement.
86
de Haas p.165 87
Donaldson & Nogee p.352 88
Keohane & Nye p.220
36
Ukraine 2004
Military presence89
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
Basis of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet in Sevastopol
13,000
As we can see from the table above, there was a Russian military presence in Ukraine in 2004.
Energy cut-off90
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
The table shows that Russia did not cut energy supplies during the crisis.
Sanctions91
To repeat from earlier, if the line goes up from year to year then exports are increasing. This means
that trade has not been negatively affected from the crisis. In the case of the above diagram, it shows
that trade with Russia was not negatively affected by the Orange Revolution.
89
See military presence table in Appendix A 90
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 91
See export table in Appendix A
37
With only the military factor present in this crisis, it will be classified as a 1 on the four scale index.
Lithuania 2006
Military presence92
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
N/A None
The table shows that there was no Russian military presence in Lithuania in 2006.
Energy cut-off93
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
This table shows that Russia did cut off energy supplies to Lithuania during the crisis.
Sanctions94
The diagram shows no negative effects on Lithuanian exports as a result of the crisis.
As the only factor present in the crisis is that of energy cut-off, this crisis is classified as a 1.
92
See military presence table in Appendix A 93
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 94
See export table in Appendix A
38
Estonia 2007
Military presence95
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
N/A None
There was no Russian military presence during the crisis.
Energy cut-off96
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
Energy supplies were cut during the crisis.
Sanctions97
Estonian exports to Russia were not affected by the crisis.
As energy supplies was the only factor affected during the crisis, this crisis is classified as a 1
95
See military presence table in Appendix A 96
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 97
See export table in Appendix A
39
UK 2007
Military presence98
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
N/A None
As the table indicates, there were no Russian troops present in the UK during the crisis.
Energy cut-off99
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
Energy supplies to the UK were not affected by crisis.
Sanctions100
UK exports to Russia were not affected during the crisis.
With no factors present during the crisis, this crisis is classified as a 0 on the scale.
98
See military presence table in Appendix A 99
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 100
See export table in Appendix A
40
Belarus 2007
Military presence101
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
Radar station in Baranovichi
and communication center of
the navy in Vileyka
850
The table shows that there was a military presence in Belarus during the crisis.
Energy cut-off102
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
This table shows that energy supplies were cut during the crisis.
Sanctions103
The diagram shows Belarus exports to Russia were not seriously affected during the crisis.
With two factors present, military presence and energy cut-off, this crisis is classified as a 2.
101
See military presence table in Appendix A 102
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 103
See export table in Appendix A
41
Georgia 2008
Military presence104
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
Military bases in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia
3,000 – 7,600
The table shows that there was a military presence in Georgia during the crisis.
Energy cut-off105
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
The table shows that energy supplies from Russia were not affected by the crisis
Sanctions106
This diagram shows that exports to Russia were negatively affected during the crisis.
As there were two factors present in this crisis, it will be classified as a 2.
104
See military presence table in Appendix A 105
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 106
See export table in Appendix A
42
Ukraine 2009
Military presence107
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
Basis of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet in Sevastopol
13,000
As indicated, there was a Russian military presence in Ukraine during the crisis.
Energy cut-off108
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
Energy supplies were cut during the crisis.
Sanctions109
The table shows that trade with Russia was negative during the crisis. It shows that export to Russia
has dropped to less than US$ 2 Billion in less than 2 years. Although it looks extreme, this data is
confirmed by the source. With all three factors present, this crisis is classified as a 3 on the scale.
107
See military presence table in Appendix A 108
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 109
See export table in Appendix A
43
Tajikistan 2011
Military presence110
Type of Military Basis Troop Strength
Military bases and joint use of
the air force base at Ayni
5,500
The table shows that there was a military presence in Tajikistan during the crisis.
Energy cut-off111
Energy cut-off present Energy cut-off not present
X
This indicates that energy supplies from Russia were not cut.
Sanctions112
This diagram shows that trade with Russia was expected to pick-up during the crisis year, indicating
that the crisis would not necessarily affect Tajiki exports.
With only one factor present, this crisis is classified as a 1.
110
See military presence table in Appendix A 111
See energy cut-off table in Appendix A 112
See export table in Appendix A
44
18. Summary for crisis score
This section summarizes the evidence gathered from the previous section.
CRISIS MILITARY PRESENCE ENERGY CUT-
OFF
ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
CRISIS SCORE
Ukraine 2004 X 1
Lithuania 2006 X 1
Estonia 2007 X 1
UK 2007 0
Belarus 2007 X X 2
Georgia 2008 X X 2
Ukraine 2009 X X X 3
Tajikistan 2011 X 1
As the summary table above shows, the crises scores were spread across the whole range, with one 0
and one 3, two 2’s and the rest as 1’s. It shows that the factor present in most cases was that of
military presence. Energy cut-offs were present in half the cases, and only two cases saw a negative
effect on trade.
The following diagram is the same as above, only it is organized according to Crisis Score.
CRISIS MILITARY PRESENCE ENERGY CUT-
OFF
ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
CRISIS SCORE
UK 2007 0
Ukraine 2004 X 1
Lithuania 2006 X 1
Estonia 2007 X 1
Tajikistan 2011 X 1
Belarus 2007 X X 2
Georgia 2008 X X 2
Ukraine 2009 X X X 3
What we can see from this table is that economic sanctions were only implemented in the two crises
with the top Crisis Scores.
45
19. Actor activity
Here we present the actor activity. The following diagrams show power ministry activity, in the form
of public statements, during each crisis. Technical limitations make presenting the data clearly a
problem. This is especially so in cases where power ministries made statements on the same day, as
the peaks would overlap. In attempting to overcome this problem activity lines will be designed
differently (e.g. some are dotted). The statement tables can be referred to in Appendix B. In the
following diagrams, each peak represents a statement. For example, in the diagram below, the light
gray peak between December 14 and 16 means the State Duma made a statement on December 15.
These diagrams only show those power ministries which made statements.
Ukraine 2004
The central date in the Orange Revolution crisis is December 26, when the re-vote was held. As we
can see here, the most active power ministry was there Russian Foreign Ministry, which made
statements throughout the crisis. They were followed by the Russian State Duma, which made
statements prior and up to the central date. The Russian president, at the time Putin, made a total of
three statements
46
Lithuania 2006
In the case of the Lithuanian pipeline shut-off, the central date is July 29. This was when Russian
authorities stated that the Druzhba pipeline leading to Lithuania had ruptured. Of the ten power
ministries examined, only one, the Emergency Situations Ministry, made a statement. This statement
was made two days after Russia had shut off supplies.
Belarus 2007
The central dates for the 2007 Belarus energy dispute are January 8 through 10. The most active
power ministry here was the Russian president, with eight statements. He was followed by the
Finance Ministry, with five statements. Actor activity is mostly centered around and just after the
central dates.
47
Estonia 2007
The 2007 Estonian Bronze Night crisis began on April 26 and ended on May 4. As we see here, by far
the most active power ministry was the Russian Foreign Ministry, with eight statements. Most actor
activity was centered on the crisis dates.
UK 2007
The central date for the 2007 Litvinenko affair is July 17, when British authorities decided to expel
four Russian diplomats and suspend visa facilitation talks with Russia. As we see here, the most
active power ministry is the Foreign Ministry, with 12 statements. The Federal Security Service made
three statements prior to the central crisis date. Actor activity is relatively spread throughout the
measured time period.
48
Georgia 2008
Due to the technical limits, this particular crisis is a bit difficult to illustrate. The main difference
between this crisis and the others is that many of the power ministries involved made several
statements per day, thus leading to higher peaks. Again, the most active power ministry was the
Foreign Ministry. They were followed by the Defense Ministry and the Russian president, by now
Dmitri Medvedev. Of note is the new Russian prime minister, Putin, who made eight statements.
Ukraine 2009
The Ukrainian gas-dispute was centered from January 1 to January 18. The most active actor in this
crisis was the Russian prime minister, Putin. He was followed by the president, Medvedev. Trailing in
the back was the Russian Foreign Ministry, with only two statements.
49
Tajikistan 2011
The central date for the Tajikistan pilot row is November 8. The Russian Foreign Ministry is the most
active power ministry here, with six statements. The Russian president follows with three
statements. The statements are mostly centered on the central crisis date.
50
20. Analysis
This section contains the analysis part of the study.
The following chapter analyses actor activity for each Crisis Score category, as outlined in the Method
chapter. These percentages are the mean values for all crises with that Crisis Score. The circle
diagrams are added to better illustrate these percentages. The calculations can be found in Appendix
C
Score 0 - Activity
Presid
ent
Foreign
Min
istry
Defe
nse M
inistry
FSB
11% 67% 5% 17%
What this diagram tells us is that when Russia possesses no hard power factors against a country, the
by far most active power ministry is the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry represents over two
thirds of the measurable activity during crises where Russia lacks hard power projections. The
Federal Security Service represents 17 percent, and the President only 11 percent. The smallest actor
at this level is the Russian Defense Ministry, with only five percent.
51
Score 1 Activity
Presid
ent
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Federatio
n C
ou
ncil
Finan
ce Min
istry
Emergen
cy Situatio
ns
Min
istry
15% 38% 15% 5% 2% 25%
In cases where Russia can influence crises outcomes with one hard power, the situation becomes
much more dynamic. Here we can see that the Foreign Ministry still dominates the activity landscape
with 38 percent. They are followed by the Emergency Situations Ministry, with 25 percent. By
comparison, the President and the State Duma only represent 15 percent each. The Federation
Council and the Finance Ministry trail behind with five and two percent, respectively.
52
Score 2 Activity
Presid
ent
Prim
e min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Federatio
n C
ou
ncil
Finan
ce Min
istry
Energy M
inistry
Defe
nse M
inistry
Emergen
cy Situatio
ns
Min
istry
FSB
35% 12% 21% 0,5% 1% 14% 3% 13% 0,5% 0,5%
The Score 2 Crises are crises in which Russia can employ two hard powers in order to influence the
crisis outcomes. When compared to the Score 1 diagram, we see that there are even more actors
involved here. The main difference here is that the President now represents 35 percent of all
activity. The Foreign Ministry is no longer the most active actor, having fallen to 21 percent. They are
followed by the Finance Ministry, Defense Ministry. At this level the Prime Minister makes his first
appearance, at 12 percent.
53
Score 3 Activity
Presid
ent
Prim
e min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
38% 56% 6%
Score 3 Crises are crises where Russia may use all three hard powers as identified by Wilson and
Popescu. The by far most active power ministry here is the Prime Minister, who represents over half
of all activity. The President’s office follows with 38 percent, and the marginalized Foreign Office
represents six percent.
Of interest here is the growth in activity by the Russian Prime Minister. The likely explanation for this
is that the crisis which achieved a Score 3 was in 2009, which meant that Putin was Prime Minister.
Overall, looking at the actor activity diagrams in the Evidence chapter, one can see that the role of
the Russian Prime Minister appears to have become more active as Putin entered that position.
54
21. Conclusion
This study set out to answer three questions. The first one was to identify which hard powers were
present in different crises. This was answered in the Summary for Crisis Score chapter. The second
question was to identify how active each power ministry was the crises. This information was
summarized in the Analysis chapter. Finally, the third question wanted to look at whether there was
a correlation between crises where hard power resources were present and certain power ministries.
The answer to that can be seen in the circle diagrams in the Analysis chapter.
As was noted in the Theory chapter, organizations (in this case the power ministries) define “the
central goal of ‘health’ as synonymous with autonomy”113. This means that one of their goals is to
expand in terms of budget, personnel, and responsibilities. By positioning themselves as highly visible
organizations during certain crises, this can essentially be interpreted as a land grab and wanting to
have more influence. As we saw in the circle diagrams presented in the Analysis chapter, there were
more actors involved in the higher Crisis Score crises (barring Crisis Score 3). As more hard powers
were available, more power ministries appeared to want to influence the government policy. This
seems to confirm the imperialist tendencies as noted by Allison’s Organizational Behavior Model.
The Crisis Score summary indicates that Russian hard power projection has increased over the years,
hovering around 1 from 2004 to 2007, and then increasing. This is in line with scientific observations
by de Haas, who has shown that this increased with Putin’s second term as president. As Russia has
received significant gas revenues, this wealth has allowed Russia to engage in power politics.
Looking at the actors, the Russian Foreign Ministry was the most dominant actor at the lower Crisis
Scores. As the number of hard powers available in dealing with the crises increased, the Foreign
Ministry was gradually replaced by the President. The conclusion we can draw from this is that as the
stakes become higher, the Russian President, as the ultimate arbiter, will want to ensure that the
crisis is resolved in a satisfactory manner. Incidentally, as there is more hard power resources
available at these higher level Crisis Scores, the likelihood that the outcome will be beneficial
increases. Whoever is the most active at these higher Scores is likely to be seen as a catalyst for good
foreign policy, and as such improve their organizational ‘health’ as defined by Allison114.
113
Allison & Zelikow p.181 114
Ibid. p.181
55
This study would benefit from having more cases. Teorell and Svensson note that extensive studies
should have a large sample group, generally having at least 20-30 cases115. As the total number of
bilateral relations crises involving Russia since 2004 is relatively low, it was assumed that using eight
cases would still represent a large sample of the total population. However, it is understood that
adding four or five more cases would vastly improve the generalizability of the study. Ideally there
should have been more cases at Crisis Scores 0 and 3.
Future quantitative studies should look further into the relationship between Russian power
ministries and Russian government policy. Using Allison’s third model, the Governmental Politics
Model, may reveal a better understanding of the Russian core sub-divisional actors. Other research
might look into the dynamics of Putin and Medvedev. For example, by looking at Prime Minister
activity prior to 2008 and after 2008, we see indications that the Prime Ministerial role has expanded
under Putin. Future research might want to look into how it has expanded, and why.
115
Teorell & Svensson p.80
56
References
Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision – Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd Ed. Longman,
New York. (1999)
Edling, Christofer & Hedström, Peter. Kvantitativa metoder. Studentlitteratur, Lund (2003)
Forbrig, J. Shepherd, R. comps. and eds. Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Strengthening
European and Transatlantic Commitments. German Marshal Fund of the United States, Washington
(2005)
Donaldson, R.H. & Nogee, J.L. The Foreign Policy of Russia – Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 3rd
ed. M.E. Sharpe, New York (2005)
de Haas, Marcel. Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century – Putin, Medvedev and beyond.
Routledge, New York (2010)
Hewitt, George. (2009) “Abkhazia and Georgia: Time for a Reassessment” Brown Journal of World
Affairs, vol. 15, Issue 2, pp.183-196
Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S., Power and Interdependence. 3rd Ed. Longman, New York, (2001)
Klein, Margarete. Russia’s Military Capabilities –“Great Power” Ambitions and Reality” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin (2009)
Larsson, R. Rysk energy makt – Korruption och säkerhetsfixering I nationens namn. Erzats,
LivoniaPrint, Latvia, (2010)
Nye, J.S., Soft Power – The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs, New York, (2004)
Rosenthal, U., Charles, M.T. & Hart, P. eds Coping with crisis: The management of disasters, riots and
terrorism. Charles C Thomas, Springfield IL. (1989)
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Sabatier, Paul A. Theories of the Policy Process. 2nd Ed. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, (2007)
Renz, Bettina. (2005) Russia’s “Force Structures” and the Study of Civil-Military Relations, Journal of
Slavic Military Studies, vol. 18, nr. 4, pp.559-585
Vendil Pallin, Carolina. De ryska kraftministerierna: maktverktyg och maktförsäkring. FOI, Stockholm,
(2006)
Wilson, A. & Popescu, N. (2009) Russian and European neighborhood policies compared. South East
European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 9, Issue 3, 2009
Åslund, A. & McFaul, M. comps. and eds. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic
Breakthrough. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D.C., (2007)
Web articles
RIA Novosti
Russia sets 2007 gas price for Belarus at $200 per 1,000 cu m
2006-11-03 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061103/55362782.html
Ban on Georgia's Borjomi water to start May 7, Nabeglavi May 10
2006-05-06 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060506/47619386.html
Russia to make statement on Litvinenko case
2007-07-21 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070721/69405339.html
Putin calls London extradition demand ‘vestige of colonialism’
2007-07-24 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070724/69591666.html
Russia deports 300 Tajik workers after pilot incarceration
2011-11-15 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111115/168716845.html
Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia prevented NATO growth - Medvedev
2011-11-21 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111121/168901195.html
58
Russian. Estonian pilots released in Tajikistan
2011-11-22 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111115/168716845.html
RFE-RL
Putin, Lukashenka To Meet Amid Oil Row
2006-12-15 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073464.html
Belarus Says Compromise Reached, While Moscow Demurs
2007-01-07 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073912.html
“Putin Says Market Governs Russia's Energy Relations” -
2007-01-18 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074104.html
One Killed In Estonian Violence Over War Memorial
2007-04-27 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076138.html
Russian Lawmakers Fuel Estonia-Russia Row
2007-05-01 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076214.html
Estonia: War Anniversary Exacerbates Ethnic Divions
2007-05-01 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076344.html
Rice: Russia should help resolve, not stoke, Georgia tensions
2008-05-10
http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Russia_Should_Help_Resolve_Not_Stoke_Georgia_Tensions/118
2835.html
Georgian Troops, Warplanes, Pound South Ossetia Separatists
2008-08-08
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Troops_Warplanes_Pound_South_Ossetia_Separatists/1189
386.html
59
Georgian President Accuses Russia Of Launching 'Full-Scale Invasion'
2008-08-09
http://www.rferl.org/content/Fierce_Fighting_Continues_In_South_Ossetia_As_Civilians_Flee/11896
75.html
Russian President orders halt to Military Operations in Georgia
2008-08-12 http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html
Politicians Say Moscow Should 'Take Revenge' Against Dushanbe Over Sentencing Of Pilots
2011-11-09
http://www.rferl.org/content/politicians_say_moscow_should_take_revenge_against_dusanbe/243
86074.html
Miscellaneous web sources
'Country Report: Estonia' 2007, Country Report. Estonia, 10, 8, pp. 1-6, International Security &
Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost, viewed 16 January 2012..
STRATFOR, Punishing the Baltics with a Broken Pipeline, June 1 2007
(http://www.stratfor.com/russia_punishing_baltics_broken_pipeline)
Russian Constitution
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
Ministry of Defense Mission
http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/tasks.htm
APPENDIX A
I
APPENDIX A
MILITARY DATA
The author wishes to emphasize that the following table was borrowed from a study created by
Margarete Klein of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Russian Military Facilities and Bases Abroad
HOST COUNTRY TYPE OF MILITARY BASIS TROOP STRENGTH
ARMENIA Air base in Yerevan, military basis in
Gyumri
3,214
AZERBAIJAN Radar station in Gabala 900
BELARUS Radar station in Baranovichi and
communication center of the Navy in
Vileyka
850
GEORGIA Military bases in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia
Exact figure unknown; Officially 3000,
up to 7600 allowed
KAZAKHSTAN Radar station in Balkash Unknown
KYRGISTAN Air basis in Kant; negotiations for
another basis in the south of the
country are on-going
Ca. 700
MOLDOVA Peacekeepers in Transdnistria and
forces for the protection of ammo
depots
1500
TAJIKISTAN Military bases and joint use of the air
force base Ayni
5500
UKRAINE Basis of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol
13000
SYRIA Logistical facilities of the Navy (under
repair)
150
Taken from:
Klein, Margarete. Russia’s Military Capabilities –“Great Power” Ambitions and Reality” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin (2009)
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP12_kle_ks.pdf (p. 20)
APPENDIX A
II
ENERGY CUT-OFF DATA
The following table identifies which crises Russia curtailed gas supplies. The first column shows the
different crises, and the second column shows if Russia cut supplies. The figures correspond to the
links below.
CRISIS ENERGY CUT-OFF
UKRAINE 2004 NO
LITHUANIA 2006 YES (1)
ESTONIA 2007 YES (2)
UK 2007 NO
BELARUS 2007 YES (3)
GEORGIA 2008 NO
UKRAINE 2009 YES (4)
TAJIKISTAN 2011 NO
1. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070230.html
2. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076256.html
3. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073871.html
4. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Sharply_Curbs_Gas_Flow_To_Ukraine/1365501.html
APPENDIX A
III
EXPORT DATA
The following tables show each country’s export figures to Russia. The data includes the actual year
of the crisis, as well as the year prior to and after the crisis.
UKRAINE 2004
2003 4311395470
2004 5888676370
2005 7495821720
Sourced from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2004/zd/ztt/ztt_e/arh_ztt2004_e.html
LITHUANIA 2006
2005 3422100000
2006 4956100000
2007 6473000000
Sourced from Statistics Lithuania
http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectTable/omrade0.asp?SubjectCode=S6&PLanguage=1&ShowNews=OFF
ESTONIA 2007
2006 605267985
2007 709627389
2008 880385827
Sourced from Statistics Estonia
http://pub.stat.ee/px-
web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=FT09&ti=EXPORTS+AND+IMPORTS+BY+COUNTRY+%28MONTHS%29&path=../I_Databas/E
conomy/11Foreign_trade/03Foreign_trade_since_2004/&lang=1
UK 2007
2006 2069000000
2007 2833000000
2008 4132000000
Sourced from HM Revenue & Customs
https://www.uktradeinfo.com/pagecontent/datapages/tables/Webtbls_final2010.XLS
APPENDIX A
IV
BELARUS 2007
2006 6845300000
2007 8878600000
2008 10551900000
Sourced from the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade1.php
GEORGIA 2008
2007 45338456,17
2008 29783440,57
2009 21146172,62
Sourced from Statistics Georgia
http://www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng
UKRAINE 2009
2008 15735571900
2009 8495072300
20010 1343188100
Sourced from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2009/zd/ztt/ztt_e/arh_ztt2009_e.html
TAJIKISTAN 2011
2010 87270876
2011 79800000
2012 88067280
Sourced from the EU Commission and the International Monetary Fund
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113453.pdf
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28
APPENDIX B
I
APPENDIX B
The following tables show power ministry statements for each crisis. If a cell contains a number, that
means one statement was made by the power ministry that day, regardless of its numerical value. If
it contains more numbers, the power ministry made more statements. The actual number itself (i.e.
3 or 20) corresponds to the source list at the end of this Appendix B.
In the date column, the date(s) that are bold correspond to the central crisis dates.
UKRAINE 2004
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
November 26 1
November 27 2
November 28
November 29 3
November 30
December 1
December 2 4 5
December 3 6
December 4
December 5 7
December 6
December 7
December 8
December 9 8
December 10
December 11
December 12
December 13 9
December 14
December 15 10
December 16
December 17
APPENDIX B
II
December 18
December 19
December 20
December 21
December 22
December 23 11
December 24
December 25
December 26 12
December 27 13
December 28 14
December 29
December 30
December 31
January 1
January 2
January 3 15
January 4
January 5
January 6
January 7
January 8
January 9
January 10
January 11
January 12
January 13
January 14
January 15
January 16
January 17
January 18
January 19 16
APPENDIX B
III
January 20
January 21
January 22
January 23
January 24 17
January 25
January 26
TOTAL 3 0 7 6 0 0 0 0 1 0
LITHUANIA 2006
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
June 29
June 30
July 1
July 2
July 3
July 4
July 5
July 6
July 7
July 8
July 9
July 10
July 11
July 12
July 13
July 14
July 15
July 16
July 17
APPENDIX B
IV
July 18
July 19
July 20
July 21
July 22
July 23
July 24
July 25
July 26
July 27
July 28
July 29
July 30
July 31 18
August 1
August 2
August 3
August 4
August 5
August 6
August 7
August 8
August 9
August 10
August 11
August 12
August 13
August 14
August 15
August 16
August 17
August 18
August 19
APPENDIX B
V
August 20
August 21
August 22
August 23
August 24
August 25
August 26
August 27
August 28
August 29
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
ESTONIA 2007
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
March 26
March 27
March 28
March 29
March 30
April 1
April 2
April 3 19
April 4
April 5
April 6
April 7
April 8
April 9
April 10
April 11
APPENDIX B
VI
April 12
April 13
April 14
April 15
April 16
April 17
April 18
April 19
April 20
April 22
April 23
April 24
April 25
April 25
April 26
April 27 20 21 22
April 28 23 24
April 29
April 30
May 1 25 26
May 2 27
May 3 28
May 4
May 5 29
May 6
May 7
May 8 30
May 9 31 32
May 10
May 11
May 12
May 13
May 14
APPENDIX B
VII
May 15
May 16
May 17
May 18
May 19
May 20
May 21
May 22
May 23
May 24
May 25
May 26
May 27
May 28
May 29
May 30
May 31
June 1
June 2
June 3
TOTAL 2 0 8 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
UK 2007
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
June 17
June 18
June 19
June 20
June 21
June 22
APPENDIX B
VIII
June 23
June 24
June 25
June 26
June 27
June 28
June 29 33
June 30
July 1
July 2 34
July 3
July 4
July 5
July 6
July 7 35
July 8 36
July 9
July 10
July 11 37
July 12 38
July 13
July 14
July 15
July 16 39
July 17 40
July 18 41
July 19 42 43
July 20 44
July 21 45
July 22
July 23
July 24 46
July 25 47
APPENDIX B
IX
July 26 48
July 27
July 28
July 29
July 30
August 1
August 2
August 3 49
August 4
August 5
August 6
August 7 50
August 8
August 9
August 10
August 11
August 12
August 13
August 14
August 15
August 16
August 17
TOTAL 2 0 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
BELARUS 2007
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
December 8
December 9
December 10
December 11
APPENDIX B
X
December 12
December 13
December 14 51
December 15
December 16
December 17
December 18
December 19
December 20
December 21 52
December 22
December 23
December 24
December 25
December 26
December 27
December 28
December 29
December 30
January 1
January 2
January 3
January 4 53
January 5
January 6 54 55
January 7
January 8 56
January 9 57 58
January 10 59 60
January 11
January 12 61
January 13 62
January 14 63
APPENDIX B
XI
January 15
January 16
January 17
January 18 64
January 19
January 20
January 21 65
January 22 66
January 23 67
January 24
January 25
January 26
January 27
January 28
January 29
January 30
January 31
February 1
February 2
February 3
February 4
February 5
February 6 68
February 7
February 8
February 9
February 10
TOTAL 8 3 1 0 5 1 0 0 0 0
GEORGIA 2008
APPENDIX B
XII
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce m
inistry
Energy
min
istry
Defen
se m
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
July 7
July 8 69
July 9 70 71
July 10 72
July 11
July 12
July 13
July 14
July 15
July 16
July 17 73
July 18
July 19 74
July 20
July 21
July 22
July 23
July 24
July 25
July 26
July 27
July 28
July 29
July 30
July 31
August 1
August 2 75 76
August 3
August 4 77 78
August 5 79
APPENDIX B
XIII
August 6 80
August 7
August 8 81, 82, 83
84 85, 86, 87
August 9 88, 89 90, 91 92 93, 94, 95 96
August 10 97 98 99
August 11 100, 101
102 103, 104
105, 106, 107, 108
109
August 12 110, 111
112, 113
August 13 114, 115
116
August 14 117 118, 119
120, 121
August 15 122 123
August 16 124 125
August 17 126
August 18 127 128
August 19 129 130, 131
August 20 132, 133
134 135
August 21 136 137, 138
August 22 139 140
August 23
August 24
August 25 141, 142
143 144
August 26 145, 146
147
August 27
August 28 148 149 150
August 29 151 152
August 30 153
August 31 154
September 1 155, 156, 157
September 2 158 159, 160
APPENDIX B
XIV
September 3
September 4
September 5 161 162
September 6 163
September 7
September 8 164
September 9 165 166 167
September 10
September 11
September 12 168
September 13 169
September 14 170
September 15 171 172
September 16
TOTAL 26 8 39 1 0 0 26 1 2 1
UKRAINE 2009
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
December 1
December 2
December 3 173
December 4 174
December 5
December 6
December 7
December 8
December 9
December 10
December 11
December 12
APPENDIX B
XV
December 13
December 14
December 15
December 16
December 17
December 18
December 19
December 20
December 21
December 22
December 23
December 24 175
December 25 176
December 26
December 27
December 28 177
December 29 178 179
December 30
December 31 180 181
January 1 182
January 2
January 3
January 4
January 5 183
January 6 184
January 7 185
January 8 186
January 9 187 188
January 10 189
January 11 190 191
January 12 192 193
January 13 194
January 14 195
APPENDIX B
XVI
January 15 196 197
January 16 198
January 17 199 200
January 18 201
January 19 202
January 20 203
January 21
January 22
January 23
January 24
January 25
January 26
January 27
January 28
January 29
January 30
January 31
February 1
February 2
February 3
February 4
February 5
February 6 204
February 7
February 8
February 9
February 10
February 11
February 12
February 13
February 14
February 15
February 16
APPENDIX B
XVII
February 17
February 18
TOTAL 12 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAJIKISTAN 2011
Presid
ent
Prim
e
Min
ister
Foreign
Min
istry
Du
ma
Finan
ce M
inistry
Energy
Min
istry
Defen
se M
inistry
Emergen
cy
Situatio
ns
Min
istry
Federatio
n
Co
un
cil Secretary
FSB
October 8
October 9
October 10
October 11
October 12
October 13
October 14
October 15
October 16
October 17
October 18
October 19
October 20
October 21
October 22
October 23
October 24
APPENDIX B
XVIII
October 25
October 26
October 27
October 28
October 29
October 30
October 31
November 1
November 2
November 3
November 4
November 5
November 6
November 7
November 8 205 206
November 9 207 208 209
November 10
November 11
November 12
November 13
November 14 210 211
November 15 212
November 16
November 17 213
November 18
November 19
November 20
November 21
November 22 214
November 23 215
November 24
November 25
November 26
APPENDIX B
XIX
November 27
November 28
November 29
November 30
December 1
December 2
December 3
December 4
December 5
December 6
December 7
December 8
TOTAL 3 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
APPENDIX B
XX
SOURCING
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16. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057043.html
17. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057043.html
LITHUANIA 2006 18. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070230.html
ESTONIA 2007 19. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075677.html
20. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076138.html
21. http://en.rian.ru/world/20070427/64566911.html
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23. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076188.html
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31. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076356.html
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UK 2007 33. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070629/68077832.html
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40. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070717/69138851.html
41. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070718/69179730.html
APPENDIX B
XXI
42. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070719/69298671.html
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44. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070720/69370864.html
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52. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061221/57525530.html
53. http://en.rian.ru/world/20070104/58448489.html
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60. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073902.html
61. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073962.html
62. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073987.html
63. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074023.html
64. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074104.html
65. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074179.html
66. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074195.html
67. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070123/59586701.html
68. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070206/60310432.html
GEORGIA 2008
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tml
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APPENDIX B
XXII
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104. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Raids_Continuing_Despite_Georgian_Moves/1189976.html
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109. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_West_Dispute_Georgia_Roils_UN/1194789.html
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ml
122. http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Lands_Georgia_CeaseFire_Talks/1191302.html
123. http://www.rferl.org/content/Rice_Lands_Georgia_CeaseFire_Talks/1191302.html
124. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1191517.html
125. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1191517.html
126. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Regroup_After_CeaseFire/1191655.html
127. http://www.rferl.org/content/Eyes_On_Russia_As_Georgia_Pullout_Scheduled_To_Begin/1191868.html
128. http://www.rferl.org/content/Eyes_On_Russia_As_Georgia_Pullout_Scheduled_To_Begin/1191868.html
129. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Russia_Begin_Prisoner_Exchange/1192158.html
130. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Georgia_Exchange_Prisoners/1192128.html
131. http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Russia_Begin_Prisoner_Exchange/1192158.html
132. http://www.rferl.org/content/Diplomatic_Tensions_Grow_Amid_GoSlow_Pullback/1192483.html
133. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Rejects_UN_Security_Council_Resolution/1192538.html
134. http://www.rferl.org/content/Diplomatic_Tensions_Grow_Amid_GoSlow_Pullback/1192483.html
135. http://www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_To_Ask_Russia_To_Recognize_Independence/1192571.html
136. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Pulls_Back_Some_Forces_But_Stills_Holds_Key_Points_/1192734.html
137. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Pulls_Back_Some_Forces_But_Stills_Holds_Key_Points_/1192734.html
138. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Pulls_Back_Some_Forces_But_Stills_Holds_Key_Points_/1192734.html
139. http://www.rferl.org/content/UN_Security_Council_Divided_On_Georgia_Resolution/1192992.html
APPENDIX B
XXIII
140. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Begin_To_Withdraw_From_Georgia/1193177.html
141. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Warns_Moldova_Against_Georgian_Mistake/1193614.html
142. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html
143. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Upper_House_Calls_For_Recognition_Of_Georgias_Breakaway_Regions/1
193553.html
144. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Upper_House_Calls_For_Recognition_Of_Georgias_Breakaway_Regions/1
193553.html
145. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html
146. http://www.rferl.org/content/West_Condemns_Russian_Recognition_Of_Rebel_Regions/1194155.html
147. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html
148. http://www.rferl.org/content/SCO_Fails_To_Back_Russia_Over_Georgia/1194578.html
149. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_US_Politics_Georgia_Crisis/1194674.html
150. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_US_Politics_Georgia_Crisis/1194674.html
151. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Links_Its_Help_On_Iran_To_Georgia_Dispute_/1194774.html
152. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Says_Georgian_Breakup_Is_Irreversible/1194782.html
153. http://www.rferl.org/content/British_PM_Says_West_Wont_Be_Held_Ransom_To_Russia/1195188.html
154. http://www.rferl.org/content/British_PM_Says_West_Wont_Be_Held_Ransom_To_Russia/1195188.html
155. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Summit_To_Reevaluate_Relations_With_Russia/1195361.html
156. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Summit_To_Reevaluate_Relations_With_Russia/1195361.html
157. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Seeks_International_Police_Presence_In_Georgia/1195441.html
158. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Says_US_Support_For_Georgia_Is_A_Mistake/1195850.html
159. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Regrets_EU_Decision_On_Partnership_Talks_/1195696.html
160. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Regrets_EU_Decision_On_Partnership_Talks_/1195696.html
161. http://www.rferl.org/content/Security_Treaty_Leaders_Condemn_Georgia_For_Aggression_/1196765.html
162. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Seeks_Backing_Over_Georgia_At_CSTO_Summit/1196550.html
163. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_West_Provocation_Black_Sea/1196878.html
164. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1197300.html
165. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Agrees_Troops_Pullout_From_Georgia_Heartland/1197424.html
166. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Agrees_Troops_Pullout_From_Georgia_Heartland/1197424.html
167. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Plans_7600_Georgian_Rebel_Regions/1197656.html
168. http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Would_Attack_Georgia_Even_If_On_NATO_Track/1199555.html
169. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Military_Leave_Georgian_Port_Of_Poti/1199722.html
170. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Foreign_Minister_Visits_Georgian_Rebel_Regions/1199896.html
171. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_NATO_Try_To_Keep_Up_In_Georgia/1200084.html
172. http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_NATO_Try_To_Keep_Up_In_Georgia/1200084.html
UKRAINE 2009
173. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081203/118674414.html
174. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081204/118693811.html
175. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081224/119160157.html
176. http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Threatens_Ukraine_With_Sanctions_Over_Unpaid_Gas_Bill/1363487.html
177. http://en.rian.ru/world/20081228/119204487.html
178. http://en.rian.ru/business/20081229/119220791.html
179. http://www.rferl.org/content/Gazprom_Says_Gas_Price_For_Ukraine_Could_More_Than_Double/1364838.html
180. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081231/119298305.html
181. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081231/119298305.html
182. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090101/119305591.html
183. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090105/119376630.html
184. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090106/119385213.html
185. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090107/119391463.html
186. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090108/119398542.html
187. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090109/119403642.html
APPENDIX B
XXIV
188. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090109/119404395.html
189. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090110/119411561.html
190. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090111/119429865.html
191. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090111/119429865.html
192. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090112/119455443.html
193. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090112/119455443.html
194. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090113/119473865.html
195. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090114/119494937.html
196. http://en.rian.ru/business/20090115/119579123.html
197. http://en.rian.ru/business/20090115/119579123.html
198. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090116/119637053.html
199. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090117/119669923.html
200. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090117/119660366.html
201. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090118/119675864.html
202. http://en.rian.ru/world/20090119/119704871.html
203. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090120/119725022.html
204. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090206/120023064.html
TAJIKISTAN 2011
205. http://www.rferl.org/content/politicians_say_moscow_should_take_revenge_against_dusanbe/24386074.html
206. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111108/168511094.html
207. http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_response_to_tajik_court_ruling_gains_in_clarity/24388218.html
208. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111109/168559822.html
209. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111109/168559822.html
210. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111115/168716845.html
211. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111114/168695778.html
212. http://www.rferl.org/archive/Russia/20111201/666/666.html
213. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111117/168792223.html
214. http://en.rian.ru/world/20111122/168925781.html
215. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111123/168972078.html
APPENDIX C
I
APPENDIX C
The following tables present the activity summary for each power ministry during the crisis, as
collected in Appendix B. The top table presents the activity summary, and the lower table shows this
activity as a percentage. These percentages are achieved through summing up all activity for a
particular crisis, and dividing a power ministry’s activity by the summed up total, thus getting a
percentage.
UKRAINE 2004
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
3 0 7 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
18 % 0 41 % 35 % 6 % 0 0 0 0 0
LITHUANIA 2006 P
RESID
ENT
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 0
APPENDIX C
II
ESTONIA 2007
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
2 0 8 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTR
Y
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
14 % 0 57 % 14 % 7 % 7 % 0 0 0 0
UK 2007
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
2 0 12 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
P
RESID
ENT
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
11 % 0 66 % 0 0 0 0 5 % 0 17 %
APPENDIX C
III
BELARUS 2007
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
8 3 1 0 0 5 1 0 0 0
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
44 % 17 % 5.5 % 0 0 28 % 5.5 % 0 0 0
GEORGIA 2008
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
26 8 39 1 2 0 0 26 1 1
P
RESID
ENT
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
25 % 8 % 37 % 1 % 2 % 0 0 25 % 1 % 1 %
APPENDIX C
IV
UKRAINE 2009
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
12 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
38 % 56 % 6 % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAJIKISTAN 2011
PR
ESIDEN
T
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
3 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
P
RESID
ENT
PR
IME
MIN
ISTER
FOR
EIGN
MIN
ISTRY
DU
MA
FEDER
ATIO
N
CO
UN
CIL
FINA
NC
E
MIN
ISTRY
ENER
GY
MIN
ISTRY
DEFEN
SE
MIN
ISTRY
EMER
GEN
CY
SITUA
TION
S
MIN
ISTRY
FSB
27 % 0 54 % 9 % 9 % 0 0 0 0 0
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