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“Thugs-for-Hire”:StateCoercionand“EverydayRepression”inChina
LynetteH.Ong
May,18,2015
Abstract
Thispaperexamines“thugs-for-hire”asaformofstatecoercionandeverydayrepression.Third-partyviolenceiscommonlydeployedbythestatetoevicthomeownersandtodealwithpetitionersandprotestorsinChina.Thisstudycontributestothestaterepressionliteraturebyelaboratingtheroleofthugsandgangstersasarepressivemeasure.Violenceiseffectiveandefficientinimplementingunpopularandillegalpolicies.Third-partyviolenceasaformofprivatizedcovertrepressionalsoallowsthestatetoevaderesponsibilityandtomaintainaveneeroflegitimacy.However,itcomesatacosttoregimelegitimacyandtrustingovernment.Borrowedviolencebolstersonlytheregime’sdespoticpowerandmakesnocontributiontostrengthenitsinfrastructuralcapacitytogovern.ItwillultimatelyweakenregimedurabilityinChina.Keywords:“Thugs-for-hire”,thugs,coercion,violence,China.Prepared for “A Workshop on CollectiveProtestandStateGovernanceinChina’sXiJinpingEra,Harvard-Yenching Institute”, Harvard University on May 18, 2015. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the University of Michigan China Center Noon Lecture Series, and the University of Columbia Workshop on Chinese Politics.
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I. Introduction
IntheheightoftheOccupyCentralprotestsinHongKonginOctober2014,where
thousandsofresidentspeacefullyoccupiedthestreetstodemanduniversalsuffrage,
unidentifiedthugsandgoonsweredeployedtodismantlebarricades,teardown
posters,andassaultpeacefulprotestors.Rumorsspeculatedthatthethugswere
hiredbythepro-BeijingHongKongSARgovernmenttointimidateprotestorsinto
givinguptheiractivism.Someofthegangsterswerereportedtohavelinkswiththe
undergroundcriminalgroupsortriadsinHongKong,whileotherswerehiredfrom
theneighboringGuangdongprovinceinChina.i
ThisincidentparallelsapervasivephenomenoninmainlandChina—thugsand
gangstersareregularlyhiredbytheChinesestatetorepresscitizensandcoerce
themintocomplyingwithitspolicies.Thugsarerecruitedtoevicthomeownersin
demolitionprojectsandtodislodgefarmersinurbanizationandindustrial
developments.Thestatealsoregularlydeploysthird-partyviolencetointercept
petitionerswhotrytolodgepetitionswiththecentralauthorityandthreaten
activistswhotaketheirgrievancestothestreets.Thestateco-optstheextralegal
coerciveforceofthethugswhenimplementingunpopularandillegalpoliciesand
whentakingrepressiveactions.Thesehiredthugsaredefinedprimarilybytheuse
ofviolenceinexecution.Thispaperbringsintofocusthenatureofthe“thugs-for-
hire”,theirrelationshipswiththestate,andtheimplicationsofthisrelationshipfor
statepowerandregimelegitimacy.
Thisstudycontributestotheliteratureonstaterepressionbyaugmentingthe
discussionoftheuseofthugsandgangstersasarepressivemeasure.Repressionis
actionintendedtoraisethecontender’scostofcollectiveaction(Tilly1978).iiMost
studiesofrepressionfocusonovertactionscarriedoutbyagentsconnectedwith
nationalpoliticalelites(Earl2003).AsChristianDavenport(2007)andJenniferEarl
(2003,2011)havecorrectlynoted,wecurrentlyknowverylittleaboutcovert
repressivemeasuresorthecircumstancesunderwhichthestatedeploysthem.This
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paperarguesthathiredthugsarebestperceivedasaformofprivatizedcovert
violentrepression.Theyofferthestateadistinctadvantagebyallowingthestateto
evaderesponsibilityandmaintainaveneeroflegitimacy—intheeyesofeither
higherauthorities(withinamulti-levelgovernment)ortheinternational
community.Awidevarietyofcountriesrangingfromeconomicallydevelopedand
underdevelopedstates,autocraciesandproceduraldemocraciestothosereliant
uponexternalaidshaverelieduponprivatizedstateviolencetofightwarsandcarry
outrepressiveactions(Carey,Mitchell,andLowe2013;Alvarez2006;Kirschke
2000;Roessler2005;Mazzei2009).
Alargenumberofscholarlyworkshaveinvestigatedthequestionofregime
durabilityoftheChineseCommunistPartyfromvariousperspectives.These
perspectivesincludepoliticalparticipation(Shi1997),foreigndirectinvestment
(Gallagher2002),co-optationofthemiddleclassandprivateentrepreneurs
(Dickson2006;Tsai2006),theroleofpeople’scongresses(Manion2008),cadre
evaluationsystemanddecentralizedauthoritarianism(Landry2008),mediaand
informationcontrol(StockmannandGallagher2011),socialmobilization
perspectives(O’BrienandLi2006;Lorentzen2013),andcoerciveinstitutions(Cai
2008;Y.Wang2014).Thisstudyjoinsthisvastbodyofliteraturetoexplainhowthe
ChineseCommunistregimeaugmentsitscoercivepowerbyrelyingonviolent
extralegalthird-partyagentstocarryouteveryday(unpopular)policy
implementationandrepression.However,thispaperdivergesfromtheexisting
bodyofliteratureontheimplicationoftheexpandedcoercivepower.While
privatizedstateviolencemayhelptheregimetocoercecitizensintocomplianceand
acquiescenceintheshort-term,thiscomesatacosttoregimelegitimacyandtrustin
government.Itisdetrimentaltoregimedurabilityinthelongrun.
Theprimarydatainthepaperweredrawnfromapproximately100interviews
conductedwithvillagersandresidentsaffectedbyhousingdemolitionandland
expropriationintheprovincesofHenan,Sichuan,YunnanandAnhuiovertheperiod
2011-14.Duringavisittotheinfamous“petitionvillage”inBeijinginthesummerof
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2014,theauthorsspoketopetitionerswhotraveledfromafartochanneltheir
grievancesthroughtheofficialpetitionsystem.ThepaperalsodrawsonChinese-
languagescholarlyliteratureandmediareportsassecondaryevidence.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.SectionIIsituates“thugs-for-hire”inthecontext
oftheliteratureonorganizedcriminals.Thesehiredthugs,asagentsofthestate,are
distinctfromGambetta’sSicilianMafiosiorVolkov’s“violententrepreneurs”in
Russia.Demandfortheserviceofhiredthugsispremisedupontheefficiencyand
effectivenessofthird-partyviolence.SectionIIIengagestheliteratureonstate
repression,particularlythatregardingwhysomestateschooseprivatizedstate
violenceasarepressivetool.Likeengagingparamilitaries,militiasandvigilantesto
fightwars,hiredthugsoffertheadvantageofreducedliability.Statescan
strategicallymanipulatetheargumentofmoralhazard,stemmingfromdelegation
ofauthority,totheiradvantageinordertoavoidaccountabilityfortheiractions.We
showhowthisstrategyhasbeensimilarlyimplementedbythelocalandcentral
governmentsinChina.Inspiteofthat,covertstaterepressionleadstofalling
legitimacyandtrustingovernment.Itnecessitatesfurtherstatedeploymentof
third-partyviolencetoexecutepoliciesandtorepress,andtherefore,itexacerbates
existingstateweakness.Thelastsectionconcludesthestudy.
II. ViolentAgentsinComparativePerspective
Whoarethese“thugs-for-hire”?Whatservicesdotheyprovide?Whyistherea
demandfortheirservice?Howaretheydifferentfromothercriminalgroups?This
sectionshedslightonthesefundamentalidentityquestionsbycomparingthe
“thugs-for-hire”withsimilarviolentagentsandcriminalgroups.
“Thugs-for-hire”refertoruffians,hooligans,thugsandgangsters,aswellas
legalizedprofessionalizedwhorenderviolenceasaformofserviceforprofitorin
exchangeforin-kindbenefits.Itissimilartotheconceptof“violententrepreneurs”
firstcoinedbyVolkov(2002a)todescribebusinessesthatconvertedorganized
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forceorviolenceintoprofit-makingenterprisesinRussiainthelate1980sand
1990s.However,thugs-for-hireinChinaarenotentirelythesameasVolkov’s
“violententrepreneurs”.Aswewillillustrate,theyemergefromdifferentneeds,and
theyprovidedifferentiatedservice.
ThebreakdownoftheSovietsystemerodedtheruleoflawandotherinstitutions
necessaryforbusinessestofunctioninYeltsin’sRussia.Politicaltransitioncorroded
thebasicinstitutionsforamarketeconomytofunction—namely,publicsecurity,
contractenforcement,disputesettlementmechanisms,andtransactioninsurance,
usuallysuppliedbythepoliceandthecourtsystem(Volkov2002b).The“violent
entrepreneurs”steppedintosupplybusinesseswithprotectionandalternative
mechanismsofsettlingdisputesandenforcingcontractsbycoercivemeans.By
providingkrysha,aRussianconceptdenoting“roofs”,whichloweredtransaction
costsandminimizedoperationalrisks,theseentrepreneursfacilitatedsmooth
runningofbusinesses(Volkov2002b).TheideadatesbacktoGambetta(1996),who
attributestheemergenceoftheSicilianmafia—abusinessproviderofprivate
protection—tolowsocialtrustandweakstateinstitutionsthatwereincapableof
providingprotectiontothecitizens.Russia’stransitionaleconomyhadsimilar
formativeconditionsformafiasastheearlycapitalSicily(Varese2001).Similar
reasoninghasbeenappliedtothemafiagroupYakuzainJapan(Hill2006).The
Mafiosiand“violententrepreneurs”alikebothcameabouttofilltheinstitutional
vacuumofweakstates.
Organizedcrimecanbedividedintovarioustypes.Organizedcrime,anall-
encompassingtermforallcrimesthatareorganized(Schelling1984),isan
organizationalattempttoregulateandcontroltheproductionanddistributionofan
illegalcommodityorservice(Varese2010,14).TheMafiosiisaparticulartypeof
organizedcrime,asitattemptstoregulateandcontroloneservice:thesupplyof
privateprotection(Gambetta1996).Theuseofcoercionandviolencebythemafia
isthekeytoestablishingitselfasacredibleprotector(Gambetta1996,40).
Sometimes,inordertocreateaneedforprivateprotection,themafiawillfirst
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deployviolentintimidation.Theexistenceofviolentthreatswillbegetademandfor
privateprotection.
“Thugs-for-hire”isalsoasubsetoforganizedcrime.However,thesethugsare
agentsofthemasterswhopayfortheirservices.Theassociationsarebasedupon
principal-agentrelationships.Thugs,asagents,renderservicesrangingfromviolent
threats,harassment,andbeatingstophysicalabusesandmurders.Thecommon
denominatoroftheseservicesistheuseofcoerciveforceintheirexecution.The
scopeofserviceisthereforebroaderthantheprovisionofprivateprotectionoffered
bytheMafiosi.Moreimportantly,becausethesethugsareagentsofthepaying
masters,theiractivitiesarepremisedonmeetingtheobjectivesoftheirmasters,
ratherthanthoseoftheirown.
Tobesure,thisdoesnotmeanMafiosiasdepictedbyGambettaandVolkovdonot
existinChina.Theydo,andtheyindeedthriveinsomeregions.AsWang(2011)has
documented,mafiasinChinahelpsettledisputes,suchasneighborhoodquarrels,
trafficaccidents,andpropertydisputes.iiiTheyworklike“shadow”policewhen
policeofficialsdonothavethecapabilitiestohandletherisingnumberofcivil
disputes.Theyalsoserveasa“shadow”judicialsystemwhenthecourtsfailto
protectpropertyrightsandenforcecontracts.Additionally,undergroundbanks,
gamblinghousesandotherillegalestablishmentsalsousemafiastocollectdebts
andtoprotecttheirbusinessesthatfalloutsidethepurviewoftheformalcourtand
policeinstitutions.ivInstead,thisstudyfocusesontheunder-studiedphenomenonof
state-hiredthugs.
Efficiencyandeffectivenessofthird-partyviolence
Whydostatesprefertoengagehiredthugsinsteadoftheirowncoerciveapparatus
inexecution?Mafiasandalltheviolentagentsalikearedefinedbythecentralityof
violenceintheiractions.Thelocalstate,asthebuyerofsuchservicesinChina,
perceivesvalueinviolenceasthemostefficientandeffectivemeansofexecuting
someactions.Thestatedoesnotutilizeviolenceallthetime,butonlyindealingwith
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certaincitizengroupsandintheexecutionofselectedtasks.Thestate’suseof
violenceiscommonwhencitizensdonotcomplywithillegalorunreasonablestate
directivesorpoliciesaswellasinstaterepressionofcitizens’actions.Simplyput,
violenceisexpedientinpushingthroughunpopularstatepoliciesandillegal
directivesandforrepressionpurposes.Violenceexecutedbythirdparties,fromthe
buyerorstate’sperspective,hastheaddedadvantageofaccountabilityevasion.We
willaddressthelastpointinthenextsection.
HiredthugsaremostfrequentlyrecruitedbytheChinesestatetobeinvolvedin
housingdemolitionandevictions,landexpropriations,collectionoftaxesandillegal
fees,anddealingwithprotestorsandcitizenactivists.vThe1994fiscal
recentralizationsignificantlyreducedlocalgovernments’shareofrevenue,while
keepingtheirshareofexpendituresunchanged.(TsuiandWang2004;Shueand
Wong2007).Withskyrocketinglandandrealestatepricesinthelasttwodecades,
land-salesrevenue,whichisnotsubjecttosharingwiththehigher-levelauthorities,
hasbecomethemajorcontributortotherevenuestreamsoflocalandmunicipal
governments.viLocalgovernmentsarethereforestronglyincentivizedto
expropriatelandeithertobuildindustrialzonesandcommercialrealestateorfor
infrastructurepurposes.Inrecentyears,localgovernmentshavealsobeen
feverishlyclearingexisting“urbanvillages”(chengzhongcun)orother“urbanslums”
tomakewayfornewconstructionaslandhasbecomescarcer.Urbanprojectsand
realestatedevelopmentsalsogeneraterevenuefrombusinesstaxespaidbyservice
industries,whichisataxlargelyexclusivetolocalgovernments(Tao2014).
Thisstrongrevenuedriveresultsinhastygovernmentdevelopmentpolicyactions
andsometimesevenillegalactions.Localgovernmentsfacetightdeadlinesto
completeurbandevelopmentprojectsbecausethecostsofresettlingresidents,
interestfrombankloans,andopportunitycostsofunsoldrealestateproperties
increaseovertime.Citizens’resistancetohousingdemolitionandland
expropriationislargelyduetoloworunreasonablemonetarycompensation.Others
refusetocomplybecauseofinferiorresettlementhousing,corruptionand
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embezzlementbyofficials,andproceduralconcerns,suchaslackofnoticeor
consultationovertheevictionprocess.Tosuccessfullyimplementtheseprojects,
(forced)consentoftheentirecommunityisoftenrequired.Anurbandevelopment
projectstallsifonlyafewfamiliesoutofanentirevillageorneighborhoodrefuseto
vacatetheirproperties.Therefore,hiredviolenceprovidesaswiftandeffective
solutiontothedeadlocks.Othertimes,townshiporvillageofficialsmaydecideto
expropriatefarmlandwithouthigher-levelapprovalsbecausetheywantto
personallypocketalargershareoftheproceeds.viiWhenillegalactionstakeplace,
officialsareunabletoproduceofficialevictionnotices,andtheiractionswill
encounterevenfiercerresistancefromvillagers.Violencebecomesanevenmore
necessarymeansofeffectuatingacquiescenceintheseillicitcases.
Therearealwayssomeintransigenthouseholdswhorefusetocomplyregardlessof
thelevelofcompensationoranywrongdoingoflocalofficials.Inanycase,whether
ornottheintransigenceisjustified,the“nailhouseholds”(dingzihu)areparticularly
vexatiousforlocalauthorities.Deploymentofstrong-armtacticsandcoerciveforces
arebothefficientandeffectiveinobtainingacquiesce.Aprominentresearcheratthe
ChineseAcademyofSocialSciences,YuJianrong,hasestimatedthat90percentallof
demolitionandrelocationcasesinvolvethugviolence(Yu2009).
Belowisadescriptionofsomeofthestrong-armtacticsdescribedbythevillagersin
YunnanprovincewithwhomIconductedafocusgroupinterview.Thevillagers
havecollectivelyresistedseveredemolitionpressuresince2010(Villagersin
Yunnanprovince2012):
“Thefirstmeasurestaken(bythevillageauthority)werecuttingoff
waterandelectricitysuppliestohomes.Then,theysentthugstospray
paintourhouseswithintimidatingwords:‘Ifyourefusetomove,the
housewillbebulldozedwhileyouareasleep!’,and‘Thosewhodon’t
vacate,watchoutforyoursafety!’”(Boththreatswereindeedcarried
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out.Somevillagersfoundtheirhomesbeingbulldozedinthemiddle
ofthenight.Otherswerebeatenup.)
“Atnight,theydrovetrucksthroughthepaddiesandfarms,destroying
ourcropsandvegetables,killedourpoultry,andfedourdogspoison.”
“Theysetfiretomycourtyardbuiltwithteakwoodinthe19thcentury.
Fourgenerationsofmyfamilyhavelivedinthistraditional
quadranglehome.MylifewassparedonlybecauseIwasn’tathomeat
thetime”,saida76-yearoldmanwholedtheresistanceagainst
homedemolition.
“Thoseofuswhosubmittedapetitionletterwereparticularly
targeted.Theeldestdaughterofoneofthepetitionorganizerswas
badlybeatenbyabunchofthugswhenshereturnedfromworkone
night.Shewasleftunconsciousandhadtobehospitalizedforafew
weeks.”
InavillageinHenanprovincewherewehaveconductedfieldresearch,villagers
whohadsimilarviolentencountersspokeofruffians(xiaohunhun),whoareusually
unemployedyoungsters,hiredbythelocalgovernmentto“teardownhouses”and
“manhandlevillagers”.Thejobstheyarehiredtodorequirenospecificskills,aside
fromphysicalstrengthandsomeboldness.Violenceisusedforthepurposeof
disruptingvillagers’businesses,suchas“ransackingstores”,“tearingdown
billboards”,“lootingbusinesses”and“intimidatingcustomerswithvulgarlanguage”.
Whentheresidents’incomesourcesareseverelydisrupted,theyoftenhadno
choicebuttocomplywiththegovernment’sdemolitionnotice.Thethugsdonot
hesitatetouseforcetodealwiththe“nailhouseholds”whostubbornlydefendtheir
homesortheorganizersoftheresistance.Inthisrespect,third-partyviolenceisan
integralpartofthelocalgovernment’srepressivemachinery.
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Theidentitiesofthesecamouflage-donningthugsandgovernmentofficialswerefar
fromdistinct,asrecountedbysomeofourinformants.Insomeplaces,theycalled
themselves“patrolofficers”(xunfangrenyuan).Inotherplaces,theywerethe“law
enforcers”(zhifarenyuan)inchargeofimplementingthelocalauthority’s
demolitiondirectives,buttheycarriednoofficialpass.Inanycase,their
camouflageduniformsprovidethemwithapseudo-militaryorgovernmentsecurity
identity.Yet,onotheroccasions,theyseemedtobemoreintegratedwiththeformal
governmentbureaucracies.Thephysicalactsofdemolishinghousesareusually
carriedoutbylocalgovernments’“demolitionteams”or“demolitionoffices”.The
informantshavereportedthattheseteamsorofficesaremadeupofgovernment
officialsorvillagecadresandhiredthugs.Whiletherewasadivisionoflabor
betweenthetwo—thegovernmentorvillageofficialsprovideleadershipandlocal
knowledge,whilethethugsareinchargeofexecutingtheactions—itisnotalways
easyfortheinformantstodistinguishbetweenthem.Thisisnotleastbecauseallof
themidentifiedthemselvesaspartoftheofficialdemolitionunit.
InChina,amajorityoftheseviolentagentshavecriminalrecordsthatcreate
obstaclestotheiracquiringproperjobsandbeingreintegratedintosociety.These
thugstendtoberecruitedfromdifferentvillagesortownswithinthesameregions.
Theyarerelativelyfamiliarwiththelocalesandspeaklocaldialects,yettheyhave
anescaperouteiftheygetintotrouble.Outsidersalsohaveanadvantageofnot
beingrecognizabletothelocalsorsubjectsunderattack,whichisusefulinblame
shifting.Thethugsarenotparticularlywelleducated,andtheyhavenotreceived
anypreviousmilitaryorsecuritytraining.Becomingahiredthugisthereforea
meansofmakingalivingfortheseindividuals.Bywayofcontrast,thosewhojoined
theranksof“violententrepreneurs”inRussiawereformerpoliceorstatesecurity
officers,includingex-KGBofficers,whowerelookingtodiversifytheirincome
sourcesduetohighinflationorretrenchmentfromthestatesystem,asaresultof
theSovietcollapse(Volkov2002b,96-8).Inshort,violentagentsinChinaarenotas
professionallytrainedastheretiredstatesecurityofficersinRussia.
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Someinfamousundergroundkingpins,suchasQiaosiinHarbinandLiuYongin
Shenyang,madetheirfortunesbyofferinghiredthugservicestostateagentsin
demolitionandevictionprojects.Qiaosiwasknownasthe“undergroundmayor”in
thecityofHarbininnortheastChina.Hebeganmakingmoneyinthethugs-for-hire
businessin1987,whenthecityunderwenturbandevelopmentandrenewal.
Workingwithvariousconstructioncompanies,theybecamegovernment
contractorsindemolitionprojects.Hewouldorganizeandsenddemolitionteamsto
assisttheHarbinmunicipalgovernmentinrelocationworks.Theteamsweremade
upofhooligansandruffianswhoutilizedviolencetoeffectuateforcefulevictions.
Qiaosi’sbusinessestablishmentwassosuccessfulthatitdominatednearly80
percentofthedemolitionmarketinHarbinatthattime.Thereafter,hegrewhis
empirebybranchingoutintoconstruction,gambling,prostitutionandothervices.
However,itwaswiththugs-for-hireindemolitionprojectsthathisillegalempire
sprouted(Zhang2012).viiiWhenQiaosiwasputontrialinthemid-2000s,hehad
nearly100accomplices,andmorethan60policeofficerswhowereallegedtohave
beeninvolvedinhisringwereputunderinvestigation.
Qiaosi’ssuccesscouldbeattributedtohisabilitytosupplythevoidinmarket
demand.Inurbanrenewalprojects,demolitionandrelocationworksareoutsourced
tothese“professionalthugs”or“securitycompanies”thatemploythemosteffective
meanstoproducedesiredoutcome.Thestatecannotsenduniformedgovernment
officials,includingthepolice,toforcefullyevictresidentsfromtheirhomes,but
outsourcingittothirdpartiesmakesitpracticallyfeasible.Oftentimes,whenafew
“nailhouseholds”orstubbornshopownersrefusedtorelocate,theycanholdupthe
entireproject,imposingsignificantcostsintimeandinfinancialterms.Therefore,
outsourcingviolenceisalsocost-effectivebecauseitraisesprojectefficiencyand
lowersthecostsofurbandevelopmentforlocalgovernments.Whenjob
effectivenessandcostefficiencyareprioritizedaheadofthewelfareofcitizens,
hiredthugsbecomeanareawheregenuinemarketdemandexists.
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LiuYonginthecityofShenyangisanotherkingpinwhohadmadehisinitial
fortunesinthugs-for-hireservicessincethelate1980s.In1999,whenadrugstore
ownerfailedtoobeyanevictionorder,Liuorderedthugsarmedwithlethal
weaponstobreakintothedispensary,wheretheykilledthedutymanagerandsome
oftheemployees.Hehadsimilarlydeployedindiscriminateviolenceagainstother
evictees.Lootingsofproperties,physicalabusesandslayingofordinarycitizens
werewidelyobserved.WhenLiuwasarrestedinthelate1990s,theJiayangGroup,
thecompanyhefounded,hadventuredintolegalbusinesses,suchasclothing,food,
entertainment,andrealestatebusinesses.Liuwasalsoanelecteddeputyofthe
People’sCongressinShenyangmunicipality.ix
OtherprominentMafiosifiguresincludeHaoweiinChangchun,ZhouQiangin
Nanjing,andWangPinginChongqing.xTheytendedtoshareacommon
characteristicinthattheybegantheircriminalactivitieswiththugs-for-hireservices
inurbanrenewalprojects.Therudimentaryorganizations,oftenconsistingofa
handfulofarmedfighters,thugs,organgsters,thendevelopedintofull-scale
criminalorganizationswithwide-rangingbusinessinterests,includingarms
smuggling,gamblingandprostitution,andconstructionandrealestate,spanning
bothlegalandillegalrealms.Incriminalstudies,scholarshaveidentifiedacommon
patternofhoodlumsinChinaevolvingfromvagrantsandhooliganstoacriminal
underworldthroughaprocessofcontinuousdevelopment.xi
Beforetheabolitionofruraltaxesandfeesinthemid-2000s,localgovernmentsalso
engagedthugstohelptocollecttheseexactions.Notdissimilartocasesofhousing
demolitionandlandexpropriation,compliancewasvexatiousforlocalofficials.The
exactionswereoftenarbitrarilyimposedbygrassrootsgovernments—rangingfrom
theagriculturetaxandvariousagriculturalsurchargestofinesforviolatingtheone-
childpolicy,educationsurcharges,andmandatorycontributiontowardslocal
infrastructurebuilding—andcouldreachashighas30-40percentofafarm
household’stotalannualincome(Kennedy2002;Ong2012).Accordingly,third-
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partyviolencewasdeployedbecauseofitsefficiencyandeffectivenessinextracting
compliancefromthevillagers.xii
Theaboveanalysisillustratestheefficacyofborrowedviolenceinforcing
compliancewhenstatepoliciesareunpopularanditsactionsillegal.Separately,
violencealsoservesasanextremelyeffectiverepressivemeasure.Gangstersand
privatesecuritycompaniesarewidelyengagedbylocalgovernmentsto“intercept”
and“retrieve”(jiefang)petitionerswholodgecomplaintsoflocalofficial
malfeasancewiththecentralauthorityinBeijing.Thepetitionsystem,originatingin
theimperialtimes,allowedcommonerswrongedbylocalofficialstoseek
interventionfromtheImperialCourt.IncontemporaryChina,therightstopetition
areconstitutionallyenshrined.Althoughthecentralgovernmentintendsforthe
systemtoserveasagaugeforlocalmisconduct,italsosetstargetsforlocalcadres
toensurethatthenumberofpetitionsdoesnotspinoutofcontrol(Li,Liu,and
O’Brien2012).Petitionisa“vetotarget”(yipiaofojue)inlocalcadreevaluation.
Accordingly,ifapetitionweresuccessfullylodgedinBeijing,eveniftheprobability
ofpetitionsyieldingsuccessfuloutcomesisextremelylow,itwouldadverselyaffect
thecareerprospectsoflocalleaders.
Giventheenormouspressuretoquashpetitions,localofficialsmakealleffortsto
preventcitizensintheirjurisdictionsfromtakingtheirgrievancestoBeijing.This
createsademandforprofessionalinterceptors.Whilelocalgovernmentscouldsend
theirownofficialstodothejob,itmaynotbecost-effective,giventransportand
lodgingexpenses.Justasimportantly,localofficialsdonotknowthecityaswellas
theBeijing-basedprofessionalsdo.Professionalscanalsobemoreeffectivein
handlinganddealingwithaggrievedcitizens.Accordingly,localgovernments
outsourcetheworkof“intercepting”and“retrieving”petitionerstoBeijing-based
privatesecuritypersonnel.Thejobofthe“interceptors”istodeployallnecessary
meanstoensnarepetitionersbeforetheyreachthecentralpetitionbureauwhere
petitionsarefiled.Thesehiredviolentagentsregularlyassaultpetitioners,detain
themillegallyin“blackjails”or“blackhouses”,andthenhaulthembacktothe
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villages.Therearealsowidespreadreportsofrapesanddeathsofpetitionerswhile
incustody.xiii
Themosthighlypublicizedcaseofsuchprivatesecuritycompaniesistheinfamous
Anuyuandingsecuritycompany.TheBeijing-basedsecuritycompanywasfounded
byZhangJun,amiddle-schooleducatednativeofHebeiprovince.Hedecidedto
moveBeijinginthe1990sinorderto“makealiving”.Intheearlieryears,hetookon
variousoddjobsandhadadifficulttimeinBeijing.ThoughZhangwasaleaderof
thepeople’smilitiainthevillage,thesecuritypersonnelheemployeddidnotseem
tohaveanymilitaryorsecuritybackground.Theirprofileswerenotsignificantly
differentfromtheunemployedhooligans,thugsandgangstershiredfordemolition
projects.Thecompanymade8.6millionRMBinsalesrevenuein2007.Inthe
followingyear,thecompanyestablishedan“escort”departmenttoprovidesecurity
servicetolocalgovernmentsforhandlingpetitioners.Thoughitwasonlyoneoften
departmentsinthecompany,the“escort”businessprovedtobeextremelylucrative
anddrovethecompany’sgrossrevenueupto21millionRMBin2008(Linand
Zhang2010).
TheBeijinggovernmentengagedAnyuandingtoprovidesecurityprotectionfor
dignitariesduringthe2008SummerOlympicGames.Thecompanyalsowonseveral
awardsfromtheBeijingSecurityServicetradeassociationinrecognitionofits
“serviceexcellence”from2007to2009.Thismaybeanindicationofthecompany’s
scaleamongitspeersratherthananyformalrecognitionbytheBeijinggovernment.
However,itisclearthatitsservicestraversebetweenlegalandillegalareas.
Thecompanywassubjecttocriminalinvestigationin2010thatledtoZhang’s
convictionandimprisonment.Thiscameaboutwhenadozenpetitionersfrom
variouspartsofthecountrywhohadbeenabusedandillegallydetainedcollectively
pleadedtothemediatoexposetheirordeals.Thecompany’sbackgroundandits
abuseofpetitionersbecameanintensesubjectofinvestigativejournalisminthe
Chinesemedia.xiv
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III. EverydayRepression:PrivatizedStateViolenceandthePrincipal-Agent
Problem
Authoritarianregimesrelyonaplethoraofinstitutionstopreserveitscoercive
power,includingthemilitary,thepolice,andtheintelligenceagencies(Bellin2004,
2012).Borrowedviolenceaugmentsthestate’scoercivecapacitytogaincompliance
withitsdirectivesanditsabilitytorepress.However,itdiffersfromthetraditional
coerciveinstitutionsthatundergirdauthoritarianstatesinafewdimensions.First,a
privateagentastheactorisdistinctfromthestateagents,suchasthemilitaryand
police,connectedwithpoliticalelites.Second,itisacovertasopposedtoanovert
formofcoercionandrepression.FollowingEarl’sdefinition,overtorobservable
formsofrepressionareintendedtobeknowntothepublic,whereascovertor
unobservablerepressionisintendedtobehiddenfromthepubliceye(Earl2003,
48).Commonexamplesofcovertcoerciverepressivemeasuresincludeanonymous
deaththreatsandthreateningphonecallstoactivists(Earl2003,50).
Thisstudyjoinsagrowingbodyofliteraturethataddresseswhysomestatesprefer
usingprivatizedviolenceasarepressivemeans.“Privatizedstateviolence,asa
subsetofstateviolence,iscoercionorchestratedbythestateagainstrealor
perceivedopponentsbutcarriedoutbynonstateactors,suchasvigilantes,
paramilitaries,andmilitias,whoaredirectlyorindirectlysupportedbythe
government”(Roessler2005,209).Carey,MitchellandLowe(2013)uncover281
relationshipsbetweenthestatesandpro-governmentmilitiasintheperiod1981-
2007regardlessofwhetherthestateschosetoformallyacknowledgethem.These
relationshipsarepresentineconomicallyundevelopedstates,suchasSudanand
Haiti,aswellasinmoredevelopedstates,suchasSouthAfricaandChile.Theycan
alsobefoundinautocracies,suchasMyanmarandZimbabwe,andinprocedural
democracies,suchasIndiaandTurkey.Thisstudycontributestotheliteratureon
privatizedstateviolenceshowingthat,inadditiontoparamilitariesandmilitias,the
statecanalsoengagethugs,gangstersandcriminalgroupstoperpetuateviolence.
16
Whilemilitiagroupsandparamilitariesareusedtofightwarsandforethnic
cleansingpurposes,thugsandgangstersarehiredtoengageintheeverydaypolitics
ofpolicyexecutionandovertrepression.
Table1differentiatesphysicalcontrolofandpurposeintheuseofviolenceby
“public”and“private”domains.Themostlegitimateuseofviolenceisdeployedby
publicagents,namely,thepoliceandmilitary,forthepublicpurposesofprotecting
itsbordersorcitizens.Attheendofthespectrumisviolenceusedbyprivate
entities,suchasmafias,organizedcrimegroups,andprivatemilitias,fortheprivate
purposesofdecimatingopponentsandprotectingtheirturforcommercialinterests.
Thecrossoverbetweenpublicandprivatepurposesandtheuseofviolencearethe
mostcontentious.Thetopright-handquadrantrepresentstherealmofprivatized
stateviolence,whenthestateengagesthugs,paramilitaries,militiagroups,or
vigilantestofulfillpublicobjectives.Thestate’sengagementofprivateviolent
agentscouldtaketheformofprovidingweapons,personnel,logistics,intelligence,
orfinancialsponsorshiporrefusingtoquellviolentandrepressiveactivitiesof
thesegroups(Roessler2005,209).
Table1.Publicvs.PrivateDeploymentofViolence&PurposesA.PhysicalControlB.Purpose
A1)Public A2)Private
B1)Public Police,military Stateuseofprivateagents,suchasthugs,militias,andvigilantestocarryoutviolenceforpublicpurposes
B2)Private Publicofficials’useofviolenceforprivatepurposes
Mafias,organizedcrimegroups
Source:Author’sanalysis.
Whydosomestatespreferusingprivateagentstoexecuteviolentrepressionandto
fightwars?Existingstudiespointtotheadvantageofreducedliabilityofthird-party
violence.Inastudyofregimes’useofmilitiasingenocide,Alvarez(2006)argues
17
that“thefirstobviousbenefittorelyingonparamilitarygroupisdeniability.The
militaryandpoliceforcesofanationarealwaysovertlyanofficialandrecognizable
branchofthestate.Thereisnoconcealingthefacttheyarerepresentativesofthe
governmentandtheirinvolvementingenocidemakescleartheroleofthe
governmentinthemurderofthetargetedpopulationwhichthoseregimesareoften
atpaintoconceal…”(Alvarez2006,17)xvTypically,weakdemocraciesandthose
countriesreliantonforeignaidfromdemocraciesaremorelikelytoengagein
privatizedstateviolenceinordertomaintainaveneeroflegitimacyand
accountabilityintheeyesofthedonorcountries(Carey,Colaresi,andMitchell
2015).Studieshavealsofoundsuchevidenceinsub-SaharanAfricaandinLatin
America(Mazzei2009;Stanley1996).
Thepresentstudydiffersfromtheexistingliteratureinthatitislocalstates,rather
thannationalstates,thatusethirdpartiestoperpetuateviolence.Notwithstanding
thatfact,asimilarquestioncouldbeaskedoftherationaleforprivatizedstate
violencebylocalstates.WearguethatlocalauthoritiesinChinaaresimilarly
concernedwithmaintainingaveneeroflegitimacy—butintheeyesofthecentral
government.Theuseofviolenceinhousingdemolition,landexpropriation,and
interceptingpetitionershasneverbeenformallysanctionedbythecentral
authority,thoughitisunlawful,anditswidespreaduseiswidelyknown.Although
thecentralgovernmentmaybecomplicitbycondoningthebehavioroflocal
officials,itfallsfarshortofsanctioninglocaluseofviolence.Tobesure,theState
Council,China’sequivalentofacabinet,issuedaregulationin2011entitled
“RegulationsontheExpropriationofHousesonState-ownedLandand
Compensation”thatprohibitsforcedevictionsofanykind,includingcuttingoffthe
utilitysuppliesofoccupiers,demolitionbyimplication,andtheuseofbruteforce.xvi
However,thisregulationisrarelyobservedandenforcementisnon-existent.Bythe
sametoken,privatesecurityand“blackjails”,insteadoflocalpoliceorarmed
personnel,areusedagainstpetitionersbecausetherightsofChinesecitizensto
petitionarerecognizedbythelawandbythecentralgovernment.
18
Whencaughtred-handed,third-partyagentsallowlocalgovernmentstoshift
responsibilitymoreeasily.InanurbanvillageinZhengzhouthatwevisitedin2014,
thevillagersresistingevictionshadviolentlyclashedwithlocalgovernment-linked
personnelandthugs,whichhadresultedinthedeathofanelderlywomanand
scoresofinjuries.Theviolentclashwasrecordedbyclosed-circuittelevisions
privatelyinstalledbyvillagers.Whenthehigher-upgovernmentspressedforthe
culpritsresponsibleforthecasualties,thevillageauthorityclaimedthattheviolent
agents,whowerenotwearingofficialuniforms,werenotpartofitsadministration
andwerenotonitspayroll.Thus,withthat,villageleaderswereabletoshrugoff
responsibility.Thisisalltoocommoninthethousandsofhousingdemolitionand
landexpropriationcasesoccurringacrossChinaeveryyear.AmnestyInternational
(2012)hasdocumenteddozensofdemolitioncasesinvolvingthuggishviolenceand
humanrightsviolationsinextensivedetail.
Thefactthatdelegationofauthorityresultsinagencyproblemsiswellknownin
economicsandpoliticalscience(SpenceandZeckhauser1971;WeingastandMoran
1983;Miller2005).xviiWhenprivatemilitiasareengagedbythestateasanagentfor
repressionpurposes,studieshavefoundstrongevidenceofagent-centeredhuman
rightsviolations,suchasexcessiveviolenceandsexualabuseofrepressedcitizens
(Mitchell2004;Boharaetal.,n.d.;AlisonBrysk2014;CampbellandBrenner
2002).xviiiIndeed,hiredthugsandsecuritypersonnelinChinacouldbeandhave
beenabusivetotherepressedtargets.Excessesintheirbehaviorcouldbeprivately
motivatedinwaysthatgobeyondtheinstructionoftheprincipal.Theseagent-
centeredviolationsexplaintheroutinenessofexcessiveviolenceusedagainst
evicteesandpetitioners.Italsoshedslightonwhysexualviolence,anarguably
unnecessarymeasureforinterceptingpetitioners,iscommonamongcaptivesof
“blackjails”.
However,thelogicofdelegationgivingrisetomoralhazardcanbesimilarlyapplied
totheprincipals(Miller2005;Mitchell2004;PothandSelck2009).Because
governmentswhohaveworkingrelationshipswithprivatemilitiasareusually
19
punishedbytheinternationalcommunity,intheformofnamingandshaming,
withholdingforeignaid,reducingtraderelationships,orexcludingfrom
internationalorganizations,claimsofinformationasymmetryanddivergenceof
objectivesvariancecanbecomeastrategicadvantage—ratherthanaproblem—for
theprincipals(Mitchell,Carey,andButler2014).Accordingly,localgovernmentsin
China,theprincipal,mayintentionallyengageagentswithpenchantsforviolence
andexerciseloosecontroloverthem.Agentsprovideopportunitiesforthe
principalstoshifttheblameifandwhenhigher-levelauthoritiesdecidetopressfor
responsibility.
Theuseofthird-partyagentsinrepressionalsoallowsthecentralgovernmentto
denyculpabilityunderthewatchfuleyesoftheinternationalcommunity.In
preparationforthe2008BeijingOlympicsandthe2010ShanghaiExpo,hundredsof
thousandsofresidentsinbothcitieswereforciblyevictedfromtheirhomestomake
wayforconstruction.Whiletheworld’sspotlightwasonChinafor“comingofage”
asthehostoftheseglamorousinternationalevents,thousandsofcitizensendured
humanrightsviolations.xixHousingrightsadvocatesandotherhumanrights
activistsweresilencedthroughbeatings,intimidation,anddetention.Petitioners
whotriedtobringtheirgrievancestothecentralpetitionbureauwereviolently
roundedupandillegallydetainedat“blackjails”.xxTheChinesegovernmentflatly
deniedtheexistenceof“blackjails”whenquestionedbyaforeigncorrespondentin
apressbriefinginJune2009.xxi
Privatizedstateviolenceandextralegalchannelsofdetentionenabled(local)state
agentstocarryouttheseegregiousacts,whileallowingthecentralstatetoavoid
condemnationbytheinternationalcommunity.Theextralegal“blackjails”emerged
aftertheabolitionoftheofficialcustody-and-repatriationcenters(shourong
qiansongzhongxin)in2003,afteramigrantworkerinfamouslydiedwhilein
custody.Beforetheclosure,theofficialdetentionsystemwasusedtoholdcaptive
petitionersanddissidents,alongwithbeggarsandvagrantswhomtheauthorities
wantedtokeepoffthestreets.xxiiTheprevalenceof“blackjails”canalsobe
20
attributedtothe“petitionrankingsystem”introducedbythecentralgovernmentin
2004.Thissystem,whichrankedallprovincesaccordingtothenumberof“non-
normalpetitioncases”,wasintendedtoputpressureonlocalauthoritiestolimitthe
numberofpetitionersfromtheirjurisdictions.xxiiiItwasthecentralgovernmentthat
madepetitioncasesa“vetotarget"inthecadreevaluationsystem.Thesystem
punishedlocalofficialswhofailedtomaintain“socialstability”bytheirfailureto
preventdisgruntledcitizensfromlodgingcomplaintsinBeijing.xxivExtralegal
violenceandchannelsthereforeservetheinterestsofbothcentralandlocal
authoritiesalike—theyareeffectiverepressiontoolsbutalsoallowthe
governmentstodissociatethemselvesatthesametime.
Notwithstandingthatfact,statelegitimacyandtrustingovernmentnecessarily
sufferasaconsequenceofcovertviolentrepression.Thisisparticularlythecasefor
localofficialswhodirectlyengageviolentrepression.Duringournumerousfield
visitstovillagesandcommunitiesthathaveenduredviolenceorderedbythelocal
government,weheardunflatteringanddebasingadjectives,suchas“Communist
thugs”(gongfei)and“bandits”(tufei),usedtodescribelocalofficials.Wewere
repeatedlytoldbythevictimsoflocalgovernmentviolencethat,“wewouldrather
belackeysfortheJapanese,thenbethesubjectofthelocalauthorities”xxv.Ina
countrywherethecitizenshadenduredenormoushumiliationandhardshipsunder
theJapanesecolonizationandwhereanti-Japanesesentimentstillrunhigh,the
greaterdisdainandindignationforlocalofficialsistelling.Otherinformantstoldus
that,“wewouldratherreturntotheKuomintangrule!”xxvi
Existingliteraturesuggeststhatlocalrepressioncanalsonegativelyaffectthetrust
ofthecitizenryinthecentralgovernment.Weakeningtrustinthecenterinturn
inducesfurthercitizenactivismandradicalactions.Li(2008)arguesthat
petitioninginBeijingbecomes“amomentoftruth”forthosewhohaveindeed
participatedinit.Citizenswhohavehadexperiencechannelingtheirgrievances
throughthecenter-endorsedpetitioningsystem“haveseenthroughthecentral
government’sduplicity(ofsanctioningcitizen’slodgingclaimsontheonehand,and
21
tacitlyapprovinglocalgovernment’scrackdownsontheother),astheybecame
doubtfulaboutthecenterwhentheysufferedrepressionbylocalgovernments.”xxvii
Furthermore,owingtothecovertnatureoftherepressivemeasures,thecentral
governmentcanfendoffpressurefromthemediaorcitizenrythatmightotherwise
compelittogiveintoprotestors’demands.xxviiiDistrustinthecenter’scommitment
toupholdjusticeandtheenduringlocalabusestendtoinducemoreconfrontational
anddisruptivepopularactions,suchasstreetprotestsandriots,whichposefurther
threatstosocialstability.xxix
IV.Conclusions
Thisstudyintroducesanewdimensiontotheliteratureonstaterepression—the
useofthugsandgangstersasaformofprivatizedstateviolence.Undercertain
circumstances,statespreferusingviolenceexecutedbyhiredthugs,insteadoftheir
ownmilitaryorpoliceofficials,toexecutepoliciesandperformrepressiveactions.
InChina,alongside“relationalrepression”,xxxmonetaryexchangeforsocial
stability,xxxiandasecuritystate,xxxii“thugs-for-hire”isanotherinstrumentinthe
authoritarianstate’srepressivetoolkit.Undercertainconditions,“thugs-for-hire”
hasprovedtobethemostefficient,effectiveandevasiverepressivemeasure.
Tobesure,authoritarianregimesarenottheonlystatesthatutilizecriminalgroups
forrepressivepurpose.Hybridregimeshaveusedsimilarstrategies,xxxiiisuchasthe
employmentofvigilantesportsmen‘skinheads’orTitushkybyYanukovych’sParty
ofRegionstoattackpoliticalopponents,journalistsandactivists.xxxivTherearealso
historicalprecedentsofthestate’suseofgangsterstosuppressoppositional
movementsinChina.Inrecenthistory,theKuomintang(KMT)instrumentallyco-
optedtheGreenGangtobrutallysuppressCommunistopponentsinShanghaiin
1927whenitsforcewastooweaktodoso.xxxv
Wecontendthatemploying“thugs-for-hire”comesatacostfortheauthoritarian
regimeinChina—fallinglegitimacyandtrustinboththelocalandcentral
22
governmentsforthosewhohavebeendisenfranchisedbytheformalinstitutions.
Third-partyviolentagentsmayhaveaugmentedthestate’scoercivepower,butthey
arenotpartofthestate’spermanentinfrastructurethatgovernsitscitizenry.In
MichaelMann’sterm,“thugs-for-hire”augmentsthestate’s“despoticpower”,as
opposedto“infrastructuralpower”(Mann1984).SlaterandFenner(2011)
differentiatesbetweencoerciveinstitutionsthataredisciplined,suchasthemilitary,
andthosethatareundisciplined,suchasrandomthird-partyviolence.Disciplined
coerciveinstitutionsarecapableofdeployingviolenceina“controlledmanner”that
doesnotgobeyond“specifiedtargetsandlimits”(SlaterandFenner2011,20).They
arepartofthestate’sinfrastructuralpowerthatsustainsauthoritarianregime
durability(SlaterandFenner2011;Bellin2004).
Themilitaryisapermanentinstitution,whichundergirdstheinfrastructuralpower
ofauthoritarianstates.Itisalsopartofthepowerconfigurationbetweenthestate
andsociety.AftertheTiananmenIncident,societycanreasonablyexpectthat
whoeverisinchargeoftheCentralMilitaryCommissionholdstheultimatedecision-
makingindeployingthecoerciveforces.Thisexpectationmakesforadurableand
stableregime.
Stateshavetorelyonthird-partyviolencebecausetheyarefundamentallyweak:
withoutco-optingtheextralegalcoerciveforcesofviolentagents,theyareincapable
ofexecutingeverydaypolicyandrepression.AsJohnLucas(1998)hasargued,when
autocratsfacetrade-offsbetweeninfrastructuralanddespoticpowers,thosein
weakstatestendtochoosetopersistentlyrelyontheirdespoticpower.Relianceon
third-partyrandomviolencebolstersonlytheregime’sdespoticpowerand
contributesnothingtostrengtheningitsinfrastructuralcapacitytogovern.
Furthermore,whenaweakstatedeploysextralegalcoerciveforcetogetitsjobs
done,theveryactofdoingsocontributestofurtherweakness.Weakstatesbeget
weakstates.Whenastatehaslostitslegitimacyintheentirety,itwillhavetoresort
tomoreandharsherrepressivemeasures.Itisaviciouscyclethatweakensregime
durabilityinthelongrun.
23
i(Lim2014).ii(Tilly1978).iiiPengWang,“TheChinesemafia,”GlobalCrime12,no.4(2011):290-311.iv(P.Wang2011,308).vWedonotruleoutthestateuseofviolenceinawiderangeofscenarios,butwebelieveitismostcommonlyusedwhendealingwiththesesubjects.viLocalgovernmentshererefertocounty,townshipandvillageauthorities.Unlikevalue-addedtaxandotherformaltaxes,land-salesrevenuescollectedbythesemunicipalandlocalgovernmentsarenotsubjecttosharingwiththecentralandprovincialgovernments.Formoredetails,see(Tao2014).viiThelawstatesthatcountygovernments(alevelabovetownship,andtwolevelsabovevillageauthorities)havetherighttoapprovelandexpropriationprojectsbecauseofthecentralgovernment’spolicyobjectiveofprotectingarablelandareasforthepurposeoffoodsufficiency.Whenlandisexpropriatedillegally,grassrootsofficialscanpocketasubstantialproportionoftheproceedsthatwouldhaveotherwisegonetogovernmentcoffers.viiiYuanhuangZhang,“Zhongguoyouzuzhifanzuidefazhanxianzhuangjilifawanshanduice”[CurrentdevelopmentofChina’sorganizedcrimeandmeasuresforlegislativeimprovement],Fazhiyanjiu,no.2(2012).ix(LiaoshenWanbao2000).xSee(ChengshiWanbao2010;172539642012;C.Chen,Yang,andZhu2009).xi(M.Xia2009).xiiTownshipandvillagegovernments’engagementofgangsinthecollectionofruraltaxesandfeesisdocumentedingreatdetailinChen(2010).See(BaifengChen2010).xiiiForexamplesofmediareportsonthis,see(Jacobs2009,2012).xiv(LinandZhang2010;LongandYang2010).xv(Alvarez2006).xvi(StateCouncil2011).xviiSee(SpenceandZeckhauser1971;WeingastandMoran1983;Miller2005).xviii(CampbellandBrenner2002).xix(StandingTheirGround:ThousandsFaceViolentEvictioninChina2012,31).xx(StandingTheirGround:ThousandsFaceViolentEvictioninChina2012,146-7).xxiPerhapsitwasnocoincidencethattwoforeignjournalists,MelissaChanofAlJazeeraandChrisBuckleyofReuters,whoinvestigatedtheseextralegaldetentioncenters,wereexpelledfromthecountryandhadtheirreporterpermitsrevokedbyBeijing.See(AnAlleywayinHell2009;AlJazeera2012;R.Xia,n.d.).xxiiSee(TheEconomist2013;AnAlleywayinHell2009).xxiii(Li,Liu,andO’Brien2012).xxiv(Li,Liu,andO’Brien2012).xxvWehaveheardthisdescriptioninvillagesfromSichuantoHenanprovinces.InChinese,ninyuandangribenrendezougou,yebuyuanyibeidifangzhengfuguanzhi.xxviTheKuomintang(KMT)partyruledChinaduringtheRepublicanerabeforebeingdefeatedbytheChineseCommunistPartyledbyMaoduringthecivilwar.xxvii(Li2008).Li’ssurveyresultsshowthatregardlessofthepetitionoutcome,petitionerswhohadbeentoBeijingwere31.2percentlesslikelytoagreethatthecentertrulycaredaboutfarmersthanthosewhohadnot,40.8percentlesslikelytoagreethatthecenterwelcomedfarmerstopetition,and46.5percentlesslikelytoagreethatpetitioningBeijingwasveryuseful.
24
xxviiiOntheargumentofthecostsandbenefitsofrepressionandconcessionswithinamulti-levelgovernment,see(Cai2008).xxixSee(Li2008;X.Chen2011).xxx(DengandO’Brien2013).xxxi(LeeandZhang2013).xxxii(Y.WangandMinzner2015).xxxiii(LevitskyandWay2010).xxxiv(Kuzio2014).xxxvMartin,BrianG.1996.TheShanghaiGreenGangpoliticsandorganizedcrime,1919-1937.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.IntheQingdynasty,secretsocietieshadalsoexistedascomplementstostatepower.SeeDavidOwnby(1996),BrotherhoodsandSecretSocietiesinEarlyandMid-QingChina,StanfordUniversityPress.
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