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Maintainability & Maintenance Engineering + Maintenance Planning & Services
XM33 TrainingXM33 Training
3..Systemsystems Powerplantowerplant logicogic+CMRsMRsPrinciplesrinciples
based on Airbus experience
This document must be used for training purpose only.
Under no circumstances should this document be used as a reference.
It will not be updated.
This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S.
No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of itscontent.
This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express writtenconsent of AIRBUS S.A.S.
This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it issupplied.
The statements made herein do not constitute an offer.They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith.
Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased toexplain the basis thereof.
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MARCH 07XM33 Tr aini ng Systems & Power plant l ogic + CMRs Principl es Pag e 2
Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles
1. Introduction 3
2. MSI Selection process 6
3. MSI Analysis 11
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77
Table of Contents
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Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles
1.1. IntroductionIntroduction 33
2. MSI Selection process 6
3. MSI Analysis 11
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77
Table of Contents
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Structures
Section
Zonal
Section
Systems and Powerplant
Section
MSIMSI--AnalysesAnalyses SSISSI--AnalysesAnalyses ZonalZonal--AnalysesAnalyses
1. Objectives1. Introduction
The respective content of the Systems & PP , Structures and Zonal sections (or programs) of the MRBReport is based on the results from the works performed by the different MWGs and the ISC in order to define the
initial minimum scheduled maintenance requirements , thanks to the MSG-3 method, through the MRB Processsettled for a dedicated a/c program.
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1. Introduction
Systems &Powerplant
All systems & powerplant items are divided into a list of
Maintenance Significant Items (MSI)
The MSI are analysed according to MSG-3 methodology
MSI selection
MSI analyses
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Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles
1. Introduction 3
2.2. MSI Selection processMSI Selection process 66
3. MSI Analysis 11
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77
Table of Contents
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2. MSI selection process
Before the actual MSG-3 analysis can begin, the aircrafts
Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) have to be identified,
using a conservative approach (engineering judgement).
MSIs are those items identified by the manufacturer
whose failure:
could affect safety (flight or ground) and/or
could be undetectable during operations and/or
could have a significant operational or economic impact.
MSI Selection List
MSI Selection List will be kept up to date after Entry into Service
( MSI Validation List)
Selection Process
Before the actual MSG-3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft's significant systems and
components must be identified. A significant item for systems and power plant is called aMaintenance Significant Item or MSI. These are items fulfilling defined selection criteria for which
MSI analyses are established at the highest manageable level. Items fulfilling the selection criteria thatare analyzed at another, higher, level are not called MSIs but MSI Elements.
The process of identifying Maintenance Significant Items is a conservative process (using engineeringjudgment) based on the anticipated consequences of failure. Four selection questions have to beanswered for each item: safety?, hidden failure?, operational repercussions?, economic
repercussions?
The top-down approach is a process of identifying the significant items on the aircraft at the highestmanageable level.
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Could failure be undetectable
or not likely to be detected
during operations? Could failure affect safety
(on ground or in flight?)
Could failure have
significanteconomic impact?
Could failure have
significantoperational impact?
MSI Selection2. MSI selection process
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If at least one of four questions is answered with a "YES:
MSG-3 analysis is required
Highest manageable level must be confirmed
Highest manageable level should be:
high enough to avoid unnecessary analysis not too many
functions, not too complex
low enough to ensure that all functions, functional failuresand failure causes are covered but not too low, e.g. no
screw level analysis
MSI Selection2. MSI selection process
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If all four questions are answered with a NO:
MSGMSG--3 analysis is not required.3 analysis is not required.
Examples:Examples:
items covered by zonal analyses (harness, tubingitems covered by zonal analyses (harness, tubing))
items covered by structure analyses (engine mountsitems covered by structure analyses (engine mounts))
items for maintenance purpose only (Access doorsitems for maintenance purpose only (Access doors))
MSI Selection2. MSI selection process
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Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles
1. Introduction 3
2. MSI Selection process 6
3.3. MSI AnalysisMSI Analysis 1111
4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) 77
Table of Contents
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Analysis process & documentationAnalysis process & documentation 1212
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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MSI Analysis Process
Establish data to allow traceability and historyof analysis
Provide MSI description and component data
Describe Functions, Functional Failures,Failure Effects and Failure Causes
Determine the Failure Effect Category foreach Functional Failure
Determine if a task is applicable and effectiveand for each selected task, determine an
interval
Establish other task data for the MRB Reportas well as task accomplishment data
Administrative Data
Functional FailureAnalysis
Failure Consequences(Level 1 Analysis)
Task & IntervalSelection (Level 2)
Task Summaries &Task Data
MSI Description &Component Data
Analysis Method
The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for systems and power
plant, uses a progressive logic diagram laid down in the MSG-3 document. This logic is the basisof an evaluation technique applied to each Maintenance Significant Item (system, sub-system,
module, component, accessory, unit, part, etc.), using the technical data available.
Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, a work sheet will be completed that clearly
defines the MSI, its functions / functional failures / failure effects / failure causes and anyadditional data pertinent to the item.
The process to be followed comprises the following basic analysis steps:
1. Establishment of administrative pages of MSI analysis.
2. Collection of basic MSI data and establishment of an MSI description.
3. Development of the MSIs functions, functional failures, failure effects and failure causes.
4. Categorization of functional failures in accordance with their failure effects (Level 1 analysis).
5. Determination of tasks based on rigorous selection criteria (Level 2 analysis).
6. Determination of intervals for the selected tasks.
7. Summary and combination of tasks (if relevant).
8. Establishment of data for task planning and task accomplishment.
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MSI Analysis Documentation
Administrative Pages Data Sheet A
Data Sheet B
Level 1 and 2 Analyses
Task Summary Sheet
MRBR Interface Sheet
Task Data
The MSI analysis consists of the following types of form sheets:
Administrative pages
Cover sheet
List of Effective Pages (LEP)
List of Revisions (LOR)
History of Changes sheet Applicability
Assumptions
Data Sheet A
Component Data sheet(s)
Item Description sheet
Data sheet B
Level 1 & 2 Analysis
Level 1 sheets
Level 2 sheets
Task Summaries
Task Summary sheet MRB Report Interface sheet
Task Data sheet
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative dataAdministrative data 1515
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Administrative Pages / Overview
Cover Sheet
List of Effective Pages
List of Revisions
History of Change
Applicability Sheet
Assumptions
Administrative Pages
These are pages intended to allow monitoring of the revision status and of the
scope/applicability of the analysis.
Cover sheet (1 page)
List of Effective Pages (LEP) (one or more pages)
List of Revisions (LOR) (one or more pages)
History of Changes sheet (one or more pages)
Applicability Sheet (one or more pages)
Assumptions (one or more pages)
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Administrative Pages / Applicability
Aircraft
SeriesAircraft
Series
Mod number and titleMod number and titleEngine/Propeller
(where applicable)Engine/Propeller
(where applicable)
All Modifications, that have an impact on the MSG-3 Analysis, shall be included and listed.
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Assumptions / Example
Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual(AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have animpact on e.g. task selection
Assumptions
(open)Assumptions
(open)
Note: currently, assumption tables are appliedfrom A380 programme onwards
MMEL: Master Minimum Equipment List
MEL: Minimum Equipment List
The MMEL is an Airbus document, developed by the Flight Operations Support and Services
Department. Operators use the Airbus MMEL as a reference for creating their own MEL, which isprovided to their flight crews, line maintenance personnel, and/or flight operations personnel. It is
important to note that an Operators MEL cannot be less restrictive than the Airbus MMEL. Both the
MMEL and the MEL are legal documents that are either approved or accepted by AirworthinessAuthorities.
The MMEL and the MEL consist of component and system lists that are attributed a GO, GO IF, orNO GO status, depending on their impact on the safety of a flight. These attributes are defined as
follows:
GO or GO IF items can remain inoperative for a limited period of time.
NO GO items prevent the dispatch of the aircraft.
The MMEL and the MEL are both designed to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is respected,when an aircraft is dispatched with inoperative equipment.
The MEL enables Operators to rapidly dispatch an aircraft, and avoid unnecessary delays or flight
cancellations, without sacrificing safety.
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Assumptions / Example
Typical Assumptions are on MMEL status or Airplane Flight Manual(AFM) procedures, but also on open technical issues, that have animpact on e.g. task selection
Assumptions
(open)Assumptions
(open)
Note: currently, assumption tables are appliedfrom A380 programme onwards
AFM: Airplane Flight Manual
The Airplane Flight Manual is a book containing the information and instructions required to operate
the aircraft safely. The pilot must comply with this AFM information. A typical AFM will contain thefollowing:
Limitations - the 'envelope' of maximum speeds; maximum weights; allowable centre of gravity
range; maximum engine RPM, temperatures and oil pressures, etc (for the specified powerplant); and
allowable manoeuvres and other limits, within which the aircraft must be operated to be safe.Operating procedures - aircraft procedures, speeds and configurations used to:
Achieve expected performance and behaviour in Normal situations.
Achieve safe outcomes in some specified Abnormal or Emergency situations (such as a
forced landing after engine failure).
Performance - the required variation of the aircraft's maximum allowable weights, as affected by airpressure and temperature, in order to:
Take-off or land in available runway distance.
Climb at the minimum required gradient, or greater gradient needed to clear obstacles in the
intended flight path following take-off or missed approach.
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Assumptions / Example
Assumptions
(closed)Assumptions
(closed)
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA)MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 2020
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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MSI Description / Data Sheet A
Data Sheet A consists of Component Data Sheet
lists all components which are part of the system provides information about part numbers, reliability (MTBF, MTBUR
figures)
Item Description provides information about system redundancies, experiences
from other programs and about MMEL status
describes the system and its components and providesinformation essential to understand defined functions,functional failures etc. to be analysed
provides information about systems normal operation and failurebehaviour, as well as fault detection and indication
DATA SHEET A
Data Sheet A / MSI Description
Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, data sheets will be established that clearly
define the MSI, its function(s), functional failure(s), failure effect(s), failure cause(s) and any additionaldata pertinent to the item; e.g.,
ATA chapter reference
fleet applicability
manufacturer's part number
brief description of the item
expected failure rate
hidden functions
redundancy (may be unit, system or system management), etc.
The descriptive part of the MSI analysis is an integral part of the analysis and will be included as part
of the total MSG-3 documentation for the item.
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Data Sheet A / Component Data Sheet
ATA
Reference on
component
level
ATA
Reference on
component
level
Item
DescriptionItem
Description
Qty:
Quantity per
Aircraft
Qty:
Quantity per
Aircraft
SupplierSupplier
Supplier
Part NumberSupplier
Part Number
Zone(s)Zone(s)
MTBF
MTBURMTBF
MTBUR
AccessAccess
Source
of DataSource
of Data
Data Sheet A / Component Data
This sheet shall be used to list all component data relevant for MSI analysis.
It is important to state the source of the reliability (MTBF/MTBUR) data quoted. Preferably, this
reliability information should be based on relevant service experience. However, if specification orguarantee values are quoted, this should me made clear in the analysis.
It is to be noted that the reliability data quoted need to be as realistic as possible in order to allow the
selection of the highest possible intervals commensurate with the inherent reliability characteristics.
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Data Sheet A: Item description
Data sheet A shall be used to establish all data necessaryto clearly define the MSI, its functional failure characteristics,
indications, maintenance means and any additional data
pertinent to the item.
All modificationsrelevant to, and
covered by, the design
are to be listed
Redundancies, in-serviceexperience, MMEL status
Data Sheet A / Item Description
The author should be aware of the fact that, normally, no other descriptive data will be supplied with
the MSG-3 analysis. The recipient / reader of the analysis, therefore, must be able to understand theitem under consideration in sufficient depth to critically appraise the analysis prior to the meeting.
The textual description should include a system overview (including reason for existence of system),
functional description (operation in normal and any other mode) and information on indication, system
interfaces, components, built-in tests and reference documentation (if applicable).
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Item description / Example
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB)Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 2525
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Failure Analysis / Overview
Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions
of the item.
Functional Failure(s) - how the item fails to
perform its function.
Failure Effect - what is the result of the
functional failure.
Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure
occurs.
The first step for the system analysis
procedure is the identification of:
Function
Functional
Failure
FailureCause
FailureEffect
Data Sheet B should consider single failures.Failure combinations are analysed in the subsequent
Level 1 Analysis (if the functional failure is hidden).
Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis
After the basic MSI analysis data have been assembled, the actual analysis is begun by establishing
the functional failure analysis.
This means that the following must be identified for each MSI:
Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions of an item
Functional Failure(s) - Failure of an item to perform its intended function within specified limits
Failure Effect(s) - what is the result of a functional failure
Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occurs
The functional failure analysis will be the basis for the categorization of the functional failures which inturn constitutes the basis for the task selection process.
For protective devices (e.g. a filter bypass), Function and Functional Failure can refer to an additional
failure, i.e. the failure or the event for what the device is designed for.
Example
Function: To bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging.
Functional Failure: Fails to bypass the hydraulic filter in the event of filter clogging.
Failure Effect: No effect as a single failure. Under normal conditions the bypass is closed.
Failure Cause: Filter bypass failed closed.
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Failure Analysis Hierarchy
Function 2Function 1 Function 3
Functional
Failure B
Functional
Failure A
Functional
Failure C
Functional
Failure D
Failure
Effect
Failure
Cause
2
Failure
Cause
1
FailureCause
3
Failure
Effect
FailureCause
1
Failure
Effect
FailureCause
2
FailureCause
1
Failure
Effect
1
FailureCause
1
Failure
Effect
2
FailureCause
1
Failure Analysis Hierarchy
Each MSI will have at least one function. With increasing complexity of the equipment, the number of
functions will also increase.
For every function, there should be at least one functional failure; there is no function that cannot fail.
For every functional failure, there should be one failure effect only (if there is more than one failureeffect for a given functional failure, either the functional failure or the failure effect(s) are probably
incorrectly defined).
For every functional failure, at least one failure cause must be given.
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Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B
FunctionFunctionFailure EffectFailure Effect
Functional FailureFunctional Failure
Failure CauseFailure Cause
Important:
Start with functions and
not with failure causesData Sheet B is
critical for the quality
of the analysis
Data Sheet B / Functional Failure Analysis
When developing the Data Sheet B, it is essential to start with the functions and not with the failure
causes (as in the case of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis). If this is not observed, it can result inan analysis where complete functions are missing or where a failure cause is only covered once, even
though the item might have different functions and different failure modes (e.g. a valve might have oneor more electrical, and one or more mechanical failure modes).
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A380
Data Sheet B: Example
1D: Failure to regulate the heating of
one Floor panel at the correct operating
Temperature (MOD 45670)
1: To provide controlled and regulated
heating of the floor panels at
each passenger door/emergency exit
1D1: Insufficient or excessive heating
at the affected floor panel
1D12: One heated floor
panel defective(Temp Sensor)
The above sheet is one of several pages making up a complete Data Sheet B and only shows some
(not all) functional failures associated with function 1. The other sheets would also show that this MSIhas not only one, but some 25 functions.
The example shows that there is a one-to-one relationship between functional failures and failure
effects.
The example shows also that for some functional failures, there are more than one failure causes that
can cause the failure to occur.
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 AnalysisConsequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 3030
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis
MSI Analysis Decision Logic
Level 1:Level 1: Questions (1, 2, 3 and 4) require theQuestions (1, 2, 3 and 4) require the
evaluation of each FUNCTIONALevaluation of each FUNCTIONAL
FAILURE for determination of theFAILURE for determination of the
Failure Effect Category (5,6,7,8,9).Failure Effect Category (5,6,7,8,9).
The decision logic hasThe decision logic has two levelstwo levels::
Level 2:Level 2: Questions (A to F as applicable)Questions (A to F as applicable)
then take the associated FAILUREthen take the associated FAILURE
CAUSES into account for selectingCAUSES into account for selectingthethe specific type of task(s).specific type of task(s).
The decision logic for systems and power plant has two levels:
Level 1
(questions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
requires the evaluation of each FUNCTIONAL FAILURE for determination of the Failure Effect
Category; i.e., safety, operational, economic, hidden safety or hidden non-safety.
Level 2
(questions "A" through "F", as applicable to the Failure Effect Categories 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9)
then takes the FAILURE CAUSE (S) for each functional failure into account for selecting the specifictype of task(s).
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Level 1 Analysis: Questions
1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating
crew during the performance of normal duties ?
1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating
crew during the performance of normal duties ?
Safety effects
Yes
5
Yes
2) Does the functional failure or
secondary damage resulting from thefunctional failure have a direct adverse
effect on operating safety ?
2) Does the functional failure or
secondary damage resulting from thefunctional failure have a direct adverse
effect on operating safety ?
Yes
Operational effects
6
Economic effects
No
7
Non-safety effects
No
9
No
4) Does the functional failure have a
direct adverse effect on operatingcapability ?
4) Does the functional failure have a
direct adverse effect on operatingcapability ?
3) Does the combination of ahidden functional failure and
one additional failure of a
system related or back-upfunction have an adverse effect
on operating safety ?
3) Does the combination of ahidden functional failure and
one additional failure of a
system related or back-upfunction have an adverse effect
on operating safety ?
No
Safety effects
Yes
8
Level 1 Questions
The MSG-3 decision logic diagram for Level 1 has the aim of categorizing the failure consequences.
There are four first level questions, identified as questions 1 to 4.
1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of
normal duties ?
2) Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a directadverse effect on operating safety ?Direct: To be direct the functional failure or resulting secondary damage must achieve its effect by itself, not in combination with other
functional failures (no redundancy exists and it is a primary dispatch item).
Adverse Effect on Safety: Safety shal l be considered as adversely affected if the consequences of the failure condition would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft and/or might cause serious or fatal injury to human occupants.
Continued safe flight and landing is the capability for continued controlled flight and landing at a suitable airport, possibly using emergency
procedures, but without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength.
Operating: This is defined as the time interval during which passengers and crew are on board for the purpose of flight.
3) Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system relatedor back-up function have an adverse effect on operating safety ?
The question takes into account failures in which the loss of the one hidden function (whose failure is unknown to the operating crew) doesnot of itself affect safety; however, in combination with an additional functional failure (system related or intended to serve as a back-
up) has an adverse effect on operating safety.
4) Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability ?Adverse effect on operating capability requires: either the imposition of operating restrictions or correction prior to further dispatch; or flight
crew use of abnormal or emergency procedures (MMEL restrictions/procedures).
As a result of answering these first level questions, the functional failure is assignedto one of five failure effect categories, identified as categories 5 to 9:
Evident Safety (Category 5)
Evident Operational (Category 6)
Evident Economic (Category 7)
Hidden Safety (Category 8)
Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)
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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example
Functional Failure 2A: fails to isolate the APUbleed duct line from engine bleed pressure
1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THEPERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?
Answer: No, APU check valve malfunction in open
position is not evident to the operating crew because thecheck valve is not monitored
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FEC 8 Hidden Safety / Example (contd)
Functional failure 2A: Failure to isolate the APUbleed duct line from engine bleed pressure
88
3) DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDENFUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONALFAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ONOPERATING SAFETY ?
Answer: Yes, APU check valve in open positionin combination with APU bleed duct leakage in sensitive
areas may cause adverse effect to operational safetybecause A/C structure integrity may be affected.
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Special case safety / emergency equipments
For hidden failures of safety/emergency equipments,The additional failure is the event for which this function of
the system or equipment is designed,
A FEC 8 is to be selected. Safety/emergency = a device or system that:
Enhances the evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency or
If it does not function when required, results in a failure
condition that might have an adverse effect on safety.
Megaphone
CrashAxe
Oxygen
Escape
Ropes
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example
Functional Failure 1A: Fails to protect the engine
against recirculating
1) IS THE OCCURENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILUREEVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW DURING THEPERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES?
Answer: Yes, because the engine indication is shown
on ECAM
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)
Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine
against recirculating
Answer: No, because engine shut-down does not affectsafety directly and adversely
2) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE ORSECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THEFUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY ?
Answers to Level 1 Questions
When answering the Level 1 questions, care should be taken to provide a sufficiently detailed
explanation to the answer provided.
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Level 1 / FEC 6 Example (contd)
Answer: Yes, engine shut-down affects operatingcapability because A/C cannot be dispatched with one
engine inoperative.
4) DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECTADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING CAPABILITY ?
66
Functional Failure 1A: fails to protect the engine
against recirculating
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 AnalysisTask Selection / Level 2 Analysis 3939
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis
The Level 2 Analysis takes the FAILURE CAUSES of each Functional
Failures into account and provides a means whereby an applicable and
effective task - or a number of applicable and effective tasks - can be
selected.
According to MSG-3, the following maintenance tasks can be selected: Lubrication / Servicing Operational Check / Visual Check Inspection / Functional Check Restoration Discard
Task Selection and Failure Effect Categories
Once the applicable first level questions have been answered, the analyst is directed to one of the five
Failure Effect Categories:
a) Evident Safety (Category 5)b) Evident Operational (Category 6)
c) Evident Economic (Category 7)d) Hidden Safety (Category 8)
e) Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9)Task development is handled in a similar manner for each of the five Failure Effect categories. Fortask determination, it is necessary to apply the failure causes for the functional failure to the second
level of the logic diagram. There are six possible task resultant questions in the five Failure Effectcategories.
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Level 2 Analysis: Applicability & Effectiveness
Task ApplicabilityA set of conditions that leads to the identification of a task type when a
specific set of characteristics of the failure cause being analyzed wouldbe discovered and/or corrected as a result of the task beingaccomplished.
Applicability is dependent on the task type.
Task EffectivenessA specific set of conditions that leads to the selection of a task alreadyidentified to be applicable. Avoids, eliminates, or reduces the negativeconsequences of the failure to an extent that justifies doing the task atthe selected interval.Effectiveness is dependent on task type and failure effect category(FEC).
A selected task must be applicable and effective.
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Level 2 Analysis overview
LUBRICATION/SERVICIN G
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
TASK/COMBINATIONMOST
EFFECTIVE MUST BE DONE
REDESIGNI SM ANDATORY
DISCARD
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE &E FFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE &EF FECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVO ID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE &E FFECTIVE?
IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINAT ION OF
TASKS APPLICABL E & EFFECTIVE?
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NOYES
OPERATIONAL/VISUA L CHECK
IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERA TION
APPLICABLE &EFFECTIV E ?
YES
NO
Regardless of the answer on question A, the next
task selection question must be asked in all cases.
When following a safety effects path (FEC 5 and 8),all subsequent questions must be asked
In the remaining categories (FEC 6, 7, 9), subsequent
to the first question, a YES answer will allowexiting the logic. However, advancement to
subsequent questions after deriving a YES answer
is allowable, but only until the cost of the task is equalto the cost of the failure prevented.
For FEC 5 and 8, if no task becomes applicable andeffective a redesign is mandatory.
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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 Formsheet
Functional
FailureFunctional
Failure
Failure
Cause(s)Failure
Cause(s)
Level 2
questions to
be answered
Level 2
questions to
be answered
Indication of
answer
(YES or NO)
Indication of
answer
(YES or NO)
Field for
Answers to Level 2
questions (YES/NO)
and
Explanation of answers
Field forAnswers to Level 2
questions (YES/NO)
and
Explanation of answers
Task
Number(s)Task
Number(s)
Task
Description(s)Task
Description(s)
Task Interval
Usage Parameter(s)Task Interval
Usage Parameter(s)
Interval
justificationInterval
justification
Level 2 Form Sheet
There is only a single form sheet for the Level 2 analysis (although there are five different ways of
progressing through the Level 2 questions).
The form sheet has been arranged so that the failure related information from Data Sheet B(description and reference of the functional failure and the failure cause) is placed at the top of the
sheet.
The left part of the form sheet is used for a graphical representation of the Level 2 logic chart with thesix task selection questions. On the left hand side of this graphical representation, the applicable task
selection questions for a certain FEC are indicated. It also allows an indication of the YES or NOanswer to each question.
The main part of the form sheet is used for the answers to the task selection questions (i.e. YES or
NO) and for the detailed explanation of these answers.
At the bottom of the sheet, there is space for the task(s) that has resulted from the analysis. Itcomprises of the
- The task number
- The task description
- The predominant (and the secondary) usage parameter selected for the interval
- The task interval expressed in the predominant usage parameter
- Optionally a secondary usage parameter and interval
- Interval justification
A single Level 2 form sheet may be used for the analysis of several failure causes only in those cases
where all the answers and the explanations of the answers given on the sheet apply equally to all thereferenced failure causes.
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AAAAA
98765
N
YIS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING
TASK APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
LUBRICATIONSERVICING
The task must becost-effective.
The task mustreduce the risk of
failure to anacceptable level.
The task must reducethe risk of failure.
The replenishmentof the consumable
must reduce therate of functional
deterioration.
ECONOMIC
EFFECTIVENESS
(FEC 7, 9)
OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
(FEC 6)
SAFETY
EFFECTIVENESS(FEC 5, 8)APPLICABILITY
Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining
inherent design capabilities.
Purpose is: Failure Prevention
Level 2 Analysis: Lubrication, Servicing
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Level 2 Analysis: Operational / Visual Check
BB
98765
N
YIS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
OPERATIONALVISUAL CHECK
An operational/visual check is a task to determine that an item is
fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require
quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task.
The question is only asked for Hidden FEC 8 & 9.
Purpose: Failure finding
task !!!
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Level 2 Analysis: OPC, VCK selection criteria
The task must
ensure adequateavailability of the
hidden function in
order to avoid
economic effects of
multiple failures andmust be cost-
effective.
(FEC 9)
Not applicableThe task must ensure
adequate availabilityof the hidden function
to reduce the risk of a
multiple failure.
(FEC 8)
Identification of
failure must bepossible.
ECONOMIC
EFFECTIVENESS
OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
SAFETY
EFFECTIVENESSAPPLICABILITY
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Level 2 Analysis: Inspection / Functional Check
CCBBB
98765
N
YIS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
INSPECTION /
FUNCTIONAL
CHECK
Purpose: Check fordegradation !!!
Potential Failure Finding
An inspection can be a General Visual Inspection (GVI), a Detailed
Inspection (DET) or a Special Detailed Inspection (SDI).
A functional check is a quantitative check to determine if one or more
functions of an item performs within specified limits.
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Level 2 Analysis: Inspections GVI, DET, SDI
GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVI)A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to detect
obvious damage, failure or irregularity. This level of inspection is made from withintouching distance, unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to enhance
visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection area. This level of inspection is
made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting,flashlight or drop-light and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors.
Stands, ladders or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked.
DETAILED INSPECTION (DET)An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage,
failure or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source ofgood lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors,
magnifying lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access
procedures may be required.
SPECIAL DETAILED INSPECTION (SDI)An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage,failure or irregularity. The examination is likely to make extensive use of specialized
Inspection Techniques and/or equipment. Intricate cleaning and substantial access ordisassembly procedure may be required.
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Level 2 Analysis: Insp / FNC selection criteria
The task must be
cost-effective; i.e.,the cost of the task
must be less than
the cost of the
failure prevented.
(FEC 7, 9)
The task must
reduce the risk offailure to an
acceptable level.
(FEC 6)
The task must
reduce the risk offailure to assure
safe operation.
(FEC 5, 8)
Reduced resistance to
failure must bedetectable, and there
exists a reasonably
consistent interval
between a
deterioration condition
and functional failure.
ECONOMIC
EFFECTIVENESS
OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
SAFETY
EFFECTIVENESSAPPLICABILITY
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Level 2 Analysis: Restoration
DDCCC
98765
N
YIS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE ?
RESTORATION
From cleaning to overhaul !!!
Purpose: Failure Avoidance
That work necessary to return the item to a specific standard.
Since restoration may vary from cleaning or replacement of single
parts up to a complete overhaul, the scope of each assigned
restoration task has to be specified.
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Level 2 Analysis: RST selection criteria
The task must becost-effective: i.e.,
the cost of the task
must be less than
the cost of thefailure prevented.
(FEC 7, 9)
The task mustreduce the risk of
failure to an
acceptable level.
(FEC 6)
The task mustreduce the risk of
failure to assure
safe operation.
(FEC 5, 8)
The item mustshow functional
degradation
characteristics at
an identifiable ageand a large
proportion of units
must survive to thatage.
It must be possible
to restore the item
to a specific
standard of failure
resistance.
ECONOMIC
EFFECTIVENESS
OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
SAFETY
EFFECTIVENESSAPPLICABILITY
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Level 2 Analysis: Discard
EEDDD
98765
N
YIS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
DISCARD
Safe life limitEconomic lifelimit
Purpose: Failure Avoidance
The removal from service of an item at a specified life limit.
Discard tasks are normally applied to so-called single celled parts
such as cartridges, canisters, cylinders, engine disks, safe-life
structural members, etc.
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Level 2 Analysis: DIS selection criteria
An economic-life
limit must be cost-
effective: i.e., the
cost of the taskmust be less than
the cost of thefailure prevented.
FEC 7 & 9
The task must
reduce the risk of
failure to an
acceptable level.
FEC 6
A safe-life limit
must reduce the
risk of failure to
assure safeoperation.
FEC 5 & 8
The item must show
functional
degradation
characteristics at anidentifiable age and
a large proportion ofunits must survive
to that age.
ECONOMICEFFECTIVENESS
OPERATIONALEFFECTIVENESS
SAFETYEFFECTIVENESS
APPLICABILITY
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Level 2 Analysis: Task combination
FE
98765
N
YIS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF
TASKS APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE ?
TASK MOST
EFFECTIVEMUST BE DONE
Since this is a safety category (FEC 5 or 8) question and a task is
required, all possible avenues must be analyzed.
To do this, a review of the task(s) that are applicable is necessary.
From this review the most effective task(s) must be selected.
All Level 2 analyses for FECs 5 and 8 that do not result in a task
must be brought to the attention of the ISC.
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Level 2 Analysis: No task for FEC 5 or 8 ?
FEC 5
For all failure causes, it is necessary to derive an applicable and effective
task. No exceptions are allowed.
FEC 8
Under exceptional circumstances, it may not be possible to derive an
applicable and effective task:
No redesign possible
Lack of a task can be justified, if the probability of the functional
failure occurring is low enough for ISC acceptance.
Failure becomes evident before scheduled fai lure-finding
If a failure is hidden and the Level 1 analysis results in a FEC 8,
the lack of a task may be justified by the fact, that the failurebecomes evident long before an applicable and effective task can
be carried out at any reasonable interval.
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Level 2 Analysis / Applicability & Effectiveness
APPLICABILITYTASK
+ Codes
+ Purpose
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA
CRITERIA SAFETYFEC 5 8 OPERATIONALFEC 6 ECONOMICFEC 7 9LUBRICATION
OR
SERVICING (LUB, SVC)FAILURE PREVENTION
The replenishment of the
consumable must reduce the rate
of functional deterioration.
The task must reduce the
risk of failure.
The task must reduce
the risk of failure to an
acceptable level.
The task must be cost
effective.
OPERATIONAL
OR
VISUAL CHECK
(OPC, VCK)FAILURE FINDING
Identification of failure must be
possible.
The task must ensure
adequate availability of
the hidden function to
reduce the risk of a
multiple failure.
Not applicable. The task must ens ure
adequate availability of
the hidden function in
order to avoid economic
effects of multiple
failures and must be
cost effective.
INSPECTION
OR
FUNCTIONAL CHECK(GVI, DET, SDI, FNC)POTENTI AL FAILUREFINDING
Reduced resistance to failure
must be detectable, and there
exists a reasonably consistent
interval between a deterioration
condition and functional failure.
The task must reduce the
risk of failure to assure
safe operation.
The task must reduce
the risk of failure to an
acceptable level.
The task must be cost
effective; i. e., the cost
of the task must be less
than the cost of the
failure prevented.
RESTORATION(RST)FAILURE AVOIDANCE
The item must show functional
degradation characteristics at an
identifiable age, and a large
proportion of units must survive to
that age. It must be possible to
restore the item to a specific
standard of failure resistance.
The task must reduce the
risk of failure to assure
safe operation.
The task must reduce
the risk of failure to an
acceptable level.
The task must be cost
effective; i.e., the cost
of the task must be less
than the cost of the
failure prevented.
DISCARD(DIS)FAILURE AVOIDANCE
The item must show functional
degradation characteristics at an
identifiable age and a large
proportion of units must survive to
that age.
The safe life limit must
reduce the risk of failure
to assure safe operation.
The task must reduce
the risk of failure to an
acceptable level.
An economic life limit
must be cost effective;
i.e., the cost of the task
must be less than the
cost of the failure
prevented.
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Level 2 Analysis / Level 2 example
8E) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identifiableage; therefore, no discard task is applicable.
8D) No: The item does not show functional degradation at an identi fiableage; therefore, no restoration task is applicable.
8B) No: A failure finding check is not applicable because there are noappropriate means to verify operation on A/C.
8A) No: There is no appli cable lubrication or servicing task becausethere is no consumable to replenish.
8C) Yes: Detailed visual inspection of APU check valve is appli cable todetect degradation and is effective.
8F) Yes: detailed visual inspection is appli cable and effective.
Remove APU check val ve for detailed visual inspectio n10 Inter val selec ted based on reliability pr ediction and engineeri ng j udg ment FH 10 000 FH
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determinationInterval determination 5858
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Interval Determination
The MWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each
maintenance task based on available data and goodengineering judgment.
The information needed to determine optimum intervals isordinarily not available until after the equipment enters service.
In the absence of specific data on failure rates andcharacteristics, intervals for systems tasks are largely
determined based on service experience with similarsystems/components.
A task should not be done more often than experience or otherdata suggests simply because it is easily accomplished.
General Considerations for Interval Determination
As part of the MSG-3 logic analysis, the Maintenance Working Group has to determine the interval of
each scheduled maintenance task that satisfies both the applicability and effectiveness criteria. TheMWGs should select the most appropriate interval for each maintenance task based on available data
and good engineering judgment.
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Intervals / Sources of Information
In order to determine the 'best initial' maintenance interval
for each task, each MWG must assess the interval based on
all relevant data that is available:
Manufacturers tests and technical analysis
Manufacturers data and/or vendor recommendations(based on test data or failure analysis)
Customer requirements
'Best engineering estimates
Service experience gained with comparable oridentical parts, components and subsystems on other
aircraft
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Usage Parameters
Task intervals are established in terms of the measure of exposureto the conditions that cause the failure at which the task is directed.
The most widely used usage parameters are:
Flight Hours
Flight Cycles
Calendar Time (e.g. MO)
But also:
Engine Hours
Equipment Operating hours
Equipment Operating cycles
Interval Determination / Usage parameters
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Task Summary Sheet
Purpose: summarize tasks selected during Level 2analysis (including intervals, associated failure effect
categories and failure cause references).
Not to combine tasks derived from Level 2 analysis so thatthey agree fully with the proposed MRB Report.
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Task Summary Sheet
Each failurecause and the
related FEC to bestated
Each failurecause and the
related FEC to bestated
For each task stated on the Task Summary sheet, the task number, the task description, the usage
parameter of the task interval and the interval itself have to be provided. In addition, for each task, allthe failure cause references from which the task was derived and their associated failure effect
categories must be given.
The task numbers on the Task Summary sheet are normal sequence numbers, starting with 1 andcontinuing with 2, 3, etc.
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MRB Report Interface Sheet
Purpose:
To summarize task description and task interval so that
they can be directly transferred to the MPP (draft of
MRB Report)To specify all additional data not derived from the
analysis but required for the task section of the MRB
Report.
Once reviewed and agreed by ISC, the MRB ReportInterface sheet Sheet becomes the source document for
the Maintenance Review Board Report.
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MRBR Interface Sheet / Task Combination
Possible to combine tasks on the MRB Report Interfacesheet in order to
Combine tasks that should be performed together fortechnical reasons
Bring the wording of tasks proposed for the MPP/MRB
Report and those in the MSG-3 analysis in agreement with
each other
Tasks not affected by task combinations can be transferredfrom the Task Summary sheet to the MRB Report Interface
sheet without change
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MRBR Interface Sheet / Example
Task sequencenumbers (as
used in theMRBR)
Task sequencenumbers (as
used in theMRBR)
LUB, SVC,OPC, VCK,FNC, GVI,DET, SDI,RST, DIS
LUB, SVC,OPC, VCK,FNC, GVI,DET, SDI,RST, DIS
Task numbers(as used on
the TaskSummary
Sheet)
Task numbers(as used on
the TaskSummary
Sheet)
Description of taskas used in theMRB Report
(after combiningtasksfrom TSS)
Description of taskas used in theMRB Report
(after combiningtasksfrom TSS)
Most stringentevident and/or
hidden FEC(e.g. 5 only
instead of 5, 6, 7)
Most stringentevident and/or
hidden FEC(e.g. 5 only
instead of 5, 6, 7)
Transfer toZIP?
(YES or N/A)
Transfer toZIP?
(YES or N/A)
Should alwaysbe stated
(e.g. All, ModNo, A380-800)
Should alwaysbe stated
(e.g. All, ModNo, A380-800)
Interval expressed inthe appropriate
usage parameter
Interval expressed inthe appropriate
usage parameter
Anyadditionalremarks
Anyadditionalremarks
The MRB Report Interface sheet lists for each task the following data:
The task numbers of the task(s) from the Task Summary sheet that the task on the MRB Report
Interface sheet covers (after combining tasks)
The task number of each task
The three-letter task code
The task description
The Failure Effect Category or Categories
The task interval
The ZIP reference if the task is covered by the zonal program
The applicability of the task
Any additional remarks if applicable
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Task Data Sheet
Purpose of the Task Data sheet:
To provide procedural information for task accomplishmentTo provide additional task planning data.
Task Data sheet for every
task listed on the MRBR
Interface sheet (not for
every task on the Task
Summary sheet)
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Task Description and Planning Data
The level of detail for the task procedure should be such that aMWG is able to assess task accomplishment procedure
The planning data shall besuitable for direct useduring MPD development.
Under Reason for Taskit is necessary to providea brief statement on theintent/purpose of the task(e.g. To detect wear-outof thebefore it fails
completely).
Task Data Sheet
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Interval Justification
As part of the working group review of the analysis,substantiation/justification is to be provided for all intervals
The statement shall includethe reason why the
predominant usageparameter was chosen
the secondary usageparameter is.
This justification can beused as a basis for latertask intervaladjustments.
Task Data Sheet
Note: currently, interval justification is appliedfrom A380 programme onwards
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
SamplingSampling 7171
Maintenance Programme Evolution 73
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Applicability of Sampling
Sampling = examination of a specific number of items at definedintervals
to confirm that there are no unexpected degradation
characteristics.
Non-sampled items may continue in service until samplingresults highlight the need for change.
Sampling can be considered for tasks in the systems and powerplant program if
the characteristics of the task and the associated failure processesare such that a 100% - task accomplishment is not necessary and
the results of the sample task are equally applicable to the non-sampled items.
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Analysis process & documentation 12
Administrative data 15
MSI Description / Data Sheet A (DSA) 20
Failure Analysis / Data Sheet B (DSB) 25
Consequences of Failure / Level 1 Analysis 30
Task Selection / Level 2 Analysis 39
Interval determination 58
Task summaries and task data 62
Sampling 71
Maintenance Programme EvolutionMaintenance Programme Evolution 7373
Table of Contents
4. MSG3 Analysis procedure3. MSI Analysis
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Maintenance Programme Evolution
2 types of MP evolutions
OperatorOperator fleet in-service experience
(local A/A approval)
ManufacturerFleet in-service experience
(FAA/EASA approval)
MRB process
Operatorsencouraged to
participate to MRB
process
NOT COVERED BY THISPRESENTATION
The manufacturers evolution results shall be applicable to the whole fleet.
This means that the resultant interval will be used as minimum interval by all operators (even for new
operators), regardless of their previous in-service experience.
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Maintenance Programme Evolution
Objective is to maintain safety, reliability, at minimum cost.
Optimize the initial interval, task by task
Exercise launched when the A/C manufacturer and the ISC
consider that sufficient in-service experience is collected.
The term 'Evolution' is used to clarify that the exercise considers all means to improve the
Maintenance Program and does not focus entirely on 'Escalation'. Although the goal is to justifygreater task intervals, it is equally important to assess the need for additional scheduled tasks or more
frequent intervals of some existing tasks.
The evolution is performed on a task-by-task basis (individual review).
The ISC will provide the new target / interval framework of the dedicated Maintenance ProgramEvolution.
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Task reports
Maintenance Programme Evolution
Manufacturer domain
ISC(Industry Steering
Committee)
MPDrevis
ion
(Maintenance
Planning
Document
)MRB
R
IssueN+1
(Maintena
nce
ReviewB
oard
Report)
MWG meetings(Maintenance Working Groups)
Industry domain
Tasks
(Jobc
ards)
OMP
(Operator
Maintena
nce
Program)
Airline / MRO domain
Datacompilation& analysis
Manufacturer domain
Evolution
dossiers Nil findings / details of findings
Tasks
(Jobc
ards)
Task
(Jobc
ard)
Otherengineering
data
In order to conduct a complete study, the evolution exercise shall be handled in four phases that run concurrently.
Only when all phases are complete can the decision be made to propose task interval evolution and changes tothe MRBR.
Phase 1 - Operators investigation and data reporting
All operators is responsible for reviewing current in-service experience and reporting the necessary data to the
manufacturer in an agreed format.
Phase 2 - Data Compilation
The reported data are collected by Airbus in a dedicated database. The next phase of the evolution exercise areonly launched when Airbus, the ISC and the MRB are satisfied that the database contains a sufficient quantity
(e.g. number of tasks reported) and quality of data (e.g. geographical distribution, A/C age).The database is thenfrozen and supplied to the ATA specialist responsible for each MSI, SSI or ZIP task.
Phase 3 - Manufacturer's investigation
The manufacturer is responsible for:
-An engineering review of all tasks under consideration for evolution.
o a review of the basis for the original task and interval selection (e.g. MSG-3 analysis, MWG
minutes, ISC minutes).
o a review of available engineering data (reliability data, Inspection Service Bulletins (ISB),Service Information Letters (SIL), Technical Follow-Up (TFU), etc).
o a review with design/product support specialists to get their advice on the related task interval
evolution.
-Review of the database by the MSI, SSI, Zonal maintenance engineering specialists.
-Compilation of the evolution dossiers to be reviewed during MWG Meetings.
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Task reports
Maintenance Programme Evolution
Manufacturer domain
ISC(Industry Steering
Committee)
MPDrevis
ion
(Maintenance
Planning
Document
)MRB
R
IssueN+1
(Maintena
nce
ReviewB
oard
Report)
MWG meetings(Maintenance Working Groups)
Industry domain
Tasks
(Jobc
ards)
OMP
(Operator
Maintena
nce
Program)
Airline / MRO domain
Datacompilation& analysis
Manufacturer domain
Evolution
dossiers Nil findings / details of findings
Tasks
(Jobc
ards)
Task
(Jobc
ard)
Otherengineering
data
Phase 4 Maintenance Working Group (MWG) meetings and Industry Steering Committee (ISC) meetings
By reviewing the evolution dossiers prepared by the manufacturer, the MWG discusses the evolution proposals on
a task-by-task basis to agree on appropriate usage parameters, intervals and any other changes to the program.
Operators are also requested to provide in-service experience during the Maintenance Working Group sessions.The MWG results are then summarized and presented to the ISC for acceptance.
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Systems & Powerplant logic + CMRs - Principles
1. Introduction 3
2. MSI Selection process 6
3. MSI Analysis 11
4.4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRsCMRs)) 7777
Table of Contents
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4. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs)
MRB Process / Type Certification interface
CMRs
CS 25.1309 Compliance
Selection of CMRs
Handling of CMRs
CMR document
Certification and Maintenance Coordination Committee(CMCC)
Coordination of MRB and CMR Processes
CMR document and MRB Report
Table of Contents
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MRB process / type certification interface
TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
(CS/FAR 25)
1.Safe Life items(25.1529 App. H 25.4
25.571)
2.Structure ALIs
(25.571 & 25.60325.1529 App.H 25.4)
3.Systems CMRs
(25.1309 SSA25.1529 App.H)
MPDMPD
MRB PROCESS (CS/FAR 25.1529)
EvaluationMethods
(MSG-3)
MRB Report25.1529, Appx H
ALSParts 1 to 5
Operators
Approved
MaintenanceProgram
CS/FAR 21/39
(AD, CN)Service
Bulletins
AD, CNService
Bulletins
L/HIRF (Assurance Plan)
ALS : AirworthinessLimitation Section
/
5.Fuel ALIs(SFAR 88 / CS25-981)
4. Ageing Systems
Maintenance
MRB Report : Means of compliance for 25.1529 Appx H
Airworthiness Limitation Section :
Part 1 Life Limited Parts
Part 2 ALI document (Structure)
Part 3 CMR document (Systems)
Part 4 Ageing Systems Maintenance (ASM)Part 5 Fuel ALI document
MPD: At EIS, MRBR tasks, ALS
The MPD is a repository document not to be considered as a source document.
Operator's approved maintenance : To be established from source documents.
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