control instruments of war
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Arms overview
Disarmament Process and
Development Challenges and Hopes
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The conventional logic underpinning normalpractices of states and of non-state forcesresorting to use of force to achieve political aims Peace is not always good, war is not always bad
Just war and unjust peace Weapons are neutral, what matters is who uses
them and for what purpose You cant obtain and secure peace and justice
without resort to violence as the final argument Use of force in politics will always be with us The best we can do is limit it
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The anti-militarist position:
The destructiveness of modern warfare
Weapons of mass destruction
In wars, most casualties are now civilianUse of force both by states and by non-state
forces - is often politically counterproductive
If we address root causes of conflict and work for
just solutions by political means, weapons maynot have to be used
Peace works - if it is based on justice
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To make the world more peaceful, it is necessaryto change the existing social conditions whichbreed conflict and violence
How to change it? Various proposed solutions: Facilitate replacement of authoritarian regimes
by democracies Promote social and economic development to
eliminate poverty and suffering Strive for equality and social justice Replace capitalism with some form of socialism
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While recognizing the need to address the rootcauses of conflict, antimilitarism focuses on the
means of political struggle Arms buildups themselves make war more likely
Military budgets are a burden on the economy
The incidence of warfare can be reduced if states
cut their armaments to a minimum
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WHAT IS NONPROLIFERATION?
Prevention of the spread of weapons ofmass destruction (nuclear, chemical,biological) and their means of delivery*
Horizontal nuclear proliferation: spread of weapons tostates not currently possessing nuclear weapons
Vertical nuclear proliferation: increase in number anddestructiveness of nuclear weapons within a state already
possessing them
* Mostly applicable to nuclear weapons as biological and chemical weapons arebanned
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WHAT IS DISARMAMENT ?
Total elimination of weapons of massdestruction, including nuclearweapons, through the prohibition ondevelopment, production and useand destruction of all such weapons
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WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NON -PROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT REGIME?
Collective term for international
initiatives to prevent the spread ofnuclear weapons leading to theirtotal elimination
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The idea of disarmament
Traditional: compelling a defeated state to disarm
In the 20th century: a new international practice -mutual arms control and disarmament byinternational treaties
Natural reaction to the Era of Global Conflict, whichthreatens the very existence of humanity
Limit the scale of wars
Respond to public antiwar sentiment
Opposition to arms buildups dates back to late 19th
century
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After WWI Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 8:
The maintenance of peace requires the
reduction of national armaments to the lowestpoint consistent with national safety.
1922: the Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty,extended and Conferences of 1922 and 1930
A historic precedent was set World Disarmament Conference of 1932 no
success, buildup of international tensions, newwars
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After WWII
Demobilization everywhere; strong desire for
peace Creation of the United Nations Organization
But the Cold War generated a new arms race
Its cutting edge were nuclear weapons And the conventional (non-nuclear) arms race
continued
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The First Nuclear Age: 1945-1991
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Trinity, historys first nuclear explosion,
Alamogordo, NM, July 16, 1945
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Robert
Oppenheimer,
father of the
atomic bomb
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Worlds first nuclear weapon: The Little Boy,
explosive yield 12-15 kilotons (1/100 of B83 bomb)
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Hiroshima, August 6, 1945
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US B83 nuclear bomb, explosive yield 1.2 megatons
The Weapons
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A single US nuclear submarine carries 192nuclear warheads which can kill up to 50 mln.
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A
MIRV
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Topol-M ICBM (Russia)
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Tu-95 strategic bomber (Russia)
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B-52 strategic bomber (US)
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The
White
Swan:Tu-160
strategic
bomber
(Russia)
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B-2A strategic bomber (US)
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The worlds nuclear arsenals
23,360 nuclear weapons located at some
111 sites in 14 countries. Nearly one-halfof these weapons are active or
operationally deployed.
96% of the total are in the possession of the
United States and Russia
*BAS, Nov.-Dec. 2009, p. 86-87
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The nuclear arsenals, bycountryCountry Numbers of weapons
Russia 13,000 (est., 2,790deployed)
USA 9,400 (2,200 deployed)
France 300
China 240 (est.)
Britain 180
Israel 80-100 (est.)
Pakistan 70-90 (est.)India 60-80 (est.)
N. Korea ?
Total ~23,360
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The destructive power of nuclear weapons Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Aug. 1945:
0.25 million lives Total destructive power of existing nuclear
weapons: 150,000 times the bombs which destroyed
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or
2,000 times the destructive power used in all ofWorld War II, including the nuclear bombsdropped on Japan
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What are these weapons for?
2 schools of thought: They can be used to fight and win wars They can only be used to prevent wars as a means
ofdeterrence
Since 1945, they have never been used in a war Deterrence only In 1949, US lost its monopoly on nuclear
weapons, and deterrence became mutual By 1960s, it became clear that a nuclear war
would have no winners It would be an act ofomnicide (killing everyone
and everything)
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The balance of terror The two sides the Americans and the
Russians have balanced each other out forthe past 50 years
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction The weapons became unusable nuclear
deadlock
No one can strike first without causing
devastating retaliation Second strike capability ability to survive a
strike and strike back
Can be as small as 100 warheads
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The disappearance of the first strike capability
severely limited possibilities of nuclear war Those who believe in using nuclear weapons to
win wars are unhappy about this They seek ways to regain nuclear superiority
(also known as strategic superiority) Their argument: in order to deter the enemy,
he must know you can fight and win nuclearwar
So, you need to devise new weapons whichwould make it possible
So, deterrence requires ability to wage nuclearwar with a purpose MAD, indeed!
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The US-Russian nuclear arms race
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October 1962:the Cuban
Missile Crisis,
the turning
point
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Gorbachev and Reagan sign a treaty to ban all
medium-range ballistic missiles (The INF Treaty)
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COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION &NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION &
DISARMAMENT REGIMEDISARMAMENT REGIME
NPT IAEA
SAFEGUARDS
EXPORT
CONTROLS
BILATERAL
AGREEMENTSNWFZs
United Nations Security Council &United Nations Security Council &
Disarmament machineryDisarmament machinery
CTBT ?
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THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS Parties: 188 Non-parties: India, Israel, Pakistan
A cornerstone of global security
Embodies the international community's efforts to preventthe further spread of nuclear weapons and its aspirationsfor global disarmament, while also facilitating cooperationin the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards
Entails commitments by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states
Verification of compliance with nonproliferationundertakings through the application of safeguards wasconferred on the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)
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Encourages & assists research, development andpractical application of atomic energy for peacefuluses throughout the world
Establishes & administers safeguards designed toensure that the use of nuclear energy is not used
for military purposes Applies safeguards to relevant activities at the
request of Member States Applies mandatory
comprehensive safeguards inNNWS to the NPT & otherinternational treaties
INTERNATIONAL ATOMICINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
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IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
extensive set of technicalmeasures by which the
IAEA Secretariatindependently verifies thecorrectness and thecompleteness of thedeclarations made byStates about their nuclearmaterial and activities
confidencebuilding tools ofthe nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Why are safeguardsimportant?
Prevent the proliferationof nuclear weapons
Foster the beneficialuses of atomic energy
Provide confidence andbuild trust
Continual monitoring of nuclear material to ensure it is
not used for military purposes
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INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS:3 key components
Accountancy: reporting by states on thelocation of fissionable material under theircontrol, on stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, onprocessig and reprocessing of nuclear
materials, etc.
Containment & Surveillance: techniques suchas seals or video recording inside a facility
Inspection: by IAEA inspectors, checkinginstrumetns and seals, verifyingbookkeeping, confirming physical inventoriesof fuel or spent fuel
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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST
BAN TREATY Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any
other nuclear explosion (true zero yield)
Verification regime includes an internationalmonitoring system (IMS) composed ofseismological, radionuclide (16 laboratories),hydro acoustic and infrasound monitoring;consultation and clarification; on-site inspections;and confidence building measures
Treaty provides for measures to redress asituation and to ensure compliance, includingsanctions, and for settlement of disputes.Conference of State Parties or Executive Councilcan bring the issue to the attention of the United
Nations
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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST
BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION Adopted by UNGA
9/24/1996 Signed by 165 State with
93 State Parties Entry into force requires
ratification of 44 specificStates with nuclear powercapacities: 41 have signed- only 31 ratified
Non-signatories includeIndia, North Korea, andPakistan
The US (led the effort toconclude a CTBT and firstto sign) and China, amongthose that have signed butnot ratified
U.S. Senate voted in 1999not to ratify
Global verification regime Worldwide network of 321
monitoring stations built &run by the host countriesin cooperation with the(Provisional) Technical
Secretariat (some 100stations already transmitdata to the InternationalData Center (IDC) inVienna via satellite-basedglobal communicationsinfrastructure)
On-site inspections andconfidence-buildingmeasures
Administrated by a(Provisional) Technical
Secretariat
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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT
CONTROL REGIMES
Zangger Committee Trigger list & conditions
of supply
Nuclear SuppliersGroup (NSG) Harmonization &
strengthening of exportcontrol guidelines
Missile TechnologyControl Regime(MTCR) Guidelines to control
missile systems &
technologies
WassenaarArrangement Dual-use, all WMD
Membership limited to suppliers
Voluntary export controls
Exchange of information
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BILATERAL TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS US-Russian strategic
reduction treaties andagreements SALT
INF
START I
START II
Anti Ballistic MissileTreaty
SORT
DPRK-ROK JointDeclaration onDenuclearization ofKorean Peninsula
US-DPRK AgreedFramework
India-Pakistan Non-
attack agreement Lahore Declaration
START I & II
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START I & II
START I
limits the total number ofstrategic nuclear deliveryvehicles for the US andRussia to 1,600 each,warheads to 6,000 each,warheads mounted onballistic missiles to 4,900
each, warheads mountedon mobile ICBMs to 1,100each, and the totalballistic missile throw-weight for each party to3,600 metric tons (t)
Bans the testing anddevelopment of certaintypes of ballistic missiles
START II limits strategic weapons
for each party, withreductions to beimplemented in twophases:
Phase I reduce totaldeployed strategic nuclear
warheads to 3,800-4,250 Phase II total number of
deployed strategic nuclearwarheads may not exceed3,000-3,500
Both US and Russia haveratified
US declared withdrawalfrom ABM Treaty on 13
June followed by theRussian Federationannouncement that it
would withdrawal from
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ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
The US & Russia undertook to limit ABM systems, and not todeploy ABM systems for the defense of their countries or anindividual region except as provided by the Treaty:
Deployed ABM systems were limited to two sites: one aroundthe national capital with no more than 100 ABM launchers and
no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, and the otheraround ICBM silo launchers with no more than 100 ABMlaunchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, withthe requirement that the two sites must be separated by noless than thirteen hundred kilometers
President Bush announced the US withdrawal on 13 June 2002thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty. The US is committedto developing, testing and deploying defenses against limitedmissile attacks. Construction of silos in Alaska to house missiledefense interceptors will commence by 2004
SORT
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SORT
A Joint Declaration was signed at the U.S.-Russian summitheld in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26, 2002
outlining the foundation of a new strategic relationship andclaims that the era in which both countries saw each otheras an enemy or strategic threats has ended.
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty providesfor reduction of strategic arsenals in both countries to
1,700-2,200 warheads from the current levels of 5,949 forthe United States and 5,858 for Russia
Will remain in force until December 31, 2012 but is notbinding
Both sides are free to define the composition and structureof their offensive forces within the imposed ceilings.
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US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK (1994)
DPRK to halt operations and infrastructure development of itsnuclear program in return for a package of nuclear, energy,economic, and diplomatic benefits from the United States
DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclearweapons grade reactors; allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze ofits reactors; allow the implementation of its safeguardsagreement under the NPT; allow the IAEA to resume ad hoc and
routine inspections of facilities; come into full compliance with itssafeguards agreement with the IAEA; remain a party to the NPT;take consistent steps to implement the North-South JointDeclaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; andengage in North-South dialogue
In return for its obligations above, the DPRK will receive two lightwater reactors financed and supplied by an internationalconsortium, by 2003; 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by October1995 for heating and electricity production foregone due to thefreeze of its graphite-moderated reactors, and 500,000 tonsannually thereafter until the completion of the first LWR; andformal assurances from the United States against the threat oruse of nuclear weapons.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES
A NWFZ prohibits the development, manufacture,stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control, assistancein research on the development, manufacture,stockpiling or acquisition, or possession, of any nuclearexplosive device within the zone of application by anycontracting party. Peaceful applications and uses ofnuclear energy, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, areallowed
The first NWFZ to affect a major inhabited regionapplies to Latin America, and was open for signature in
1967, prior to the signing of the NPT. The impetus for itwas the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cubaduring the Cuban missile crisis of 1962
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
TREATIESMore than 110 states covered
Antarctic
Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco)
South Pacific (Rarotonga) South Asia (Bangkok)
Africa (Pelindaba)
Mongolia
Central Asia (?)
Middle East (?)
South East Asia (?)
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL
Nonproliferation accomplishments:
mandatory sanctions against Iraq Counter-Terrorism Committee
exchanges information on thepossession of WMD by terrorist groups
responded to 1998 nuclear tests byIndia and Pakistan -- denied NWSstatus
recognizing negative securityassurances by the NWS in April 1995
urged all States to pursue in goodfaith effective measures relating tonuclear disarmament and on a treatyon general and completedisarmament under strict andeffective international control
declared the proliferation of all WMD
constitutes a threat to internationalpeace and security
Organs established by the UNSC:
Monitoring, Verification andInspection Commission(UNMOVIC): a reinforced, ongoing monitoring and
verification system to ensure Iraqicompliance with Security Councilresolutions
Undertake the responsibilities of theformer (UNSCOM)
Special Commission on Iraq(UNSCOM): Established for the purposes of
eliminating Iraqs capabilities vis--visWMD and ballistic missiles
Promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security,Promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security,
including through disarmament and the establishment of a system for the regulationincluding through disarmament and the establishment of a system for the regulation
of armaments.of armaments.
15 members: five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK USA; and 1015 members: five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK USA; and 10
non-permanent membersnon-permanent members
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UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
General Assembly First Committee
Conference on Disarmament
UN Disarmament Commission Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
UN Institute for Disarmament Research
UN Department for Disarmament Affairs
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PART IIPART II
THE TREATY ON THE NON-THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEARPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (NPT)WEAPONS (NPT)
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Opened for signature on June12, 1968, signed by 62 statesincluding 3 depositarygovernments (US, USSR, UK)
UN General Assembly approved
NPT text on March 11, 1968 Entered into force: 1970 Extended indefinitely: 1995
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THE NPT: A DEAL BETWEEN THE
HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) (China, France, the RussianFederation, the United Kingdom, and the United States): may retain their nuclear arsenals; may not transfer nuclear weapons to any one; may not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or control
nuclear weapons; and commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith towards ending
the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) (defined as thosestates that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1,1967) must not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons; may research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes; and must accept safeguards (audits and intrusive on-site
monitoring) on all of their nuclear activities and materials toverify they are not being used for nuclear weapons.
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NPT: A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
AND DISARMAMENT DEAL
NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclearweapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not toassist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture orotherwise acquire them (Art I)
NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclearexplosive devices from any transferor, and not tomanufacture or acquire them (Art II)
NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclearactivities under IAEA safeguards (Art III)
All parties to facilitate and participate in the exchange ofequipment, materials, and scientific and technologicalinformation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Art IV)
All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effectivemeasures relating to the cessation of the nuclear armsrace and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty ongeneral and complete disarmament under strict andeffective international control (Art VI)
NPT COMPLIANCE & VERIFICATION
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NPT COMPLIANCE & VERIFICATION :
IAEA ROLE
NNWS
Full scope safeguards : legal agreements required under Art III Verification of declared records on nuclear material & facilities
through inspections, surveillance and physical inspections
Additional protocols (93+2): As a result of failures in Iraq &DPRK, voluntary measures + expansion of legal agreement withIAEA
Goal: to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities inaddition to detecting diversion from peaceful to military use
Strengthen the Effectiveness & improving the efficiency ofsafeguards Comprehensive picture of a States nuclear related activities,
including imports and exports Requires an expanded declaration IAEA has authority to inspect any facility declared or not
THE NPT : A SECURITY ASSURANCE
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Positive Security Assurances Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would
require immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255, 1968)
Negative Security Assurances NWS will not threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons
against NNWS parties
All NWS have made several formal pledges not to use, orthreaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties UNSC formalized NWS commitments in resolution 984 of
1995 NWS required to undertake legal obligations not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties
The US and other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobbyfor the indefinite extension of the treaty.
1995 Review & Extension Conference incorporatednegative security assurances in the P&O which was vital tosecuring the indefinite extension of the treaty
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NWS & IAEA SAFEGUARDS
NWS
Concern that NNWS are at a commercial
disadvantage because of safeguards NWS have also concluded agreements with
the IAEA to put their non-military nuclearfacilities under safeguards
Trilateral Agreement: US, Russian Federation& IAEA
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THE NPT : AN OVERVIEW OF
DEVELOPMENTS
Idea the result of fear by the superpowers (US & SovietUnion) that other industrialized nations would developnuclear weapons following 1st French test in 1960
1961 Irish resolution in the UN GA
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Negotiated in the late 60s in the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (forerunner of the CD)
Adopted by the UN GA on 12 June 1968 62 Statessigned
Entered into force on 5 March 1970 upon ratification of3 depository states (US, UK, Soviet Union) & 40 otherstates France & China only joined in 1992
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NPT REVIEW CONFERENCES
Review conference 5 years after entry into force andadditional review conferences at 5 year intervals (ArtVIII)
Conference after 25 years to determine the duration ofthe Treaty (Art X)
Only the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conferenceadopted Final Documents due to lack of consensus onkey nonproliferation & disarmament
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NPT INDEFINATE EXTENSION
1995 Review & Extension Conference extended the treatyindefinitely
as part of a package deal:
Strengthened review process Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and
disarmament, including a Program of Action for implementingArt VI
Resolution on the Middle East
No Final Document was adopted differences between NNWS& NWS over the implementation of Art VI (nucleardisarmament)
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2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
Adopted a final Document following agreement on 13practical steps towards the total elimination of nucleararsenals
Result of negotiations between New Agendacountries (Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,South Africa & Sweden) and the NWS
NWS made an unequivocal commitment to nucleardisarmament
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13 PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS
THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF
NUCLEAR ARSENALSi. early entry into force of the CTBT
ii. moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosionspending CTBT
iii. treaty banning the production of fissile material fornuclear weapons within five years
iv. CD nuclear disarmament body
v. irreversibility to disarmament, arms control andreduction
vi. unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total
elimination of nuclear arsenalsvii. entry into force of START II and the conclusion of
START III while preserving and strengthening the ABM
viii. completion and implementation of the US/Russia/IAEATrilateral Initiative
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13 PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS
THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF
NUCLEAR ARSENALSix. Steps by all NWS: efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally increased transparency regarding nuclear capabilities reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons
diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies engagement of all NWS in the process of elimination of
nuclear weapons
x. all NWS to place fissile material under internationalverification (IAEA)
xi. Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general andcomplete disarmament under effective internationalcontrol (notice de-link with step 6)
xii. Regular reports on the implementation of Art VI andProgram of Action in P&O
xiii. development of verification capabilities to assurecompliance with nuclear disarmament agreements
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NPT 2002 PREPARATORY
COMMITTEE FOR 2005 REVCON
Chairmans Factual Summary
Important new issues: Tactical nuclear weapons Disarmament education Material security/terrorism
Disagreements: reporting Article 6 implementation
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NPT : A REGIME IN NEED OFINTENSIVE CARE? Not universal 3 states with nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan &Israel) remain outside
Non-compliance Iraq & DPRK (Art II), US & other NWS (Art VI)
Lack of progress towards elimination of nuclear arsenals abrogation of the 13 practical steps & P&O program of action
No progress in CD on FMT, PAROS, nuclear disarmament
Nuclear terrorism international mechanisms (export controls,IAEA Safeguards & treaties) vs. unilateral action
Defense doctrines by the US (other NWS?) threaten securityassurances given to NNWS new kinds of nuclear weapons(bunker busters) & pre-emptive strike policy
Safeguards & peaceful uses of nuclear energy slowimplementation of Additional Protocol
Relevancy of multilateral approach (NPT, IAEA, UNSC) in aunipolar world
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WILL THE REGIME SURVIVE?
How relevant and viable is the NPT in the currentinternational security climate?
Is real progress possible towards achieving a world freeof nuclear weapons?
What are the possible consequences of North Koreaswithdrawal?
What will be the impact on other members of the axisof evil given US policy of pre-emptive strike?
Will nuclear capable NNWS continue to believe thattheir security lies within the NPT, or will they tooacquire NWS?
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CONCLUSION
Security cannot be achieved through the continued reliance onnuclear weapons, but only through international cooperation indeveloping and maintaining effective, binding, and verifiablemultilateral agreements such as embodied in the NPT and theCTBT
Vertical and horizontal proliferation should be given equal priority Fulfillment of NWS commitments is integral to maintaining the
NPT itself - if NNWS are to be convinced of the continuing value ofnot pursuing nuclear weapons and staying within the NPT, theywill need to be convinced that the NNWS are taking active stepstowards eliminating their nuclear arsenals and decreasing rather
than increasing the changes of these weapons being used If the NWS fail to adequately address these concerns, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime may be unraveling by the time the 2005NPT Review Conference convenes - litmus test for undertakingsgiven in 1995 and 2000
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