dividing the spoils of power: how are the benefits of majority party

State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol.9,No.2(Summer2009):pp.125–150

©2009bytheBoardofTrusteesoftheUniversityofIllinois

Dividing the Spoils of Power: How Are the Benefits of Majority Party Status Distributed in U.S. State Legislatures?

HenryA.Kim,University of ArizonaJustinH.Phillips,Columbia University

abstract

Weassesstheconditionsunderwhichmajoritystatusgeneratesbenefitsforincum-bentlegislatorsandhowthesebenefitsaredistributedamongmembersofthemajor-ityparty.Wearguethatmajoritystatusisvaluableonlyinprocedurallypartisanchambers;thatis,whenthemajoritypartymonopolizeschamberleadershippositionsandcontrolofthelegislativeagenda.Contrarytotheexistingliterature,wealsopositthattheserewardsshouldbedistributedbroadlyacrossthemajorityparty.Totestourexpectations,weutilize10recenttransitionsinthepartisancontrolofU.S.statelegislaturesanddataoncampaigncontributions.Consistentwithourexpectations,majoritystatusisvaluable,butonlyinprocedurallypartisanchambers.Furthermore,thepremiumincampaigncontributionsenjoyedbythemajoritypartyisprimarilydistributedtobackbenchers,althoughtoppartyleadersalsobenefit.TheseresultsprovideimportantinsightsintothedistributionofpowerandinfluenceinU.S.statelegislatures.

despite the large numberofscholarlyarticlesandbooksdevotedtoevaluatingpartisantheoriesoflegislativeorganization,littleattentionhasbeenpaidtotheimplicationsofchamber-widemajoritypartyadvantageatthelevelofindividuallegislators.Theexistingliteraturehasfocusedonwhetherthemajoritypartycollectively enjoyssubstantialadvantagesinthelegislativeprocess,notwhointhemajoritypartybenefits(CoxandMcCub-bins1993;Cox,Kousser,andMcCubbins2005;Aldrich1995).Dotheseben-efitsaccrueexclusivelytomajoritypartyleadersortoindividualmembersoutsideofthepartyleadership?Whataretherelativemagnitudesofthesebenefits?Whatconditionsdeterminetheirdistribution? ThisarticleaddressesthesequestionsinthesettingofU.S.statelegis-latures.Inparticular,weexaminewhetherandhowdonorsreallocatetheircampaigngivingfollowinganintra-chamberchangeintheidentityofthe

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majorityparty.WeemployamethodderivedfromtheinnovativestudybyCoxandMagar(1999)thatexaminesadjustmentsincontributionpatternsfollowingchangesinpartycontroloftheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives.Ouranalysis,however,goesbeyondthatofCoxandMagar,examininghowthatvalueisdistributedamongmajoritypartyleaders,committeechairs,andbackbenchers1whodonotenjoyanyprivilegedpositionsinthechamber. FollowingexistingstudiesofU.S.CongressbyDenzauandMunger(1986),GrierandMunger(1993),andRomerandSnyder(1994),weviewcampaigncontributionsasapaymentfor“legislativeservices”thatmembersofanassem-blycanprovideonbehalfofpotentialdonors.Inotherwords,campaigncon-tributionsareanindirectmeasureofalegislator’sinfluence.Thegreaterthevalueofservicesthatalegislatorcanprovide,themorecontributionsheorshecanraise,holdingallelseequal.Byexaminingthedistributionofcontributions,wecaninferthedistributionofpowerandinfluencewithinthechamber. Formalpowersandprivilegesarenotdistributeduniformlyinalegis-lature,evenwithinthemajorityparty.Researchatthestatelevelindicatesthatpartyleadersandcommitteechairsoftenhavemoreformalpowersandagreaterabilitytoinfluencelegislativeoutcomesthanmajoritypartyback-benchers(Francis1989;Rosenthal2004;SquireandHamm2005;Hamm,Hedlund,andMartorano2006).Asaresult,theexistingliteraturesuggeststhatthebenefitsofmajoritystatus,ifatallvaluable,willmostlyfalluponindividualsholdingthesepositions. Wearguetheopposite:Thefruitsofthemajoritystatusshouldbesharedbroadlywithintheparty.Sincedisloyalbackbencherscoulddefecttotheminorityanddeprivethemajoritypartyofproceduralcontrolinthecham-ber,assuringtheirlong-termallegianceisessentialtothemajority’scon-tinuedholdonpower.Thisrequiresthatbackbenchersbegivenastakeinmaintainingtheirparty’scollectiveadvantages.Suchastakeisfurnishedbyprovidingthemashareofinfluence,eventhoughtheylackformalpositionsinthelegislativeprocess.Oneoftheprincipallociinwhichbackbencherscanexertinfluenceisthepartycaucus,wheretheycanpartakeinintrapartybargainsandofferinputintothepolicymakingprocess. Nonetheless,wemustbeginbyconsideringwhetherandwhenmajoritypartystatusisvaluableinstatelegislatures.Unfortunately,nosystematicstudyexiststoestablishthisvalueintermsofcampaigncontributions.Thereislittlepointinexaminingthedistributionofbenefitswithinthemajoritypartyiftherearenobenefitstobedistributed.Importantly,therearereasonstoexpectthatthevalueofmajoritystatuswillsystematicallydifferacrosschambers.Statelegislaturesvarygreatlyintheextenttowhichthemajor-itypartymonopolizeschamberleadershippositions,committeechairman-

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ships,orproceduralcontroloverthelegislativeagenda(JewellandWhicker1994;SquireandHamm2005).Weexpectthatthevalueofmajoritystatusdependsontheinternalorganizationofthechamber;undersomeinstitu-tionalarrangements,majoritystatusmightnotbevaluable. Wearguethattheprerequisiteofvaluablemajoritystatusiswhatweterm“proceduralpartisanship.”Wedefinethisascompletemonopolybythemajoritypartyofallagenda-settingauthorityinthechamber,includingthespeakershipandcontrolofallcommittees.Inthesechambers,themajorityparty’scontroloveralllegislativeoutcomesisanearcertainty.Othercham-bersmayfeatureminoritypartymembersincontrolofseveralpositionswithagenda-settingauthority,evenifmajoritypartymembersretaincontrolovermostofthem.Welabeltheseinstitutionalarrangements“procedurallybipartisan.”Controlofsuchpositionsbyminoritypartymemberssuggeststhatmajoritypartymembershipisneitheranecessarynorsufficientcondi-tionforinfluenceinthelegislativeprocess.Bargainscanbestruckwherebyevenminoritypartymembersaregivenaseatatthebargainingtableandaccrueapremiumincampaigncontributions,whilesomemajoritypartymembersarecutout. Totestourexpectations,wetakeadvantageof10recentinstancesofpar-tisanchangeinasampleofeightU.S.statelegislatures.First,wecomparethevalueofmajoritystatusacrosschambersthatareexclusivelyorganizedbythemajorityparty(i.e.,procedurallypartisanchambers)tothosethatarenot(i.e.,procedurallybipartisanchambers).Amongoursampleofstates,wefindthatthevalueofmajoritystatusisindeedtiedtotheexclusivityofproceduraladvantages:itisvaluableonlyifthemajoritypartymonopolizesallkeypostsandcontrolofthelegislativeagenda.Wheremajoritystatusisindeedvalu-able,wefindthatthemajoritypartypremiumrangesfromover$10,000inIndianatoapproximately$35,000inGeorgia.Inprocedurallynon-partisanlegislatures,thevalueofthemajoritystatusisstatisticallyzero. Toexaminethedistributionofmajoritypartypremiums,wepooldatafromthefivestateswherethemajoritystatusisshowntobevaluable.Weesti-matehowtheincreasedcontributionsthataccompanythechangeinmajoritystatusaredistributedamongmajoritypartyleaders,committeechairs,andbackbenchers.Wefindthatmuchofthemajoritypartypremiumgoestothebackbenchers;simplybeingamajoritypartymemberwithout holdinganyprivilegedpositionsconfersasignificantvalue.Thisfindingsupportsourargumentthatsuccessfulpartygovernmentprovidesitsbackbencherswithashareofinfluencesothattheycanbenefitfromtheirparty’sstatus. Inthenextsection,wedescribethelogicofourstudyandformulatehypothesesconcerningtheconditionsunderwhichmajoritystatusmay,

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andmaynot,bevaluableandhowthebenefitsofmajoritystatusshouldbedistributed.Wethenaccountforourselectionofcasesandhighlightsomeoftheimportantcross-sectionalvariationwithinoursample.Next,wedescribeourdata,statisticalmodel,andresults.Followingthediscussionoftheresults,weconsidertheirimplicationsforvarioustheoriesoflegislativeorganizationaswellasourunderstandingoflawmakinginstatehouses.

theoretical framework

When is Majority Status Valuable?

Wedistinguishbetweenwhatweterm“procedurallypartisan”and“proce-durallybipartisan”statelegislatures.Theformer,suchastheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,operatesontheprinciplethatthemajoritypartycompletelymonopolizesallprocedurallyimportantpositionsandtherebycontrolovertheagenda.Thelatter,suchastheTexasandVermonthouses,donotrequiremembershipinthemajoritypartyasaconditionforholdingkeylegislativepositionsanddonotallowthemajoritypartytoexerciseexclusivecontrolovertheagenda. Thevastmajorityofstatelegislativechambersareprocedurallypartisan.Inthesechambers,thepresidingofficer—usuallytheSpeaker—isselectedwithinthemajoritypartycaucus,whosemembersthenunitebehindtheirnomineeinballotingonthechamberfloor(JewellandPatterson1986).Themajoritypartyalsoenjoysamonopolyoverthechamber’scommit-teesystem.Thepartycaucus,inconjunctionwiththepresidingofficer,decidesuponthetotalnumberofcommitteesaswellastheirjurisdictions(Francis1989;Rosenthal2004).Thecaucusalsoclaimsforitsmember-shipallchairmanshipsandtherighttooccupyapreponderanceofseatsonallcommittees(JewellandWhicker1994).Throughtheseinstitutionaladvantages,themajoritypartycontrolstheflowoflegislation;i.e.,ithasthepowertoexpedite,delay,orstopthepassageofbills.Thesepowersareregularlyusedbypartyleaders,actingasagentsoftheircaucus,tobothmovethroughthechamberlegislationthatadvancestheinterestsofthepartyanditssupportersandtokilllegislationthatharmstheirpartisaninterests,dividesthecaucus,orisespeciallycontroversial(CoxandMcCub-bins1993;Rosenthal2004). Therefore,majoritypartymembersinaprocedurallypartisanchambershouldbeabletodomuchmoreforpotentialdonorsthancomparablysitu-atedmembersoftheminority.Ifsuchisthecase,majoritypartymembersshouldhavegreaterabilitytoraisecampaigncontributions.Thisleadstoourfirsthypothesis:

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ThePartisanHypothesis(H1):Whenalegislatureisprocedurallypartisan,membersofthemajoritypartywillraisemoreincampaigncontributionsthanwilltheircounterpartsintheminority,ceteris paribus.

Ontheotherhand,majoritypartiesinprocedurallybipartisanchambersdonotmonopolizecommitteechairs,chamberleadershippositions,orthelegislativeagenda.Instead,thesepositionsandpowersareheldby,anddis-tributedto,membersacrosspartylines.Thispatternoflegislativeorganiza-tionismostcommonlyfoundinstatesthathavepreviousexperiencewithsingle-partydominanceorwhenablocwithinthemajoritypartydefects,forwhateverreason,fromitscaucusandagreestoorganizethechamberwiththeminority. Inprocedurallybipartisanlegislatures,thebenefitsofmajoritystatusshouldbesmall.First,minoritymemberswhoareservingascommitteechairsandchamberleaderscannotbeexpectedtowieldtheirauthorityinamannerthatbenefitsthemajoritypartyoritsmembers.Anyadditionalcampaigncontributionstheyaccruethroughtheexerciseoftheirinfluencedonotaddtothemajorityparty’spremium.Second,minoritycommitteechairsandchamberleadersholdtheirjobsinplaceofmajoritypartymem-bersandwiththecooperationandsupportfromotherchamberleaderswhoareoftenthemselvesmembersofthemajorityparty.Thissuggeststhatprocedurallybipartisanchambersareorganizedaroundsomeprinciplethatsupersedesloyaltytoone’sfellowpartisans. Inplaceofthemajorityparty,abipartisanagenda-settingstructureexiststhatspreadsbenefitstosomemembersonbothsidesofthepartyline.Thereareseveralpossibilitiesastowhatmightconstitutetheorganizingprincipleofabipartisanregime;itcouldbethespeaker’s“personal”cliqueoraregionalorideologicalgrouping.Whatevertheorganizingrationale,ittrumpsmerepartyaffiliationindeterminingwhogetsashareofinfluencenecessaryforrenderinglegislativeservices.Thisleadsustooursecondhypothesis:

TheBipartisanHypothesis(H2):Whenalegislatureisprocedurallybiparti-san,membersofthemajoritypartywillnotraisemoreincampaigncontri-butionsthantheircounterpartsintheminority,ceterisparibus.2

How Are the Benefits of Majority Status Distributed?

Apositiveaveragepremiumformajoritystatusdoesnotrevealmuchabouthowthesebenefitsaredistributedwithintheparty.Inanylegislature,themajoritypartyisacomplexorganizationwithmembersholdingdifferentrolesandwithdifferentformalpowersandprivilegesdistributedunevenlyamongtheseroles.Givensuchinternalcomplexity,thebenefitsofthemajor-itystatusmaynotaccrueuniformlyacrossallmembersoftheparty.

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ManycurrentstudiesofpartygovernmentinbothCongressandstatelegislatures(Aldrich1995;CoxandMcCubbins1993;JewellandWhicker1994;Clucas2001)emphasizetheroleofmajoritypartyleaders,ashasourdiscussionthusfar.Intheseanalyses,themajoritypartydetermines,asagroup,itsoverallgoalsand,toachievetheseaims,delegatesasetofpowerstotheleadership,includingthosetobeusedagainsttheirownmembersasnecessary.Inturn,thetoppartyleadersdelegatepowerfurthertoanotherrungofleadersbelow,suchascommitteechairs,tohelpimplementthepartyagenda.Littleremainsforthebackbencherstodointheparty’sday-to-dayoperation,otherthantorevokethedelegationcollectivelyiftheleadershiprunsafoulofthepartyasawholeandtosetforththedelegationanew. Inmostoftheexistingtheoreticalconceptionsofpartygovernment,indi-vidualbackbenchersareassignedrelativelylittlepower.Discussionoftheirrolesisgenerallylimitedtothatofsettingthepartygovernmentinmotionandtobringingittoaclose,ifnecessary,andonlybyactingasacollective.Allday-to-dayoperationsarerunbythepartyleaders,whoenjoymyriadformalpowersthroughoutthelegislativeprocess(CoxandMcCubbins1993).Thereislittleopportunityfortheindividualmajoritypartybackbencherstorenderlegislativeservicesonbehalfofparticularinterestgroups,manyofwhommightnotbeseekingbroadpolicychange.Giventhelargedisparityinpotentialinfluence,contributorsmaypreferdirectingdonationstoleaders.Thispossibilityisexpressedasourthirdhypothesis:

TheLeadershipHypothesis(H3):Thefinancialadvantagesofmajoritypartystatuswillbeenjoyedprincipallybypartyleadersandcommitteechairs,notbackbenchers.

Whiletheroleofleadersisclearlyimportant,wesuspectthattheiruseofformalpowerswillbedirected,inlargepart,atmaintainingthesupportofbackbenchers.Themajoritypartyleadershiprequiresthesupportoftheseindividualsfortworeasons.Mostimportantly,theleaders’ownjobsdependonthecontinuedsupportfromco-partisansintheircaucus.Second,thevotesofbackbenchersarenecessaryforupholdingtheleaders’agenda-settingwork.Majoritypartybillsneedtobeprotectedfromencroachment(i.e.,unfriendlyamendments)bothincommitteeandonthechamberfloor,andtheywillultimatelyneedtogarneramajorityofvotesforpassage.Supportfrombackbenchersinthesestepswillbemorelikelyiftheyhaveapersonalstakeinmaintainingthecohesionofthemajorityparty.Suchastakecanbegeneratedbypartyleadersthroughthesharingoftheirinfluencewiththeirco-partisansandbyadvancingtheinterestsofindividualbackbenchersintheday-to-dayoperationsofthelegislature.Suchhelpfromanattendantleadershipkeepsupthevalueofpartymembership.Ineffect,mostmajority

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partymembers,eventhoselackinginformalpowers,shouldbegrantedashareofthecollectiveadvantagethattheirpartyenjoysandthussomestakeworthdefendinginthemajoritystatusitself. Wepositthatanimportantmechanismfordistributingthebenefitsofthemajoritystatustobackbenchersisthepartycaucus.3Thecaucusprovidesaforumforcommunicationbetweentheleadershipandbackbenchersandfordealmakingwhereaccessisrestrictedtomembersofthesameparty.Theseactivitiespermitincorporationoftheneedsoftheindividualmembersintotheparty’soverallagendaandallowforresolutionofinternaldisputesthroughdeliberationandbargaining(Rosenthal2004).Thebargainsstruckinthecourseofthecaucusprocessmayevengenerateanintrapartyconsen-susthatmightnotnaturallyexist.Oncebargainsarestruckinthecaucus,themajoritycanhonorthedealsitsmembershavereached,thankstoitsproceduralandnumericaladvantages.Theproceduraladvantagesensurethatthedealswillbeprotectedfrominterferenceandbebroughtupforcon-siderationonthefloor.Thenumericaladvantage—steeledbytheintrapartybargains—assuresthattheyhavesufficientvotestoguaranteepassage. Inthisconceptionofpartygovernment,majoritystatusbringswide-spreadbenefitsthroughouttheparty,fortheleaderswithformalpowersandbackbencherswithout.Thisleadstothefollowinghypothesis:

TheCaucusHypothesis(H4):Thefinancialadvantagesofmajoritypartystatuswillbewidelydispersedamongmembersofthemajoritypartycaucus,includingbackbenchers.

sample of legislatures

ToassessthemonetaryvalueofmajoritystatusinU.S.statelegislatures,weassembleasampleoflegislativechambersthatexperiencedaswitchintheidentityofthemajoritypartyandforwhichthereisreadilyaccessiblecam-paignfinancedata.Unfortunately,dataconcerningthecontributionsmadetostatelegislativecandidateshavenotbecomesystematicallyavailableuntilthepastdecade.4Additionally,manystateshavenotexperiencedarecentchangeinthepartisancontroloftheirlegislature.Thesetwoconsiderationslimitthestatesfromwhichwecanculloursample. Withtheserestrictionsinmind,wehaveidentified10instancesofpartisanchangeinlowerlegislativechambers:Colorado(2004),Georgia(2004),Indiana(1994,1996,and2004),Illinois(1996),NewJersey(2001),Oklahoma(2004),Texas(2002),andVermont(2000).5Fourofthesecases—Colorado,Indiana(1996),Illinois,andNewJersey—aretransitionsfromRepublicantoDemo-craticcontrol,whiletheremainingarechangesintheoppositedirection.

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Thissampleincludesbothprocedurallypartisanandbipartisanlegisla-tures.ThechambersinGeorgia,Illinois,Indiana,NewJersey,andOklahomarepresenttheformercategory.EachofthesecloselyresemblestheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesinthatthemajoritypartymaintainsmonopolycontrolovertheleversofpower.Membersofthemajorityconsistentlyholdallofthechamber’sleadershippositions,chairallmajorcommittees,andcontrolthelegislativeagenda.6Themajoritypartyineachalsohasastronglegislativecaucuswithawell-developedleadershipstructure. TheTexasandVermontHouses,ontheotherhand,areprocedurallybipartisan.Themajoritypartyintheformerdoesnotplayaroleinorga-nizingthechamber.Instead,thistaskishandledexclusivelybythespeakerandhisbipartisanleadershipteam(Jones,Micozzi,andVonnahme2006;MaxwellandCrain2006).Teamstatus,whichusuallytranslatesintovariousprestigiouspositions,isbasedonamember’spersonalrelationshipwiththespeakerorideologyratherthanhisorherpartisanaffiliation(HammandHarmel1991;Kraemer,Newell,andPrindle2003).Asaconsequence,severalprizecommitteesineachlegislativesessionarechairedbymembersoftheminorityparty.Forinstance,aftertheRepublicanswoncontrolfromDemocratsfollowingthe2002elections,Democraticlawmakerscontinuedtochairsixcommittees,includingseveraldesirablecommittees,includ-ingtheEnvironmentalandNaturalResourcesCommitteeandtheRulesCommittee.Beyondthespeakership,theTexasHousehasnoformalpartyorganization. Similarly,privilegedpositionsintheVermontHousearesharedacrosspartylines.Thespeaker,regardlessofhisorherpartisanaffiliation,routinelyappointsDemocrats,Republicans,andmembersofthirdpartiestochaircom-mittees.Approximately20percentofchairmanshipsineachlegislativesessionareheldbynon-majoritylawmakers,includingsuchchoiceassignmentsasthetransportationandagriculturecommittees.Moreover,thechamberhasahistoryofelectingminoritypartymembersasspeaker,somethingthatisrarelyobservedinotherlegislatures.ArecentexampleisRalphC.Wright,aDemocratwhoservedasspeakerforsixyears(1985though1991)withaRepublicanmajority(Wright2005).Thissuggeststhat,asinTexas,privilegedpositionsareoftendistributedbasedonpersonalrelationshipsandideologywithpartyaffiliationasasecondaryconsideration. TheColoradoHouseisanintermediatecase.Althoughthemajoritypartyorganizesthechamberandmonopolizesallleadershippositionsandcom-mitteechairs,controloftheseinstitutionsdoesnotallowittocontrolthelegislativeagenda.Theagenda-settingpowersofthemajoritypartyareseverelylimitedbythestateconstitution.InNovemberof1988,voterspassedaballot

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measureentitled,“GiveAVotetoEveryLegislator(GAVEL),”requiringthatallproposedbillsbegivenavoteincommitteeand,ifpassed,beconsideredonthechamberfloor(Straayer2000).Thisrequirementdeprivesthespeakerandcommitteechairstheabilitytounilaterallyblocklegislation,andittrans-formedColorado’slegislaturefromatextbookcaseofmajoritycontroltoadecentralizedbody(Cox,Kousser,andMcCubbins2005,14).Keypostswithinthelegislatureweredeprivedoftheauthoritytosustainadecidedlypartisanagendaandthepowerneededbypartyleaderstobenefittheirbackbencherswasdecidedlyweakened. Oursamplealsoaccountsfortwoadditional,andpotentiallyrelevant,variationsinstatepoliticalinstitutions.Thefirstoftheseislegislativepro-fessionalization,thefullspectrumofwhichiscapturedbyourstates.ThelegislaturesinIllinoisandNewJerseyareconsideredprofessional;membersservefull-timeinnearlyyear-roundsessionswithlargesalariesandstaffs.Incontrast,thechambersinGeorgia,Indiana,andVermontaretypicallycategorizedas“citizenlegislatures.”Intheseassemblies,lawmakersmeetinshortsessions,withonlyasmallsalaryandperdiemandsupportfromveryfewstaff.Finally,theTexasandOklahomachambersareclassifiedashybridlegislatures(Kurtz1990;HammandMoncrief2004). Similarly,oursampleencompassesadiversityofcampaignfinanceregimes.Ononeextreme,wehaveseveralstateswithverypermissivelaws.TheseincludeTexas,Illinois,andIndiana,whichallowforunlimitedgivinginstatelegisla-tiveracesbyindividualsandpoliticalactioncommittees(PACs).AttheotherendofthespectrumisthestateofVermont,whichhasadoptedoneofthenation’smoststringentsetofcontributionlimits,permittingPACs,individu-als,corporations,andunionstogivenomorethan$200tocandidates.Whilewedonotanticipatethatourresultswillvaryasafunctionoflegislativepro-fessionalizationorastate’scampaignfinancelaws,byutilizingasampleoflegislaturesthatvaryonthesedimensions,wecanseeifourresultsarerobusttothesedifferences.7

empirical analysis

Data and Statistical Model

FollowingtheapproachusedbyRomerandSnyder(1994)andCoxandMagar(1999),weestimatethevalueofmajoritypartystatuslongitudinallyinsteadofcross-sectionally.Specifically,weexaminechangesinthecam-paigncontributionsmadetoindividualincumbentlegislatorsacrosstwoelectoralcycles,thefirstofwhichresultedinapartisanchange.Thisallowsustoholdconstantmostmember-specificdeterminantsofcontributions,

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animportantconsiderationgiventhelimiteddataavailableregardingindi-viduallegislators. Unlikeexistingstudies,foreachstateinoursample,wealsoutilizedatafromtwoconsecutiveelectioncycles(chosenatrandom)acrosswhichtheidentityofthemajoritypartyremainsunchanged.Doingsoallowsustoestablishabetterbaselinefornormalsession-to-sessionvariationsincam-paigncontributions.Also,itpermitsamoreaccurateexaminationofthechangesinlegislatorstatusthattakeplaceintheabsenceofpartisanchange.Changesinleadershippositions,committeechairmanships,andcommitteeassignmentstakeplaceevenwhenthesamepartyremainsincontrolofthechamber.Asweareinterestedinnotjustthevalueofthemajoritystatusalonebutalsothedistributionofthebenefitswithinthemajorityparty,anexaminationoftheeffectsfromthechangesinkeypositionsthatdonotaccompanyachamber-widepartisanchangeisdesirable.TheidentityofallthestatesandelectionyearsusedinthisanalysisaredisplayedinTable1.

Table 1. StatesandElectionCyclesUsedinEmpiricalAnalysis

Mean Mean Election Election Partisan Contributions ContributionsState Cycle1 Cycle2 Change Cycle1 Cycle2

Colorado 2004 2006 R→D $33,291 $41,027 1998 2000 Control 20,517 28,442Georgia 2004 2006 D→R 57,082 58,875 1998 2000 Control 39,468 37,412Illinois 1998 2000 Control 213,550 234,454 1996 1998 R→D 255,169 216,092Indiana 2004 2006 D→R 76,891 56,369 2002 2004 Control 65,031 74,667 1996 1998 R→D 57,041 50,945 1994 1996 D→R 39,089 52,967NewJersey 2001 2003 R→D 119,420 153,826 1999 2001 Control 120,670 113,598Oklahoma 2004 2006 D→R 59,438 62,079 2000 2002 Control 41,793 33,437Texas 2002 2004 D→R 168,796 187,638 1998 2000 Control 125,296 147,157Vermont 2000 2002 D→R 2,651 1,776 1998 2000 Control 1,432 2,683

Notes:Thefirstcolumnidentifiesthestatesincludedinouranalysis.Thefollowingtwocolumnslisttheelectioncyclesusedforeach.ThefourthcolumnindicateswhetherthechambertransitionedfromRepublicantoDemo-craticcontrol(R→D),DemocratictoRepublicancontrol(D→R),orisusedasacontrolcase(meaningtherewasnopartisanchange).Theremainingcolumnsidentifymeantotalcontributionsbystateforeachelectioncycle.Meantotalcontributionsaretheaverageamountofmoneyraisedperelectioncyclebyincumbentlegislators(minusfundsreceivedfrompartycommitteesandfundsdonatedbylegislatorstotheirowncampaigns).

Source:InstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics

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Totestourfirsttwohypotheses,weestimatethefollowingmodel:

ΔContributions=b1+b2ΔMajorityStatus+b3ΔPartyLeadershipStatus+b4ΔChairStatus+b5ΔLaggedElectoralSafety+b6ΔValuableCommittee

Ourdependentvariableisthechangeintotalcontributionsraisedbyindividualincumbentlegislatorsacrosstwoelectioncycles.CampaignfinancedatacomefromtheInstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics,anonpartisan,nonprofitorgani-zationthatcompilescampaigncontributioninformationoneverystate-levelcandidateandmajorpoliticalpartycommitteeinthecountry.TheInstitutegathersitsdatafromthestatedisclosureagencieswithwhichcandidatesmustfiletheircampaignfinancereports.Unfortunately,thedatadonotdistinguishgivingbypoliticalactioncommitteesfromdirectgivingbyindividualsandeconomicentities.ThereisnowaytoisolatePACcontributionsinaconsis-tentfashionacrossmultiplestatesduetodifferencesinthedefinitionofwhatconstitutesaPAC.Thus,weexaminechangesintotalcontributions,ratherthanPACcontributionsasperCoxandMagar.Inclusionofindividuals’con-tributions,whichmaynotbestrictlymotivatedbyconsiderationsofpolicyinfluence,certainlyintroducesadditionalnoiseintothedata(Thompson,Cassie,andJewell1994).Ifanything,thisbiasesagainstfindingsthatstatisticallyconfirmourhypotheses.Additionally,sinceweareonlyinterestedinmoneyraiseddirectlybylegislators,wesubtractfromtotalcontributionsanymoneydonatedbyacandidatetohisorherowncampaign,orgivenbyapoliticalparty,orfromchamberleadership.Allcontributionsdataaremeasuredinconstant(2000)dollars. Changeinmajoritystatusisoperationalizedasatrichotomousvariablewith1denotingmemberswhogainedmajoritystatusfromoneelectiontothenext,–1denotingmemberswholostmajoritystatus,and0denotingnochange.Incumbentswhoscore0usuallyswitchedpartiesfollowingapartisanchange,aremembersofathirdparty,orcomefromacontrolcase.Thechangeinpartyleadershipandcommitteechairstatusarealsoopera-tionalizedtrichotomously.Here,alegislatorisassignedavalueof1ifheorshebecameapartyleader(chair),–1ifheorshelostherleadershipposition(chairmanship),and0iftherewasnochangeinherstatus(orlackthereof).Weconsiderpartyleadershippositionstoincludethespeakerandmajorityandminorityleaders.Theidentitiesofpartyleadersandcommitteechairswereobtainedthroughcontactswithlegislativestaffsandvariousissuesofstatelegislativebluebooksandjournals.Theexistingliteraturesuggestsmemberswhogainacommitteechairorwhoareelectedtoatopleadershippostwillseebiggerincreasesincampaigncontributions,allelsebeingequal(Francis1989;CoxandMagar1999).

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Previousresearchsuggestsanumberofadditionalvariableslikelytobepertinentindeterminingtheamountofcampaigncontributionsraisedbyindividualincumbentlegislators.Inordertotestourhypotheses,weneedtocontrolforthesefactors.Amongothers,largercampaigncontributionsareknowntobelinkedtolegislatorpreferences,favorablecommitteeassign-ments,andelectoralsafety(JonesandBorris1985;GrierandMunger1993;ThielemannandDixon1994). Dataavailabilityprecludestheinclusionoflegislatorpreferences.Asofyet,preferencemeasuresofstatelegislators(cf.DW-Nominatescores)arenotreadilyavailablefortheyearsincludedinourstudy.Givenouruseofalongitudinalmodel,however,itisunlikelythattheabsenceofsuchameasurewouldsystematicallybiasourresultssincethereisnoreasontoexpectthatlegislatorpreferenceschangemuchoveraspanofjusttwoelectioncycles. Wedoincludemeasuresforservingondesirablecommittees.Scholarsandobserversofstatelegislaturesgenerallyagreethataseatonakeypolicyorcontrolcommitteequalifiesassuchanassignment.Themostwidelycitedexamplesofeachtypearefiscalandrulescommittees(Francis1989;Rosen-thal2004;Wright2005).Fiscalcommitteesshapepublicpolicybydecidingwhichgovernmentprogramsreceivefundingandhowthecostsofthoseprogramsaretobedistributed.Membersofthesecommitteesarealsowellsituatedtosupplytargetedbenefits,suchasindustry-specifictaxbreaks.Rulescommitteeshelpthechamberleadershipcontrolthelegislativeagendabydeterminingwhichbillsandamendmentsareallowedonthechamberfloor.Bothtypesofcommitteesreceiveagreatdealofattentionfromlobbyistsandaffordmembersexcellentopportunitiestoprovidelegislativeservicestoorganizedinterests. Beyondfiscalcommittees,however,littlesystematicstudyisavailableatthestatelevelonthedesirabilityofotherpolicycommittees(JewellandWhicker1994).Inlightofthis,weemploywhatwebelievetobeadefensiblemethodofsystematicallyidentifyingthosecommitteesthatmightaffordmemberssomeofthebestopportunitiestoprovidevaluablelegislativeser-vices.WedothisusingreportsfromtheInstituteonMoneyinStatePoli-tics.Accordingtothese,theeconomicsectorswithlargestcontributionstostatelegislativecampaignsaretheFIRE(finance,insurance,andrealestate)andhealthcaresectors(O’Connell2004;Weiss2006).Thus,weconsideralegislatorservingononeofthesecommitteestoalsobeonanimportantpolicymakingcommittee. Foreachstateinoursample,wehaveidentifiedthefiscalandrulescom-mitteesaswellasthosethathavejurisdictionovertheFIREandhealthcaresectors.Tocapturechangingmembershiponthesecommittees,wehave

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createdfourvariables.Eachisoperationalizedtrichotomouslyinthesamemannerasthevariablesdiscussedabove.Avalueof1denotesamemberwhogainedanassignmentonacommittee,–1denotesalegislatorwholostoneoftheseassignments,and0denotesnochange.TheonlymodificationmadetothisapproachisintheanalysisoftheTexasHouse.Inthiscase,themodelincludesavariabletocapturemembershiponthecommitteeresponsibleforregulatingtheoilandnaturalgasindustries.TheenergysectorinTexasisalsoalargedonortostatelegislativeraces,makingserviceonthiscommit-teeaplumassignment.Legislatorswhojoinavaluablecommitteemightseelargerincreasesincampaigncontributionsthanthosewhodonot. Lastly,weincludealaggedmeasureofelectoralvulnerability.Tocalcu-latethismeasure,wetakethedifferenceofacandidate’sloggedvotesharesfromthepriortwoelections.8Thedatausedtocreatethismeasureweregenerouslyprovidedbyvarioussecretariesofstate.Existingresearchinstatepolitics(c.f.,JonesandBorris1985)hasshownthatorganizedinterestsinstatelegislativeelectionstendtotargettheirdonationstoincumbentswhoarelikelytoretaintheirseats,suggestingthatelectoralsafetyshouldleadtohigherdonations,especiallyoncepartycontributionshavebeenremoved.

results

Webeginbytestingthepartisanandbipartisanhypotheses.Todoso,weestimateourmodelseparatelyforeachstateinoursample.Thefirstsetsoffindings—theeffectsofachangeinmajoritystatusonthetotalcontributionsraised—arereportedinTable2andTable3.Thedependentvariableisthechangeintheamountofcampaigncontributionsinconstantdollarsraisedbyagivenincumbentlegislatoracrosstwoconsecutiveelectioncycles.Theindependentvariablesarechangesinthestatusofthelegislatorthattakeplaceovertheperiodexamined,includinggainorlossofmajoritystatus,partyleadershippositions,committeechairmanships,andmembershipsonpotentiallyimportantpolicycommittees. Table2reportstheresultsfortheprocedurallypartisanchambersinoursample:Georgia,Illinois,Indiana,NewJersey,andOklahoma.9Ineachestima-tion,thecoefficienton∆MajorityStatus,whichcapturesthevalueofservinginthemajorityinsteadoftheminorityparty,ispositiveandsignificantatthe95or90percentlevel(usingaone-tailedtest).10Theseresultsareconsistentwiththepartisanhypothesis.Thegainofmajoritystatusbyalegislatorinaprocedurallypartisanchamberleadstoastatisticallysignificantincreaseinthereceiptsofcampaigncontributions.Theestimatedvalueofservinginthe

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majoritypartyinoneofthesechambersrangesfromwellover$10,000inIndianatoalmost$35,000inGeorgia,withtheaveragevalueacrossallfivestatesequaling$20,622. Surprisingly,almostnoneoftheremainingexplanatoryvariablesroutinelyexhibitastatisticallymeaningfuleffectoncontributions.Thevariablecaptur-ingchangeinpartyleadershiphasapositiveandlargecoefficientinallbutonecase,butitonlyobtainsstatisticalsignificanceintheGeorgiaHousewherealeadershippositionisworthover$150,000inadditionalcampaigncontribu-tions.Thesignsontheremainingtermsareinconsistentacrosschambersandrarelystatisticallysignificant.Manyofthesecoefficientsshould,however,betreatedwithcaution.Rarelydochangesintheoccupantsofformalpositionsoccuracrosstwoelectionscycles,particularlyinthecaseoftoppartyleaders,whichmakesaccurateestimationofeffectsdifficultandincreasesthelikeli-

Table 2. ChangeinTotalContributionstoIncumbentLegislators:ProcedurallyParti-sanChambers

New Georgia Illinois Indiana Jersey Oklahoma Pooled

ΔMajorityStatus 34,794* 26,597* 10,578* 12,649# 18,494* 0.26* (9,274) (17,987) (3,605) (8,699) (9,112) (0.05)ΔPartyLeader 154,930* 18,225 12,897 -103,901 74,056 0.16 (81,130) (15,801) (15,896) (6,880) (82,686) (0.46)ΔCommitteeChair 7,058 –3,445 –92 10,546 –7,275 –0.01 (9,837) (17,987) (4,389) (12,627) (8,729) (0.06)ΔFiscalCommittee –13,877 –441 –5,708 13,683 –621 –0.08 (8,134) (6,434) (4,254) (17,568) (5,692) (0.06)ΔRulesCommittee 890 22,219 –3,337 9,468 43,559* 0.05 (12,267) (24,120) (4,870) (7,857) (21,006) (0.10)ΔFIRECommittee 2,364 –20,468 –507 5,515 –12,303 –0.05 (8,816) (19,212) (3,765) (17,479) (9,312) (0.06)ΔHealthcareCommittee 12,769 –3,965 –3,207 –1,634 –3,575 0.02 (16,374) (7,521) (6,289) (16,572) (19,993) (0.12)ΔLaggedVote 12,056 37,955 7,262 –14,308 42,997* 0.31* (15,014) (39,757) (5,997) (28,448) (13,325) (0.13)Constant –362 –18,827 14,517 5,588 –8,310 0.13 (4,289) (8,212) (4,035) (5,186) (4,472) (0.07)N 243 178 298 105 106 932R2 0.28 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.32 0.07FStatistic 6.91 0.89 4.68 412.31 3.51 5.41

*p<0.05;#p<0.10;one-tailedtestNotes:Thedependentvariableisthechangeintotalcontributionsraisedbyindividualincumbentlegislatorsacross

twoelectioncycles.AllmodelsareestimatedusingOLSandrobuststandarderrors.Electioncycledummiesareincludedbutnotreportedhere.Thepooledmodelutilizesdatafromallstateswithprocedurallypartisanlegislaturesandincludesbothelectionyearandstatedummyvariables.Thedependentvariableinthepooledmodelisthechangeintotalstandardizedcampaigncontributions.

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hoodthattheresultsaredrivenbytheidiosyncraticcharacteristicsofthelegislatorswhoexperiencedthestatuschange.11

Toaddressthispossibility,weestimateamodelinwhichthedataforallprocedurallypartisanstatesarepooled.Bycombiningdataforallofthesechambers,wecanlimittheinfluenceofidiosyncraticfactorsandpotentiallyobtainmoreaccuratecoefficientestimates.Therearealsotheoreticalreasonstobelievethatpoolingisappropriate.Intheprecedingsection,wearguethatallprocedurallypartisanchambersaredrivenbythesameorganizingprinciple,eveniftheymightdifferinsignificantwaysfromprocedurallybipartisanchambers.ThisissupportedbythefindingspresentedinTable2thatsuggestthatthedeterminantsofcampaigncontributionsacrossoursam-pleofprocedurallypartisanchambersarequitesimilar.Inordertoanalyzethepooleddata,westandardizethedependentvariable.Foreachchamber-electioncycle,wesubtractmeantotalcontributionsfromeachlegislator’stotalanddividebythesamplestandarddeviation.Asaresult,contributionsforeachchamber-electioncycle,canbeconsidereddrawnfromthestandardnormaldistributionandcanbecomparedacrosscases.12Thecoefficientsontheexplanatoryvariablesnowindicatethechangeinstandardizedcampaigncontributionsthataccompanyastatuschange.Forexample,acoefficientofonemeansthataone-unitchangeintheexplanatoryvariableleadstoaonestandarddeviationincreaseincampaigncontributions. TheresultsofthisnewestimationarereportedinthelastcolumnofTable2.Onceagain,wefindstrongsupportforthepartisanhypothesis.ThecoefficientonΔMajorityStatusispositiveandsignificantatp=0.95.Themagnitudeofthecoefficientindicatesthatgainingmajoritystatusresultsina.26standarddeviationincreaseintotalcontributions,ceterisparibus.13Theimportanceofthemajoritystatusinprocedurallypartisanchambersisfurtherillustratedbystandardizedregressioncoefficients(notreportedhere).Theserevealthatmajoritystatushas,byfar,thelargestrelativeimpactonchangesincampaigncontributions. Table3displaystheresultsofourestimationsfortheproceduralbipar-tisancases,TexasandVermont,andtheintermediatecase,Colorado.Thelasttwocolumnsshowpooledestimations.SinceColoradodoesnothavearulescommittee,werunthepooledmodeltwice,onceincludingchangeinmembershiponarulescommittee(andwithoutColorado)andonceexclud-ingthisvariable(andincludingColorado).Allofthesenewestimationsareconsistentwiththebipartisanhypothesis.Thegainofmajoritystatusinthesechambersleadstonostatisticallysignificantincreaseincontributions.Ineachofthesechambers(andinthepooledmodel),thecoefficientonΔMajority

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Statusissmallandnegative.Combinedwithourearlierresults,thesefindingssuggestthatproceduralpartisanshipisnecessaryforensuringthevalueofmajoritystatus. Unlikeintheprocedurallypartisanchambers,manyofthecontrolvari-ablesareimportantpredictorsofcontributions.Inallthreechambers,lead-ershipstatusisquitevaluable,reachingoveronemilliondollarsintheTexasHouse.14Additionally,inColoradoandTexas,gainingmembershiponkeycommitteesresultsinasignificantincreaseincampaigncontributions.ThevaluablecommitteesinColoradoappeartobethefiscalandFIREcommit-tees,whileinTexastheyarethosethataddressthehealthcareandtheenergysectors.Texaslegislatorsalsoseeasignificantincreaseincontributionsupongainingacommitteechairmanship.Inbothpooledmodels,however,onlythevariablesfortoppartyleaders,committeechairs,andelectoralsafetyhave

Table 3. ChangeinTotalContributionstoIncumbentLegislators:ProcedurallyBipar-tisanChambers

Colorado Texas Vermont Pooled Pooled

ΔMajorityStatus –2,498 –209 –204 –0.09 –0.07 (2,477) (11,363) (184) (0.06) (0.07)ΔPartyLeader 6,656# 1,077,719* 1,304* 0.99* 1.49* (4,411) (252,942) (373) (0.41 (0.55)ΔCommitteeChair –1,243 25,239* –153 0.14# 0.13# (4,500) (14,859) (383) (0.08 (0.09)ΔFiscalCommittee 4,112# –15,187 –665 –0.04 –0.13 (3,066) (14,533) (357) (0.08) (0.08)ΔRulesCommittee __ 2,609 –412 __ –0.21 (14,833) (586) (0.16)ΔFIRECommittee 5,884* 16,146 –156 0.12 –0.13 (2,770) (19,569) (786) (0.18) (0.25)ΔHealthcareCommittee –4,081 35,524# –473 0.14 –0.01 (1,952) (24,519) (982) (0.16) (0.16)ΔOilCommittee __ 23,668# __ __ __ (14,833)ΔLaggedVote 5,140 13,666 900* 0.60 0.56* (5,834) (30,707) (445) (0.17) (0.18)Constant 9,772 19,977 1,201 –0.02 –0.01 (3,041) (6,810) (202) (0.19) (0.02)N 46 224 140 410 364R2 0.25 0.57 0.31 0.08 0.09FStatistic 5.03 3.39 19.43 3.25 2.96

*p<0.05;#p<0.10;one-tailedtestsNotes:Thedependentvariableisthechangeintotalcontributionsraisedbyindividualincumbentlegislatorsacross

twoelectioncycles.AllmodelsareestimatedusingOLSandrobuststandarderrors.Electioncycledummiesareincludedbutnotreportedhere.Thepooledmodelsutilizedatafromallstateswithprocedurallybipartisanlegislaturesandincludebothelectionyearandstatedummyvariables.Thedependentvariableinthepooledmodelisthechangeintotalstandardizedcampaigncontributions.

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astatisticallymeaningfuleffect.Standardizedregressioncoefficientsforthepooledmodels(notreportedhere)indicatethatthelargestrelativeimpactoncampaigncontributionscomesfromchangesinchamberleadershippositions(andchangesinelectoralsafety),whiletheeffectfromthechangeinmajoritystatusisnegligible.Overall,thedissimilaritybetweentheresultsinTables2and3stronglysuggeststhatchambergovernanceinprocedurallypartisanchambersisverydifferentfromthosethatarenot.15Indeed,thelargepre-miumsthataccompanybothchamberleadershipandcommitteechairmanstatusunderscoretheirimportanceintheprocedurallybipartisanlegislaturesandsuggestthatthesechambersoperateinatop-downmanner. Whiletheresultspresentedthusfarindicatethatthemajoritypartypre-miumsaremuchlargerinprocedurallypartisanchambersthanthosethatarenot,theresultsdonotindicatewhethertheseobserveddifferencesacrosschambertypesarestatisticallymeaningful.Totestforthispossibility,weconductstatisticaltestsacrossourestimations.Specifically,wecomparethecoefficientonΔMajorityStatusfromeachofthechambersthatisprocedur-allybipartisan(thestatesinTable2)tothecoefficientfromeachchamberthatisprocedurallypartisan(thestatesinTable3). Duetospacelimitations,wedonotreportthespecificsofthesetestshere.Nonetheless,theyprovidefurthersupportforourfirsttwohypotheses.Wefindthatthevalueofmajoritystatusinalloftheprocedurallypartisanchambersissignificantlygreater(atp=0.95or0.90usingaone-tailedtest)thanitisinColoradoandVermont.WealsofindthatthevalueofmajoritystatusintheGeorgia,Oklahoma,Illinois,andIndianaHousesisstatisticallylargerthanintheTexasHouse,althoughthedifferencebetweenthevalueintheNewJerseyandTexasHousesfallsshortofstatisticalsignificance. Aretheseresultsdrivenbyvariationsinlegislativeprofessionalizationandcampaignfinanceregimes?Itdoesnotseemtobethecase.Thevalueofmajoritystatusisnotcorrelatedwithprofessionalization.Wefindevidenceofamajoritypartypremiuminprofessional(IllinoisandNewJersey),semi-pro-fessional(Oklahoma),andcitizenlegislatures(IndianaandGeorgia).Therealsoappearstobenoconsistentrelationshipwithstatecampaignfinanceregimes.Wefindmajoritystatustobevaluableinstateswithverypermissivecampaignfinancelaws(IllinoisandIndiana),aswellasinthosewithmorestringentregulations(NewJerseyandGeorgia). Overall,thesefindingssuggesttwodistinctmodesoflegislativegovernancestructures,dependingonwhetherthemajoritypartymonopolizeschamberleadershippositionsandtheagenda.Theprocedurallypartisanformgeneratesapositivevalueformajoritypartymembership.Theprocedurallybipartisanformdoesnotgenerateapositivevaluemerelyformajoritypartymembership,

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althoughitdoesappeartoenhancethevalueofcertainprivilegedpositionsalongthelegislativeprocess. Havingestablishedthatmajoritystatusisvaluableinprocedurallypar-tisanlegislatures,weinvestigatehowthisvalueisdistributedamongmajor-itypartymembers.Dopartyleadersandchairmenreceivethebulkofthebenefits,assuggestedbytheleadershiphypothesis,orarebenefitssharedbroadlythroughouttheparty,asperthecaucushypothesis? Toevaluatetheleadershipandcaucushypothesesfully,weneedtointeractourvariablethatcapturesachangeinmajoritystatuswithtermsthatindicatealegislator’sotherpositionswithinthechamber.Forinstance,ifwewanttocomparehowpartyleadersbenefitfromachangeinmajoritystatusrelativetotheirco-partisanswhoserveonafiscalcommittee,weneedtointeractdummyvariablesindicatingpartyleadershipstatusandserviceonarevenueorexpenditurescommitteewithΔMajorityStatus. Inthenextestimationofourmodel,weagainpoolthedataforalloftheprocedurallypartisanchambers,butnowweinteractΔMajorityStatuswithdummiesindicatingwhetheralegislatorisapartyleader,servesonafiscal,FIRE,rules,orhealthcarecommittee,andwiththevariableΔCommitteeChair.Wealsoincludethenecessarybaseterms.Thenewinteractionsmeanthatthecoefficientonthestand-aloneindicatorforchangeinmajoritystatusnowmeasurestheaveragepremiumreceivedbymajority-partybackbencherswhoarenotonanyimportantpolicyorcontrolcommittees,ratherthanthepremiumenjoyedcollectivelybyallmajoritypartymembers.Theremaininginteractiontermsthenallowustoestimateseparatelythemajoritypremiumsenjoyedbytoppartyleaders,committeechairs,andbackbenchersservingonkeycommittees. TheresultsofthisnewestimationarereportedinTable4.16Toproperlyinterpretthecoefficientsonthenewinteractiontermsandtocomparethesetoourbaselinecategory,wecalculatemarginaleffectsasrecommendedbyBrambor,Clark,andGolder(2006).TheresultsarereportedinTable5.Thesecondcolumnofthetableshows,byformalposition,theincreaseincontri-butionsformembersofthenewmajorityparty.17Thethirdcolumnreportsthedifferencesbetweenthechangesincontributionsreceivedbybackbench-ersnotservingonakeycommitteeandlegislatorswithvariousprivilegedpositionsandwhetherthesedifferencesarestatisticallysignificant. ThefirstrowofTable5showsthatbackbenchersnotservingonafiscal,rules,FIRE,orhealthcarecommitteeenjoy,onaverage,a.11standarddevia-tionincreaseintotalcampaigncontributions.Thisincreasefallsjustshortofreachingstatisticalsignificanceusingatwo-tailedtest,althoughitissignifi-cant(atp=0.90)usingaone-tailedtest.Importantly,itsuggeststhatthevalue

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Table 4. ChangeinTotalContributionstoIncumbentLegislators:ProcedurallyPartisanChambers(PooledData)

ΔMajorityStatus 0.11 (0.07)ΔPartyLeader –0.70 (0.53)PartyLeader 0.78# (0.46)PartyLeader*ΔMajorityStatus 0.59 (0.39)ΔCommitteeChair 0.02 (0.06)ΔCommitteeChair*ΔMajorityStatus 0.06 (0.07)ΔFiscalCommittee –0.13# (0.07)FiscalCommittee 0.11# (0.06)FiscalCommittee*ΔMajorityStatus 0.15# (0.08)ΔRulesCommittee 0.01 (0.10)RulesCommittee 0.02 (0.11)RulesCommittee*ΔMajorityStatus 0.24* (0.12)ΔFIRECommittee –0.07 (0.08)FIRECommittee 0.03 (0.07)FIRECommittee*ΔMajorityStatus 0.16* (0.08)ΔHealthcareCommittee 0.05 (0.12)HealthcareCommittee 0.01 (0.08)HealthcareCommittee*ΔMajorityStatus –0.12 (0.11)ΔLaggedVote 0.34* (0.12)Constant –0.07 (0.11)N 932R2 0.11FStatistic 4.70

*p<0.05;#p<0.10;two-tailedtestsNotes:Thedependentvariableisthechangeintotalstandardizedcampaigncontribu-

tionsraisedbyanincumbentlegislator.ThemodelisestimatedusingOLSandrobuststandarderrors.Electioncycleandstatedummiesareincludedbutnotreportedhere.

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ofmajoritystatusiswidelydistributedwithinthepartyandnotnecessarilycontingentuponholdingaprivilegedpositioninthelegislativechamber. Theresultsinthebottomfourrowssuggestasimilarconclusion.Back-benchersservingonkeypolicyandcontrolcommitteesconsistentlyseetheircampaigncontributionsincreasebymeaningfulamountsupongainingmajoritystatus.Backbencherswithaseatonarulescommitteeseea.38standarddeviationincreaseintotalcontributions,whilethoseservingonafiscalorFIREcommitteereceiveincreasesof.37and.31,respectively.Alltheseincreasesarestatisticallysignificantatp=0.95usingatwo-tailedtest.Intheprocedurallypartisanchambersincludedinouranalysis,many,ifnotmost,membersofthemajoritycaucusserveonatleastoneofthesethreetypesofcommittees.Forexample,intheGeorgiaHouse,approximately40percentofmajoritypartymembersserveononeofthechamber’stwofiscalcommittees.Whileserviceonakeypolicymakingcommitteeclearlyenhancesthevalueofmajoritystatus,thisenhancementissharedbroadlywithinthepartyanddoesnotfallexclusivelytocommitteechairsasthelead-ershiphypothesissuggests.Equallyasimportant,thecoefficientsonchange

Table 5. AverageIncreaseinContributionsFollowingaGainofMajorityStatus:ProcedurallyPartisanChambers(PooledData)

IncreaseRelative toBackbenchers Increasein whoGained Contributions MajorityStatus

Gainmajoritystatus(backbenchers) 0.11## __ (0.08)Gainmajoritystatuswhileservingasatoppartyleader 1.49* 1.38* (0.61) (0.61)GainMajorityStatus&GainChairmanship 0.20* 0.08 (0.08) (0.11)GainMajorityStatuswhileservingonrulescommittee 0.38* 0.27 (0.16) (0.16)GainMajorityStatuswhileservingonfiscalcommittee 0.37* 0.26* (0.08) (0.10)GainMajorityStatuswhileservingonFIREcommittee 0.31* 0.20# (0.14) (0.12)GainMajorityStatuswhileservingonHealthcarecommittee –0.01 –0.12 (0.14) (0.14)

*p<0.05;#p<0.10;two-tailedtests##p<0.10usingaone-tailedtestNotes:Thesecondcolumnshowsthestandarddeviationincreaseincampaigncontributions,byformalpositioninthe

legislature,followingagaininmajoritystatus.Thefinalcolumnshowswhetherthisvalueissignificantlydifferentfromthechangeexperiencedbybackbencherswithoutassignmentsonkeypolicyorcontrolcommittees.Forinstance,thefourthrowshowsthatlegislatorswhogainmajoritystatuswhileservingonarulescommitteeenjoya.38standarddeviationincreaseintotalcontributions.Standarderrorsarereportedinparentheses.

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incommitteeassignmentandonourstand-alonemeasuresofcommitteemembership(seeTable4)arealmostalwaysstatisticallyinsignificant.Thisfindingindicatesthatservingonanimportantpolicyorcontrolcommitteewithoutbeinginthemajoritymightnotbeparticularlyvaluable.Inotherwords,committeemembershipismuchmorevaluableformajoritypartymembersthanfortheminority. TheresultspresentedinTable5alsoshowthatthemajoritypartypremiumisdistributedtolawmakerswhooccupyprivilegedpositionsinthechamber.Toppartyleadersseetheircampaigncontributionsrisebyawhopping1.49standarddeviationswhentheirpartygainsmajoritystatus.Thisincreaseismuchlargerthanthatenjoyedbythetypicalbackbencher.Lawmakerswhogainbothachairmanshipandmajoritystatusseetheircontributionsriseby.20standarddeviation.Whilethisincreaseissignificant,itisnotstatisticallylargerthanthepremiumincontributionsenjoyedbybackbenchers—eitherthosewithorwithoutanassignmentonakeypolicyorcontrolcommittee.18Interestingly,thepremiumenjoyedbythosewhogainachairmanshipinconjunctionwithmajoritystatusis,onaverage,smallerthanthatenjoyedbybackbenchersonafiscal,rules,orFIREcommittee,althoughthesedifferencesarenotstatisticallymeaningful. Overall,theresultsreportedinTable5providestrongsupportforthecaucushypothesis.Thepremiumincampaigncontributionsenjoyedbythemajoritypartyisnotdistributedprincipallyamongthosewithprivilegedpositionsinthelegislature,butratherissharedwidelyamongthemajoritypartymembership.Backbenchers(thosewithandwithoutkeyassignments),toppartyleaders,andcommitteechairsallbenefit.Nevertheless,importantcaveatsdoemerge.First,whilebenefitsaredistributedwidely,toppartylead-ersseethelargesttotalincreaseintotalcampaigncontributions.Second,thevalueofbackbencherstatuswithinthemajoritypartyvariessubstantiallyasafunctionofalawmaker’scommitteeassignments.Changeinthemajoritystatusbyitself,withoutmembershiponakeypolicyorcontrolcommittee,confersarelativelysmallandstatisticallyinconsistentincreaseincampaigncontributions.Serviceonapowerfulcommittee,inconjunctionwithmajor-itystatus,offersmuchlargerandmorerobustincreases.Thelargesizeofthemajoritypartycontingentsonsuchcommittees,however,meansthatthesecommittee-basedpremiumsaresharedbroadlythroughouttheparty. Beforeconcluding,weshouldnotethatthenatureofourresearchdesignlimitsoursampletolegislativechamberswhereboththeDemocraticandRepublicanpartiesarecompetitive.Forsomereaders,thismayimplythatthenecessaryconditionsforvaluablemajoritypartystatusincludenotonlyproceduralpartisanship,butalsoacompetitivetwopartysystem.Wedonot

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believethistobethecase.AsThompson,Cassie,andJewell(1994)note,legisla-tivepartiesseektomaximizetheirchamberseatshare.Asaresult,itisunlikelythatevenapartythatenjoysaverysizablemajoritywouldstoprewardingtheloyaltyoftheirbackbenchers.Notonlyaredefectionstotheminoritypartyembarrassing,butgiventheunpredictablenatureofpolitics,thereisnoreasonforthecurrentmajoritynottozealouslyguardeachseat.

implications

Inthisarticle,wehavedevelopedatheoryofwhatdetermineswhethermajor-itystatusisvaluableinalegislatureandhowthatvalueisdistributedwithinthemajorityparty.Wefindthatthevalueofmajoritystatusinstatelegisla-turesissensitivetotheparticularsofchamberorganization.Servinginthemajorityisvaluableonlyifthechamberisprocedurallypartisan.Thatis,itisvaluableifeverypathforabillthroughthelegislativeprocessandeverypathforindividuallegislatorstoadvancethroughthechamber’sleadershiphierarchyisconstrainedtoliewithinthemajorityparty.Ontheotherhand,ifthelegislatureisorganizedinaprocedurallybipartisanfashion,themajoritypartyceasestobe“theonlygameintown,”andthevalueofmajoritystatusfallsstatisticallytozero.Inthesechambers,themembersoftheorganizingcoalitionarescatteredacrosspartylinesandthebenefitstheyaccruedonotcoincidewithserviceinanyparticularpoliticalparty. Inthosechamberswheremajoritystatusisvaluable,alargeproportionofthisvaluefallstobackbenchers.Beingamajoritypartybackbencherissufficienttoconferapremiumincampaigncontributions,althoughthedistributionofthesebenefitsfavorsbackbenchersonimportantpolicyorcontrolcommittees.Nonetheless,occupyingaleadershippositioninthelegislativehierarchyisnoguaranteeofanadditionalpremium.Someposts,suchastoppartyleadership,conferalargebonuswhileothers,suchascommitteechairmanships,donot.Thissuggestsaredistributivemechanismisatworkwithinthemajorityparty,throughwhichtheleadersareworkingnotonlyforthemselvesbutalsofortheirfellowco-partisanswithlessformalpowersandprivileges.Wespeculatethatthisinternalcooperationisengenderedandfacilitatedbythecaucuspro-cess,whichprovidesavenueforintra-partycommunicationandbargaining,makingiteasiertoarrangePareto-improvingtradeswithinthemajorityparty.Theconsequentboostinthevalueofmajoritystatushelpsundergirdpartygovernmentinprocedurallypartisanlegislatures. Thefindingspresentedherehaveimportantimplicationsforourunder-standingofpolicymakinginstatelegislatures.Theysuggestthat,inpro-cedurallypartisanassemblies(i.e.,thevastmajorityofstatelegislatures),

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majoritypartybackbenchersexertsubstantialinformalinfluenceonthepolicymakingprocessandderivesubstantialbenefits—intermsofcam-paigncontributions—evenwithlimitedformalpowers.Insuchchambers,wesuspectabottom-upprocessprevails,perhapsthroughthemajoritypartycaucus,andresultingpolicyoutcomesshouldbroadlyreflecttheinterestsofmajoritypartymembers.Thesamecannotbesaidforprocedur-allybipartisanlegislatures.Inthese,thelociofkeypolicydecisionsappeartolieoutsidethemajoritypartycaucusandinthehandsoftopleadersandcommitteechairswhomaybeagentsofacross-partygoverningcoalition.Policymakinginthesechambersisnotlikelytoreflectthatoftheentiremajorityparty. Whymightsomestatesadoptandmaintainaproceduralbipartisanstruc-tureoverthepartisanvariant?Basedonourunderstandingofthecasesweexamine,theredoesnotappeartobeasingle,simpleanswertothispuzzle.Potentialanswersmightincludepasthistoryaswellasvarioushistorical“acci-dents”ofleadershipandothereventsthatmarkinstitutionaldevelopmentsinthesestates.Forexample,VermontandTexasshareahistoryoflongperiodsofsinglepartydominance,coupledwithperiodsofhighlypersonalisticleg-islativeleadership.Regardless,theexactrolesplayedbypasteventsinshapingtheinstitutionsinthesechambersremainbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,butcertainlywarrantfurtherstudy. Ourfindingssuggestthatsustainablepartygovernmentinstatelegislaturesdependsontheinteractionbetweentheformalrulesandinstitutionsandtheinformaldistributionofbenefits.Maintainingformalmechanismsofmajoritypartyinfluenceispredicatedonspreadingitsfruitswidelyamongitsmem-bers,eveniftheydonotholdformalpowers.Putdifferently,successfulpartygovernmentrestsoncreatingpositivevalueforthebackbenchers,notsimplymonopolizingallagenda-settingpowerinthehandsofthemajorityparty.

endnotes

Fortheirhelpfulcomments,wewouldliketothankGaryCox,AndrewGelman,GaryJacobson,andGeraldWright.Forinvaluableassistancegatheringdata,wealsothankRachelWeissoftheNationalInstituteonMoneyinStatePolitics,numerousstatelegisla-tiveaides,andourresearchassistantBrittanyBrewer.

1.Forthesakeofsimplicity,weusetheterm“backbencher”torefertolawmakerswhodonotoccupyformalleadershippositionsinthelegislativehierarchy. 2.Membersofthecross-partygoverningcoalitioninprocedurallybipartisanchambersmayraisemoreincampaigncontributionsthanthenon-members.Determiningthemem-bershipofsuchcoalitionsis,however,difficultandbeyondthescopeofthisarticle. 3.Informalmechanismsmightalsoexist,suchasthosebasedonapersonalrelation-

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shipbetweentheleadersandbackbenchers.Thekeyremainsthattheserelationshipsareinternaltothemajorityparty. 4.Formoststates,thisdataisnotsystematicallyavailableuntilthemid-orlate-1990s. 5.Oursampleconstitutesanearlyexhaustivesetofstatelowerhousesthatunderwentoneormorechangesinpartisancontrolbetween1994and2004forwhichcampaignfinancedataanddataforourcontrolvariableswerereadilyavailable.Ahandfulofstates,includingWashington(1994),Michigan(1996),andMissouri(2002),wereexcludedbecausetherecentpartisanchangesintheselegislaturescoincidedwiththeeffectivedateoftermlimitlaws,leavingtoofewincumbentsforameaningfulanalysis. 6.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,weexpresslyrequirethataprocedurallypartisanchamberfeature:(1)majoritypartymonopolyofthespeakership;(2)majoritypartymonopolyofthechairmanshipsofallstandingcommitteesotherthanethics;and(3)thatthemajoritypartyoccupyamajorityoftheseatsonallstandingcommitteesotherthanethics.Formostlegislatures,theseconditionssufficetogivethemajoritypartymonopolycontrolofthelegislativeagenda.Usingthesecriteria,thechambersexaminedinthisarticlefallneatlyintotwodistinctgroups,withoneexception.IntheColoradoHouse,themajorityparty,despitecontrollingallformalleversofpower,isunabletomonopolizethelegislativeagendaduetoaconstitutionalamendment.Informationusedtocategorizestateswasobtainedthroughanexaminationoftheexistingliterature,legislativejournalsandrules,andconsultationswithlegislativestaff. 7.Thesechambersalsovarysubstantiallyintermsofspeakerandcommitteepowers(c.f.,Clucas2001;Hamm,Hedlund,andMartorano2006).Variationsinthevalueofmajoritystatusdonotappeartodependonthesefactors. 8.ΔLaggedElectoralSafety=log(Percentt–2)–log(Percentt–1),wherePercenttistheshareofthevoteobtainedbytheincumbentinanelectionyeart.Therearetwoinstanceswhenaredistrictingyearintervenesbetweentheelectionsusedtocreateourmeasure(thesubstantivecaseinTexasandacontrolcaseinIndiana,bothfollowingthe2000census).Unfortunately,thiscannotberectifiedduetodataunavailability.Wedonotbelievethatthishasameaningfuleffectonourresults.Estimationsthatexcludethelaggedelectoralsafetyvariableyieldcomparableresults. 9.TheestimationforIndianausesthreeinstancesofpartisanchangeandacontrolcase.Ifestimatedseparately,changeinmajoritystatusisstatisticallysignificantineachinstance. 10.Becausewemakedirectionalpredictionsforeachofourexplanatoryvariables,weemployone-tailedtestsofstatisticalsignificance.However,thevalueofmajoritystatusissignificantusingatwo-tailedtestinallprocedurallypartisanstatesexceptNewJersey.Observethatnocoefficientonavariableofinterestcanbenegativeandsignificantbecauseallofourdirectionalpredictionsarepositive. 11.Forinstance,thelargenegativecoefficientonthechangeinpartyleadershipstatusinNewJerseyisattributabletoAlbioSires.AssemblymanSireswentfromDemocraticbackbenchertospeakerbetweenthe2000–01and2002–03sessions.Forthe2001elec-tion,heraisedwellover$265,000,butforthe2003election,heraisedonly$83,000.NewJerseyalsofeaturesanegativecoefficientonthelaggedelectoralsafetyvariable.Thisrepresentstheonlynegativecoefficientonthisvariableamongallourcases,butitfailstoevenapproachstatisticalsignificance. 12.Thestandardizedcontributionisthus

(cij – μij )

ρijkij=

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andkij~N(0,1),wheremijisthesamplemeanandrijisthesamplestandarddeviation,forchamberiandelectioncyclej. 13.Surprisingly,severalcoefficientsonthevariablescapturingchangesinassignmentstokeycommitteesarenegative.Wesuspectthatthismighthavetodowithpoliticsofcommitteeassignment,specifically,whichlegislatorslosemembershipinthesecommitteeswhenapartylosesmajoritystatusandwhichgainnewseatsonthesecommitteeswhenapartywinsthemajority.Suchquestions,however,arebeyondthescopeofthisarticle. 14.SincetheonlypartyleaderintheTexasHouseofRepresentativesisthespeaker,ΔPartyLeaderreducestoameasureofmovementintoandoutofthespeakership. 15.OurresultsforTexasareconsistentwiththoseinThielemannandDixon’s(1994)studyofcampaigncontributionsintheTexasHouseinthe1988–89period.Theyfindthatbeinginthemajoritypartygeneratednoadditionalcontributions,butmembers’institutionalpositionsdid. 16.Weuseatwo-tailedtestforthissectionbecausetheleadershipandcaucushypoth-esesyieldpotentiallyconflictingpredictions. 17.Theseestimatesarecalculatedbysimplyaddingthecoefficientsonanyrelevantterms.Forexample,tocalculatetheincreaseincontributionsenjoyedbymemberswhogainmajoritystatuswhileservingonafiscalcommittee,weaddΔMajorityStatus(.11)toFiscalCommittee(.11)andΔMajorityStatus*FiscalCommittee(.15). 18.Thelackofbenefitsaccompanyingcommitteechairmanshipsdoesraiseaninterestingquestion:Whydolegislatorsseekchairmanships?Itmaybethattheyaremotivatedbydesireforgoodpublicpolicyorthattheypossessexpertiseinapolicyarea.Also,byrenderingservicetotheirco-partisans,committeechairsmayaccumulatetherespectandprestigeneededtorisetothetoppartyleadership,whichwedofindtobehighlyvaluable.

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