ecu reply brief
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In the Matter of the Application of the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority for an order authorizing the construction of a two-track at-grade crossing for the Exposition Boulevard Corridor Light Rail Transit Line across Jefferson Boulevard, Adams Boulevard, and 23rd Street, all in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, California.
And Consolidated Proceedings.
Application 06-12-005(Filed December 6, 2006)
Application 06-12-020(Filed December 19, 2006)
Application 07-01-004(Filed January 2, 2007)
Application 07-01-017(Filed January 8, 2007)
Application 07-01-044(Filed January 24, 2007)
Application 07-02-007(Filed February 7, 2007)
Application 07-02-017(Filed February 16, 2007)
Application 07-03-004(Filed March 5, 2007)
Application 07-05-012(Filed May 8, 2007)
Application 07-05-013(Filed May 8, 2007)
REPLY BRIEF OF EXPO COMMUNITIES UNITED
DAMIEN WESLEY CLARK GOODMONExecutive Director, Get LA Moving3062 Stocker PlaceLos Angeles, CA 90008
On Behalf ofEXPO COMMUNITIES UNITEDP.O. Box 781267Los Angeles, CA 90016
SUBJECT INDEX
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......................................................................................1
II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW........................................................................................4
III. DISCUSSION...............................................................................................................7
A. The Authority Miscalculates Grade Crossing Hazards......................................7
1. The Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy.............................................................8
a. GCP Application: Exposition Park.................................................................9
b. GCP Application: The Authority’s Blue Line.............................................10
2. Public Utilities Commission..............................................................................10
3. United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”)............................12
a. Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
................................................................................................................................12
b. Accident Prediction Formula........................................................................13
c. Hazard Index...................................................................................................13
d. Federal-Aid Policy Guide..............................................................................14
4. National Research Council Transportation Research Board.........................14
B. The Expo Line’s Shared Blue Line At-Grade Portion Should Require an
Applications Process...................................................................................................17
C. Photo Enforcement is Not a Safety Mitigation Measure..................................18
1. Red-Light Cameras (“RLCs”) Do Not Create Safer Intersections ...............18
2. Legality.................................................................................................................19
3. Inconsistency.......................................................................................................20
4. Required Annual Allocation..............................................................................20
D. Additional Impacts of Authority’s Crossings Designs.....................................21
1. Increased Likelihood of Jaywalking.................................................................21
2. Congestion in Residential Areas.......................................................................21
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3. Implications to Funding & CEQA....................................................................22
E. The Authority’s Discussion of the Alignment Classification is Misleading
and Irrelevant..............................................................................................................23
1. The Authority’s Transit Service Policy & Blue Line.......................................23
F. The Authority’s Cost Analysis is Deficient.........................................................25
G. The Authority Only Admits that Grade Separation is More Expensive; They
do not State They Can’t Find Additional Funding................................................28
1. The Authority Found $314 Million in Two Weeks.........................................28
2. The Authority Assets & Annual Budget..........................................................29
3. Funding Sources Yet to be Fully Explored......................................................29
a. 2006 California Propositions..........................................................................29
b. Federal New Starts Funding.........................................................................30
c. Public Private Partnerships ...........................................................................30
4. The Commission’s Authority to Apportion Capital Costs...........................30
5. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform and Accountability
Act of 1998................................................................................................................31
H. Domino Effect.........................................................................................................31
I. The Authority’s Design Makes Redevelopment More Difficult.......................32
1. Challenging the Goals of the Community Redevelopment Agency, a
Fellow State Agency...............................................................................................32
2. Crenshaw Corridor.............................................................................................32
3. Property Rights....................................................................................................33
4. Los Angeles Trade Tech College Master Plan.................................................33
J. Culver City’s Assessments ....................................................................................34
K. Community Standards..........................................................................................35
1. Below-Grade is Preferred...................................................................................35
2. Noise Pollution....................................................................................................35
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3. Public Hearings...................................................................................................36
L. Defining Agency Compliance and Stakeholder Endorsement........................37
1. Hauser/Exposition.............................................................................................37
2. Farmdale/Exposition.........................................................................................37
3. Crenshaw/Exposition:.......................................................................................39
4. 7th Ave/Exposition:............................................................................................39
5. Arlington/Exposition:........................................................................................39
6. Gramercy Place/Rodeo Road:...........................................................................39
7. Western/Exposition............................................................................................40
8. Vermont/Exposition...........................................................................................40
9. 28th/Flower & HOV/Flower............................................................................41
10. Washington/Flower.........................................................................................41
11. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Compliance..............................42
M. The Authority’s Influence in the Proceedings..................................................42
IV. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................43
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
California Cases
Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co.
61 Cal.2d 659 (1964)....................................................................................................36
City of San Mateo v. Railroad Commission of California
9 Cal.2d 1 (1937)......................................................................................................8, 10
Mineral Park Land v. Howard
172 Cal. 289 (1916).........................................................................................................2
San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco
193 Cal.App.3d 1544 (1987).......................................................................................24
Schmeltzer v. Gregory
266 Cal.App.2d 420 (1968)...........................................................................................2
United California Bank v. People ex. Rel. Dept. of Public Works
1 Cal.App.3d 1 (1969).................................................................................................36
California Public Utilities Commission Cases
City of Bakersfield
Decision 04-08-013 (2004).......................................................................................7, 22
City of Oceanside
Decision 92-01-017, 43 CPUC 2d 46 (1992)............................................................4, 6
City of San Diego
Decision 03-12-018 (2003)...........................................................................................32
City of San Diego
Decision 98-09-059 (1998).............................................................................................6
City of San Mateo
Decision 82-04-033, 8 CPUC 2d 572 (1982)......................................................passim
Los Angeles to Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction Authority
Decision 02-05-047 (2002)..................................................................................passim
iv
California Statutes
Public Utilities Code
Section 1202(c)...............................................................................................6, 8, 22, 32
California Environmental Quality Act
Section 15162................................................................................................................24
Section 15163................................................................................................................24
Section 15165................................................................................................................24
Section 15168................................................................................................................24
California Streets and Highways Code
Section 2450..................................................................................................................11
Section 2452..................................................................................................................11
California Health and Safety Code
Section 33000..........................................................................................................34, 35
California Public Utilities Commission Regulations
Rules of Practice and Procedure
Rule 13.11.......................................................................................................................1
Rule 38(d)...................................................................................................................6, 8
Rule 40............................................................................................................................6
Other Authorities
City of Culver City
General Plan Circulation Element 2.O.....................................................................37
Resolution 2001-RO63................................................................................................37
Federal Transit Administration
Record of Decision: Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor Mid-
City/Exposition Corridor Light Rail Transit Project by Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (February 2006)......................................24
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Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Final Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Review for the
Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor/Mid-City Exposition Light
Rail Project (October 2005).........................................................................9, 23, 33, 39
Final Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Review for the
Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor/Mid-City Exposition Light
Rail Project Findings of Fact and Statement of Overriding Considerations
(December 2005)..........................................................................................................19
Pasadena-Los Angeles LRT Project Draft Supplemental EIR (March 1994).......38
Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report for the
Los Angeles Mid-City/Westside Transit Corridor (April 2001)..........................46
2001 Long Range Transportation Plan (April 2001)...............................................35
County of Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform & Accountability Act (1998). .33
State of California
Proposition 1B (2006)............................................................................................31, 32
Proposition 1C (2006).................................................................................................32
State of Minnesota
State of Minnesota vs. Daniel Allen Kuhlman, Case No. A06-568............................21
United States Department of Transportation
Federal-Aid Policy Guide..........................................................................................15
Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade
Crossings....................................................................................................13, 14, 15, 27
Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook revised 2nd Edition (August
2007)............................................................................................................14, 15, 19, 36
United States Government
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 (1990)...........45
vi
Witkin’s Summary of California Law.................................................................................1
vii
REPLY BRIEF OF EXPO COMMUNITIES UNITED
In accordance with Rule 13.11 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “PUC”) and the
schedule established at the prehearing conference held July 19, 2007 in the above-
captioned proceeding and memorialized in the July 23, 2007 Ruling of
Administrative Law Judge Koss, Expo Communities United (“ECU”) hereby
respectfully submits its reply brief in the above-captioned consolidated
proceeding.
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
If the Exposition Light Rail (“Expo Line”) design was the product of a transit
agency led by novice engineers, relatively inexperienced in light rail, who lack
access to volumes of studies and thousands of incident reports, perhaps the
Authority could claim, and the Commission could assume that the applications
are the result of incompetence. But as clearly shown in the opening brief and will
be expanded in this reply, the Authority is deliberately ignoring well-established
Commission precedence, state and federal criteria, and firmly stated local agency
objections. Thus, their callous pursuit of a proven defective design can only be
considered a result of a Ford Pinto cost-benefit analysis.
In their attempt to overcome the established criteria of practicability, the
Authority’s insistence that the Commission employ a contractual definition,
citing Witkin’s Summary of California Law as its authority for such use, can only be
characterized as desperate. What a contractual relationship between two
businessmen could possibly have to do with grade crossing safety is beyond
conjecture, and the Authority makes no attempt to elucidate this rather bizarre
1
application of the law of contracts to the situation at hand.1 Surely Professor
Witkin never contemplated that any portion of his treatise on substantive civil
law, no less than relating to contracts, would be utilized as safety criteria for at-
grade crossings.
The Authority also attempts to distinguish the mandate applied by the City of
San Mateo case (D. 82-04-033, 8 CPUC 2d 572 (1982)), which it admits held that
there must be separated grade crossings in all cases where such construction is
feasible, i.e., where it is physically possible (City of San Mateo, id., at 580-81), by
arguing that we are here dealing with light rail, as opposed to “long trains of
heavy cars moving at high speeds” (Authority’s Opening Brief – “AOB” - at p.
16). To this end, the Authority cites Los Angeles to Pasadena Metro Blue Line
Construction Authority D.02-05-047 (“Pasadena Blue Line”). But, as shall be shown
below, as a result of the urban setting and heavy traffic/pedestrian mix involved
in the subject crossings, analysis utilized to permit at-grade crossings on the
Pasadena Blue Line is not applicable.
Epitomizing the dangers mitigating against modifying the mandate of City of San
Mateo is the proposed Farmdale crossing: a complicated, sequentially timed,
gated intersection, consisting of a mishmash of horns, blinking lights and
confusing signs, attempting to regulate an admittedly heavy traffic flow coming
from four directions, which commingles with trains running in two directions,
and new bicycle lanes, exacerbated by hundreds of teenagers rushing twice daily
to and from Dorsey High School. In an effort to avoid this accident-waiting-to-
happen the Authority proposes to, each morning and afternoon, herd hundreds
1 The Authority makes the rather astounding assertion that the City of San Mateo criterion is “ill suited to light rail transit” (Authority’s Opening Brief – “AOB - at p. 16), arguing without any authority that “a definition of practicality better suited to the context of light rail transit is supplied by the law of contracts” (AOB p. 17). It then cites to Schmeltzer v. Gregory, 266 Cal.App.2d 420 (1968), a breach of personal service contract case, and Mineral Park Land v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 (1916), another, and ancient, contract case. Again, one can only guess what these cases have to do with rail safety.
2
of children into fenced “holding pens,” which are more akin to controlling farm
animals or inmates in a penal institution, (the only opening in the fences being
small pedestrian gates right onto the tracks), where the Authority believes these
youngsters will patiently wait until the coast is clear of the intermingling of
onrushing traffic and trains. Then the Authority believes these children will
cross the tracks (and streets) in what the Authority apparently envisions as the
typical orderly fashion for which teenagers are well known.2 All of this will be
going on while parents in their cars are making left and right hand turns over
two sets of railway tracks (apparently inside closed quad gates) in their haste to
get their children to school on time so that they themselves are not late to work.
Adding to this nightmarish scenario will be cars lining up on at least two sides of
the light rail tracks in order to get onto the school grounds to drop off their
children.
The Authority’s solution: moving the Farmdale driveway that heads onto school
grounds some arbitrary distance to the south so, hopefully, this line of cars
entering school grounds will not back up inside the gates and onto the tracks.
Let us not parse words, so that when it happens no one can say they were not
fully warned: children, perhaps along with their parents, will die and suffer
catastrophic injuries at this intersection if it is not grade separated. The
Authority’s explanation as to how this intersection will actually work miserably
fails to make “a convincing showing eliminat(ing) all potential safety hazards.”3
(bolding added)4
The Authority’s constant refrain that the cost of grade separation prohibits its
2 ECU respectfully suggests that the Administrative Law Judge view the Farmdale/Exposition intersection as school lets out on a typical weekday afternoon (May 11, 2007) at http://youtube.com/watch?v=YXtY-33nX8c (or by putting “Dorsey High School Crossing” in the “youtube.com” search window).3 Pasadena Blue Line, D.02-05-047, adopted May 16, 2002: Interpreting the “heavy burden” and “convincing standard” enunciated in City of San Mateo, supra.
3
implementation flies in the face of this Commission’s very specific holding that
the cost of an at-grade crossing is “much less persuasive than safety
considerations.”5 As demonstrated in ECU’s opening brief and herein, not only
is the cost of separating crossings vastly outweighed by overriding and
paramount safety concerns, but also the Authority’s calculation of costs is
fundamentally flawed.
II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Notwithstanding the Authority’s attempt to stand the definition of practicability
on its head by applying a contractual definition, the now seminal case of City of
San Mateo, supra provides the rationale for the applicable standard of
practicability:
“Today in this state a proponent who desires to construct a new at-grade crossing over mainline railroad trackage carrying any appreciable volume of passenger traffic has a very heavy burden to carry. Against the aforesaid formidable backdrop of fundamental statutory and professional opprobrium, he must convincingly show6 both that a separation is impracticable and that the public convenience and necessity absolutely require a crossing at grade.” City of San Mateo, supra at pp 580-581 (emphasis added)7
City of San Mateo goes on to clarify, ”the statutory scheme controlling grade
crossings utilizes the terms ‘practicality’ and not ‘practical’ meaning being
possible physically of performance, a capability of being used, a feasibility of
construction”, utilizing Webster’s New Dictionary of Synonyms (1973 p. 625) to
exemplify its holding that “a plan might be practicable in that it could be put into
4 Indeed, the Authority fails to explain how it will balance its desire to refrain from disrupting classes at Dorsey through the lowering and mitigating of its warning horns with the need to amplify these sounds so as to catch the attention of the very children whose education is being disrupted while on their way to classrooms. The only reference in the AOB is to the use of quacker horns at p. 40.5 Pasadena Blue Line id., at p. 106 Where there is a request for an at-grade crossing a mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice. The safety of the proposed at-grade crossing must be convincingly shown. Pasadena Blue Line, pp. 11-127 See also City of Oceanside, Decision 92-01-017, 43 CPUC 2d 46 (1992).
4
practice, though not practical because...too costly...” City of San Mateo, at 581.
Of paramount importance to this proceeding is City of San Mateo’s recognition
that:
“Safety is an issue of overriding importance. Despite substantial advances, there are numerous situations remaining where grade crossing protection can never provide a satisfactory solution due to limiting physical and operating conditions. In such locations grade separation is the only solution.” id.,at p. 582 (emphasis added)
It is beyond cavil that the Farmdale crossing epitomizes just such a scenario. The
Authority argues that the cost of grade separation at Farmdale and other
crossings should compel the Commission to ignore the holdings of City of San
Mateo.8 In support it cites the Pasadena Blue Line decision, wherein the
Commission determined that “it is the rare case where it is physically infeasible
or impossible to construct a grade separation,” and accordingly determined that
there are “a number of factors that should be considered in reviewing an
application for an at-grade crossing.” The Commission then went on to
enumerate six such factors, which are well known and need not be repeated here
in their entirety. Pasadena Blue Line, supra at p. 10.
The most important of the six issues enumerated in Pasadena Blue Line to be used
as criteria for judging practicability is “a convincing showing by the applicant
that all potential safety hazards have been eliminated.”9 (emphasis added) The
8 The only “evidence” of what grade separation would cost is provided through the “Prepared Testimony of Richard D. Thorpe” attached to the Authority’s Opening Brief, where he states on page 7 thereof that an undercrossing at Flower Street and Figueroa cost approximately $20 million. The Authority makes no attempt to estimate the cost of crossing over the Farmdale Avenue, or any other, intersection. Most importantly, although decrying this increased cost, the Authority fails to even attempt to balance any such cost estimate against the safety and lives of our children, which are clearly at substantial risk.9 Indeed, the Authority’s Chief Project Officer, Eric R. Olson, readily acknowledges that the “primary criterion of ‘practicality’ is a ‘convincing showing that all potential safety hazards have been eliminated’” But then, as he must, Mr. Olson admits that the best the Authority can do in attempting to comply with this criteria is “identify and address significant safety hazards.” (AOB - Olson Testimony at p. 5)
5
least important (“a factor much less persuasive than safety considerations”) is the
cost of grade separation. Pasadena Blue Line at pp. 10-11.
The Authority attempts to avoid the clearly defined standard of optimal safety of
all crossings by alleging cases such as City of San Mateo and others involved
freight or commuter rail and that these proceedings involve light rail. It is a
distinction without a difference that the Commission does not recognize. PUC
Section 1202(c) and Rules 38(d) and 40 make no distinction between the
operation of heavy rail or light rail over a crossing. Indeed, the 240 light rail
trains per day, pose greater risks than the weekly freight rail that utilized the
right-of-way in the past. Nonetheless, safety and practicability are two different
subjects, and the need to address practicability does not disappear with the
removal of heavy rail.
In City of San Mateo the crossing involved a combination of commuter rail trains
and freight rail. (Supra at 578.) In City of Oceanside (Supra at 49.) the Commission
citied City of San Mateo, and the need to show that a grade separation was
impracticable in denying application for an at-grade crossing that featured 16
Amtrak trains and 6 freight trains per day with more commuter rail trains
planned. In City of San Diego, supra (D.98-09-059 (1998)) the Commission denied
an at-grade crossing, again relying on City of San Mateo for a crossing involving
only two freight movements and 150 light rail trains per day.
Instructive to the situation at hand is the recent case of City of Bakersfield, Decision
04-08-013 (2004). Although an at-grade crossing was approved there, it was
based upon what the Commission found to be “an adequate level of safety when
considering the low volume of traffic (2-3 a day), the low train speed (10 mph),
the type of crossing (flat, no line of sight difficulties), and the type of railroad line
(single track branch line with no rail passenger traffic).” As noted, “The unique
facts of this case overcome any presumption against an at-grade crossing...” City
6
of Bakersfield, supra.
The Authority has fallen miserably short of meeting the “very heavy burden” it
must carry in order to overcome the presumption against at-grade crossings.
Quite the contrary, the very nature of the complex machinations it has had to
employ in its failed attempt to “convincingly show that grade separation is
‘impracticable’” definitively proves that grade separation is mandatory.
The Authority has failed to demonstrate that a grade separation at the subject
crossings, particularly the one at Farmdale and Exposition, is “impracticable”
pursuant to the Commission’s Rule 38(d), PUC Section 1202(c), and City of San
Mateo v. Railroad Commission of California, 9 Cal.2d 1 (1937), which holds:
“In these days of heavy automobile traffic the hazards to life and limb by reasons of numerous railroad crossings at grade is of great public concern. To eliminate unnecessary grade crossing and to minimize the hazards created thereby has become a definite government state policy. To effectuate the desired results it is necessary that some public authority be vested with power to compel compliance with regulatory orders. The Constitution and statues have vested that power in the...Commission” id., 9 Cal.2d at 9-10.
Therefore, ECU respectfully asserts that the Commission must now exercise its
exclusive jurisdictional responsibility. The Farmdale Avenue, and other crossings
have not been adequately addressed by the Authority and, on that basis, the
Commission must, respectfully, order grade separation of crossings.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Authority Miscalculates Grade Crossing Hazards
ECU submits that the Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy (“GCP”) does not
adequately determine the appropriate level of mitigation at crossings, due in part
7
to fundamental deficiencies in the evaluation of crossing hazards, especially in
comparison to well-established federal and Commission standards.
Consideration of the principles, established by higher and more credible sources,
along with application of lessons learned from the Authority’s own Blue Line
should have led to a determination of immitigable hazards on the Exposition
corridor and full grade separation. Yet, the Authority arbitrarily deems such
criteria secondary to a high peak hour per lane vehicular count to train frequency
ratio.
The Commission should go much further than stating they have “major
concerns” with the Authority’s GCP, as declared by PUC Staff (a.k.a. “RCES”) in
response to the FEIS/R,10 and completely repudiate it on the basis of being
fundamentally inadequate to addressing the intrinsic hazards of grade crossings,
and thereby antithetical to the mandate bestowed to the Commission by the
people of California for the safety of all crossings.
1. The Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy
As the engineering basis of their suggestion that the Commission throw out its
long-established standard and so approve a proven defective design, the
Authority advocates a policy that is tempered more towards providing political
justification for not implementing grade separations, rather than the actual safety
of crossings.
Crossings are required to pass a high initial threshold of vehicular lane volume to
train frequency ratio, immediately placing almost all crossings in the second
most populous city in the country, regardless of their site conditions into a
category that places the burden on proving the necessity of a grade separation,
instead of disproving the feasibility of grade separation. This is the antithesis of
10 RCES Letter to FEIS/R (November 23, 2005)
8
the Commission’s mandate as expressed clearly in City of San Mateo (1937). The
policy supercedes the many standards, criteria and conditions established by the
Commission, and outlined in numerous rail safety studies and manuals,
including the Authority’s own.11
The Commission does not have to look very hard to find examples of the
crossing policy deficiencies.
a. GCP Application: Exposition Park
The Exposition Park at-grade crossings have been labeled by the General
Manager of the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) as
“unsafe for pedestrians” and the event management plan as “fundamentally
flawed.” RCES has formally and repeatedly requested the Figueroa trench be
extended to Vermont, as the problems are immitigable. Area stakeholders have
all expressed reservation about the safe operation of vehicles during Exposition
Park events. In the face of strong opposition (see Sec. 8) the Authority maintains
that these concerns are inconsequential in comparison to the vehicular lane
volume to train frequency ratio:
“The CPUC expressed concerns over the proposed at-grade crossing at Vermont Avenue, citing major traffic generators at both sides of the tracks at this location. The feasibility of constructing an at-grade crossing at Vermont has been evaluated for grade separation using the Metro Grade Crossing Policy. The Policy applies a milestone-based approach to grade crossing analysis. Milestone 1 comprises an evaluation based on traffic volume and train frequency; the conclusion based on these criteria alone indicates that grade separation is not warranted.”12
11 Evaluation of the Current Grade Crossing Safety Improvement Program of the Metro Blue Line - LACMTA – Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc (November 1998)12 EMLCA Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report (PGCHAR) for the Exposition Light Rail Transit Project - Section L (August 22, 2006)
9
b. GCP Application: The Authority’s Blue Line
Perhaps even more illuminating is the fact that application of the Authority’s
GCP would have resulted in few, if any, additional grade separations on the
deadliest light rail line in the country, the Authority’s own Blue Line. As
illustrated in Figure A-2 of the GCP (Page A-7), 22 select crossings of the 100 at-
grade crossings on the Blue Line would not have passed Milestone 1, and thereby
would not have been grade separated had the policy been in place during the
planning of the line. Yet, 222 train-vehicle and train-pedestrian accidents
occurred at these crossing from 1990 to 2006.13
ECU submits that placing any confidence in a policy that would have failed to
sufficiently mitigate the hazards of the least safe light rail line in the country
would irreparably harm the Commission’s reputation.
2. Public Utilities Commission
The California Transportation Commission allocates funding for grade
separations based on an index formula established by the Commission
(California Streets & Highways Code Section 2452). The very small fund14
requires a calculation that computes the actual hazards of at-grade crossings and
benefits of grade separation, and is thereby far more comprehensive than the
Authority’s GCP. The formula places ten-year accident history at a level equal
with the daily (not just peak hour per lane) vehicular and train volume.
Additionally, significant weight is given to the amount of time the crossing is
blocked.15 The vehicular speed limit, train speed, crossing geometry, presence of
13 Summary of Metro Blue Line Train/Vehicle and Train/Pedestrian Accidents – LACMTA (July 1990 – June 2006)14 The Grade Separation Program is established by Section 2450 et seq of the California Streets and Highways Code15 Grade Separation Priority List Index Formula Revision Workshop Report – PUC RCES Report (March 2001)
10
routes for transit buses, school buses and vehicles carrying hazardous waste, and
the community impact are all part of the calculation. The computation and
assessment of major hazards are made early in the screening process, whereas in
the Authority’s GCP they are secondary and only considered an initial
determination of grade alignment.
Indeed, the defining philosophical difference between the Commission’s optimal
safety approach and the Authority’s acceptable casualties position is reflected in
the RCES Comments on the Preliminary Hazard Analysis Report, where the PUC
staff lectures the Authority on their insufficient criteria for evaluating crossing
safety hazards.16
At p. 1:
“In our opinion vehicle count is not a good indicator of the probability of [automobiles driving around crossing gates]. Other indicators which are more appropriate are roadway geometrics that allow easy access to circumvent the gate, length of time crossing is blocked, frequency of trains, Level of Service (LOS) rating of the road, etc.”
At p. 2:
“In our opinion vehicle count is not a good indicator of the probability of [automobiles entering ungated crossing with train approaching]. Other indicators which are more appropriate are the presence of traffic signals or presignals, sightlines, distance between nearby intersection and railroad tracks, frequency of trains, LOS rating of the road, etc.”
At p. 2:
“In our opinion a more important factor [to the hazard of pedestrian crossing tracks with train approaching] is the amount of pedestrian traffic at the crossing, which can be estimated by the presence of a nearby pedestrian traffic generators (such as train stations, schools, parks, etc.).
16 RCES Comments on the Preliminary Rail Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, rev. 3 (June 16, 2006) (PRCHAR, rev 3)
11
Another important factor is the sightlines to the crossing.”
3. United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”)
a. Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
The USDOT Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade
Crossings manual suggest that there are several safety variables when
considering closure, grade separation or active control: Annual average daily
traffic, legal and/or operating speed, train frequency and speed, design level of
service, proximity to other intersections, proximity to schools, industrial plants
and commercial areas, accident history and predicted accident frequency, and
available clearing and corner sight distance, including the ability of the driver to
see an approaching train in both directions, with sufficient time to stop 15 feet
before the near rail.
As stated in the opening brief, there are several crossings on the Expo Line that
violate the important sight distance principle, due to obstructed line of sight
and/or non-perpendicular crossing geometry.17 ECU also referenced the
proximity of intersections and elements that can lead to queuing on the tracks.
The manual goes to state that highway-rail grade crossing should be considered
for grade separation whenever the cost of grade separation can be economically
justified based on fully allocated life cycle costs (see Sec. F) and one or more of the
following conditions exist, “An average of 50 or more passenger trains in urban
areas; [….] Passenger train crossing exposure (the product of the number of
passenger trains per day and AADT) exceeds 500,000 in urban areas; The
17 Under optimal conditions, at perpendicular crossings necessary sight distances at crossings where trains travel at 55 mph ranges from ~900 to ~1300 feet for pedestrians, buses and trucks and ~550 feet for cars. For trains approaching at 35 mph the range is ~600 to ~900 feet for pedestrians and trucks and ~350 feet for cars. (Table 2 Clearing Sight Distance)
12
expected accident frequency (EAF) for active devices with gates as calculated by
the USDOT Accident Prediction Formula including 5-year accident history,
exceeds 0.2; Vehicle delay exceeding 30 vehicles hours per day; An engineering
study indicates that the absence of a grade separation structure would result in
the highway facility performing at a level of service below its intended minimum
design level 10% or more or the time.”18
b. Accident Prediction Formula
The USDOT Accident Prediction Formula19 is a comprehensive evaluation that is
used to determine, in absolute terms, the likelihood of accidents at a crossing
given certain conditions. Among the variables are the 5-year accident history of
the intersection, number of daytime trains, product of daily vehicular and train
traffic, number of tracks, number of lanes, and type of street (urban, rural,
principal arterial, collector, etc.). The formula can also be manipulated to predict
the likelihood of fatalities and severity of injuries.
Use of these factors indicates that crossing hazards go well beyond the simple
vehicular lane volume to train frequency ratio. Among many other factors,
certainly the corridor’s large percentage of elderly citizens, who have slower
pace and reflexes, would have been considered had these established principles
been applied.
c. Hazard Index
Conditions at a crossing are computed to determine an index that objectively
results in a quantifiable comparison of the hazardous level of crossings. There
18 Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings – United States Department of Transportation (November 2002)19 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 2 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007)
13
are various indexes throughout the country that in addition to the variables
specified in the Accident Prediction Formula and Guidance on Traffic Control
Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings, consider the presence of automatic
gates, flashing lights, crossing width, number of school bus crossings, and
population.
ECU submits that application of a hazard index at Western Ave and Denker Ave
would have considered the high percentage of accidents involving pedestrians,
and school bus stops for lots of special needs children arriving from other Los
Angeles Unified School District schools.
d. Federal-Aid Policy Guide
The USDOT Federal-Aid Policy Guide requires a calculation of the potential
danger to large numbers of people at crossings used on a regular basis by
passenger trains, school buses, and vehicles transporting hazardous materials be
considered when state agencies prioritize crossings for grade separation
funding.20
4. National Research Council Transportation Research Board
The 1996 National Research Council Transportation Research Board report on the
Integration of Light Rail Transit into City Streets specifies several causes of LRT
accidents, several design induced errors, and identifies design principles:21
“Design, controls, and operating practices should provide recovery oppor-
tunities for errant motor vehicle and/or pedestrian movements. In other
words, the system design should be forgiving.”
20 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007)21 Integration of Light Rail Transit into City Streets – Sections 3.2 and 3.4 - National Research Council Transportation Research Board (1996)
14
“Provide adequate storage areas (turn bays or pockets) for turning traffic
and provide separate turn signal indications. When left- or right-turning
movements across the LRT tracks are preempted, an adequately sized
storage area should be provided to accommodate those vehicles that are
expected to arrive during the preemption phase.
“Motorists often violate the red left-turn arrow when leading left-turn ar-
row indications are preempted by LRVs. Usually, this illegal movement is
not a conscious choice on the part of the motorist, who has simply learned
to expect the green arrow indication before the through movement.”
“Red time extensions resulting from multiple LRV preemptions cause mo-
torists waiting to turn left across the LRT tracks to become impatient. This
impatience develops further when the signals do not recover to the left-
turn movements. (Typically, signal preemption strategies are designed to
return to the cross-street traffic movement.) Often, motorists will assume
that the traffic signal has malfunctioned and will then violate the signal.”
“Traffic control devices and roadway geometry must be clear and unam-
biguous; they must never confuse the motorist or pedestrian about any ac-
tion to be taken. Unusual or complex intersection treatments should be
avoided.”
“Complex intersection geometry complicates motorist and pedestrian de-
cisions”
“If LRT is designed to operate on a one-way street, LRVs should only op-
erate on a side alignment in the direction of motor vehicle.”
“Two-way, side aligned LRT operations on one-way or two-way streets
confuse motorists and pedestrians and result in high accident frequencies.
Typical problems include the following: Pedestrians and motorist are con-
fused as to which way the LRV is approaching. [….] Two two-way street
couplets are effectively formed when a two-way LRT is side aligned on a
two-way street. This type of geometry especially when turning traffic is
involved, forces the motorist to make complicated decisions. Drivers may
15
be especially confused at night, when the headlights of an approaching
LRV appear on the right-hand side of the road.”
“Pedestrians jaywalk across LRT rights-of-way, having received mixed
messages about relative crossing ease from block to block.”
“Channel pedestrian flows on sidewalks, at intersections, and at stations
to minimize errant or random pedestrian crossings of the LRT track envi-
ronment. This channelization could be accomplished by landscaping
and/or aesthetically pleasing bollards and chain along the curbside of the
sidewalk (between intersections). This channelization also helps prevent
jaywalking across the LRT track environment.
“Unless a specific urban design change is desired (e.g. converting a street
to a pedestrian mall), attempt to maintain existing traffic and travel pat-
terns. If existing traffic patterns are changed when LRT is implemented,
the road user’s expectancy is violated. Despite restrictions or limitations
(e.g., left- or right-turn prohibitions, closure of pedestrian sidewalks or
crosswalks), motorists and pedestrians often try to use the travel routes
they used before the LRT was implemented. Often this type of violation is
committed not intentionally but rather out of habit.
“[P]edestrians do not have adequate, safe queuing areas. Additionally,
LRV dynamic envelopes are not marked clearly, are marked improperly at
LRV turns, or are implied to be smaller than they are by de facto pavement
delineation, such as concrete paving above railroad ties or just between
the rails that are installed in an asphalt roadway.”
“Motorist make illegal left turns across the LRT right-of-way immediately
after termination of their green left-turn arrow. They know it will take a
few seconds for the parallel through traffic to enter the intersection from
the stopped position; however they might be unaware that an LRV is ap-
proaching the intersection at a higher speed.”
“Differences between standard and preempted traffic signal phase se-
quences violate motorist expectancy. For example, preemption of coordi-
16
nated traffic signals in a grid network violates what motorists expect as
they progress along cross-street arterials.”
“Motorists violate active and passive NO LEFT/RIGHT TURN (R3-2/R3-
1) signs, especially where left turns were previously allowed before the
LRT system was constructed. Permanently prohibiting a traffic movement
that was previously allowed disrupts normal, expected travel patterns.”
The Authority is clearly ignoring lessons learned has failed to show an
elimination of all hazards in their applications.
B. The Expo Line’s Shared Blue Line At-Grade Portion Should Require an Applications Process
ECU is concerned about the frequent and numerous catastrophic events in the
short segment that the Expo Line is proposed to share with the Blue Line. The
0.6-mile portion on Flower Street between 12th Street and Washington Blvd has
lead to 138 accidents in the past 17 years,22 and the increase in the risk, by more
than doubling the number of trains operating on the tracks, should require strict
safety oversight, including submission of new crossing applications. Train
frequency in this short segment will amount to a combined Blue Line and Expo
Line headway of 2 minutes – a crossing every minute. The pressure to maintain
headways has already been citied as creating a high level of stress on the light
rail operators. (see Sec. 1) The increased train volume, presence of numerous
driveways opening directly to the tracks, and substantial existing and projected
high-density mixed-use development in the sports and entertainment district
will lead to more vehicular and pedestrian traffic at crossings23 already proven to
22 Summary of the Metro Blue Line Train/Vehicle and Train Pedestrian Accidents - LACMTA (July 1990 - June 2006)23 ECU shares the belief conveyed by AEG/L.A. Arena Company, LLC that the traffic projections are underestimated and inconsistent with year 2008 forecasts discussed in the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District EIR. (FEIS/R Findings of Fact and Statement of Overriding Considerations at p. c-16 (December 2005))
17
be extraordinarily unsafe.24 ECU maintains that it is not acceptable to grant the
Authority permission at the crossings absent an applications process.
C. Photo Enforcement is Not a Safety Mitigation Measure
The Authority’s apparent assertion that they can overcome the many deficiencies
in their proven defective design with photo enforcement, should be as unsettling
to the Commission as the many others proclaimed. The Commission should find
no confidence in photo red-light enforcement as a sufficient safety mitigation
measure given the mounting evidence showing it does not make intersections
safer, numerous court cases challenging their constitutionality, required annual
allocation for operation, and substantial public opposition.
1. Red-Light Cameras (“RLCs”) Do Not Create Safer Intersections
In accordance with their overall applications, the Authority is actually proposing
a safety “mitigation measure” that will make intersections less safe:
a. Urban Transit Institute: “The results do not support the conventional
wisdom expressed in recent literature and popular press that red light cameras
reduce accidents. [….] In many ways, the evidence points toward the installation
of RLCs as a detriment to safety.”25
24 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007): “[A] new residential or commercial development may substantially increase the volume of highway traffic over a crossing such that its hazard index would greatly increase”25 A Detailed Investigation of Crash Risk Reduction Resulting from Red Light Cameras in Small Urban Areas - Urban Transit Institute (July 2004)
18
b. The most recent of several Virginia Department of Transportation/Federal
Highway Administration studies of photo red light enforcement in large Virginia
counties, concluded that the RLCs lead to an increase in the number of accidents,
specifically an increase in total crashes at intersections, increase in rear-end
accidents, and increase in the frequency of injury crashes.26
c. In 2005, the Washington Post published the results of their study of the
District of Columbia’s photo red light cameras:
“The Post obtained a D.C. database generated from accident reports filed by police. The data covered the entire city, including the 37 intersections where cameras were installed in 1999 and 2000.
“The analysis shows that the number of crashes at locations with cameras more than doubled, from 365 collisions in 1998 to 755 last year. Injury and fatal crashes climbed 81 percent, from 144 such wrecks to 262. Broadside crashes, also known as right-angle or T-bone collisions, rose 30 percent, from 81 to 106 during that time frame. Traffic specialists say broadside collisions are especially dangerous because the sides are the most vulnerable areas of cars.” -D.C. Red-Light Cameras Fail to Reduce Accidents (Washington Post - October 4, 2005)
d. In their Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing
Hazard Analysis Report,27 the Authority even admits that photo enforcement is
insufficient: “The Authority accepts that photo enforcement may not necessarily
be the most effective solution in every situation.”
2. Legality
Civil liberties advocates throughout the country have challenged the legality of
photo red-light enforcement, arguing among other reasons that it violates due
26 The Impact of Red Light Cameras (Photo-Red Enforcement) on Crashes in Virginia – Virginia Transportation Research Council (June 2007)27 Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report for the Exposition Light Rail Transit Project – Section D (August 22, 2006)
19
process of law. Earlier this year, the Minnesota State Supreme Court awarded the
party’s challenging the new technology their first major victory, in State of
Minnesota vs. Daniel Allen Kuhlman (MN Case No. A06-568), striking down photo
enforcement in the entire state.
3. Inconsistency
RCES Comments on PRCHAR at p. 2:28
“LACMTA has informed us that at other locations where photo enforcement cameras were installed, they were eventually taken out for a variety of reasons. We are concerned that cameras may be initially installed at these locations and then taken out. Therefore, we do not have confidence in the usage of photo enforcement cameras as a long-term measure for deterring illegal left turns.”
4. Required Annual Allocation
Additionally, red-light cameras require annual allocation from finite resources to
their operation. Elected politicians make the decisions, and can cut their
operational funding at any time. The Commission should have no confidence in
any safety mitigation measure proposed by the Authority whose continued
operation requires annual allocations from the finite budgets of local
governments, school districts or other entities over which the Commission has
limited jurisdiction.
Comparatively, Public Utilities Code Section 1202(c) grants the Commission the
“exclusive power” to allocate the capital expense of grade separations among the
Authority, the State, the County, the cities of Los Angeles and Culver City, as well
as any political subdivision along the route of the Expo Line’s second phase,
between Culver City and Santa Monica, which will be affected by the project.28 RCES Comments on the Preliminary Rail Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, rev. 3 (June 16, 2006) (PRCHAR, rev 3)
20
D. Additional Impacts of Authority’s Crossings Designs
1. Increased Likelihood of Jaywalking
The many street closures in the Authority’s design are likely to disrupt current
travel patterns and lead to jaywalking and unsafe vehicle movements. The
Authority admits as much in their response to the RCES Comments on the
Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, where they justify leaving
some low traffic crossings open to vehicular and pedestrian traffic because they
consider the long distance pedestrians would have to walk to cross will lead to
jaywalking:29
“Regarding the pedestrian volumes at Halldale Road, the CPUC is cored in noting that the pedestrian volume crossing Exposition Boulevard is not significant. Incorrect information was presented in the PCHAR. However, although the pedestrian volume is not significantly high, those pedestrians who do wish to cross will be forced to walk significant distances to adjacent crossings, which in turn may encourage jaywalking for impatient pedestrians.”
In their opening brief the Authority suggests adding a median fence to prevent
jaywalking between Denker Ave and Western Ave, but this fence is not identified
in the FEIS/R or anywhere in the application.
2. Congestion in Residential Areas
The Authority goes on to state that closure of the street would also adjust traffic
circulation in the area:
“Halldale Avenue is a collector street. [….] [A]ccording to LADOT, the closure of this crossing would alter the traffic pattern within the local neighborhood. The traffic at this intersection would be displaced to adjacent through crossings thereby increasing local traffic, travel time and
29 EMLCA Response to RCES Comments on the PGCHAR - Section D (August 22, 2006)
21
inconveniencing local residents.”
Vehicular and pedestrian access via Halldale, along with the many other closed
intersections, are needed to improve traffic circulation, reduce congestion, and
improve air quality. It therefore cannot be closed. (City of Bakersfield) Grade
separation is the Commission’s only option that ensures the safety of this and
other crossings.
3. Implications to Funding & CEQA
Increasing local traffic and travel times through street closures, extended gate
down time and/or higher than expected train frequency would also seem to
challenge the air quality benefits assessed from the project,30 inviting a CEQA
challenge, and unseating the justification for several sources of the funding.
Further, ECU submits that the inadequate horizon year (just 10 years into
operation), inadequate traffic counts supplied to the Commission (several were
taken during the summer when regular school was not in session), the
availability of 2035 traffic projections through the Southern California
Association of Governments (CEQA Section 15162, 15163, 1516531), and the
omission of Phase 2 impacts and possible Crenshaw LRT impacts, preclude the
Commission from approving the applications. Grade separation must be
required, or the clearly defined CEQA laws against segmentation, environmental
justice and others, make it appropriate for the Commission to order the
Authority to formulate a supplemental or subsequent environmental impact
report. (San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco,
193 Cal.App.3d 1544 (1987)).
30 Record of Decision – Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Funding31 CEQA Section 15165: “Where individual projects are, or a phased project is, to be undertaken and where the total undertaking comprises a project with significant environmental effect, the Lead Agency shall prepare a single program EIR for the ultimate project as described in Section 15168.”
22
E. The Authority’s Discussion of the Alignment Classification is Misleading and Irrelevant
As part of their justification for the repetition of the proven defective design, the
Authority states that light rail is primarily at-grade.32 This tactic is an intentional
distraction to the voluminous unidentified, ignored and unmitigated safety
hazards along the Expo Line alignment, and speaks less to crossing safety than
good lawyering and public relations. The statement even conflicts with the
Authority’s own Transit Service Policy, study of Blue Line accident causation,
and classification of their rail lines.
1. The Authority’s Transit Service Policy & Blue Line
The Authority’s Transit Service Policy Planning Warrants (Section 2.14) states
that any rail line expected to serve over 50,000 passengers per day be designed
100% grade separated, and is classified as heavy rail.33 ECU submits that the
operations department of the Authority developed the policy based heavily on
their lessons learned from operating the Blue Line, the light rail line with the
highest ridership in the country. The debate of what is and is not light rail is
secondary to the safety hazards caused by high travel demand realities34 and
operational challenges.
32 The Authority’s Opening Brief – Testimony of Rick Thorpe at p. 733 Yet if one must, the Authority has always and continues to refers to it’s own 20-mile, 100% grade separated Green Line as “light rail” (Metro Construction Program Summary – LACMTA (March 2006)), and it is recognized as such in the media and among the public. As is relevant to other aspects of the ECU statement of benefits of grade separation, the Green Line, which is dubbed the train “from nowhere to nowhere” (MTA's Green Line Is Ridden and Derided; Boardings are up on what critics say is 'the train that goes from nowhere to nowhere.' - LA Times - July 10, 2004) is the fastest light rail line in the country, which reduces the line’s operating costs because of increased ridership – more than 40,000 riders per day.34 ECU Opening Brief at p. 5: EMLCA was established by California Senate Bill 504 (Kuehl), for the purpose of completing the Expo Line from Downtown Los Angeles to Downtown Santa Monica. The Applications before the Commission are for Phase 1 from Downtown LA to Culver City. Phase 2 is from Culver City terminus to Downtown Santa Monica. Ridership for the full Expo Line is expected to be 72,000 – 44% higher than the threshold.
23
As stated in the Authority’s own report, the high ridership on the Blue Line
(“MBL”) is the most important contributing factor to the accident rate of the
deadliest and most accident-prone light rail line in the country:
“The MBL has one of the highest ridership counts for light rail lines in the Country. This factor is perhaps the most important contributor to the grade crossing accident rate. The high ridership results in increased pedestrian traffic near stations as compared to other light rail systems. In addition, although MTA Operations does not allow high passenger loads [to] dictate safe operations, there is pressure to maintain travel times and headway schedule requirements (e.g., passenger trip from Los Angeles to Long Beach in less than one hour).” (emphasis added) –Evaluation of the Current Grade Crossing Safety Improvement Program of the Metro Blue Line – LACMTA – Prepared by Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. (Nov. 1998)
Booz-Allen also identifies other conditions, which are intensified on the
Exposition Corridor that contribute to exorbitant accident rate:
“The MBL travels through a high population density area with a diverse varied social-economic community. The high density results in increased pedestrian and automobile traffic as compared to other transit properties. In addition, the communities through which the MBL travels requires special attention to language and literacy issues when disseminating public outreach and education information.
[…]
“The MBL traverses through an industrial center of Los Angeles. The industrial center results in increased trucking and shipping traffic near the MBL. The increased truck traffic results in increased driver frustration due to slower street traffic speeds. This frustration may result in increased crossing gate running and illegal left turns.”
The Authority clearly has not learned from it’s Blue Line as the Expo Line is
projected to serve similarly high ridership at a considerably higher passengers
per mile ratio,35 travel through an area with greater residential density, large
social-economic diversity, more vehicular, pedestrian and bicyclist traffic and
35 Blue Line = 75,000 / 22 miles = 3400 riders per mile (LACMTA Facts at a Glance); Expo Line = 72,000 / 15 miles = 4800 riders per mile
24
adjacent to industrial properties. The callous repetition of the defective Blue Line
design in the applications before the Commission is indefensible, and the
Authority admits as much through their continued attempt to sidetrack the
public and Commission’s attention from the demonstrated reality that building a
light rail line at-grade in such environments is not safe.
F. The Authority’s Cost Analysis is Deficient
Although comparative alignment cost is the least persuasive factor among the
well-established criteria for practicability, the Authority apparently expects the
Commission to make its decision on that basis alone, and assumes that the public
and responsible agencies should accept their elementary cost estimates. As
explained by the United States Department of Transportation, assessing the
economic costs and benefits of grade separation at a crossing requires a far more
comprehensive analysis than the Authority’s.
The Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings (at p.
27), clearly states that the costs of grade separation can not be solely based on a
calculation of construction cost, but instead on the actual economic impact to the
public:36
“The decision to grade separate a highway-rail crossing is primarily a matter of economics. Investment in a grade separation structure is long-term and impacts many users. Such decisions should be based on long term, fully allocated life cycle costs, including both highway and railroad user costs, rather than on initial construction costs. Such analysis should consider the following:
36 In the same report, USDOT suggests similar calculations should be made with street closures (at p. 27): “The crossing closure decision should be based on economics; comparing the cost of retaining the crossing (maintenance, accidents, and cost to improve the crossing to an acceptable level if it would remain, etc.) against the cost (if any) of providing alternative access and any adverse travel costs incurred by users having to cross at some location. [….] “Whenever a crossing is closed, it is important to consider whether the diversion of highway traffic may be sufficient to change the type or level of traffic control needed at other crossings.”
25
eliminating train/vehicle collisions (including the resultant proper-ty damage and medical costs, and liability);
savings in highway-rail grade crossing surface and crossing signal installation and maintenance costs;
driver delay cost savings; cost associated with providing increased highway storage capacity
(to accommodate traffic backed up on a train); fuel and pollution mitigation cost savings (from idling queued ve-
hicles); effects of any “spillover” congestion on the rest of the roadway sys-
tem; the benefits of improved emergency access; the potential for closing one or more additional adjacent crossings;
and possible train derailment costs.”
Given the extraordinary burden placed on public agencies to protect the public
interest, the Authority has no more important mandate than to meticulously
prove grade separations are impracticable. The gravity of the proceedings and
the inexplicable callous repetition of a proven defective design that will result in
predictable catastrophic consequences, compel the Authority to make public
their life cycle cost calculations for each crossing, as proper judgment requires
the Commission to apply the USDOT life cycle cost standard when considering
this less persuasive aspect of practicability.
A crash on the Authority’s prized Gold Line just last week37 resulted in injuries to
half dozen passengers,38 the train operator, and a Sheriff’s deputy. The reduced
speed of the train (15-20 mph) and lower comparative weight (60 passengers on a
2-car Gold Line compared to fully-occupied 3-car Expo Line) still resulted in 37 Gold Line Train Hits Truck in Highland Park – LA Times – September 12, 200738 “[V]irtually all the passenger deaths that occurred on such [light rail] vehicles in collisions were the result of secondary impacts of riding passengers with structures within the passenger area due to the sudden stop, particularly older passengers. More than half the passenger fatalities recorded did not involve another vehicle. [….] Interiors are not designed to cope with secondary impacts of passengers into interior fittings following sudden stops. Interior furniture is too angular and stainless steel grab-handrails have no resilience. Often seats are of stainless steel construction for durability and vandal resistance but unyielding in collisions.” – Incident-Friendly and Secure Light Rail Vehicle Design – Joint International Light Rail Conference/John Swanson (April 9, 2006)
26
derailment, crumbled the F-150 Ford pick-up,39 and left the driver in critical
condition. Thus, specifically, but not exclusively, consideration of the costs for
accidents alone should include:
Lost employee time and employment disability for traumatized and in-
jured train operators, public employees and staff
Capital expenditures for repair or replacement of damaged infrastructure
and equipment
First responders cost
Cost of damage to public property
Cost of service disruption
Economic cost of delay for rerouted transit passengers
Economic cost of detoured or delayed cars queued at the crossing
Air quality costs or detours around incident sites
Even more meaningfully the Authority needs to explain the cost of a human life;
and describe to the Commission and the public if the life of a Dorsey, Foshay or
Trade Tech student is less or equal in value to a Culver City student.
The Authority needs to elucidate the economic costs to victim’s families; and
clarify if a family in South LA is likely to incur less or more economic damage
than a family in Culver City.
The Authority’s cost assessment needs to include a comparison of a grade
separation to the deaths of elderly Leimert Park residents due to impeded access
of emergency services.
Further, the Authority needs to justify how at-grade crossings, street closures,
elevated structures, impeded pedestrian access, and reduced access to parks is 39 ECU respectfully suggests that the Administrative Law Judge view the damage to the F-150 truck and substantial amount of emergency services required at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kF8EEsWJx_k
27
defensible when it limits land use capabilities, resulting in less investment,
smaller projects, and fewer job and housing opportunities (including affordable
and low-income) in communities still struggling to recover from civil unrest over
a decade ago.
ECU is certain the Commission shares in their belief that it would be
contemptible for public agencies to be complicit in the production of a massive
public works project, built at taxpayer expense, which actually creates
immitigable risks to the public and harms community cohesion. Surely the
design is the product of such a life cycle cost analysis. Therefore, such
calculation and explanation of methodology should be made public for the
Commission’s consideration, and the initial calculations for the Blue Line should
be made for comparative purposes.40
G. The Authority Only Admits that Grade Separation is More Expensive; They do not State They Can’t Find Additional Funding
The Authority does not state anywhere in their opening brief or testimony that it
cannot find additional funding. ECU submits the Authority is plenty capable of
financing grade separations.
1. The Authority Found $314 Million in Two Weeks
The recently passed budget of the California Legislature initially cut nearly half
the funding for the Expo Line.41 Just two weeks later, funding was allocated from
other sources.42
40 A 1994 LACMTA study (Los Angeles Metro Blue Line Enforcement Program – LACMTA) estimated the cost of grade separating the entire mid-corridor section from Washington/Long Beach to Long Beach/Willow as $277 million. There have been 139 accidents in this portion and numerous near misses since ‘9441 After 51-day stall, Senate OKs budget – LA Times - August 22, 200742 State OKs final piece of Expo light-rail funding – LA Times – September 6, 2007
28
The action should completely eliminate any and all costs considerations of grade
separations for the Commission. Surely if the Authority can secure $314 million
in just two weeks after being stripped by bipartisan support from both houses of
the California legislature, at the urging of the Governor, the Authority can find
all necessary resources to build crossings that meet the City of San Mateo criteria.
2. The Authority Assets & Annual Budget
The Authority is one of the largest transit agencies in the country with assets
valued at nearly $6 billion and an over a $3 billion annual budget.43 Surely if the
Commission has required far smaller public agencies to grade separate crossings,
then the Authority is capable of making the investment, the benefits of which go
beyond safety to include reduced annual operating cost, and increased ridership
as a result of reduced travel times.
3. Funding Sources Yet to be Fully Explored
a. 2006 California Propositions
Additionally, in November 2006, area voters overwhelmingly supported the
passage of Proposition 1B and Proposition 1C. Included in Proposition 1B is $250
million dollars dedicated solely to grade separations and $4 billion dedicated to
capital rail projects.
Proposition 1C dedicates $850 million to infrastructure improvement projects
when tied to transit oriented development, and given the projected increase in
density around the stations and existing Community Redevelopment Agency
43 LACMTA Comprehensive Annual Financial Report – June 2006: “Metro’s total assets exceeded its liabilities as of June 30, 2006 by $5,796,673,000. Of this amount, $1,380,134,000 is reported as unrestricted net assets and may be used for system expansion, acquisition, and general and special revenue obligations.”
29
(“CRA”) project areas, substantial funding should be lobbied. To date there has
been no formal public action to pursue additional funding from these two rich
resources for additional grade separations.
b. Federal New Starts Funding
In 2003, the Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”) New Starts Funding
Program gave the Expo Line project a rating of “Not Recommended” for the
Fiscal Year 2005 in part because of a deficient funding plan. The following year
the project was reevaluated and given a rating of “Not Rated,” in part because it
failed to meet the New Starts criteria for “user benefits.” Expressing that it
would be too time consuming to remodel the project in spite of the FTA’s offer to
help (to the tune of $300 million dollars), the Authority chose to seek funding
elsewhere, and it did so successfully.
c. Public Private Partnerships
When public-private partnerships for grade separations were offered, including
an effort to levy a benefit assessment district specifically for grade separation led
by the University of Southern California (“USC”), the Authority failed to
successfully negotiate such offers.44
4. The Commission’s Authority to Apportion Capital Costs
If the Authority can demonstrate it is impossible to execute the minimal operable
segments construction options identified in the FEIS/R,45 impractical to secure
additional funding for grade separations, and a revenue short fall, Section 1202(c)
44 USC President Steve Sample Letter to Roger Snoble (March 31, 2006)45 Sections 4.15.1.1, 4.15.1.2 and 2.4.4.2 of the FEIS/R identifies the minimum operable segments construction option, which allows the Authority to build from Downtown Los Angeles to two temporary termini – Vermont Avenue or Crenshaw Blvd.
30
grants the Commission the authority to apportion the expense of grade
separations among the Authority, the State, the County, the cities of Los Angeles,
and Culver City, as well as any political subdivision along the route of the Expo
Line’s second phase, between Culver City and Santa Monica, which will be
affected by the project:
The commission has the exclusive power: “To require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any crossing established and to prescribe the terms upon which the separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the construction, alteration, relocation, or abolition of crossings or the separation of grades shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected or between these corporations and the state, county, city, or other political subdivision affected.”
5. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform and Accountability
Act of 1998
In their opening brief, the Authority references the MTA Reform and
Accountability Act of 1998,46 neglecting to mention that the ban on expending
sales tax revenue for subway construction does not apply to station construction
costs (one of the most expensive elements of subway capital cost), and that the
ban does not apply to trench construction. Additionally, the varied sources of
funding for the project provide the Authority with the flexibility to direct the
non-sales tax portion of funding to subway construction, and commit the sales
tax portion of the budget to other Expo Line costs, such as tracks, signaling and
rolling stock.
H. Domino Effect
In their opening brief and preceding applications the Authority explains that that
grade separations at individual crossings require inclines and declines that
46 Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 2
31
impact other crossings. ECU respectfully submits that this “domino effect”47
precludes the Commission from making any decisions at any crossings, until safe
solutions can be determined at all crossings.
I. The Authority’s Design Makes Redevelopment More Difficult
1. Challenging the Goals of the Community Redevelopment Agency, a
Fellow State Agency
The Authority’s continued pursuit of the Expo Line design will limit the
effectiveness and challenge the objectives of another state agency, the CRA. 48
Section 33000 et. Seq. of the Health and Safety Codes mandates the CRA retain
and expand affordable housing stock, yet forcing future projects to mitigate the
negative traffic impacts of the Expo Line would limit potential investment in a
corridor that needs as many resources and opportunities as possible.
2. Crenshaw Corridor
Similarly important to the economic growth and revitalization of South Los
Angeles is the probable Crenshaw Light Rail Transit line, which is in the
Authority’s 2001 Long Range Transportation Plan constrained funding plan. The
environmental impact report process is funded and has begun. Among the
alternatives heavily being considered is a branch line of the Expo Line. By failing
to study and build the trunk portion of the Expo Line from Downtown Los
Angeles to Crenshaw Blvd in a manner that provides the necessary capacity to
operate a spur, the Authority is jeopardizing redevelopment efforts in the CRA
project areas that line the corridor.
47 City of San Diego D.03-12-018 (2003) at p. 1148 The CRA/LA was established by resolution of the Los Angeles City Council in 1948 pursuant to Community Redevelopment Law of the State of California (Section 33000 et. Seq. of the Health and Safety Code) - http://www.crala.org/internet-site/About/index.cfm - September 15, 2007
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3. Property Rights
Several existing property owners, including Charles Dunn Real Estate, have
already expressed the adverse impacts of the at-grade crossings.49 In a July 2007
letter to the Authority from representatives of a separate property owner,50 the
legal ramifications of the loss of vehicular access to their property is placed in the
appropriate context:
“In California it is well-established that property abutting a major roadway has ‘an easement of ingress and egress’ as well as a right to ‘free and convenient use of access’ to such roadway. See, for example, United California Bank v. People ex. Rel. Dept. of Public Works (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1, 7. See also Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 721 (‘We have long recognized that the urban landowner enjoys property rights, additional to those which he exercises as a member of the public, in the street upon which his land abuts.’). In situations involving substantial reductions in the accessibility of a property (not necessarily a total loss of vehicular ingress and egress), courts have found actionable inference with the above-described right of access, and awarded compensation to property owners. United California Bank, supra, at 7.”
4. Los Angeles Trade Tech College Master Plan
The frequency of trains (one every minute) at the Washington/Flower crossing is
sure to conflict with the Los Angeles Trade Tech College master plan that seeks to
convert current automotive instructional buildings into more traditional
classrooms. Additionally, the increase in the student vehicular, pedestrian and
bicyclist traffic volume will increase the hazards at this already complex
crossing.51 In an environment where educational pursuits are difficult enough,
LATTC should not be forced to mitigate the traffic impacts of the Expo Line.
49 ECU Opening Brief at p. 2050 Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, LLP Letter to Rick Thorpe on behalf of Orthopedic Hospital Campus property owner G.H. Palmer Associates (July 3, 2007)51 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007): “[A] new residential or commercial development may substantially increase the volume of highway traffic over a crossing such that its hazard index would greatly increase.”
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Further, LADOT is unwilling to accept a crosswalk on the east side of Flower St.
“due to the long distance that pedestrians would be expected to clear” across two
tracks,52 yet inexplicably they are willing to accept a longer north side crosswalk
across four tracks.
J. Culver City’s Assessments
It is ECU’s contention that the City of Culver City has been accorded a different
and more stringent design standard than the rest of the Exposition corridor.
While the Authority consistently maintains that light rail is designed to run
primarily at-grade,53 the Authority has committed to respecting the Culver City
General Plan Circulation Element 2.O, which prohibits at-grade crossings of light
rail within Culver City or any elevated alignments of light rail transit adjacent to
residential neighborhoods, and reiterated Resolution 2001-RO63 passed by the
City Council of Culver City in 2001.
ECU shares Culver City’s “concerns related to safety, traffic, fiscal responsibility”
cited in the Element Memorandum,54 which were based on extensive assessments
of emergency response times (among other safety hazards), impacts to land use,
and threats to community cohesion.55 However, it is troubling that upon receipt
of the information, the Authority failed to apply the principles throughout the
corridor. It is apparent the Authority simply recognized that approval from
Culver City was a requisite, negotiated a deal the City could tolerate, and
dismissed the legitimate issues raised. The double standard creates obvious
issues of environmental justice.
52 RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale Crossing at p. 1 (April 24, 2007)53 Authority’s Opening Brief – Testimony of Rick Thorpe at p. 754 Culver City Redevelopment Agency Agenda (March 7, 2005)55 Culver City Senior Management Analyst Memo to Culver City Senior Planner (November 10, 2005) & Culver City Traffic Manager Memo to Culver City Public Works Director & City Engineer (October 10, 2003)
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K. Community Standards
The Commission’s consideration of the community standard, as a component of
the legal definition of practicability, is accented by the substantial safety risks the
Authority proposes to place on local communities. ECU maintains that not only
does the Authority disrespect community standards, they refuse to acknowledge
that there are any, stating that only a few “disgruntled voices” have expressed
any safety concerns.
1. Below-Grade is Preferred
ECU believes that ample precedent exists in the form of the Authority’s Gold
Line to require below grade separations in conformance with community desires.
The Pasadena-Los Angeles LRT Project Supplemental EIR adopted in 1994,56
outlines a process in which a crossing initially planned at-grade was evaluated as
an aerial grade separation and built as a below grade separation:
“The Projects FEIR cleared an at-grade LRT crossing at the intersection of Marmion Way and Figueroa Street in the community of Lincoln Heights. Upon the request of the City of Los Angeles, an aerial grade separation was evaluated as an alternative for the intersection in the Project’s first SEIR. The above-grade alternative, however, resulted in unavoidable visual impacts which the community found to be unacceptable. For this reason, a below-grade alternative to the previously cleared aerial option is proposed in this SEIR.”
2. Noise Pollution
ECU recognizes the desirability of crossing gate bells cessation when the crossing
arms reach the down position, especially in the area between Crenshaw Blvd and
Farmdale Avenue where there is no sound wall proposed on the north side of the
tracks. But in consideration of the conditions delineated in the ECU opening and 56 Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Report Pasadena-Los Angeles Light Rail Transit Project – Section 3.3.6 - LACMTA (March 25, 1994)
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reply briefs and protest of the Farmdale crossing, the lowered safety mitigation
measure is simply unsafe. The community is being expected to negotiate the
safety of our children against the tranquility of our community and ECU submits
that they are both non-negotiable. Below grade separation, which is the optimal
solution for safety and community cohesion should be implemented instead.
3. Public Hearings
Accordingly, ECU welcomes the public hearings assured by ALJ Koss, and
respectfully submits that since community input is a condition of practicability
that no crossings decisions can be made until such public hearings. ECU
requests the two public hearings take place (one at Foshay Learning Center and
another at Dorsey High School) during weekday evening hours or on a non-
holiday weekend Saturday, outside the holiday season, and that an aggressive
community outreach strategy, implemented over a period of no less than 8 weeks
be developed in coordination with Commission’s Public Advisor’s Office, ECU
and the impacted neighborhood councils.
The importance of an aggressive public outreach strategy cannot be overstated.
As reflected in the FEIS/R, the 2001 Public Hearing at West Angelus Church was
the only location where the majority of participants voiced opposition to the
Expo Line,57 largely due to the lowered safety and noise mitigation standards the
Authority was proposing for South Los Angeles communities. Several of the
participants stated that they were not adequately notified by the Authority
despite living on or within a few blocks of Exposition Blvd.
The disrespectful public relations tactics of the Authority continue to this day
with monthly Project Status Update set in the communities along the alignment,
where the Authority fails to permit, and in fact will shout down, any request by
57 FEIS/R Volume 2
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the community to have an open public forum.58 As a result community
participation in the meetings has noticeably declined.
L. Defining Agency Compliance and Stakeholder Endorsement
It’s clear from the official communication between agencies that the Authority is
very liberal in its definition of concurrence and input, as it treats the concerns of
fellow agencies as dismissively as the concerns of the community. Several safety
hazards were raised by various entities and engineers and remain unresolved.
1. Hauser/Exposition
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 36:
“The gate crossing ha[s] been designed…to provide a safe environment.”
DCA Civil Engineering Group Report:59
“[T]he proposed Service Road, the geometric layout, rail crossing, and the almost unavoidable use of opposing traffic lanes will inherently create problems that will prohibit efficient and free flowing traffic. In addition, it is our belief that a completely safe, efficient crossing through the Hauser Boulevard Access Intersection may not be possible under the current design or other design due to the geometric limitations of the area.”
2. Farmdale/Exposition
The Authority’s Opening Brief at pp. 39 - 40:
“The pedestrian flows were modeled using this concept and it was demonstrated that this arrangement allows adequate pedestrian flow and storage.”
58 Culver City Light Rail Countdown at Less Than 1100 Days, Expo Reports – The Front Page – July 18, 200759 DCA Civil Engineering Report sent to Expo Authority (December 12, 2006)
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LADOT:
“LADOT is concerned that the gains made due to the increased width of the sidewalks and crosswalks to the south of Exposition Blvd. will be negated due to the lack of sidewalk space on Farmdale Ave north of Exposition Blvd. Currently, the eastern sidewalk on Farmdale north of Exposition Blvd. is 8 ft wide. It was clearly indicated on the pedestrian model that there is some spill-over of pedestrians into the street after crossing Exposition Blvd. to the north. Currently there is no problem because the intersection is controlled by a “STOP” sign which allows for a fairly constant flow of pedestrians across Exposition Blvd. At the future signalized intersection pedestrians will cross Exposition Blvd. in larger groups resulting in congestion at the north-west corner of the intersection as pedestrians reach the existing 8 ft wide sidewalk.” -RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale at p. 3 (April 24, 2007)
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 40:
“The ECU Amended Protest also expressed concern about the safety of stopping the sounding of crossing bells once the gate has reached the horizontal (closed) position. [….]“This measure reasonably balances the need for public safety with the mitigation of noise impacts.”
RCES:
“Silencing the bells when the gates are down was also discussed, but staff did not support that option due to the large number of pedestrian activity.” -RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale at p. 3 (April 24, 2007)
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 41:
“In summary, the at-grade crossing at Farmdale Avenue…has been designed with the cooperation of…LAUSD.”
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LAUSD:
“Habitable school buildings and places of assembly shall be located outside the 128-foot setback” for active rail lines. -LAUSD Distance Criteria for School Siting (February 27, 2007)
3. Crenshaw/Exposition:
“MTA is concerned about the eastbound right turn; expecting the same kind of troubles they’ve experienced on the Orange Line.” EMLCA Field Diagnostics Meeting #4 Minutes at p. 6 (November 6, 2006)
4. 7th Ave/Exposition:
“PUC asked if the two driveways south of the tracks could be closed.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #2 Minutes at p. 2 (October 23, 2006)
5. Arlington/Exposition:
“PUC wanted the northbound bus zones to be re-located from the current location south of Exposition to just south of Rodeo.” (Field Diagnostic Meeting # 2 Minutes at p. 6 (October 23, 2006)
6. Gramercy Place/Rodeo Road:
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 34:
“[The crossing] ha[s] been designed with the cooperation of LADOT.”
LADOT:
“Okazaki also said that LADOT’s Bicycle unit was concerned about the tire slippage crossing the tracks, and although we’ve designed the bike lane to cross the tracks perpendicular to it, they believe that bicyclist will take a short cut and ride across the track along the roadway.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #4 Minutes at p. 5 (November 6, 2006)
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7. Western/Exposition
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 35:
“[The crossing was] designed…consistent with past experience and current guidelines, to provide a safe environment.”
LAUSD:
“Habitable school buildings and places of assembly shall be located outside the 128-foot setback” for active rail lines. -LAUSD Distance Criteria for School Siting (February 27, 2007)
8. Vermont/Exposition
The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 38:
“Expo Authority, in cooperation with LADOT, the Memorial Coliseum, Exposition Park, and USC, developed the Event Management Plan to integrate light rail service as a means to facilitate safe and efficient arrivals and departures for the large numbers of people attending events at the Coliseum.”
LADOT General Manager Gloria Jeff to Rick Thorpe (May 18, 2007):
“This study is based on an assumption that the Trousdale Station will be built and operated. [….] This is a fatal flaw of the study.”
[….]
“This study proposes that, during a post event, passengers taking the westbound LRT from a Coliseum event are required to line up in westbound traffic lanes on Exposition Boulevard east of Vermont Avenue and to be directed across Vermont Ave on unmarked westbound travel lanes. This proposed operation is not safe for pedestrians.”[….]
“The proposed 50-50 split requirement creates significant impacts to the Coliseum post event traffic control. Vermont Avenue capacity will be cut
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by at least 20% and delay will be doubled. Traffic congestion at Exposition Boulevard and Vermont Avenue will cause major gridlock at Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard and Vermont Avenue, thus will prolong post event traffic congestion, and is no acceptable to LADOT.”
“LADOT raised the above concerns in numerous meetings with the Expo Authority. As of today, none of these concerns have been addressed.”
Expo LRT Ped Simulation Analysis Coordination Meeting Minutes November 8,
2006 with LADOT, Classic Parking, Expo Park, Expo Park Dept of Public Safety,
USC Dept of Public Safety, USC Transportation, LA Coliseum and LAMCC:
“Several individuals note their concerns regarding operating LRT service along Exposition Boulevard under an event situation. The pedestrian flows are extremely large and it would be very difficult to imagine how LRT service could be safely operated at-grade through this area.”
RCES:
“[W]e recommend extending the grade-separation another 0.30 miles to Vermont Avenue. This will result in eliminating four proposed crossings (Vermont, Menlo, Watt and Trousdale), and eliminate hazards associated with severe traffic congestion and traffic surges expected during venue use.” –RCES Comments on PRHCAR rev. 3 at p. 4
9. 28th/Flower & HOV/Flower
“Okazaki started off by saying that traffic moves very fast and erratic as drivers merge onto the HOV lane just south of 28th Street.”
10. Washington/Flower
“PUC was concerned about the long crosswalk on the north leg when the median island is removed.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #3 Minutes at p. 2 (October 30, 2006)
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11. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Compliance
“MTA pointed out that ADA recommends at least an 8-foot sidewalk. However, we only have a 6-foot wide sidewalk on the south side, and there were no property takes proposed in the Project EIR to address this situation” -Field Diagnostics Meeting #6 Minutes (November 21, 2006)
ECU is disturbed that in a country that so profoundly values the rights of the
disabled that mom-and-pop small businesses can be forced to shut their doors
because the owners lack the financial ability to implement ADA compliant
changes to their property, that the Authority, with it’s Expo Line capital budget
of $640 million, over $3 billion annual budget and an army of lobbyists, would be
absolved from making alterations to accommodate disabled citizens.
M. The Authority’s Influence in the Proceedings
Indeed the entire process of permitting the Commission to exercise its voter-
approved oversight is under attack. Though their own Gold Line management
consultants advised subsequent projects to file grade crossing applications early
to plan for the possibility of protests and Commission proceedings,60 that
guidance went unheeded and construction schedules were developed with no
regard to the process. So here again, just a few years later, the Authority (with
many of the same project managers) is before the Commission complaining
about interference to their scheduling, and this time they attempt to undermine
the process altogether by pursuing sponsorship of legislation that attempts to
shorten the time that the Commission has to approve grade crossing
applications.61 Shortening the time frame would no doubt expedite the
construction of light rail projects in California, but to whose benefit and to whose
detriment? 60 Lessons Learned on the Gold Line Rail Project – Project Management Consultants Monica Born & Christopher Burner (APTA): Born and Burner stated applications should be submitted early to guard against at-risk construction, but the stated goal is also to provide “less time for small but vocal opposition groups to become established.”61 California Senate Bill 724 (Kuehl)
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the face of pending catastrophes and in defiance of all logic and fact, the lead
managers of the Expo Line project continue to profess the company line that they
are building a safe system, as a component of their Baghdad Bob
communications strategy. The Authority's CEO, dismissively labels ECU as “a
few disgruntled voices,” a category which he apparently lumps members of his
own staff, a former Los Angeles City Councilmember,62 the president of the
University of Southern California,63 the Los Angeles Unified School District, the
General Manager of the Los Angeles Department of Transportation, the City of
Culver City and the Rail Crossings Engineering Section of the Commission.
The numerous uncovered smoking memos, along with the Authority's political
actions, reveal an organization acting defensively under the crisis of transparency
and oversight. The Authority attempts to deceive elected officials with
misrepresentative design analogies64 as they develop and abet sponsorship of
end-around legislation that seeks to pressure Commissioners to grease the
wheels en route to disaster lest the Commission be stripped of it's California
voter-approved mandate. From publication of the Draft EIS/R to the current
applications the entire process has been more akin to political damage control
than engineering that is principled, in both senses of the term.
As the proceedings continue the Commission will either, like others, fall victim to
the Authority's strong arm tactics or apply the clearly defined legal definition of
practicability using sound engineering principles and lessons learned from the
black-eye of American rail transit safety – the Authority's Blue Line.
If the Commission buckles under the pressure of the Authority, perhaps it should
62 Don’t Turn Exposition Park Into A Rail Yard – LA Times - June 28, 200163 USC President Steve Sample Letter to Roger Snoble - March 31, 200664 Exposition Line Transit Project Status Update Legislative Staff Briefing – EMLCA (May 17, 2007)
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voluntarily or be forced to close its doors and the responsibility of rail crossing
safety should be transferred to a public agency willing to perform the duties
bestowed by the people of California and granted by the Federal Transit
Administration. Approving the verifiably defective design of the deadliest and
most accident-prone light rail line in the country on a corridor with more intense
site conditions and hazards would constitute a total abdication of responsibility
and betrayal of the people's trust. And failure to perform its well-defined duties
would make the Commission liable for the resulting catastrophes.
It is the belief of ECU that the Commission understands its duty. And it is the
hope of ECU, along with those for whom it stands (the muzzled and ignored
engineers and operators, the children, the parents, the teachers, and the citizens),
that well-established engineering principles and stare decisis will triumph.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ DAMIEN WESLEY CLARK GOODMON Date: September 17, 2007
Damien Wesley Clark Goodmon
Executive Director, Get LA Moving
On Behalf of Expo Communities United
P.O. Box 781267
Los Angeles, CA 90016
(323) 932-1959; email: csimmons@successnet.net
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