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Abstract: The nadir of the study of civil-military relations is how diplomats negotiate
to control the equipment type and quantity of other countries armed forces. After the
borders and the free movement of people. Civil-military relations is no longer
control has become a facet of public administration. This paper will detail the
CFSP/ESDP separate to the agreements reached by individual member states. This
contrasts the 'national role conception' but highlights the significance of human
Introduction
The theme of this 20 IPSA World Congress is “Is Democracy Working?” Many
things. This includes the formal and informal imposition of different political
these known as democracy is a subjective political ideology, philosophy and practice.
European Arms Control Regime
Glen M. Segell
Cold War the European Union has experienced enlargement and deepening with open
national, nor is it paramount to the defence of sovereign territorial boundaries. Arms
emergence of a European Union arms control regime linked to the evolving
decision-makers.
Keywords: European Union, civil-military relations, arms control, CFSP/ESDP
th
parts of the world may blame centuries of European political meanderings for many
ideologies, philosophies and practices within Europe and across the globe. One of
There is no singular definition. Like all political ideologies, philosophies and
These values can form norms for daily interactions and practices. Norms can be
agreements, institutions and regimes. Taking this further this paper commences with
democracies have ever entered into armed conflict with each other. This can in part be
(negotiation). This paper will continue along such lines of consideration using The
working with regards to a “European Arms Control Regime.” The paper will discuss
and the EU stance on WMD non-proliferation.
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practices democracy arises out of the values of society as a collection of individuals.
codified into legislation and form the basis for national and international treaties,
the hypothesis that democracy is working in the case of arms control, predominately
amongst and between democratic states. There are very few if any instances where
attributed to the democratic practises (norm) of resolving disputes through diplomacy
European Union (EU) as the case study of democracy showing that democracy is
the various treaties and how they were reached, the implementation of the treaties
within Europe and with other states, the European code of conduct on arms exports,
is the only prerequisite for wider world peace and harmony with universal consensus.
Numerous other criteria and factors could be contemplated and debated. It could also
disputes without the use of armed force are solely confined to the practise of
between sovereign states that are not democratic. However the historical precedence
part due to the creation of the European Union and a European Arms Control Regime.
In evaluating such a case there is no doubt that it could be questionable if democracy
be questionable if issues of arms control, disarmament and the determination of
democracy. Indeed there are many cases of successful diplomacy and arms control
of thousands of years of conflict and war have been brought to an end in Europe, in
All member states of the European Union being democratic as it is a prerequisite for
where, when and why democracy is working, for example in the European Union.
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membership. It follows that arms control is a significant starting point to note how,
states is the nadir of democratic civil-military relations. Diplomats aim to curtail
another states military capability offering to likewise limit their own. The result is
peace dividend and/or gain an eventual comparative or absolute advantage of one side
military of the respective parties to the agreement will limit or reduce their weaponry
sovereign state who control the military is an important characteristic of democracy.
Such practises of elected civilian authorities enacting arms control has abolished
development and procurement in the armed forces of EU member states. Today the
and peace-roles across the globe. The security and defence of the EU is maintained by
police and para-military forces co-operating in patrolling the open internal borders
states engaged in diplomacy. In the 19 and 20 Centuries the most prevalent of arms
the predominate states and the most frequent at war. This was often as multi-lateral
In doing so it should be noted that the diplomacy of arms control between sovereign
sometimes multi-faceted and not always symmetrical. Agreements may achieve a
of the other. When diplomats reach agreement internationally it is expected that the
and forces. This is per se civilian control of the military. Elected civilians in a
conscription and reduced the manpower and devastating escalation of weapon
armed forces of EU states are predominately used to project humanitarian missions
between and amongst EU member states and the free internal movement of citizens.
Historically arms control agreements in Europe have not been confined to democratic
th th
control treaties were negotiated by the Great Powers of Europe, mostly monarchies as
agreements after the cessation of hostilities such as the Peace of Versailles after
control agreements between the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
had civilian control of the military. NATO countries had predominately
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World War I. During the Cold War, European states were proxy to bi-lateral arms
was not a democratic state though the majority of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
democratically elected civilian governments while the Warsaw Pact had
predominately autocratic civilian control of the military.
In both historical periods the characteristic of such agreements was the construction of
norms originated from the values of domestic politics. State leaders were signatories
democratic sovereign states these elected state leaders were required to refer the treaty
to domestic legislature for ratification. It was understood that the process of
There was confidence in continuity in following treaties signed and ratified by
was no such legislative ratification. This frequently gave cause for apprehension that
subsequent leaders would not adhere to their predecessor's agreement. In this
reached through diplomatic efforts. This longevity was apparent after the end of the
international authority to enforce the treaty. This was especially since not all parties to
international norms codified into legal documents in state-to-state agreements. Such
to these treaties often after protracted diplomatic processes. In the Western European
ratification in democratic states by their legislature was in a binding notion of trust.
previous governments. In the Eastern European non-democratic sovereign states there
democracy gave confidence to the longevity of arms control agreements that had been
Cold War for example the INF Treaty.
The inherent limitation of any arms control process is the lack of any form of
such treaties were democratic sovereign states. However, it was understood that so
that they would reach agreement and/or comprise not to descend to war. The hope
fields that could bring antagonistic entities towards peaceful co-existence. There were
reflection of arms control during the Cold War. Indeed the diplomatic process and
important as the domestic ratification and deposition of the treaties in the newly
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long as antagonistic states were negotiating and engaged in diplomacy there was hope
was that arms control treaties would be the platform for further co-operation in other
also clauses in most agreements for monitoring and verification process though these
were also difficult to confirm. By and large and in retrospect this was an accurate
debate in retention of the Cold War agreements after the Cold War was seen as just as
democratic European states as morally if not legally binding.
The arms control environment has progressively changed since the end of the Cold
War. Instead of a rigid bi-polar world dominated by two Superpowers there are now
that cannot participate (weak/failed states) in the diplomatic processes. Such non-
weaponry as well as dissent on the basis of existing treaties resting on the domestic
values of the dominant / hegemonic state that is not universally accepted as
espoused by the USA is complicated by the increased number of sovereign states due
diplomatic process between less than 30 Kingdoms or between two Super-Powers.
General Assembly or its 15 member Security Council to reach consensus.
non-state entities (terrorists), states that are not willing to participate (rogue) and those
participation in arms control discussions has been aggravated by the proliferation of
representative of all nations. This dissent over democracy, capitalism, and secularity
to the end of colonial rule and the rise of nationalism. Arms control is no longer a
Effective arms control and disarmament now requires 192 states in the United Nations
Complicating issues is the decision by President Bush to take uni-lateral pre-emptive
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military action against those opposing the democratic values of the United States.
On a positive and unique note the 25 member states of the European Union (EU) are
disarmament as part and parcel of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) with a sub-ordinate European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The idea
European integration process itself. But the Union has made less progress in forging a
and a single currency. The geopolitical changes following the collapse of
EU members to redouble their efforts to speak and act as one. The deep divisions
among EU member states in spring 2003 illustrate just how difficult this can be over
Nor is it a purely intergovernmental organisation like the United Nations. It is, in fact,
a unique experiment in democracy that is working. Its member countries remain
through the pooling of state sovereignty - and thus gain much greater collective
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. For example, a
functioning civil-service, an elected parliament and agreements on social, culture and
progressively and democratically adopting a common approach to arms control and
that the European Union should speak with one voice in world affairs is as old as the
common foreign and security policy over the years than in creating a single market
communism, and the outbreak of regional crises in the Balkans and beyond, have led
whether the UN Security Council should authorise the American-led war on Iraq.
The European Union (EU) is not a federal State like the United States of America.
independent sovereign nations, but their citizens attain greater democratic rights
strength and influence. Joint decisions are taken through shared institutions such as
single currency, a judiciary as the highest court of appeal to citizens of the EU, a
health issues are just a few benefits to all citizens, to name just a few. Although many
integration to abrogate nationalism that was the cause of 350 years of European
amongst its 25 member states is being enacted as public administration rather than
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may contest what the EU is all about most would concur that it's two objectives are
conflict and strife and to promote democracy. The practise of democracy between and
international diplomacy.
that the EU is an additional entity involved in international arms control and
cannot be a signatory to international agreements and whose actions do not require
governmental organisations or indeed United Nations agencies such as UNIDR that
strive to further arms control and disarmament. Hence CFSP/ESDP is not the same as
not have a 'national role conception' in its foreign, defence and security policy. The
'external action' as it is called in Part III of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the
Convention encompasses the so called 'first pillar' policies such as development co-
well as rapid reaction forces for humanitarian intervention.
The rules for decision-making and the role of the Commission and of the Council are
Council by QMV on the basis of a Commission initiative and under the control of the
Integral to understanding the formulation and implementation of these EU policies is
disarmament that is wielding power in the name of itself and its members but that
domestic ratification. In a sense this is similar but also different from the various non-
a sovereign states foreign policy nor is it the same as external relations. The EU does
EU is thus a democracy but without nationalism. In EU jargon, external relations, or
operation and technical assistance, trade, environmental, visa and asylum policy as
unique for CFSP. Whereas in the first pillar most decisions can be taken in the
European Parliament, all CFSP decisions require the unanimous consent of 25
substantial budget of some 100 billion EURO annually. The second pillar only
crisis management operations in the Balkans. Decision-making and implementation in
effective way - commonly referred to as coherence - implies a seamless and
these are managed in the Commission by debates between the Commissioners who
upon the human element of the actual decision maker. This differs from national
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Member States, but no EP involvement. Also, first pillar policies are underpinned by a
disposes of an annual budget of 40 million EURO most of which is currently spent on
the EU federal attitude is typified of the option of either consensus (commonality) or
unanimity (singularity). However, the implementation of external relations in the most
coordinated use of the CFSP and of all other external relations instruments. Most of
often negotiate from personal views. Such decision making is very much dependant
assemblies / parliaments where there is often the input of political parties, public
opinion, and the need to attain coherency with colleagues.
This is also a consequence of the nature of the European Union where civil-military
territorial boundaries. On the tactical (operational) and strategic (structural) levels
throughout the EU there has progressively been a restructuring of armed forces, new
armed forces are no longer required for territorial defence nor for border patrols given
focussing on the state apparatus for human security by such EU organisations as
laundering and trafficking etc. The armed forces as a defence industrial base are
relations is no longer national, nor is it paramount to the defence of sovereign
focus on equipment procurement and human resource recruitment and training. The
the open borders with the legalised free movement of people and goods. The EU is
EUROPOL against terrorism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, money
retained as insurance and are being restructured to operate as combined-joint-task-
forces have a dual-hat role with and by NATO's Response Force (NRF).
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forces (CJTF) for humanitarian and peace-operations on a global basis. Many of these
states are progressively adopting consensual attitudes towards regional and global
issues on the policy (political options) and doctrinal (specific political
assisting Russia to dismantle obsolete nuclear weapons, the threat of biological and
nuclear program. It is also clear that many of the Cold War arms control agreements
doubt receive the attention of both the EU and OSCE. Indicative of any new
agreements is the uniqueness that EU agencies such as EURATOM and not the IAEA
the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be preserved by all means. This is recalled
December 2003. The Commission is contributing, in close cooperation with the
Council, to the implementation of the Strategy.
Given such events and realities it is the purpose of this paper to continue by focussing
Union's CFSP/ESDP. The goal is to detail the emergence of a unique European Union
democratic public administration separate but in tandem with individual member
Given such practicalities it is of no surprise that the European Union and its member
implementation) levels. These include thematic and regional issues that include
chemical weapons and in taking an active role in negotiations with Iran over its
such as CFE are no longer relevant to the union of 25 EU member states and will no
monitor the EU member states. An example of common policy is the insistence that
in the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMDs adopted by the Council in
on certain specifics of arms control and disarmament that pertain to the European
arms control regime that is co-ordinated with the evolving CFSP/ESDP through
states sovereign diplomacy and democratically formed policies. The emerging form of
regulations; illicit trafficking; a code of conduct; joint action on small arms; a
and disarmament.
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this EU arms control regime is in: dual use regulation; conventional export
common military list; non-proliferation of WMD; and non-proliferation assistance
It is more than likely that the real impact on armed forces and society of the EU
construction of a European military force. This is not surprising given that the
better than French President Jacques Chirac (2001) who succinctly stated ‘The
its task’. The current peace between and amongst EU member states shows just how
democracy is working compared to other ideologies and political systems that have
socialism, and fascism.
This debate has already attracted some attention in academia, in the writings of
Dunnay (2002), Feakes (2002), Grand (2000), Saferworld (2004) and Wulf (2003)
Notable in the debate are the relations between the United States and the European
international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance. Anthony (2004) has
prominent cases of Iran and China since neither are really pertinent to the unique
CFSP/ESDP will be through arms control and disarmament rather than the
rationale of the very existence of the European Union could not have been defined
Purpose of the European Union is to establish lasting peace on our continent. This is
failed in the European region for example monarchies, communism, national
where a list of relevant documentation has been made available by SIPRI (2005).
Union since both espouse democracy. This article will not detail the role of the EU in
already been written on this topic. Further this article will not delve into two
European Union Institutions but are more inclined to relations between the United
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States and separate sovereign states on a bi-lateral level.
Specifically the Iranian dialogue is the initiative of France, Germany and the United
individual or specific institutions of the European Union. These three European union
member states have different diplomatic, political, economic and cultural relations
on the basis of and as a follow-up to the 'Paris Agreement.' This agreement
against terrorism, middle east peace process, weapons of mass destruction, on the one
negotiation but other EU states have remained passively inactive.
European Union on the suggestion of the lifting of European Union’s arms embargo
report that details these relations (Grimmett and Papademetriou 2005). Further to their
report it has also been argued that should the embargo be lifted that it would not result
understood that the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, while not
safeguard against worrisome arms exports by EU states to the Chinese in the future.
for example the transfer of technology. The United States does not have a Code of
Kingdom through the IAEA and the United Nations and does not actively involve the
with Iran but have agreed to co-ordinate their efforts to engage Iran on arms control
encompasses crucial political issues such as the promotion of human rights, the fight
hand, trade and cooperation on the other hand. The United States has supported this
Similarly this article will not consider the relations between the United States and the
on China imposed by the Council of the EU on 27 June 1989. There is an excellent
in either a quantitative or qualitative increase in EU arms exports to China. It is
legally binding on EU members, with some enhancements, would provide a solid
To be sure the Code of Conduct is more comprehensive than the embargo covering
Conduct on Arms Exports.
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is really the stance of the United States on whether the European Union or indeed
States. Supporting this is the fact that 6.7% of all China's military imports come from
the United States compared to 2.7% from the EU. Further the United States frequently
at the United Nations. Alleged human rights abuses were the cause for the imposition
Ambassador of France to the United Kingdom (2005), noted such as 1) Australia is an
criticised; 2) there was no opposition to the Olympic Games in Beijing and 3) France
received remonstration for having recognised China in 1964 as a sovereign state but
recognition.
The Treaties
debated in Larsen (2002). The different national perspectives of EU member states
does not have a single definition or application. The European Union covers an
external neighbours. For example the Mediterranean area has to take into
It is also understood that arms control is a diversionary issue where the main question
other states should have foreign policy stances independent of that of the United
supports China on many issues including vetoing resolutions of human rights abuses
of the arms embargo. There are further examples that Monsieur Errera, the
ally of the United States that does not have an arms embargo on China but is not
this was followed shortly afterwards by President Nixon's visit to China and state
There is no panacea to counter the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons well
show that there is 'no one-size-fits-all' policy that can be applied. As noted democracy
extensive geographical area each with specific needs dependent upon local needs and
consideration the Middle East peace process and states for concern such as Syria and
Kaliningrad enclave while the Balkans remain on a precarious cliff-edge of ethic and
their own special considerations, as do the neutral states of Ireland and Austria.
sovereign member states have been entrusted to meet regularly to discuss the
basis of consensus that the goal is to establish norms and regimes for arms control and
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Libya. The Baltic area has to consider residual Russian weaponry and issue of the
clan strife. The nuclear power states of Europe, France and the United Kingdom, have
Despite this sub-regional focus the overall EU goal is to promote peace and
democracy across the continent and globally where diplomats of each of the 25
formality of agreements and treaties to counter the spread of weapons. This forms the
disarmament.
The norms and regimes follow such treaties as reached in agreement between the two
super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, exampled by the Treaty on the
(CTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin
European states, be they members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, followed the super-
powers in these agreements. Pessimists could claim that the debate was more
evidence of effective inspection and verification regimes, such as those of
the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose intrusive inspections have
concealment and deception programmes; limited the development of WMD; and –
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Weapons Convention (BTWC). During the Cold War both Western and Eastern
important than treaty given that they could be torn up at any stage. Optimists provide
EURATOM, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organisation for
helped force the proliferating or violating country concerned into complex and costly
ultimately - helped reveal covert WMD programmes. This optimism persisted after
European members continued to adhere to the treaty agreements even though they
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the end of the Cold War where former Warsaw Pact European states as well as NATO
were no longer being imposed upon through the bi-polar Cold War alliance system.
Indeed mitigating the pessimism, and seeking an alternative to lengthy diplomatic
efforts in treaty negotiation and furthering the optimism, the EU as the world's largest
utilise its economic might to arms control advantages. Its member states agreed to
This has turned the European Union into a major initiator of international arms
objective given that from the Treaty of Rome (1957) until 1970 agreements with third
party states focussed exclusively on common market issues, mainly economic, where
October 1970 that Member States endeavoured to consult one another on major
context of 'European Political Cooperation'. In 1986, the Single European Act
formalised this intergovernmental cooperation without changing its nature or methods
came when the Maastricht Treaty entered force on 1 November 1993 announcing the
utilise the common EU institutions to make their combined voice heard on the
trading block reached internal agreement through negotiation in December 2003 to
include a model non-proliferation clause in all mixed agreements with third countries.
control and disarmament. This was a unique intra-EU agreement and extra-EU
the expression 'common foreign policy' found no place in the Treaties. It was only in
international policy problems. However, this was at intergovernmental level in the
of operation.
An added momentous impetus to the intra-EU agreement and extra-EU objective
concept 'common foreign policy'. Since then the EU member states have strived to
international stage in addition to the actions of their own diplomats. This has been in
subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis
Convention on Human Rights.
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expressing common EU positions on armed conflicts, human rights and any other
of the European Union to which it is committed to defend exampled by the European
The provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty which entered
specifically to the CFSP. An important decision in terms of improving the
Representative for the CFSP (an innovation of the Treaty of Amsterdam). The former
October 1999. The new Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003 contains
new CFSP provisions. The proposed Constitutional Treaty would grant further powers
Affairs who will be responsible for the representation of the Union on the
The Implementation
The progression of these Treaties reflects the attitudes and intent of EU member states
becoming increasingly complex and multi-faceted in the areas of: 1) export controls
operative threat reduction initiatives. For example, during the 1990s EU members
into force in 1999. Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty on European Union are devoted
effectiveness and profile of the EU foreign policy was the appointment of a High
NATO Secretary-General Mr Javier Solana Madariaga, took up the post on 18
towards foreign policy through the creation of the post of Union Minister for Foreign
international scene.
to grant the EU institutions a role in armaments, security and defence. This is
of both dual-use items and conventional arms; 2) non-proliferation policies; and 3) co-
developed an export control system that includes a common legal basis for dual-use
an iterative process the institutions and agencies of EU have also exercised a
Member States.
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export control and strengthened cooperation in conventional arms export control. In
progressively larger influence over the conventional arms export systems of its
In this fashion the EU has taken on a strong and coherent role in fighting the
Council adopted a WMD Strategy and a WMD Action Plan. Enlargement of the EU
additional new member states, who once were members of the Warsaw Pact, and who
information sharing in arms control treaty implementation. One of the prerequisites
for states to join the European Union in enlargement is that they have demonstrated
Central and East Europe. In the process of enlargement and democratisation arms
Europe.
Control System'. Individual decisions about whether or not to approve an application
their national governments. This is passed to the European Union dual-use export
national obligations with regard to non-proliferation in the context of the EU single
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, in 2003, the
in 2004 has extended these processes and the standards contained therein to the new
have now gained access to the common EU mechanisms for consultation and
that they are democratic. In the process of enlargement, democracy has extended in
control, disarmament and a peace dividend has replaced the Iron Curtain of Cold War
Such processes and standards can be viewed in the 'European Union Dual-Use Export
to export controlled items are taken at the national level by authorities responsible to
control system which is then used by the members of the EU to help implement their
market. The main principle that underpins the dual-use export system is that civilian
commitment to non-proliferation within a single market that aims at free movement of
without first considering the implications of the export for: 1) commitments under
4) the intended end-use and risk of diversion.
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trade shall not undermine the essential security interests of the member states or their
goods and services. Accordingly, products subject to control will not be exported
international agreements on non-proliferation; 2) obligations under sanctions imposed
by the United Nations Security Council; 3) national foreign and security policy; and
the internal market for goods and services established under the 1987 Single European
established the dual-use export control system were developed between 1991 and
1994 to clarify EU legislation [Article 296 (EC)] that makes it clear that member
296 (at that time known as Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome) was not changed in the
Rome (1957) clarifies that arms production and trade are exempted from any common
European regulations. No subsequent EU agreement has changed this status. Hence
trade competence of the European Union, all other manufactured goods are subject to
applications. In this EU member states recognized that they have a strong national
proliferation of certain types of weapons. As a result, it was necessary to develop a
The objective of this EU dual-use export control system is intended to help complete
Act while safeguarding the non-proliferation principle. The regulations that
states may exempt arms production and arms trade from EU common rules. Article
Treaty revisions at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Article 223 of the Treaty of
while items identified in an annex to Article 296 (EC) are explicitly excluded from the
community law. This includes civilian goods which have potential military
security interest as well as national and international commitments to prevent the
system which allowed this non-proliferation commitment to be maintained in the
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framework of EU community law.
In March 1995 the system entered into force. The original system was based on two
Community Regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods; and 2) EU Council
Decision 94/942/CFSP of 19 December 1994 on the joint action adopted by the
control of exports of dual-use goods. On 22 June 2000 the European Union Member
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology.
1334/2000 applies. This includes a Joint Action to introduce export controls covering
technical assistance (including transfers of technology) controlled by the international
missiles and for conventional military goods exported to countries subject to arms
The decisions about whether to approve or deny a given transfer are taken by the
which are then required to provide enforcement and penalty power. Member states
the greatest awareness of potential proliferation risks. Member states have agreed to
territory. In cases where aspects of a specific transfer are unclear or in dispute the
documents: 1) EU Council Regulation 3381/94 of 19 December 1994 setting up a
Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the
States introduced a new Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a
Subsequent amendments have updated the control list to which Regulation (EC) No
export control regimes, bodies and treaties for weapons of mass destruction and
embargoes. The regulation is directly applicable in all Member States.
member states through their national authorities that are democratically elected and
exchange information about license denials to ensure that each licensing authority has
respect export licenses issued by EU partners at the point where goods leave EU
responsible national authorities in the country from which the goods are to be
license was issued. Alternatively, the EU Commission can act as a clearinghouse to
dual-use exports according to agreed criteria to make the process of dispute resolution
19
exported can contact the responsible national authorities in the country where the
assist in resolving the case. States are obliged to keep information and records about
easier and to assist in making exchanges of information more useful in analysis.
in which commonality functions in the European Union based upon ethos, norms and
inconsistent with: 1) the international obligations of member states and their
commitments to enforce UN, OSCE, EU agreements; 2) the international obligations
Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; 3) their
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement; 4)
their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine; and 5) the
example, to-date the total EU support to the fight against landmines for the period
of the worldwide financial assistance to mine action in that period.
The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has the status of a political
The Code of Conduct
A Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU 1998) has emerged inherent to the manner
values. It states that an export licence should be refused if approval would be
of member states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and
commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology
respect of human rights in the country of final destination. In perspective of one
1997-2004 has exceeded the figure of 1 billion Euro. This represents more than half
commitment in the framework of the CFSP serving as the major political document of
commitment to ensure that their national legislation enabled them to conduct their
that coherence is desirable in implementing agreed measures, including arms
this Code of Conduct into their national arms export legislation, and to publish annual
recognize the industrial and technological base required to maintain a defence
detailed in EU documentation (EU 1997) provides ample forum for discussion to
export licences for items subject to the Code of Conduct.
20
the EU arms export regime. Upon signing, the member states' made a political
arms exports in the fashion outlined in the agreement. Such commonality recognises
embargoes, and establishing procedures to facilitate gradual harmonization towards
singularity. In generating EU singularity EU Member States are aiming to incorporate
reports on the Code's implementation. The Code of Conduct has integral elements that
industry able to deliver equipment of the latest generation. The EU framework
elaborate a programme to combat illicit arms trafficking and to enhance information
sharing, including the circulation of information about national decisions to deny
policy has also increased over the years. Similar to national parliaments, the European
Parliament is divided into Committees dealing with specific issues. The ‘Committee
deals with arms transfer matters. There are also two major working groups under the
that plays the central role in the discussion on arms transfer issues within the EU and
most of the information is shared and COARM produces an annual report under
In furthering the Code of Conduct the European Parliament's role in arms export
on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy’ normally
Council of Ministers in which member states discuss these matters. Firstly COARM
in dealing with most issues covered by the Code of Conduct. In this working group
provision 8 of the Code of Conduct. The 'Programme for Preventing and Combating
programme provides a coherent framework for tackling illicit weapons trafficking
disarmament measures.
21
Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms', was adopted by COARM in 1997. The
called for in UNGA resolution 51/45 F (10 December 1996), to take practical
The second group is POLARM that has examined whether the trade in military
multilateral arrangements that exchange technology and multinational defence
impact of simplified procedures for internal trade in military equipment on economic,
programmes that only involve EU member states could the process of exchanging
articles and technologies between members of an industrial project team be made
procedures for internal trade in military equipment: 1) the impact on economic policy;
In 1998 the Council also adopted a Joint Action on the basis of Article J.3 of the
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (EU 1998a). The Joint
national laws and procedures. The Joint Action therefore permits the EU to provide
of small arms and light weapons. The EU has taken actions as regards technical,
equipment between member states could be simplified. A central issue here are
industrial projects among EU members. Discussions in POLARM have examined the
export and procurement policy. For example, in the framework of cooperative
more straightforward? This discussion has examined three aspects of simplified
2) on export policy; and 3) on procurement policy.
Treaty on European Union on the EU's contribution to combating the destabilizing the
Action is legally binding on the member states, though it is implemented through
financial and technical assistance to solve problems caused by existing accumulations
financial and other assistance given to projects conducted by the UN, the Red Cross,
other states. Projects have been conducted in Albania, Cambodia, Georgia and
for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Lima. In July 2002, the Council
22
other international organisations and regional arrangements, and NGOs, as well as to
Mozambique. In addition, the EU has sponsored the United Nations Regional Centre
modified the Joint Action to include ammunition in the small arms definition.
practices have been added to an increasing list of joint EU efforts. A council
European Union code of conduct on arms exports. Like the code of conduct, the
The member states made a political commitment to ensure that their national
legislation enables them to control the export of all the goods on the list. The common
than directly replacing them.
The European Union and WMD Non-proliferation
levels detailed in the EU document on the issue (EU 2003). In brief these are: 1)
EU standpoint, first discussed and agreed upon between the Member States, is
into account. The safeguards systems implemented within the EU, the commitments
Since the introduction of the Code, a number of other policy instruments and agreed
declaration of June 2000 adopted a common list of military equipment covered by the
common list has the status of a political commitment within the framework of CFSP.
list therefore acts as a reference point for Member States’ national military lists, rather
The European Union handles WMD non-proliferation and disarmament on three
During political dialogue with third countries, the issue is frequently raised and the
recalled and explained; 2) At Community level the proliferation risks are duly taken
of the Member states in the different international non-proliferation regimes
Wassenaar, Zangger), and specific regulations, like the Council regulation setting up a
important contributions to the global non-proliferation regime; and 3) Assistance
the realisation of disarmament projects. These programmes are financed from
23
(Australia group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Supplier’s Group,
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, are
programmes are designed and implemented, in particular with Russia and other
Newly Independent States and North Korea, to reinforce non-proliferation or support
different Community Budget sources and managed by the Commission.
Hence the European Union (including the Member States, The Parliament, the
international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance. The creation of the Global
Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by the G8 group of
of international non-proliferation and disarmament assistance as a security building
effectiveness of non-proliferation systems. The Community and its member States
support a strengthening of the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and call for all
weapons of mass destruction developed by the EU Political and Security Committee
individual Member States as well as collectively. EU assistance is financed using a
Council and the Commission) has become a progressively more important player in
industrialized states was the catalyst for additional thinking by the EU about the value
measure. The recent Gulf War showed the absolute necessity of further enhancing the
States to become parties to the NPT.
Measures of this kind feature prominently in the Action Plan against proliferation of
at a meeting on 10 June 2003. Programmes and projects are developed nationally by
variety of different national and collective mechanisms. Some projects are managed
include: 1) Community support to Russia: EU Joint Action on Non-Proliferation and
Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR); 3) the
Science and Technology Centre, Ukraine (STCU) in Kyiv.
24
by the authorities of Member States and others are managed by the Commission that
Disarmament in Russia Nuclear Environmental Programmes; 2) The Multilateral
Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) Scientific cooperation; 4)
The International Science and Technology Center, (ISTC) in Moscow; and 5) the
CFSP Javier Solana presented a paper entitled ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ to
that the EU would have to address as a matter of highest priority: 1) terrorism; 2) the
proliferation of WMD; and 3) the nexus between failed states and organized crime.
Notably that a secure Europe relied on member states of the European Union
In this context, in November 2003, the EU adopted a policy regarding the
countries. Language for a ‘non-proliferation clause’ was agreed and was to be
commitment to join, ratify, implement and comply with relevant international legal
establish an effective system of national export controls that apply to both the export
Furthering these objectives, on 20 June 2003, the EU High Representative for the
the Council of the European Union. In the paper Solana identified three new threats
The Council accepted Solana’s analysis and provisionally endorsed his strategy.
continuing to adhere to democratic values and practises.
management of non-proliferation in the context of its relationships with third
included in future agreements with third countries. The agreed language included a
instruments that seek to counter the proliferation of WMD as well as a commitment to
and the transit of WMD-related goods. In November 2003, the Council also adopted a
agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
25
Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral
means of delivery.
Largely building on these, on 12 December 2003, the EU Strategy Against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was agreed at the Council in Brussels.
operational elements such as the establishment of a monitoring centre to collect
review of implementation by the General Affairs Council. In this document the
security’.
categories: 1) measures for immediate action; and 2) measures to be implemented
each the Action Plan included a time frame, the specific actions to be taken and
projected costs. The seven measures were: 1) a detailed plan of diplomatic action; 2)
the EU’s programme on disarmament and non-proliferation in the Russian Federation;
member states and acceding countries; 5) a budget increase for the IAEA to allow it to
framework of the CWC; and 7) making the EU a leading cooperative player in the
The process involved protracted diplomatic negotiations. The strategy included
information and intelligence relevant to the strategy’s implementation and a biannual
proliferation of WMD was described as ‘potentially the greatest threat to EU
The ensuing Action Plan grouped measures to be undertaken by the EU into two
over a longer period. Seven measures were identified for immediate action and for
firm engagement to promote universalization and reinforcement of 3) prolongation of
4) rapid ratification and implementation of IAEA Additional Protocols by all EU
implement safeguards tasks; 6) the promotion of challenge inspections in the
export control regimes.
26
“Is Democracy Working?” As a case to show that democracy is working this paper
took the instance of the European Union. It was note that a prerequisite for
was note that there are few if any known instances where democratic states have
European Arms Control Regime to show how borders are being opened amongst and
regime are functioning as a public administration institution reducing nationalistic
tendencies that have been the cause of centuries of conflict and war.
This EU arms control regime is part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
regime being separate but in tandem with individual EU member states sovereign
diplomacy and policies. This EU regime probably being the single most important
amongst the 25 EU member states. It was also noted that two main rationales for the
centuries of war and to promote democracy through the rights of individuals. Such a
Conclusion
This article commenced by highlighting the theme of this 20th IPSA World Congress -
membership of the European Union is the adherence and practise of democracy. It
entered into armed conflict with each. The paper detailed the development of a
between EU member states who are also disarming. Democracy and indeed this EU
(CFSP) and sub-ordinate European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This EU
contribution to a common foreign, security and defence dimension between and
establishment and continuance of the European Union are to reduce conflict after
democratic Europe is more peaceful than ever before in its history.
The success of the European Union is not confined to the European continent or
international recognition and acceptance as the worlds single largest trading bloc. In
the rights of individuals, the European Union stresses the means it used to achieve
states, and of corporate and of GO endeavour's. The EU arms control regime is used
conventional export regulations; preventing illicit trafficking; a code of conduct; joint
proliferation assistance and disarmament. Specific thematic and regional efforts are
Iranian nuclear program, the lifting of the arms embargo to China and opinions on
27
region. The European Union wields power and attains respect globally through
setting an example based on its achievements politically, financially, legally, and for
these ends. The European Union promotes democracy as a means better than any
other to achieve peacefully the aspirations and needs of individuals in society, of
to project such values and norms of democracy globally in: dual use regulation;
action on small arms; a common military list; non-proliferation of WMD; and non-
engaged such as EU efforts in assisting Russia in dismantling obsolete nuclear
weapons and concerns on biological and chemical weapons. The dialogue on the
North Korean were also mentioned by this paper as specific projects.
Further the EU Commission plays a role in the various multi-lateral global non-
proliferation regimes to reduce conflict amongst non-democratic states. These are the
and effectiveness of non proliferation export control measures: 1) the Australia Group
Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention); 2) the Zangger
Non Proliferation Treaty); 3) the Missile Technology Control Regime; and 4) the
four international regimes providing co-ordination fora to reinforce the consistency
looking at the bio and chemical sectors (linked with the Chemical Weapons
Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (linked with the ultimate objectives of
Wassenaar Arrangement for the broader arms non proliferation aspects.
28
current stance of consensus (commonality akin to a collective alliance) to unanimity
Constitution for Europe, unveiled in June 2003. This Constitution, the height of any
democratic practise, would grant the European Union a legal personality to enter into
post of EU foreign minister entrusted with formulating EU-wide foreign policy. The
Treaty explicitly creates a federal national security structure superior to that of any
questions relating to the Union's security.’ Member states, according to Article 15(2),
must ‘actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security
effectiveness’; and ‘uphold the Union's position’ in international organizations,
25 member states.
announcement to the world on the promotion and furtherance of democracy. This
through codification into treaties and the establishment of national and international
EU Constitution. Ingrained in this Constitution is the agreement amongst 25 states
The overriding conclusion on the potential for the European Union to move from its
(singularity or a federal union) is exampled in the 263-page Treaty Establishing a
bi-lateral arms control processes with other sovereign states. The Treaty creates the
structure also envisages a European Chiefs of Staff. Specifically Article 15(1) of this
member state, with EU competence ‘cover[ing] all areas of foreign policy and all
policy’; ‘refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its
including the UN Security Council. The Treaty is currently under ratification by the
If and when the Constitution enters force it is likely to signify a dramatic
given that arms control policy is based upon a set of values and norms furthered
regimes. These values and norms arise from domestic politics and society such as the
across an entire continent to further a unified stance on the promotion of democracy
international community for arms control to be established based upon the European
there are few that could argue on the need for an agreement for peaceful coexistence
informal agreements, treaties and regimes. The process towards this is already in
democratic states and where it is working it is reducing local, regional and global
29
and arms control. This would enhance and strengthen the case for an enforceable
Union example of the value of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. Clearly
even though the precise means of attaining these may still be debatable. Nevertheless
a starting point for such an arms control community could be the existing formal and
progress and hence it can be said that the democracy is working between and amongst
tensions that would otherwise lead to armed conflict.
30
Disarmament Assistance, GCSP Occasional Paper Series, No 44, Stockholm,
Jacques Chirac, (2001) The Common Foreign and Security policy of the European
trimestere
P. Dunay, (2002) 'A Lasting Decline or a Dead End in European Arms Control?',
Errera, Gerrard, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom, (2005) Lecture to the
conventional arms. www.nisat.org/EU/European_Armament_Cooperation.htm
www.nisat.org/EU/European_Armament_Cooperation.htm
EU (1998a), Joint Action on Small Arms,
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Biographical note
Glen Segell, PHD, is the Director of the Institute of Security Policy, Editor of the
London Security Policy Study, and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society.
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