lopes esteves kasmi you dont hear me

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 1/40

Hack In Paris - 18/06/2015

You don’t hear me but your phone’s voice interface does

José LOPES ESTEVES & Chaouki KASMI 

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 2/40

WHO WE ARE

ANSSI 2

José Lopes Esteves and Chaouki Kasmi

 ANSSI-FNISA / Wireless Security Lab 

Electromagnetic threats on informationsystems

RF communications security

Embedded systems Signal processing 

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 3/40

AGENDA

ANSSI 3

Voice command interpreters 

Voice and command injection

 Attack scenarios Countermeasures

Conclusion 

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 4/40

Your phone hears… 

Voice Command Interpreters

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 5/40

Definition

Commands scope

 Activation conditions

Process description

Security

VOICE COMMAND INTERPRETERS

ANSSI 5

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 6/40

Hands-free UI

More and more deployed

Smartphones, smartwatches, IoT, cars,

desktop OS, browsers, apps… 

 Apple: Siri, VoiceControl

Microsoft: Speech, Cortana

Google: Google Voice Search

3rd party apps (e.g. Samsung S-Voice)

DEFINITION

ANSSI 6

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 7/40

Telephony: calls, SMS… 

Internet: browsing, emails, social networking,

web searches, maps… 

Local: launching/using apps, changing

settings, creating notes, alarms, calendar

entries… 

COMMANDS SCOPE

ANSSI 7

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 8/40

 Always on: keyword (OK Google, Hey Siri )

Via soft button: in specific applications

Via hard button: on phone or on headset

remote

ACTIVATION CONDITIONS

ANSSI 8

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 9/40

Local: keyword detection, limited actions

Remote: voice processing and command

recognition

PROCESS

ANSSI 9

OK GOOGLE

Call Mom

<Cmd: Call Mom>

1

2

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 10/40

SECURITY

ANSSI 10

Pre-auth actions (limited but still…): authbypass [1]

Cloud based: malicious server responses [2]

Voice processing: privacy [3], biometric data

Local attacks: malicious app voice sending

commands by audio front-end [4]

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 11/40

SECURITY

ANSSI 11

Pre-auth actions (limited but still…): authbypass [1]

Cloud based: malicious server responses [2]

Voice processing: privacy [3], biometric data

Local attacks: malicious app voice sending

commands by audio front-end [4]

Today: Remote and Silent Voice Command

Injection by Smart IEMI

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 12/40

But you don’t hear anything… 

Voice and Command Injection

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 13/40

Smartphones, headsets, FM

Transmission principle and field to line

coupling

Experimental setup

Results

VOICE COMMAND INJECTION

ANSSI 13

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 14/40

Some smartphones are FM radio capable

Use headphones cables as an antenna

Remote buttons change the signal on the

MIC cable

SMARTPHONES, HEADSETS, FM

ANSSI 14

Bandpass

Fil ter

FM

Demodulation

Audio IN

Lowpass

Fil ter

Ampli f ication

Audio IN

   F   M   p

  r  o  c  e  s

  s   i  n  g V 

 oi   c e pr  o c e s si  n g

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 15/40

SMARTPHONES, HEADSETS, FM

ANSSI 15

Some smartphones are FM radio capable

Use headphones cables as an antenna

Remote buttons change the signal on the

MIC cable

Headphones are good [80MHz-108MHz]

coupling interfaces

Maybe we can inject a signal interpreted as

sound by abusing the low-pass filter with a

VHF AM signal

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 16/40

SMARTPHONES, HEADSETS, FM

ANSSI 16

Lowpass

Filter

Ampl i f icat ion

Aud io IN

V  oi   c e pr  o c e s si  n g

«OK GOOGLE »

80-100 MHz CW

  A

  M

 m o

  d u

  l a  t  i o n

PoC: Main hypothesis

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 17/40

PoC: injecting music

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

ANSSI 22

AM – 80-108MHz

Wi-Fi

Faraday Cage

Audio s t reaming

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 18/40

PoC: injecting commands ?

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

ANSSI 24

AM – 80-108MHz

Wi-Fi Internet access

Faraday Cage

<Cmd: Call Mom>

Cloud

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 19/40

 Activation (if needed):CW (80-108MHz), Frequency modulated signal

Exploitation:

CW (80-108MHz), Amplitude modulated CW byaudio voice commands

Electric field level/range:

28V/m at 100MHz (< than the human safety limit)

RESULTS

ANSSI 25

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 20/40

Limitations Antenna size (~30cm)

Emitted power

E-field level/range 28V/m at 100MHz

Power level/range

40W/2m, 200W/5m

RESULTS

ANSSI 26

2m5m

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 21/40

…Silent and Remote Command Injection

Attack scenarios

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 22/40

Tracking

Eavesdropping

Cost abuse

Reputation / Phishing

Malicious app trigger

 Advanced compromising

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 28

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 23/40

Tracking Activate wireless interfaces (Wi-Fi, BT)

Capture advertising packets (Probe Requests)

Use MAC addresses to identifyUse presence of packets to locate

Use Wi-Fi SSIDs to identify known locations

Demo: S-Voice bluetooth (de)activation

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 29

Payload: Hi Galaxy  – Bluetooth

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 24/40

EavesdroppingPlace a call to a monitoring phone’s number  

Simply listen to the target’s sound environment 

Demo: placing a call

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 30

Pay lo ad : Cal l «Mon Compte » («My accoun t »)

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 25/40

Cost abuseMassive attack in a crowded place

Place a call or a SMS to a paid service

Browse to some URL with ads

Demo: web browsing

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 31

Payload: OK Goog le  – Go to www.ssi .gouv.fr

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 26/40

Reputation / PhishingCreate malicious content (embarrassing,

phishing)

Send by SMS, emailOr publish to social media

Web/search history poisoning

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 32

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 27/40

Malicious app trigger Launch an already installed malicious application

Use voice input to trigger a payload

Launch a critical application (e.g. Sesame)

Demo: launching an application

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 33

Payload: OK Google  – Open Gmai l

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 28/40

ATTACK SCENARIOS

ANSSI 34

 Advanced compromisingUse voice command injection as a way to extend

the attack surface (Interface activation, web

browsing…) Exploit vulnerabilities to compromise the device

Ex: silent application install via a malicious web

page [5], local priviledge escalation… 

Ex: wireless interface reset, capture initial

exchange, exploit protocol weaknesses, rogue

 AP [6], launch an application… 

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 29/40

Restrict, Detect and Alert

Countermeasures

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 30/40

COUNTERMEASURES

ANSSI 36

ForUsers

Manufacturers/editors

ToReduce attack surface

Limit impact

Increase attacker levelDetect the attack

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 31/40

USERS

ANSSI 37

Unplug headphones when not used Use mic-less headphones

Only enable voice command when needed

Personalize keyword

Carefully select commands available

(especially pre-auth)

Enable as many feedbacks as possible

(sound, vibration…) 

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 32/40

EDITORS

ANSSI 38

Limit critical commands available Reduce audio front-end sensitivity

Voice recognition

Provide finer-grain settings to users

Detect abnormal EM activity with built-in

sensors [7]

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 33/40

Conclusion

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 34/40

CONCLUSION

ANSSI 40

Voice command interface IS critical andshall be correctly secured

Users: use it wisely

Editors: allow users to use it wisely andimplement secure defaults

Researchers: take a look at it, it is a critical

and complex command input interface

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 35/40

CONCLUSION

ANSSI 41

Smart IEMI can be an efficient attackvector against information systems

Not limited to DoS

More and more affordable (SDR…) 

Take it into account for risk analysis

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 36/40

References

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 37/40

REFERENCES

ANSSI 43

[1] N. Gonzalez, Siri exploited again  – how to bypass the lock screen in iOS

8 , ios.wonderhowto.com, 2014[2] Applidium, Cracking Siri , GitHub, 2011

[3] W. Wei, Apple admits Siri voice data is being shared with third parties,

www.hackernews.com, 2015

[4] W. Diao et al., Your Voice Assistant is Mine: How to Abuse Speakers to

Steal Information and Control Your Phone. SPSM 2014

[5] A. Moulu, Abusing Samsung KNOX to remotely install a malicious

application, Quarkslab, 2014

[6] G. Wilkinson, The machines that betrayed their masters, BH Mobile

Security Summit, 2015

[7] C. Kasmi, J. Lopes Esteves, Automated analysis of the effects induced

by radio-frequency pulses on embedded systems for EMC safety , AT-

RASC, URSI, 2015

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 38/40

IMAGE CREDITS

ANSSI 44

dailymail.co.uk, jimmymacsupport.com, scene7.com,wonderhowto.com, eroelectronic.net, dryicons.com,

webniraj.com, shopify.com, icon100.com, icon8.com,

tagstation.com, wikipedia.org

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 39/40

Thank You

7/23/2019 Lopes Esteves Kasmi You Dont Hear Me

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lopes-esteves-kasmi-you-dont-hear-me 40/40

QUESTIONS ?

Jose Lopes Esteves, jose.lopes-esteves@ssi.gouv.fr   Chaouki Kasmi, chaouki.kasmi@ssi.gouv.fr