muleskinner report vol. 4 issue 10
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Cash-for-Work projects to
the AEAs, and closely
m o n i t o r a n d p r o v i d e
f e e d b a c k o n t h e i r
performance.
But before making this
transition, we developed a
fully transparent CFW
p r o j e c t m a n a g e m e n t
process designed to ensure
CFW funds got to their
intended recipients. In
doing so, we put ourselves
in a position to identify
corrupt officials and work
with the DAIL to have
them reprimanded.
Our plan was simple but
e f f e c t i v e – s h o w a l l
stakeholders “the books” at
the beginning, middle, and
e n d o f a p r o j e c t a n d
provide them a hotline
number to call if they knew
o f o r e ve n s us pe c t ed
corruption. Specifically,
we provided copies of both
the attendance log and pay
log to the laborers shortly
after they were paid and
asked them to verify that
they had received the
correct amount and that all
the people listed on the
(Continued on page 2)
S i n c e o u r
arrival here in
Nangarhar province in
August 2010, Missouri
Agribusiness Development
T e a m IV h a s wo r ke d
closely with the provincial-
l e v e l D i r e c t o r o f
Agriculture, Irrigation, and
L i v e s t o c k t o r e d u c e
co r rupt ion wi th in h i s
organization.
While this has not been
an easy task, we have made
significant progress toward
this objective and this
progress appears to be
somewhat irreversible.
This article describes
t h e me t h o d we u s e d ,
discusses the underlying
cultural dynamics that
contributed to our success,
summarizes some of our
important lessons learned,
and attempts to generalize
o u r f i n d i n g s s o o u r
methodology might be
applied elsewhere.
While anti-corruption is
not a primary mission of
the ADT, Gen. Petraeus’s
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
guidance dated July 27,
2010 directs all U.S forces
in Afghanistan to “identify
a n d c o n f r o n t c o r r u p t
o f f i c i a l s ” a n d “ h e l p
Afghans build accountable
governance.”
In the September 2010
Muleskinner Report , I
discussed the rampant
corrupt ion problem in
Afghanistan and explained
how cor rup t of f i c ia l s
undermine the legitimacy
of the government in the
eyes of the people. I also
described how the ADT
would implement Gen.
Petraeus’s anti-corruption
guidance as we pursued
our agriculture -related
mission objectives.
We did not se t out
specifically to uncover
corruption, but rather, to
improve the ability of the
D A I L ’ s A g r i c u l t u r e
Extension Agents to lead,
m a n a g e , a n d d e l i v e r
services to the farmers in
their districts.
One of the ways we
hoped to achieve this was
t o t r a n s f e r t h e
responsibility for managing
small, limited duration,
Commander ’ s Corner Winn i n g t h e wa r o n c o r r up t i o n
The Muleskinner Report Mo Agribusiness Development Team IV
M A R C H 3 1 , 2 0 1 1 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
D R I V I N G
T H E T E A M
Commander
Col. Fortune
Deputy Commander
Lt. Col. Charles
Senior Enlisted
Advisor Senior Master Sgt.
Blankenship
I N S I D E
T H I S I S S U E :
Winning the War
on Corruption
1-3
Ensuring
Continuity
During Unit
Transitions
4-5
Private Sector
Policy
Development
6-8
A Cheesehead
Amongst
Muleskinners
9-11
Creating
Agriculture
Opportunities for
Women
12-15
www.facebook.com/
MONG.ADTIV
Winning the war on corruption
P A G E 2
attendance log and pay log actually
worked on the project.
In essence, we were showing the
Afghans – both government officials
and farmers – what accountable
governance is supposed to look like
a nd c l ea r l y de mo ns t r a t i n g a
m e t h o d o l o g y f o r a c h i e v i n g
transparency that could be expanded
to other types of processes.
When, during our first round of
CFW projects, we did encounter
signs of corruption, we quickly
g a t h e r e d a n d o r g a n i z e d t h e
evidence , and confronted the
suspected AEA in the presence of
his boss – the DAIL. When the
A E A c o u l d n o t a c c o u n t f o r
discrepancies or explain the calls we
received on our hotline, the DAIL
told the AEA to either return the
money he had skimmed, or be fired
and put in jail. In all cases, the
guilty parties returned the money
and the DAIL made a point to
personally distribute the recovered
funds to the laborers for whom they
were originally intended.
Once word got out to the other
AEAs that we were watching them
and were prepared to hold them
accountable, they abruptly fell in
line and we have had few corruption
-related problems since.
The Pashtuns – the inhabitants of
Nangarhar province – are a very
proud people, know right from
wrong, and like to be seen as
altruistic. While many Pashtun
officials may find it acceptable to
partake in corrupt activities when no
one is watching, they still consider it
very shameful to be called out on
their misdeeds, and will avoid this
embarrassment at all costs.
(Continued from page 1) They also tend to be terrified at the
threat of being fired and thrown in
prison because this would bring
shame, not just upon them, but upon
their entire family and extended
family. Afghans put an extremely
high value on their relationship with
and status within their family because
this is where they tend to find security,
employment, power and respect, and
opportunities for advancement.
Behind-the-scenes, what we also
found both interesting and beneficial
was that the DAIL himself seemed to
be embarrassed, concerned, and even
fearful that some of his AEAs were
caught embezzling funds. This is
most likely because, in confronting his
AEAs, he felt we were confronting
him as well – although this was not
our intent.
On multiple occasions during the
next couple months and without
p r o mpt in g f r o m the ADT , we
observed him telling his subordinates
that he would not tolerate corruption
of any kind. At one point, he went
so far as to state “A corrupt man has
no conscience, and a man with no
conscience might as well be a dead
man.”
And because he has taken such a
strong stance with his subordinates,
it seems unlikely that the DAIL
himself will engage in corruption –
either now or in the semi-distant
future – for fear of being seen as a
hypocrite.
In working with the DAIL to
reduce cor rupt ion with in h is
depar tment , we learned some
important lessons that we would like
to convey to other leaders engaged
in, or preparing to engage in,
d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s a c r o s s
Afghanistan.
For instance, shortly after arrival
in theater, we recommend that
commanders meet with their Afghan
counterpart to clearly state their
intent to address corruption. We
believe that the longer it takes to
have this discussion, the more
difficult it will be and the less
impact it will have.
T a k i n g a f i r m s t a n c e o n
corruption early in the relationship
es tabl i shes the commander ’s
authority up front and this is one of
the keys to success in working with
Afghans as discussed in an earlier
Muleskinner Report article. Failing
to have this conversation completely
is, in effect, failing to acknowledge
the big pink elephant in the room.
I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t
commanders not only ensure
p r o c e s s e s h a v e s u f f i c i e n t
management controls to provide
good accountability, but that they
a l so minimize incent ives for
(Continued on page 3)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
Engineer Safi, Nangarhar DAIL, takes a strong
stance against corruption during a Leadership
Training Academy session at Sheshembaugh
Agriculture Research Station in Jalalabad.
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
P A G E 3
corruption. For example, because
management of CFW projects
requires the AEAs to do additional
work and expend money for fuel
t h e y w o u l d n o t h a v e s p e n t
otherwise, we compensate them
modestly for transportation and
other incidental expenses – up to
$50 per project. This seems to be
about the right amount to keep the
honest AEAs honest and less apt to
try to undermine the process to
make up for personal losses they
may have incurred in managing
a project.
Commanders should also
use shame to their advantage.
When confronting corrupt
officials, they should team up
with their Afghan counterpart to
make the experience as painful as
possible for the guilty party.
Wi th t ha t s a id , i t i s ve r y
important that suspected officials be
given the opportunity to first explain
themselves before being judged.
We experienced one case where it
initially appeared an AEA had
skimmed funds, but he was able to
c l e a r l y e x p l a i n a w a y a l l
discrepancies when questioned
about them. It is also critical to
limit the number of people present
d u r i n g q u e s t i o n i n g . W h e n
confronting a corrupt official, the
commander, his Afghan counterpart,
and the interpreter should be the
only ones in the room.
In summary, we have found
Afghan officials in Nangarhar to be
more competent than we had
anticipated but also more corrupt.
Given an opportunity to increase
their personal wealth through
corruption, it seems that a large
percentage of them will opt to do so.
However , wi th a careful ly
designed process and some due
diligence on our part, we were able
to force the issue and get these
officials to operate in a transparent
and uncorrupt manner. Even the
DAIL himself, who was reluctant to
even discuss the corruption upon
our arrival, now takes a strong
s t a n c e a g a i n s t i t w i t h h i s
subordinates.
Although this is our only data
point, it appears that our bottom-up
approach might achieve similar
results if applied to other line
directors in other sectors and in
other provinces. It might also be
effective in modifying the behaviors
of district sub-governors and their
staffs. But for this or any other
method to t ruly be effective,
officials at lower levels must be
fearful or at least aware that their
superiors are prepared to hold them
accountable.
It is questionable whether this
same approach would work at the
m i n i s t e r i a l a n d p r o v i n c i a l
governance levels because, as
mentioned in previous Muleskinner
Report article, the higher an Afghan
government official’s rank, the more
t h e y t e n d t o b e v i e w e d b y
themselves and others as above the
l a w a n d u n t o u c h a b l e . F o r
corruption to be eliminated at these
levels, it seems that enforcement
will have to come from the top
down. ADTs and other tactical and
ope ra t i ona l - l eve l un i t s mus t
continue to do all they can to reduce
corruption within the provinces and
districts, but ultimately, if there is
no emphasis at the national level,
these efforts will be in vain.
At some point, Coalition Forces
will leave Afghanistan. If we leave
behind competent Afghan leaders
who unders tand the negat ive
impacts of corruption and hold their
subordinates accountable, the
government has a good chance of
being seen as legitimate by the
Afghan people. If we fail to
do this, the government is
also likely to fail.
Teaching Afghans about
transparency, holding them
accountable, and convincing
them to hold others accountable is
hard work, but it is work that must
be done at all levels of the Afghan
government if we are to succeed
here.
(Continued from page 2)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
Winning the war on corruption
“A corrupt man has no conscience,
and a man with no conscience might
as well be a dead man.” - Nangarhar
DAIL, Engineer Safi.
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
1st Lt. Jodie McCall meets with local
villagers as part of his quality control
check on a Cash-for-Work project in
Surkh Rod. During the first round of
AEA-managed CFW projects, the team
discovered some loopholes in the process
that allowed the AEAs to embezzle
funds. However, the process has been re-
worked and the ADT has had few prob-
lems with corruption since.
P A G E 4
C o n d u c t i n g
a g r i b u s i n e s s
d e ve lo p me nt du r in g
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
remains an incredibly
difficult and challenging
mission.
Due to the protracted
nature of agribusiness
development, the time
required for successful
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e
Secretary of Defense’s
guidance on length of
d e p l o y m e n t s , i t i s
n e c e s s a r y t o r o t a t e
multiple agribusiness
development teams in
and out of the f ight
before the mission is
c o m p l e t e . T h e s e
condi t ions crea te an
imperat ive to ensure
continuity during ADT
unit transitions.
G e n e r a l D a v i d
Petraeus, the commander
of International Security
Assistance Force and
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan,
recognizes this challenge.
He provides specific
guidance in writing, “…
maintain operat ional
t e m p o a n d l o c a l
relationships throughout
t r ans i t i ons t o a vo id
giving insurgents and
m a l i g n a c t o r s a
r e s t . ” ( C O M IS A F ’ s
C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
Guidance, 27 July 2010)
Past is sues of the
Muleskinner Report have
d i s c u s s e d t h e f o u r
standard elements of unit
t r a n s i t i o n s : P r e -
deployment Site Survey,
Advance Detachment,
Re l i e f - In -P l a c e a n d
Transfer Of Authority.
W h i l e t h e s e f o u r
specific elements are
integral to any successful
transition, this article
focuses on the three
principles of continuity
during unit transitions:
consistency from the
Afghan’s perspective,
c o n t i n u a t i o n s i n
campaign planning and a
blending of both rotating
units’ conduct of the
operation.
Consistency from the
Afghans’ perspective
takes a wide variety of
forms and pays a number
of significant dividends.
An incoming unit might
maintain an existing,
recurring meeting with
an Afghan partner to
a vo i d d i s r up t i n g a n
established routine.
For example, ADT IV
conducts a ser ies of
meeting with the Director
of Agriculture, Irrigation
a n d L i v e s t o c k ,
Nangarhar University
a n d a N a n g a r h a r
Watershed Management
Bo ard o f Di r ec t o r s .
Those meeting are likely
c a n d i d a t e s f o r
maintaining consistency.
An incoming unit may
a l s o c o n t i n u e
communica t ing wi th
loca l Afghans us ing
famil ia r , es tabl i shed
formats. As an example,
e a c h A g r i c u l t u r e
Extension Agent receives
a P r o j e c t A n a l y s i s
Scorecard (a grade card)
on their performance
following each Cash-for-
W o r k p r o j e c t .
Maintaining consistency
in the eyes of Afghans
reinforces established
practices and ensures
c o n t i n u e d f o r w a r d
momentum in partnering
with Afghan leaders.
C o n t i n u a t i o n i n
campaign planning is the
s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e t o
ensure continuity during
unit transitions. While
ADT IV developed its
own campaign plan, we
can trace our lineage
back to the campaign
plan issued by Lt. Col.
Greg Allison and ADT I.
E a c h c o m m a n d e r
must conduct his own
mission analysis and
issue their own campaign
(Continued on page 5)
By Lt. Col. North K. Charles
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
E n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i t y d u r i n g u n i t t r a n s i t i o n s
ADT IV agriculture team leaders and Col. Mike Fortune, ADT IV commander, discuss how to implement ADT V concepts during an assessment briefing on February 28.
P A G E 5 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
plans; however, the set of
core tasks should remain
consistent.
In the case of ADTs, core
campaign plan tasks remain
the focus on the Government
of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, the support of
counterinsurgency efforts
and the requi rement to
p a r t n e r w i t h c i v i l i a n
agencies (the U.S. Agency
f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Development and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture,
for example).
Commanders who do not
ensu re con t inua t ion i n
c a m p a i g n p l a n n i n g
experience an unacceptable
cyclic, systematic loss of
institutional knowledge.
Similarly, rotating units
can adopt similar metrics
and assessment criteria to
e n s u r e u n i n t e r r u p t e d
p r o gres s i n e va lu a t i n g
p r o g r e s s . A l i g n i n g
c a m p a i g n p l a n s a n d
assessments during transition
ensures minimal loss of
momentum.
Effectively blending both
rotating units’ conduct of the
operation ensures smooth
t r a n s i t i o n s . A s e a c h
commander envisions how to
accomplish this mission, the
counterpart commander can
e n s u r e c o n t i n u i t y b y
implementing appropriate
e l e me n t s o f t h e o t h e r
commander’s plan.
In the case of ADT IV,
we will adopt and implement
elements of ADT V’s plan.
T h i s n o t o n l y e n s u r e s
continuity, but prepares the
operational environment for
the arrival of the new unit.
In addition, the incoming
u n i t m a y a d o p t s o m e
elements of the outgoing
unit’s operation to ensure a
smooth transition. In the
c a s e o f A D T I V , t h e
incoming ADT V leaders
may continue a number of
Commander’s Emergency
Response Program projects
to blend the two teams’
operations.
A g r i b u s i n e s s
development as a mission set
is challenging for all ADTs.
The mission is especially
difficult during transition
from team to team. The
most effective ADTs are
t h o s e w h o e n s u r e
c o n s i s t e n c y f r o m t h e
A f g h a n s ’ p e r s p e c t i v e ,
maintain continuation in
campaign planning and
blend both rotating units’
conduct of the operation.
These effective teams
r e m a i n f o c u s e d o n
accomplishing the mission,
instead of being distracted
by the numerous challenges
of transitions.
(Continued from page 4)
E n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i t y d u r i n g u n i t t r a n s i t i o n s
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
Col. John Akers,
commander of ADT V,
and Col. Mike Fortune,
commander of ADT IV,
participate in a combined
ADT campaign planning
workshop at Forward
Operating Base Fenty on
January 28.
P A G E 6
Afghanistan’s agriculture
development.
The MAIL’s PSDD has
been in existence for a little
over two years. Since its
establishment, however, the
PSDD has done little relating
to the development of the
private sector. A new director
will soon be appointed for the
PSDD and will begin
development of a department
strategy and business plan. A
timeline has not been
established for this goal but
hopefully it will not take long.
A f g h a n i s t a n ’ s r u r a l
population has traditionally
relied upon subsistence or
small scale agriculture for
their existence. There are a
few centers of economic
development, and few
investors venture far from the
major urban centers.
Based upon experiences in
other devastated countries,
attempting to encourage
growth and development
through either indigenous
farm development or large
scale investment into the
whole country, will not work.
In order to be successful,
private sector development
must support provincial and
district authorities, farmer
associations and private
agribusinesses.
Provincial DAIL offices
should be empowered to foster
economic growth within the
(Continued on page 7)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
Private sector policy development
ISO-9000 certification
now enables raisin export to
the United States and
quality control labs have
been established in major
cities.
T h e M A I L h a s
established an Afghanistan
L a n d A u t h o r i t y t o
streamline and simplify
private access to land; an
Agriculture Development
Fund to ensure private
sector access to agriculture
and livestock credit; a
Policy Analysis and Legal
Advisory Department to
promote an improved legal
and policy framework that
includes tax incentives,
standardization and quality
control; and a Private Sector
Development Department
(PSDD) to coordinate
private sector development
a c r o s s a l l M A I L
departments.
Future plans for private
sector growth include
establishing Free Trade
Zones and an International
Food Center for packaging
a n d w h o l e - s e l l i n g
agriculture produce; and
attaining international
sanitary and phyto-sanitary
standards to ease access to
global markets.
Funding limitations to
support major programs and
a lack of marketing
expertise remain two major
c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g
Funding
limitations to
support major
programs and
a lack of
marketing
expertise
remain two
major
challenges
facing
Afghanistan’s
agriculture
development.
T h e A f g h a n i s t a n
M i n i s t r y o f
Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock recognizes the
need to create and
implement economic
policies to foster the
development of the private
a g r i b u s i n e s s s e c t o r
throughout Afghanistan.
However, it currently
lacks either the resources
or knowledge base to
create, implement and
enforce those policies.
Despite nearly ten years of
U . S . g o v e r n m e n t
i n v o l v e m e n t i n
Afghanistan and a heavy
influx of USG capital into
the country, much remains
to be done to foster the
development of a vibrant,
organic and functional
private agribusiness sector.
T h e M A I L ’ s
agribusiness development
vision is for private sector-
d r i v e n a g r i c u l t u r e
development that is world
famous for quality and
competitive products. In
the last two years, the
MAIL has made significant
a c h i e v e m e n t s i n
developing that vision.
In October 2010, the
MAIL convened an
international AgFair to
encourage international
investors.
By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
private agribusiness sector by
removing barr ier s for
improved and alternative
crops, supporting private
sector and farmer associations,
establishing a provincial
agricultural identity, and
maximizing local resources.
However, this change
requires reformulating the
current governmental structure
and will take time.
In his September, 2005,
“Potential Analysis of the
Eastern Region and Nangarhar
Province, Implications in
Regional Planning,” prepared
by the Citizens Network for
Foreign Affairs, Raphy Favre
suggested creating a small
national office in Kabul to
oversee the identification of
pilot provinces and training to
e n c o u r a g e e c o n o m i c
development at the provincial
and district levels.
The office would report to
a National Supervisory Board
with representation of the key
Afghan ministries as well as
national representatives of
farmer associations and the
Chamber of Commerce. To
be effective, the national
office also needs to be
mirrored at the provincial
level.
Establishing these Regional
Agricultural Growth and
Development Agencies could
be a viable model to
encourage foreign and
domestic investment in fruit,
vegetables, flowers and other
agricultural products and aid
in stabilising the security
situation.
In addition they could
become centers for irrigation,
cultivation and processing
technology.
I m p r o v i n g t h e
Agriculture Extension Agents
technical skill sets through
ADT’s Leadership Training
Academy will provide the
Nangarhar DAIL a solid
foundation to use for
i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r e
production in Nangarhar.
C o m b i n i n g i m p r o v e d
technical skills for AEAs and
increased production by
farmers creates the foundation
for Regional Agricultural
Growth and Development
Agencies. Unless the AEA
skill sets are improved, either
before or concurrently with
the establishment of regional
agriculture growth and
development agencies, Afghan
farmers will be unable to fully
exploit the opportunities these
regional organizations would
provide.
Successful economic
reforms will require multiple
efforts across the economic
spectrum. As economic
reforms are enacted, the
Afghan government, local
business communities and
partner organizations must
communicate those reforms
across the economic spectrum
to ensure they are understood
by all participants.
Provincial Development
Councils must develop
“bankable” agr icul tural
projects with support from
government and international
donors. PDCs must also
provide feedback to policy
makers in Kabul on the impact
of economic policy at the
regional and provincial level
ADT IV’s efforts to
develop the professional
planning and execution
capacity of the Nangarhar
DAIL will help ensure that
agriculture projects presented
to the PDC are sustainable and
provide value added programs
for local farmers.
Farmer organizations,
farmers, small holders and
processors must be
provided support
for crop, product
a n d p r o c e s s
development.
Provinces need
to be promoted as
v i a b l e a n d
sustainable places
to live and do
business through
exhibitions and specialized
events. These exhibitions and
events can promote the
strength of the province’s
existing agricultural business
sectors and disseminate
information. The primary
objectives of the RAGD
facilities will be to drive
sustainable agricultural
economic growth and
development at the provincial
level, stimulate agricultural
economic development in
targeted regions through the
dissemination of agricultural
policy, engagement in
agricultural growth and
(Continued from page 6)
(Continued on page 8)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 7
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
Private sector policy development
A farmer
examines a
sample of seed on
display at a booth
set up as part of
the DAIL
sponsored
Agriculture
Exhibition at the
Governor’s
Compound on
Mar. 21. This was
the first time an
agriculture
exhibition was
held during the
Farmers Day
celebration which
is a traditional
event held in
conjunction with
the Afghan New
Year.
development policy formulation
t h r o u g h f e e d b a c k f r o m
stakeholders in the region, and the
promotion of national and regional
policies to ensure that the private
sector benefits from a consistent
and effective policy framework.
Even if these challenges are
overcome, the development of a
vibrant private sector economy will
be extremely difficult to establish
in Nangarhar without infrastructure
development.
I n 2 0 0 5 , C F N A
described the road network
i n N a n g a r h a r a s
“deplorable.” With U.S.
funding the road network
has since improved, but
there is insufficient
information to determine
the measurable effects of
those road projects.
I n a d d i t i o n t o
infrastructure challenges,
Nangarhar’s limited land
availability limits the
province’s agriculture
potential.
With 145,280 hectares of arable
land, the eastern region of
Afghanistan, including Nangarhar
Province, is not a main agriculture
production area and only represents
6% of the permanently irrigated
land and 3% of the intermittently
irrigated land. Water availability is
a constant constraint resulting in
the predominance of annual
cropping.
The eastern region only
produces 5% of the national wheat
production. Rice and maize
production are more significant at
16% and 15% respectively. The
rice crop is used mainly for local
consumption, while maize is used
for both personal consumption or
as animal fodder.
While fruit production in the
eastern region of Afghanistan is
currently limited, it has a vast
potential. CNFA estimates that the
annual cash flow of productive
orchards in Nangarhar could be
over $2,000 USD per hectare.
Jalalabad lacks a wholesale
agriculture market because, except
f o r o k r a wh i ch r e q u i r e s
Nangarhar’s warmer climate to
perform well, fruit, cereal and
vegetable production is limited.
Vegetables grown in Nangarhar are
transported directly to Pakistan
from farmer’s fields.
Two windows of opportunity
for vegetable production exist in
Nangarhar. The first is the few
weeks between the end of Pakistan
production and before the Afghan
highlands enter production.
The second window of
opportunity is winter vegetable
production before the beginning of
Pakistan production. These narrow
windows of opportunity explain the
low vegetable production levels in
Nangarhar. Farmers and traders
understand this counter-season
opportunity and have proven to be
fast in responding to market
signals.
Continuation of this economic
practice does not require major
publ ic support for future
development as most
farmers can afford to invest
in annual crops, including
vegetables.
The eastern region
produces significant cotton
and clover crops. With
35% of the country’s cotton
production, the eastern
region offers opportunities
for small scale basic
processing plants.
The high level of clover
production reflects the
fairly good livestock and
dairy sector in Nangarhar.
The eastern region also has
the highest number of cows
per family in Afghanistan.
However, the high summer
temperature in Nangarhar requires
a well operated cold chain, with
higher costs and technical
difficulties, to establish a
productive dairy industry and there
is no current initiative to support
increased dairy production or
processing.
Despi te these his tor ical
limitations, Nangarhar province has
the potential to develop a
(Continued from page 7)
(Continued on page 15)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 8
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
Private sector policy development
A vendor advertises locally produced honey and the banner in
the background says “Home products are the pride of Afghani-
stan” at the Farmers Day Agriculture Exhibition held March 21.(Photo by Scottie McCord, Public Affairs, Nangarhar PRT)
P A G E 9
I t i s n o w
approaching fifteen
months since I first
s t e p p e d o n t o
Afghan soil.
In this time, I have
experienced many things
strange and new, as well
a s m a n y t h i n g s
surprisingly familiar.
A m e r i c a n
involvement is entering
i ts ' 10th year in this
country. I have been
personally responsible
for the monitoring and
administration of our
national treasure (your
tax dollars) and have
experienced the tragic
loss of f riends, both
military and civilian. Life
goes on for the United
States and Afghanistan.
Our confluence in
world history at this point
in time is borne out of a
he inous v io l ent ac t .
However , as h i s tory
judges either of us, it is
obvious we will affect
each other’s culture as a
result of this experience.
The expression, “One
of the few constants in
life is change” applies
here as well.
I have been here long
enough to see an entire
c r o p p i n g c y c l e i n
Afghanistan's Nangarhar
Valley. It is amazing the
var iety of crops and
vegetables grown in this
par t of t he count ry .
N e v e r h a v i n g l i v e d
where double and even
t r i p l e c r o p p i n g i s
practiced, it is a learning
experience to see the
abundance of produce
grown.
I have been here long
enough to s ee th ree
rotations of Provincial
Reconstruction Team
Soldiers and Airmen, two
r o t a t i o n s o f t h e
A g r i b u s i n e s s
D e v e l o p m e n t T e a m
National Guard units
from Missouri, and two
ro ta t i ons of Speci a l
T r o o p s B a t t a l i o n
Soldiers.
I t p robably i s the
i n t e n s i t y o f o u r
Afghanistan experience
t h a t m a k e s o u r
friendships stronger and
b o n d s s o f i r m .
Sometimes, we get so
wound up in what we are
doing, we lose sight of
the fact that this is but a
way station in life for all
of us serving here.
E a r t h q u a k e s a n d
indirect fire are also a
way of life here. We have
h a d a t l e a s t s i x
earthquakes since my
arrival. Fortunately, their
epicenters have always
been far away and we
have only felt 'slight'
t remors. Our B-Huts
wiggle with the earth
during an earthquake,
dampening the effect.
T h o s e i n b r i c k a n d
mortar structures usually
feel less, but have to
worry about collapse.
Indirect fire, which
includes rockets and
m o r t a r s , i s f a i r l y
i n f r e q u e n t b u t
u n f o r g e t t a b l e . I t i s
amazing how sound and
vibration transfer though
the soil to your bed and
wake you up. During this
type of event, we B-Hut
residents have to don our
helmets and body armor
and get into a bunker or
'hardened' structure.
My former roommate
and I had this down to 45
seconds. There was the
time he had to remind me
to put on my pants, and
that added a few seconds
to our timeline.
As someone who can
now claim 'hands-on'
agricultural experience
(Continued on page 10)
By George Roemer, USAID
Guest Contributor
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
George Roemer, USAID, and Staff Sgt. William Fox, ADT hydrologist, work together with the local village to evaluate the measures necessary to increase the agriculture productivity at Shinwar.
A amongst Muleskinners
P A G E 1 0 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0
on four continents and over
h a l f a d o ze n d i f f e r e n t
countries, it is interesting to
make some comparisons;
1 . F a r m e r s a r e
farmers, whether American,
E u r o p e a n , A f r i c a n o r
Afghan. All engage in hard
physical labor, are generally
unappreciated, even looked
down upon by their non-farm
neighbors, and view their
respective governments with
some amount of disdain.
They are al so the most
genuine, friendly and honest
people one will meet on any
continent, in any country.
2. Livestock are a
universal source of wealth,
pride and burden. From the
nomadic Masai of Africa, the
p a s t o r a l K u c h i o f
Afghanistan, to the free stalls
and feedlots of America,
various species of livestock
represent their keepers '
investment and potential
income. These animals also
require considerable labor
and resources to make them
profitable production units.
A n i m a l h u s b a n d r y i s
practiced to different degrees
of success around the world,
being dependent on feed,
water, veterinary care and
managerial skills.
3. Crops and soil
management are the basis of
all agriculture, anywhere it is
practiced. Wheat is the most
universally important crop,
followed closely by corn and
rice. Conservation practices
(or lack thereof) significantly
(Continued from page 9) affect the productivity of the
land. Keeping topsoil on the
hillsides is the single most
d i f f i c u l t c h a l l e n g e t o
agriculture anywhere.
As an 'adviser ' to the
Missouri ADT, I am able to
g e t i n v o l v e d i n s o m e
agricultural projects and
programs, give advice (it's
f r e e ) a n d h a v e b e e n
graciously allowed on many
ADT missions.
I have written curriculum
and learning objectives for
c l a s ses on agr i cu l t u r a l
mechanics and cooperative
associat ions. I am even
p l a n n i n g t o t e a c h a
cooperatives class to Afghan
agriculture extension agents.
The ADT is in the process
o f bui ld ing agr icul tur e
i n f o r ma t i o n c e n t e r s i n
Nangarhar's district centers.
It is becoming an accepted
opinion that agricul ture
extension is the single best
way to br ing improved
management techniques to
Afghanistan's farmers.
He l p i n g e du c a t e t h e
current extension agents is an
i mp o r t a n t s t e p i n t h i s
direction. Giving them a base
of operation is another. It is
somewhat amazing what a
hard sell this is to the non-
agriculturally-oriented in
m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i l i a n
command. Even in a place
where agriculture employs
80% of the populat ion ,
getting respect is difficult.
T h i s f a c e t o f a c e
engagement is, I believe, key
to whatever success we may
have in this country. My
ADT friends have had to
hear me say too many times,
“A country cannot have an
industrial revolution until it
h a s a n a g r i c u l t u r a l
revolution.” At least the
ADT guys nod their heads in
agreement before rolling
t h e i r e y e s . M y n o n -
agricultural colleagues just
roll their eyes.
It is the human element in
the Afghan enigma that is
m o s t c o m p e l l i n g t o
contemplate. Whether on or
off the FOB, we see a wide
v a r i e t y o f p e o p l e a n d
motivations. It is easy to get
negative feelings about this
country and its people. There
are those who want to do we
expatriates physical harm;
others who see us as the last
in a long line of invaders
with our own selfish motives
for being here; still others
who are trying to capitalize
on our generosity for their
own gain.
Yet for every one of those
negative elements there are, I
wou ld argue , a gr ea te r
number of positives.
For example, during my
vis i ts to farmers in the
surrounding area while on
mission with the ADT, I have
had some amazing exchanges
and conversations. Afghan
f a r me r s t a l k a bo u t t h e
w e a t h e r , c r o p s a n d
government agricultural
programs. Sound familiar?
We also found out there
a r e c u s t o m p e s t i c i d e
(Continued on page 11)
A amongst Muleskinners
“A country
cannot have
an
industrial
revolution
until it has
an
agricultural
revolution.”
George Roemer stands on
the edge of a cornfield with
Staff Sgt. Eli Colson that
doesn’t look much different
from farmer’s fields in the
U.S. Roemer say, “Farmers
are farmers…”
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
P A G E 1 1 V O L U M E 1 , I S S U E 1
applicators in Afghanistan!
Of c o u r s e , t h e c u s t om
operator we met uses a three
ga l l o n h a n d p u mp a n d
something from a bottle we
couldn't read, but his area's
farmers (“between those two
mountains” he pointed out)
depend upon his services for
crop protection.
Another example is the
young Afghans who have
returned from abroad to help
their fellow Afghans. They
f requent ly come to our
office, sometimes looking for
advice but almost always
looking for funding to assist
t h e i r c o u n t r y m e n i n
rehabilitating watersheds,
improving irrigation systems
or training farmers on better
agriculture practices.
Two instances stand out; a
pair of young Afghan born
men living in Norway came
to us looking for advice on
building a school in their
home village. Another young
Afghan man called me from
San Diego, then had his
brother stop in for a visit to
also ask about building a
school in their home village.
There is a large group of
younger Afghans (mostly
men) that we see at meetings
who are patiently waiting
their turn for authority. Many
of them are graduates of
Nangarhar University here in
Jalalabad.
I t i s a m a z i n g h o w
adaptable we humans are to
an array of circumstances.
(Continued from page 10) Soldiers and civilians here
alike take our environment in
stride and attend to their
respective tasks. The military
e l emen t he re i s h i gh ly
professional and does an
excellent job of keeping us
safe, both on the base and on
miss ions . The c ivi l i ans
include support staff who
c o o k a n d m a i n t a i n
equipment, as well as those
o f u s w h o s u p e r v i s e
development . We of ten
become good friends and
respect each other’s work.
Part of the next step in the
Afghan strategy is to have
even more c ivi l i an and
military presence in what are
called, 'Key Terrain Districts'
or KTDs. The idea is to focus
development strategy in
a r e a s w i t h l a r g e r
concentrations of people
(most are farmers), and along
c r i t i c a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
corridors.
M y p o s t i s n o w i n
Shinwar District, as part of a
designated District Support
T eam. I a m l i v in g and
working out of Forward
Operating Base Shinwar.
M o s t o f t h i s a n d t h e
surrounding districts are
agr i cul tu r a l . My ma jo r
responsibility will be to work
with farmers, agriculture
extension agents, and farmer
associations (cooperatives) in
Shinwar and neighboring
KTDs.
I bring to our team almost
a year's worth of experience
w i t h p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l
programs, as well as an
agricultural background. This
will help give some guidance
and technical knowledge to
what we do.
We in agriculture know
better than most about not
stopping until 'the job is
done'. The job is far from
done here in Afghanistan. I
point out that production
agriculture is not just a
lifestyle but a business as
wel l , even i f i t may be
subsistence. It is critical to
economic development in
Afghanistan.
It is my experience that all
farmers recognize the need to
u p d a t e a n d i n n o v a t e ,
regardless of country or
continent. Based on what I
have seen, Afghan farmers
are no different than those
with whom I have interacted
in any other country.
O n e o f t h e m o s t
productive efforts here, in
my opinion, is the Missouri
ADT's focus on training
agriculture extension agents.
This includes their efforts in
bui ld ing and equipping
agr icul ture informat ion
centers in each of Nangarhar
Province's district centers.
These agents will represent
t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f
Afghanistan at the most
f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l o f
development. It is rewarding
to be advising and assisting
these f ine Soldiers and
Airmen in this endeavor.
Afghanistan's agricultural
revolution is somewhere in
the future. Hopefully our
efforts here will help it begin.
“The job is far
from done
here in
Afghanistan. I
point out that
Agriculture is
not just a
lifestyle but a
business as
well, even if it
may be
subsistence. It
is critical to
economic
development
in
Afghanistan.”
A amongst Muleskinners
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
P A G E 1 2
Creating agriculture opportunities for women
One of the greatest
challenges to
t h e A g r i - b u s i n e s s
Development Team is the
creation of agriculture
related opportunities for
women.
A b i g h u r d l e i n
Nangarhar Province, and
l i k e l y m u c h o f
A f g h a n i s t a n , i s t h e
i m p o r t a n c e M u s l i m
society places on men
and the status of each
within their social circles.
This pattern is ingrained
in each boy from the day
they are born.
To understand how
the ADT can increase
opportunities for women,
one must understand the
basics of Afghan norms
and values. From this
basis, the ADT can work
w i t h i n t h e l i m i t i n g
f a c t o r s t o d e v e l o p
p r o g r a m s w h i c h
empower women but yet
s t a y w i t h i n t h e
framework of the male
dominated society.
For a person from
Western society, the
culture of Afghanistan
can be a bit shocking.
More than once we have
seen the difference in
status of women in the
Pashto culture. Women
a r e t y p i c a l l y f u l l y
covered with a burka or
hejab after the age of 15.
T h e b u r k a i s a
complete one piece dress
which covers the person
from the top of the head
to her feet. The hejab is
a f u l l l e n g t h d r e s s
w i t h o u t t h e h e a d
covering but is typically
worn with a scarf to
cover the head and face.
A c c o r d i n g t o
traditional society, only
the husband is allowed to
see his wife uncovered.
Modern laws do not
enforce the wearing of a
burka or hejab but the
cul ture p laces a b ig
importance on preserving
family honor and status is
d i r e c t l y t i e d t o t h e
protection of women’s
honor.
D u r i n g mi s s i o n s ,
w o m e n w i l l a v o i d
contact with Soldiers.
This includes squatting
down and placing their
b a c k t o w a r d s u s o r
moving indoors out of
sight. A major taboo is
for a Soldier to attempt to
engage a woman directly
in conversation. The
woman may be beaten or
p o s s i b l y k i l l e d ,
depending on the area of
Nangarhar Province, as
t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n i s
shameful for the husband
or the male relatives of
that woman.
I n s o m e o f t h e
outlying areas of the
province, the farmer's
animals seem to have a
greater importance than
the women and children.
We have seen animals
being transported inside a
vehicle while the women
and children were riding
in the trunk of the car.
T h e d i s p a r i t y o f
education between males
and females has been
we l l d ocu me nte d i n
Afghanistan. Currently,
of the over six million
students in Afghanistan,
35 percent of them are
girls. During the reign of
the Taliban, women were
not al lowed to go to
school.
Typically today, rural
villages allow their girls
to attend school through
th e s ix t h o r e i gh th ,
depending on the district.
Tribal norms influence
education.
The more progressive
and developed areas,
such as Behsood and
Kama districts, see more
women completing high
school and some are
allowed to attend college.
In t h e mo r e r e s t i ve
d i s t r i c t s , s u c h a s
Khogyani and Hesarak,
girls are not allowed to
complete more than a
few grade levels if they
a r e a l l o w e d a t a l l .
Education is power and
power is controlled as
much as possible with
some tribes by limiting
education largely to the
males.
(Continued on page 13)
A Soldier speaks
to a promoter of
the Development
Association for
Afghanistan which
trains and hires
women to process
and can fruits and
vegetables.
M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
By Sgt. 1st Class Earl Eisenbacher
Photo by Scottie McCord, Public
Affairs, Nangarhar PRT
Creating agriculture opportunities for women
P A G E 1 3 V O L U M E 1 , I S S U E 1
S o w h a t i s t h e
involvement of women in
agriculture? On most farms,
they play as vital of a role as
the husband. Their labor
i n p u t s t o t he f a r m a r e
sometimes as great as the
ma n ' s . T h e wo ma n i s
charged with maintaining the
home and responsible for
c o o k i n g f o o d , r a i s i n g
chi ldren and car ing for
livestock. The men tend to
the field crops and take on
daily labor outside of the
farm when avai lable to
s u p p l e me n t t h e f a mi l y
income.
The women also help with
duties in other relatives'
homes when possible, as well
as assist men with planting,
weeding and harvest ing
when extra labor is needed
for a short period of time to
complete critical farming
tasks.
Women are typically in
charge of tending the farm
livestock. This includes
chickens, turkeys, goats,
s h e e p a n d c a t t l e . A l l
l ivestock are grown for
family consumption first and
then, if extra animals are
available, they are sold off.
T here seems to be a
division of thought with
marketing excess products
with farmers. Some farmers
we have interviewed viewed
selling excess production as
rather selfish, the farmer
(Continued from page 12) should take care of his
relatives in his village with
his bountiful harvest before
s e l l i n g i t f o r h i s o w n
personal gain.
Obviously, that is not
always the case as a trip
through any district will
reveal markets bloated with
the current vegetable crop.
Multiple butchers are also
typical in any given market;
the product has to come from
somewhere and the nearby
farms are usually the source.
Women are able to make
a contribution to the farm
income from the products
provided by their tended
animals. Chicken meat;
eggs; milk from goats, sheep
and cows; as well as yogurt
and cheese made from excess
mi l k a r e s o l d t o l o c a l
v i l l a ge r s a n d ma r ke t s .
Bartering is important for
farm economics; trading of
production goods is made to
access needed commodities.
F o r t h e A D T t o
implement a sustainable
woman's initiative, it has to
fall within the norms of
society and the accepted farm
life. The ADT can increase
w o m e n a g r i c u l t u r e
opportunities by focusing on
their responsibilities on the
farm. Specifically, poultry
training has been the first
step for the Missouri ADT.
The first hurdle the ADT
overcame was answering the
question “How do we teach
women about poultry?”.
Men are not usually allowed
to have direct contact with
women. The Kentucky ADT
overcame this by hiring an
Afghan company to conduct
t r a in ing wi th a woman
trainer.
We have adopted this
p r ac t ice and h i r ed Mr .
Mohammad Sultani with the
Agency for Building a New
Afghanistan to conduct
poultry training using his
female instructors.
The t raining program
included two days of training
conducted by a female trainer
from ABNA. Additionally,
the Nangarhar Department of
Agriculture, Irrigation and
Livestock has a female
master trainer who sat in on
the training as well.
The first program was
initiated in Qalah-ya Atek
village, Kuz Kunar district in
early February.
T h e p r o g r a m w a s
designed to train 25 poor,
widowed or disadvantaged
women from the village how
to raise and manage chickens
for meat and egg production.
In addition to the training,
each woman received nine
hens, a rooster, a feeder, a
waterer and two months
worth of feed. The chickens
were six months old and
r e a d y t o l a y e g g s
immediately.
The ADT was not present
for the t raining but the
(Continued on page 14)
“Women are
able to make a
contribution to
the farm
income from
the products
provided by
their tended
animals.”
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
P A G E 1 4
Creating agriculture opportunities for women
ABNA later provided
photographs of the two-
day session. The District
Agriculture Extension
Agent, Mr. Mohammad
Zarif, was present and his
role was to oversee the
project.
Involvement of the
D i s t r i c t A E A w a s
important because it put
the face of GIRoA on the
project and enabled the
villagers to see a direct
b e n e f i t f r o m t h e i r
government. In this way,
the training contributed
t o t h e A D T ’ s
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
efforts.
The next obstacle to
overcome was the ability
of the ADT to check the
status of the project at a
later date to see if the
women who received the
training were actually
sustaining their poultry
operation. Because the
(Continued from page 13) ADT Ag Section is all-
male and because all
of our interpreters
are also men, making
an unannounced visit
t o t h e v i l l a g e
required additional
p l a n n i n g n o t
typically required for
other Ag missions.
To resolve this
problem, a female
Soldier was selected
from the security
forces platoon to
conduct a key leader
engagement with the
t r a i n e d w o m e n .
Spec. Virginia Fletcher
was up to the task and
she was given a list of
quest ions to ask the
g r o u p o f w o m e n
i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e
training program. Also, a
female interpreter was
requested from the PRT
unit on FOB Finley-
Shields to accompany the
Ag Team to the village.
Once on s i t e , the
district AEA arranged a
meeting place for the
women, Fletcher and the
female interpreter.
Fletcher reported the
women were excited to
h a v e r e c e i v e d t h e
training and had taken
necessary steps to make
the program sustainable.
They had organized
themselves into what
resembled a farmer’s
cooperative association
by consol idat ing the
housing area for about
t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e
chickens. This eased
securing and maintaining
the flock.
T h e e g g s w e r e
collected daily and taken
to the Jalalabad markets
by a local villager. He
r e t u r n e d t h e mo n e y
earned from egg sales to
the women. Some of the
e g g s h a d a l s o b e e n
col lected and placed
under broody hens to be
hatched, to add to the
future flock.
An agreement had
been set up with a local
farmer to provide grain
for future feed needs.
Finally, training of
additional women in the
village had been done by
some of the elder women
on their own accord. The
village has seen a direct
and tangible benefit from
the training program. It
appears the women can
appreciate the future
possibilities with the
s i mpl e p r o vi s i on o f
agriculture education and
a few materials.
T h e l o n g t e r m
sustainabi l i ty of the
project has yet to be
determined but from the
outside, it appears the
t ra ined women have
made the most of their
opportunity to start a
small business.
(Continued on page 15)
M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
Spec. Virginia
Fletcher stands
with recent
graduates of a
poultry course
the Nangarhar
ADT
sponsored in
Kuz Kunar.
T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have
questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at mike.fortune@afghan.swa.army.mil
The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness
Development Team IV to provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers and Airmen, their
Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not
necessarily those of the Department of the Army or DOD.
MONG
ADT IV Contact Information
The ADT will continue periodic assessments of the
project to determine if additional adjustments are
needed or if other information is essential for long term
sustainability.
A reasonable goal would be for the DAIL female
master trainer to continue poultry training throughout
Nangarhar with the assistance of local women
previously enrolled in the program. Their first hand
experience would be an invaluable part of training
other women. This process would not only be
empowering for women but an added value to each
farm community.
Additional opportunities exist for women in
agriculture. The ABNA offers training for bee
keeping, carpet weaving, and goat rearing also. Other
economic opportunities are available through home
canning and juicing businesses and maintenance of
greenhouses.
The largest stumbling block for an outsider is to
recognize the importance of society norms and values
in Afghanistan. Agriculture programs can empower
women but to be successful, they have to be within the
acceptable cultural range of responsibilities. Taking
small steps forward will ensure no major setbacks will
occur in the progress of Afghan female agriculturists.
(Continued from page 14)
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 1 0 P A G E 1 5
Creating agriculture opportunities for women
significant agribusiness sector. A thorough and
comprehensive agri-market analysis can determine
what infrastructure and market improvements will have
an immediate and direct positive impact on agri-
business sector. ADT IV has begun to analyze the agri-
business market situation to determine the scope and
extent of agri-business activity throughout Nangarhar.
That analysis will provide an information transition to
ADT V that allows them to develop a focused plan to
improve agriculture markets.
Establishing Regional Agricultural Growth and
Development facilities in Afghanistan will be
challenging and will require the support of MAIL,
Provincial Governors, Provincial Development
Councils and donors. In order to be successful private
agribusiness sector development must be championed
by the key ministries – MAIL, MRRD, Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Economy.
On the provincial level ADT IV will allocate
approximately ten percent of its time during its fourth
phase focusing on economics by enhancing the value
chain for Agribusiness in Nangarhar.
This will be done by linking businesses with other
businesses, individuals, cooperatives, non-
governmental organizations, and Government Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan officials to further their
economic opportunities; better coalition forces, GIRoA,
and private sector knowledge of such opportunities;
and help encourage sustainable private sector growth.
(Continued from page 8)
Private sector policy development
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