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Governance networks in telecoms regulation: how to compare the
independence of the sector‐specific regulator in Belgium and Switzerland?
Karin Ingolda1, Frédéric Varoneb2, David Aubinc, Emmanuelle Mathieuc, Koen Verhoestd, Joery
Matthysd
aETH Zurich, Switzerland; bUniversity of Geneva, Switzerland; cUniversité catholique Louvain‐la‐
Neuve, Belgium;dKU Leuven, Belgium3
Abstract: This paper analyzes the independence of the sector‐specific
regulators (RA) which were created in the 1990s to regulate the liberalized
telecoms markets in Belgium and Switzerland. Previous studies focused
mainly on the formal (de jure) RA independence. We argue that a formal
social network analysis (SNA) allows to broaden this perspective by
considering simultaneously the real (de facto) RA independence from
elected politicians, regulatees (i.e. telecoms operators) and other co‐
regulators (e.g. competition authorities). The empirical results show that the
de jure RA independence is a poor predictor of its de facto independence.
The SNA approach offers thus an added value to grasp the complexity of RA
independence in a multi‐level regulatory framework.
Please do not cite without permission
1 Dr. Karin M. Ingold, Institute for environmental decisions, ETH Zurich, +41 44 632 41 27; kingold@ethz.ch 2 Prof. Frédéric Varone, Department of political science, University of Geneva, +41 22 379 83 82;
frederic.varone@unige.ch 3 This paper has been prepared within the framework of the ongoing REGUNET‐project. This research project of
the Belgian Federal Science Office is realized in execution of the Research Program “Society and Future”.
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1. Introduction
The European Single Act of 1986 marked a decisive step in the completion of the common market.
This strategy also resulted in the liberalization (i.e. de‐monopolization) of what were formerly public
monopolies in network industries such as telecommunications, postal services, electricity and gas,
railways and civil aviation. This liberalization process induced in several sectors and countries a
concomitant privatization process of the former public enterprise, as well as the re‐regulation of the
sector opened to competition. One of the major re‐regulation innovations (Majone 1990) is the
creation of so called “sector‐specific regulatory agencies” (RA hereafter).
Furthermore, the current trend of re‐regulating liberalized sectors is a clear move towards a
proliferation of agencies with regulatory powers (i.e. the sector‐specific RA, the competition agency,
ombudsman and judicial courts) on different governmental levels (i.e. EU‐level, national and regional
levels). These RAs are integrated in large regulatory or governance networks sharing contacts with
public authorities (e.g. government, specific ministries or administrative units, parliamentary
committees, etc.), regulatees (e.g. incumbent operator and new competitors) and other stakeholders
representing the economic sector (e.g. business associations, trade unions) and civil society (e.g.
consumers associations). In spite of this widespread interconnection, the issue of independence of
the main RA is raised in scientific debate in relation to the guarantee of legitimate, accountable and
efficient regulatory processes and consistent regulatory outputs. This independence relates to
independence from elected politicians, especially the Minister, from other regulatory actors
(Maggetti 2007; Gilardi 2005; Majone 2001), and from the regulated industry (Peltzman 1976;Stigler
1971).
Different scholars have conceptualized RA independence concentrating, almost exclusively, on the
competences delegated to the main sector‐specific RA by elected politicians based on principles
outlined in the corresponding primary legislation and secondary executive ordinances. The aim of
this paper is to develop the concept of RA independence further by (1) adopting a broader view and
focusing on the large network of actors concerned by sector‐specific regulation; (2) concentrating on
actors’ empowerment in the re‐regulated sector which allows us to identify the agencies with de
facto regulatory competences; (3) conducting a formal social network analysis (SNA) to
operationalize structural characteristics and relational profiles.
The main goal of this paper is thus to show the contribution of SNA to the empirical measurement of
RA independence. To gain first empirical evidence about this topic, we conduct a comparative study
of the telecommunications regulatory framework and network in Belgium and Switzerland. Both
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countries are characterized by a small open economy, a federalist structure and a consensus
democracy with power‐sharing devices. After the telecommunications liberalization both countries
experienced a horizontal and vertical fragmentation of the sector’s regulation. Both countries have
created a sector‐specific RA: the Federal Communications Commission (ComCom, 1997) in
Switzerland and the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications (BIPT, 1991). However, they
also have significant divergences: Switzerland is not a member state of the EU (as it rejected by a
popular vote to enter the European Economic Area in 1992) and has not decentralized its regulatory
arrangement; while Belgium is a founding member of the EU and has delegated broad regulatory
competences to RA on both the national level and the regional and community levels. Furthermore,
the privatization of the incumbent operator (i.e. Belgacom in Belgium and Swisscom in Switzerland) is
less advanced in Switzerland (the State owning about 60% of the operator) than in Belgium (the
Federal State having 50% plus one share in the company). In a nutshell, the present empirical study
concentrates on how the two countries diverge regarding the RAs independence in the telecoms
sector and how these differences can be explained.
This paper is structured as follows: after outlining the concepts of network governance, (de jure and
de facto) RA independence and the link between them, the research design integrating concepts
borrowed from formal SNA is developed and research hypotheses are formulated (section 2). The
difference between the Belgian and Swiss regulatory arrangements is then scrutinized. The analysis is
split in two parts. First, the formal (de jure) RA independence in the two countries is investigated and
operationalized through the calculation of the Gilardi index. Second, the formal SNA concretizes the
real (de facto) RA independence towards the different actor groups in the regulatory framework
(section 3). In the next section (4), we discuss our hypotheses by investigating the added value of a
broader definition of de facto independence towards formal independence and by identifying
explanatory factors for the difference between the Belgium and the Swiss cases. Finally, we conclude
regarding the usefulness of SNA to frame RA independence, and define questions to be addressed in
future research about multi‐level regulation (section 5). In general, this paper will highlight
conceptual and empirical elements of network analysis in the governance literature and for
comparative studies.
2. Theoretical and methodological framework
2.1. A governance perspective on RA
Governance networks play a significant role in the production of public policies (Soerensen 2005).
This is particularly true for regulatory activity in Europe, which is characterized by a horizontal and
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vertical fragmentation and an extended inclusion of several (both public and private) actors.
Examples of this process can be found in Belgium and Swiss telecoms sectors where, after the
liberalization and re‐regulation in the 1990s, regulating competences and resources were dispersed
between multiple levels of government and authorities.
To cope with this fragmentation of the regulatory activity and to strengthen coherence of the
system, RAs were created on different implementation levels. They have market surveillance,
recommendation, rule‐making, and sometimes even sanctioning competences delegated from
Parliament and/or Government. The members of the RAs are neither elected by the citizens nor
directed by elected politicians. Thus, they are typical (so called) “non‐majoritarian institutions”. This
situation immediately raises the question of their democratic legitimacy and accountability and,
relates to the discussion about power decentralization in governance networks (Christopoulos 2008;
Coen and Thatcher 2005).
It is true that the creation of RAs (which are independent from public authorities) to regulate a public
policy sector may appear somewhat of a paradox at first sight. Why do politicians decide to reduce
their own influence by delegating regulatory power to a RA that they do not control directly? In
political science literature, three main reasons (at least) could be indentified to explain this
phenomenon (Varone and Ingold 2010).
• First, and by assigning a (more or less) clearly defined regulatory task to RAs, public
authorities ensure a long‐term predictability of both goals and modalities of public
regulation. Rules do not a priori change due to partisan interference nor, in particular, to a
change of majority in Government and/or Parliament. The resultant credibility of public
regulation (or long term commitment) is absolutely essential for players that need to
anticipate the decisions of the RAs to reasonably invest their resources in the regulated
sector (e.g. telecommunications infrastructure) and to calculate their return on investment
(Majone 1997, 139‐140).
• Second, the regulation of the sector in which RAs were created often requires detailed
sector‐specific expertise, whether technical, economic or legal. Classical administration does
not generally provide the necessary resources and elected politicians serving in a
Government college or militia Parliament even less. Thus, one expects that RAs composed of
independent experts would reduce the information asymmetry between the regulatees (i.e.
the competing operators) and the regulator (i.e. RA; see Coen and Thatcher 2005).
• Third, by delegating regulatory competences to RAs, politicians undertake so‐called blame
shifting. They seek to avoid blame in the case of a regulatory failure by assigning extended
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regulatory responsibilities to an independent agency. If problems occurred, then elected
politicians may put the blame on the RAs instead of taking their own responsibility and
fearing an electoral sanction (Fiorina 1982).
These three arguments explain the (a priori paradoxal) delegation of regulatory powers to RAs. The
question arises however if this de jure assigned independence can also be observed in the de facto
sector regulation. This question is not trivial for two reasons. On one hand, all policy scholars know
that implementation gaps occur frequently, due to the fact that legislation (1) leaves some
discretionary power to implementers; (2) is not clear enough and needs interpretation to be
implemented; or (3) is contested by some actors. On the other hand, the sector‐specific RAs
represent a clear institutional innovation. However, the RAs are not working in a tabula rasa context.
On the contrary, they are integrated in a multi‐level and trans‐sectoral actors’ network and have to
interact with pre‐existing administrative units, competition and other agencies which represent co‐
regulators of the liberalized sector.
2.2. Operationalizing RA independence through network approach
One of the most extensively addressed arguments in the political science literature (Thatcher 2005,
Gilardi 2005) is the RA’s formal (de jure) independence, e.g their independence from political power
as defined by the law. Referring directly to the legal basis which established the sector‐specific RAs,
such an analysis focuses exclusively on the RA’s status (without comparing with other co‐regulators).
It takes four dimensions into account (Gilardi 2005): the appointment procedure of the RA’s
members; their source of financial and personal resources; the scope of their regulatory powers; and
formal requirements about reporting and accountability.
Maggetti (2007) developed the concept of RA independence one step further: besides considering
the formal aspects deduced from legal texts, this author also investigated the RAs real (de facto)
independence by taking into account the RA’s self‐evaluation and its independence from regulatees.
In that sense, Magetti tested the three following hypothesis: (1) a high degree of formal
independence does not guarantee a high degree of de facto independence towards politicians and
regulatees; (2) the earlier the RA was institutionalized in the liberalization process, the greater its
independence from elected politicians; and (3) the better the RA is integrated in European (informal)
networks of national RAs, the more independent it is from regulatees. Maggetti confirmed the three
hypotheses in its comparative case study of 16 RAs in various sectors and countries.
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Notwithstanding these first results, we argue that exclusively considering RA’s self‐interpretation and
their relations towards elected politicians and regulatees is still too restrictive to grasp what is going
on in liberalized and re‐regulated sectors. As already mentioned above, RAs are integrated in a large
multi‐level network of actors which justifies the adoption of an approach concentrating on their
relations shared with all actors in the regulatory arrangement. Thus, we here develop the concept of
de facto independence further.
The first issue we address is the one of actors’ empowerment following the postulate that a certain
degree of power is needed to ensure actors’ independence. Freeman’s (1979) centrality measures
constitute a key concept when it comes to identifying strategic positions and powerful actors in a
network (Christopoulos and Ingold 2009; Ingold and Varone 2009; Christopoulos 2006b), and gives
insight here to the exact role and competences of the different regulators (sector‐specific RA,
competition authority, administrative units, judicial courts, etc.) in the telecoms sector.
To answer the question if a sector‐specific RA is capable of compensating for vertical and horizontal
fragmentation of the regulatory functions, the multi‐level coordination among actors of the
regulatory arrangement has also to be assessed empirically. Coordination and cooperation cannot be
analyzed through the simple measure of densities in the network (Christopoulos 2008). Therefore,
our research design contains the analysis of different relational types (information, influence and
frequent contacts) identifying subgroups of strongly related actors. We thus concentrate on a RA’s
ego‐network and its participation in cliques (Wassermann and Faust 1994; see also definition below),
in order to evaluate how the sector‐specific RA is linked to the direct neighborhood and if it shares
strong relationships with actors representing different governance levels and/or assuming various
regulatory functions.
2.3. Research hypotheses
We formulate four research hypotheses, which are mainly based on the above mentioned theoretical
and empirical studies (Maggetti 2007; Gilardi 2005). The innovation of our empirical research lies in
the new methodological approach used to test these hypotheses. For all hypotheses, the dependent
variable is the de facto independence of the sector‐specific RAs from elected politicians, from
regulatees and from the other co‐regulators. We operationalized this dependent variable by
focusing on RAs reputational power and three SNA measures: Betweeness and degree centralities,
and subgroups of strongly related actors. In that sense, and following our definition here, the de
facto independence depends on two dimensions: a high reputational power and betweenness
centrality. A significant number of impact relations on other actors also enhances the RA’s de facto
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independence. However, a RA’s de facto independence can be affected if other actors take an
important position in the regulatory framework (according to their reputational power and
betweenness centrality), co‐implement regulatory tasks (see cliques of strongly related actors), or
themselves have an impact on RA’s decisions (degree analysis in influence network).
• Hypothesis 1: The formal (de jure) independence of the RA – as defined in the telecoms
legislation and measured according to the Gilardi index ‐ does not guarantee its real (de
facto) independence.
• Hypothesis 2: The longer the life cycle of the RA, the higher its de facto independence.
• Hypothesis 3: The more a RA participates in a European network of RAs, the higher its de
facto independence.
• Hypothesis 4: The more a national RA is integrated in a multi‐level regulatory framework
(with both regional and European co‐regulators), the lower its de facto independence.
The last and “new” (in comparison to Gilardi's and Magetti's studies) research hypothesis is quite
visible as a multi‐level regulatory framework tends to fragment expertise and regulatory powers, as
well as to increase the coordination costs and the (potential) conflict of interest between RAs at
various levels of power. For example, one might expect some tensions between a European co‐
regulator (which is clearly independent from national operators and elected politicians), a national
RA (which has to develop a national regulation beyond diverging regional views on some issues) and
a regional RA (which is for instance dependent from elected politicians). This fourth hypothesis is
very relevant for our two empirical cases. Even if both countries, Belgium and Switzerland, are
federalist states, only Belgium has, to some extent, "decentralized" some aspects of the
telecommunications regulation on the regional level as well. In Switzerland, telecoms regulation is a
national policy; thus only one RA on the federal level has regulatory competences. In addition,
Belgium is a member state of the EU and thus has to conduct a regulatory policy that is compatible
with EU standards and norms; while the EU cannot sanction Swiss authorities if the national RA
would adopt a regulation not compatible with EU norms. In a nutshell, Belgium has a much more
complex multi‐level regulatory framework with extended power‐sharing among different regulators
depending on each other. While both Switzerland and Belgium are characterized by a horizontal
fragmentation of the regulatory network (i.e. the sector‐specific RA, the competition agency,
ombudsman and judicial courts), only Belgium is also characterized by an additional vertical
fragmentation (i.e. EU‐level, national and regional levels).
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2.4. Methodological approach
As a first reference for the study of the Swiss and Belgian regulatory framework in the telecoms
sector, we have studied the national legislations and different scientific studies. This led us to
indentify the actors integrated in the regulatory arrangement which were of interest here, and to
construct a first overview of the RA and other co‐regulators’ tasks and competences.
On the basis of a questionnaire provided by COBRA‐project leaders (Verhoest and Verschuere 2008)4,
we then conducted guided interviews with the Secretary General of ComCom and a member of the
governing board of BIPT, the RA of the corresponding country. We further refined our analysis by
studying public documents and websites of different actors integrated in the regulatory framework.
This first investigation allowed us to define the network boundaries enabling us to conduct a formal
SNA and to concretize our network approach.
Different scholars implemented a network approach in order to better reconstruct stakeholder
intervention in policy processes (Knoke 1996; 1990; Krackhardt 1990; Kriesi 1980). These studies
have proven that formal social network analysis provides an impressive toolbox for empirical analysis
of social network structures and their relevance for behavioral choices of persons and organizations.
In this research, SNA is applied to analyze how different actors implicated in Swiss and Belgian
telecoms policy perceive coordination and implementation of the regulatory framework.
For the definition of the key actors in the mentioned implementation process, we rely on the classical
combination of positional, decisional and reputational approaches. In line with Knoke et al. (1996, 7),
formal organizations, rather than individuals, stand in the foreground of today’s politics. Therefore,
actors in this research are defined as organizations participating in the policy‐implementation
process. Following the decisional approach, actors formally implicated in the telecoms
implementation process by being mentioned or concerned by national legislation are indentified.
This first list was completed by actors of relevant positions in the Swiss and Belgian telecoms policy,
as well as by actors who were mentioned as very powerful by interviewed experts. In the end, we
had a set of 38 actors for Switzerland and the SNA surveys were sent to 31 actors. For a postal
4 The COBRA network (Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis) is an academic
research collaboration in the field of public management. It gathers and analyzes similar survey data on agency
autonomy and control on a large number of participating countries, allowing the comparison of agency types
and features operating in different politico‐administrative cultures (see http://www.publicmanagement‐
cobra.org).
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survey, the response rate was very high and provided us with reliable data: 25 out of 31
questionnaires were answered, corresponding to a response rate of 82%. The Belgian
telecommunications network consists of 34 actors, 24 of them received our survey. 16 surveys were
answered and sent back; thus the response rate of 65% was significantly lower than in the Swiss
case, even if both networks were of about the same size. We will take this difference into account
when interpreting both network results5.
In order to conduct a formal social network analysis (SNA), survey participants furthermore indicated
the relations they share with the 37 or 33, respectively, other actors in telecoms policy
implementation: more precisely, they were asked to indicate with whom they share information and
contacts; who influences their decisions, which organization they can influence and, finally, with
whom they share conflict or cooperation relations. Details about this survey are outlined in the
analysis.
3. First empirical evidence
After a short description of the liberalization process and the new regulatory arrangements in
Belgium and Switzerland, we outline our multi‐dimensional analysis, operationalizing RA’s formal
independence by calculating the Gilardi index; and de facto independence with a formal SNA. Every
measure and concept is then compared between the two countries.
As the two identified networks contain a significant difference in tie numbers, due to the response
rate being higher for the Swiss than the Belgian case, a direct comparison of SNA measures (such as
overall density or centralization) is not workable. However, we still can compare the results emerging
from both separate network analyzes6.
5 In Annex I, a list of all actors integrated in the Swiss and Belgium network is outlined; all actors having
answered our survey are in bold; actors not having received our questionnaire in cursive. 6 As outlined in the analysis part, we conduct our calculations with un‐symmetrical data displaying in most
cases in‐ and out‐degrees. This allows us to take into account the specificities of the Swiss and the Belgian case
which could arise from the difference in the amount of expressed relations or from specific actors’ self‐
evaluation.
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3.1. Brief description of the liberalization processes in Switzerland and Belgium
Switzerland
Over one century, the telecommunications sector in Switzerland was characterized by a huge
stability. The traditional model – which existed since 1878 and had prevailed for more than 100 years
– consisted of a state‐owned monopoly governed by a powerful national PTT and with a strong
emphasis on reducing national disparities by both establishing a national network and by cross‐
subsidizing between beneficial and non beneficial services (Fischer 2008).
A profound reform consisting of two steps occurred within few years. In a first step, an incremental
reform initiative succeeded in the adoption of the telecommunications law in 1991. The monopoly of
the PTT in the field of voice telephony remained, while other parts of the market, such as added
value services and large parts of the equipment market for end users were liberalized (Fischer 2008).
In a second step, a more radical reform fundamentally changed the telecommunications policy in
1997, combining partial privatization of the former monopolist with liberalization and re‐regulation
of the telecommunications market.
In the field of re‐regulation, a regulatory framework was created in order provide the necessary tools
to settle unavoidable disputes between different operators. In order to distinguish clearly between
the players and the regulators, all regulatory tasks were transferred from PTT to the Federal Office of
Communications (OFCOM) in 1991 (Fischer 2008). After the second revision of the LTC7, the full
liberalization of the telecom market and the creation of the Communications Commission (ComCom)
in 1997, a complete separation of regulatory functions (ComCom) and operational activities (OFCOM)
was introduced.
The ComCom represents the licensing authority and market regulator in the telecommunications
sector. Switzerland did not decentralize its telecommunications regulation; ComCom is therefore the
unique RA in this sector located at national level. The ComCom’s main activities and competences are
divided within telecommunications services, universal service licensing, addressing resources,
supervision and sanctions.
ComCom consists of 7 independent specialists, nominated by the Federal Council (Swiss
Government), and has its own Secretariat managed by the Secretary General. As an independent
7 Telecommunications Act of 30 April 1997, RS 784.10
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authority, the Commission is not subject to any directives or financial support from the Federal
Council or the Department when making its decisions.
The Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) is part of the Department of Environment,
Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) and was the sectors’ RA before the instauration of
ComCom. Today it mainly implements ComCom’s decisions while still holding some regulatory
competences.
In the process of policy design and preparation, OFCOM is the central actor and is in close contact
with the political authorities, the Department (DETEC) and all stakeholders expressing their position
in the pre‐parliamentary (consultation) procedure.
In policy implementation and sector regulation, besides the strong collaboration with the
Commission and the derived contacts with the operators, OFCOM has been engaged, since its
creation, in international collaboration: contrarily to ComCom, it participates in several European and
international networks such as the ECC (Electronic Communications Committee; body of the
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations), the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute
(ETSI). OFCOM represents Switzerland in the FRATEL network and accompanies the President of
ComCom to the meetings of the European telecommunications regulatory authorities which are
represented within the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) and the European Regulators Group
(ERG).
ComCom and OFCOM are collaborating with other regulating agencies on different specific issues
concerning competition on the telecoms market with the Competition Commission (Comco ‐in charge
of regulating competition in general); tariffs and price questions with the Price Surveillance (the Swiss
price oversight); and for the settlement of disputes among consumers and operators, Ombudscom
(the telecoms conciliation body) is in charge.
Finally, ComCom’s decisions may be appealed against on the basis of administrative law at the
Federal Administrative Court (FAC). FAC and the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) as the ultimate level of
jurisdiction can thus overrule ComCom’s decisions.
With the 1997 revision of LTC, PTT and Swisscom (since 1st of October 1997) were separated, the
latter as a partly privatized public company; the federal state remained the majority share holder
(Häusermann et al. 2004). In 1998, Swisscom went public. Since that year, Swisscom holds the
universal service license. This license will again be put out to tender by ComCom in 2017.
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Swisscom not only guarantees the universal service, it is the biggest operator on Swiss telephone,
mobile and internet markets as well. Besides Swisscom, there are today only three other operators
obtaining an important market share. These are Cablecom, Orange and Sunrise; the two latter
recently announced their fusion.
Belgium
As in most industrialized countries, the telecommunications sector in Belgium was initially an organic
public service. After some developments by the private sector, the sector was put under public
monopoly in 1896 and the services supplied by a public company (Régie des télégraphes et
telephones, RTT). This organizational structure was unquestioned until the late 1980s when the
European Commission (EC) proposed to liberalize the telecommunications sector8. At this time, the
incumbent was turned into a public limited company called Belgacom, which was partially privatised
in 19969.
The same year, the second round of the opening process was launched at the EU level with the
objective of a full market opening in 199810. In spite of liberalization, some operators maintained
dominance and control over the market. To tackle this, the EU decided to adopt a revised legal
framework in 2003 that improved economic regulation with the conduct of market analyses and the
designation operators with significant market power (SMP)11. National RAs implement the
framework and impose specific obligations (e.g. about transparency, network access or tariffs) to
them. The 2003 framework extends regulation to all electronic communications networks and
services, pushes sector regulation very close to general competition law, and sets up a regulatory
arrangement centralised around the European Commission while enlarging the national RAs’
competencies at the same time12.
8 Directives 90/388/CE, 94/46/CE, 95/51/CE, and 96/2/CE liberalizing the market for terminals and services with
high added value. 9 Law of 21 March 1991 on autonomous public companies. 10 Directive 96/19/CE transposed into Belgian Law by the law of 19 December 1997. 11 The 2003 EU telecoms framework is composed of the Access Directive (2002/19/EC), the Framework
Directive (2002/21/EC), the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC), the Directive on Privacy (2002/58/EC),
the Competition Directive (2002/77/EC), and the Radio Spectrum Decision (676/2002/EC). The R&TTE Directive
(1999/5) and Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop are also part of this current
framework. 12 The European Framework was transposed in Belgium through Federal and Community laws. At the Federal
level, the EU framework is transposed by the Law of 17 January 2003 about the statutes of BIPT, the Law of 17
January 2003 on appeal and dispute settlement, and the Law of 13 June 2005 on electronic communications,
which entails most of the transposition. At the Community level, the transposition is made by the French
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The regulatory arrangement in the telecoms sector in Belgium is organized around the Belgian
Institute for Post and Telecommunications (BIPT). BIPT was created by the Law of 21 March 1991,
which provided it with legal personality, but reformed and reinforced the Law of 17 January 2003.
The first task of BIPT is to implement the EU framework in Belgium. It must take the necessary
measures to guarantee a fair and undistorted competition. BIPT is the central decision‐maker for
analyzing markets, identifying operators with SMP and imposing remedies upon them. Remedies are
concrete tools enforcing the access of new entrants and other competitors to the networks of the
operators with SMP (e.g. obligations of non discrimination and transparency). In addition, BIPT issues
opinions about the definition of the obligations of universal service, and controls their
implementation.
At the European level, the policy initiative belongs to the Commission which consults a large set of
public and private stakeholders, notably the CEPT, ERG and IRG. The decision‐making is made by co‐
decision between the EU Council and the Parliament. In the implementation phase, the Commission’s
Directorate General Information Society (DG INFSO) monitors the Member States’ transposition and
a joint task force with DG Competition (DG COMP) supervises the national market analyzes with a
veto power. In addition, the Commission takes technical recommendations or decisions to harmonize
implementation under the control of comitology committees (i.e. the Communications Committee,
COCOM).
The Belgian Federal level is mainly involved in the implementation of the EU framework. Formally,
the Federal Ministry of the Economy is in charge of drafting the Federal legislation (DG Telecoms), but
in fact, it has remained a task of BIPT. Each bill is submitted to consultation to the Community
Governments within the Interministerial Committee for Telecommunications and Broadcasting. The
implementation of Belgian law is handled by BIPT which largely consults the stakeholders as well as
the Competition Council about issues related to competition law. Usually, BIPT follows the guidelines
of the ERG about secondary issues. In terms of litigation, the Competition Council is competent for
dispute resolution between operators, even if the operators complain to BIPT or the judicial courts.
Complaints against BIPT decisions must be referred to the Court of Appeal in Brussels. Broadcasting is
the competence of the Community Governments and media regulators (Conseil supérieur de
l’audiovisuel, Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media and Medienrat). BIPT consult them on regulatory
Community Law of 27 February 2003, the Flemish Community Law of 4 March 2005, and the German
Community Law of 27 June 2005.
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decisions, notably within the Conference of Regulators of Communications (CRC), and consider their
respective positions13.
3.2. Formal independence of the sector‐specific RA
Gilradi (2005) concretized the RAs’ (in) dependence on political authorities in an index allowing cross‐
country and cross‐sectoral comparison. The four following dimensions are taken into account:
• The terms of appointment, removal and replacement of the regulator’s director and its executive
officer, and the duration of their mandate.
• The sources of the regulator’s budget and its internal organization, especially in terms of
recruiting staff. Here, proper funding and levies from sectoral operators are a priori better than an
independent budget that is voted for (thus possibly reduced) by the Government.
• The scope of regulatory powers, which range from monitoring the sanctions through to the
formulation of recommendations, standards development, (ex ante or ex post only) binding
decisions, and the possible sharing of certain regulatory tasks with the executive (e.g. a Government)
and /or legislative (e.g. a committee) power. Clearly, the exclusive powers granted to the regulator
provide a degree of independence greater than shared competences.
• The formal requirements (accountability, for example) towards the Government and Parliament,
and the fact that political institutions could possibly overturn regulator’s decisions. Independence
will be stronger if only a court that various stakeholders can appeal to is empowered to quash the
decisions of the regulator.
To measure this indicator, one relies on legal texts and occasionally on interviews with main
regulator’s representatives.
Switzerland
For Switzerland’s telecom regulator, Gilardi calculated in 2002 the degree of 0.51. This is very close
to Germany’s and the Scandinavian regulators at that time; Ireland, Austria and the UK however have
a main telecoms regulator obtaining a much higher independence (Gilardi 2005).
Today, eight years later, the Gilardi index of the ComCom would follow our own evaluation slightly
higher ranging 0.54: even if the formal requirements and the terms of appointment did not change,
the latest revisions of the LTC attributed more regulatory power to the ComCom where it can act
independently of the political authorities. The rather moderate Gilardi index for ComCom in
international comparison can be explained by the fact that the political authorities still have a big
13 Cooperation agreement of 17 November 2006.
15
impact on the regulatory content and the appointment of the Commission. If ComCom is strongly
independent regarding financial and decisional aspects, it is strongly related to the Federal
Administration through its links with OFCOM and the DETEC.
Belgium
In 2002, the Gilardi index amounted to 0.36 (Gilardi 2005). According to our own calculation, it has
currently reached 0.54, which means that the BIPT has gained significant independence between
2002 and 2010. This increase in formal independence can be explained by the 2003 reform of the
Institute’s statute. At its creation in 1991, the BIPT was directly dependent on the Minister and had
no decision competences. Over the 1990s, a series of reforms have gradually extended the BIPT
competences without altering its statutes (Verhoest, Aubin et al. 2009, 58‐60).
In 2002, at the moment of the first calculation of the index, the BIPT was therefore in an ambiguous
situation. Although it had quite important independent decision‐making competences, it was directly
managed by the Minister who kept in control the Institute’s day‐to‐day activities. Abiding with the
constraints stemming from the EU, the 2003 reform completely reformulated the statutes of the
Institute, and further enlarged its decision‐making competences. The BIPT is no longer managed and
represented by the Minister, but by a Board of Directors whose members are independent persons
chosen by the Government following a competitive application procedure.
Comparison between both countries regarding formal RA independence
During the last decade, the BIPT’s formal independence increased much more than that of ComCom.
But as BIPT started with a very low index in 2002, still being very dependent on the Ministry, both
RAs reach today the same index of 0.54. They have both significant freedom, this concerning their
regulatory decision‐making and execution of their tasks. Their moderate index in international
comparison arises however out of the formal dependence ComCom has from the Federal
Administration. Concerning BIPT, the moderate index is mainly explained by the fact that the Federal
Government still appoints the whole four‐member Council, i.e. the management board including the
agency head and that these appointment are renewable. In addition, the Government can overturn
BIPT decisions in case of politically salient issues, even though it has never happened, and still holds
some regulatory competencies (e.g. the launching of a fourth 3G licence for mobile phone services).
The fact that both Belgium and Switzerland reach the same level of formal (de jure) independence is
optimal from a methodological point of view. If the real (de facto) independence of RAs varies
between the two countries, then our first research hypothesis is clearly confirmed. Furthermore, our
16
three additional hypotheses are of great value in explaining the de facto independence of RAs, this
which is supposed to be different from and not determined by the de jure independence.
3.3. Power distribution in the regulatory framework
The first element we add when considering the main regulator’s independence is its power in the
regulatory framework. The more powerful the regulator is, the more independently of other actors
he can act and take decisions. We also consider two different dimensions of power: the reputational
power of an actor and its betweenness centrality. Both measures are derived from our survey
conducted in 2010.
The reputational power indicates how many actors of the network see the main regulator (as well as
all other actors) as very powerful. They indicate if they consider the other actors as very important
and influential in the telecoms regulatory framework.
Additionally, the degree of centrality in the contact network is calculated using the ‘betweenness
centrality concept’ developed by Freemann (1979). ‘Betweenness centrality’ measures the number of
times an actor is on the shortest path between two other actors. It is the most prominent centrality
measure used to study power and dominance, as it indicates an actor’s strategic position between
other actors of the network. Actors having high ‘betweenness centrality’ have better negotiation
potential, and control over the flux of information within the regulatory framework14.
Switzerland
First, ComCom and OFCOM clearly have the highest reputational power in the network of telecoms
regulation (with 85% or 22 players seeing them as very important (see Annex II)). Three other
political actors are also considered as very important by other actors in the network, but to a lesser
degree than ComCom and OFCOM, namely the two parliamentary commissions on transport and
telecommunications (75%), DETEC ( 75%) and CF (62%). The incumbent Swisscom and the operator
Sunrise are also evaluated as very important, other operators to a lesser extent. Non sector specific
regulators (Competition Commission, Price Surveillance and the FAC) are judged as being
"important".
14 The two measures are complementary: reputational power indicates in a subjective manner which institutions are seen as powerful by the other actors of the network, while the centrality measure shows which actors hold a control position over others (Scott 2000).
17
Second, OFCOM has the maximum betweenness centrality15 of the network, this being 57. This
means that OFCOM is the biggest gatekeeper in the network controlling most contacts among actors.
The incumbent Swisscom, the Swiss Business Federation (Economiesuisse), DETEC, and Sunrise
closely follow with “betweenness centralities” of 49, 41, 24 and 22 respectively, which is remarkable
considering the average betweenness of 9.7 (Annex II). ComCom also has a significant betweenness
indicator of 21.8. These empirical findings clearly indicate that these six actors have great control
over the flow of information within the network, which gives them greater bargaining power over
other actors and, consequently, increases their independence. Predictably, the other regulators
without specific regulation task in the telecommunications sector (the Competition Commission and
the Price Surveillance) are much less central (betweenness centrality of 11).
In summary, OFCOM seems more powerful than ComCom: we will see in the further analysis if this is
only related to its role of implementer or if OFCOM has also considerable decisional power in the
Swiss telecoms regulations. The significant importance of the two operators Swisscom and Sunrise,
as well as the power of DETEC, will have to be confirmed by the following relational analysis.
Belgium
16 organizations integrated in the Belgium telecoms network evaluated the power of all 34 actors. All
of them see the European Commission (16) as a very important actor in telecoms regulation, this
making the EC one of the most powerful actors in the Belgian framework.
Belgacom (15) and BIPT (14) have almost the same reputational power as the EC. Besides the
incumbent, the operator Telnet and, among the national authorities, the Federal Government and
the Federal DG Telecoms (FMC TC) are also evaluated as very important (see Annex II).
The Federal Parliament, the Competition Council and the regional governments and media regulators
VRM, CSA and Medienrat are all seen as “important”.
Belgacom clearly obtains the highest betweenness centrality with 40.5 (6.9 being the mean): the
incumbent thus links the most actors in the Belgian telecoms network together. Given the relatively
low response rate and looking at Belgacom’s answers in the survey, it becomes clear that this result
is the consequence of the way the actor judges its own position. The EC, the Federal Government
15 UCINET locates the geodesic paths between all pairs of actors, and counts up how frequently each actor falls in each of these pathways. If we add up, for each actor, the proportion of times that they are "between" other actors for contact exchange, we get the measure of actor centrality. For example OFCOM’s frequency for being located between two actors not being in contact with each other is thus 57, ComCom’s 22 (Annex II).
18
and the BIPT are also very central with respective betweenness measures of 31, 27 and 23 (see
Annex II).
The two power analyzes (reputational and betweenness) are thus showing the same result: first, EC,
the Federal Government, Belgacom and BIPT seem very powerful obtaining a strategic position in the
telecoms network; and second, the regional media regulators and the Competition Council are seen
as important, but much less for playing the role of gatekeepers in the network as betweenness
centralities range from 4.3‐16.316. The same is true for the other operators who are less connected
and thus less central than Belgacom.
3.4. Subgroups of strongly related actors
To consider the integration of the RA and other important actors in telecoms policy implementation,
we now look if our networks are composed of sub‐groups of strongly related actors. This analysis
shows the vertical and horizontal coordination among actors by outlining if strong relations are
dispersed among actors representing different levels and sectors. We expect strong relations
between the RAs and the operators here, as a frequent exchange among these actors is defined by
the telecoms regulatory framework. However, it will be interesting to see if other regulators and
political authorities also have a say in regulation implementation, this being something which would
affect the RA’s independence.
We choose a clique analysis which structures the network of strong contacts into maximally
complete subgraphs (Wassermann & Faust 1994). This means that a clique contains actors who have
all possible ties present among themselves (Hanneman & Riddle 2005).
Switzerland
In the network of strong contacts we could indentify 46 cliques with a minimum size of 3 members,
and 12 cliques with a minimum size of 5 members. Table 1 (Annex III) illustrates that strong contacts
seem to be shared in Swiss telecoms regulation between regulators (OFCOM, ComCom, Price
Surveillance and Ombudscom) on the one side, and operators (Swisscom, Sunrise, Orange,
Cablecom) and their representatives (ASUT, Syndicom) on the other.
OFCOM is part of 7 out of the 12 cliques. It shares strong contacts with operators but always in
presence of another regulator (ComCom, Price Surveillance or Ombudscom) or the Swiss Business
Federation (Economiesuisse) which represents large parts of the Swiss private sector.
16 As for the Belgian case the response rate was only 60%, one must note that the betweenness centrality can
significantly differ (being higher) for those actors having answered the questionnaire and those having not.
These results must thus be interpreted with prudence. Fortunately, with the reputational power analysis, we
introduced a second measure to calculate importance in the network.
19
The same, but to a lesser extent, is also true for Ombudscom and Price Surveillance, both members
of cliques together with operators and the consumer protection associations.
These results clearly show that OFCOM is responsible for the implementation of market regulation
while Price Surveillance and Ombudscom are involved in social regulation and consumer issues.
ComCom is less present in these cliques (only twice), which confirms that the de facto
implementation of regulatory decisions is achieved by OFCOM: the Office has stronger contacts with
regulatees than ComCom. This can however have a positive impact on ComCom’s independence
towards operators. Other representatives of the public administration and the executive and
legislative branch are not part of cliques of strongly related actors. They are not directly involved in
regulation implementation. Apparently, the identified regulators participating in cliques are
independent in the execution of their regulatory tasks from public authorities.
ComCom’s ego network of strong contacts (Figure 1) displays all actors that are directly adjacent to
ComCom and the relations among them. To organize its regulatory task, ComCom is in frequent
contact with the OFCOM and the operators which is no surprise if we consider the above outlined
division of tasks in the regulatory arrangement. The ego‐network also shows that ComCom
collaborates strongly with the two other regulators, Comco and Price surveillance, even if they do not
build a clique.
Belgium
In the Belgian telecoms network of strong contacts we found 24 cliques with a minimum size of
3 members and 17 cliques with a minimum size of 5 members (Table 2 Annex III). The clique analysis
provides a very interesting image: the RA BIPT is a member of 13 out of the 17 cliques. In the
implementation of Belgian telecoms regulation, it thus plays a crucial role. As in the Swiss case,
strong contacts are shared between the regulators on one side (BIPT, Competition Council, VRM, CSA
and Medienrat) and the operators on the other (Belgacom, KPN Gourp and Telenet). There seems to
also be a sort of co‐regulation between BIPT and the other regulators, explained by the fact that they
meet regularly within the Conference of Regulators of Communications (CRC).
The impact of the Federal government in Belgium is much stronger than in Switzerland. In most
cliques, BIPT is a co‐member with the Federal Government. The Federal Government is involved in 11
cliques and is thus an active actor in national telecoms regulation implementation too.
20
What is interesting is that the Competition service (FME CS) 17, part of the Federal Ministry of
Economy, is also very well implicated in telecoms regulation, more than the Federal DG telecoms of
the same Ministry (FME TC).
The EC is just present in 3 cliques, which signifies that it is perceived as a very powerful actor having
an impact on Belgian telecoms regulation, but that it is less present in the regulatory interactions. In
fact, most contacts are directly shared with BIPT and this is principally in the decision making
process18.
Again, BIPT’s ego‐network19 is very similar to the Swiss RA ones and follows the logic of its regulatory
tasks (Figure 2): to organize its regulatory task BIPT is in strong contact with the operators and the
Ministry (here FME CS). However, and different than in Switzerland, BIPT is strongly related to the EC,
the Belgian permanent representation to the EU and the Federal Government on one side and to the
local media regulators on the other20.
3.5. Influence structure
Finally, to assess another dimension of RAs’ independence, we analyze the influence relations among
the actors of the telecoms network. The following question was asked in the survey:
“Which actors have an impact on the decision making processes within your own
organisation in relation with the implementation of the regulatory framework, and which
actors are impacted in their decision making processes by your organization?”
17 The Belgian Competition Authority is composed of the Federal DG Competition on the one hand and the
Competition Council on the other hand, so it plays an important role in the regulation of general competition.
Following the implementation of the third EU telecoms package, several telecoms markets were released from
the regulation and fell into the general regulations of competition (e.g. fixed phone lines). 18 In the policy preparation phase, once the draft decision is ready, BIPT sends it to the Commission which
approves it or not, but without a new phase of consultations. Operators claim against the fact that they are not
formally involved in this second phase of the decision‐making process, even if informal contacts exist. In sum,
the Commission only interacts with BIPT, at least formally. 19 The comparison of ego‐networks makes much sense here, where the expressed relations between the Swiss
and Belgian cases differ significantly. As the results show, the RAs ego‐networks follow very much the logic of
the overall regulatory arrangement as outlined above and the logic of the specific RA task, e.g executing
regulatory competences. 20 Beltug, the association of the business clients of ICT Services, mentioned as well being in frequent contact
with the BIPT.
21
The influence structure within the network indicates if the RA depends on other actors, including
other regulators, in carrying out the duties delegated to it by political power. The more other
regulators and actors have an impact on the decisions of the main regulator, the less it is
independent. This effect is reduced of course if the main regulator may, in turn, also influence the
decisions taken by other regulators and actors.
Switzerland
As ComCom’s ego‐network of influence relations (figure 3, Annex V) shows, the relations among the
actors surrounding ComCom are very dense. That means that the influence flow not only exists
between ComCom and these actors, but also between these actors too. For a clearer view of the
impact ComCom has on the other regulators (including the courts, the political authorities, OFCOM
and DETEC) and vice‐versa, figure 5 (Annex VI) outlines the influence relations exclusively among
them. ComCom’s formal independence is relativized here: the Government and the Parliament seem
to have an impact on ComCom’s decisions; but reciprocally, ComCom also influences the decisions of
the Parliamentary Commissions. Concerning the public administration, OFCOM and ComCom
influence each other; this is no surprise looking at their shared regulatory competencies. No other
public agency seems to have an impact on the Commission’s decision.
The strong contact relations with the other regulators shown in figure 1 are confirmed here:
ComCom and Comco have an impact on each other; the Price Surveillance only influences ComCom;
this relationship is therefore not mutual. Furthermore the Federal Administration Court has an
impact on the ComCom’s decision, but this relation is obviously not reciprocated.
As the main regulator, it is clear and confirmed here that ComCom influences all operators. What is
very interesting however is that four telecoms providers seem to influence ComCom’s decisions too:
Swisscom, Orange, Cablecom and openaxs. In the interview with the main regulator, these findings
are qualified however: these operators behavior on the market, but not their opinions, influence the
regulator’s decisions.
The results of the power analysis are to a large extent confirmed with the actors’ in‐ and out degree
of their influence relations (table 3, Annex VII): Once again, OFCOM is one of the most influential
actors in the network having an impact on 25 players’ (out of 38) decision. This result must however
be balanced by the fact that OFCOM is, in turn, influenced by decisions taken by 25 players. ComCom
is one of the most influential actors too with an impact on 18 actors and only being influenced by 11
actors. As already illustrated in figure 3, besides the political authorities and the OFCOM, the
Competition Commission, the Price Surveillance and the Federal Administration Court also impact
22
the regulators decisions. The other regulators have much less influence within the telecoms network
(with respective impacts from 10 to 15 actors), however, they seem to be more autonomous in their
decision making, as influenced by a number of actors ranging only from 3 to 14.
The actor having the biggest impact on other stakeholders’ decisions seems to be the Parliamentary
Commission of the Council of States: normally, its competences are much higher in the decision
making process than in the regulatory framework related to policy implementation. It is possible that
survey participants and the Parliamentary Commission itself also translated its significant decision
making power into the implementation process analyzed here.
Another surprise could be the consumer protectionists’ high impact: but looking at the raw network
data, it becomes clear that both organizations mentioned themselves as having a big impact on other
actors’ decisions; these relations were however not confirmed by the other stakeholders in the
network.
Last but not least, we take into consideration the regulatees position in the influence network. As the
former monopolist and today’s concessionaire of the universal service, Swisscom still seems to be
having a big impact in the telecoms network. But as it is true for all other operators (Sunrise, Orange,
Cablecom), Swisscom is more impacted in its decisions than it can influence others.
Belgium
Also BIPT’s ego‐network of influence relations is very dense, including all categories of actors such as
the European and Federal authorities, the operators, the courts and the regional regulators and
authorities (figure 4).
The network of all regulators (figure 6) relativizes BIPT’s formal independence (the same was
observed in Switzerland): the Belgian RA is influenced in its decisions by the Government, the
Parliament and the General Directorate of Telecommunications. These influence relations are
however not confirmed by BIPT. BIPT and the Competition council mutually influence each other; this
is confirmed by both actors (reciprocated ties). All regulators, including BIPT, the Competition Council
and the regional media regulators influence each other mutually.
Looking at the courts, the BCA, the CS and, on the European level, the ECJ impact the decisions of
BIPT; obviously this relation is not reciprocated. Further European actors such as the EC, the EP, the
CM and regulatory networks such as ERG/IRG, RSC and CoCom seem to have an influence on BIPT;
with the exception of the EC which is impacted by the BIPT too, these relations are only present from
the European to the national level.
By analyzing the influence relations an actor gives or receives (out‐degree, respectively in‐degree,
see table 6) one interesting observation can be made: the three regulators BIPT, CSA and Medienrat,
23
as well as the EC, which has, following the above outlined analysis, an important impact on Belgian
telecoms regulation (at least what concerns regulatory decision and influence, less regulatory task
execution), are impacted in their decisions by a significantly higher number of actors (in‐degree) than
they influence actors in their decisions (out‐degree).
By looking at the raw data, this result is a consequence of these actors’ self evaluation: BIPT, CSA,
Medienrat and the EC perceive themselves as actors receiving much more influence than having
influence on others. This is a very interesting result as participants in SNA surveys often tend to
overestimate their out‐going relations in comparison with their in‐going ones (see Ingold 2008 for a
detailed discussion).
The other regulators, VRM and Competition Council have a much more balanced influence situation
with approximately 15 in‐ and out‐degrees.
The actor with by far the highest in‐degree (33) is Belgacom. First, this result is a consequence of
Belgacom’s self‐evaluation in the network: Belgacom itself mentioned being influenced by 32 actors.
Furthermore, 8 actors recognized influencing Belgacom (BIPT, Federal Government, Senate, Chamber
of Representatives, Competition Council, VRM, KPN and Bletug). A potential explanation is that
Belgacom is present on all of the territory and in all the telecoms markets and is, therefore exposed
to a high range of actors and issues. Concerning the other operators, besides KPN Group with a
significant number of in‐ and out‐degrees, the other operators appear not to be too influential nor
influenced.
The actors having the biggest impact on other stakeholders taking part in the Belgian telecoms sector
seem to be the Representatives’ Chamber and the operator Telenet; this is the own perception of
these two actors. However again, the Federal Government then follows with a more balanced profile
of in‐ and out‐degrees.
Finally, and not surprisingly remembering the courts role in telecommunications implementation
(see liberalization process above), the BCA and the CS impact a significant number of actors, but are
on their side only influenced by 2 and 3 stakeholders.
4. Hypotheses test and Discussion
Before testing empirically our four research hypotheses, the tables 5 and 6 below summarize our
empirical measurement – showing the evidence how SNA contributes to operationalize the
dependent variable (i.e. the de facto RA independence).
24
Table 5: De facto independence in Switzerland
Actors Reputational power
Betweenness centrality
Co‐implementation of regulatory task with RA (cliques)
ComCom has influence on21
ComCom is influenced by
ComCom (sector‐specific RA)
Very important Very high weak
CF Very important Not significant No X Elected politicians P Very important Not significant No X X
OFCOM Very important The highest Very strong X X Competition Commission
Important Significant No X X
Price Surveillance
Important Significant In social regulation
X
Ombudscom Not important Low In social regulation
Co‐regulators
Courts Important Low‐significant No X Swisscom Very important Very high Present as
regulatees X X
Sunrise Very important Very high Present as regulatees
X
Regulatees
Orange, Cablecom
Important Significant Present as regulatees
X X
Table 6: De facto independence in Belgium
Actors Reputational power
Betweenness centrality
Co‐implementation of regulatory task with RA (cliques)
BIPT has influence on22
BIPT is influenced by
BIPT (sector‐specific RA) Very important Very high Very strong FG Very important Very high Very strong X X Elected
politicians FP Important Significant weak X EC Very important Very high weak X X Competition Council
Important Significant Very weak X X
VRM, CSA, Medienrat
Important Low ‐ significant weak X X
Co‐regulators
Courts Not important –important
No no X
BELGACOM Very important The highest Present as regulatees
X X
KPN Gr Important Very high Present as regulatees
X X
Telnet Very important Significant Present as regulatees
X X
Regulatees
Voo and Mobistar
Not important‐ important
No Present as regulatees
X X
21 The crosses in bolt indicate the influence relations confirmed by both actors. 22 See FN 21
25
The cross‐country comparison of the various SNA measures in the telecoms regulation leads to the
following coding of the de facto RA independence from elected politicians, regulatees and co‐
regulators (see table 7 below). It clearly appears that, all in all, the de facto independence of the
Swiss sector‐specific RA (ComCom) is medium, while its Belgian counterpart (BIPT) shows a lower de
facto independence.
Table 7: Coding of the dependent variable
De facto independence
From Elected politicians From Co‐regulators From Regulatees
ComCom High (as the reputational power of CF and P is very high) NB. Influential elected politicians are located in the Parliament
Medium (as the reputational power, the betweeness centrality, the co‐implementation of regulatory tasks and the influence of OFCOM are very high and, as the influence of Comco and Price Surveillance is high) NB. All influential co‐regulators are located at the national level
Medium (as the reputational power and betweeness centrality of Swisscom and Sunrise are very high)
BIPT Low (as the reputational power, the betweeness centrality and the co‐implementation of regulatory tasks of FG are very high) NB. Influential elected politician are located in the Government
Medium (as the reputational power, the betweeness centrality and the influence of EC are very high and as the influence of the Competition Council, the VRM, CSA and Medienrat is high) NB. The other influential co‐regulators are located at the European, national and regional level
Low (as the reputational power and/or the betweeness centrality and/or the influence of Belgacom, KPN Gr and Telnet are very high)
We now turn to the concrete and systematic test of our research hypotheses (see section 2.3). The
first hypothesis states that the formal (de jure) independence of the RA – as defined in the telecoms
legislation and measured according to the Gilardi index ‐ does not guarantee its real (de facto)
independence. The empirical evidence provided by our two cases confirms, without any doubt, this
hypothesis. Both the ComCom in Switzerland and the BIPT in Belgium reach an identical level of
formal independence (Gilardi’s index of 0.54); but, at the same time, the de facto RA independence,
as measured through a SNA approach, is obviously higher in Switzerland than in Belgium.
26
In particular, the real RA independence from elected politicians and from regulatees diverges
between the two countries. This result confirms the previous study of Magetti (which did not
compare the Swiss and Belgium telecoms regulation in his sample of RA). The fact that the BIPT is
less independent than the ComCom from the federal government does not represent a great surprise
in itself: the Belgian polity is a typical “partitocracy”, where political parties are the key players of the
(regulatory) game (Walgrave and Varone 2008; Walgrave et al. 2005; De Winter et al. 1996;
Dewachter 1981). In sharp contrast, the political role of parties is rather weak in Swiss policy
implementation.
Furthermore, the ComCom is more independent from the regulatees than the BIPT is. This situation
also seems plausible and reasonable as a greater independence from the incumbent (i.e. Swisscom
and Belgacom) is required if the State is still the majoritarian owner of this historical operator. In
order to avoid a conflict of interest between the State as owner of an operator competing on the
market, and the State as responsible of the good regulation of this market, the best regulatory design
consists of guaranteeing a large degree of independence to the RA. As Swisscom is more than 60%
owned by the State, while the public share of Belgacom only reaches 50%, it makes a priori sense
that the ComCom is more independent from Swisscom than the BIPT is from Belgacom.
Our second hypothesis postulates that the longer the life cycle of the RA, the higher its de facto
independence. This has to be rejected stricto sensu. We mentioned in the short description of the
liberalization processes in Switzerland and Belgium that the ComCom was created in 1997, while the
BIPT exists since 1991. At first sight, the longer life of BIPT did not give it more formal or de facto
independence. However, this observation has to be nuanced: the ComCom strongly relies on the
expertise of the OFCOM, which was institutionalized in 1991 already, while the BIPT experienced a
major revision in 2003 (mainly due to the Third EU telecoms package). As such more de facto
independence is gained with modifications of status. However, we presume that some effect of
reinforcement was played by the age of the institution. An old institution may benefit more from a
change of status towards more independence than a younger one. It may empower itself more
rapidly. But the question remains open and additional empirical testes are needed.
In the same vein, the empirical data do not confirm our third hypothesis. The participation to an
informal European network of RA (i.e. ERG/IRG, CoCom and/or RSC) is not a precondition for a high
level of de facto RA independence, as generally postulated and partially demonstrated by Maggetti
and other scholars. The Swiss and the Belgian reality is more complex. In the former case, the
administrative co‐regulator (OFCOM) ‐ and not the main sector‐specific RA (ComCom) ‐ is the Swiss
27
representative within several European and international networks of regulators. Moreover, we
know that OFCOM is a very influential and powerful actor within the governance network. Thus, the
participation to informal EU regulatory networks has effects, but not on the main sector‐specific RA.
In the latter case, the observed direct link between the BIPT and the European Commission
(perceived as an influential co‐regulator) seems to be more decisive than being a member of an
informal network of regulators. This explanatory factor, as defined in hypothesis 3, is therefore of
little use in understanding the de facto RA independence.
Last but not least, our fourth hypothesis is verified in our two empirical cases. The BIPT is obviously
integrated in a complex multi‐level regulatory framework; its decisions are strongly influenced by the
European Commission, by the national competition authority and also by regional co‐regulators. This
multi‐level coordination (in the horizontal and vertical sense) tends to reduce its de facto
independence. By contrast, the ComCom has to coordinate itself with other co‐regulators (OFCOM,
ComCo and Price surveillance) at the same level of power (almost exclusively horizontal
fragmentation) and thus benefits form a slightly higher de facto independence.
5. Outlook
This empirical study of course has several limitations. We mention just two here. On one hand, the
comparative basis is limited (regulation of one sector in two countries) and the results cannot be
generalized. On the other hand, the research hypotheses do not discuss the causal relations between
independence and power of a RA (e.g. does a high de facto independence always translate, in fine,
into a high regulatory power?).
Nevertheless, this exploratory work already suggests several improvements to the dominant
theoretical approach on RA independence. First, it makes sense to compare both the formal (de jure)
and the real (de facto) RA independence. Second, one has to address this issue by considering
simultaneously the RA’s independence vis‐à‐vis three types of actors taking part in the regulatory
network, namely the elected politicians, all the co‐regulators (at various levels of power) and the
regulatees. Third, the SNA methodology offers useful tools to grasp the complexity of RA
independence by pointing out actors’ empowerment and relational profiles across levels and sectors.
The next research steps should take several points into account. The empirical basis of the upcoming
comparative studies has to be enlarged. The relevant research design has to combine several sectors,
several countries and several points in time. This strategy of course raises the question of the
research costs induced by the conduct of multiple SNA. Thus, it could make sense to focus on less
28
SNA indicators (e.g. reputational power, betweenness centrality and influence) measuring the
relationships between the network actors. Furthermore, from both a theoretical and a normative
standpoint, the next key question to be addressed concerns the impacts of high versus low de facto
RA independence on the quality of regulatory activity and outputs.
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ANNEX I : List of actors integrated in both surveys Switzerland CF Federal Council Parl. Com. CS Parliamentary Commission for
Transport and Telecommunications of the Council of States
Parl. Com. NC Parliamentary Commission for Transport and Telecommunications of the National Council
DETEC Federal Department for Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications
OFCOM Federal Office of Communications ComCom Federal Communications Commission Comco Federal Competition Commission Price Surv. Price Surveillance Ombudscom Telecommunications Conciliation Body VBS Federal Department of Defense
Civil Protection and Sport EDI Federal Department of Home Affairs EJPD Federal Department of Justice and Police SECO State Secretariat for Economic Affairs EDA Federal Department of Foreign Affairs EFV Federal Finance Administration FSC Federal Supreme Court FAC Federal Administration Court Economiesuisse Swiss Business Federation SEU Swiss Employers Union SGV Swiss Business Union SGB Swiss Trade Union Travail Suisse Trade Union SKS Swiss Consumer Protection FRC Consumer Protection of Western Switzerland ASUT Swiss Telecom Association Syndicom Swiss Telecoms Trade Union Swisscom operator, incumbent Orange operator Sunrise operator Cablecom operator Swisscable Sectoral Association for Cable TV Operators Openaxs Association of Swiss electric companies developing
fiber connections IG Telecom Pool for innovative telecommunication: pool of
small operators SAB Swiss Group for the Mountain regions EC European Commission EU European Union CEU Council of Europe Avenir Suisse Independent think tank for Switzerland’s social and
economic development
31
Belgium BIPT Belgian Institute for Postal Services and
Telecommunications FG Federal Government FP: Senate Federal Parliament: Senate (high chamber) FP: RC Federal Parliament: House of the Representatives
(low chamber) FME TC Federal Ministry of the Economy, Information
society Competition Council Competition Council (competition court) FME CS Federal Ministry of the Economy, Competition
service Belg. Rep EU Belgian Permanent Representation to the European
Union BCA Brussels Court of Appeal CS Council of State VRM Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (Flemish
Community media regulator) FG Flemish Government FP Flemish Parliament CSA Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (French
Community media regulator) FCG French speaking Community Government FCP French speaking Community Parliament Medienrat German Community media regulator GCG German speaking Community Government GSP German speaking Community Parliament Belgacom/Proximus Operator (incumbent) Mobistar Mobistar Telenet Telenet KPN Group KPN Group (Tele2 / Base) Voo Voo Alt. Oper. Platform of alternative operators Test‐achat / Test aankoop Test‐achat / Test aankoop (consumers interest
group) Beltug Beltug (business consumers interest group) EC European Commission CM Council of Ministers EP European Parliament ERG/IRG European Regulators Group / Independent
Regulators Group Cocom Communications Committee RSC Radio Spectrum Committee ECJ European Court of Justice
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ANNEX II: table outlining reputational power and betweenness centrality for the Swiss and Belgian network of strong contacts
SWITZERLAND Betweenness/ mean 9.7
Very important/ max. 25
Important/max. 25
Not important
BELGIUM Betweenness/
mean 6.9
Very important/max. 16
Important/max. 16
Not important
OFCOM 57.1 22 3 0 Belgacom 40.5 14 1
Swisscom 49.1 18 4 2 EC 31.34 16 0 0
Economiesuisse 41.5 3 12 7 Federal Gov. 26.7 12 3 0
DETEC 24.4 19 5 1 BIPT 23.3 15 1 0
Sunrise 22.2 13 7 4 KPN Gr 20.6 9 5 0
ComCom 21.8 22 3 0 FME CS 16.8 9 5 2
Cablecom 20 9 11 4 CSA 16.3 8 10 2
ASUT 17.6 5 13 4 FP: RC 14.7 5 11 0
SKS 14.9 2 13 8 Medienrat 10.8 7 4 4
SGV 14.4 0 7 16 Comp. Coucil 8.8 8 7 0
Syndicom 13.3 2 11 9 Telnet 8.6 12 3 0
Seco 11.3 1 11 12 VRM 4.3 8 7 0
Comco 11 7 16 2 FME TC 4.4 10 2 4
Price Surv. 11 5 15 4 Test‐achat 4.3 2 8 3
FRC 10.1 1 12 10 Beltug 3.1 1 7 4
Orange 8 9 11 4 FP: Senate 1.6 5 11 0
Parl. Com. CS 6.8 19 4 2 Mobistar 0 8 6 0
EFV 4.7 1 6 17 EP 0 8 6 2
Parl. Com. NC 3.9 20 4 2 BCA 0 7 8 1
VBS 2.2 0 5 19 CM 0 7 7 1
Ombudscom 2 1 8 15 ERG/IRG 0 5 11 0
openaxs 1.9 3 8 12 Alt. Oper. 0 5 9 0
IG Telekom 0.1 1 4 15 Voo 0 5 8 2
Travail Suisse 0 1 4 19 CoCom 0 4 10 2
SGB 0 1 7 16 ECJ 0 3 9 2
33
SWITZERLAND Betweenness/ mean 9.7
Very important/ max. 25
Important/max. 25
Not important
BELGIUM Betweenness/
mean 6.9
Very important/max. 16
Important/max. 16
Not important
FG 0 2 12 0
FAC 0 4 15 5 FCG 0 2 11 2
FSC 0 5 12 7 GCG 0 2 8 5
EJPD 0 0 9 15 RSC 0 2 10 3
CF 0 16 9 0 CS 0 1 11 4
EDI 0 0 2 23 Belg. Rep. EU 0 1 10 5
Swisscable 0 4 13 6 FP 0 1 9 4
SEU 0 1 5 17 FCP 0 1 8 5
EDA 0 0 1 22 GCP 0 1 6 7
SAB 0 1 6 16
EC 0 1 10 10
EU 0 1 9 12
CEU 0 0 3 19
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Annex III Cliques in the strong contact network Table 1: Cliques in the Swiss network of strong contacts (min. size: 5) 1: OFCOM Economiesuisse ASUT Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
2: OFCOM Ombudscom ASUT Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
3: OFCOM Comcom Price Surv. Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
4: OFCOM Ombudscom ASUT Sunrise Orange CAblecom
5: OFCOM Economiesuisse ASUT Sunrise Orange CAblecom
6: OFCOM Comcom Sunrise Orange CAblecom
7: OFCOM Economiesuisse ASUT CAblecom Swisscable
8: Ombudscom SKS Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
9: Price Surv. SKS Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
10: Ombudscom Syndicom Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom
11: Ombudscom Syndicom Sunrise Orange CAblecom
12: Economiesuisse Swisscom Sunrise CAblecom Avenir Suisse
Table 2: Cliques in the Belgian network of strong contacts (min. size: 5)
1: Federal Government FP: RC FME TC FME CS Belgacom / Proximus Telenet
2: Federal Government FME TC Belg. Rep EU Belgacom / Proximus Telenet
3: Federal Government FP: Senate FME TC Belgacom / Proximus Telenet
4: BIPT Federal Government FME CS Belgacom / Proximus Telenet EC
5: BIPT Federal Government Belg. Rep EU Belgacom / Proximus Telenet
6: BIPT Federal Government Belgacom / Proximus Telenet Beltug
7: BIPT VRM CSA Belgacom / Proximus Telenet
8: BIPT CSA Belgacom / Proximus Telenet EC
9: BIPT Federal Government FME CS Mobistar Telenet
10: BIPT Federal Government Mobistar Telenet Beltug
11: BIPT Federal Government FME CS Telenet KPN Group EC
12: BIPT Federal Government Telenet KPN Group Beltug
13: BIPT CSA Telenet KPN Group EC
14: BIPT Telenet KPN Group Alt. Oper. Beltug
15: Federal Government FME TC FME CS Telenet KPN Group
16: BIPT Federal Government Competition Council FME CS Belgacom / Proximus
17: BIPT VRM CSA Medienrat Belgacom / Proximus
37
Annex V: RAs’ ego‐network of influence relations Figure 3: ComCom’s ego‐network of influence relations
39
Annex VI: Influence relations among regulators
Figure 5: Influence relations among regulators in Swiss telecoms policy implementation
41
Annex VII: Degree centralities in the influence network
Table 3: Degree centrality of influence relations in Swiss telecoms regulatory framework (mean 10.7)
OutDegree InDegree
Parl. Com. CS 31.000 19.000
OFCOM 25.000 25.000
FRC 22.000 23.000
Swisscom 21.000 27.000
SKS 19.000 11.000
Comcom 18.000 11.000
SGV 18.000 4.000
Parl. Com. NC 17.000 18.000
Sunrise 17.000 20.000
Orange 17.000 20.000
CF 17.000 14.000
DETEC 15.000 21.000
Price Surv. 15.000 8.000
Comco 14.000 14.000
Cablecom 14.000 17.000
openaxs 13.000 19.000
FAC 12.000 3.000
Syndicom 12.000 11.000
Economiesuisse 11.000 12.000
ASUT 11.000 14.000
FSC 10.000 4.000
42
Table 4: Degree centrality of influence relations in Belgian telecoms regulatory framework (mean
10.4)
OutDegree InDegree
FP: RC 27.000 13.000
Telenet 26.000 17.000
Federal Government 21.000 20.000
KPN Group 17.000 16.000
EC 16.000 22.000
Test-achat 16.000 5.000
FP: Senate 15.000 22.000
BIPT 15.000 22.000
VRM 14.000 17.000
CSA 13.000 26.000
Competition C. 13.000 16.000
FME TC 13.000 9.000
Beltug 12.000 5.000
BCA 12.000 2.000
CS 11.000 3.000
Belgacom 11.000 33.000
Mobistar 10.000 9.000
FME CS 8.000 12.000
Medienrat 6.000 25.000
Voo 6.000 10.000
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