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Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 1 of 46
RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 2 of 46
6.0 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THESTUDY
The principal objective of this study is to identify the potential hazards posed by
incidents occurring at proposed project facilities. The study identifies the possible
failure cases, which might affect the population and property in the vicinity of the
facilities and thereby provides information necessary for developing mitigation
measures for preventing accidents and to formulate the disaster management plan.
Details of the proposed facilities for augmentation of existing crude oil pipeline & gas
pipeline and new gas pipeline are given in Tables 2.4, 2.6 and 2.9 respectively in
chapter-2 of this report. Among these facilities certain representative facilities have
been chosen for risk assessment study based on similarity of layout and operating
parameters and same are listed below in Table 6.1. The Conclusion and
recommendations for the representative stations are equally applicable for all other
stations.
Table 6.1 : Representative facilities for Risk Assessment study
Project component
Proposed facilities Selected facilities
Augmentation of
existing crude oil
pipeline
AGI-9 & 26, Viramgam
terminal
AGI-9, Viramgam terminal,
24” existing buried crude oil
pipeline
Augmentation of
existing gas
pipeline
AGI-6,7,8,11,16,18,20 &
25, Viramgam terminal
AGI-25, Viramgam terminal,
8” existing buried gas
pipeline
New gas pipeline Raageswari despatch
station, SV-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8
& 9, IP station, compressor
station and Palanpur
receiving station
Raageswari despatch
station, SV-3, compressor
station, Palanpur receiving
station, 30” new buried gas
pipeline
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 3 of 46
6.1 DESIGN FEATURES FOR SAFE OPERATION
The existing pipeline is built in accordance with the prudent construction practices as
defined in ASME/ANSI 31.8/31.4, OISD standard 141 and 138 for design, construction,
maintenance and inspection. The storage terminals are designed according to OISD
118 - ”layouts for oil and gas installations” and OISD 117- “Fire protection facilities for
petroleum and Depots and terminals”. Other relevant standards adopted for existing
facilities are given in tables 2.11 to 2.16 of section 2.1.2, Chapter 2 of this report.
Instrumentation and monitoring is done by state-of-the-art equipment that transmits real
time data to the central control centres at Mangala, Viramgam and Bhogat. This data
received in the control centres allows the pipeline operating pressures and flow
volumes to be monitored on a real time basis.
Safety features such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Leak
Detection System (LDS), Pipeline Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) have been
incorporated in the design of the existing facilities and will be extended to the new
facilities. In addition to the above, the pipeline and associated facilities are periodically
patrolled to ensure that there is no encroachment on the pipeline right of use.
Information captured through in built safety systems and physical patrolling are
communicated directly to the central control room at Mangala, Viramgam and Bhogat
for suitable action.
Pipeline External Corrosion Protection and Monitoring
Pipeline is epoxy coated line with 4” PUF insulation and HDPE top sheath. Periodic
intelligent pigging survey and pipe-to-soil potential surveys shall be conducted for
pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of codes and best
industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in insulation
system design for piping application:
Controlling heat loss on hot piping by PUF insulation system
Providing personnel protection
Limiting or retarding surface condensation
Providing process control
Economic optimization or energy conservation
Providing fire protection
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
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Providing freeze protection
Providing noise control
Sectionalizing Block Valves
Main line block valves are provided as per the requirements of ANSI/ASME B 31.8/B
31.4 and OISD 141 based on population density and land use along the pipeline route.
Provision should be made for safe blow down of gas contained in each section of the
pipeline into the atmosphere.
Valve maintenance should be performed every six months to ensure effective
operability.
Leak Detection System
State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system supported
by leak detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated communication
system is installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The shut down system of the
pipeline will act to close the sectionalizing valves based on leak detection system and
will alert the pipeline operator about the potential leaks along the pipeline route.
Typically, the time required detecting / confirming a leak, raising alarm and taking
action to isolate the leaking section is around 100-150 seconds. The entire pipeline
system should be monitored continuously from a control station having a SCADA
system. The remote control and monitoring is typically done from a centralized system
on a 24/7 basis. The systems are typically computer based and most have a back-up
computer and other redundant features. The centralized SCADA system typically
communicates with the field and remote devices through a dedicated communication
network such as land telephone lines, satellite system, microwave towers, or directional
radio frequencies with most systems having reluctant communication frequencies. The
measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA systems include:
Maintain integrity of communication parts through out the system
Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis
Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule
Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability
Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure
Accessing control to the control center by defined procedure
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 5 of 46
Other Safety Aspects
The pipeline will be physically patrolled by walk-through and aerial survey to ensure
there is no encroachment on the pipeline right of way. Moreover, during day to day
operational and maintenance activities, company employees should be aware of all
activities occurring around the pipeline and report such activities to the appropriate
authorities
Pipeline appurtenances like valves and meters should be painted to prevent
atmospheric corrosion
Pipeline marker signs should be placed where the pipeline crosses rivers, highways
and major crossings. Line of sight of markers should be maintained
Nearby population along the pipeline route should be made aware of the safety
precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap due to pipeline.
6.2 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT
The facility handles various hazardous materials like natural gas and crude oil which
have a potential to cause fire and explosion which may lead to major hazards.
In a pumping or compressor station, the potential sources of a large loss of
containment are not many. There are various modes in which flammable chemicals can
leak into the atmosphere causing adverse affects. These losses could be in the form of
a small hole in the piping, the failure of an instrument tapping, the failure of
pump/compressor seal etc. Large loss of containment can be due to failure of the
pipeline or even catastrophic failure of storage tanks.Various types of fire and
explosions are described below:
FLASH FIRE A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapours/gas burns without generating any
significant overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from- the
leak source. The combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition
point. The duration of the flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a
continuous jet fire from the leak source. For flash fires, an approximate estimate for the
extent of the total effect zone is the area over which the cloud is above the LFL.
JET FIRE Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the
momentum of the release. The jet flame stabilizes on or close to the point of release
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 6 of 46
and continues until the release is stopped. Jet fire can be realized, if the leakage is
immediately ignited. The effect of jet flame impingement is severe as it may cut through
equipment, pipeline or structure. The damage effect of thermal radiation is depended
on both the level of thermal radiation and duration of exposure.
POOL FIRE
A cylindrical shape of the pool fire is presumed. Pool-fire calculations are then carried
out as part of an accidental scenario, e.g. in case a hydrocarbon liquid leak from a
vessel leads to the formation of an ignitable liquid pool. First no ignition is assumed,
and pool evaporation and dispersion calculations are being carried out. Subsequently
late pool fires (ignition following spreading of liquid pool) are considered. If the release
is bunded, the diameter is given by the size of the bund. If there is no bund, then the
diameter is that which corresponds with a minimum pool thickness, set by the type of
surface on which the pool is spreading.
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of flammable gas burns sufficiently
quickly to generate high overpressures (i.e. pressures in excess of ambient). The
overpressure resulting from an explosion of hydrocarbon gases is estimated
considering the explosive mass available to be the mass of hydrocarbon vapor
between its lower and upper explosive limits.
BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE) BLEVE occur when pressurized vessels containing volatile liquids, in particular
liquefied gases, are engulfed by external fires causing catastrophic rupture of the
vessel and the formation of a disastrous fireball.
6.2.1 POSSIBLE MODES OF FAILURE Lists of common reasons for failure are as follows:
Material and Construction Defects
Inappropriate material of construction
Improper use of design codes
Weld failures
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 7 of 46
Failure of, or inadequate, piping supports
Pre-Operational Activities Failure induced during delivery of materials at site
Failure induced during installation
Effects of Pressure and Temperature Overpressure
Cyclic expansion induced cracking
Low temperature brittle fracture
Fatigue loading induced cracking
Corrosion Internal corrosion
External corrosion
Cathodic protection failure
Operational Errors Failure to inspect regularly and identify defects
Failures due to Third Party Activity Vandalism and theft
External Impact Induced Failures Dropped objects
Vehicle impact
Subsidence of soil
Failure due to Fire External fire impinging on the piping
Rapid vaporisation of cold liquid in contact with hot surfaces
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 8 of 46
6.3 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Consequence analysis involves the application of the mathematical, analytical
and computer models for calculation of the effects and damages subsequent to a
hydrocarbon / toxic release accident.
Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous
incidents. The model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of
identified scenarios:
Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work
Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in
the atmosphere
Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burnt
as jet fire, pool fire, flash fire and fire ball.
Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point
of release
The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss
of containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material
released leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both.
DISCHARGE RATE The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the
equipment, size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two-phase). The
release rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction
depends mainly on the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-
down the equipment.
DISPERSION Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the
wind, by turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the
release. In case of flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their
Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) are important in determining whether the release will
ignite. In this study, the results of dispersion modelling for flammable materials are
presented LFL quantity.
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 9 of 46
6.3.1 SELECTED FAILURE CASES
Listing of failure cases helps eliminate failure cases of small magnitude as well as
cases with a very low probability of occurrence. A list of selected failure cases was
prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment, experience, past
incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general mechanisms for
loss of containment. A list of cases has been identified for the consequence analysis
study based on the following.
Cases with high probability of occurrence but having low consequence:
Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for
pumps, sample connection failure, instrument tapping failure, drain/vent failure etc.
Cases with low probability of occurrence but having high consequence
Example includes catastrophic failure of station piping etc.)
Although the list does not give complete failure incidents considering all equipments,
facilities etc., but the consequence of a similar incident considered in the list below
could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular accident. The failure cases
considered for consequence analysis are listed in the Table-6.2 below.
TABLE 6.2 : SELECTED FAILURE CASES
S. No. Unit Equipment Failure Mode Consequence
1. AGI-9 Pump
Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
2. Viramgam
terminal
Pump / Compressor/ Tank
Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Tank on Fire Pool Fire
3. AGI-25 Compressor Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire,
Overpressure Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 10 of 46
S. No. Unit Equipment Failure Mode Consequence
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
4. Raageswari
despatch
station Pig Launcher
Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
5. SV-3 Sectionalising Valve
Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
6. Palanpur
receiving
station Pig Receiver
Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)
Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
7. Existing Buried
crude oil
Pipeline Pipeline
20% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
50% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
100% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
8. Existing buried
gas pipeline Pipeline
20% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
50% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
100% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
9. New Gas
Pipeline Pipeline
20% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
50% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
100% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 11 of 46
6.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELLING 6.4.1 SOFTWARE USED FOR THE STUDY
The software used for this study is PHAST 6.7, developed by DNV. Phast 6.7
estimates the consequences of various failure scenarios.
6.4.2 METEOROLOGY
GENERAL
The actual behaviour of and consequences arising from any release of flammable
material largely depend upon the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of
major scenarios involving the release of toxic or flammable materials, the most
important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion
of the escaping material, namely the wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability
and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk
analysis; however, it may be beneficial by absorbing or washing out released materials.
6.4.2.1 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY
The stability of the atmosphere directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to
disperse pollutants emitted into it. In most dispersion scenarios, the relevant
atmospheric layer is that nearest the ground, varying in thickness from a few meters to
a few thousand meters.
Turbulence induced by buoyant forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the
vertical temperature gradient. The temperature of air decreases with height at a rate
called the Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR), a value that varies with time and place.
The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the ELR being
less than, equal to or greater than the Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), a constant
value of 0.98°C/100 meters. The Pasquill-Gifford stability parameter is a meteorological
parameter describing the stability of the atmosphere, i.e., the degree of convective
turbulence. Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) and night time
cloud cover have been identified as prime factors defining these stability categories.
Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved
EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 12 of 46
Table: 6.3 : PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES
Surface
Wind
Speed
(m/s)
Day time solar radiation Night time cloud cover
Strong Medium Slight Thin < 3/8 Medium 3/8 Overcast
>4/5
< 2 A A/B B - - D
2 – 3 A/B B C E F D
3 – 5 B B/C C D E D
5 – 6 C C/D D D D D
> 6 C D D D D D
Legend: A = Very unstable, B = Unstable, C = Moderately unstable, D = Neutral, E =
Moderately stable, F = stable
6.4.2.2 SPECIFIC METEOROLOGICAL DATA
Since the stations are located along the Barmer-Bhogat pipeline, it has been
considered advisable to take into account the prevalent weather conditions of the
regions nearest to the stations. The meteorological data of the observatories nearest to
the stations, have been taken from the “Baseline Environmental Status prepared under
this Project”. The Meteriological data that have been used for the study are
summarized below in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 : Meteorological Conditions
Sl. No.
Location of failure
Weather Station Applicable
Temperature (ºC)
Wind Speed (m/s)
Pasquill-Gifford Stability
1 AGI-9 Banaskantha 32.4 (mean) 3 C/D
2 Viramgam
terminal Ahmedabad
32.7 (mean) 3 C/D
3 AGI-25 Wankaner 32 (mean) 3 C/D
4 Raageswari
despatch station Barmer
6.3-48 3 C/D
5 SV-3 Jalore 32.4 (mean) 3 C/D
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
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Sl. No.
Location of failure
Weather Station Applicable
Temperature (ºC)
Wind Speed (m/s)
Pasquill-Gifford Stability
6 Palanpur
receiving station Banaskantha
32.4 (mean) 3 C/D
7 Buried Existing
crude oil Pipeline
Banaskantha 32.4(mean) 3 C/D
8 Buried Existing
gas Pipeline
Banaskantha 32.4(mean) 3 C/D
9 Buried New
Pipeline
Banaskantha 32.4(mean) 3 C/D
6.4.3 SIZE AND DURATION OF RELEASE
Leak size considered for selected failure cases are listed below:
Leak Size for selected failure scenario is detailed below : Pin-hole leak 5 mm leak
Instrument tapping
failure 20 mm hole size
Large hole 50 mm, complete rupture of 2” drain line
Catastrophic
failure Complete rupture of pressure vessels
The discharge duration is taken as 10 minutes for continuous release scenarios as it is
considered that it would take plant personnel about 10 minutes to detect and isolate the
leak.
Ref [5] AICHE, CCPS, Chemical process Quantitative Risk Analysis
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
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6.5 DAMAGE CRITERIA
DAMAGE CRITERIA DUE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS
In order to appreciate the damage effect produced by various scenarios,
physiological/physical effects of the blast wave, thermal radiation or toxic vapour
exposition are discussed.
LFL OR FLASH FIRE
Hydrocarbon vapor released accidentally will spread out in the direction of wind. This
mixture (hydrocarbon and air) finds an ignition source before being dispersed below
lower flammability limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame will travel back
to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn
injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance of LFL value is usually taken
to indicate the area, which may be affected by the flash fire.
Flash fire (LFL) events are considered to cause direct harm to the population present
within the flammability range of the cloud. Fire escalation from flash fire such that
process or storage equipment or building may be affected is considered unlikely.
THERMAL HAZARD DUE TO POOL FIRE, JET FIRE AND FIRE BALL
Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet fire or fire ball may cause various degrees of burn
on human body and process equipment. Following Table 6.5 below tabulates the
damage effect due to thermal radiation intensity.
Table 6.5 : Damage due to incident thermal radiation intensity
Incident radiation intensity (KW/m²)
Type of damage
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
32.0 Maximum flux level for thermally protected tanks containing
flammable liquid
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of
plastic tubing etc.
8.0 Maximum heat flux for un-insulated tanks
4.0 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20
seconds. However blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is likely.
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 15 of 46
The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 32 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2, 8 kW/m2 and 4 kW/m2
radiation levels, selected based on their effect on population, buildings and equipment
were modelled using PHAST.
VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION:
In the event of explosion taking place within the plant, the resultant blast wave will have
damaging effects on equipment, structures, building and piping falling within the
overpressure distances of the blast. Tanks, buildings, structures etc. can only tolerate
low level of overpressure. Human body, by comparison, can withstand higher
overpressure. But injury or fatality can be inflicted by collapse of building of structures.
Table 6.6 illustrates the damage effect of blast overpressure.
Table 6.6 : Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure
Blast Overpressure (psi) Damage Level
5.0 Major structure damage (assumed fatal to people inside
building or within other structures)
3.0 Oil storage tank failure
2.5 Eardrum rupture
2.0 Repairable damage, pressure vessels remain intact, light
structures collapse
1.0 Window pane breakage possible, causing some injuries
The hazard distances to the 5 psi, 3 psi and 2 psi overpressure levels, selected based
on their effects on equipment, buildings and population were modelled using PHAST.
6.6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
6.6.1 PIN-HOLE LEAK
A Pin-hole leak is assumed to result in a 5 mm hole in the piping. The ensuing release
would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released material’s
encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather stations will
be applicable for different pump stations. Following Table 6.7 provides the details of
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FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
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the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:
Table 6.7 : Fire Hazard Distances Due to Pin-Hole Leak
Location Inventory Release (Kg)
Consequence
Thermal Radiation Distances (m) or Overpressure Distances(m) or Flash Fire Envelope (m)
4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi
12.5 kW/ m2 or 3 psi
37.5 kW/ m2 or 5 psi
AGI-9 900
Flash fire 11
Jet fire 25 19 15
Over pressure 28 26 24
Viramgam
terminal
900/78
Flash fire 11/3
Jet fire 25/5 19/NR 15/NR
Over pressure 28 26 14
AGI-25 78
Flash fire 3
Jet fire 5 NR NR
Over pressure NR NR NR
Raageswari
despatch
station
1000 Flash fire 4
Jet fire 8 8 NR
Over pressure 39 37 35
SV-3 1000
Flash fire 14
Jet fire 28 22 18
Over pressure NR NR NR
Palanpur
receiving
station
1000
Flash fire 14
Jet fire 28 28 28
Over pressure NR NR NR
6.6.2 INSTRUMENT TAPPING FAILURE
An instrument tapping failure is assumed to result in a 20 mm hole in the piping. The
ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released
material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather
stations will be applicable for different pump stations. Following Table 6.8 provides the
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 17 of 46
details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:
Table 6.8 : Fire Hazard Distances due to Instrument Tapping Failure
Location Inventory Release (Kg)
Consequence
Thermal Radiation Distances (m) or Overpressure Distances(m) or Flash Fire Envelope (m)
4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi
12.5 kW/ m2 or 3 psi
37.5 kW/ m2 or 5 psi
AGI-9 14130
Flash fire 74
Jet fire 83 62 49
Over pressure 201 194 188
Viramgam
terminal
14130/
1200
Flash fire 74/11
Jet fire 83/25 62/20 49/16
Over pressure 201/26 194/24 188/23
AGI-25 1200
Flash fire 11
Jet fire 25 20 16
Over pressure 26 24 23
Raageswari
despatch
station
2670
Flash fire 18
Jet fire 37 30 24
Over pressure 49 47 45
SV-3 2670
Flash fire 18
Jet fire 37 30 24
Over pressure 49 47 45
Palanpur
receiving
station
2670
Flash fire 18
Jet fire 37 30 24
Over pressure 49 47 45
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
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DRAIN POINT RUPTURE A drain point rupture is assumed to result in a 50 mm hole in the piping. The ensuing
release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released
material’s encountering a source of ignition. Following Table 6.9 provides the details of
the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions.
Table 6.9 : Fire Hazard Distances due to Drain Point Rupture
Location Inventory Release (Kg) Consequence
Thermal Radiation Distances (m) or Overpressure Distances(m) or Flash Fire Envelope (m)
4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi
12.5 kW/ m2 or 3 psi
37.5 kW/ m2 or 5 psi
AGI-9 90000
Flash fire 210
Jet fire 178 133 107
Over pressure 533 514 497
Viramgam
terminal
90000/ 7800
Flash fire 210/37
Jet fire 178/64 133/50 107/39
Over pressure 533/97 514/93 497/90
AGI-25 7800
Flash fire 37
Jet fire 64 50 39
Over pressure 97 93 90
Raageswari
despatch station
16344
Flash fire 61
Jet fire 93 71 55
Over pressure 146 140 135
SV-3 16344
Flash fire 61
Jet fire 93 71 55
Over pressure 146 140 135
Palanpur
receiving station 16344
Flash fire 61
Jet fire 93 71 55
Over pressure 146 140 135
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6.6.3 CRUDE OIL TANK AND TANK MANIFOLD FAILURE
Crude Oil Tank on Fire
The case modelled is the crude oil tank on fire. Crude Oil tank is a fixed roof tank. The
dimension of the tank is 31.5 m in diameter and 20 m in height. The storage capacity of
the tank is 14927 m3. Table 6.10 below depicts the details of same.
Table 6.10 : ‘Crude Tank on Fire’ case Failure Scenario
Weather Pool Fire radiation (kW/m2) Distances in meters
4 8 37.5
3 C/D 22 14 6
The consequence contours show that both any of the above radiations are not getting
incident on the adjacent dyke.
Instrument Tapping Failure in manifold of Crude Tank
The scenario considered for modelling is a large hole in the inlet manifold of crude oil
tank. A representative hole size of 20 mm has been modelled for a release duration of
10 minutes. The pressure considered for release is based on the head in the tank and
temperature is assumed to be ambient. The dimension of the tank is 31.5 m in
diameter and 20 m in height.
Though a jet fire result has been assessed, the possibility of jet fire is not likely due to
the low pressure at the point of release. Table 6.11 below provides the details of this
scenario.
Table 6.11 : Large Hole in manifold of Crude Tank
Wea
ther
Flash Fire Distances in meters
Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters
Pool Fire radiation (kW/m2) Distances in meters
Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters
LFL 4 8 32 4 8 32 2 3 5
3 C/D 59 55 40 32 58 33 NR* 104 98 93
* NR- Not Reached
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From the consequence contours it is observed that the hazards of pool fire might reach
the tanks in the adjacent dyke.
6.6.4 EXISTING AND NEW GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE
20 % RUPTURE
The case modelled is 20% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline from
Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and
late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather
conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different locations.
Following Table 6.12 below provides the details of the fire hazards for before-
mentioned weather conditions:
Table 6.12 : 20% Rupture of the Pipeline
Pipeline
Weather
Flash Fire Distances in meters
Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters
Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters
LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5
Existing
Gas
3 C/D 300 467 326 243 593 549 510
New Gas 3 C/D 442 712 493 372 878 813 753
The scenario of 20 % rupture is a most credible scenario for the pipeline with a
relatively high frequency of occurrence. Where the buried pipeline is passing through a
populated area, LFL distances may extend up to those areas. Since there is no control
of ignition sources in these areas therefore general public may get exposed to
hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of the pipeline. General Public working
in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline route should be made well aware
about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency Contact numbers shall be displayed
at number of locations so that in any case of leakage from the pipeline, concerned
personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should be regularly monitored by using LEL
meter for any leakage.
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FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
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50 % RUPTURE
The case modelled is 50% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline from
Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and
late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather
conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different locations.
Following Table 6.13 provides the details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned
weather conditions:
Table 6.13 : 50% rupture of the Pipeline
Pipeline
Weather
Flash Fire Distances in meters
Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters
Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters
LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5
Existing
Gas
3 C/D 343 559 389 291 675 624 578
New Gas 3 C/D 500 856 592 449 1004 928 860
The scenario of 50 % rupture is a credible scenario for the pipeline with a high
frequency of occurrence. Where the buried pipeline is passing through a populated
area, LFL distances may extend up to those areas. Since there is no control of ignition
sources in these areas therefore general public may get exposed to hazardous effects
of fire in case of such rupture of the pipeline. General Public working in
offices/industries and residing along the pipeline route should be made well aware
about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency Contact numbers shall be displayed
at number of locations so that in any case of leakage from the pipeline, concerned
personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should be regularly monitored by using LEL
meter for any leakage.
100% OR FULL BORE RUPTURE
The case modelled is 100% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline
from Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire
and late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition.
Weather conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different
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EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY
FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 22 of 46
locations. Following Table 6.14 provides the details of the fire hazards for before-
mentioned weather conditions:
Table 6.14 : 100% rupture of the Pipeline
Pipeline
Weather
Flash Fire Distances in meters
Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters
Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters
LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5
Existing
Gas
3 C/D 361 599 416 313 720 665 616
New
Gas 3 C/D 523 914 630 480 1044 964 890
The scenario of 100 % rupture is a least credible scenario for the pipeline with a
relatively low frequency of occurrence but with the worst consequences. Where the
buried pipeline is passing through a populated area, LFL distances may extend up to
those areas. Since there is no control of ignition sources in these areas therefore
general public may get exposed to hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of
the pipeline. General Public working in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline
route should be made well aware about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency
Contact numbers shall be displayed at number of locations so that in any case of
leakage from the pipeline, concerned personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should
be regularly monitored by using LEL meter for any leakage.
6.6.5 EXISTING CRUDE OIL PIPELINE RUPTURE
The case modelled is 50 mm rupture of the buried existing crude oil pipeline. The
ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released
material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather
stations will be applicable for different locations. Following Table 6.15 below provides
the details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:
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FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401
Rev 0 Page 23 of 46
Table 6.15 : 50 mm rupture of the Pipeline
Pipeline
Weather
Flash Fire Distances in meters
Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters
Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters
LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5
Existing
Crude
Oil
3 C/D 210 178 133 107 533 514 497
The scenario of 50 mm rupture is a major credible scenario for the pipeline with a
relatively high frequency of occurrence but with the lower consequences. Where the
buried pipeline is passing through a populated area, LFL distances may extend up to
those areas. Since there is no control of ignition sources in these areas therefore
general public may get exposed to hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of
the pipeline. General Public working in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline
route should be made well aware about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency
contact numbers shall be displayed at number of locations so that in any case of
leakage from the pipeline, concerned personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should
be regularly monitored by using LEL meter for any leakage.
6.7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While consequence distances have been mentioned under section-6.6, the major
conclusions and recommendations based on the consequence analysis of the identified
representative failure scenarios are summarized below:
6.7.1 AGI-9 PUMPING STATION
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
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1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover the entire station. It is therefore
recommended that blast resistant design be considered for all the manned facilities like
new control room, Guard room etc. with positive pressurization or otherwise this control
room is to be relocated to a safe location outside the overpressure zone, in which case it
shall lie outside the boundary limit of tentative plot demarcated for the same.
2) Pool fire is not envisaged at this station due to the above-mentioned leakage.
3) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may come under its influence.
6.7.2 VIRAMGAM TERMINAL
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire,
Overpressure and Late Pool Fire hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be
made from the results:
1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover around half of the station.
2) Pool fire is envisaged at this station due to the above-mentioned leakage.
3) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may not come under its influence and
therefore personnel may escape easily in case of such instance.
6.7.3 AGI-25 COMPRESSOR STATION
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover the compressor station only.
1) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may not come under its influence and therefore
personnel may escape easily in case of such instance.
6.7.4 RAAGESWARI DESPATCH STATION
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
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FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
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1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station and hence all manned
buildings like Control room. Guard room etc. need to be built as blast-proof.
2) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may come under its influence.
6.7.5 SV-3 STATION
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station and hence all manned
buildings like Control room. Guard room etc. need to be built as blast-proof.
2) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may come under its influence.
6.7.6 PALANPUR RECEIPT STATION
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station, hence all manned
buildings like Control room. Guard room etc. need to be built as blast-proof.
2) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may come under its influence.
6.7.7 CRUDE OIL TANKS
1) Hydrocarbon detectors would be installed as per OISD-116 near the tank manifold.
Hence the early detection of release would enable in quick isolation of the tank contents
through the ROSOV which will be installed as the first isolation valve at tank body flange.
Hence this detection and isolation of tank contents would reduce the amount of inventory
released.
2) The fire at the tank manifold shall be fought with the monitors and hydrants provided
near the tank dyke. To protect the crude oil tanks from the radiation, the water spray
systems shall be started for shell cooling.
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
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6.7.8 EXISTING AND NEW GAS PIPELINE
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost 616 and 890 m for existing and new
gas pipeline respectively, hence all habitation in this much periphery of the pipeline
should be generally avoided.
6.7.9 EXISTING CRUDE OIL PIPELINE
From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and
Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the
results:
1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost 500 m, hence all habitation in
this much periphery of the pipeline should be generally avoided.
6.7.10 COMMON RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations applicable to all stations based on the consequence analysis of the
identified representative failure scenarios are summarized below:
1) The owner must take cognisance of the fact that the area bordering the station is
to be kept free of habitation, and means to discourage the growth of such
habitation must be incorporated in the offsite disaster management plan.
2) The vicinity of the station must be rendered free of all sources of ignition. An
additional measure of security may be provided in the form of explosion-proof
fittings.
3) Measures need to be put in place for the evacuation of non-essential employees
from the premises in the event of a fire.
4) The firewater system ought to be of sufficient capacity to cater to all demands
that may be made of it.
In order to reduce the risk involved at the station, the following measures are
suggested:
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a. Preventive Maintenance
Routine inspection and preventive maintenance of equipment and facilities at the
station is advisable, so as to avoid any untoward occurrence.
b. Instruments
All pressure and temperature instruments, alarm switch, safety interlocks and
emergency shutdown systems should be tested for intended operation as per the
preventive maintenance schedule.
6.7.11 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Mitigating measures: Mitigating measures are those measures in place to minimize
the loss of containment event and thereby hazard associated. These include:
Rapid detection of an uncommon event (HC leak, Flame etc) and alarm
arrangements and development of subsequent quick isolation mechanism for major
inventory.
Measures for controlling / minimization of Ignition sources inside the Station.
Active and Passive fire protection for critical equipments and major structures
Effective Emergency Response plans to be in place.
Detection and isolation: In order to ensure rapid detection of a hazardous event the
following is recommended:
Ensure installation of Hydrocarbon detection and fire detectors at strategic location for
early detection and prevention of an uncommon event emanating from the facilities.
Once the flammable gas release has been detected, as the gas or subsequent fire and
escalation risk will be reduced by isolation of the major inventory from the release
location (prevention of loss of containment). Hence, manual / automated mechanism is
required to isolate the major inventory during any uncommon event. It is recommended
that the station piping should be considered to have remote operated valves so that
these valves can be closed from the safe location upon fire or flammable gas detection.
Ignition control: Ignition control will reduce the likelihood of fire events. This is key for
reducing the risk within the station facilities. As part of mitigation measure it is strongly
recommended to consider minimizing the traffic movement within the station area.
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Escape routes: Provide windsocks throughout the site to ensure visibility from all
locations. This will enable people to escape upwind or crosswind from flammable
releases. Sufficient escape routes from the site should be provided to allow
redundancy in escape from all areas.
Others: Closed sampling system may be considered for pressurized services. Failure
scenarios discussed in this report shall be considered in formulating disaster
management plan of the station.
Control Rooms Control room shall be located at a distance at sufficient distance from operating
areas
The building shall be located upwind of the process storage and handling
facilities.
Control Rooms coming under overpressure zones should be blast proof and
shock proof
Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line
Minimum number of doors shall be provided in the control room while at the
same time the number of doors shall be adequate for safe exit
Smoke detection system shall be provided for control rooms at appropriate
locations
Halon / its proven Equivalent fire extinguisher shall be used for control rooms and
computer rooms
To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts
Power Generating Units Hydrocarbon detectors are recommended in power plant
Surrounding population (including all strata of society) should be made aware of
the safety precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap in the plant
Critical switches and alarms should always remain online
the equipments should be hydraulically tested to a pressure of at least 1.5 times
the design pressure before putting into operation
The pipeline / equipments / storage loading unloading lines should be monitored
continuously for identifying leakages and have control systems which should be
capable of closing down transmission of oil and gas automatically, if ever required
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FROM RGT TO PALANPUR
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Every storage tank, including its roof and all metal connections, should be
electrically continuous and be effectively earthed as per OISD Std. 108
Hydrocarbon detectors may be installed in the tank farms with remote alarms in
control stations as per OISD Std. 108
Fire water requirements should be decided as per guidelines given in OISD Std.
116
Fire proofing materials and systems should be applied as per OISD Std. 164.
6.8 GUIDELINES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING
Disasters are major accidents which cause wide spread disruption of human and
commercial activities. Most natural and man-made disasters have a sudden onset
leaving no possibility of planning then for the occurrence. Industrial disasters cost
human lives, cause injuries and long-term disablement within the facility, while also
affecting the surrounding populace. The loss of revenue and employment, besides the
cost of rebuilding provide severe economic constraints to recovery.
The possibility of disasters needs to be foreseen keeping in mind past experience, so
that means to mitigate the effects can be planned in advance. Human life and the
environment should be given the utmost importance in such planning.
6.8.1 DEFINITION OF AN EMERGENCY
Emergency Planning is integral to loss prevention. Emergencies will be considered
here that have the potential to result in severe consequences, which tend to cause
disruption both on and off-site, and which may require the use of external resources
While „Emergency‟ is a general term that implies a hazardous situation both inside and
outside the factory premises, an „on-site emergency‟ refers to a situation that is
confined to the facility although it may require external help, and an „off-site emergency‟
refers to a situation whose effects spread beyond the facility. An on-site emergency
that is not controlled may turn into an off-site emergency.
6.8.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE PLAN
Emergency preparedness consists of a comprehensive plan to:
1) Respond to a number of emergencies that may be anticipated in the works
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2) Contain the loss of human life and property
3) Provide speedy and effective remedial measures.
The nature of a scenario and its consequences determines the emergency response,
and therefore, the action plan should cover all credible accident scenarios.
Identification of scenarios includes the detection of abnormal conditions, assessment of
the potential consequences and determination of the immediate measures to mitigate
the situation. It also includes emergency response actions, which must be taken to
protect the health and the safety of the staff personnel and the public. Responsibility
for accident assessment normally resides with the managements of individual plants in
the complex, who are best placed to accomplish this function.
The important elements of emergency planning are:
1) Identification of potential disaster scenarios and planning for the same to
mitigate damage to property and life.
2) Disaster Phase Warning and Protective actions like evacuation of personnel.
3) Containment of the disaster by isolating it and fire-fighting
4) Effective and efficient rescue of and provision of relief to people affected in the
works or in the community, based on actual needs and on information collected
locally, both before the disaster and as soon as possible after its occurrence.
5) Efforts to return to normal conditions once the situation has been contained.
The first four points listed above are the most relevant to the management of the
facility. It would be appropriate to classify the hazards posed to the areas around the
facilities by both large and smaller events and provide emergency measures in both
onsite and offsite areas affected.
6.8.3 ALERT
The first, and most important, step in disaster management planning is the
identification and assessment of the principal hazards, which, in facilities handling
Crude Oil are for the most part of the nature of fires. Without the hazards being
identified, planning for an emergency would be an exercise in futility. Operational
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experience and historical evidence concerning past events will help identify the points
of vulnerability and the dangers posed by various scenarios. This information is used in
conjunction with the layout of the facilities and of adjacent communities in preparing the
contingency plans.
Any witness to the beginning of an accident or of any anomalous incident, which could
lead to an accident, is duty bound to give the alert and employ all means available to
him to the best of his ability. These constitute the 1st intervention steps.
An alert is a term used to refer to the information given to ask for assistance or to warn,
in principle, using alarms inside or outside the establishment.
CAIRN will have to ensure, through training or otherwise, that each of its staff can give
a brief and precise warning indicating the place, type and seriousness of the incident,
whenever an abnormal initiating event is witnessed by him. Depending on the nature
and magnitude of the event, and local conditions such as meteorology, geographical
layout, population distribution and accessibility, the important aspect to be considered
is the type or level of an emergency. Emergencies may be broadly categorised into
four levels depending upon the in-plant facilities and the extent of external help that will
be required to meet the emergency. While a Level 1 emergency can be controlled at
the unit in itself and no external help of any nature will be required, in other levels,
external help will be required as outlined below:
Level 1: Operation/Unit level
Level 2: Local/District level
Level 3: State/National level
Level 4: International level
6.8.4 ORGANISATION
Activities during an emergency must be coordinated and this is best achieved by an
organizational approach, with quick response capabilities.
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The ability to respond quickly should not be affected by the time of day or night in
responding to disasters. The coordination of the response to the emergency is critical
in protecting the lives of plant personnel, property and the community. To ensure an
effective response under any circumstances or a combination thereof, a central
authority must be constituted for inter-departmental organization of works. The
functions of the authority should comprise the following:
Establishment of plans and procedures to deal with the disaster, with all
departments and agencies (including the civic authorities).
Creation of a chain of command.
Assignment of responsibilities for each critical function – communication,
gathering of information and revision of records and documentation with fresh
information.
Organisation and execution of training courses and emergency drills.
Establishment and operation of an emergency control centre.
Provision of medical facilities.
Formulation of plans for restoration of normality, partially or fully, depending upon the
destruction caused.
Generation and maintenance of records and documentation.
Certain suggestions concerning the duties of individuals concerned in preparing for an
emergency and during the emergency are outlined below:
i) Works Incident Controller (Chief Incident Controller)
The Works Incident Controller will head the group during an emergency. The Chief of
the Installation or the Deputy General Manager (Operations) may assume the position
of the Works Incident Controller. In his absence, the Sr. Manager (Operations) should
assume this pivotal role until the arrival of the designated Works Incident Controller.
The Works Incident Controller will be responsible for finalizing the emergency plan,
organisation of transportation and establishment of the control centre communication
arrangement, amongst other related duties. The Works Incident Controller will assess
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the situation, declare an emergency and activate the relevant plan. Given a thorough
knowledge of the plant, he should be in a position to decide whether or not the
operation is to be suspended, taking the input necessary from the shift-in-charge/shift
supervisor.
The Works Incident Controller normally operates from the Emergency Control Centre
delegating the shift-in-charge to take charge on-site. He should see that the
procedures laid out for emergency are strictly followed. Mutual aid plans should be
invoked by him, should the requirement for outside assistance arise. The duties of the
Works Incident Controller during an emergency may be summarized as follows:
Announcing an emergency and activating the disaster management plan.
Deciding whether the offsite emergency plan is to be initiated or not, depending on
the level of the emergency.
Arranging for a chronological record of the emergency.
Continuous review and monitoring of the situation and implementation of corrective
action with the help of other senior members/functional coordinators.
Co-ordination with the various internal and external agencies to augment
resources.
Ensuring that key personnel are called in.
Ensuring that the essential emergency services are called in and directed to the
site.
Deciding where to stop an activity.
Issuing directions for the cessation of activities in a safe manner so that the
consequences are minimized.
Ensuring that all personnel in the affected area are accounted for.
Ensuring that casualties receive adequate attention and arranging for additional
medical help, if required, while also ensuring that the casualties’ relatives are
informed.
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Ensuring that the head of CAIRN is kept informed of the status of the situation.
In case of a prolonged emergency, arranging for the replacement of panel
members handling the emergency
Declaring the end of the emergency.
Controlling the rehabilitation of those affected.
Approving press statements to be released by the press coordinator.
Constituting a committee to investigate into the causes of the disaster.
In addition to the co-ordinators mentioned below, chiefs of the electrical, mechanical,
instrument and civil services should also be available with Works Incident Controller for
tendering any help necessary.
ii) Senior Operations Manager
iii) As mentioned earlier, the Senior Operations Manager should take control of the
emergency till the Works Incident Controller arrives and can take charge. After handing
over charge, or, if the Works Incident Controller is already at hand, from the start, he
will work closely with the Maintenance and Operations Engineer and take control at the
emergency site, tackling the situation and co-ordinating the activities of various
agencies. The Senior Operations Manager will have the following important functions
during an emergency.
Arranging for the acknowledgement of the receipt of alerts or alarm signals.
Appraising the situation and maintaining a liaison with the Works Incident
Controller.
Arranging for the containment and isolation of the damaged area
Warning all personnel involved in the operation and evacuating them to a
predetermined place if the need arises.
Commencing and directing fire fighting (if required) till the fire fighting crew arrives.
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Initiating rescue activities and first aid for injured persons pending the arrival of an
ambulance.
Ensuring that only persons with authorized duties enter the affected area.
Controlling spectators to prevent an addition to the confusion.
iv) Fire Co-ordinator
The functions of the Fire Co-ordinator will be:
To work in close association with the Works Incident Controller.
Rendering technical assistance on logistics to fire personnel.
Establishing danger zones and barricading, if necessary.
Making requests for assistance or special services, as may be required.
Arranging for and maintaining necessary appliances and supplies.
Planning and organising evacuation services and training its members.
Accounting for personnel in the affected area.
Arranging mock drills and monthly fire fighting exercises
Inspecting and maintaining an adequate number of fire fighting equipments,
ensuring the functioning of the fire water system and the fixed fire installations, as
well as the corresponding fire alarms
v) Medical Co-ordinator
The important functions of Medical Co-ordinator will be:
Keeping the dispensary of the facility always ready for an emergency on the piping
at Pumping Station.
Assigning doctors, nurses and first-aid personnel specific duties.
Procuring and maintaining medical supplies, drugs and equipment.
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Arranging for ambulances to transport casualties.
Identifying the nature of the accident before sending victims to a hospital so that
action relevant to the injury can be initiated. He should be acquainted with the
chemicals handled and be aware of the specific treatments to be administered.
Imparting knowledge of first-aid to plant personnel
Imparting health education to workers and training them in the methods of dealing
with pool fires and jet fires.
vi) Personnel/Welfare Co-ordinator
The major functions of the Personnel/Welfare Co-ordinator will be:
Arranging for canteen facilities and special food as per medical advice.
Ensuring the availability of adequate provisions and stores for canteen services.
Making arrangements to meet emergency clothing requirements.
Arranging for communication with the families of casualties.
Maintaining public relations and arranging for a media briefing wherever
necessary.
Assisting in evacuation of personnel and neighbouring people, if necessary.
vii) Transport Co-ordinator
The functions of Transport co-ordinator will be:
To keep all vehicles and drivers in readiness and send the vehicles in keeping
with the requirements of different co-ordinators and officials.
To requisition vehicles from outside agencies, if necessary, for which purpose he
should maintain a list of local transport agencies and be in touch with them.
To make all travel and accommodation arrangements for VIPs and company
employees who may have to travel to or from other locations for the
implementation of the emergency control plan.
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To arrange for VHF hand sets to link rescue teams with the Emergency Control
Room.
viii) Security Co-ordinator
The important functions of Security Co-ordinator in an emergency follow:
Instructing all security personnel to help maintain the law and order.
Leading and assisting an evacuation, if necessary.
Closing all visitor's gates, regulating traffic, permitting entrance only of authorized
persons, discharging contract labourers, casual labourers and employees not
involved in emergency operations in consultation with the Chief Incident Controller.
Drawing a cordon around the area of an accident and co-ordinating with external
security personnel, if necessary.
Informing people and vehicles entering the facility, in advance, of restricted entry,
parking, and disaster-struck areas as communicated by the Chief Incident Controller
and the various co-ordinators.
Issuing guidance to external fire-fighting agencies on the premises, as directed by
the Fire Chief.
Co-ordinating with the local police and informing them about additional patrolling, if
required for law enforcement, traffic control and crime protection, in consultation with
the Chief Incident Controller.
Ensuring that systematic efforts are launched and no confusion or panic ensues.
ix) Press and Public Co-ordinator
The important functions of Press and Public Co-ordinator in an emergency are:
Co-ordinating with the press as the official spokesman for the company on the
disaster and its effects.
Keeping the Chairman & Managing Director informed concerning all press releases
and press queries.
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Co-ordinating all legal matters pertaining to the disaster.
Arranging for photo/video coverage for the record and for information.
x) Finance Co-ordinator
The important functions of the Finance Co-ordinator during an emergency follow:
Responsibility for the financial management and accounting of expenses for disaster
control.
Approval of contracts agreed upon with external services by the relevant co-
ordinators, and arranging the finances for the same.
Arranging for the finance to be paid as compensation to the public, upon the advice
of the Chief Incident Controller.
Preparing, forwarding and settlement of all claims with insurance companies.
Co-ordinating with the Central Excise, Income Tax and Sales Tax authorities to
settle all claims.
Arranging for sufficient finance and ensuring that no activity of any functional co-
ordinator is stopped for a paucity of finance.
xi) Emergency Maintenance Co-ordinator
The important functions of the Emergency Maintenance Co-ordinator during an
emergency are:
Ensuring rapid emergency repair and maintenance of all spill-control, fire fighting
and rescue equipment.
Arranging for the maintenance materials required for disaster control in co-ordination
with the Material co-ordinator.
Providing emergency lighting in the area of a disaster and at other locations
identified by the Chief Incident Controller and functional co-ordinators.
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Arranging for medicines, rescue equipment and fire fighting materials as
requirements of the highest priority.
xii) Material Co-ordinator
The important functions of the Material Co-ordinator during an emergency are:
Procuring all materials required for disaster control.
Procuring medicines, rescue equipment and fire fighting materials on priority.
xiii) External Agencies Co-ordinator
The important functions of the External Agencies Co-ordinator during an emergency
are:
Maintenance of correspondence and contacts with external agencies, for complying
with statutory requirements.
Requesting neighbouring organizations for help in controlling emergencies after
consultation with the chief incident controller.
xiv) Stock Co-ordinator
The important functions of the Stock Co-ordinator during an emergency are:
Responsibility for isolation of storage.
Ensuring that an emergency supply of chemicals required for the implementation of
the disaster control plan is always available.
Arranging the evacuation of processing units as instructed by the Senior Manager
Operations.
Activating the in-built safety/fire protection system if the disaster is in his area.
6.8.5 CHAIN OF COMMAND
The Organisational structure should lay stress on the execution and speedy
implementation of response plans. At the same time, it should be flexible enough to
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adapt to a rapidly changing scenario. All actions must be co-ordinated well, so that the
situation on the whole is under control.
The duties and responsibilities of each individual co-ordinator are to be fixed such that
actions can be taken logically. If any changes are necessitated in the procedure, or in
actions, it should be possible for the front-end area co-ordinator to respond logically.
To achieve the above, the chain of command must have a tiered structure, so that the
supervisors can take a few independent decisions to achieve the ultimate objective.
The chain of command should naturally correspond to the organisational structure with
a clear delineation of the nature of duties and the objectives each position entails. It
should also, clearly spell out the duties of each co-ordinator, and his area of control. All
technicians and operators should know who would issue them their instructions in case
of an emergency. The chain of command should also indicate an alternative for each of
the co-ordinators if any of those designated is not available.
All co-ordinators should see that suitably trained men are deployed for each job. Mock
emergency drills conducted on a regular basis would help the co-ordinators understand
their duties and responsibilities well. The command structure can be improved with the
feedback and experience gained from these drills.
Co-ordinators should never leave the command post unattended. If a co-ordinator is
required to leave the command post for any reason whatsoever, he has to appoint a
deputy to attend to his functions, since the activities will be of a crucial nature, and
admitting no delay.
6.8.6 INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION
COMMUNICATION
Communication includes all physical and administrative means by which operators can
rapidly notify the management, off-site emergency response agencies and the public. It
also includes emergency response actions, which must be taken to protect the health
and safety of the personnel and the public. Communication may be by both, software-
and hardware-oriented systems. An emergency planning cannot be successfully
executed without adequate communication.
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During a disaster, communication channels must be kept open to the Emergency
Control Centre (ECC) and outside agencies. The communication system may be
planned as follows:
1) Voice communication Channels:
i) ECC to
Civilian Hospitals.
Civic authorities including police.
Local fire fighting brigade.
Company corporate office or Headquarters.
ii) ECC to
Medical centre (first aid station)
Fire station
Security gate
2) Audio Communication Channels (Alarms)
ECC to
Disaster warning siren
Central warning system (fire)
3) Fire warning
If the fire is noticed at any sector the fire warning is to be given and to alert all the
sections of the complex. If it is a major fire, the ECC is to be immediately activated.
4) Medical alarm/alert
A medical alarm channel is to be created to alert plant personnel trained in first aid.
The channel should include the following tracks:
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From control room to security.
From control room to the Company Medical Officer
From control room to the nearest civil hospital
5) Warning System
The alarm should be raised by a siren audible at a distance.
The siren system should be so devised so that the types of emergencies can be
identified immediately and appropriate action taken at the first instance. For instance,
different signals could be devised for evacuation, assembling the emergency service
personnel at designated points inside & outside plant.
The siren system is to be designed so that it can be activated from the emergency
control room.
6) Power supply for the communication system
All communication systems should have an independent power backup system.
Walkie-talkies are to be given to personnel directly involved in operations and to
those responsible for the area, for additional communication.
MEDICAL RESOURCES
The medical centre must be situated in a zero risk area, while the first aid facility can
be located within an office building. It is most advisable that a full-fledged medical
centre be planned outside the facilities. The medical centre must be equipped to deal
with at least five injured persons simultaneously to treat burn injuries, multiple
fractures, shock etc. and antidotes.
TRANSPORT
Adequate transport vehicles are to be provided for medical treatment, communication,
evacuation and the movement of emergency staff. A general indication of the types of
vehicles that will be required follows:
i) Ambulances, which can accommodate at least two stretcher cases.
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ii) Pick-up vans, preferably with radio communication system (i.e., walkie-talkie).
iii) General-purpose vehicle (Jeeps and cars).
EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE
This is a common, permanently installed centre of works. The staff can be called at a
certain level of danger and the concerned activities performed by the selected people.
The control centre must be located outside the reasonable area of hazard and suitably
fortified while also being approachable. The centre must be equipped with emergency
power and should have the following provisions:
An adequate number of external telephones, one accepting outgoing calls only in
order to bypass the switchboards during an emergency.
An adequate number of internal telephones.
Layout of the facility.
Technical documentation including P&IDs, process data and equipment data.
Safety data sheets.
Identified hazard zones for the types of scenarios considered.
Maps marked with escape routes.
Evacuation plans in case evacuation is necessitated.
Information regarding the available fire-fighting and medical services.
Medical first aid facilities to handle two or three people at a time.
A muster roll of employees.
A pick-up van with radio communications systems.
A list of key personnel, with addresses, telephone numbers etc.
Refreshments.
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The emergency control centre need not always be manned. During an emergency, the
persons concerned should be shifted there to direct activities.
An expert/specialist support team is to be identified to provide specialist assistance to
the emergency control room staff, for directing and advising special operations. The
experts' team may contain specialists both from the company and from outside (civic
authorities, other industries, medical care, the fire service, and government agencies).
This team's involvement helps in minimizing the errors in making decisions.
The centre must be provided with an emergency air circulation system so that in the
event of a fire in the vicinity, the centre can be pressurized, thereby protecting the
personnel.
6.8.7 CO-ORDINATION WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES
Responsibility for warning the population and conveying information on measures that
necessarily need to be taken by them rests with the civic authorities and other
governmental agencies. Intimation or warning of the incident must be given by the
management to these agencies. The decision as to when the population must be
warned will, however, lie with the civic authorities who will base their decision on the
information supplied by the plant management during the crisis, as well as the
information given earlier, on the likely scenarios of accidents.
Depending upon the methodology adopted for the coordination of various aspects of
disaster management, specific responsibilities have to be fixed for civic and
government agencies. The support of outside agencies is required for emergency
responses such as:
For assisting the fire-fighting service and for firewater.
For medical treatment of casualties in isolated areas.
For evacuation of personnel.
For law-enforcement, traffic-control and crime-control.
For communication and transport facilities.
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For rapid procurement of consumables like the foam compounds and fire hoses.
6.9 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions listed below are based on the emergency scenarios generated in the
consequence analysis section.
1) All credible disaster scenarios and their consequences will have to be considered
for the disaster management plan.
2) Disaster Management procedures will have to be made as per the hazard
distances and hazard zones indicated earlier on in this report.
3) Hazardous zones must be identified in keeping with the consequences of various
scenarios already discussed
4) All the staff at the pumping, pigging and compressor stations and engaged in
maintenance and inspection must be informed of the possible consequences of
all incidents and their potential for damage.
5) A proper warning system shall be developed for identifying hazardous situations
so that disaster plan could be implemented.
6) Access roads, escape routes and evacuation plans will be made as per the
hazard distances and hazard zones.
7) The emergency coordinators shall be easily accessible to the operating staff.
8) The company’s fire-fighting resources may be rendered useless in the event of a
major fire at an isolated or distant location. Mutual aid with civil and commercial
organizations in the area must be worked out to augment these facilities. For the
same reason, effective and speedy means of communication with all mutual-aid
centres must be developed.
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6.10 REFERENCES
1. “Classification of Hazardous Locations”, A.W.Cox, F.P.Lees and M.L.Ang,
Published by the Institution of Chemical Engineers, U.K.
2. “The Reference Manual”, Volume-II, Cremer & Warner Ltd. U.K' (Presently
Entec).
3. “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Hazard Identification, Assessment
and Control”, Frank.P.Lees (Vol. I, II and III), 2nd Ed., Butterworth-Heinemann,
U.K.
4. “Risk Criteria For Land-Use Planning In The Vicinity Of Major Industrial
Hazards”, Health & Safety Executive, UK.
5. “Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis”, AICHE, CCPS
6.11 CONTOURS
All the contours plotted for risk assessment study has been attached as Annexure-XII.
Jet fire due to 5 mm pump seal failure of crude oil pump (AGI-9)
Page 1
Overpressure due to 5 mm pump seal failure of crude oil pump (AGI-9)
Page 2
Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude oil pump (AGI-9)
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Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude oil pump (AGI-9)
Page 4
Jet fire due to 50 mm leak in crude oil pump (AGI-9)
Page 5
Overpressure due to 50 mm leak in crude oil pump (AGI-9)
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Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)
Page 7
Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)
Page 8
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)
Page 9
Jet Fire due to 50 mm large hole near NG compressor (AGI-25)
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Overpressure due to 50 mm large hole near NG compressor (AGI-25)
Page 11
Jet fire due to 5 mm seal leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 12
Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 13
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 14
Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 15
Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 16
Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 17
Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 18
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 19
Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 20
Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)
Page 21
Jet fire due to 5mm seal failure of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 22
Overpressure due to 5mm seal failure of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 23
Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 24
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 25
Jet fire due to 50 mm leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 26
Overpressure due to 50 mm leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 27
Pool fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 28
Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 29
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 30
Late pool fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 31
Late pool fire due to tank on fire (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 32
Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 33
Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 34
Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 35
Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 36
Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)
Page 37
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