securing our world_ata - with adds
Post on 16-Aug-2015
159 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
NATOSecuring
ourworld
An official publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association
NATO
Sec
ur
ing
ou
r w
or
ld
Providing the world’s most capable 4x4 SUV range, Land Rover offers the Discovery 4 Armoured. It is the perfect platform, ideal for both VIP protection and support/escort roles with military, police and security organisations. The Discovery 4 Armoured undergoes a thorough and painstaking engineering and development programme, is fully type approved and comes complete with the support of Land Rover’s worldwide dealer network.
DISCOVERYSENTINELDiscreet protection with the legendary capability of a Land Rover.
landrover.com/armoured
Discovery Sentinel is the most capable of all the vehicles in the Land Rover Armoured range. It offers an outstanding breadth of off-road capability while providing B6 ballistic capability, which is defined in accordance with European Standard EN1063 BR6 (glazing) and EN1522 and is certified by QinetiQ®.
Almost indistinguishable from the non-armoured Discovery, it is ideal for VIP protection, support and escort roles, and the Discovery Sentinel is an ideal platform for both police and security organisations.
3NATO Securing our world
Editor Simon Michell
Editor-in-chief Barry Davies
Managing editor Jane Douglas
Chief sub-editor Victoria Green
Sub-editor Amanda Simms
Art director Jean-Philippe Stanway
Art editor Herita MacDonald
Production and distribution manager Elizabeth Heuchan
Sales manager Laurie Pilate
Sales executives James Johnston, Alex Kaye
Publishing director Anne Sadler
Managing director Andrew Howard
Chief operating officer Caroline Minshell
President Paul Duffen
Chairman and chief executive Lord David Evans
Newsdesk Media publishes a wide range of business and customer publications.
For more information please contact Caroline Minshell, chief operating officer
Printed by Cambrian Printers, managed by TU ink
Front cover image: NATO, Sylvain Petrmand ©armée de Terre, US Air Force photo
by Airman 1st Class Dana J Butler/Released
Published by
www.newsdeskmedia.com
Twitter: @newsdeskmedia
184-192 Drummond Street, London NW1 3HP, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7650 1600 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7650 1609
© 2014. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed by independent authors and contributors in this publication are provided in the writers’ personal capacities and are their sole responsibility. Their publication does not imply that they represent the views or opinions of the Atlantic Treaty Association or Newsdesk Media and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such. The reproduction of advertisements in this publication does not in any way imply endorsement by the Atlantic Treaty Association or Newsdesk Media of products or services referred to therein.
Atlantic Treaty Association
Quartier Prince Albert
Rue des Petits Carmes, 20
B-1000 Bruxelles
Tel: +32 2 502 31 60
Fax: +32 2 502 48 77
Email: info@ata-sec.org
www.ata-sec.org
An official publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association
NATOSecuring
ourworld
ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE FOR
REAL-TIME DECISIONS
www.rafael.co.il
RecceLite.High resolution tactical reconnaissance system for combat aircraft and UAS’s
RecceLite delivers the edge you need for superior mission performance.
• Simultaneous collection by IR and VIS channels• Full sphere real-time image collection• Exploitation unit for image interpretation• Wide band digital data link• Solid state on-board recorder• Day/night high, medium and low altitude operation • Enables IED detection
LITENINGTargeting and Navigation System
E/O Solutions
RECCELITETacticalReconnaissance System
TOPLITEObservation &Targeting System
RECCE-UTacticalReconnaissancefor UAS
5NATO Securing our world
ContentsForewords
11 AndersFoghRasmussenSecretary General of NATO
15 TheRtHonDavidCameronMPPrime Minister of the United Kingdom
17 DouglasELutePermanent Representative for the
United States to NATO
Introductions
22 GeneralKnudBartelsChairman of the NATO Military Committee
25 HonDrKarlALamersMPPresident of the Atlantic Treaty Association
Editor’s letter
27 ContinuedevolutionSimon Michell, Editor
NATO inside view
28 Tacklingtoday’schallengesDamon Wilson looks at ways in which NATO can
adapt to the security challenges that are threatening
its periphery today in order to stay relevant to the
interests of its members
31 Theenlargementconundrum –who'snext?
Terhi Suominen considers the potential costs and
benefits of admitting aspirant members to NATO
in the light of recent geopolitical developments,
which have provoked fresh debate on the subject
Amr
NAb
il/A
P/Pr
ess
Asso
ciAt
ioN
imAg
es
ANdy
Wo
Ng
/AP/
Pres
s As
soci
Atio
N im
Ages
cONTeNTs
6 NATO Securing our world
34 Smartdefence,connectedforcesand progressivepolicy
NATO's response to the complexity of today’s
security environment must involve culturally
appropriate forces and look beyond military
measures to social investment, says Hugh Segal
The security challenge
38 TheloomingthreatofglobalinstabilityJason Wiseman explores how NATO responds to
political instability around the world, and how
ATA fully supports its efforts by acting as a bridge
between the Alliance and civil society
41 WhyistheWestfailinginitsrelations withRussia?
Projecting a strong public image across the world
will be crucial if NATO is to re-establish good
relations with Russia, writes Solomon Passy
44 TheUnitedKingdomandAfghanistanAs the deadline for withdrawal looms, Dennis
Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom's
objectives in Afghanistan, outlining the political
and military approaches used to create stability
47 ATA’sroleintheMediterranean andMiddleEast Having played a pivotal role in promoting dialogue
in the Mediterranean and Middle East, ATA is set to
intensify its efforts, explains Fabrizio W Luciolli
50 EmergingsecuritythreatsThe new security context, with particular regard
to Russia, poses a number of short- and long-term
challenges for the Alliance, explains Jamie Shea
54 AlliancesandtheAsiansecuritydilemmaDavid Fouquet looks at NATO's long-standing
partnerships with countries throughout Asia,
and the impact on these of a recent flare-up in
tensions in the Asia-Pacific region
Promoting NATO partnerships
57 Celebrating20yearsofthe PartnershipforPeaceprogramme
Now celebrating its 20th anniversary, the
Partnership for Peace programme is still
going strong, and has an expanding scope
60 BridgingtheMediterraneanSeaAssessing the status of two key NATO regional
partnership programmes: the Mediterranean
Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
64 BestofbothworldsHow do NATO's Response Force and the European
Union Battlegroups complement one another?
NATO operations worldwide
66 SafeguardingenergysuppliesNATO and its partners are working to secure the
safe transit of oil and gas to Europe, and in doing
so, they are countering the threat of piracy
70 ConfrontingterrorismLooking at the counterterrorism role of NATO’s
Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism
MULTIPLE SENSORSONE COMPLETE PICTURE
•Seamlessmulti-sourcedataintegration•Enhancedimageprocessingandautomation•Comprehensiveimageintelligencereports•Combinesimage,videoandGISdatalayers•Mobileandstationarysystemconfigurations
ImiLite.multi-task, multi-sensor Intelligence system for exploitation and real-time ISR missions
www.rafael.co.il
coPy
rig
ht
© b
oei
Ng.
All
rig
hts
res
erve
d.
cONTeNTs
8 NATO Securing our world
73 MovingforwardonKosovoReviewing the progress of the Alliance's
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and what
it means for the wider western Balkans
76 NATO'sdisasterresponse The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination
Centre plays a pivotal role in providing assistance
during civil emergencies, operating all year round
Strengthening military capabilities
80 RebalancingNATOforcesAfter more than a decade of war in Afghanistan,
what should the Alliance plan for as it contemplates
its place in a dangerous 21st-century?
84 ClosingthegapAssessing NATO members’ capabilities following the
launch of initiatives designed to increase European
cooperation, thus reducing the reliance on US assets
88 RampingupNATOcyberdefenceHaving recognised cyber as a major component
of modern warfare through the adoption of a
cyber defence policy, the focus is now on shared
knowledge and interoperability
90 TakingtheleadoncybersecurityThe United States’ cyber-protection policies offer
safeguards for both business and government. What
could NATO countries gain from such an approach?
92 NATOballisticmissiledefence: isitachievable? A defensive and offensive strategy, and robust
situational awareness are essential for NATO to
effectively respond to the growing threat from BMs
98 UpwardlymobileNATO's Strategic Airlift Capability, Strategic
Airlift Interim Solution and HIP Helicopter
Task Force are designed to plug the gaps in its
airborne-transport capabilities
101 AirsuperiorityThe Air Command and Control System initiative
is a radical enhancement to NATO’s ability to
safeguard European skies for many years to come
104 AllianceISTARNATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme
enhances its ability to gather near real time data
in order to follow events on the battlefield
111 MaritimeprojectionNATO members provide a suitably varied maritime
capability to address the range of security threats
at sea, but what ships will they need in the future?
114 AdvertisingindexNAt
o/F
lt.sg
t Ar
tig
Ues/
FrAF
BT is one of the world’s leading providers of communications services and solutions, serving customers in more than 170 countries. BT Security builds on 70 years’ experience in helping organisations around the globe and across all sectors get ahead of the threat curve and reduce the uncertainty and complexity of security. BT Security protects both BT and its customers and includes a full portfolio of security consulting and managed services.
To fi nd out more visit:
www.bt.com/btassure/securitythatmatters
“ We were very grateful that BT agreed to share its wealth of cyber security expertise with us; the learning from its vast experience from the London Olympics being particularly relevant. BT Advise consultancy proved of enormous value, while its connectivity services were impeccably delivered.” Han-Maurits Schaapveld,Director, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Aff airs
To deliver a great performance,you need to build security into every element
Unbenannt-3 119.08.14 12:04Unbenannt-3 1 19.08.14 12:04
11NATO Securing our world
FOrewOrd
Anders Fogh Rasmussen Secretary General of NATO
Our Summit in Wales will be a chance to demonstrate continued transatlantic
resolve and unified action at a critical moment for the NATO Alliance.
We will meet as we prepare to complete International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), our longest combat mission. We have worked hard and sacrificed much to
deny international terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan. Better security has made
it possible for Afghans to develop their own country and decide their own future.
When the relevant legal arrangements are in place, NATO stands ready to continue
supporting Afghanistan to build on the gains we have made.
The end of ISAF marks a significant chapter in NATO history. At the same time,
we face multiple threats around our borders, ranging from terrorism to fragile states
and proliferation. We see an arc of crises from North Africa to the Middle East. And
Russia’s aggressive action against Ukraine has fundamentally challenged our vision
of a Europe whole, free and at peace. In this changed world, NATO remains ready to
protect our Allies against any threat.
As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, we took immediate steps to strengthen collective
defence, with more planes in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground.
Every one of NATO’s 28 Allies has played its part in this defensive effort.
At the Summit, we will adopt a Readiness Action Plan to ensure that NATO is fully
prepared to defend any Ally against any threat.
We are looking closely at how we can best deploy our forces for defence and
deterrence. We are considering reinforcement measures, including the pre-positioning
of equipment and supplies. We are reviewing our defence plans, threat assessments,
intelligence-sharing agreements, early-warning procedures and crisis response
planning. We are developing a new exercise schedule. And we want to further
strengthen our multinational response force, which is designed to respond rapidly
to any crisis, anywhere.
We will also strengthen political and military cooperation with our partners,
and provide support to those who request it so they can develop their own defence
structures and military forces. This will help us prevent conflicts before they start
and project stability without always having to deploy large numbers of troops.
To meet the challenges we face, we need to continue investing in modern armed
forces that can operate effectively together to defend NATO territory, manage crises
beyond our borders and build security with our partners. Over the past five years
Allies have, on average, cut defence spending by 20 per cent. At the same time, the
United States’ share in total Allied defence spending represents more than two-thirds.
So it is critical that we commit to reversing the trend of declining defence budgets,
spending better on key capabilities, and addressing imbalances across the Alliance.
Such a pledge will reinforce the transatlantic bond that has been the bedrock of our
security for 65 years. And it will reaffirm our continuing and unwavering commitment
to the common security of North America and Europe.
NATO’s purpose in the 21st century is to keep our nations safe, the bond between
Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. The Wales
Summit will demonstrate that NATO remains an essential source of stability in a
changed world.
NAT
O
www.gkn.com/aerospace
Formed in 1939 as Fireproof Tanks Ltd (FPT) in response to an Air Ministry requirement for the development and
manufacture of self-sealing fuel tanks for the war effort, our early tanks were of a welded aluminium structure with the
sealing material applied as a composite layer on the outside. Now GKN Aerospace – Portsmouth designs, develops,
qualifi es and manufactures a range of elastomeric products and associated systems for aerospace, military, marine and
commercial applications.
We are committed to designing, building, testing and delivering safe, lightweight fl exible fuel tanks and buoyancy
devices for our global aerospace and defence customers in air, land and sea applications, including fuel tanks, fl otation
systems, sea trays, fuel handling, silicone seals and comprehensive EASA part 21 approved MRO facilities
7575GKN AEROSPACE – PORTSMOUTH IS DELIGHTED TO CELEBRATE 75 YEARS OF DESIGNING, BUILDING, TESTING AND DELIVERING SAFE, LIGHTWEIGHT FLEXIBLE FUEL TANKS AND BUOYANCY DEVICES TO OUR GLOBAL AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE CUSTOMERS.
GKN TECHNOLOGY
SINCE 1939
GKN AEROSPACE – PORTSMOUTH CELEBRATING OUR 75TH YEAR
75SINCE 1939SINCE 193975SINCE 1939757575MAKING THINGS FLY
AirPower adv_ARTWORKv2.indd All Pages 03/06/2014 14:06
www.gkn.com/aerospace
Formed in 1939 as Fireproof Tanks Ltd (FPT) in response to an Air Ministry requirement for the development and
manufacture of self-sealing fuel tanks for the war effort, our early tanks were of a welded aluminium structure with the
sealing material applied as a composite layer on the outside. Now GKN Aerospace – Portsmouth designs, develops,
qualifi es and manufactures a range of elastomeric products and associated systems for aerospace, military, marine and
commercial applications.
We are committed to designing, building, testing and delivering safe, lightweight fl exible fuel tanks and buoyancy
devices for our global aerospace and defence customers in air, land and sea applications, including fuel tanks, fl otation
systems, sea trays, fuel handling, silicone seals and comprehensive EASA part 21 approved MRO facilities
7575GKN AEROSPACE – PORTSMOUTH IS DELIGHTED TO CELEBRATE 75 YEARS OF DESIGNING, BUILDING, TESTING AND DELIVERING SAFE, LIGHTWEIGHT FLEXIBLE FUEL TANKS AND BUOYANCY DEVICES TO OUR GLOBAL AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE CUSTOMERS.
GKN TECHNOLOGY
SINCE 1939
GKN AEROSPACE – PORTSMOUTH CELEBRATING OUR 75TH YEAR
75SINCE 1939SINCE 193975SINCE 1939757575MAKING THINGS FLY
AirPower adv_ARTWORKv2.indd All Pages 03/06/2014 14:06
• Tactical Simulation Training • Development & Production of Simulation Technologies
PRAGUE
STARA BOLESLAV
PARDUBICE
BRNO
• Tactical Simulation Training • Development & Production of Simulation Technologies
PRAGUE
STARA BOLESLAV
PARDUBICE
BRNO
• Tactical Simulation Training • Development & Production of Simulation Technologies
PRAGUE
STARA BOLESLAV
PARDUBICE
BRNO
ABOUT THE COMPANYLOM PRAHA state enterprise provides a comprehensive range of services for civil and military Mi-2/8/17/24/35/171 helicopter operators from maintenance, repairs and overhauls including overhauls of engines TV3-117 and gearboxes VR-14/24, to sophisticated modernizations of helicopter systems. As part of its training center in Pardubice, LOM PRAHA provides combat training to air force pilots including basic, advanced and combat flight training on fixed and rotary aircraft, and tactical simulation training of combat situations. All services provided by LOM PRAHA are certified in direct cooperation with manufacturers and in compliance with international civil and military standards including NATO standards. High added value of the products supplied is guaranteed by the capability to create a synergy between robust eastern aviation technology and high quality western avionics. LOM PRAHA know-how, which has been developing since 1915, comes down to the ability to create a repair center onsite according to customer needs, including the provision of staff training.LOM PRAHA keeps its global significance thanks to the production and support of unique piston aerobatic engines M132, M137, M332, and M337. LOM PRAHA subsidiary VR Group develops and produces sophisticated simulation technologies for air and ground forces.
Flight Training (Own Fleet) • Piston Aerobatic Engines Production • Power Units Overhaul • Tactical Simulation Training • Development & Production of Simulation Technologies
Aviation Technology Life Cycle Support • Aviation Training • Modernizations
LOM PRAHA services
• Helicopter MRO (Mi-2 • Mi-8/17 • Mi-24/35 • Mi-171 Sh)• Helicopter Systems Modernizations & Development• Power Units MRO (TV3-117 • VR14/24 • Al-25TL • Al-9V)• Piston Aerobatic Engines Production (M132 • M137 • M332 • M337)• Tactical Simulation Training (Ground & Air Forces)• Flight Training (Fixed & Rotary Wing Aircraft)• Simulation Technologies Development & Production• L-39 Albatros MRO & Training• Key supporter of MATC
(Multinational Aviation Training Center)
LOM PRAHA credentials
• Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant Civilian & Military Certificate (Mi-2 • Mi-8/17 • Mi-171Sh)• OAO Klimov Certificate (TV3-117 • VR-14/24)• Interstate Aviation Committee – AR MAK• Czech Military Aviation Authority – AED recognized• Czech Civil Aviation Authority• ISO 9001:2009 Certificate• AQAP 2110 Certificate• NATO Security Clearance Certificate “SECRET“• Motor Sich Certificate (Al-25TL)
Civilian HelicopterOverhaul Program
Military HelicopterModernizationProgram
www.lompraha.czLOM PRAHA • Tiskarska 270/8 • 108 00 Prague 10 • Czech Republic • marketing@lompraha.cz • +420 296 505 243
15NATO Securing our world
FOrewOrd
The Rt Hon David Cameron MP Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
This will be the first NATO Summit in the United Kingdom since Margaret
Thatcher hosted the London Summit in 1990, just as the Cold War was ending.
That Summit proved a turning point for the Alliance as leaders charted a new course
for NATO and for a Europe “whole, free and at peace”.
In 2014, the world is more unpredictable than ever and leaders will meet in Wales
at another pivotal moment in the history of the Alliance. In Afghanistan, our combat
mission is coming to an end. To the East, Russia has ripped up the rulebook with its
illegal annexation of Crimea and aggressive destabilisation of Ukraine. To the South,
an arc of instability spreads from North Africa and the Sahel, to Syria, Iraq and the
wider Middle East. This Summit will agree how NATO should adapt to respond to
and deter such threats in order to ensure the continued collective defence of all its
members. To do this we need to address the following areas.
First, seven months into the Russia-Ukraine crisis, NATO must agree on long-term
measures to strengthen our ability to respond quickly to any threat, to reassure those
allies who fear for their own country’s security, and to deter any Russian aggression.
While NATO has only ever sought to be a partner to Russia, it must be clear that
neither it nor its members will be intimidated.
Second, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan draws to an end, allies must consider
how to support the Afghan Government in the years ahead, in particular through
NATO’s new mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces from the
start of next year and by helping to financially sustain these forces in the near future.
Third, the Alliance must agree how NATO will address the risks in an unstable
world – the challenges that are posed by failed states, terrorism, cyberattacks and
extremist ideologies.
NATO must have the capabilities it needs to respond to changing threats. That
requires investment. The UK is only one of four members of the Alliance to meet the
target of spending two per cent of our GDP on defence – we want others to commit to
investing more, particularly in research and equipment. As we invest in our defence
elsewhere, so we should invest in security beyond the Alliance’s borders, strengthening
the capacity of forces elsewhere to tackle local conflicts through new defence capacity-
building missions, for example to Georgia or the Middle East.
Fourth, as the world’s broadest security network, with partnerships with over 40
countries and organisations on four continents, the Summit offers the opportunity to
demonstrate a clear commitment to working with others who share our values and
to maintaining an international rules-based order that promotes freedom, democracy
and the rule of law.
Fifth, and finally, we should recognise the sacrifices made by our Armed Forces.
In the UK, we have enshrined an Armed Forces Covenant in law to ensure that our
Armed Forces get the respect and support they deserve. Building on this, it is my
personal priority to establish a new ‘North Atlantic Armed Forces Charter’ to make
clear our shared commitment to our Armed Forces and their families.
At the London Summit in 1990, leaders agreed that “we need to keep standing
together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades”. The
Wales Summit, with these ambitious priorities, should prove that NATO continues
to be a rock-solid alliance with strong partnerships around the world that fosters
global peace and stability, creating a secure environment for our economies to grow.
Working together for peace and stability
cro
wn
copy
rig
ht
17NATO Securing our world
FOrewOrd
Douglas E LutePermanent Representative for the
United States to NATO
As NATO leaders gather in Wales on 4 September, our work is clear: heads
of state and government will be taking decisions to ensure that NATO,
the world’s strongest, most durable alliance, will continue to meet new security
challenges for years to come.
The threats are real, and every day grow more complex: instability on our
eastern and southern flanks, the rise of non-state actors, and emerging threats
such as cyber and ballistic missile attacks. And as the bedrock of transatlantic
security, NATO’s mission has never been more important. In this two-day
event, President Barack Obama and other world leaders will focus on a diverse
range of challenges: NATO’s evolving mission in Afghanistan; challenges on
NATO’s periphery, including the Ukraine crisis and the impact of Russia’s actions
on transatlantic security; the readiness of Alliance capabilities; and the deepening
and broadening of NATO’s partnerships.
At the Summit, we’ll focus on four main themes.
First, Afghanistan. After 12 years, NATO can be proud of its legacy in Afghanistan.
Our objectives remain clear: disrupting threats posed by al-Qaeda, supporting Afghan
security forces and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand
on their own. Together with the Afghan people and international partners, NATO
helped build an army and police force; and, created a secure space for improvements
in health, education, women’s rights, media freedom and governmental institutions
– all building blocks for a secure and democratic future – to take hold. And NATO’s
commitment doesn’t end when ISAF’s combat mission draws to a close at the end of
2014. NATO will remain a partner for Afghanistan as we transition to a new mission
focused on training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces. We will provide
the tools and the training, and the Afghans will provide the courage and the will
to succeed. Much remains to be done, but Afghanistan’s future is in the hands of
Afghans, while NATO stands ready to support.
Second, challenges on NATO’s periphery. NATO leaders will meet with Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko to discuss the crisis caused by Russia’s illegal aggression,
the most severe challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War. All
28 Allies today contribute to reassurance measures in the air, on the land and at sea
among the eastern Allies, signaling NATO’s unity and resolve. At the Summit, we’ll
address additional reassurance measures and further adaptations to NATO’s posture in
response to this challenge. Leaders will also discuss the rapidly evolving situations
in Syria and Iraq, as well as persistent instability in North Africa, especially Libya.
Third, capabilities. NATO’s mutual security guarantee rests on the ability of each
Ally to come to the defence of the others. Leaders will consider a Readiness Action
Plan that adapts the Alliance to new challenges. Our nations must ensure that NATO
has the capabilities required – experienced troops, modern equipment, world-class
training, regular operational exercises, and ongoing education. Military capability is
the core of the Alliance, and this requires defence investments. Allies all benefit from
NATO’s security guarantee and all must contribute proportionately, especially now
that we are beginning to recover from the worst recession in Alliance history. Together
U.S.
Sta
te D
epar
tmen
t
Together for mission accomplishmentSecurity and defence forces in the field need effective, reliable communications. Operational teams need to be able to connect to their headquarters on a secure network and communicate instantly within closed user groups over local, wide-area or global networks.
Your device, our satellite network – BYODThere is an increasing demand for seamless integration between terrestrial and satellite communications. Government and defence users want to be able to use their smartphones no matter where they go. Thuraya addressed the bring-your-own-device (BYOD) trend for end users with the Thuraya SatSleeve – a satellite adaptor that integrates with Android or iPhone devices, allowing users to make calls and access email and apps via Thuraya’s satellite network.
Thuraya solutions for governmentSecure, assured, reliable mobile satellite communications
or wireless connectivity. They are compact, lightweight, fast, highly flexible, easily deployed, and interoperable for all operations.
Land voiceThe only satellite phone to meet the most demanding criteria for splash and dust resistance and shock, Thuraya XT is ideal for users operating in harsh environments where local networks are unreliable. An industry first, the Thuraya SatSleeve (for Android or iPhone) is the world’s first adaptor that transforms a smartphone into a satellite phone.
Land dataThuraya IP+ represents the most compact and lightest satellite broadband terminal in its class. Highly portable, it supports broadband data communications with streaming speeds
of up to 384kbps and standard IP of up to 444kbps, and is engineered to
support a broad range of mission-critical solutions and applications.
In 2014, Thuraya launched two new vehicular broadband terminals.
Thuraya Voyager IP is designed for basic data communications on the move, while Thuraya
Commander IP is the first ruggedized satellite broadband terminal designed using MIL-SPEC components.
Certified solutions Security and defence forces require more cost-effective and immediately deployable forms of communication than ever before. Products and solutions must be adaptable to continuously changing environments, simple to deploy and use, compatible with commercial off-the-shelf technology (COTS), interoperable between disparate communications networks, and designed using standards-based technology. Thuraya’s suite of solutions for the government
sector meets operational requirements such as, encryption, ISDN calls over satellite, border surveillance, extending headquarters to remote locations, and many others. Our solution providers include AEP Encryption, AudiSoft, Crypto AG, Hawkeye Surveillance, Horizon MultiVoIP, Librestream Onsight, OneAccess, Scotty, Software Definable Radio (SDR), Tetra, Thuraya GSM, Thuraya NettedComms and Vocality, all of which can provide customisation to meet your needs.
The partner you can depend onThuraya recognises the importance of mission-critical operations, which need to work within stringent budgets to rapidly deploy and establish secure mobile satellite communications in any given location. Whether it is a bring-your-own-device or building-your-own-device requirement, handheld voice solutions, or dedicated broadband data solutions, Thuraya’s depth of expertise makes it a natural choice for government users seeking a partner they can depend on.
ADVERTISEMENT
For more information on Thuraya’s services and solutions for the government sector, please email us at government@thuraya.com
Thuraya’s extensive satellite network provides clear communications and uninterrupted coverage across two-thirds of the globe by satellite, and across the whole planet through its unique GSM roaming capabilities. Our satellites provide reliable L-band coverage across Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe and the Middle East. Our network management uses Dynamic Resource Allocation to automatically assign capacity in high-congestion areas during mission-critical deployments, disasters and conflict.
Thuraya’s rugged, compact terminals are innovative, easy to install and maintain, with simple set-up for LAN
The Thuraya IP Commander
The Thuraya SatSleeve for Android or iPhone
19NATO Securing our world
FOrewOrd
we must reverse the decline in defence spending, move towards the NATO target of
two per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of military spending allocated to investment,
and improve in meeting NATO’s agreed performance metrics. Each Ally must commit
to doing its part to keep our Alliance strong, ready and able to meet current and
emerging threats. Shared benefits mean shared responsibility.
Finally, partnerships. With over 40 partners around the world, NATO has a
valuable network that exports stability well beyond the borders of the Alliance –
from Mauritania, east to Japan, from Sweden, south to the Persian Gulf. Our partners
enhance Alliance operations, add critical capabilities, and provide political and
geographic diversity. We believe NATO’s partners benefit, too, gaining access to
world-class training, exercises and education; building capacity in their own
security institutions; opening political dialogue on shared interests; and even
pooling resources to gain efficiencies. NATO partnerships are a two-way street
and, as we meet in Wales, our leaders will consider how this Alliance will continue
to invest in NATO partnerships beyond 2014.
Overall, the Summit provides Alliance leaders with the opportunity to renew
NATO’s core mission: our binding obligation to Article 5, the mutual defence
commitment in the Washington Treaty. As President Obama joins our Allies and
partners in Wales, the world will focus again on NATO. Since 1949, NATO has been
the world’s strongest, most durable and most effective military alliance. It is a family
of nations from both sides of the Atlantic who are committed to peace and freedom,
and determined to defend these common values. In Wales, we will reaffirm that
commitment and determination, and make sure that NATO has what it takes to keep
our nations secure and our citizens safe.
NAT
O
President Barack Obama speaks with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Leaders will discuss diverse challenges at the Wales Summit
AM132_NATO Ad_Securing our World publication.indd 1 2014-08-05 11:10 AM
AM132_NATO Ad_Securing our World publication.indd 1 2014-08-05 11:10 AM
IntroductIon
22 nAto Securing our world
General Knud Bartels Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
The Wales Summit brings with it a unique set of opportunities and challenges
for the NATO military authorities, setting the stage for NATO’s future as one
of the most significant summits since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance will
seek to build on the experiences of the past and set the conditions for the future in
these turbulent times.
Events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have reinforced the
need for the Alliance’s military to be ready, relevant and responsive in an increasingly
uncertain security environment, characterised by complex, so-called hybrid, and
asymmetric threats. In recent months we have seen how the Alliance can effectively
bring together contributions from 28 Allied Nations to deliver a series of military
reassurance measures to Eastern Allies under the auspices of collective defence. In
Afghanistan, the Alliance has developed unparalleled interoperability and operational
experience alongside a large number of partner nations. But, we cannot rest on our
achievements and must continue to evolve as the threats to NATO and global security
have evolved in often unpredictable ways.
Therefore, at the Summit, NATO will demonstrate its commitment to the continued
evolution of its military structures through a Readiness Action Plan. This will underpin
the development of more responsive, agile and capable Alliance military forces able
to support the three strategic core tasks of collective defence, crisis management
and cooperative security. In doing so, the Alliance’s military will seek to exploit the
advantages of its new lean command structure, adapted NATO Response and Special
Operations Forces, and nested Allied joint enablers.
Delivering on the Connected Forces Initiative will be central to this ongoing
transformation to retain and expand the interoperability achieved in Afghanistan,
while broadening the range of activities and exercise scenarios. Education, exercises,
training and evaluation will be key themes for NATO’s military, requiring both
investment and commitment from nations and the Alliance as whole. As a catalyst
for this process, NATO will develop a more relevant, more demanding and more
inclusive programme of exercises starting with Trident Juncture in 2015, which
will be the largest NATO exercise of this type in more than 20 years.
Finally, NATO remains the most powerful global defensive alliance in terms
of combined GDP, military spending and military technology. There is an urgent
requirement to arrest the decline in investment seen over recent years in order to
ensure that NATO maintains this qualitative advantage. That investment must be
focused on critical capability areas and also support the associated training and
enablers necessary, which have been under-resourced in the past.
NATO’s military structures continue to offer the highest degree of professionalism,
capability and political choice for the Alliance, and we should pay tribute to the men
and women who make up these forces on a daily basis. Our challenge will be to ensure
we provide the proper tools and support to maintain and build upon our strengths and
ensure we are agile, adaptable and fit for purpose in an uncertain world.
NAT
O
Allocate Software plc1 Church Road, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 2QE, UK,
Tel. +44(0)20 7355 5555www.allocatesoftware.com
Allocate DefenceSuite: Accelerating Informed Decisions
Efficient Force Generation & Personnel Management Using the Industry-Leading Force Optimisation Solution
The Allocate Software NATO Automated Personnel Management System seamlessly integrates people and posts from the Alliance across the entire Command Structure. Using APMS gives Commanders a global view of the organisation, enabling the efficient and effective management of NATO-assigned personnel and saving significant staff effort. APMS allows individuals to share their talents, ensuring that their skills benefit both NATO and their nations. Allocate Software applications also support NATO force generation and NATO Special Forces HQ. All Allied nations can use APMS.
To find out how it can help you please contact:
Hugh Toler – Defence Pre-SalesHugh.Toler@allocatesoftware.com Tel: +44 (0)20 735 55526
www.allocatesoftware.com/defence
The software is accredited for NATO, Australian and British classified defence networks
Allocate Software’s defence experience::
23 Years with UK MoD
15 Years with NATO
13 Years with British Army
8 Years with Australian Defence Forces
Allocate Software’s applications address three key areas: force generation, personnel management and special forces.
Allocate is proud to have supported NATO for 15 years.
1st Joint Public Affairs Unit, Credit LS Andrew Dakin, Copyright String Commonwealth
DefenceAdAugust2014v3.indd 1 21/08/2014 09:54:40
FIRST RESPONSE• Emergency evacuation• Medical evacuation• Firefighting• Disaster relief• Surveillance• Assessment
LAST MILE• Multimodal• Freight forwarding• Project management• Camp operation/management• Airport management • Ground handling• Warehousing• Fuel• Aircraft maintenance • Airdrop
SkyLink is a leading Aviation Transport & Logistics services provider in support of peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, military contingency operations, humanitarian operations, and other governmental and commercial applications.
SkyLink has operated for over 26 years in more than 75 countries and has delivered assistance and support services in the most challenging and remote areas in the world.
• Rotary wing and fixed-wing aircraft of various Eastern and Western makes and models for operations anywhere in the world.
• SkyLink has the ability and the network to match any aircraft type to the specific requirements.
• Skylink has the ability to transport passengers worldwide through its existing network.
• SkyLink transports any kind of cargo worldwide through its existing network and freight forwarding capabilities door to door.
Janet Alkobi | Director of Sales | TorontoEmail: jalkobi@skylinkaviation.comOffice (+1) 416 924 9000 ext 201Mobile (+1) 416 450 5240
Rima Saleh | EVP, Business Development | Washington DCEmail: rsaleh@skylinkaviation.comSkype: rima.saleh88Office (+1) 703 318 4003Mobile (+1) 703 973 9801
Kris Bebbington | VP, Sales and Services | DubaiEmail: dbebbington@skylinkaviation.comOffice (+971) 42146 717Mobile (+971) 5617 42211
www.skylinkaviation.com
First in the AirFirst on the Ground – Anywhere
25NATO Securing our world
INTrOducTION
Hon Dr Karl A Lamers MPPresident of the Atlantic Treaty Association
The beginning of the 21st century has led us to an interconnected world where
dependence on one another has become a global imperative for our security.
This has allowed us to share our resources and expertise while also making us
vulnerable to various shared threats, compelling us to take collective responsibility
for the security of our citizens, allies and partners.
It is crucial to realise that not only local authorities or military institutions are
responsible for global security. A wide spectrum of non-governmental actors, media
and, especially, civil societies play a fundamental role in promoting security and
awareness. Different actors have different functions, but they all strive towards a
common goal, which is based on shared norms and values seeking to promote and
strengthen a broader sense of security cooperation. In short, we all strive to contribute,
one way or another, to the security of our countries, regions and the world. In order
to explain security, we need a comprehensive approach that encompasses all actors in
the field. This is why the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) pursues both a top-down
approach from our governments and highest authorities, and a bottom-up approach
from grass-roots organisations, civil societies and community leaders.
Effective and long-lasting peace can only be achieved together with a common
understanding that security is a necessity in our lives. We have recently witnessed
that threats and challenges to our safety can happen to anyone at any time with a
devastating impact on our livelihood. Living in a more prosperous part of the world
does not allow us to sit back and enjoy the achievements of the past – we still have
to point out why defence matters.
We cannot allow the concepts of security and defence to only truly be understood
once under attack. In times of peace, which many in the Euro-Atlantic region have
become overly accustomed to, it becomes rather easy to give up on maintaining a
defensive mindset. Today, together with the rebirth of territorial aggression and the
rise of violent extremism, we find ourselves facing one of the most trying times in
recent memory. This makes it necessary for NATO and ATA to explain the importance
of collective and cooperative defence so that security measures can be perceived in
terms of investment, rather than expenditure.
Our role is to promote confidence and trust between nations, governments and security
institutions such as NATO. This can only be done by improving the understanding of the
need for security for everyone. Military efforts must be supplemented by those of non-
military structures and society, including every civilian. Therefore, we advocate for a
hand-in-hand approach in order to maximise the benefits to all nations.
Crucially, we encourage increased dialogue and understanding of the enlargement
process of the Alliance. Effectively integrating aspiring countries through the ‘open door
policy’ remains highly critical in order to abolish the dividing lines in Europe for good
and unite people across the continent. In the interlinked world of today, partnerships
matter more than ever before, whether they are political, economic or military. It goes
without saying that cooperation leads to stability and that the inclusive approach of the
Alliance is the key towards securing our world.
ww
w.c
duc
su.d
e
Fall 2014. Our journey begins…
OBE-OneGLOBAL GUARDIANS
®
www.obe-one.com
27NATO Securing our world
EdiTOr’s lETTEr
Two years ago at the
Chicago Summit, NATO
leaders faced a multiplicity
of challenges: financial,
political and military. This
September, the heads of state
of the 28 NATO Alliance
members will face similar
dilemmas, but with the added
complication of a rampant
and vicious insurgency led
by the Islamic State (IS)
forces in Syria and Iraq, and a Russia that is flexing its muscles
on the eastern borders of the Alliance.
Already, the United States has taken unilateral action with
air strikes in Iraq to assist Kurdish forces beat back IS. NATO
will need to decide what actions, if any, it will take in support
of its most powerful member. Difficult decisions will also have
to be made in respect of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine.
Added to that, the nations affected by the Arab Spring are
facing continued stresses as they move from revolution to the
next phase of their political evolution. The implications this
has for NATO partnership programmes like Mediterranean
Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will need to
be carefully considered.
NATO, however, has shown in the past that it can find
consensus and act collectively to help stabilise the regional
security on its outer rim. That same resolve must be found
again at the Celtic Manor. However, increased military
expenditure is required, particularly by those nations that
are not currently able to invest the minimum target of
two per cent of GDP in their defence capabilities. That said,
there are already signs that the sustained budget cutbacks
that most Alliance members have had to implement over
the past years may be coming to an end – at least for some.
Just as in preceding NATO summits, those gathered at
Celtic Manor in Wales will once again have to grapple with
the capability gap between the United States and Europe.
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya almost three years
ago highlighted the continued lack of sufficient critical airborne
assets in European inventories – tankers, ISTAR (intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) platforms
and transporters. Access to a single European fast-jet aircraft
carrier during OUP was also a significant reminder of the
impact of legacy planning decisions.
Joint capabilitiesThat said, NATO is making sustained headway on a number
of capability programmes, whose impact, once implemented,
will be huge. The Air Command and Control System (ACCS)
is starting to reach operational capability – albeit over a
staged and iterative schedule. The system, which will offer air
operations commanders an enhanced unified air picture over
Europe, will plug into the European Phased Adaptive Approach
ballistic missile defence system that is continuing to reach
maturity. The Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme is
also ploughing ahead. Once in service, it too will offer NATO
commanders unparalleled situational awareness. In short,
the completion of these collaborative efforts by the end of
the decade will deliver considerable joint capabilities for the
protection of NATO’s member states.
Equally as important as those capabilities, cyber defence is
an area of growing concern – one in which the Alliance is now
investing significant resources and planning. Together, these
new, enhanced competencies focus back on NATO’s core raison
d’être – collective defence.
Continued evolutionSimon Michell, editor
NATO iNside view
28 NATO Securing our world
Dar
ko V
oji
no
Vic
/aP/
Pres
s as
soci
atio
n im
ages
a pro-russian rebel at the barricades on a road leading into slovyansk, eastern Ukraine. russian aggression could trigger a series of conflicts, threatening european stability
29NATO Securing our world
NATO iNside view
Conflict and bloodshed on the periphery of the NATO region must be dealt with head-on at this year’s summit if the Alliance is to remain
relevant to its members’ interests, argues Damon Wilson
Tackling today’s challenges
As NATO leaders gather in Wales, transatlantic security
faces the most serious challenges it has confronted
since the end of the Cold War. From Ukraine and Syria, to
Iraq and Libya, the frontiers of the Alliance are plagued by
conflict and bloodshed. Yet, as NATO seeks to look beyond
Afghanistan and chart its future course in Wales, many Allies
are reluctant to face these new challenges head-on. Dodging
these issues at the UK Summit would be a mistake. In fact,
focusing exclusively on the defence of NATO Allies’ risks
would leave the Alliance less secure over time.
After more than a decade of war-fighting and peacekeeping,
NATO Allies are understandably eager to bring an end to the
Alliance’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan and transition to a strictly training and advising
mission. At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine
has reinforced many of the Allies’ desires to focus on collective
defence of the Alliance and to ensure the credibility of the
Washington Treaty’s Article 5 commitment that an attack
on one Ally would be treated as an attack on all.
Wales, no doubt, will reinforce Allied solidarity and
commitment to each other’s defence as the most essential
elements of deterrence. Yet, in the absence of a NATO strategy
to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance will face
more difficult security challenges in the future.
In the East, if Russian aggression is not stopped, a series
of conflicts and crises will unfold, threatening European
stability. In the South, continued conflict and instability in
the Arab world could not only threaten to destabilise NATO
Ally Turkey and key partners in the region, but also lead to
massive refugee and immigration flows to southern Europe.
Regional threatsIf the Wales Summit ignores these challenges, it risks creating
a perception of an Alliance licking its wounds, reluctant
for a fight, weakening its greatest contribution to security:
deterrence. An agenda that avoids the tough issues may even
embolden adversaries who oppose NATO interests and values.
To NATO’s east, a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin
has invaded and annexed Crimea and continues to wage a
hybrid war against Ukraine, undermining the pillars of
stability that have been the guarantee of peace in the region.
On NATO’s south-east frontier, extremist terrorist forces are
waging war in Syria and Iraq, posing a direct threat to Turkey’s
security and broader transatlantic security in the near term.
To NATO’s south, the collapse of civilian authority in
Libya and increased repression in Egypt risk producing
further instability that breeds future terrorists and sends
waves of refugees seeking asylum across the Mediterranean.
These challenges are daunting. There are no simple
solutions. And NATO is not always the answer. Yet NATO’s
strength is its adaptability – that is, the Alliance’s ability
to be relevant to ensuring the security of its members.
During the Cold War, NATO provided security to its
members through its deterrence of the Soviet threat,
helping to avoid large-scale bloodshed. With the collapse
of the Soviet Union, NATO advanced its members’ security
by reaching out to former adversaries, forging far-reaching
partnerships and, ultimately, welcoming many as new Allies.
The Alliance responded to the crises in the Western
Balkans by becoming an operational Alliance, demonstrating
its capability to use military force to bring peace. Since 9/11,
NATO has agreed to tackle security threats from wherever
they may originate, leading to its long mission in Afghanistan.
In the absence of a NATO strategy to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance
will face more difficult security challenges in the future
NATO iNside view
30 NATO Securing our world
NATO forces and infrastructure are in place to help deter a
Russia that now treats NATO allies as potential adversaries.
Second, the countries designated as NATO’s most capable
partners should include Georgia and Ukraine, two that are
on the fault line of European insecurity today. Georgia, after
all, has been the partner that has contributed more than any
other to the mission in Afghanistan. Ukraine, meanwhile, has
participated in every NATO operation since the Balkans, and is,
unfortunately, swiftly gaining credible fighting capacity. These
nations, along with Sweden, Finland, the United Arab Emirates
and Australia, will buttress the Alliance’s capabilities, binding
them closely in a network of contributors to security.
Third, NATO’s new defence capacity-building initiative
will most likely be targeted to help Montenegro prepare to
become an Ally quickly, and to train the African Union and
its leading force contributors to better manage crises on the
African continent. However, this initiative should also be
offered to Ukraine and
Libya, the two countries
most in immediate need of
stronger defence capacities
to maintain security on
their own territories. To be
relevant, NATO’s capacity-
building initiative should
address the two countries
that are most in need of
greater capacity on the
Alliance’s periphery.
This initiative could
evolve into a new strategy
for the Partnership for
Peace countries that now feel threatened by Russia. This kind
of targeted partnership package would not address issues
related to membership, but rather focus on helping partners,
ranging from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan, to build their capacity to defend their
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Fourth, as the Allies put a new emphasis on intelligence-
sharing to guarantee more common situational awareness,
they should focus on ensuring shared information to inform
more common strategies toward the disasters of Iraq and Syria,
while preparing for potential challenges in the Arctic.
This effort should form the basis of a new strategy among
key NATO Allies – the United States, Turkey, France and the
United Kingdom – in cooperation with Arab partners to make
sure that terrorist forces hostile to NATO members’ interests
do not prevail in Syria or Iraq. The Alliance will not provide
the answer to all of these security challenges. But to be relevant
to its own members’ interests, it must not relegate itself to a
peripheral role on today’s greatest security threats.
But this has also helped to transform the Alliance so that it
is better prepared to defend against new threats, for example,
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, as well as terrorism and cyberthreats.
Today, the question is whether the Alliance has the will
and capability needed to continue to adapt, in order to remain
relevant to ensuring the security of its members.
Prepared for the futureIn the run-up to the Wales summit, NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen deserves immense credit for advancing
an agenda focused on precisely this necessary adaptation. He
has pushed the Allies to make sure that NATO is fit for purpose,
as well as prepared for the future.
First, Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to
collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military
deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the Baltic
states, Poland and Romania.
Along with the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR), Rasmussen has
led the charge to ensure that
Allied forces are prepared
to respond to any threat
quickly, including by
reinvigorating the NATO
Response Force to achieve its
original purpose of serving
as a rapid-reaction force in
the event of a crisis.
NATO’s operations in
the Balkans, Afghanistan
and Libya have also demonstrated the value of military
contributions from non-NATO members. Wales will mark
a watershed in not only recognising the value of these
partners, but also providing a pathway to a guarantee that
the Alliance’s capabilities are permanently bolstered by
like-minded partners, rather than hastily assembled in
an ad hoc fashion in each new scenario.
After years of difficult training missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Alliance and its militaries have developed
capabilities critical to helping local forces provide security.
Significant to NATO’s adaptation, the Wales Summit will
launch a new defence capacity-building initiative in which
the Alliance will work with other nations and organisations
to help them develop the capacity to manage crises and
conflicts. The idea is that NATO’s advance spadework will help
prevent future crises while also making certain that partners
can increasingly address their own regional security needs.
In turn, NATO and the member countries themselves won’t so
often be called on as the only forces capable of ensuring peace.
These Wales initiatives are the key to the Alliance’s
adaptation. However, it is equally important how NATO leaders
agree to apply these new tools. To ensure that the Alliance
is relevant, they should seek to offer and apply these to the
relevant crisis the Alliance is facing today. First, they should
agree to make the Alliance’s temporary measures – put in place
to reassure the Eastern Allies – more permanent, ensuring that
Mr Damon Wilson is executive Vice President of the atlantic council of the United states. Previously, he served as special assistant to the President, and senior Director for european affairs at the national security council, the White House. He has been involved in every nato summit since Washington in 1999
Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the
Baltic states, Poland and Romania
31NATO Securing our world
NATO iNside view
NATO has continued to grow since the Cold War ended – a process influenced by global security dynamics – but admitting new members
involves costs and benefits for both parties, says Terhi Suominen
The enlargement conundrum – who’s next?
NAT
O
A NATO meeting of foreign affairs ministers. The Alliance now has 28 member countries, 22 of which are from the European Union
For 65 years, NATO has been the premier international
collective military and security institution in the world.
It has been the sole and pre-eminent Euro-Atlantic security
actor, and at the core of America and Europe’s relationship.
NATO has been compared to ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove’.
Throughout its existence, the Alliance changed and moved
forward, but the nature of security itself has also transformed.
The most apparent of these changes was the disappearance of
the single threat. From the beginning, the Alliance’s military
forces opposed a common enemy, the Soviet Union, and its
existence was only seen as a balance of the Soviet threat.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, NATO started to change, but its evolution was not all
plain sailing. During NATO’s post-Cold War transformation,
it continued to play a key role in transatlantic geopolitical
stability. This is when enlargement emerged as a topic.
Today, NATO is an organisation of 28 member countries.
NATO has gone through three enlargement rounds since the
United States
Canada
Iceland
NATO iNside view
32 NATO Securing our world
end of the Cold War, which were in 1999, 2004 and 2009.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty describes how the
enlargement process of admitting new countries is conducted.
The Article states that: “the Parties may, by unanimous
agreement, invite any other European State in position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.
Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by
depositing its instrument of accession with the Government
of the United States of America.”
Enlargement todayNATO enlargement is not only based on the requirements
that the aspirant countries should fulfil, because having
the will and fulfilling the criteria is not enough. Primarily,
NATO enlargement is a political process and the decision-
making is affected by international security dynamics and
political considerations.
Recent geopolitical developments in Eastern Europe have
inevitably produced an impact on the Alliance and its future.
More than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War, the crisis in Ukraine is driving
NATO back to its original purpose: to protect its members
against a perceived Russian threat. Before the crisis in Ukraine
emerged, Europe was not seen as a continent of potential
threats and the United States was perceived as being less
focused on matters of European security. The developments
in Ukraine have sent NATO back to basics, provoking debate
on NATO membership in many potential aspirant countries
and rekindling discussion, especially in the non-aligned states
of Finland and Sweden.
Finland is known for its longstanding policy of military
non-alignment. However, it wants to “keep all doors open” and
preserve “an option to NATO”. In line with this, the country
has not pursued membership, but has been systematically
aiming at getting as close to NATO as possible. For instance,
the country joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme
in 1994 to work alongside NATO Allies in areas where bilateral
aims converge, and also supports NATO-led operations. Finland
has worked alongside the Allies in security and peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Finland is politically aligned, but militarily non-aligned.
While military non-alignment is technically possible, it is
more complicated in practice. Since Finland joined the EU,
the political link to NATO emerged. NATO and the EU are
intimately linked and largely overlapped organisations. Today,
the two organisations share the majority of their members – 22
out of 28 NATO member countries are also members of the EU.
The EU and NATO share common strategic interests and
work together in a spirit of partnership and complementarity.
North Atlantic Ocean
North Pacific Ocean
NATO member countries
United Kingdom
Norway
Denmark
EstoniaLatvia
Lithuania
Portugal
Spain
Poland
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
France
Luxembourg
Italy
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Romania
Hungary
TurkeyBulgaria
Slovenia
Croatia Albania
Greece
33NATO Securing our world
NATO iNside view
the Finnish political establishment comes out with its concrete
arguments. A similar situation emerged in the beginning of the
1990s, before Finland joined the EU.
NATO enlargement and NATO’s Open Door Policy remain
core elements of its overall strategy, and an important objective
on the transatlantic agenda. All NATO nations concur that the
Alliance’s door should remain open for new members.
In the first place, NATO is a security policy instrument and
a community of shared values. NATO enlargement, as well as
NATO membership, entails both political costs and political
benefits for NATO and potential new members alike. The
question is whether benefits outweigh costs; new members
should be security providers, not only security consumers.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and
do not reflect the opinion of the Atlantic Council of Finland
Ms Terhi Suominen is the Secretary General of the Atlantic Council of Finland. Prior to her current position, she served in policy think tank Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA, the European Business Leaders Convention (EBLC), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Turku and Turku School of Economics. She holds Masters of Political Science and Bachelor of Business Administration degrees from the University of Turku
Close cooperation between these two organisations is an
important element in the development of an international
comprehensive approach to crisis management and operations
that require the effective application of both military and
civilian means. It is important to avoid unnecessary duplication
of effort in the framework of the EU and NATO.
The challenge of public opinionThe question of Finland’s NATO membership is not a simple
yes or no issue. While there are several arguments both for
and against, there is no decisive conclusion. Roughly 30 per
cent of Finns are in favour of membership, with figures staying
more or less unchanged since the first opinion polls. In Finland,
public opinion has been divided into two groups: NATO
enthusiasts and NATO sceptics. Finnish discussion has been
coloured black and white, with the issue being simply whether
to join or not. In order to improve the public’s understanding
of NATO, there is a demand for more detailed, extensive and
profound information.
The challenge for Finland is that the NATO debate is
seen far too often as a political battle behind the scenes.
This deadlock can only be broken by political activity and
commitment. A key to opening public debate is to get the
politicians involved in frank discussions. However, it is
unlikely that any change will occur in public opinion before
Arctic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea
NorthSea
Black Sea
BalticSea
NATO member countries
NATO INSIDE VIEW
34 NATO Securing our world
Alongside acute intelligence capacity and enhanced Special Forces deployability, social and economic investment is needed in order to
stop the spread of want and fear that plays into the hands of terrorist recruiters in areas of instability, writes Hugh Segal
Smart defence, connected forces and
progressive policy
Complexity of targets was not a dominant challenge
during the Cold War. Two world views were positioned
against each other, with serious conventional military and
nuclear capacity, and with all the intelligence and counter-
intelligence depth necessitated by the strategic challenge.
Unofficial allies or non-aligned states of either the Soviets or
the West were parsed for where they had stood in the event of
hostilities. NATO was the focus, consolidator and aggregator
of our poised military resolve to contain the Soviets in
communist Eastern Europe.
The end of the Cold War – while a great tribute to the
essential resolve of NATO’s planning, military doctrine and
joint defence concept – has produced a multilayered complexity
to the issue of global security, which the simplicity of the Cold
War tended to obviate. In the Middle East, for example, the
Cold War was really about who the Soviet and American client
states were, following the demise of the United Kingdom’s
military role in the region.
Subsequently, Egypt’s role as a Soviet client state versus
Israel’s role as a US client state were really the underlying
realities that forced a unified United Nations response to
the Suez Crisis, in which countries such as Canada did more
than their fair share, diplomatically and militarily, in defence
of the imperative of Alliance unity, as well as reducing the
threat of thermo-nuclear war.
The same can be said of the conclusions reached about
geostrategic priorities in Asia and Africa, for better or worse,
before the unification of Germany. The Cold War provided
the clarifying framework for analysis and the prioritising of
strategic interests. While this conclusion may have been too
blunt, too broad or insufficiently nuanced, it served well.
Nostalgia for the Cold War is misplaced. We cannot
be nostalgic about the risk of thermo-nuclear destruction.
Indeed, our hard reality involves a new complexity where
nation states are not always the ally or the threat, while the
alliances arrayed against NATO principles of democracy,
individual liberty, rule of law and free markets are equally
as likely to be sustained by non-state actors, foreign-funded
insurgencies, or religious and denominational extremists.
Going deeperEmbracing this new complexity must be a central priority of
the Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force
direction, which was recently agreed on by Allied leaders. This
is about enhanced multilingual, culturally appropriate and
rapidly deployable NATO forces, which are assisted by advanced
human and signal intelligence, and are operating at a far deeper
level than previously. It is about the infiltration and subversion
of terrorist networks poised to attack NATO members and
interests. It is about parsing Sunni and Shia factionalism in
an intellectually acute and actionable way. It is about avoiding
the conclusion that a military alliance can only act through
exclusively military, combat or open deployment means. It is
about reallocating NATO defence budget cuts in Europe, the
United States and Canada with a smart-spending and diversified
deployment instrumentality that was not available before now.
Imagine the lives that might have been saved and the
suffering that might have been avoided if, after the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO had had the intelligence
and presence of mind to deploy investment through its member
states – in education, roads, healthcare and women’s rights –
in Afghanistan, before the Taliban collusion with al-Qaeda
35NATO Securing our world
NATO INSIDE VIEW
Militant Islamists parade along the streets of Syria’s Raqqa province. Multilingual, culturally appropriate and rapidly deployable NATO forces will be better placed to infiltrate and subvert terrorist networks
REUT
ERS/
STRI
Ng
ER
NATO INSIDE VIEW
36 NATO Securing our world
made an Article 5 military response the unavoidable option
to the unprovoked 9/11 attack on American civilians.
NATO relying only on derivative intelligence and the
deployability of its member states is not sufficient. Instead,
the Alliance must have an enhanced apprehensive intelligence
and deployability capacity resident in its own operations and
planning headquarters. The activities of NATO’s Intelligence
Fusion Centre in support of existing operations in Afghanistan
and Kosovo, Operation Ocean Shield against piracy and
Operation Active Endeavour against terrorism, are all worthy
of respect and praise. In
Afghanistan or Bosnia, NATO
troops found that having
the UK’s Department for
International Development,
the United States Agency for
International Development,
the Canadian International
Development Agency or other
deployed investors in social
infrastructure integrated
into their pure defence
and combat capacity was of immeasurable value in terms of
community relations and building trust. We have this type of
capacity and myriad instruments to engage with long before a
NATO military commitment is justified or unavoidable.
More than traditional combat deploymentThe end of the Cold War and NATO’s successful core strategy
might best be summed up in this question: what did we do in
terms of commitment, investment, intelligence and non-combat
deployment in various places to prevent combat altogether?
The answer, in different parts of the world, varies. The Marshall
Plan, the US economic support after the Second World War for
a Europe that was impoverished, desolate, hungry and actively
courted by the Stalinist communist option, was not a combat
deployment. But it had as much to do with rebuilding freedom,
and containing totalitarian reach and hegemony, as did the
deployment of military forces to the west of the Iron Curtain.
Today, the ruthlessness of Islamic State terrorists in Syria
and Iraq, the role of Iran in funding terrorist insurgencies in
Lebanon and Gaza, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) are all forces aiming to destroy Western
values, peaceful Muslim and Christian populations, and the
Middle East’s only democracy, Israel. The active recruitment
and military training of young terrorists from Europe, Asia
and North America so that they might be deployed in their
prior countries of residence is a direct threat to NATO values.
For the terrorists and
those who finance them,
teenage shoppers in a town
centre, innocent people of
another faith or another
denomination of the same
religion, or young girls at
school are as valid a target
as the military forces of
the world’s democracies.
This is why a more
acute intelligence and
infiltration capacity, enhanced and more diversified Special
Forces deployability – from the air, the seas, or land – and a
real pre-deployment of social and economic investment with
the scope to diminish the extent to which want and fear feed
terrorist aspirations and recruitment have never mattered
more. A NATO Response Force as part of the Connected
Forces Initiative must be more than traditional combat
deployment. It must be about being connected to reality
on the ground before combat becomes the only option.
Hon Mr Hugh Segal, Master of Massey College at the University of Toronto, is a former chair of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism and chairs the NATO Council of Canada. Mr Segal was previously Chief of Staff to the Canadian Prime Minister and Associate Cabinet Secretary in Ontario. He has also served as Senator for Ontario
The active recruitment and military training of young terrorists from
Europe, Asia and North America is a direct threat to NATO values
U.S.
NAv
y PH
OTO
by
HMC
JOSH
IvES
/REl
EASE
d
Members of the United States Agency for International development (USAId), the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the US Army take part in a working group in Afghanistan. Integrating social infrastructure investors such as USAId into NATO’s defence capacity has been of immeasurable value
Smartphones are vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping. It happens every day, millions of times, all over the world. Secusmart has something to help: a little electronic protective sheath that makes the communication of governments, public authorities, defence departments and international organisations such as NATO secure around the globe.
Take a tip from the top government agencies worldwide, take advantage of SecuSUITE for BlackBerry® 10 security, also known as the Chancellor Phone, to protect your confi dential communications. Only you can control what happens to your secrets. Their fate is in your hands.
The German Chancellor’s smartphone In use by the German government and NATO Global protection approved by NATO
www.secusmart.com
Your Protection against Electronic Eavesdropping
SEC 14.23 AZ Behoerde NATO_securing our world_210x297.indd 3 20.08.14 11:55
The securiTy challenge
38 naTO Securing our world
Against a challenging backdrop in Europe, NATO must continue its work as a military and political actor to encourage stability. The Atlantic Treaty
Association plays an important role in bridging the gap between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic region, writes Jason Wiseman
The looming threat of global instability
In what is perhaps the most effective international
organisation in history, NATO’s role over the years goes
beyond security and defence. Since the Cold War, NATO has
evolved into a key player on the world stage with the capacity
to provide conditions for democratic development and ensure
its members move towards a future of peace and prosperity.
Yet NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is
widespread political instability, economic turmoil and social
upheaval in various regions of the globe, plaguing the safety and
security of millions. The instability this causes is contagious,
and spreading along the borders of the Euro-Atlantic.
In the six months
leading up to NATO’s
summit in Wales, the world
has witnessed a dramatic
escalation of hostilities in
Eastern Europe, a surge of
jihadist activity across North
Africa and the Middle East,
along with a rise of insurgent
attacks in Afghanistan – just
as NATO seeks to end its
longest combat mission.
Against these challenges, there is a backdrop of slow financial
recovery and global power shifting to the East. The need
for NATO leaders to address our rapidly changing security
landscape will be the basis on which this summit is judged.
Maintaining foresightGathering amid one of the most trying times in recent memory
should serve to sharpen NATO’s motivation in harnessing
two of its primary assets – capability and experience. Having
successfully helped to keep the peace in Europe for the past 65
years, a key challenge will be how to best address the seemingly
spontaneous crises that arise when weak and fledgling states
fail to provide security or well-being for their citizens.
The foundation for the political integration and prosperity
of Europe has become a reality, thanks to the common effort of
the Allies and their citizens. After the Cold War, the Alliance
went through its biggest enlargement, strengthening security
and stability in Europe to the benefit of members and non-
members alike. The democratisation and integration of post-
Soviet states has set an excellent example to countries that are
still finding their way to the Euro-Atlantic community. Simply
put, modern Europe would not be possible without NATO, and
NATO would not have been successful without its adherence to
the values and principles of freedom and democracy.
Yet, as we continue to
watch events unfold on
Europe’s southern and
eastern borders, it must be
remembered that popular
uprisings can quickly be
accompanied by chaos and
hijacked by radicals, the
results of which threaten
millions and test NATO’s
resolve to act.
In the face of these
challenges, NATO must continue to balance its role as
both a political and military actor by utilising the collective
experiences its members have gained over the years. NATO’s
military role during difficult campaigns such as Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Libya, provide valuable lessons that will
be necessary in any future engagement, including how to
fight in urban combat zones, avoid civilian casualties and
cooperate with local forces.
Similarly, NATO’s position as a political actor in helping
to warm relations between Greece and Turkey, assisting with
the integration of East Germany and Spain into Europe, or
their role in closing the gender gap in the security sector, also
offers valuable experience.
NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is widespread
political instability, economic turmoil and social upheaval
39naTO Securing our world
The securiTy challenge
A US soldier and an Afghan National Police officer search a hillside in Kunar province, Afghanistan. NATO planned its withdrawal for 2014 and has been handing over security control to Afghan forces, but there has been an increase in insurgent attacks this year
US A
rmy
STAf
f Sg
T. g
Ary
A. W
iTTe
The securiTy challenge
40 naTO Securing our world
As a military power, the best way for NATO to protect
itself against the ongoing tides of political instability that
are currently massing along its borders will be to remain
committed to operations such as Ocean Shield or Active
Endeavour. Furthermore, it must continue to develop the
NATO Response Force (NRF), so that it can act quickly to
contain and solve security crises before they spread.
As a political power, NATO can draw on its network of
relationships that it has spent years establishing by using
the trust and confidence it has built among its members and
partners to mediate and solve problems. NATO is the most
reliable international organisation capable of assisting states
in building their own capabilities and providing the tools,
training and forums necessary for weak or fledgling states
to secure their borders, disarm non-state actors, marginalise
political radicalism and advance rule of law.
Taken together, the political and military power of NATO
are the two levers needed to steer future policy in order to
effectively reduce the risks associated with political instability
and assist troubled states in their pursuit to provide security and
well-being for their citizens.
Building lasting securityBeyond its operational role, NATO has the skill and practice as
a political actor to provide far-reaching assistance in building
secure and stable environments in which societies can flourish.
This is where the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) – a network
facilitator of NGOs between NATO and Euro-Atlantic societies
– has a special role to play.
As ATA celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, we look
back on its joint history with NATO and acknowledge that the
very idea of transatlantic unity has been the key to providing
the necessary conditions for member states to develop and
consolidate their democracies. As a global network of diplomats,
military officials, politicians, academics, business leaders and
young professionals, we work together to promote the values
of the North Atlantic Treaty and build networks of support for
NATO and its policies throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and
beyond. Our role is to stimulate political consultation, dialogue
and cooperation across the Atlantic and between generations.
Despite its best efforts, NATO’s missions are often deeply
misunderstood. This puts a strong burden on leaders to explain
their message in a more effective way. NATO and ATA have
prepared for this by coordinating outreach to at-risk civil
societies and engaging in long-term projects that highlight
NATO’s political role, reduce dependency on military action,
and engage the youth in issues they will soon have to face as
future leaders. This, in large part, has coloured the nature of
ATA, which stands as a bridge between NATO and civil society.
We are proud to be part of this development and strongly
believe that the long-term solution to resolving political
instability is to work towards building lasting harmony
among our peoples. This can only be achieved by working
together in order to build the knowledge and support
necessary to further develop our regional security and to
continue our pursuit towards spreading the common values
that unite us as people.
Mr Jason Wiseman is the Secretary general Designate of the Atlantic Treaty Association, working with the ATA Secretariat since 2012. Prior to this, he was a National Security Analyst with the NATO Council of Canada from 2011-12. He holds an mA in government with a specialisation in counter-terrorism and homeland security and a BAH in political science. Other areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, middle eastern politics, state failure and transnational organised crime
NAT
O
ATA President Dr Karl A Lamers with NATO Secretary general Anders fogh rasmussen. ATA acts as a bridge between NATO and civil society
41NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
Solomon Passy examines the West’s approach to Russia, and how to interact with a country that has values different to those we hold
Why is the West failing in its relations
with Russia?
The Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. There has been Russia-West cooperation in several areas, such as in dialogue with Iran
Mo
Rdo
lff/
IsTo
cK
Ever since the 10th century – when the historic state
Kievan Rus adopted Orthodox faith under the guidance
of Bulgarian clergymen – Bulgarians have embarked upon
close yet complex relations with Russia, intertwining the
evident common cultural and religious elements with ferocious
conflicts and wars for dominance. Throughout the centuries,
Bulgarians have understood that a good mutual understanding
with Russia would depend on keeping a respectful distance,
although this was sometimes inadvertently narrowed or even
destroyed by historic trials and tribulations. Together with
this historical experience, its present geopolitical position has
allowed Bulgaria to introduce the European Union to two of
its communication channels with Russia – the alphabet and
language – which is expected to improve West-Russia dialogue.
Why is it that today, despite the multitude of modern
communication channels, Russia and the West are speaking
different languages? The answer is simple. It is because of
the incompatibility of respective value systems or, to express
it in technical terms, owing to our differences in ‘default’.
Russia enjoys satisfactory and open cooperation with
the West in many areas. The dialogue with Iran, supporting
NATO in Afghanistan, working with the US to destroy chemical
The securiTy chAlleNge
42 NATO Securing our world
weapons in Syria, the global fight against terrorism and joint
work on the International Space Station, all bear witness to
that. Yet, this cooperation is invariably based on common
interest rather than common values. In other words, Russia
will engage with others as long as it is reimbursed at the
highest possible price and this will only change when
the defaults of the West and Russia converge.
Why we get it wrongWhile the wealth of the West has arguably been rooted in
a competition aiming at the perfection of society, Russia
has predominantly built her wealth through territory. Since
territory supplies the needed wealth, this explains and
generates the impulsive and imperial attitude of Russia,
which seems to define its actions for the time being, at least.
The West allows for a recurrent error in its attitude towards
its opponents, and even partners, by habitually treating all of
them as ‘one of us’, thereby punishing or rewarding in a uniform
manner based on its own concepts. The outcome often seems
like a dialogue between inhabitants of different galaxies.
Thus, the West is prone to confusion at the very core
of its policy towards Russia, wrongly combining episodes of
untimely neglect with pledges for eternal strategic partnership.
This ultimately adds to
the bargain concessions
that lack principles and
indulgence that defies
logic. Consequently, Russia
interprets this as a sign
of weakness, encouraging
further steps towards
division and demands for
further concessions.
This is how Moscow reads
the West’s anemic response
to their effective annexation
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, complete with
the persisting refusal to invite Georgia to join NATO.
We could imagine Russia thinking, ‘since NATO avoids a
state with problems, it will be in our interests to create the
problems’. Thus, we naturally arrived at the moment when
Crimea was annexed, practically annulling any chance of
NATO membership for Ukraine. The next possible victims
of Russian aggression are Transnistria, the breakaway state
located between Moldova and Ukraine, and Moldova itself.
For all the conditionality of historic analogies, there is
still psychological recurrence in political behaviour, which
has been seen throughout historical periods. The annexation
of Crimea is a reminder of the Anschluss of Austria, an event
particularly instructive in the wake of the ‘democratic’ fig leaf
of the Crimean referendum.
The Munich syndrome is another of those recurring
themes. At the Munich conference of 1938, the West granted
Hitler the right to dispose of the fate of the Sudetendeutsche,
thus encouraging him to occupy Czechoslovakia and divide
Poland with the USSR in 1939.
The trap that the West systematically falls into is to trying
to sacrifice temporary values to gain significant advantage.
Invariably, this approach results in the loss of both, in
addition to the loss of substantial human life.
Just as it does not succeed to the expected degree in
making concessions, the West is unsuccessful in sanctions.
These are similar in essence as the ones against Iran, North
Korea, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya and Cuba, and now against
Russia. Sanctions undermine values that would be much
closer to those of the average Western-European or North-
American citizen than to the inhabitants of Kamchatka or
Siberia, let alone those of the militarised region of Kaliningrad.
In the overwhelming majority, Russian citizens cannot even
imagine being more important than the state, hence their
tolerance to material deprivation, which is far higher than
that of the average Western citizen.
Consequently, Western sanctions are making Russians rally
behind President Putin – and Putin would be happy to offer a
round of drinks for that. He is currently turning into the most
charismatic Russian leader after Stalin; as much as a result of
the territories annexed by him, as for the sanctions imposed
on him. The heroic slogan of the Second World War “For the
motherland, for Stalin!” is now being edited by history itself
as “For the motherland, for Putin!” And this is all because
Putin has shown a strong understanding of the rules of public
relations and has a free
hand in using them to suit
his wishes. The West seems
to be his best ally in this.
Undoubtedly, the results
of Putin’s current political
policies today will be paid
for by the children of those
glorifying him now. Does the
West have to wait that long
until acting? The answer is
no, of course it does not.
If we insist on sanctions,
then why not turn to a smarter approach that may prove more
efficient than classic sanctions? Since Putin seeks to make
a public impact through the his acts, photographs and even
T-shirts, the West should decisively deprive him of such a
chance. Sanctions against participation in world sports
events, cultural festivals and competitions would be far more
effective than any trade sanctions or financial restrictions
placed on Putin’s entourage.
To start with, NATO should put a stop to its wrong signals
and policies. Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Kosovo ought to urgently be
involved and allowed to join NATO as an opening to their mid-
term EU prospects. Additionally, Finland and Sweden should be
energetically encouraged to develop and deepen their relations
with NATO, and the EU ought to seek a new mode in their
strategic relations with NATO.
In the meantime, the presently neglected, yet budding,
partnerships between NATO and Japan, Korea, Australia
and New Zealand, as well as Mongolia, ought to be revitalised
urgently, since they all present unfinished business with
traditional partners. NATO urgently needs to establish new and
even unplanned partnerships. Firstly with China, secondly with
The West is prone to confusion at the very core of its policy towards
Russia, combining episodes of untimely neglect with pledges for
eternal strategic partnership
43NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
the Islamic world via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
and, thirdly, with Latin America and Africa. Additionally,
NATO needs to communicate directly with Russian society,
rather than through the Russian government. The internet will
make this possible, despite all efforts to restrict access to it.
The West ought to be firmer in its actions with regard to smaller
dictators around the world, for example Bashar al-Assad, since
every dictator is a stronghold for all dictators.
The way forwardNATO’s most urgent and substantial need is to create a
new public image for itself among the societies of its own
member states, as well as those all over the world. Global
public opinion is NATO’s most powerful ally, which will help
it to win numerous battles prior to starting them, prevent
enemy goals being formulated and stop criminal minds
from acting. NATO also needs a new flight of qualitative
imagination and the finances to boost it. Investing $100
in information can save $1,000 from being invested in
war. Those ideas should not come as a surprise to NATO.
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria (ACB) launched them first in
2009 and has been promoting them ever since.
Dr Solomon Passy is the President of the Atlantic club of Bulgaria. Previously the Bulgarian Minister for foreign Affairs from 2001-05, he negotiated and signed Bulgaria’s accessions to NATo and the EU. In 1990-91 and 2001-09 he was an MP and chaired the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence. dr Passy has a Phd in mathematical logic and computer science
ACB also expanded the pioneer think-tank research
on ‘NATO’s Global Role in the 21st Century’, which was
completed on a NATO Manfred Wörner scholarship in
1998. The research furthered the successful policies and
the history-endorsed vision of the world, formulated as
early as 1990 by the ACB, the first pro-Atlantic organisation
set up on a Warsaw Treaty territory.
Russia will be a friend of the West only when the West
remains strong and follows policies of principle that are
not dubious. Russia will return to the political tradition of
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which will make it a good partner
of NATO. This should be the daily message to the Russian
society. Meanwhile, the West as a whole should take good
care to ensure our global presence, as well as our appearance.
President Vladimir Putin during a televised question-and-answer session in Moscow. Putin has demonstrated a strong understanding of public relations
AlEx
EI N
IKo
lsKy
/AP/
PREs
s As
socI
ATIo
N IM
AGEs
the security challenge
44 natO Securing our world
An ISAF soldier from the Royal Anglian Regiment out on patrol in Afghanistan. The UK is the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF after the US Cp
l pA
Ul M
oRR
ISo
n/C
Row
n Co
pyRI
gh
T
45natO Securing our world
the security challenge
With the deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, Dennis Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom’s objectives, outlining
both the political and military approaches to creating stability
The United Kingdom and Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been a key element in British foreign
policy during the early years of the 21st century.
The overriding reason for the British presence is to protect
our national security through the mechanism of helping
the Afghans take control of their own security. Along with
NATO and other allies, our aim has been to enable the
Afghans to develop the ability to maintain security in order
to prevent the return of international terrorists seeking to
use Afghanistan as a safe haven.
This has been the dominant objective of British foreign
policy in the region. Consequently, the threat to the United
Kingdom from this region has been substantially reduced.
Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in
training Afghan security forces and assisting Afghanistan
in becoming a more viable state, thereby reducing instability.
Our international partners are working in concert with the
same aim of encouraging the Afghan government’s ability to
provide proper governance with an effective infrastructure
and the provision of essential services. The UK has worked
alongside allies and partners to help the Afghan government
develop in a way that will benefit the country’s future. British
efforts in Afghanistan have focused on three key elements,
which will be analysed below.
Military supportThe UK’s military activities in Afghanistan are conducted under
the United Nations Mandate as part of NATO’s International
Security Assistance Force, widely known as ISAF. The UK
is the second largest contributor after the United States to
this coalition of nearly 50 nations. Under the auspices of ISAF,
key NATO countries that have provided more than 1,000 troops
include the US and UK, which together contribute some
75 per cent of total deployment. While the majority of British
forces have operated in Helmand, the province best known
for its hazardous insurgent activities, the British assist in and
advise on providing security and basic civilian policing services
with the aim of securing safe operational bases in Afghanistan.
This support programme will largely be completed by the
end of 2014, when the ISAF mission ends and the majority
of the British combat forces will have left Afghanistan.
Political and socio-economic supportApart from achieving stability through military operations,
the long-term goal has been to assist Afghanistan in becoming
a feasible state able to increasingly meet its people’s needs with
its own resources. This activity is largely conducted by the UK’s
Department for International Development, which operates
in three main areas to reduce poverty and increase stability:
improving security and political stability, providing economic
stimulus and assisting the delivery of basic services.
During the Tokyo Conference in 2012, the UK agreed to
maintain development assistance of £178 million per annum
until at least 2017 in order to help the Afghan government
achieve long-term economic growth. This is a challenging
task and will continue to be so.
The overriding reason for the UK’s participation in the
Afghanistan mission was to counter the threat arising from
the country serving as a base for international terrorism.
This situation threatened not only the UK, but also the rest
of the world. The Taliban had given al-Qaeda a safe haven in
Afghanistan, which allowed terrorists to plan and carry out
attacks across the world, most notably the 9/11 atrocities in the
US. The British government has consistently recognised that
Afghan security cannot be achieved by military activities alone,
and therefore actively supports the Afghan government’s efforts
to achieve a political settlement, leading to peace and stability.
These objectives are based on key historical decisions
evolved from the outset of the Afghan conflict. The UN Security
Council Resolution 1378 in 2001 contained a condemnation
of “the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base
for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other
terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Osama bin
Laden, al-Qaeda and others associated with them, and in
this context supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to
the security challenge
46 natO Securing our world
replace the Taliban regime”. The UN further authorised an
international force – ISAF – with a mandate to help the Afghans
maintain security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. In 2003,
NATO assumed political command and coordination of ISAF
and progressively, throughout 2006, assumed command of the
south and east of the country. Insurgency in the following years
required a greater military response from NATO.
In 2011, the House Of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
reported that military pressure alone would not be enough to
bring security and stability to Afghanistan. It concluded that
without appropriate political leadership, the current military
campaign would be in danger of inadvertently de-railing efforts
to secure a political solution to what, in essence, was a political
problem. The report stressed that the US should not delay its
significant involvement in talks with the Taliban leadership
because, without US support in this respect, there could be no
long-term peace in Afghanistan.
The Committee report voiced doubts about whether success
in Afghanistan could be achieved through a strategy of “clear,
hold and build”. It concluded by stating that “there is also
evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification
for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it
is necessary in the interests of the UK’s national security, may
have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited
strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan”.
Accordingly, in consultation with allies, ISAF approved the
deadline of 2014 for the completion of plans to transfer security
and civilian control to Afghanistan. The withdrawal process
is now nearly over. Looking back, the Committee specifically
placed on record that: “Her Majesty’s Armed Forces have our
full support in tackling the challenges before them and their
efforts are rightly described in so many instances as heroic. It is
our hope that this report will be received in the constructively
critical manner in which it is intended, and regarded as a
contribution to the wider debate which is taking place on how
to improve a situation to which there are no easy solutions.”
A way forwardAs is often the case when liberal interventionist policies
are pursued, solutions are far more complex than relatively
straightforward military ones. It is also more difficult for
such policies to gain widespread public support. The threat is
often not so readily perceived and the solutions not so readily
obvious. With new global crises on the increase, running
alongside the gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan, the new
domestic challenge is to maintain public support for such
interventions. Emerging terrorist threats and barbaric activity
in the Levant, crises in North, East and West Africa, and the
tensions in Ukraine, all require an extensive public information
programme both from the government and NATO, not only in
the UK, but throughout Western society. A new focus for ATA
and support of organisations such as the Atlantic Council of
the UK would go a long way towards alerting public opinion
to the problems, and in the maintenance of confidence in the
necessary responses from the UK and others.
Mr Dennis Hartshorne is the Director of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. he is a founding member of the Council, and prior to that was the Chairman of British Atlantic Universities Committee, part of the Council’s predecessor organisation, the British Atlantic Committee. he has been the author or editor of over 120 publications of that Committee, and served as its Deputy Chairman. he is a nATo Fellow
Members of the Afghan national Army carry out weapons training. handing over security control is a vital part of nATo’s work in Afghanistan
Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in training Afghan security forces and assisting
Afghanistan in becoming a more viable state
SgT
STev
e Bl
AKe/
CRo
wn
Copy
RIg
hT
47NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
Anti-Mubarak protesters in Cairo during the Arab Spring, which highlighted political, social and economic instability factors
ATA’s role in the Mediterranean
and Middle EastThe security threats arising in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are
posing new challenges for NATO. Fabrizio W Luciolli explores how the Atlantic Treaty Association supports and facilitates NATO’s work
In the near future, the Atlantic Treaty Association
(ATA) and its national chapters will be called on to
face increasing tasks and responsibilities. The aggression
against Crimea and the subsequent escalation in Ukraine
has dramatically changed the agenda of the NATO Summit
and reminded the Allies of their primary commitment to
collective defence and the crucial role of Article 5 of the
Atlantic Treaty, which must be considered in times of modern
aggression, including with regards to hybrid warfare and
cyberthreats. Concurrently, due to the latest developments
in the Middle East and North Africa, the Mediterranean
flank of the Alliance has become increasingly subjected
to the threat of extremist forces.
NATO and ATA in 2014NATO has promptly reacted to the reversal of relations
with Russia by reinforcing the security of the member
states that are more liable to be affected by the fallout of
the events in Ukraine and by reasserting the collective
defence of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, NATO has
AMr
NAb
il/A
P/Pr
eSS
ASSo
CiAt
ioN
iMAg
eS
The securiTy chAlleNge
48 NATO Securing our world
ATA is poised to intensify its focus on the broader Middle East, building on more than 10 years of relevant dialogue and cooperation
the unfinished business in the region. In this respect, in 2014,
ATA celebrated its 60th anniversary with a council meeting
hosted in Budva by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, thus
testifying ATA’s enduring commitment to accompany all
Western Balkans nations into the European Union and NATO.
Likewise, ATA intends to shore up its Mediterranean and
Middle Eastern dimension. There is no Iron Curtain in the
Mediterranean separating the South from the North. Yet, a
combination of conflicting viewpoints and misconceptions
inherited from the past and intertwined with current events,
hinders the deepening of relations in a cooperative security
perspective, as pointed out by the NATO Strategic Concept.
In this respect, ATA has played a pivotal role by conducting
numerous dialogues and cooperation activities involving the
NATO partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and other states and entities,
such as the Kurdistan Regional Government.
ATA and the Greater Middle EastThe present situation engulfing the Greater Middle East
requires major and renewed efforts in order for the Arab and
Muslim world to undertake the construction of pluralistic
societies where moderation in the political and cultural domain
will prevail over extremism
and violence. To this end,
ATA is poised to intensify
its focus on the broader
region, building on more
than 10 years of relevant
dialogue and cooperation
in the form of training
courses, research projects,
high-level conferences,
roundtables and workshops.
In particular, ATA
can orient its programmes in order to foster cooperative
security and reinvigorate the role of NATO partnerships
in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In fact, the adoption
of synergistic and coordinated responses are crucial in the
fight against terrorism, as well as crisis management and
prevention, including humanitarian emergencies.
Socio-economic issues will also be at the top of ATA’s
agenda, with a view to promoting the implementation of
modernisation and development strategies for the southern
Mediterranean. Solving lingering issues – such as youth
unemployment, food security and marginalisation – will
deprive extremist forces of breeding grounds they can
exploit, especially in countries that have previously, or are
still, experiencing domestic turmoil.
Cultural issues are also important. Sectarian divisions
are the main cause of conflicts sweeping across the Greater
Middle East today. To this end, crucial questions – such
as the future of local religious minorities and promoting
intercultural dialogue – are handled by specific ATA
research programmes and relevant initiatives.
ATA has always paid close attention to the successor
generation through a series of initiatives, educational
courses and events that are attended by young researchers,
repeatedly stated it is giving its full support to the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and the efforts made by the legitimate
leadership to restore security and stability.
Along these lines, ATA has enhanced its role in the
Baltic states and has decided to organise a flag event in
Kiev in 2014. This will be a sign of strong political backing
to the people and government of Ukraine, and will launch
a comprehensive programme of training and educational
initiatives in the country and at a regional level. In this
respect, ATA is conducting a NATO Science for Peace and
Security Programme in Georgia, while new relations have
been established with the Atlantic Council of Moldova.
However, on the eve of its 60th anniversary, it is particularly
in the Mediterranean and Middle East that ATA will test its
traditional skills in promoting dialogue and cooperation, while
fostering peace and stability in Northern and Eastern Europe.
The broader region presents a variety of security threats
and challenges, which are a growing concern for the Euro-
Atlantic and international community. Extremism and its
terrorist manifestations, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles, arms trafficking, religious
genocides and the massive flows of refugees fleeing wars and
humanitarian crises are the most crucial and evident elements
affecting today’s security
scenario. Nevertheless, the
series of uprisings known
as the Arab Spring pointed
out the existence of even
more relevant instability
factors, which are of a
political, social and economic
nature rather than a military
one. These instability factors
are mostly damaging the new
generations, and producing a
dangerous fallout in the security domain.
In this respect, the European Union and NATO cannot
afford to disregard the ongoing developments across its
southern neighborhood. In today’s increasingly globalised
and interconnected world, the breakout of the uprisings that
swept across the region must be considered an alarming wake-
up call, urging a more constructive and effective cooperation
between the two shores of the Mediterranean.
The role of ATAIn this framework, the Atlantic Treaty Association has a
significant role to play. Written in 1956 by Gaetano Martino,
Lester B Pearson and Halvard Lange, the Report of the Committee
of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO acknowledged
the role of the Atlantic Treaty Association and paved the way
for NATO’s engagement in cultural and economic cooperation
even beyond the North-Atlantic borders. Recalling this
message, ATA can act in the Mediterranean and the Middle
East by taking stock of the extraordinary experience and
accomplishments achieved in cooperation with central
and south-eastern European countries.
The Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans has been
successful. However, much work remains in order to complete
49NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
professionals and PhD and university students coming from
Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The level
of interplay has grown remarkably over the past few years,
and the achievement of more structured forms of cooperation
will significantly contribute to advancing the aims of ATA
programmes in the Greater Middle East. These activities have
allowed ATA to create, consolidate and expand a new living
network of decision-makers, experts and researchers, who
will be able to enhance the cooperative security perspectives
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this respect,
the level of cooperation achieved by ATA in the Western
Balkans represents an inspiring model for the new generation
in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and for the future
programmes in Eastern Europe as well.
ATA outreach in the southern neighborhood proved
to be successful and was able to offer the European Union
and NATO an extraordinary additional value, since it comes
to fill the gap that still exists between the Euro-Atlantic
institutions and the public opinions of the Arab world.
In doing so, ATA intends to have an actual impact on the
ongoing processes thanks to its connection with civil society
and the capability to engage relevant authorities and decision-
makers from NATO member states and partners, as well as from
other international organisations and entities.
Peace, security and common progress have been the key
objectives of the Alliance since its establishment, and so
should it be in the present complex international scenario.
A sense of community In order to achieve this, NATO needs to promote a security
culture that is able to reconnect the transatlantic community
with the Alliance’s fundamental values. As stated in Report of
the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO,
“a sense of community must bind the people as well as the
institutions of the Atlantic nations”. In this perspective
is the strengthening of ATA, recommitting itself and the
public opinion of NATO member and partner countries to
the enduring Atlantic values and, after 60 years, willing
and able to carry out new challenging tasks both in Eastern
Europe and in the Greater Middle East.
Dr Fabrizio W Luciolli is the President of the italian Atlantic Committee and Vice President of the Atlantic treaty Association. He is also Professor of international Security organisations at the Center for High Defense Studies of the italian Ministry of Defence and lectures at a range of national and international, military and academic institutions. Dr luciolli is also a consultant on foreign affairs and security matters to various MPs
the AtA 60th Anniversary leadership Summit at the to be Secure (2bS) Forum in budva, Montenegro
NAt
o
the security challenge
50 natO Securing our world
NATO may be entering the most challenging period in its history, as it combines the demand for crisis management beyond its borders with that for collective defence in Europe. As such, it needs sustained
political and public support, writes Jamie Shea
Emerging security threats
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March, many
commentators have been proclaiming that NATO is ‘back
in business’. Certainly, this perception has been borne out of
NATO’s immediate reaction to the crisis in Crimea.
The United States’ leadership has been back in evidence,
with Washington being the first to deploy land, sea and air
reinforcements to Poland, Romania and the Baltic states.
On a visit to Warsaw, President Barack Obama pledged
$1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative to cover
the costs of exercises, enhanced air patrolling, and temporary
troop and naval redeployments to the Eastern Allies. Other
Allies – Germany, France, Denmark, Canada and the United
Kingdom – have sent fighter aircraft, ships and surveillance,
intelligence and reconnaissance assets. By early June 2014, all
28 Allies had allocated forces or at least planning personnel to
NATO’s immediate reassurance efforts.
At the same time, the Alliance froze its relations with
Russia – although keeping a channel for communication open
through the NATO-Russia Council – and agreed to step up its
defence-related assistance to its partner ‘countries in-between’:
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
Thus, so far, so good. The current reassurance efforts have
built on plans that were already under way in the Alliance to
refocus on Europe after 11-and-a-half years of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Indeed, even before Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, NATO held its first major exercise
in Eastern Europe for decades (Steadfast Jazz) and devised
a Connected Forces Initiative that used regular exercises,
training and education in order to preserve the interoperability
of its forces that had been slowly acquired in ISAF. This
initiative also aims to get its forces back into the culture and
practice of major manoeuvres and force-on-force war-fighting
skills. The return to collective defence and more traditional
notions of deterrence, containment and the balance of power,
however, will inevitably raise questions as to whether Allies,
and the NATO organisation, are up to the job. This question
will be all the more pressing in a new security environment
where everything that NATO does henceforth will be tested.
The shift in global military spending towards Russia, the
Middle East and Asia testifies to this. Over the past decade,
Allied defence budgets have declined by 15 per cent on average,
while Russia’s has increased by 150 per cent. As war in Europe
goes from the previously unthinkable to the possible and
conceivable, the price that the Allies will have to pay for
their security has now become much higher than before
the Ukraine-Russia crisis. This context poses a number of
short-term and long-term challenges for the Alliance.
Two schools of thoughtIn the first place, NATO will need to decide what long-term
military posture to adopt in Central and Eastern Europe.
Currently, there are two schools of thought among Allies. One
group – unsurprisingly, those from Central and Eastern Europe
– would like to see substantial combat forces stationed in the
East, and go back to a posture of forward defence along borders.
In this view, NATO’s command structure and combat brigades
are stationed in countries that face no threat, instead of being
on the territories where the threat is much more real. In 1997,
the Alliance gave an assurance to Russia, as part of the NATO-
Russia Founding Act, that it would not station substantial
combat forces, nuclear weapons or military infrastructure on
the territories of its new member states. However, many from
these countries argue this assurance was conditional on Russia
also respecting international law and exercising restraint.
Other Allies are reticent at the thought of a major and
permanent redeployment of forces from West to East. They
prefer to occupy the moral high ground of sticking to the ‘three
noes’ commitment, in the hope that one day Russia will come
to its senses and want to re-establish a strategic partnership
with NATO. In their view, the more NATO sticks to its various
commitments vis-à-vis Russia and refuses to engage in a new
Cold-War syndrome of confrontation, the easier it could be
51natO Securing our world
the security challenge
Gre
Gor
Fisc
her
/DeM
oTi
X
A russian soldier guards the entrance to a military base in Perevalnoye, crimea. russia’s annexation of crimea this year has led to renewed tensions with NATo members
the security challenge
52 natO Securing our world
for Russia to rethink its position. Moreover, the advantage of
rotations and exercises is that they are scalable. In other words,
they can be rapidly adapted either up or down, as befits the
level of threat from Russia, or the possibilities of cooperation.
Naturally, the ability of these Allies to persuade Poland or the
Baltic states of the merits of this reinforcement strategy depends
largely on their willingness to spend money on upgrading and
improving the readiness of forces in the West, so that they
are able to respond quickly. However, it can be argued that
the high-readiness, high-mobility reinforcement strategy will
also allow the Allies to deal with other crises; for instance, an
intervention in the Middle East or North Africa, or perhaps in
response to a major terrorist incident.
Readiness Action Plan That said, there is a way to reconcile these two visions of
reassurance within the Alliance’s proposed Readiness Action
Plan. This would involve increasing NATO’s presence in the
new member states through the stationing of three or four air
squadrons, a permanent naval task force in both the Baltic
and Black seas, and establishing a military headquarters, for
instance a specific headquarters for NATO’s Rapid Response
Force. The Allies could also agree to increase their fixed air
defence assets and radars in this region, and upgrade ports
and airfields to function as reception facilities. In addition,
the Alliance could go back to standing defence plans, where
headquarters involved in collective defence could have forces
already assigned to them in peacetime, which they could train
and exercise for specific roles. This would avoid the time-
consuming process of generating forces from scratch, once
operational plans are approved by the North Atlantic Council.
Pre-delegating crisis-response measures to the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) to cope with an emerging
crisis would also speed up NATO’s response and thus reinforce
deterrence by allowing him to enhance situational awareness,
and to re-deploy and rearrange forces.
In this context, deterrence is a concept that needs to be
rediscovered, but there is a difficult question to answer here.
How far will Russia be deterred by a show of military strength
by the Alliance, especially if the Russian strategy is more
one of subversion and spreading influence through energy
deals, business contracts and propaganda campaigns, than
one of seriously thinking about challenging NATO’s Article 5
through a military attack? In the final analysis, NATO’s role
in deterrence is essential, but also inevitably limited. In fact,
some of the most effective tools are economic. Consequently,
deterrence must involve other like-minded organisations that
can complement NATO’s largely military competencies with a
more diverse set of tools. The European Union is an obvious
partner. But, depending on what or who is to be deterred, other
Euro-Atlantic organisations will have a role to play, such as the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
But actions and responses must be coordinated. Russia has
seen the deepening of the relationship between the EU and
swiss President and head of the osce, Didier Burkhalter, meets russian President Vladimir Putin in Vienna in June for bilateral talks
reUT
ers/
heiN
z-Pe
Ter
BAD
er
53natO Securing our world
the security challenge
Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant secretary General of NATo’s emerging security challenges Division. he has worked with NATo since 1980 in positions including Director of Policy Planning in the private office of the secretary General; and Assistant to the secretary General of NATo for special Projects
In this environment of austerity, it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of what they
need on a prioritised basis
Ukraine as equally acceptable as, if not even less acceptable
than, the deepening of its relationship with NATO. In a new
environment, where economic steps can produce major
military repercussions and vice versa, NATO and the EU
will have to coordinate their actions in a way they have not
managed to do in the past.
Yet, as Europeans look to Americans to provide the bulk of
reassurance, and vice versa, old NATO debates on transatlantic
burden-sharing are bound to revive. For Europeans, NATO will
be about the Americans coming to the rescue once again, while
the US, shifting the responsibility onto the Allies, will be able to
avoid hindering its pivot to the Asia-Pacific – where the Russian
assertiveness in Crimea could encourage China to act similarly
in pressing its claims in the South China Sea.
Unsurprisingly, at a time when it is spending 73 per cent of
the total NATO budget, the US is pushing its European Allies
to meet the target of devoting two per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP) to defence, and devoting 20 per cent of that to
modernisation and equipment. In 2012, the Europeans spent
an average of $473 per capita
on defence, while Americans
spent $2,057; each European
soldier costs €23,829,
compared with the €102,264
that the US invests. Yet, will
the shock of the Ukraine
crisis be enough to push the
majority of Allies to increase
their defence spending? Only
three Europeans meet the
two per cent target, while
only five hit the 20 per cent target. Currently, 14 spend below
1.5 per cent, and five are spending even less than one per cent.
If all the Allies met the two per cent target, NATO would have
an extra $90 billion a year to spend on its armies.
Delivering on collective prioritiesHowever, public support for more military spending will only
be forthcoming if the public has a clear idea of what the money
will be spent on and how it could substantially improve the
Alliance’s military posture. In this environment of austerity,
it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of
what they need on a prioritised basis and then to be effectively
organised in clusters or framework nations to deliver those
capabilities. Instead of one European army, we are likely to
see several European armies organised around lead nations or
regions, such as the Benelux, Visegrad or Nordic groupings.
NATO’s two strategic commanders have recently come up
with a list of 16 shortfalls, which also correspond to the vital
enabling capacities for all modern multinational military
operations. They concern the lack of reconnaissance capabilities
and joint information surveillance. The other gaps concern
deployable headquarters, command and control for ground and
air operations, as well as the need for better integration of air
defence and ballistic missile defence.
It is not all bleak news, though. Based on the European
Defence Agency’s Pooling & Sharing initiative, Europeans
finally have the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, more and
better helicopters, considerable technological expertise in
combating improvised explosive devices drawing on ISAF
experience, and air-to-air refuelling capacities.
The procurement of Global Hawks by NATO and an EU
common drone programme will also gradually improve
Europe’s intelligence, reconnaissance and command and
control capabilities. That said, the key task for both NATO
and the EU in the months ahead, and particularly with NATO’s
Wales Summit in September in mind, is to identify groupings
to plug the 16 shortfalls. The initiative of Germany to form a
Capability Development Group and of the UK to form a group
to develop an expeditionary force represents the best way
ahead, as these offer the best chance for medium and small
countries to plug into a framework organised by a major
country, thereby providing essential niche capabilities.
In a more dangerous world, NATO will need as many
friends and willing partners as it can persuade to work with
it. Consequently, an ‘interoperability platform’ bringing
the Allies together with 24 of their most active partners
can also help preserve
relationships, consolidated
through operations such
as ISAF. Subsequently, this
will increase the pool of
capabilities that NATO can
draw on for its missions.
In return for building their
forces to NATO standards,
and training and exercising
with the Alliance, these
particularly valuable partners
can be granted special privileges. These could include early
consultation, intelligence sharing and liaison positions in the
NATO command structure, as well as operations and planning
divisions. Partners can also be involved in NATO’s efforts to
build defence capacity and train local forces in North Africa, the
Middle East and Eastern Europe, as they also have experience
in these regions through their participation in similar EU
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or through
United Nations programmes.
So, in conclusion, NATO is perhaps entering the most
challenging period of its history, as it must deal with collective
defence in Europe and crisis management beyond for the first
time. Getting the strategy right will stimulate and require
debate, and the means will not be forthcoming without
sustained political and public support. Thus, the role of the
Atlantic Council and the Atlantic Treaty Association becomes
also ever-more important: to support NATO and to be properly
and adequately supported by it.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
54 NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
The Alliance has long-standing partnerships with countries throughout Asia. David Fouquet looks at NATO’s past involvement in the region and
its place in the existing and emerging security architecture
Alliances and the Asian
security dilemma
That the NATO Alliance has emerged as a security player in
regions beyond its original theatre of operation in the Euro-
Atlantic area is no longer in doubt following its deployments
in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. But the issue of whether
it has established a defined and consistent role or plan for its
involvement in Africa, the Middle East or Asia is still unsettled
and is rarely discussed on a firm basis. Occasionally, and
especially in recent years, some states or political figures
from the Asia-Pacific have sought to intensify relations with
the Alliance and urged the latter to increase its involvement.
Some members, especially the United States, have an
established and defined role through a system of alliances and
relationships in the Asia-Pacific and other regions as well. The
United Kingdom and France, through territorial possessions or
defence agreements, have a different but established presence.
A global networkNATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed
the relationship with Asia-Pacific in a presentation on the US’s
west coast earlier in 2014, noting that “the US and Canada
both border on the Pacific. Other Allies have territories and
interests in the Pacific. And all Allies have concerns about the
Pacific.” In order to meet such concerns and associated security
requirements, he said: “We will also bolster our partnerships.
As we prepare to complete our combat mission in Afghanistan
at the end of the year, we must maintain the close ties we have
forged on the field of battle. Global threats like terrorism, piracy
and missile attacks cross borders. They are too big for any one
country to tackle alone. We can only deal with them together.
Not just as an Atlantic Alliance. But as a global network.”
This network already includes partners in the region
that have signed partnership agreements and been engaged
alongside NATO in Afghanistan, as well as in the anti-piracy
maritime mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia.
They have expressed readiness to maintain such a relationship.
The most prominent of these are Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Australia and New Zealand, while a number of other countries
have also been involved and shown interest.
The Secretary General at that time did not address the
Central Asian region, a geographic security theatre even closer
to NATO that presents its own concerns and challenges, which
range from political instability to trafficking and terrorism
routes. While NATO has long-established relations through the
Partnership for Peace programme with countries in the region,
its states and populations have more recently become the object
of specific interests on the part of virtually all global or regional
powers. The US, European Union, Russia, China and others
have demonstrated such interests through creating their own
modern versions of the Silk Road, which historically connected
almost the entire Euro-Asian continent.
The rise of ChinaWhile the majority of such concepts involve civilian, economic,
infrastructure and other elements, the political, security and
defence aspects are also evident.
Possibly the most complex and far-reaching relationship
between the Alliance and Asia is one carried out informally
and whose objectives have yet to be defined with the rise of
China. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath,
which culminated in the bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade during NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999, relations
were characterised by suspicion and hostility. Launched as an
informal series of lunches and other private meetings between
the Chinese ambassadors and NATO secretary generals, the
55NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
Cadets of the People’s Liberation Army take part in bayonet drills near Beijing. Relations between NATO and China have been complex since the Cold War ended
ANdy
WO
Ng
/AP/
PRes
s As
sOCi
ATiO
N im
Ages
56 NATO Securing our world
The securiTy chAlleNge
later encounters have involved conferences, lectures and
some maritime anti-piracy operational cooperation. The latter
have been the most advanced of such military contacts. They
included Alliance operations in the Gulf of Aden in recent years,
when China hosted and participated in related multilateral
conferences and planning.
While some in the West and, to a lesser degree, China have
suggested other potential areas of mutual interest, including
other maritime issues, Afghanistan, Central Asia and various
global security or non-traditional security challenges, these
have tended to remain at the conceptual level.
While some NATO Member States have more official,
extensive and sophisticated relations with China and its
military forces, in China, as hosts, or in the context of UN
peacekeeping or other multilateral concerns, at the NATO
level these have been limited, in part from residual historical
or ideological divisions and perceptions.
As in many regions of the globe, there is a wide arc that
encompasses the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Asian continent,
so these are complex, sensitive and sometimes delicate issues.
Planners, policymakers, the entire security community, and
populations and other stakeholders all need to reflect on how
Mr David Fouquet is a senior Associate of the european institute for Asian studies, and an established Journalist covering foreign, security and economic relations. He has also worked as a lecturer and as a consultant for major international companies
to balance legitimate security concerns while maintaining
productive dialogues and relationships for stability.
The security dimension is a notoriously difficult enough
element to consider and deploy, but it is generally accepted that
there are no military solutions to the wider political-security-
economic-social dynamic. Nowhere has this been more
evident than in the more recent flare-up of tensions in the
Asia-Pacific region involving a number of countries over
their historic maritime sovereignty and territorial rivalries.
This friction between rival claimants to land and maritime
territories in the South China Sea, East China Sea and other
neighbouring waters has already involved the attention and
resources of numerous countries in the region, including
Western Alliance partners, other strategic partners, NATO
members and international institutions.
Although not entirely the stimulus and reasoning behind
the recent US ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ towards Asia, these tense
relationships not only have their role to play in the US decision,
but are also affected by the policy adopted by Washington.
The situations require more attention, time and patience, as
well as further internationalisation.
Although there may be no clear posture for the Alliance
to be directly involved in the existing and emerging security
architecture in the Asia-Pacific and the Eurasian continent,
the Alliance and its member states should be intellectually
and, to an appropriate degree, diplomatically engaged with
organisations such as ASEAN’s Regional Forum, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and the newly emerging Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.
Chinese peacekeeping soldiers prepare to leave for mali, december 2013. China has also hosted conferences relating to NATO’s gulf of Aden operations
Planners, policymakers, the entire security community and other
stakeholders need to reflect on how to balance security concerns while maintaining productive dialogues
Hu
di/
COLO
RCHi
NAP
HOTO
/AP/
PRes
s As
sOCi
ATiO
N im
Ages
57NATO Securing our world
PrOmOTiNg NATO PArTNershiPs
After two decades in existence, the NATO Partnership
for Peace (PfP) programme, which is overseen by the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is still going strong,
despite the current difficulties with Russia and Ukraine. In
fact, there are countries such as Cyprus and Kosovo that are
lining up to join the programme in the near future. PfP is not
an alliance, as each country signs a bilateral agreement with
NATO that does not bind it to the other PfP members; nor does
it bind them to the articles of the 1949 Washington Treaty that
created NATO. It is one of three main wider forums that NATO
has instigated to assist and cooperate with its neighbours, the
other two being the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).
Also 20 years old, the MD now comprises the countries of
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
The ICI, on the other hand, was launched a decade later in 2004
and is made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates, with Saudi Arabia and Oman also showing some
interest. Each of these groupings represents a different region.
As the name suggests, the MD is based around the nations
bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The ICI is essentially made
up of countries of the Middle East, whereas PfP is focused on
Europe, particularly the former Soviet republics.
Countries that sign the bilateral agreement to become a PfP
participating state do so for different reasons. This was true
for the first batch of 23 countries that became signatories in
January 1994. Some nations signed up as a first step to joining
NATO itself – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia. Others – in particular those traditionally neutral
countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and
Turkmenistan – are unlikely to become NATO members. They
join PfP in order to reap the benefits of the programme itself
Celebrating 20 years of the Partnership for
Peace programmeOn 11 January 2014, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme marked
its 20th anniversary. Simon Michell takes a closer look at the initiative, assessing its aims and its growing scope
with regard to capacity-building and cooperation, as well as to
coordinate their overseas peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and
conflict operations where applicable.
Notably, Ireland, Finland and Sweden have played significant
roles in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan. Russia, however, is never
likely to join NATO. That does not mean that it has not been
an active participant. Russian ships have participated in NATO’s
Operation Active Endeavour, which works to prevent terrorists
using the Mediterranean Sea to transport arms and personnel.
Just as NATO itself has gone through various stages
of enlargement, so has PfP, with new signatories in 1995
(Austria, Belarus, Malta and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia), 1999 (Ireland), 2000 (Croatia), 2002 (Tajikistan)
and 2006 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia).
PfP: raison d’êtreAccording to NATO, the aims and goals of PfP are simple and
wide-ranging: “Based on a commitment to the democratic
principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the
Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats
Most PfP countries have helped NATO in its overseas operations,
which, in these times of austerity, is an impressive level of commitment
Norwegian Sea
Greenland Sea
Arctic Ocean
Barents Sea
Kara Sea
NorthSea
BalticSea
Bay ofBiscay
Mediterranean Sea
Black Sea CaspianSea
RedSea
PersianGulf
Arabian Sea Bay ofBengal
Gulf of Guinea
Indian Ocean
PrOmOTiNg NATO PArTNershiPs
58 NATO Securing our world
PfP Member StatesThe NATO Partnership for Peace programme celebrated its 20th anniversary in January 2014
IrelandSwitzerland
Austria
Serbia
FYR Macedonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Malta
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Armenia
UzbekistanGeorgia
Kyrghyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Belarus
Ukraine
Sweden
Finland Russia
Kazakhstan
Montenegro
59NATO Securing our world
PrOmOTiNg NATO PArTNershiPs
to peace and build strengthened security relationships between
individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among
partner countries.” NATO hopes to achieve this by engaging
with each country across a number of activities, which the
Alliance likes to refer to as a PfP ‘toolbox’. This toolbox has
more than 1,400 separate activities, from which each PfP state
can choose, split into the following three main sub-themes:
capacity-building, transformation support and wider issues.
Not surprisingly, the fundamental focus is on defence-
related activities, but it does also pull in aspects that are more
closely associated with the civilian activities of the PfP nation.
Domestically, it touches on the individual country’s efforts to
implement defence reform, policy and training, as well as civil-
military relations, education, civil-emergency planning and
disaster response. On the bilateral basis, it covers military-to-
military cooperation, including participation in joint exercises
and training, and cooperation within the fields of science and,
more recently, environmental issues. Each country chooses its
own pace and scope to suit its particular requirements.
Over the past 20 years, PfP has managed to attract the
vast majority of countries around the outer borders of NATO,
with the result that a common understanding between these
countries and NATO has been achieved, creating a far less
confrontational environment than existed throughout the
20 years that preceded the programme. Moreover, most of the
PfP countries have also helped NATO in its overseas operations,
which, in these times of austerity, demonstrates an impressive
level of commitment. Beyond operations, PfP has also supported
the reform of democratic defence sectors; funded the destruction
of ammunition and millions of mines and small arms; developed
NATO policies on women in peace and security; and cooperated
on the management of humanitarian emergencies.
Success and setbacksIn November 2010, NATO leaders decided that the success of
PfP had led to a need to streamline its activities in order to
make them more efficient and manageable. At the same time,
it was agreed that the activities contained within the toolbox
should also be offered on a wider basis – they are now available
to the MD and ICI partners.
Naturally, there have been some setbacks along the way.
One of the most challenging, but most important, relationships
NATO enjoys is with Russia. Here, the fundamental premise
that no PfP nation should use military aggression against its
neighbour for territorial gain was not adhered to when Russia
annexed the Crimea. NATO’s response to this was unequivocal.
“The basic principles of PfP include the commitment to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, to respect internationally
recognised borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. In
that context, many participants deplored that one member of
the EAPC, Russia, had violated these principles, most recently
through the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and
its interference in Ukrainian affairs.” No doubt, this crisis will
be a major theme of the 2014 NATO summit in Wales.
Non-NATO contributors to ISAF meet NATO’s North Atlantic Council. General Philip Breedlove (right) talks to then acting Ukrainian Defence Minister Colonel General Mykhailo Koval (left) and Major General Anatolii Petrenko (centre), Ukraine’s military representative to NATO, in June 2014
The Turkish delegation distributes information about courses at the Turkish Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centre
NAT
ON
ATO
Promoting nAto PArtnershiPs
60 nAto Securing our world
Recent turmoil in North Africa and Syria has focused attention on two of NATO’s regional partnership programmes: the Mediterranean Dialogue
and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Simon Michell assesses the current status of the two activities
Bridging the Mediterranean Sea
Between them, members of the Mediterranean Dialogue
(MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)
account for 11 countries (MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar
and United Arab Emirates) in two of the world’s most volatile
regions. It is no surprise, then, that both the MD and the ICI
have their roots in the same aspirations: NATO’s wish to help
strengthen regional stability, enhance international security and
improve governance along the shoreline of the Mediterranean
Sea and in the strategically important waters of the Persian
Gulf. While doing this, NATO is also attempting to dispel any
misconceptions that MD or ICI member countries may have
about the Alliance and its intentions.
With the exception of Lebanon, Libya and Syria, every
country that borders the Mediterranean is now a member of
either NATO, the MD or
the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) process, which places
the Alliance’s vast array of
tools and expertise at their
disposal. Looking specifically
at the MD partners,
Mauritania is currently
exceptional in that it is not
a Mediterranean state, but,
due to the strategic importance of two nearby islands groups –
Portugal’s Madeira Islands and the Spanish Canary Islands – it
was invited to join the forum. This is not as strange as it might
first appear as, right from the outset, the MD was open
to countries beyond the Mediterranean coast.
The ICI partners are made up of four of the six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with Saudi Arabia and
Oman declining the offer to participate in the process,
but nevertheless indicating an interest in it and frequently
participating in discussions. Again, like the MD, the ICI is
open for new members to join.
This year is an important one for the MD and the ICI, with
the MD celebrating its 20th anniversary and the ICI its 10th.
As well as the age difference, there are significant variations
in the structures and agendas of the two organisations. The
seven nation states of the MD process interact with NATO
on bilateral and multilateral bases, meaning that the 28 NATO
states meet with the MD countries on a 28-plus-one basis, as
well as within a group: 28 plus seven. ICI, on the other hand,
only operates bilaterally: a methodology more akin to the PfP
model. Both programmes, however, are supervised by NATO’s
new Political Partnerships Committee, as is the PfP programme.
To give an example of how this works and the scope of the
cooperation, political consultations in the MD NATO-plus-one
format are held on a regular basis, both at the ambassadorial
and working levels. These discussions provide an opportunity
for sharing views on a range
of issues relevant to the
security situation
in the Mediterranean,
as well as on the further
development of the political
and practical cooperation
dimensions of the ‘dialogue’.
Meetings in the NATO-
plus-seven (including the
North Atlantic Council-plus-seven) format are also held on
a regular basis, often following NATO summits, ministerial
meetings, chiefs of defence meetings and other major NATO
events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way
political consultations between NATO and MD partners.
A practical set of goals and activitiesWhen the ICI was established, as a result of discussions that
took place during the highly successful Istanbul NATO Summit
in June 2004, it was agreed that the basis for the relationship
would be on the same ethical and political principles as the
Both the MD and the ICI have their roots in NATO’s wish to help
strengthen regional stability
61nAto Securing our world
Promoting nAto PArtnershiPs
The conflict in Syria has changed the political environment in the Middle East, prompting NATO to consider how the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative processes can be transformed
AA
/TT/
TT N
EWS
AGEN
CY/P
RESS
ASS
OCI
ATIO
N IM
AGES
Promoting nAto PArtnershiPs
62 nAto Securing our world
MD (non-discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness,
two-way engagement, non-imposition, complementary and
mutual reinforcement and diversity), but with a more practical
set of goals and activities than originally existed with the MD.
However, the establishment of the ICI on this more active
basis also led to a rethink of the MD model, resulting in what
is known as Enhanced MD, with the consequence that the
MD member states were given access to a significantly larger
set of the activities within NATO’s toolbox that was already
on offer to the PfP nations. This process continued to evolve
until, at their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO foreign
ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership
Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012,
the single-partnership menu became effective, thus dramatically
expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries.
In practice, this means that MD and ICI countries are able
to participate in military exercises, as well as request assistance
with a wide range of activities, from defence modernisation and
civil-emergency planning to border security, counterterrorism
and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation. To a large but perhaps differing extent, these
partnerships have managed to increase stability and security
in both regions. Moreover, they have helped to draw ICI
members in particular into NATO operations, with Qatar and
the UAE joining in the NATO-led, United Nations-mandated
operation to protect civilians during the Libyan conflict.
Bahrain and the UAE also participated in the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
However, the Arab spring, of which the Libyan unrest was
a significant element, and the Syrian civil war, which started a
year later in 2011, have changed the political environment in
the region. This has forced NATO into considering how the
MD and ICI processes can be transformed. In addition, the
Alliance will need to carefully monitor MD and ICI members
as the process of revolution and counter-revolution continues
to play out. The tendency for some of these governments to
become more authoritarian is a risk that may lead to NATO
being regarded as legitimising this trend.
Despite some tangible successes over the decades, there is
an undoubted need for change in the two programmes. Just as
the 2004 Istanbul summit was a major turning point in NATO’s
relations with these two regions, the 2014 summit in Wales
should seize the moment and deliver a step change in the
relationship between this growing number of NATO and
non-NATO partner states.
In May 2014, a group of high-level representatives from Morocco visited NATO HQ to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: key principles
■■ Non-discrimination: all partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO;
■■ Self-differentiation: allowing a tailored approach for MD and ICI countries. Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling them to outline the short- and long-term objectives of cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies;
■■ Inclusiveness: all countries should see themselves as shareholders of the same cooperative effort;
■■ Two-way engagement: the agreements are a ‘two-way partnership’, where NATO seeks partners’ contributions for its success through regular consultations; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation;
■■ Non-imposition: partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance. NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them;
■■ Complementarity and mutual reinforcement: efforts for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; and
■■ Diversity: the agreements respect and take into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners.
Source: NATO
NAT
O
Promoting nAto PArtnershiPs
64 nAto Securing our world
NATO and the European Union have each created expeditionary battlegroups. Martin Temperley considers how the two
units complement one another
Best of both worlds
While the NATO Alliance remains the main defence
organisation capable of collectively protecting Europe, the
European Union (EU), which is primarily a political-economic
partnership, has developed the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) concept.
In 1999, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy emerged
from earlier Western European Union agreements, and in 2004
the EU Battlegroup was agreed. The concept has been brought
to a point where a solely European-composed combat force
could be deployed to respond to certain emergencies.
EU Battlegroups are land forces, based on battalion-sized
combat formations drawn from EU member states, and can
be armour or infantry based. The EU’s declared intention is
to deploy BGs to conduct operations under United Nations
Security Council Resolutions, or directly if, for instance,
the protection and evacuation of EU citizens were required.
The EUBGs were declared operational in 2007, and two out
of the 18 are planned to be held available at any time. They
are not standing forces, but, instead, units are earmarked for
expeditionary deployment. Live-fire exercises and combined
exercises have been conducted, but no operational deployment
of an EUBG has yet been made.
Politicians, military analysts, academic researchers and
officials have expended thousands of words in discussing the
relative values of NATO forces and the EUBGs, and particularly
the existence of the EUBGs alongside the developing NATO
Response Force. NATO’s longest mission, the 13-year
Alliance-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, is winding down, and the NATO Response Force
(NRF) is now becoming more purposeful, just as the EUBGs
are coming available for deployment. The risk might be that a
shortage of deployable forces at a time of budgetary cutbacks
across Europe and North America could make this difficult.
A Greek Special Forces instructor shows a Spanish soldier how to perform a takedown on a hostile crew member of a suspect vessel
NAT
O
65nAto Securing our world
Promoting nAto PArtnershiPs
In certain geographical areas, EU Battlegroups could be applied where US or NATO involvement
would not be appropriate
For member governments, there is no particular competition
or contradiction, as one quotation from a recent British
parliamentary report makes clear: “NATO is still the only
credible defence community capable of the territorial defence
of Europe, and of engaging in those conflicts that are complex,
medium- or large-scale, or require sophisticated operations. It
is essential that the United States continues to participate in
the defence of Europe through NATO.”
Clear applications for deployment It is, for many members, a matter of scale and capability. The
EUBGs’ battalion-scaled forces have clear applications for
deployment in certain humanitarian missions, and mixed
civilian and military operations. Such forces are suitable
for short-term deployments. Limited peacekeeping rather
than peace-making operations are favoured by a force of
this composition. That said, EUBGs certainly require airlift
capability, and possibly the support of sea-based and Special
Forces elements. In certain geographical areas, for example
parts of Africa and the Middle East, EUBGs may be able to
be applied where US or NATO involvement would not be
appropriate. In addition to humanitarian operations, EU
missions might include policing, monitoring and training.
The UK parliamentary report says: “In the medium term the
EU should concentrate on these classes of operations, and
ensure they are delivered successfully.”
Operation Artemis is frequently held up as a pioneering
example of this, being a French-led EU mission to the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, before the EUBGs
emerged. A small force of 1,800 operational personnel, mostly
French, later boosted with some Swedish Special Forces, were
deployed swiftly and decisively after a UN call for assistance.
At that time, a breakdown of civil order made it necessary to
secure the airport, and to protect refugees and civilians in the
town of Bunia, where a massacre was feared. The operation
was successfully completed
in about eight weeks.
Austrian, Cypriot and Irish
personnel served at the
Artemis headquarters. It
was claimed to be the first
autonomous EU military
mission outside Europe.
In contrast to EUBGs,
the NRF is a joint-brigade,
scaled formation comprising
three battlegroups (defined as much larger than EUBGs) with
appropriate support. It has around 13,000 soldiers, further
supported by a naval force drawn from established NATO
maritime groups, combat aircraft and ground support aircraft,
and Special Operations Forces. If required, a task force capable
of chemical, biological and nuclear defence operations can be
added. A major exercise is scheduled for the NRF in 2015, and
its importance will grow as the NATO Alliance transforms
its military effectiveness. NATO has moved away from the
concept of large massed forces. The NRF is intended to further
reflect this with better training, improved leadership and the
application of advanced technology. Elements of the NRF have
already been deployed on disaster-relief missions in the US
(following Hurricane Katrina) and in Pakistan after a major
earthquake struck the country in 2005. Operational command
alternates between Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, the
Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.
Charter stipulationsWhile the membership of the EU and NATO mostly overlaps
(with 21 nations being members of both), there are some
exceptions. Non-NATO Sweden, for instance, is, in fact, an
EU member. Finland is similarly EU and non-NATO. Norway
is a NATO member, but not a member of the EU, and the same
applies to Turkey. Part of the charter forming the EUBGs
demanded that there should be no duplication of what was
done under NATO (with its
established headquarters
and commands), and no
decoupling from the US and
NATO, while it is stipulated
that no discrimination be
applied against non-EU
members such as Turkey.
Some capability could
be gained for Europe if
countries outside NATO
with a background of non-alignment or neutrality – Sweden
being an example – committed to the EUBG, and it is hard to
argue that this would damage NATO.
It would also be hard to find any European who would deny
that the exceptional military-technological capability of the
US was a cornerstone of NATO’s own capability. And if the
underlying long-term agenda is to uncouple European defence
from the US, EU and NATO insiders alike always emphasise
that it is important to remember that the North Atlantic
Alliance includes a North American member that is not the
US: Canada – stable, eurocentric in background and policy,
and a deeply dedicated peacekeeper nation.
NATO’s Response Force will grow in importance after the military operation in Afghanistan draws to a close at the end of 2014
Sylv
AiN
PeTR
mAN
d��©
ARm
ée d
e Te
RRe/
NAT
O
nato operations worldwide
66 nato Securing our world
Without oil and gas, Europe would grind to a halt. Simon Michell reveals how NATO is working alongside its partners to ensure that these vital supplies get through the Strait of Hormuz to the Mediterranean Sea
and then on to their final destinations
Safeguarding energy supplies
In its most recent figures for the first quarter of 2014, the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 49 incidents
of piracy on the high seas. This was the lowest figure since 2007,
when it reported 41. At its highpoint, more than 400 attacks
or attempted attacks were taking place per year (445 in 2010
and 439 in 2011). Much of the reason for this reduction in the
number of incidents is the increase in the number of countries
cooperating to monitor the situation and send naval vessels to
protect shipping – particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and
the waters that connect the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal.
Although there was much to be encouraged about in the
IMB report, it nevertheless cited the example of an incident in
January 2014 when a tanker was fired upon approximately 115
miles off the coast of Oman from a skiff launched from a mother
vessel. Thankfully, the attack was repelled and the international
navies that were patrolling the waters subsequently intercepted
the skiff’s mother ship – an Indian dhow that had itself been
hijacked only a few days previously. Some 11 Indian crew
members were freed and five suspected pirates apprehended.
This incident clearly demonstrates the essential role of the
international navies in containing the threat of Somali piracy.
The IMB, however, is insistent that, despite the drop in pirate
attacks, the international maritime presence must be maintained.
In the words of IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan, “there can
therefore be no room for complacency as it will take only one
successful Somali hijacking for the business model to return”.
These waters are of paramount international relevance,
as they are perhaps the single most important transit lane
for energy supplies on the planet – almost 20 per cent of
the world’s oil and gas is shipped through them.
International maritime security operations As the largest military alliance in the world, NATO undertakes
widespread security operations in various regional locations
worldwide. Stabilisation and peacekeeping are key roles for
many of these missions, but energy security also represents
a significant part of the operations that the Alliance carries
out – particularly maritime security operations.
At the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, the allies
were presented with a report entitled ‘NATO’s Role in Energy
Security’, which outlined guiding principles, options and
recommendations for activities. Since then, the impetus has been
maintained and, in 2013, the NATO Energy Security Centre of
Excellence was opened in Vilnius, Lithuania. At the inauguration
ceremony, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated:
“Energy security is not a call to arms. But, when it comes to
understanding the security implications of global resource
developments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.”
In principle, there are five main areas where NATO assists
in the international effort to safeguard energy supplies:■■ information and intelligence fusion and sharing;■■ projecting stability;■■ advancing international and regional cooperation; ■■ supporting consequence management; and ■■ supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.
That said, much of the critical infrastructure related to oil
and gas is located at sea, including drilling rigs, distribution
platforms, pipelines and, of course, the tankers that ship the
energy supplies around the world.
The increased naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa
has managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks
67nato Securing our world
nato operations worldwide
This Japanese oil tanker sustained damage as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz in what was believed to have been a terrorist attack. Some 20 per cent of the world’s energy supplies must transit the narrow stretch of water
Kyo
do
Kyo
do
/Reu
TeRS
2014 FUTURE LEADERS
Summit • Wales20
14 FUTURE LEADERSSummit • Wales
The Atlantic Council wishes to congratulatethe delegates participating in the
Future Leaders Summit alongside the NATO Summit in Wales.
Representing 34 countries in North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia, the delegates are CEOs and entrepreneurs,
civil society leaders, parliamentary staff, senior government advisors, diplomats,
and military personnel and veterans.
Follow the delegates on Twitter with #FutureNATO.
For more information, please visit AtlanticCouncil.org.
Thank you to our partners for making the Future Leaders Summit possible: Robert J. Abernethy, NATO, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Allied Command
Transformation, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, DC, Airbus Group, The Scowcroft Group, US Mission to NATO, and Julie Finley.
2014 FUTURE LEADERS
Summit • Wales20
14 FUTURE LEADERSSummit • Wales
The Atlantic Council wishes to congratulatethe delegates participating in the
Future Leaders Summit alongside the NATO Summit in Wales.
Representing 34 countries in North America, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia, the delegates are CEOs and entrepreneurs,
civil society leaders, parliamentary staff, senior government advisors, diplomats,
and military personnel and veterans.
Follow the delegates on Twitter with #FutureNATO.
For more information, please visit AtlanticCouncil.org.
Thank you to our partners for making the Future Leaders Summit possible: Robert J. Abernethy, NATO, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Allied Command
Transformation, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, DC, Airbus Group, The Scowcroft Group, US Mission to NATO, and Julie Finley.
69nato Securing our world
nato operations worldwide
NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) at Northwood,
London, is the headquarters for the Alliance’s counter-piracy
and anti-terrorist naval activity. Its main area of operations is
in the Mediterranean Sea, through which 65 per cent of energy
supplies to Western Europe pass either above or below the water
(undersea pipelines carry oil from Libya to Italy and Morocco
to Spain). Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), launched in
2001, when Article 5 of the NATO treaty was invoked for the
first time following the attacks on New York’s Twin Towers
and the Pentagon building in Washington, has a remit to
monitor potential terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.
Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 are used in OAE,
with non-NATO navies now also participating. So far, more
than 115,000 vessels have been hailed and, of these, some
162 have been boarded by OAE sailors.
The other major NATO maritime operation – also supervised
from Northwood – is Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), which
patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, the southern
approaches of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea,
and along a corridor shadowing the Somali coastline. This has
a specific remit to, “provide naval escorts and deterrence, while
increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations
in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving
pirate trends and tactics”. As already mentioned, the increased
naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa has
managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks.
So much so that, in June 2014, the North Atlantic Council
extended Operation Ocean Shield until the end of 2016.
A vital element of the maritime security work that NATO
carries out in the energy security field is that of encouraging
non-NATO navies to participate. The areas involved are so
vast that it requires a much broader coalition to maintain a
credible presence. Both OAE and OOS regularly interoperate
with foreign navies outside the Alliance, among them Australia,
Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia and Ukraine.
In addition, the European Union’s own anti-piracy force
(EUNAVFOR) undertakes a complementary mission under
the name Operation Atalanta, which involves a considerable
amount of coordination and collaboration between the two
forces. Added to that is the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151,
which operates in the same waters under a counter-piracy remit.
Controlled out of Bahrain, the CTFs 150, 151 and 152 are units
within a non-political grouping of 30 countries that are also
involved in maritime security operations. Many of the NATO
nations also contribute to Op Atalanta and the CTFs with the
result that interoperability has become a much easier process.
NATO, alongside its partners and friends, has shown that
it is possible to counter piracy proliferation if the political will
exists. However, the waters around the Arabian Sea may be safer
now, but the piracy problem remains a challenge in South-East
Asia, where the majority of pirate attacks currently take place.
Another hotspot that is growing in intensity is off the West
African coast. It remains to be seen whether the political will
that was mustered to protect shipping in the waters off the
Middle East can be achieved elsewhere. NATo’s operation ocean Shield, which patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, is helping to contain piracy off the coast of Somalia
Launched in 2001, NATo’s operation Active endeavour keeps a close watch for terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea
NAT
oN
ATo
70 NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
This summer saw increased airport security surrounding mobile phones following intelligence suggesting they could be used to conceal explosive devices Im
agem
ore
Co
LTd
/Co
rbIs
71NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
Chris Aaron reviews the development of NATO’s counterterrorism role since 2001, and the focus of its new counterterrorism policy
Confronting terrorism
NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept identified terrorism as a
threat to Alliance security. However, it emphasised that the
threat was as much an issue of ‘force protection’ as of national
security, and was only one of a range of security concerns,
such as weapons proliferation and peripheral instability, that
dominated in the post-Cold War security environment
Clearly, NATO’s role in countering terrorism was under
discussion, but the fundamental impetus for adopting a
counterterrorism policy came with the 9/11 attacks on the United
States, which led to the invocation of Article 5 on 12 September
2001. Edgar Buckley’s article in the summer 2006 issue of NATO
Review provides a fascinating, first-hand account of that decision.
The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring
its political and military capabilities to the table in response
to the terrorist attack. On 4 October 2001, NATO agreed
eight measures to support the US, measures that significantly
anticipated the terrorism role and policy that the Alliance
subsequently adopted, as well as forming the basis for two
antiterrorism missions: the deployment of NATO AWACS to
the US, and Operation Active Endeavour to patrol the eastern
Mediterranean to deter terrorist activity and illegal trafficking
(a mission that continues in expanded form to this day).
NATO summits in 2002 further developed the doctrinal
basis for its engagement with terrorism: Reykjavik ended
the debate on out-of-area operations and facilitated NATO
support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and operations elsewhere, while the Prague Summit approved
the development of NATO’s Military Concept for Defence
Against Terrorism (MCDAT).
This decade-long process of resetting NATO’s stance from
one of territorial defence to security guarantor reached its
culmination, or at least maturity, with regard to terrorism,
at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, when the organisation
approved policy guidelines on counterterrorism, subtitled
‘Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future’.
NATO’s ACEThe MCDAT identified four roles: antiterrorism – essentially
defensive measures; counterterrorism – primarily offensive
measures; consequence management, mitigating the effects
of a terrorist attack once it has taken place; and military
cooperation. Given that, in most NATO states, it is civil
authorities – such as police, security services and customs
– that have the lead on terrorism, MCDAT also stated that
NATO should deepen its collaboration with civil authorities to
maximise its effectiveness against terrorism, while respecting
national and institutional responsibilities.
The policy guidelines on counterterrorism present these
roles and wider issues, under the three pillars of awareness,
capability and engagement (ACE).
Awareness: Given its experience of managing shared security
and sensitive information among a host of national members,
NATO is in a position to improve a common understanding
of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities among allies through
consultation, the enhanced sharing of information and
intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments
in support of national authorities.
The Emerging Security Challenges Division, created in
NATO headquarters in August 2010, acts as a locus for the
assessment of non-traditional risks and challenges, including
terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner. The NATO Intelligence
Liaison Unit (ILU), also created in 2010, has resulted in an
improved flow of terrorism analysis to the North Atlantic
Council. Through the ILU in Brussels, and the intelligence
liaison cell at Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium,
analytical approaches to terrorism and its links with other
The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring its
political and military capabilities to the table in response to 9/11
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
72 NATO Securing our world
transnational threats have been enhanced, as has cooperation
among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components
and intelligence-sharing with partners.
Capability: Providing member states with the capability
to deter, defend against and respond to terrorist attacks is
another core function that NATO is well placed to deliver. Its
knowledge and operational experience in the fields of airspace
security, air defence, maritime security, CBRN (chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear) response, non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, protection of critical
infrastructure and use of special forces is well established.
Through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work
(DAT POW), NATO aims to accelerate capability developments,
and innovative technologies and methods that address
asymmetric threats such as terrorism in a more comprehensive
and informed way. DAT POW uses new or adapted technologies
or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats
under three capability umbrellas: incident management,
force protection/survivability and network engagement. The
Centres of Excellence (CoE) structure, established as part of
the Alliance transformation programme, will also contribute
to capability and the sharing of lessons learnt, particularly
through the Defence Against Terrorism CoE in Turkey, the
HUMINT (Human Intelligence) CoE in Romania, and others.
The training, education and exercises based on different
threat scenarios organised by CoEs, as well as bodies such
as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the
NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, will continue to
improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learnt and
best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to allies
(on request) in support of civil-emergency planning and the
protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may
relate to counterterrorism.
NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme also
contributes to developing new technologies for antiterrorism.
The STANDEX project has been highlighted as a particular
success. In a joint development with Russia, under the auspices
of the NATO-Russia Council, scientists have successfully field-
tested a stand-off explosives-detection system that can be used
in crowded spaces, such as transit systems or sports venues, to
identify suspicious packages or individuals. While the system
is now being developed for commercial production, further
research is planned for wider applications for the detection
techniques and systems to disrupt detected devices.
Engagement: Information-sharing, consultations, exercises,
education and Centres of Excellence all contribute to NATO’s
abilities to counter terrorism, and serve to improve the
capabilities of member states, but NATO recognises that
combating terrorism requires a holistic approach by the
international community. The Alliance aims to strengthen its
cooperation with partner countries as well as international
and regional organisations, in particular the United
Nations, European Union and Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in accordance with the
Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. The UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols
against terrorism, together with the relevant UN resolutions,
provide a common framework for efforts to combat terrorism.
NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee and its executive directorate, as well as with the
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of
its relevant component organisations, and has also established
close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats
Department’s Action Against Terrorism Unit.
The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T),
which was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002,
provides a framework for practical cooperation between NATO
and partner countries. The action plan defines partnership
roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its
consequences. For instance, NATO and partner countries work
together to improve the safety of airspace, including through
exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the
handling of possible terrorist threats. Originally developed
under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
the PAP-T has since been opened to participation of all partner
countries. With the terrorist threat rising steadily in the US
and Europe, NATO has a pivotal role to play in ensuring the
safety of not just its citizens, but also those of its partners.
operation active endeavour was established as one of NaTo’s anti-terrorism measures following the invocation of article 5 in 2001
displaced Iraqis receive food from a charity in a refugee camp outside of arbil. The recent emergence of IsIs (now ‘the Islamic state’) in syria and Iraq has set alarm bells ringing across the West
Ceer
WaN
aZI
Z/La
Nd
oV/
Pres
s as
soCI
aTIo
N Im
ages
NaT
o
73NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
NATO has been leading a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo since June 1999 as part of a wider effort to bring security and stability to the Balkans.
Mike Bryant reviews the progress
Moving forward on Kosovo
On 3 April 2014, the upper airspace over Kosovo was
reopened to civilian flights. Hungary’s air navigation
service provider, Hungarocontrol, is acting as a technical
enabler, although airspace will remain under NATO/KFOR
(Kosovo Force) jurisdiction.
According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, “the reopening of the upper airspace in Kosovo
is a significant step that benefits the entire western Balkans”.
It is thought that up to 180,000 civilian flights a year could be
better off as a result, with shorter routes meaning reduced
flight times as well as various consequential economic and
environmental benefits.
The reopening of Kosovo’s airspace forms part of a NATO-
led aviation normalisation process covering the wider western
Balkans region, an effort that has encompassed not only NATO
and the Government of Hungary, but also many neighbouring
states, the European air traffic management organisation
Eurocontrol, and several other partners.
Ethnic Albanians flee a Serb advance through the Drenica region, Kosovo, in March 1999. The conflict turned thousands of people into refugees
AP/P
rESS
ASS
oci
ATio
n iM
AgES
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
74 NATO Securing our world
KFOR first deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, just two days
after the suspension of the 78-day Operation Allied Force NATO
air campaign over Kosovo that was designed to end the conflict in
the region, which had turned thousands of people into refugees.
PeacekeepingOperation Allied Force was halted following the signing of
a military technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same day as the air
campaign ceased, 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 welcomed Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the
principles of a political solution, including an immediate end
to violence. UNSCR 1244 also agreed the deployment of an
international force to maintain the peace, one that featured
substantial NATO involvement. KFOR – a peace enforcement
(more commonly known as ‘peacekeeping’) mission operated
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – draws its mandate
from that MTA and UNSCR 1244.
Today, KFOR incorporates approximately 5,000 soldiers
from up to 31 countries. It has remained in situ despite Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence that was announced in
February 2008; indeed, its role grew around that time, NATO
agreeing in June of that year to take on the missions of both
standing down the local Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and
creating a new multi-ethnic, lightly armed force called the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which has the tasks of providing
crisis response and assistance to civil authorities in the case
of natural or other emergencies, explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) and assisting in civil protection. KSF was declared
fully operational by the North Atlantic Council in July 2013.
NATO has also helped in the creation of the body that
exercises civilian control over the KSF. While primary
responsibility for that lies with NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, KFOR continues to support the NATO advisory
team in Pristina, the capital of and largest city in Kosovo.
A further development in April 2013 saw Belgrade and
Pristina ink a ‘normalisation’ agreement, which has tangibly
helped to improve relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
Yet, at its core, KFOR’s mission remains what it was in 1999:
peacekeeping. Initially deployed to protect ethnic Albanians
from ‘ethnic cleansing’ (among a number of other missions,
such as to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]
and support the international humanitarian effort in the area),
it has equally sought to protect ethnic Serbs from a similar fate.
Its focus on preventing ethnic strife and protecting
ethnic minorities has caused it to mount regular patrols
near threatened communities, as well as man checkpoints
in vulnerable localities. It has also acted to protect sites of
historical value, although – in what is known as a process of
To check on progress, nATo Supreme Allied commander Europe general Philip M Breedlove visited KFor in Pristina in november 2013
There has been a gradual transfer of responsibility for security at cultural
heritage sites away from KFOR and towards the Kosovo Police
nAT
o
75NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
‘unfixing’ – there has been a gradual transfer of responsibility
for security at religious and cultural heritage sites away from
KFOR and into the hands of the Kosovo Police.
RestructuringIndeed, the ongoing improvement in relations between the
various ethnic and political parties in Kosovo (although it is
worth noting that there have been a number of armed clashes
and this improvement has been by no means smooth nor
constant) has allowed NATO to adopt a policy of reducing
KFOR’s presence on the ground as a static force wherever
possible, instead focusing on operational flexibility and
effective intelligence collection to cope with any threats.
KFOR has gradually adjusted its force posture into what is
described by NATO as a “deterrence presence”.
Troop reductions are decided by the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) on the basis of conditions on the ground,
and are therefore not driven by a timetable. At 5,000 strong,
KFOR’s current manpower level is roughly only 10 per cent
of the 50,000 troops that made up the force when it was
originally deployed back in 1999.
In keeping the peace, KFOR continues to cooperate closely
with the United Nations and European Union, as well as other
relevant international agencies as appropriate, in order to support
the development of a democratic, multi-ethnic, peaceful Kosovo.
KFOR was initially stood up as four multinational brigades
(MNBs), one in the east, one in the centre, one in the north-
east and the last of the quartet in the south-west. In 2006,
a reorganisation brought a move to five regionally based
multinational task forces (MNTFs) and further change in
February 2010 saw a switch to mission-tailored multinational
battle groups (MNBGs). Further change was just around
the corner, however, and, in October 2010, KFOR adopted
its present structure of just two MNBGs. With MNBG East
headquartered at Camp Bondsteel near Urosevac, and MNBG
West headquartered at Camp Villagio Italia in Pec, HQ KFOR
remains at Camp Film City in Pristina.
Highly mobile and able to rapidly deploy at the first signs
of trouble, the battle groups are each composed of numerous
companies that are based at various camps throughout Kosovo.
NATO also maintains a reserve force that can quickly provide
reinforcement as and when it is required.
KFOR is led by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), who reports
to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFCN).
The current COMKFOR is Major General Salvatore Farina, who
assumed the command in September 2013.
KFor currently operates with 5,000 personnel, 10 per cent of the original force
riA
no
voST
i/Al
AMy
76 NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is responsible for coordinating disaster-relief efforts among the Alliance’s member and partner countries. Mike Bryant highlights how it handles
the task with fortitude and skill
NATO’s disaster response
Representing NATO’s principal civil-emergency response
mechanism throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic region –
for 28 NATO members and 22 partner countries – the Euro-
Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)
operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
Handling requests for assistance and coordinating the
response to both natural and man-made disasters, EADRCC
forwards any requests for assistance to NATO and partner
countries that, in response, communicate any offers of help
back to the centre and/or the country affected by the disaster.
Using its Aidmatrix software system, it maintains a record of
assistance offered, assistance accepted, assistance still required,
relevant dates, and the evolving situation in disaster-affected
areas. Relevant information is fed to NATO and its partner
countries in the form of daily situation reports, as well as
being published on the NATO website.
International operationsAll of the centre’s work is undertaken in close cooperation with
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), which holds the primary role in coordinating
international disaster-relief efforts. It also liaises closely
with NATO non-military authorities and with other relevant
international agencies. As such, EADRCC acts as a regional
coordinating mechanism, supporting and complementing
UN relief operations, rather than directing them.
When a disaster occurs that requires international
assistance, EADRCC submits requests – it does not dictate – to
NATO members and partners as to what assistance they might
provide based on the information that the centre can offer. And,
of course, the authorities in the stricken country will remain
the primary responsible party for disaster management.
EADRCC forms part of the International Staff Operations
Division based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and is
headed by the director of civil-emergency planning. Established
in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the
centre was created to form one half of a twin-element strategy
to coordinate the EAPC’s response to international disaster
relief. The other element is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Unit (EADRU), a non-standing multinational force of civilian
and military elements that are deployable in the event of a
disaster in any EAPC country.
In the early part of its existence, EADRCC was heavily
involved in coordinating the humanitarian assistance effort
of EAPC nations supporting refugees from the Kosovo War.
Since then, it has responded to more than 60 requests for
assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters, and
– since 2004 – has coordinated assistance from NATO and
partner nations in 40 different emergencies. For example, it
helped in the response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina in the
United States in 2005 and the massive Pakistani floods of 2010.
Most recently, in June 2014, EADRCC received a second request
for assistance from Turkey in regard to the large numbers of
Syrian refugees who had crossed the border into the country,
fleeing from the fighting in their country. Just a month prior
to that, in May, it responded to a request for assistance from
Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect to flooding in that region.
EADRCC operates with a small staff of fewer than 10, but
this complement can be augmented by additional civilian or
military NATO personnel or with EAPC delegations to NATO.
The centre also exploits the experience and knowledge of
national civil experts that can be called on to provide it with
advice and information as required.
NATO regards EADRCC as an example of what can be
achieved when Alliance members and partners work closely
together. It allows smaller and poorer, as well as larger and
richer, countries to actively participate in disaster-response
efforts; in so doing, many NATO partners – previously purely
recipients of Alliance support – have also become valued
contributors to its civilian operations.
The exercises conducted on an annual basis under
the EADRCC umbrella are intended to foster improved
77NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
Those affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan received assistance from NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)
DAN
iEl
BERE
hul
Ak/G
ETTy
imAG
Es
Supergum is Israel’s leading supplier for all NBC and Homeland Security solutions for both the civilian population and all government branches and armed forces.We are your one-stop shop for all NBC and Homeland security products with over 30 years of proven expertise and know how.
Contact us at info@supergum.com
SUPER TECHNOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY
79NATO Securing our world
NATO OperATiONs wOrldwide
collaboration between NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP)
and other partner countries participating in them. They offer
practice in standard disaster-response procedures and develop
the interoperability and capability skills of the EADRU. They
are among the largest and most complex civilian protection
training opportunities, bringing together both military
and civilian teams in exercises that are designed to be as
challenging and realistic as possible. They take in scenarios
as wide-ranging as flooding, storms and CBRN (chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear) threat simulations. So
far, EADRCC has held large-scale exercises in NATO member
and partner countries, including Armenia, Croatia, Finland,
Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, the Russian
Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Expanding mandateAs well as its primary responsibilities of coordinating the
responses of EAPC countries to disasters occurring in
their regions, maintaining close liaison with various UN
and European Union bodies, and acting as a focal point for
information-sharing among the relevant bodies involved in
emergency response, EADRCC also has a number of day-
to-day operational tasks that it very quickly assumed after
its formation. These have included working with the UN
Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) to maintain a list of
national civil and military elements for which EAPC members
have indicated potential availability, and conditions for their
involvement in EADRU operations, and facilitating the rapid
deployment of EADRU into disaster areas as and when required.
Moreover, amendments to the centre’s remit have come about
as a result of changes in the military operational environment.
Thus, since the terrorist attacks in the US of 11 September
2001, EADRCC has been tasked with the coordination of
international assistance from EAPC countries to help deal
with the consequences of CBRN incidents, including terrorist
attacks involving such weapons.
Then, in 2004, the North Atlantic Council widened
EADRCC’s mandate to include the handling of requests for
assistance from the Afghan Government in the event of a
natural disaster. In 2007, that remit was extended once more
to incorporate those same provisions in respect of all areas in
which NATO had been involved militarily.
Clearly, while the EADRCC’s mandate has evolved and
grown over the years, the centre has continued to play a pivotal
role in supporting disaster relief work in countries right across
the Euro-Atlantic zone.
syrian refugees arrive in Turkey. EADRCC has responded to Turkish requests for assistance with the flood of refugees from its neighbour
Since the Kosovo War, EADRCC has responded to more than 60 requests
for assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters
AFP/
GET
Ty im
AGEs
strengthening military capabilities
80 natO Securing our world
Professor Julian Lindley-French, senior fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, examines the implications of more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, and argues that NATO must go back to its first
principles if it is to counter diverse 21st-century threats
Rebalancing NATO forces
“The enemy may be seen or unseen… it is not massed
tanks on the European mainland we need, but the latest
in cyberwarfare, unmanned aircraft technology and Special
Forces capability.” In announcing an additional £1.1 billion
expenditure on the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces on
14 July 2014, UK Prime Minister David Cameron captured the
essential dilemma NATO and the forces of its member states
face: what to plan for? As host of the September 2014 NATO
Wales Summit, Cameron is fully aware of the choices faced
by the Alliance as it pulls out of Afghanistan and, for the first
time, properly considers its place in a dangerous 21st century.
Much of the focus remains on the struggle against Islamic
fundamentalism that led NATO to deploy to Afghanistan and
which remains a central security concern for almost all Alliance
members. However, with Russia’s 2014 usurpation of Ukraine-
Crimea and the growing cyber-threat from both state and non-
state actors, the very concept of ‘defence’ needs to be revisited
by NATO. In other words, if NATO and its member nations
are to resolve the force-planning dilemma, the Alliance needs
to go back to first principles.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed
out in 2014 that while defence spending in several NATO
nations had decreased by more than 20 per cent over the past
five years, Russia had increased its spending by 10 per cent
in real terms each year over the same period. Indeed, Moscow
now devotes 20 per cent of all public expenditure to defence as
part of the 2010 Defence Modernisation Programme. Similarly,
China expanded its defence budget by 12.7 per cent in 2013,
the latest year-on-year double-digit increase since 1989.
As the Alliance emerges from Afghanistan and a
13-year campaign determinedly focused on stabilisation
and reconstruction, it is clear that NATO’s centre of gravity
will once again need to become far more strategic. In force-
planning terms, that will require a military capability that
is able to operate across the mission spectrum from low- to
high-end operations. Moreover, there are likely to be far
more of these operations than in the recent past.
However, such an upgrade in capability and capacity is
hindered by two fundamental challenges. First, the United
States plans to cut its defence budget to $450 billion by 2020,
which implies a cut greater than the combined annual defence
expenditure of all the European allies. Second, because the US
is increasingly being called upon to act as the strategic stabiliser
across the Asia-Pacific region, European forces will need to
become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the
same time, integrating more closely with them.
The change in the essential strategic contract that such
a shift implies between America and its European allies is
perhaps the greatest challenge the Alliance faces. Traditionally,
European forces have provided relatively weak spokes to the
American force hub. That must change. Indeed, implicit in the
July 2014 launch of the first of Britain’s two super-carriers,
HMS Queen Elizabeth, is the creation of a European force hub
able to support and strengthen the Americans while acting,
if needs be, as an autonomous hub over time and distance.
In fact, NATO already considered its strategic future back
in 2010, but simply failed to act on it as operations swamped
strategy. Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Concept provides more than
European forces will need to become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the same time, integrating more closely with them
81natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
NATO forces attend the scene of a suicide car-bomb attack in Kabul. As the Alliance pulls out of Afghanistan, countering Islamic fundamentalism remains a focus for most members
AP/P
ress
Ass
OcI
ATIO
N Im
Ages
Your container is our mission since 1975
Sicom SpA, Via La Morra 8, Italy
www.sicom-containers.com
10ft and 20ft ISO 1C containers Dry Box, Open Top, Open Side, Hard Top, and customized units on demand
Containers made in Italy
83natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
enough strategic guidance, but has hitherto lacked sufficient
political investment. An essential NATO dilemma is the extent
to which ‘strategy’ will for once trump ‘politics’ in Europe.
While any meaningful strategic horizon scan would suggest
such a need, deep barriers remain. First, the eurozone crisis and
austerity politics in Europe have tended to make governments
view defence as a luxury and thus a budget to be cut. Second,
sound strategy is established first and foremost on strategic
unity of effort and purpose. Germany is now Europe’s strongest
political power, but remains deeply ambivalent about the use of
force and indeed, its relationship with the US. Third, Operation
Unified Protector over Libya revealed deep capability gaps,
particularly in terms of the so-called strategic enablers of ISTAR
(intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance)
air-to-air refuelling and remotely piloted air systems (RPAS).
And yet, implicit in the Strategic Concept, the need
for the Alliance to generate influence across the mission
spectrum remains and pertains. That means a NATO able to
offer continuing support to a fragile Afghanistan beyond the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and
at the same time capable of acting as a credible conventional
deterrent and, if needs be, a war-fighter to prevent the kind
of adventurism in which Russia has recently been engaged.
Given the widening gap between NATO military capability
and capacity, a radical approach is the most prudent one.
NATO’s Article 5 collective defence architecture remains the
bedrock of Alliance credibility. And yet, it is in urgent need
of modernisation – based on the following three elements:
missile defence, cyber defence and deeply joint, networked
advanced expeditionary forces.
However, it is the 21st-century balance between protection
and projection that is the key to NATO’s continued strategic
utility. It is vital that NATO helps pioneer a new type of deep,
joint force able to operate across air, sea, land, cyber, space and
knowledge. It is a force that must also be able to play its full
part in cross-government civilian and military efforts building
on the lessons from the ISAF campaign. To realise such a
vision, the Alliance will need to go beyond Smart Defence and
the Connected Forces Initiative. Deep connectivity will require
NATO’s command structures to be further reformed, with
transformation and experimentation brought to the fore.
NATO’s European allies need to undergo a profound mind-
set change if they and the Alliance are to deal with the harsh
realities of a hyper-competitive future and the harsh strategic
judgements it will impose. Life after Afghanistan will not
be easy or quiet for the Alliance. At the very least, all NATO
European allies must spend more and spend better. They must
invest the agreed two per cent a year of their national wealth
(GDP) in their armed forces and drive forward military reforms,
as well as pooling, sharing and some defence integration.
russian servicemen near the Ukrainian border. NATO must rebuild its conventional deterrent credibility in order to counter russian expansionism
Alex
ANd
er m
IKh
AIlO
v/re
UTer
s
strengthening military capabilities
84 natO Securing our world
The United States still provides the lion’s share of a number of crucial NATO capabilities. Jim Winchester reviews how European
member countries are seeking to reduce the imbalance
Closing the gap
The United States has worldwide responsibilities outside
NATO, so comparing numbers of platforms is not always
fair, but numbers provide the ability to surge resources to any
region in times of crisis. For example, 80 per cent of sorties
over Libya during NATO’s Operation Allied Protector in 2011
were flown by US assets. Wanting to increase their share of
the contribution to operations, European NATO countries, as
well as a number of partner nations, are modernising fleets and
pooling assets for greater efficiency, but generally not increasing
the number of airframes in their respective air arms.
The United States Air Force’s Air Mobility Command
operates almost 300 of the huge C-17 Globemaster III and C-5
Galaxy jet transport aircraft alone, supplemented by a large civil
reserve air fleet (CRAF). This befits America’s long-standing
global missions, but with increasing out-of-area operations
conducted by European countries in recent decades, moves
to create a force capable of strategic reach are bearing fruit.
Capabilities: areas of focusUnder the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative,
NATO has operated three C-17s since 2009, with some 10
countries, including the non-NATO Sweden and Finland,
participating in the Heavy Airlift Wing based at Pápa, Hungary.
In addition, an overlapping group of 12 European countries
is involved in the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),
which charters Antonov An-124-100 aircraft from Russian
85natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
and Ukrainian companies as an interim solution pending
deliveries of the Airbus A400M Atlas. The Atlas, which fits
neatly between the C-17 and the smaller C-130J Hercules in
terms of range and capacity, is at last entering service with
France and Turkey, to be followed by Germany, the United
Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and, finally, Luxembourg by 2018.
In all, 180 A400Ms are on order for NATO countries.
Again, the US air-to-air refuelling (tanker) fleet dwarfs
that of Europe with around 650 aircraft in service, but, at the
same time, replacement programmes for legacy aircraft have
progressed further in Europe than they have in the US. For
example, Italy has already introduced Boeing 767-based tankers,
whereas the KC-46A Pegasus, which is also based on the Boeing
767, is not expected to enter United States Air Force service
before 2017. Airbus A330 tanker/transports are beginning to
enter service with the UK and France (14 each) and Spain (two).
However, according to the European Defence Agency (EDA),
there are only 42 refuelling platforms across Europe, made
up of 12 types (as of late 2013), including some KC-130s and
C-160 Transalls. Both types and numbers have since reduced
with the retirement of the RAF’s VC-10 and TriStar. The EDA
has made refuelling a priority and is establishing a programme
of pooling and sharing, but, in the short term, has suggested
leasing or contracting commercial providers. The first option
has not met with much enthusiasm from member states, while
the single commercial air refuelling operator has had only
occasional European work to date. In November 2012, 10
countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain) agreed
to work towards the acquisition of a common European
strategic Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT), with an initial
operational capability (IOC) of 2020.
With the addition of Spain in January 2015, the European
Air Transport Command (EATC), founded in 2010, will have
six members. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and
Luxembourg have assigned transport, tanker and medevac
assets to the EATC comprising nearly 150 aircraft of more than
a dozen types. Missions and training events are planned, tasked
and controlled from the EATC headquarters in Eindhoven, the
Netherlands. The EATC has organised several exercises in 2014,
including European Air-to-Air Refuelling Training (EATT),
which took place in June at Bulgaria’s Plovdiv Airbase, and
According to the European Defence Agency, there are only 42 refuelling
platforms across Europe
The UK is considering leasing or buying the P-8 Poseidon as a possible replacement for the cancelled Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft
CoPy
Rig
hT
© B
oei
Ng.
All
Rig
hTs
Res
eRve
d.
strengthening military capabilities
86 natO Securing our world
the European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course
(AATTC), which is to be held in Spain in September.
Aside from the long-standing NATO Airborne Early
Warning & Control (AEW&C) Force of E-3D Sentry
aircraft, based in Germany at the Geilenkirchen NATO
Air Base, European ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance,
target acquisition and reconnaissance) cooperation is on
a much more limited basis, although progress is being made.
That said, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme
has existed for 23 years without yet fielding any platforms. At
one time, a manned platform, then a mixed manned/unmanned
fleet, AGS will now comprise five Global Hawk Block 40 high-
altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
operated by 12 NATO countries on behalf of all 28.
The UK and France will also contribute a number of Sentinel
aircraft and Heron TP UAVs to the system, which will be run
along the lines of the AEW&C Force, beginning in 2016-18
and based out of Sigonella, Italy.
European air arms field a small and disparate collection of
signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft used mainly for national
taskings. One rare example of trans-NATO cooperation that
is actually in place is the UK’s acquisition from the US of the
RC-135W Rivet Joint under Project Airseeker to fill the gap left
by the Nimrod R1 retirement. However, there is no replacement
on the horizon for France’s Transall C-160G Gabriel SIGINT
and C-160H Astarté communications relay aircraft or Sweden’s
Gulfstream S102B Korpen. The utility of the UK’s Global
Express-based Sentinel and King Air-based Shadow platforms
has been recognised by extending their service beyond the
previously stated out-of-service date of 2015, in a decision
recently announced at the 2014 Farnborough Air Show.
There are no multinational arrangements in Europe at this
time for the long-range maritime patrol (LRMPA) role. The US
Navy is replacing its 1950s-designed P-3 Orion with the P-8
Poseidon, while most other P-3 users are in a constant cycle of
reworks and systems upgrades. The Dutch, however, sold their
P-3s to the Germans in 2005 and the British took a ‘capability
holiday’ when the Nimrod MRA4 project was cancelled under
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Many
British personnel are flying with the US and other allied nations
as ‘seedcorn’ to regenerate a LRMPA capability, although a
decision on whether to do this must await the 2015 SDSR. UK
defence officials have reportedly been showing strong interest in
the P-8 and have not ruled out leasing, an arrangement that was
used to introduce the C-17 in the 2000s. In the meantime, the
reprieved Sentinels are to get expanded maritime capabilities.
ConclusionIn summary, the last few years have seen several new initiatives
get off the ground to increase European cooperation, and these
are now seeing results in terms of the more efficient allocation
of resources and increased common training programmes. Not
all the countries on this side of the Atlantic are participating
in every one of these arrangements, but progress is being made
within the constraints of defence budgets that have long been
shrinking or static in real terms.
NATo’s european members have ordered some 180 Airbus A400M Atlas aircraft to help fill the tactical airlift gap
AiRB
Us M
iliT
ARy
Delivering the network.Trusted and ready for the future, the Harris AN/PRC-117G enables misssion-critical connections: harris.com/117G.
Harris AN/PRC-152A Multiband Handheld Radio
Harris RF-7850S SPR™ Soldier Radio Harris RF-7800W
strengthening military capabilities
88 natO Securing our world
Simon Michell highlights NATO’s growing competence in the cybersecurity realm and looks at the benefits of sharing knowledge
Ramping up NATO cyber defence
Shared knowledge and interoperability are key to
implementing a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy
In the run-up to the May 2014 unofficial Ukrainian
referendum for the establishment of independent entities
in the eastern part of the country, a number of NATO’s public
domain websites crashed after suffering cyberattacks. The
affected sites were back up and running very quickly, and
NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu confirmed that the attacks
had not had any operational impact on the Alliance’s capability.
NATO has long been aware of cyber vulnerability; as far back
as its Prague Summit in 2002 – five years before the massive
attacks that brought parts of Estonia’s national IT infrastructure
to a standstill – the Alliance decided to put cyber defence firmly
on the political agenda. During a NATO defence ministers’
meeting in June 2007, just a
few weeks after the events in
Estonia, it was agreed that a
thorough assessment of the
Alliance’s approach to cyber
defence was urgently needed.
The findings
recommended specific roles
for the Alliance as well as the
implementation of a number
of new measures aimed at
improving cyber protection.
The development of a NATO cyber defence policy was called
for – which was particularly timely given that the 2008 conflict
in Georgia highlighted the use of cyber as a major component
of conventional warfare.
The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD
CoE) was established in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2008 with a remit
to “enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing
among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by
virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned
and consultation”. It is perhaps ironic that Estonia had first
proposed the concept of a cyber defence centre in 2004, the
same year it joined the Alliance.
In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved a revised
cyber defence policy and an associated action plan, the details
of which were agreed the following October. From then
on, cyber was steadily incorporated into all levels of NATO
infrastructure and day-to-day operations. In April 2012, cyber
was integrated into the NATO Defence Planning Process
(NDPP), meaning that national and Alliance cyber activities
would be harmonised in order to meet agreed targets.
Strategic steps to counter cyber intrusionsThe following month, the Chicago Summit ruled to bring all
of the Alliance’s networks under centralised protection and
set about bolstering the NATO Computer Incident Response
Capability (NCIRC). A tight deadline was set for completion
of the work. The Secretary General’s annual report that year
confirmed that “2013 was a
year of considerable progress
in NATO’s ability to defend
itself against cyberattacks.
NATO has implemented
NCIRC centralised protection
at NATO headquarters,
commands and agencies.
This is a major upgrade
of NATO’s protection
against the cyberthreat.
NATO networks in the
51 NATO locations that make up NATO headquarters, the
NATO command structure and NATO agencies are under
comprehensive 24/7 surveillance and protected by enhanced
sensors and intrusion detection technologies.”
Alongside this initiative, NATO also launched in November
2013 a ‘smart defence’ project – the Malware Information
Sharing Platform (MISP) – aimed at helping to defeat cyber
intrusions. NATO said: “The ultimate goal of the project is
to develop a NATO capability, available to all NATO nations,
through which nations commit to sharing their information.”
As such, MISP, with Belgium as the lead nation, will facilitate
information sharing of the technical characteristics of malware
within a trusted community without having to share details
of an attack. Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Assistant Secretary
General for NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division,
89natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
The 2008 conflict in Georgia highlighted cyber as a component of conventional warfare
REUT
ERS/
GlE
b G
aRan
ich
said of the significant step: “The common development of a
new capability under the umbrella of NATO also helps to ensure
the interoperability among those who share this capability.”
Cybersecurity exercisesShared knowledge and interoperability are key to implementing
a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy. Another way
NATO is embedding this concept into its operations is through
two main series of exercises. The Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is responsible for holding the
annual Locked Shields exercises, the latest of which, held in
May 2014, brought together nearly 300 participants from
17 nations. Over two days, 12 teams of defenders from all
over Europe were pitted against one attacking team with the
aim of training the teams of IT specialists to detect and mitigate
large-scale cyberattacks and handle security incidents.
Although the scenarios for these types of exercises are
fictitious and the events take place in a specially built self-
contained environment, the attack and defence methods used
are real, thereby giving the defending teams an opportunity
to test their skills under real-life conditions. Equally as
important, the teams need to work together, which helps
to strengthen the international security community by
establishing trusted networks, as well as getting them used
to the practice of sharing information and experience.
The other main training effort is the three-day annual
Cyber Coalition exercise, which is now in its sixth year. Cyber
Coalition 2013 was hosted by the Estonian Defence College
in Tartu. With over 30 nations (the 28 NATO member states
as well as non-NATO partners: Austria, Finland, Ireland,
Sweden and Switzerland, plus observers from the European
Union and New Zealand) taking part, it was the largest training
exercise of its kind ever to have taken place. Although similar to
Locked Shields, the Cyber Coalition exercises have a somewhat
broader scope in that they help to train technical personnel
and their leadership and to test the ability of allies and partners
to coordinate and cooperate their actions in warding off
multiple simulated cyberattacks.
Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging
Security Challenges at NATO, highlighted the importance of
the exercise and similar efforts, by pointing out that there is a
range of differing skill levels across the Alliance that all need to
be brought up to a consistent standard: “In NATO we are always
vulnerable through our weakest link.” By establishing a higher
benchmark across the Alliance, all nations within it are better
able to cope with the growing menace.
Strengthening military capabilitieS
90 natO Securing our world
Peter Roberts, Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), reviews how the United States is evolving its cyber
defence strategies and legislation to tackle increasingly complex threats
Taking the lead on cybersecurity
On 10 June 2010, Senators Joe Lieberman, Susan Collins
and Tom Carper proposed the introduction of legislation
entitled ‘Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset’. The aim
was to provide resilience to American cyber capabilities by
legalising actions against attacks that had the potential to
disrupt either telecommunications or the country’s economy.
This followed a series of studies by both the Bush and Obama
administrations into national cyber vulnerabilities and the
legalisation of potential response options. This analysis and
the legislation enacted through the Department of Defense,
Department of Homeland Security, et al, resulted in the
development of a US Government mandate for cyberspace
that has come to be known as ‘Protect the Nation’.
The actions enabled by those cyber-protection policies
provide reassurance to companies physically located in the US.
The ‘cyber over-watch’ of the combined presence of the National
Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
DHS and the newly created US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
underpins economic protection and resilience. It also acts as a
cyber safety net to the US Defense Enterprise against industrial
and international espionage activity. The safeguards that
those agencies provide are largely focused on ensuring
that research and development, exquisite technological
improvements and breakthroughs are not lost to competitors.
They also have a secondary role in protecting US forces
deployed at range from the continental US.
Developing a national cybersecurity strategy: challenges and opportunitiesAs governments deploy smaller military force packages, there
is a reliance on the connectivity between the deployed units
and their home operating bases to enable operational command
and control, as well as for logistical and administrative support.
While undoubtedly creating efficiencies, that connectivity
has now also become a critical vulnerability, which can be
exploited by third parties. Attacks on cyber networks or
operating systems have been demonstrated to have significant
advantage in military campaigns and as with many concepts,
transfer easily into a commercial construct.
Unpicking the supply-chain network within any business
model rapidly overcomes technological superiority and
resilience, or to put another way, their competitive advantage.
The past decade has seen a marked rise in disruption of the
supply or distribution chain in both the military and industrial
sectors through cyber failures or attacks. The role of US
Government agencies in mitigating these impacts is critical
to preventing wider damage across the defence, security and
industrial sectors. Commercial benefits, in terms of such things
as data protection, intellectual property protection, counter
industrial espionage and protection of reputation are all useful
by-products of the US Government mandate.
Few other nations have established a ‘protect the nation’
mandate for execution by their own security and intelligence
services or militaries, leaving industry to be self-sufficient
in network protection and vulnerability testing. It is possible
that in future, some governments may take responsibility
for the cyber elements of critical national infrastructure, The 624th Operations Center at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, where personnel conduct cyber operations for the Air Force network
U.S.
Air
FO
rCe
phO
TO B
y W
illi
Am B
elCh
er
91natO Securing our world
Strengthening military capabilitieS
pixe
lBUl
ly/A
lAm
y
but few appear to have an appetite for providing direct cyber
protection to engineering and logistics firms that service,
supply and sustain government contracts, let alone other
elements of their economies. This may appear a nonsensical
approach given that disruption to the national supply
chain could do lasting damage to a nation state. However,
governments face a media environment that is fiercely resistant
to increased official involvement in cyberspace, and complex
issues relating to legality, resources and expertise. Thus, the
responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that
are, in turn, bearing the costs of cyber insurance premiums.
Since there is little agreement about what good cybersecurity
looks like, companies are unsurprisingly at a loss as to what
standard they are seeking to achieve and thus the amount of
resource they need to invest by way of mitigation to protect
their data and online reputation.
Moreover, it is also entirely feasible that governments
will start to require assurance from industry over cyber and
network security when considering the awarding of government
contracts. The difficulty here is how to provide that assurance
when there is no established standard. Several governments
have gone so far as to advocate the SANS 20 Critical Security
Controls as an ‘approach’ companies may wish to adopt, but
have gone no further in their facilitation of this.
Various routes to achieving a cyber standard have been
offered, but few have been widely adopted. They have been
centred primarily on internal training and self-reporting,
neither of which significantly lower premiums. An alternative
path may result from a conflation of insurance premium
charges and the availability of ‘cyber ranges’ that enable
networks to be tested to a given level of resilience. The
resultant business model could allow an organisation to map
its network architecture, system configuration, software,
application accesses and current security system to ‘play’ that
specific system on a cyber-range facility against a series of
increasingly complex tests and threats.
The resulting system analysis would demonstrate cyber
vulnerabilities against an industry standard scorecard,
which, in turn, would deliver analysis that would allow
insurance underwriters to charge more appropriate premiums
as well as providing company boards and stakeholders with
reassurance. A measured assurance standard would also enable
governments to award contracts with a better understanding of
the cyber risk that accompanied it.
There is no such system currently in use in Europe, although
cyber ranges and assessment tools are indeed already available.
The utility for both business and government is, however,
clear. One has only to consider the impact that the Thatcham
standard had on the car insurance industry in the 1990s to
acknowledge the benefits that such a systematic approach
could bring across the cybersphere.
The responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that are bearing the costs of cyber
insurance premiums
92 NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
The SM-3 missile forms the backbone of NATO’s emerging sea-based ballistic missile defence capability
US N
AVY
93NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
Defence consultant and missile defence expert Jeffrey Allen Baxter examines NATO’s growing ability to counter ballistic missile attacks
NATO ballistic missile defence: is it achievable?
The art of warfare has always been a constant struggle
between offence and defence. Ballistic missile defence
(BMD) is no exception. Ever since Germany peppered the
United Kingdom with the devastating V-2 rockets during the
Second World War, offence has outpaced defence. That is,
until now. Successful missile intercepts employing systems
such as Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
and even the Israeli Iron Dome have proven that defence is
catching up and reliable BMD is an achievable goal. NATO
should, and will, play a vital role in the future of BMD. The
BMD playing field is beginning to even out, and the shield is
now demonstrating that it can deal with the sword.
The need for NATO BMDThe threat to NATO and United States-deployed forces
from ballistic missiles (BMs) was highlighted at the 2011
Multinational BMD Conference by Frank A Rose, deputy
assistant secretary at the US Department of State’s Bureau of
Arms of Control, Verification and Compliance. In his speech
to the audience in Copenhagen, he pointed out that “the threat
from short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
to our deployed forces, allies and partners is growing, and this
threat is likely to increase in both volume and complexity in the
coming years. Many states are increasing their inventories, and
making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile
and survivable. Trends in ballistic missiles show increased
ranges, more advanced propellant systems, better protection
from pre-launch attack and the ability to counter BMD systems.”
Inventories and capabilities of all classes of BMs are growing,
not only among current states with ballistic missile capabilities,
but among other countries as well.
The major threats to NATO and deployed US Forces in the
Middle East come from Iran and Syria, both of which have
fielded short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), with Iran also considered to
be developing and testing intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Added
to that, the increasing rise of well-funded non-state actors has
meant that the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
delivered from SRBMs has become a more tangible menace. In
short, the proliferation of BMs now threatens NATO and US
defences, as well as high-value targets and key population centres.
According to the 2013 National Air and Space Intelligence
Center’s (NASIC) Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat report,
Iran has launched a mobile, solid propellant MRBM (2009);
successfully tested the liquid-fuelled Qiam-1 (2010); fielded the
third-generation Fateh-110 (2010); successfully tested the fourth
generation of the Fateh-110 and an anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) variant (2012); fielded the 2,000km-range Shahab 3
(2012); tested the 2,000km-range solid propellant Sejil; and
conducted several launches of its Safir space-launch vehicle –
a potential technology precursor to Iran’s ICBM pursuits. As
extensive as this list is, NASIC cites that Iran may only have
fewer than 100 SRBM and 50 MRBM/IRBM launchers. In a
similar vein, Syria is reported to have fewer than 100 SRBM
launchers. However, launchers can be reloaded, masking the
true magnitude of the ballistic missile threat. Nevertheless,
these countries are inexorably adding to their ballistic missile
inventories. It is, therefore, essential that NATO continues to
develop a strategy of robust situational awareness, alongside
an offensive and defensive strike capability, in order to deter
ballistic missile attacks on any NATO country.
Effective ballistic missile defence There are three basic phases in the flight of a ballistic
missile: the boost, midcourse and terminal. Each phase
generates advantages and disadvantages for missile defence
systems. The boost phase is defined as lasting from launch
95NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
to booster burnout. A ballistic missile is most vulnerable in
its boost phase, given its relatively clear ballistic trajectory,
large signature, lack of penetration aids (penaids), limited
manoeuvring capability, and the presence of large amounts of
explosive propellant. Despite these factors, intercept timelines
are short and require interceptors to be extremely fast and
located very close to the adversary’s launch sites.
The midcourse phase starts at booster burnout through
warhead re-entry. It is the longest phase of flight, thereby
offering the longest engagement times. However, this
phase presents significant challenges for BMD sensors in
maintaining a continuous track on the target, owing to the
distances compared with those of the boost phase, as well as
smaller signatures and the possible deployment of penaids.
Ranges and speeds require very powerful radars and large
interceptors. Moreover, the BMD system may also have to deal
with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) and multiple
independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVS).
The terminal phase is defined as the time from re-entry
to warhead impact. While intercept timelines are short, there
are no decoys to consider, allowing for terminal BMD systems
– both radars and interceptors – to be smaller. That said, the
threat might easily overwhelm these missile defence systems
with raid saturation, MARVs and MIRVs. Furthermore, non-
traditional penaids – cyberattacks and electronic warfare on
key missile defence networks, sensors and communications
nodes, or direct kinetic attack from terrorist actions – present
further challenges to terminal defences.
Understanding the specifics in a BMD kill chain is vital.
The key steps are: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR); detection; tracking; identification; threat assessment;
engagement; and kill assessment or battle damage assessment
(BDA). ISR refers to the collection of as much information and
knowledge as possible regarding the adversaries’ capabilities
(tactics, performance, numbers and so on), deployment of forces,
and intent. Early detection provides greater opportunities for
engagement planning and calculating the launch point, as well
as a larger intercept window. Tracking refers to determining
target location, speed and direction. Identification, using ISR
and detection data, and intelligence estimates, helps determine
target class, type and predicted impact point. Sensors involved
in the first three steps include space-based infrared (IR) sensors,
surface-based and airborne radars, and IR and visual sensors.
As the data is collected, it must be fed into a command,
control and communications, and battle management (C3BM)
system that processes sufficient data to predict threat launch
points (where the targets are in the battle space) and impact
points, as well as to generate an appropriate response to each
threat. Engagement is currently the act of firing an interceptor
to destroy the target. Lastly, BDA leverages several of the same
systems from the first three steps to determine whether the
engagement was successful or not, and presents the next steps
for possible re-engagement. Two of the biggest challenges are
having enough of the right type of sensors and interceptors
in the right locations, as well as access to robust and secure
distributed networks to implement C3BM to all the BMD nodes.
Work has started on the Aegis Ashore facility with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors in Deveselu, Romania
US N
AVY
96 NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
MiS
Sile
Def
eNSe
Ag
eNcY
, DeP
ARTM
eNT
Of
Def
eNSe
Even with a direct hit on an inbound ballistic missile, debris
from the engagement has the potential to cause widespread
damage, especially if the missiles are armed with WMD. The
main challenges associated with debris mitigation are therefore:■■ tracking debris over multiple theatres and coordination
between theatres; ■■ predicting the direction and size of the debris field; and ■■ optimising shot strategies to mitigate the effects of debris
on population centres or other countries and locations.
Along with the challenges stated above, BMD effectiveness
must be balanced with affordability. To that end, several factors
should be considered. First is the scalability of the overall
architecture and how it is to be implemented. The principles of
open architecture should be applied to the greatest extent, and
consideration must be given to multinational security concerns
as well as interoperability. Furthermore, the ability to rapidly
integrate new and legacy systems in a ‘plug and play’ manner
greatly reduces overall system integration and validation costs.
An SM-3 Block 1B interceptor is launched from USS Lake Erie during a Missile Defense Agency test. More SM-3 Block 1B interceptors are to be deployed as part of the european Phased Adaptive Approach, expanding the area defended from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
97NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
Second, design considerations for BMD sensors, interceptors,
communications, C3BM and networks must factor in not only
the required capabilities for the near and far term, but also
vulnerabilities at a system and subsystem level. Lastly, the
effectiveness and affordability of any given architecture must
take into account the adversary’s understanding of NATO
and US BMD capabilities, the mobility of threat systems,
components and inventory robustness.
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence In 2005, NATO established the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme to protect deployed
NATO forces from SRBMs and MRBMs. Less than a decade
later, following NATO summits in Lisbon in 2010 and Chicago
in 2012, the ALTBMD mission was expanded to include the
protection of NATO European populations and territory from
all classes of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, the ALTBMD
Programme Office was renamed the NATO Ballistic Missile
Defence Programme Office in July 2012. Conscious of the
potential impact this decision may have had on non-NATO
countries – particularly Russia – NATO Deputy Secretary
General Alexander Vershbow has categorically stated: “The
NATO system is designed to be big enough to defend against
limited attacks by states and
non-state actors potentially
threatening us, while
remaining small enough not
to fuel regional arms races. It
is configured (in terms of the
types of interceptors, their
numbers and locations) to
defend against the principal
threats to NATO’s European
territory, namely, countries
in the Middle East, and is
not directed against Russia’s
much larger and more sophisticated strategic deterrent forces.”
Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will
consist of a multi-layered (space, air, land and sea) collection
of distributed sensors and interceptors provided by NATO
member countries, to deliver lower-layer BMD coverage.
NATO itself will develop and provide the C3BM system to
integrate each country’s capabilities into a collective NATO
capability. In addition, the US contribution to the defence
of Europe, called the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA), will be integrated with NATO’s BMD programme
to address the upper-layer defence requirements.
On 27 January 2011, the ALTBMD Programme Office
delivered the first mobile and deployable interim C3BM
capability to NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)
in Germany. This interim capability allows for BMD planning,
the linking of radars and interceptors from each contributing
country into a lower-layered BMD capability, the provision of
early warning of incoming ballistic missiles, and the limited
monitoring and direction of theatre missile defence assets.
Significantly, the interim capability will be interoperable
with the EPAA’s command, control, battle management and
communications (C2BMC) sensors and interceptors.
Full operational capability (FOC) of a NATO BMD
system that will provide complete coverage and protection
for all of NATO’s European populations, territory and forces
is expected by 2018.
This initial FOC will include an upgraded C3BM system
that will be fully integrated with NATO’s air defence system;
AN/TPY-2 radar(s) stationed in Turkey; the Aegis Ashore
site with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors
stationed in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018); four Dutch
air defence frigates with BMD-capable radars; the NATO
BMD C3BM system hosted by Germany; and four US Aegis
BMD ships to be stationed in Spain. Lastly, there are plans
for possible NATO-Russian BMD cooperation, as witnessed
in the 2012 simulated missile defence exercise, although
recent events have put these on hold.
US European Phased Adaptive ApproachIn 2009, the US announced a change in its long-standing
BMD approach to Europe. Under the Obama administration’s
new BMD strategy, the plan for US Homeland BMD to counter
ICBMs from rogue nations using ground-based interceptors
(GBIs) and missile-defence radars in Poland and the Czech
Republic will be replaced with a Phased Adaptive Approach,
for the protection of US
forces and allies from SRBMs
and MRBMs. The Approach
is divided into three phases.
Phase One (today’s
capability) is designed
to counter existing
SRBM and MRBM threats
using current proven
BMD systems, including
US Aegis BMD-capable
ships, forward-based
AN/TPY-2 radars, as
well as upgrades to the C2BMC system at NATO’s CAOC
at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
Phase Two (2015) expands the defended area coverage
against SRBMs and MRBMs with the deployment of more
capable SM-3 Block 1B interceptors (US Aegis BMD ships, a
land-based relocatable Aegis Ashore site in Romania), and a
longer-range, networked and interoperable regional BMD with
NATO’s BMD C3BM system. This construct allows for launch on
remote, leveraging forward-based sensor data for an enhanced
engagement capability, and an expanded battle space.
Phase Three (2018) expands BMD capability to counter
SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs for the whole of Europe, with the
deployment of the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptor
with a longer range and advanced seeker capabilities, an
improved networked capability through C2BMC upgrades
to provide engage on remote, and a second Aegis Ashore
site located in Poland.
Protecting NATO forces and populations from attack while
maintaining cordial relations with its neighbours stands as one
of the most difficult challenges facing NATO’s leadership. The
summit in Wales is the perfect opportunity to underline NATO’s
resolve to provide a collective defence to all its members.
Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will consist of a multi-layered collection of distributed
sensors and interceptors provided by NATO member countries
98 NATO Securing our world
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Airborne transport is a critical feature of modern military operations. Yet, with the exception of the United States, NATO countries still do not possess enough airlift capacity. Alan Dron explains how the Alliance is
pooling its resources to address this imbalance
Upwardly mobile
Airlift capacity is one of those capabilities of which
military commanders never have enough. Since the end
of the Cold War, as expeditionary warfare has become the
norm, the need to transport personnel and heavy equipment
over long distances, quickly, has become increasingly important.
With this in mind, NATO has three projects in place to
strengthen its abilities in this sector: the Strategic Airlift
Capability (SAC), the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS)
and the HIP Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF).
The need for airlift capacity was graphically shown last
year with France’s intervention to block Islamist rebels from
capturing the Malian capital, Bamako. Paris requested help
from Washington, London and Ottawa in order urgently to
move troops and equipment to the West African country to
block the advancing insurgents. Within 48 hours, two British
Royal Air Force Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs were at Évreux
airbase, near Paris, embarking men and armoured vehicles. The
following day, Canada provided another C-17 and the United
States Air Force (USAF) then dispatched five more to transport
a French mechanised infantry battalion to Bamako from Istres-
Le Tubé airbase in southern France. Five other NATO countries
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain)
provided transport aircraft, along with a further C-17 from the
SAC’s Heavy Airlift Wing, based at Pápa airbase in Hungary,
and were also involved in moving materiel to Mali.
The incident demonstrated the vital role that airlift plays in
modern military operations. It also illustrated the SAC’s ability
to cater for the needs of NATO members that do not possess
sufficient heavy military cargo capabilities of their own.
The Strategic Airlift CapabilityTen NATO countries, plus two Partnership for Peace countries,
formed the SAC in 2008. They acquired three C-17s and now
manage, support and operate them on behalf of NATO. Pooling
resources makes significant financial savings possible, and the
SAC arrangement gives countries access to assets that would
be too costly for them to acquire as individual purchasers.
The Boeing C-17 Globemaster III is a strategic transport
aircraft capable of carrying a payload of 72 tonnes of cargo
over 4,450km (2,400 nautical miles). That capability makes it
one of the very few aircraft in the world able to carry modern
main battle tanks. It has the useful ability – unusual for such a
large aircraft – to use rough, short airstrips, making use of its
reverse thrust to shorten its landing run, enabling it to deliver
supplies close to where they are required.
The SAC C-17s are configured and equipped to the same
standard as those operated by the USAF. This commonality aids
operational integration during multinational missions. They
are used primarily to meet national requirements, but are also
able to be allocated for NATO, United Nations or European
Union use. The SAC Heavy Airlift Wing has been involved in
several humanitarian missions in recent years, ferrying urgent
aid to Haiti and Pakistan following natural disasters, as well
as in supporting peacekeeping missions in Africa and NATO
missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
The Strategic Airlift Interim SolutionSALIS, as its name suggests, was initially conceived as a method
of gaining additional heavy airlift capacity before the SAC
came on line and before the new Airbus A400M Atlas heavy
transport aircraft began to appear on NATO squadrons’ aprons.
In order to accomplish this, a consortium of NATO countries
set up the Strategic Air Lift Coordination Cell (SALCC) at Royal
Netherlands Air Force Base Eindhoven early in 2006. This cell
runs SALIS, which has 14 participating nations and which
draws on Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft
supplied by two commercial companies: Russia’s Volga-Dnepr
Airlines and Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines.
The Antonov An-124s are capable of handling ‘outsize’ loads
of up to 150 tons. Under the SALIS contract, the two companies
guarantee availability of two An-124s for charter at any given
time for any of the participating countries’ national usage,
plus similar availability of up to a further six of the aircraft for
rapid deployment of forces in support of NATO or EU missions.
This arrangement has proved popular, with a series of contract
extensions, the most recent of which runs until the end of 2014.
The strained relations between NATO and Russia over
events in Ukraine may have an impact on the future of the
SALIS contractual arrangements, as will the introduction
of the Airbus A400M tactical transport aircraft, which are
99NATO Securing our world
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
NATO’s Strategic Airlift Command (SAC) operates the huge Boeing C-17 Globemaster III jet transport aircraft
NAT
O
100 NATO Securing our world
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
now starting to arrive at their units in France, Turkey and
the United Kingdom. The A400M, 170 of which have been
ordered by NATO members, has a payload of 37 tonnes. This
is considerably lower than that of either the C-17 or An-124,
but is nevertheless a substantial improvement on that of the
C-130 (around 20 tonnes), which currently makes up the
tactical transport fleets of most of the Alliance’s members.
The HIP Helicopter Task ForceThe third multinational transport capability is the HIP
Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF). Nine European members,
led by the Czech Republic, developed the organisation,
which facilitates deployment of the series of the hugely
successful Russian-built Mil Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171
medium, multipurpose transport helicopters to assist with
tactical lift capabilities. This assistance can take the form of
pre-deployment training; command and control capabilities;
base support; or financial aid. Under HIP TF, these helicopters
have been deployed to Afghanistan, where their rugged
construction and good hot-and-high performance have made
them particularly useful in the country’s searing summer heat.
Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO
operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a fully developed
road system to transport troops and equipment, as well as the
serious risk to surface transport of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Several countries that operate ‘HIPs’ were willing to
send additional aircraft to help the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) contingent, but needed assistance
to deploy and operate them. The HIP TF is, therefore, part of
a broader NATO helicopter initiative aimed at addressing
rotary-wing shortfalls on operations.
Each of these airborne-transport pooling arrangements
has proven to be extremely successful in plugging gaps in
NATO airborne-transport capabilities, but if the Alliance is
to overcome the imbalance between the numbers of transport
aircraft the US has at its disposal and those belonging to the
European countries, more will have to be done.
The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution charters Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan aircraft to transport large military equipment and other supplies
The HIP Helicopter Task Force was launched to help satisfy ISAF’s demand for tactical helicopter airlift in Afghanistan
Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a
fully developed road system
©Bu
Nd
eSw
eHR
/FAl
k Bä
RwAl
d
CZe
MO
d
101NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
The military loves acronyms, and NATO’s new Air Command and Control System has more than its fair share, but beneath this alphabet soup is a
radical enhancement to the Alliance’s ability to safeguard European skies for many years to come. Thomas Withington explains
Air superiority
The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) initiative
is designed to replace a number of national air operations
command and control (C2) systems with a scalable C2 system
that will be rolled out across NATO’s European membership.
The C2 systems that the ACCS architecture will replace enable
air force personnel to see a recognised air picture (RAP) of their
country’s airspace. The RAP is developed by integrating the
radar pictures produced by several national radars – each of
which watches a particular section of national airspace – into
one big picture. It enables personnel to see exactly what is
flying through and approaching their airspace. If a threat
is detected, the RAP can then be used to guide interceptor
aircraft or surface-to-air missiles towards the hostile aircraft
or flying object, such as a cruise or ballistic missile. The
computer software controlling the ACCS will not only allow
each country equipped with the ACCS architecture to produce
their RAP, it will also connect all of these RAPs together to
enable NATO’s commander of Allied Command Operations at
Ramstein Air Base in Germany to see a seamless European
RAP depicting the airspace of NATO’s European membership.
As well as updating legacy national air C2 systems with a
new means of generating the RAP at the national and European
level, the ACCS includes a dimension that enables user nations
to plan and execute air operations, whether those operations
occur above NATO members’ countries or during out-of-area
operations. Presently, NATO uses its Integrated Command and
© D
assa
ult
avia
tio
n -
s. R
anD
é
the new nato air Command and Control system (aCCs) will direct nato fighter aircraft towards suspicious incoming airborne threats
102 NATO Securing our world
sTreNgTheNiNg miliTAry cApAbiliTies
If a threat is detected, the recognised air picture can then be used to guide interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air
missiles towards the flying object
large-scale sporting events, and the thousands of people in attendance, will be better protected from attack by the new aCCs
Control (ICC) software for the drafting of the air tasking order
(ATO), the extensive document that forms the bedrock of any
NATO-led air campaign, detailing the activities and schedules
of all participating combat aircraft over a 24-hour period.
Whereas NATO members had previously used the ICC and its
Multi-AEGIS Site Emulator (MASE) software for ATO and RAP
generation respectively, the advent of ACCS will enable them to
perform both these functions using the ACCS architecture alone.
In 1999, NATO awarded Air Command Systems International,
a consortium that includes United States defence contractor
Raytheon and its French counterpart Thomson-CSF (now
Thales), a contract worth $500 million for the development
of the ACCS. These two companies are now continuing their
ACCS work via their joint ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS)
venture. NATO’s ACCS Management Organisation supervises
its implementation on behalf of the Alliance, with all 28
members contributing to its funding via the NATO Security
Investment Programme.
ACCS architectureThe ACCS architecture includes two main entities: the ARS
(air control centre, RAP production centre and sensor fusion
post) and the CAOC (Combined Air Operations Centre).
The ARS is designed for deployment at the national level to
ensure air sovereignty and to control national airspace via the
production of the RAP, which is produced by fusing together
a country’s disparate radars. The CAOC is used to draft and
execute air operations and to produce the ATO. Both ARS and
CAOC functions can be collocated into a single CARS (CAOC
and ARS combined). In addition to fixed ARS and CAOC sites
across NATO’s European membership, the Alliance is receiving
deployable versions of the ARS and CAOC, known as the
DARS and DCAOC respectively. These can be used to provide
deployed airspace control (DARS), such as protection above a
summit meeting or major
sporting event, or to provide
command for a NATO out-of-
area air operation (DCAOC).
TRS and NATO have
put the ACCS architecture
through exhaustive testing at
a number of locations, known
as ‘validation sites’, around
Europe. ARS validation has
occurred at the Belgian air
components’ Control and
Reporting Centre, which performs air sovereignty control of
Belgian airspace from Glons in the east of the country. Both the
CAOC and the DCAOC have undergone validation at NATO’s
Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem, Germany, close to
the Dutch border. CARS validation has been performed at one
of NATO’s CAOCs located at Poggio Renatico, northern Italy,
and at the Armée de l’Air (French Air Force) CDC 05.942 air
operations centre at Lyon-Mont Verdun airbase, eastern France.
Meanwhile, the DARS has undergone validation at the
Royal Netherlands Air Force base at Nieuw Milligen. With
validation complete, these sites will have their respective ARS,
CAOC, DCAOC and CARS facilities declared operational. Italy
is expected to become the first country to declare an initial
operating capability (IOC) for its CARS by the end of 2014, with
a full operating capability (FOC) being declared by late 2015.
Along with validating the various components of the ACCS,
TRS is tasked with rolling out the ACCS software and hardware
(the computers, communications links and infrastructure)
across the European members of NATO that are replacing
their legacy air C2 systems with the ACCS architecture. TRS
is already under contract to do this for the Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey – a process that should be
completed by the end of 2016.
Beyond these countries, the
second replication phase
could begin in late 2014,
with ACCS architecture
rolled out in Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia, which could be
completed by the end of
2017. ACCS will also be
patched into NATO’s European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to enable
personnel to detect and respond to a ballistic missile attack
against the Alliance’s members.
Canada, the United Kingdom and the US remain outside
the ACCS initiative. Canada and the US do provide a financial
contribution to the initiative and, as the ACCS is primarily
focused on protecting NATO’s European airspace, there is less
of a need for these countries to connect to it. The UK could
have its air surveillance and control system modernised at a
later date to patch into the ACCS, or have this system replaced
altogether with the ACCS architecture.
Dan
iel
oCh
oa
De
olz
a/a
P/PR
ess
asso
Ciat
ion
imag
es
www.thalesraytheon.com© 2013 ThalesRaytheonSystems. All rights reserved.
WHATEVER ITS SHAPE,NOTHING ESCAPES OUR NET
Every second of every day, ThalesRaytheonSystems provides superior protection through integrated Air and Missile Command and Control Systems, Air Defense Radars and Weapons Locating Radars. With the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), ThalesRaytheonSystems and NATO are developing a new Air Command and Control solution across 17 NATO nations in Europe. This unprecedented, integrated approach aims to meet the global security challenges of the 21st century.
www.thalesraytheon.com© 2013 ThalesRaytheonSystems. All rights reserved.
WHATEVER ITS SHAPE,NOTHING ESCAPES OUR NET
Every second of every day, ThalesRaytheonSystems provides superior protection through integrated Air and Missile Command and Control Systems, Air Defense Radars and Weapons Locating Radars. With the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), ThalesRaytheonSystems and NATO are developing a new Air Command and Control solution across 17 NATO nations in Europe. This unprecedented, integrated approach aims to meet the global security challenges of the 21st century.
strengthening military capabilities
104 natO Securing our world
NATO chose the R-Q4 Block 40 Global Hawk to make up the air segment of its AGS programme
NO
RTHR
Op
GRu
mm
AN
105natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, was adopted.
The ground segment, on the other hand, remained virtually
unchanged, as its functional and operational characteristics
were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used.
In February 2009, the NATO nations participating in the
AGS programme (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Canada [which
later withdrew], Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
and the United States), started the process of signing the
Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). By
February 2012, it was agreed that NATO common funding
would cover infrastructure, satellite communications and
operations and support. In addition, an agreement was reached
that would see the United Kingdom’s Sentinel R1 manned
ISTAR aircraft, which is also equipped with a GMTI capability,
and the future French IAI Heron TP UAV system, available
as national contributions-in-kind, partly replacing financial
contributions from those two allies. Following the signature
of the procurement contract at the Chicago Summit in May
2012, the project got under way and is expected to become
available to the Alliance within the 2015-17 timeframe.
System componentsWith the changes taken into account, the air segment is now
made up of five Global Hawk Block 40 HALE (high-altitude,
long-endurance) UAVs, which are currently in development,
and equipped with the MP-RTIP ground surveillance radar
sensor, plus an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-
of-sight, long-range, wideband data links. Moreover, it will also
contain the UAV flight control stations.
Peter Grant reviews NATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme and underlines its importance to the Alliance’s ability to understand what
is happening on the battlefield
Alliance ISTAR
AGS was designed to furnish NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability,
offering unrestricted access to data
Knowing where the enemy is located and what he is doing
has always been a vital element in the conduct of warfare
and the delivery of effect. Today, the constituent parts of this
function are grouped together under the term ‘intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance’, more
commonly referred to by its acronym, ISTAR. Its purpose is to
give the commander of troops, whether a corporal in charge of
a six-man infantry section, the commander-in-chief of an army,
or a head of state, the best information to make a decision.
However, not every nation within the NATO Alliance has
the resources to operate a comprehensive ISTAR organisation.
Originating from the Defence Planning Committee, in 1995,
plans were undertaken to implement an Alliance Ground
Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a
comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO
Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue
work on a minimum, essential NATO-owned and operated AGS
core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets”.
The AGS programme was designed to furnish NATO with a
complete and integrated ground surveillance capability, offering
unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data
in near real time and in an interoperable manner. The initiative
was to include an air segment with airborne radar sensors and
a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile
ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all
connected through high-performance data links.
In 2004, before the financial crisis struck, NATO decided
to move ahead with a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment
was originally to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and
Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40 unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), both carrying versions of a Transatlantic
Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR), with the ground segment
having an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations.
However, when it became clear that this option would
stretch the budgets of the Alliance, most of whose nations
had just experienced (or were about to experience) acute
financial shocks, NATO decided to discontinue the more
expensive mixed-fleet approach in 2007. To this end, the
A321 and TCAR elements of the mixed fleet were dropped
and instead, a simplified approach, based on the off-the-shelf
Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated multi-platform
radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) AN/ZPY-2
ADCOM SYSTEMSPO Box 25298, ICAD, Abu Dhabi, UAETel: +971 2 55 00 630Fax: +971 2 55 00 631Email: adcommgrp@eim.aewww.adcom-systems.com
United-40 Block 5
ADCOM SYSTEMS is one of the world’s leading companies engaged in the design and manufacture of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As designers, we are always guided by the idea of doing something to help humanity. We are looking for a way to show the world that UAVs can be used for civilised purposes, whether for humanitarian aid, or to provide the necessary help to avoid risking the lives of crew members.
We are looking to work closely with various United Nations departments in order to gain a profound understanding of what is needed and what we can to do help UAV support missions.
We are committed to changing the public’s common perception, as well as changing the military face of unmanned aviation. We believe that we can change the cliché and prove that UAVs do not have to be used solely for destructive purposes.
It is a long-held ambition of ADCOM SYSTEMS to design and develop serious UAV systems with the capacity to become a powerful means of dealing with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters, as well as provide support and help to those in need. We are convinced that our main objective as human beings must be to make the world a better place for our contemporaries, as well as future generations.
With this in mind, we are constantly cooperating with various international companies to acquire all types of sensors, learn from their experiences and develop new high-quality equipment to comply with the needs of our customers.
We hope that our approach will win the support of civilised governments and conscious companies all over the world. There is no better investment than an investment made in the interest of humanity.
We would like to thank the United Nations for giving us the opportunity to express our vision and aspirations to make the world a better place.
Ali Al DhaheriChief Designer and CEO
Eyes on target
www.radionor.no
Wireless data links with unmatchedoperative range and bandwidth
Vehicles
Dismounted soldiers
It’s just like being there!
Vessels and boarding teams
Unmanned aircraft
Next generation wireless technology gives you live pictures withthe quality required to make the right decisions.
C
M
Y
CM
MY
CY
CMY
K
Radionor_annonse_005.pdf 1 21.08.2014 08:31:48
109natO Securing our world
strengthening military capabilities
The ground segment will provide an interface between
the AGS core system and a wide range of command, control,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems
to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and
non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities
remote from the surveillance area. There will be a number of
ground stations both mobile and transportable, providing data-
link connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities
and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems.
The support segment, including dedicated mission support
facilities, will be located at the AGS main operating base at
Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve both as a NATO
joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR)
deployment base and a data-exploitation and training centre.
AGS core capabilityThe Global Hawk ISTAR platform has already proven its
usefulness for this sort of intense surveillance tasking, having
logged more than 115,000 flight hours supporting operations
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria.
Once in service with NATO, each AGS Global Hawk Block
40 UAV will be able fly at 60,000 feet for more than 30 hours.
The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability will
enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over
wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned
aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances
and in any weather or light condition. The sensors deployed
include swath and spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
and ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) capabilities to
collect information that will provide decision-makers with
a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.
They will continuously detect and track moving objects
throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery
of areas of interest, as well as of stationary objects.
In July 2014, US Air Force Global Hawk Block 30s flew
three successful full-day sorties from Orland Main Air Station,
Norway, as part of NATO’s 10-day trial ‘Unified Vision 2014’,
which involved satellites, aircraft, UAVs, naval vessels, ground
sensors and human intelligence from 18 NATO countries. This
demonstration of JISR capability was aimed at showcasing and
evaluating the Alliance’s ability to deploy assets, as well as
gather and fuse intelligence from multiple sources – in space,
in the air, on land and at sea – at different stages of operations.
The AGS Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft are now in
production at Northrop Grumman’s Moss Point, Mississippi
facility. Although there is no specific date released for the first
flight, the company expects to attain initial operating capability
in 2017 and full operating capability in 2018.
RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk uAVs represent a significant capability enhancement on the Block 20 version pictured here
NATO AGS Block 40 Global Hawk uAVs in production at Northrop Grumman’s moss point, mississippi facility
NO
RTHR
Op
GRu
mm
AN
NO
RTHR
Op
GRu
mm
AN
HUSBANDING AGENCYport services & supplies
HUMANITARIAN AIDport & inland support
VESSEL PROTECTION DETACHMENT logistics
Back up for your Maritime Power Projection
GLOBAL PRESENCEASSURING AN INTEGRATED SERVICE PLATFORM FOR
PORT SERVICES, LOGISTICS AND SUPPLIES.PROFESSIONALLY MANAGED AND EXECUTED
TO THE BENEFIT OF MODERN NAVIES
Shipping Consultants Associated Ltd.www.sca-ltd.co.uk
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR logistics
SCA_placed.indd 1 07/08/2014 16:41
111NATO Securing our world
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIESSTRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Iain Ballantyne looks at NATO’s evolving naval missions and asks what sort of ships and capability it will need to ensure
maritime security in the future
Maritime projection
The vessels of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures
Group 1 (SNMCMG1) and SNMCMG2 have long been a
familiar sight in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black
Seas – on exercise or eliminating the residual menace posed
by munitions from past wars. In recent months, both task
groups have paid visits to the ports of NATO Member States
that fear the Russians may have ambitions in their direction.
Similarly, the frigates, destroyers and cruisers of Standing
NATO Maritime Group 1 and SNMG2 have been kept busy
on reassurance missions.
At present, NATO fields different types of vessels, even
within the same task groups. For example, SNMG1, at the time
of writing, comprises HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark, a flexible
support ship), FGS Magdeburg (Germany, a Braunschweig-class
corvette) and USS Taylor (United States, a Perry-class frigate).
Meanwhile, SNMCMG2 comprises ITS Avieri (Italy, an
Artigliere-class frigate) as flagship, leading the mine-hunters
HMS Chiddingfold (British, Hunt class), ITS Rimini (Italian,
Gaeta class) and TCG Akçay (Turkish, Aydin class).
Given that they share a common purpose, why not impose
on these maritime task groups identical vessels that can
do everything in one platform? Commonality is surely the
Holy Grail for NATO, but it is not easy to achieve, for various
reasons, not least the need for bespoke requirements in
different countries that have sovereign operational needs, and
for preserving indigenous technology and associated industries.
NATO maritime task groups patrol the seas to counter threats and reassure friendly states
NAT
O/F
lt.SG
T AR
TIG
UES/
FRAF
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
112 NATO Securing our world
The UK’s future Global Combat Ship (GCS) will be able to swap roles using a modular equipment concept
When facing down potentially intense threats, nothing but a vessel
that can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of
the spectrum will do
BAE
SyST
EmS
Budget pressures, when combined with a still demanding
portfolio of missions, do seem to drive some navies towards
at least aspiring to create a ship that can do everything.
The Danes, with their C-Flex ships, might appear to offer
the template, should NATO strive for such a common vessel.
The Esbern Snare and her sister Absalon possess an ability to
switch roles via different mission modules, tackling everything
from anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to mine countermeasures,
task-group command, military transportation and hospital-
ship duties. They also make
useful patrol platforms, and
are fitted with anti-ship and
anti-air missiles in addition
to a 127mm gun.
Another example is the
US Navy’s radical-looking
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
which similarly aspires to
achieve flexible goals. The
LCS (which comes in two
hull types) is a multipurpose
platform that can switch
from mine-hunting to anti-surface warfare (ASW) via different
mission modules, while also tailoring embarked personnel for
the task at hand. However, as is the case with all ships of this
type, the process requires the vessel to return to port in order
to switch roles by taking aboard new modules and crew.
In the UK there has, in recent years, been an aversion to
calling the country’s future frigate a frigate. Rather, the Type
26 is known as the Global Combat Ship (GCS). The GCS will,
though, be a frigate in all but name, with the full range of the
usual capabilities (anti-submarine, anti-surface, anti-air, land
attack and maritime security). It will also be able to embark a
medium-sized helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Beyond the Type 26, the British have ambitions for a multi-role
vessel that will take on mine warfare, hydrographic surveying
and offshore-patrol tasks. A Royal Navy concept paper labelled
such a platform the ‘Black Swan’ class – partly in tribute to an
earlier class of the same name that provided sterling service
in winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This latter-day sloop of
war would have a mission bay to, in the words of the concept
paper, achieve cost-effectiveness due to the manner, “in which
it can be reconfigured to
suit a number of roles,
hence ensuring that costly
capability is only deployed
when required”. Unmanned
air, surface and sub-surface
systems would feature
prominently, for as the
concept paper goes on to
say, “unmanned systems
will have a major impact on
future maritime operations”.
The Black Swan concept
foresees a crew of as few as 16 sailors embarked for the mine-
hunting role, around 40 in the counter-piracy/counter-drugs
mission and 40 for sea control. The concept would also
offer mission packages, such as: ■■ counter-piracy/counter-drugs – Wildcat helicopter, two
rotary-wing UAVs, unmanned surface systems (USSs),
plus two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs);■■ mine hunting – USSs and unmanned underwater systems
(UUSs), plus towed-sonar, and underwater launch and
recovery of mine eliminators (such as Seafox) and two or
three rotary-wing UAVs; and
113NATO Securing our world
STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
■■ sea control – Merlin and/or Wildcat helicopters, up to
eight UAVs, plus, potentially, dozens of smaller unmanned
systems down to ‘nano-sized’, as well as containerised
mission modules for missiles/guns and containerised
sensors, including ASW towed-array sonar.
It is two years since the above-mentioned Black Swan
concept paper was published, and the world moves on, with
threats evolving all the time. The American experience has
showed that the frigate endures. Having navigated down the
LCS route, the US has taken stock and changed direction, at
least partially, to kick-start a programme for a new class of
multi-role frigates. Although the LCS can do a lot of things,
and is as big as a frigate, it has one major potential Achilles
heel, that is: lack of survivability in a high-threat zone. US
Secretary of State for Defense Chuck Hagel said: “The LCS
was designed to perform certain missions – such as mine-
sweeping and anti-submarine warfare – in a relatively
permissive environment. But we need to closely examine
whether the LCS has the independent protection and
firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced
military adversary and emerging new technologies.”
Need for a mix of vesselsWhen facing down potentially intense threats, such as those
posed by the Russians in the Black Sea and Baltic, or by the
Iranians in the Strait of Hormuz, nothing but a vessel that
can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of the
spectrum will do, hence the American change of direction.
Therefore, the answer to the question of what sort of ships
and capabilities NATO needs to ensure maritime security is
all of the above. There is clearly a place in both sovereign
navies and the multinational task groups for a mix of different
vessels. There will be fewer platforms, but they must be capable
of performing all kinds of missions. Some NATO navies will
only be able to afford the Black Swan-type sloop. Other Member
States will have to field frigates, destroyers and cruisers in
order to protect ‘the little guys’.
Counter-mining activity from FGS Weilheim, a German mine-hunter. NATO countries field different types of vessel for the same task group
NAT
O/F
lt.SG
T AR
TIG
UES/
FRAF
ADCOM SYSTEMS .............................................................................106
Allocate Software .................................................................................23
Atlantic Council ...................................................................................68
BMW .................................................................................................... 16
BT ...........................................................................................................9
CAE ......................................................................................................20
EUROtrade S.A. ...................................................................................94
Frequentis ...........................................................................................10
General Dynamics ............................................................................. 116
GKN Aerospace ....................................................................................12
Harris ...................................................................................................87
Havelsan ...............................................................................................63
Land Rover .............................................................................................2
LOM PRAHA ....................................................................................... 14
OBE-One ..............................................................................................26
Prox Dynamics .................................................................................. 115
Radionor .............................................................................................108
Rafael.............................................................................................. 4 & 7
Secusmart ............................................................................................37
Shipping Consultants Associated Ltd ............................................... 110
SICOM s.p.a ..........................................................................................82
SkyLink Aviation Inc ...........................................................................24
Supergum .............................................................................................78
ThalesRaytheonSystems ................................................................... 103
Thuraya ................................................................................................18
114 NATO Securing our world
Index of advertisers
PD-100 Black Hornet PRS is the smallest operational unmanned system in the world and has been used extensively in combat operations by NATO forces over the past few years. The system is described by its users as a “Game Changer” and a “Life Saver”, and has created a new standard and class for the smallest UAS.
YOUR PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM
proxdynamics.com
Proxdynamics_placed.indd 1 21/08/2014 10:10
General Dynamics has developed SCOUT SV, which represents the future of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) for the British Army. Its range of variants will allow the British Army to conduct sustained, expeditionary, full-spectrum and network-enabled operations with a reduced logistics footprint.
SCOUT SV provides best-in-class protection and survivability, reliability and mobility and all-weather intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and recognition (ISTAR) capabilities. The family of vehicles can operate in combined-arms and multinational situations across a wide-range of future operating environments.
General Dynamics is a market leader in the aerospace and defence industry, delivering the highest-quality products and services. Across the breadth of our offerings, we are committed to fulfilling customers’ mission critical requirements with relevant, innovative and affordable products and services. We are proud to be a key supplier into NATO, its members and partner countries, delivering cutting edge capabilities for defence programmes across the globe.
To find out more, visit: www.generaldynamics.com
www.generaldynamics.com
SCOUT SV The future of Armoured Fighting Vehicles
top related