the noble art of catching nuclear rowdies – today and in ... · the noble art of catching nuclear...

The noble art of catching nuclear rowdies

– today and in the future

Ane Håkansson Uppsala University

Needs Objectives

Advanced high explosives Knowledge Engineering skills

E.g. 235U or 239Pu

What do I need to build a NED?

Export control & other measures

Safeguards &

Physical Protection

Politics Countermeasures

Nuclear Safeguards IAEA Safeguards - Objectives: “…timely detection of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises or for purposes unknown, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.”

Nuclear Safeguards IAEA Safeguards - Means: Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)

Inspection & Verification, Process

Monitoring Containment & Surveillance (C/S)

None of these measures alone can fulfill the objectives

Safeguarding the Nuclear Fuel Chain

Type of material 1 SQ

Pu, 233U 8 kg HEU 25 kg LEU 75 kg

Nat U 10 t Depleted U & Th 20 t

Significant Quantity Approximate amount nuclear material (NM) for one NED

Safeguarding the Nuclear Fuel Chain

Type of material Time

Direct use material (fresh Pu or HEU)

1 month (1 week)

Irradiated direct use material

3 months (3 Weeks)

Indirect use material (LEU, natural U or Th)

1 year (2 months)

Timely detection Criteria: Time within which a diversion of 1 SQ should be detected

Approx. time needed for conversion into weapon-grade

material

F.P. + Minor Actinides + Pu + U

The Nuclear Fuel Chain today

Mining Tailings

3-5% 235U

0.7% 235U

F.P. + Minor Actinides

Pu

MOX

Depleted U

Vitrification

Reprocessing

Depleted U

Storage

Fuel fabrication

Enrichment

Conversion to UF6

Reactors

Disposal

Nuclear Safeguards

Fundamental - Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA)

Receipt of NM Shipment of NM Nuclear Production Loss of NM

Material unaccounted for (MUF)

Nuclear Safeguards

Inspection & Verification Item counting Volume determination Weighing Non-destructive analysis Gamma-spectrometry Passive and active neutron counting Calorimetry

Destructive analysis Mass spectrometry Concentration measurement

Containment & Surveillance (C/S) Cameras Seals

Nuclear Safeguards

Gen IV Nuclear Fuel Chain Fuel

fabrication Fast reactors

Vitrification Disposal

Storage

Recycling

Pu + U + Minor Actinides Extracted in one stream

F.P. (+ traces of M.A.)

Depleted U

Nuclear Waste

Issues: Recycling

Transports

Disadvantages with Gen IV (from safeguards point of view)

Local recycling facilities?

Development of new technologies that extract Pu + U + M.A. in one group imperative

Advantages with Gen IV (from safeguards point of view)

Much simpler system to survey and inspect

Includes no enrichment

Using adequate technique: no free Pu streams

The waste is not feasible for NED:s

It’s the only viable option for destruction of weapons plutonium and today´s nuclear waste.

Pro and cons of technology – a philosophical reflection

Cons Pro

Example -Fire Technical solution

Countermeasure Redundancy

Example -Medicine Technical solution Pro Cons

Biological weapons of mass destruction

Countermeasure ! No redundancy

Example – Energy supply Pro One technical solution Cons

Countermeasure Nuclear safeguards

Lots of redundancy

A smarter and more efficient safeguards through

”Safeguards-by-Design” will be required

Present nuclear utilisation not optimized as regards nuclear safeguards Nuclear safeguards hitherto reasonably successful New nuclear facilities can be made more secure through safeguards-by-design Generation IV systems are inherently more secure but an efficient safeguards will still be needed.

Some final notes

Thank you!