us-russian relations: nuclear arms race and disarmament
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US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Raceand Disarmament
US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Raceand Disarmament
Matt RosensteinAssociate Director
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at
UIUC
REES 200October 30, 2006
Matt RosensteinAssociate Director
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at
UIUC
REES 200October 30, 2006
“Pop Quiz”“Pop Quiz”1. What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security today?
2. What are the greatest threats to Russian national security today?
Objectives for This SessionObjectives for This Session
•What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the US-Russian arms race)
•How did it come to this? (motivations and policies that explain the build-up)
Arms Race
Disarmament and Nonproliferation
•What steps did the US and Russia take to reduce risk of nuclear war and # of arms?
•What are the salient security concerns today with respect to US and Russian nuclear arms?
What Hath We Wrought?What Hath We Wrought?Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear attack?
•United States, on Japan, WWII
•Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945)
Fat Man and Little Boy
The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In
Perspective
The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In
PerspectiveEvent
Iraq war
9/11
Vietnam war
Hurricane Katrina
Pakistani earthquake
Indian Ocean tsunami
Casualties (approx.)
2,800
3,000
47,000
1,800
80,000
275,000
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Estimated that between 115,000-170,000
were killed immediately Twice as many more died over time
(radiation poisoning) 95% of deaths were civilian
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Little Boy: 13,000 tons of TNT equivalent Most nuclear warheads today: yield between
150 kiloton-1 megaton “Tsar bomba”: Soviets exploded a
50-megaton bomb in test (1961) Spasm attack by US or USSR would
result in 40-75 million Soviet and110-150 million US deaths (RAND, 1960)
US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000
US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000
Source: Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets (2005) *=1956 totals
US USSR/Russia
Year Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads
1950 462 400 22* 84*
1960 1,559 3,127 144 354
1970 2,100 5,239 1,985 2,216
1980 2,022 10,608 2,545 7,480
1990 1,903 12,477 2,500 10,271
2000 1,407 7,519 1,266 6,094
2005 1,225 5,966 981 4,732
Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic
Forces
Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic
Forces• Both US and USSR created
“nuclear triad” forces:•Ground (ICBM)• Sea (SLBM)•Air (Bombers)
• Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces:•Ground (ICBM)• Sea (SLBM)•Air (Bombers)
Military Fissile Material Stocks
Military Fissile Material Stocks
Source: Albright and Kramer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Nov-Dec 2004)
Country Pu (tonnes) HEU (tonnes)
Israel 0.51-0.65 ??
Pakistan 0.02-0.06 1.0-1.3
India 0.3-0.5 0
UK 3.2 21.9
France 5.0 30.0
China 4.8 20.0
US 47.0 580.0
Russia 95.0 773.0
The Arms Race: Why?The Arms Race: Why?•Territorial integrity and national sovereignty
•Ideological struggle
•Capitalism vs. communism
•Liberal democracy vs. authoritarian rule
•Military prowess: nukes as visible symbol of power
•USSR could not keep up economically
•MAD = Mutually Assured Destruction
•Deterrence
•Bargaining power / leverage in multilateral bodies
US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology
US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology
1942 US initiates Manhattan Project
1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1949 Soviet explosion of nuclear device
1957 Sputnik
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
•End of atmospheric testing
•“Hotline”
•Halt proliferation to other states
1969-1972 SALT I
•Set numerical limits on missile launchers (not warheads-->MIRVs)
1972-1979 SALT II
•Broader limits than SALT I…but Afghanistan spoiled negotiations
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
1972 ABM Treaty
•Limited each to two ABM sites (no nationwide defense)
•Prohibited sea-, air-, space-based systems
•Limit on qualitative improvement
•Problematic: “Star Wars”, US pull-out in 2001-2
1972 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology
1991 START I Treaty
•Negotiated almost 10 years
•Reductions in launchers (max. 1,600) and warheads (max. 6,000)
1993 START II Treaty
•Further reductions; never ratified by US Senate and Russian Duma
Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up
Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up
Major Destruction & Dismantlement SiteChemical Weapons & Support Facility
SSBN BaseICBM Base (Silo)Mobile ICBM Base
Production FacilitiesNon deployed ICBMsHeavy Bombers
KazakhstanKazakhstan
RussiaRussia
UkraineUkraine
BelarusBelarusICBMs:ICBM Launcher Pads:
Warheads:
94 54
~225
ICBMs:ICBM Launchers:
HBs: Warhead:
25817636
~1,984
ICBMs:SLBMs:
HBs:Warheads::
1,3401,924
87~11,296
11510440
~1,462
ICBMs:ICBM Launchers:
HBs: Warhead:
Bioweapons ProgramsBioweapons Programs•1960s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs
•1972: BWC: US, USSR (other actors, such as UK) agreed to halt bioweapons research
•1992: several Russian scientists reported work with smallpox from 1970s-1990s
•Bio program cheaper than nukes
•Grew smallpox in large quantities
•Various research efforts: aerosolizing the virus; placed on ballistic missile warheads…
After the Break-Up:Proliferation and “Brain
Drain”
After the Break-Up:Proliferation and “Brain
Drain” •Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and materials
•Dysfunctional military: command and control?
• ~150,000 scientists, engineers, technicians employed in weapons-related work
•1990s economic crisis meant low wages (or back wages owed…) --> “nuclear entrepreneurs”
•Sell their knowledge?Seek employment in countries with nuclear aspirations?
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Cooperative Threat Reduction
•Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn-Lugar)
•Objectives: assist FSU states in dismantling WMD; secure WMD materials, technology, facilities and structures; reduce threat of proliferation
•Cooperation
•US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
•1993-2003: US spent avg. of $402 million/yr (~0.18% of total US defense budget); $4.4 billion total during that time
Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia
Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia
Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination
SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Elimination
SSBN/SLBM Dismantlement & Elimination
Liquid Propellant ICBM/ SLBM Elimination
Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination
Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia
Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia
Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Russia)…
Cooperative Threat Reduction:
Accomplishments
Cooperative Threat Reduction:
Accomplishments•More than 6,000 nuclear weapons destroyed
•Thousands of launchers, missiles, devices
•Removed all weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan
•Employed thousands of former weapons scientists
•Also destroying chemical and biological weapons
The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road?
The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road?
•In Dec. 2001, Bush administration gave 6-month notice that US would withdraw from treaty
•Why? US wants to develop NMD to protect against WMD threats from terrorists, “rogue states”
•Putin regime protested vehemently-->felt it would limit their deterrence capabilities (made START II levels undesirable)
•Failure of Russian diplomacy?
The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road?
The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road?
•SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), or “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002•Cut warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012•Ratified in 2003 by Duma and Senate
US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns
US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns
•Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers
•“Setting a bad example”—weapons stockpiles and fissile materials stocks are disincentives for India, Pakistan, Israel(?), Iran, N. Korea, etc.
US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns
US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns
•Whither the United States?
•National Missile Defense
•Earth-penetrating nukes, mini-nukes
•Nuclear primacy?
•Whither Russia?
•Superpower nostalgia
•Maintain credible deterrence
•Relations with China, Iran vs. with US, EU
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Perceived National Security Threats Today
U.S. national security
• Terrorism
• Proliferation of WMD
• Rogue states (harbor terrorists, foment extremism)
• Regional conflicts
Source: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006
Russian National Security Concept (2000)
• Focus on domestic security concerns: weak economy, organized crime, etc.
• Erosion of multilateral security institutions (UN, OSCE)
• Weakening of Russia’s political, economic, military influence
• Strengthening of military alliances (NATO enlargement)
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Russian National Security Concept (2000)
• Foreign military bases near Russia’s borders
• Proliferation of WMD
• Weakening of integration in CIS
• Conflicts near CIS member states’ borders
• Territorial claims against Russia
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Perceived National Security Threats Today
Russian national security concerns (2006)
• Domestic issues: economic growth, financial stability, demographic problems
• Terrorism
• Local conflicts (ethnic, religious)
• Proliferation of WMD
• Lack of military readiness
Source: Putin’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006
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