an alienated partnership · an alienated partnership stefan meister fiia briefing paper 105 • 10...

An AlienAted pArtnership

stefan Meister FiiA BrieFinG pAper 105 • 10 May 2012

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

105

GerMAn-russiAn relAtions

AFter putin’s return

• ThereturnofVladimirPutinasRussia’spresidentand theprobableendofDmitriMedvedev’smodernizationprojectwillincreasethealienationwithinGerman-Russianrelations.

• Germany’smodernizationpartnershipwithRussiahasproducedlimitedresultsbecausethetwosideshavedifferentviewsonthecooperation.WhiletheGermansidewantstodevelopcommonprojectsofgoodpracticewhichwillmodernizetheRussianeconomyandpolitics,theRussiansideisinterestedintechnologytransfer.

• TheinterestinandknowledgeofRussiaamongGermandecision-makersisdecreasing.Germanylacksvisionandconceptsonhow to influencedevelopments inRussia.This is alsodue to theresistanceofthecurrentRussianelitetowardsimplementingpoliticalreforms.

• Asaresult,RussiaislosingitsmostimportantadvocateintheEU(alsoregardingenergypolicy).ThiswillhaveanegativeimpactonEU-RussiarelationsbecausetheEUlacksleadershiponRussia.

• OngoingchangesinRussiansociety,whichchallengethePutinsystem,willpresentanopportunitytofindnewalliesinRussiaforcooperationandmodernization,whichmayincreaseGermany’sinterestinitslargeneighbour.ButthiswillcallforamorebalancedapproachbetweentheRussianelitesandsocietyinGermany’sRussiapolicy.

An AlienAted pArtnership

FiiA Briefing paper 105

10 May 2012

GerMAn-russiAn relAtions AFter putin’s return

the eu's eastern neighbourhood and russia research programme

the Finnish institute of international Affairs

stefan Meister

program officer

Center for Central and eastern europe of the robert Bosch stiftung

German Council on Foreign relations

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

the Finnish institute oF internAtionAl AFFAirs 3

German-Russianrelationsareinastateofchange.Inthepast,GermanyhasalwaysbeenanadvocateofRussian interests in theEuropeanUnionandastrategic partnerwith regard to energy and eco-nomiccooperation.Overthelastfewyears,how-ever,wehaveobservedanincreasingalienationinbilateralrelations,withbothsidesspeakingaboutthesametopicsbutnurturingdifferentprioritiesandinterests.Th isisapparentinthemodernizationpartnership:WhileGermanywantstodeveloppro-jectsofgoodpracticewhichmodernizetheRussianeconomicandpoliticalsystem,theRussianelitesareprimarilyinterestedintechnologytransferbutnotpoliticalreforms.Th isislinkedwithadecreas-ing interest in and knowledge of Russia amongGermany’spoliticalelite.GermanbusinessesstillthriveinRussia,butfrustrationabouttheongoinglackofdomesticreformsandthelackofprogressinestablishingtheruleoflawandtransparencyisgrowing.Th eshiftinGermanenergypolicytowardsincreasedrenewablesandenergyefficiency,coupledwithGazprom’sinflexiblepolicies,willhaveastrongimpactonGerman-Russianrelationsinthefuture.

Th e old consensus among the German elite thatRussian integration inEurope iskeytoEuropeansecuritystillexists,butGermanylacksideasonhowtoinfluencetheRussianreformprocess.SincethefalloftheSovietUnion,GermanyhasdevelopedanintegrativepolicytowardsRussia,buttheGermanelitesfeelfrustratedwiththereturnofPutinandtheprobableendofthemodernizationproject.Expecta-tionsinGermanyregardingthepresidencyofDmitri

Medvedevwerehigh—maybetoohigh—andwereneverfulfilled.Th ereturnofVladimirPutinasRus-sia’spresidentwillleadtoafurtherdisconnectonRussiawithintheGermanpoliticalelite.

The end of the strategic partnership?

DuringtheChristianDemocratic-SocialDemocraticgrand coalition (2005–2009), dualism existedbetweentheChancellery,ledbyAngelaMerkelandthe Social Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs,Frank-WalterSteinmeier.Th isbecameapparentinthedivergingapproachesandstatementsemanatingfromthe Chancellery and the ForeignOffice, especiallyregarding theEasternEuropeanandRussiapolicy.WhileAngelaMerkelwashighlyscepticalaboutcom-prehensivecooperationwithRussiaingeneral,andVladimirPutininparticular,Steinmeierwasthedriv-ingforcebehindGerhardSchröder’sintegrativeRus-siapolicy.Th erewasongoingcompetitionbetweentheChancellorandtheMinisteronhowtodealwithRussia—beitwithpragmatismandafocusonhumanrights,orafocusoncooperationandintegration.

For Steinmeier, Russiawas a priority.Under hisleadership,theForeignOfficemappedoutconceptsfortheEastern¹andRussiapolicy,whiletheconcept

1 Easternpolicyinthiscontextreferstothepost-Sovietstates

outsideoftheEUandincludestheconceptsENPplusandthe

CentralAsiaStrategy.

the second line of nord stream is scheduled to begin transporting gas by the end of 2012. photo: nord stream AG


of“rapprochementthroughinterweavement”wasdevelopedbyhispolicyplanningstaff.WithMed-vedev’selectionasRussianpresidentin2008,thisconceptwasfurtherdevelopedintoa“partnershipformodernization”withRussia,whichSteinmeierpresentedinaspeechinYekaterinburginMay2008.Steinmeieremphasizedthecontinuedrelevanceofthe energy and climatepolicy, thehealthpolicy,infrastructure, education, science, and publicadministrationforbilateralrelations.MerkelspokeatGerman-Russian government consultations inOctober2008 inSt.Petersburgabouta“partner-shipofinnovation”.Thebackgroundtothisconceptincludessecuringthesustainabilityofbothcoun-tries in global competition as a goal of commoneconomiccooperation.

WiththeestablishmentofaChristianDemocratic-Liberalgovernmentcoalition(CDU/CSUandFDP)aftertheparliamentaryelectionsin2009,thespecialpartnershipbetweenGermanyandRussiadriftedasunder.WithAngelaMerkel,sobrietyreplacedthepersonalrelationshipthathadexistedbetweenBorisYeltsinandHelmutKohl,aswellastheonebetweenGerhardSchröderandVladimirPutin.DuringDmi-triMedvedev’spresidency,AngelaMerkeltriedtolimitmeetingswithRussianPrimeMinisterVladimirPutintosignalthatshesupportedthe“newmodernRussia”insteadofthe“oldPutinRussia”.TheroleoftheForeignOfficeinGermany’sRussiapolicyhasalsochangedunderSteinmeier’ssuccessor,LiberalForeignMinisterGuidoWesterwelle.HehastriedtodistinguishhimselfwithtripstosmallercountriesinCentralandEasternEurope,buthasbeenunabletoemphasizetheRussiapolicy.Asaresult,theChan-celleryandtheBundestagincreasedtheirinfluenceon Germany’s Russia policy, while the ForeignOffice’sinitiativesonRussialosttheinfluencethattheyhadexertedunderhispredecessor.Atthesametime,RussiadidnotconstituteapersonalpoliticalpriorityforAngelaMerkel.EvenifshewascriticalabouttheRussiapolicyofherpredecessor,sheneverdevelopedalternativeconceptsofherown.

AlthoughRussiaisnotatoppriorityforthecurrentGerman government, its concepts are embeddedin the traditionof previous governments.RussiaisnotmentionedasastrategicpartnerintheCDU/CSU-FDPcoalitionagreement,butasan“importantpartner for overcoming regional and global chal-lenges”.Thecoalitionwants to supportmoderni-zationinRussiaandfocusesaboveallonreducing

deficitsinareaslikehumanrights,theruleoflaw,anddemocracy.Accordingtotheagreement,thegovernmentwillparticularlytakeintoaccounttheinterestsofotherdirectEasternneighbours.PolandisdescribedasamajorpartnerwithintheEUandasakeytotherelationshipwiththeEastern(post-Soviet)neighbourhood.

SincethenewGermangovernmentin2009,therehas been decreased interest and expertise in theRussiaandEasternpolicywithintheGermangov-ernment. Parliamentarians and state secretarieswithexpertiseinEasternEuropehavelefttheBun-destagandtheForeignOffice.Theglobalfinancialcrisis,theeurocrisis,andothereventssuchastheArabSpringhavetakenprecedenceovertheEasternneighbourhood.Thisdevelopmentissupportedbyaprocesswhichhasbeenobservableformanyyears:Germandecision-makersareprovidingincreasinglyfewerresourcesforresearchonRussia.Post-Sovietcountriesseemtobediminishingintermsofpoliti-calpriority,withtheresultthatresearchinstitutesdealingwithRussiaandthepost-Sovietcountrieshavefoldedandanalystpositionsontheregionhavebeenlimitedinfavourofotherregionsandtopics.2ThishashadaninfluenceontheGermandiscourseand decision-making on Russia, and knowledgeaboutdevelopmentsinthecountryhasdecreasedasaresult.ThisisexacerbatedbyanegativeimageofRussiaandPutin in theGermanmedia,whichisoftennotbasedon factbutonstereotypes likethe“energyweapon”.3TheGermanpublicopiniononRussiaiscontroversial,withbothnegativeandpositiveovertonesevidentinitsmixofthreatper-ception,romanticismandanti-Americanism.Fewpollstakeeconomiccooperationandforeignpolicyastheirfocus:inapollconductedbytheAllensbachInstitutedatedJuly2011,Russiaisinfourthplace

2 AtGermanuniversitiesmanychairsinEasternEuropeanHis-

toryorPoliticalSciencewithafocusonpost-Sovietcountries

haveceasedtoexistinthelast20years.Furthermore,theFeder-

alInstituteforEasternandInternationalStudiesinColognewas

closedin2001.Althoughsomeoftheexpertsattheinstitutehave

beenintegratedintotheGermanInstituteforInternationaland

SecurityStudies(SWP),thenumberofregionalexpertsonRussia

andthepost-SovietcountriesisalsodecreasingatSWP.

3 SeeJuriGalperin,DasRusslandbilddeutscherMedien,Bun-

deszentralefürpolitischeBildung,DossierRussland,25.03.2011,

http://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/russland/47998/

russlandbild-deutscher-medien?p=0,23.04.2012.


asanimportantpartnerforGermanywith35percentafterFrance,theUSAandtheUK.Whilethefirstthreecountrieshavediminishedimportanceaspartnersinthepublicopinioncomparedwith2000,Russiahasthesameamountofsupport.

The polarized German discourse on Russia

TheGermandiscourseonRussia iscurrently influ-encedbytwomaingroups.Thefirstoftheseisthehumanrightsorvaluefactionthathasbecomemoreinfluential under Chancellor Merkel, and whichfocuseson thedemocratic situation inRussiaandcriticized the election fraud during the Russianparliamentary andpresidential elections. Parts ofthisgrouptriedtosupportthereformsannouncedbyPresidentMedvedev,andmostlycompriseparlia-mentariansfromtheCDUandtheGreenParty,aswellassomepeopleclosetotheChancellor.ThesecondgroupconsistsofSPDmembersforthemostpart,butalsoincludesCDUmemberswhoadvocateacoopera-tiveapproachtowardsRussia,andfocusesonastra-tegiceconomicpartnershipwithRussia.Thisgroupoften adopts a similar approach to organizationslobbyingintheinterestsoftheGermaneconomy,andwhichhavebeenverysuccessfulininfluencingGer-manpolicy.ThedivergenceofviewsbetweenbothgroupswasillustratedaftertheRussianparliamen-taryelections,withaGermanbusinessrepresentativedescribingtheRussianelectionsasoneofthe“mostfree and democratic” since the end of the SovietUnion.4Incontrast,parliamentariansfromtheothergroupwereveryconcernedaboutelectoralfraudandthepressureplacedonelectionobservers.5

Thereisalackofdialoguebetweenthesetwogroups,which hinders amore sober analysis of develop-ments inRussia.Russia is increasinglybecominga matter of lobbying “for or against” a special

4 AcommentmadebytheexecutivedirectoroftheEastern

CommitteeoftheGermanEconomy,RainerLindner,atanevent

atDGAP.http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/der-modernisierungs-

druck-steigt,28.03.2012.

5 Inaninterview,AndreasSchockenhoff,deputychairman

oftheCDU/CSUparliamentariangroupforforeignaffairsinthe

BundestagandRussiacoordinatoroftheGermangovernment

forcivilsocietycooperation,comparedRussianpressureonin-

dependentNGOstoStalinistmethods.http://www.dradio.de/

dkultur/sendungen/interview/1619498/,March28,2012.

approach—eitheryouareforeconomiccooperationoragainsthumanrightsviolations.Asaresult,thereisaclearseparationbetweenaninterest-orientedand a value-oriented approach. But the conclu-sionthatthetwogroupsare,infact,twosidesofthesamecoinispushedintothebackground.Asaresult,theGermanpositiononeventsinRussiaisoftenunclearforoutsideobserversasthemessagesfromdifferentgovernmentrepresentativescanbediverging.ThisweakensGermany’sRussiapolicyandallowstheRussiansidetoundermineGermancriticsorpolicyinitiatives.

The role of German business

RussiaisimportantforGermancompanies.In2011,therewasa30percentincreaseintradebetweenGermanyandRussia,withatotalvolumeof75bil-lioneuros.GermaneconomicrepresentativeshavebeentalkingaboutthehugepotentialoftheRussianeconomyformanyyears,anditisseenasadvanta-geousthatRussiaisnearlyasimportantfortradeasPoland. In2011,Russiaranked12th inGermanexportsbehindPoland(10th)andbeforetheCzechRepublic(13th).

GermaneconomicandlobbyingorganizationssuchastheCommitteeonEasternEuropeanEconomicRelationsplayakeyroleininfluencingGermany’srelationswithRussia.Even ifAngelaMerkelwashighlycriticalof theNordStreampipelineat thebeginningof herChancellorship, shefinally sup-portedtheproject.MerkellimitedhertripstoRussiabutshedidgiveGermancompaniesaccesstoRussianleadersduringmeetingswithPresidentMedvedev.EconomicorganizationsliketheEasternCommitteealsoplayanimportantroleinpromotingpoliticallyrelevant topics in theEasternneighbourhood. InJuly2011,theCommitteepublishedastrategicpaperthatsuggestedabolishingvisasbetweentheEUandRussiaaswellasotherEasternEuropeanneighbours.Nearlyallseriousexpertsarguethattheimpactonthelabourmarketwouldbelimitedbuttheeffectonpeople-to-peoplecontactswouldbesignificant.YetGermandecision-makers,especiallymembersoftheBundestagandrepresentativesoftheInteriorMinistry,stillfearthatvoterswillpunishthemforincreasingvisafreedom.GermanstonewallingoneasingvisarequirementsforitsEasternneighboursisinaprocessofchangeduetothesupportofmem-bersofparliament,theForeignOfficeandbusiness


representatives.Aninter-parliamentarygrouphasbeenestablishedintheBundestagtopromotetheabolitionofvisarequirements,especiallytowardsRussia.

Germancompaniesarecriticalabouttheinvestmentclimate inRussia, citing inparticularcorruption,bureaucracy,andalackoftheruleoflaw.Germansmall and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) areparticularlypronetoproblemsoveraccesstotheRussianmarketandruleoflawdeficiencies.Duetothedominanceof largecompanies intheRussianeconomy,GermanSMEslackpartnersinthecoun-try.6TheRussianstate’sinfluenceovertheeconomyisasignificantbarriertodeepeningtheeconomicrelationship.RussianmembershipoftheWTOmaychangethesituation,andexpectationsinGermanyareonceagainhigh.

While formostof thebigcompanies lobbying forgoodrelationswithRussiaisbusinessasusual,thismaychangeintheGermanenergysector.RussiaisGermany’sbiggestsupplierofgasandoil,providingaround40percentofitsgasand34percentofitsoilsupplyin2011.Withthegovernment’sdecisionto stop producing nuclear energy by 2022, Ger-mandemandforgaswillincreaseintheshortandmediumterm.ThelargestGermanenergycompa-nies will have to change their business conceptandwillneedtoacquirenewstrategicpartnersforinvestment.ThisisofinteresttoGazprom,whichisfocusingonGermanyastheNorthernenergyhubforitsenergydeliveriestotheEU,andhasaninterestininvestingintheattractiveconsumermarket.Ger-manenergycompanies likeE.ONandBASF (Win-tershall)haveexperienceinlong-termcooperationwithGazprom.

ButthefailureofaplannedjointventurebetweenRWEandGazpromshowsthatthetwosidesarenotalwayscompatible.Theincreaseinmedium-termdemandforgasinGermanyisonlyonecomponentof this new energy policy.The companies needstrategicpartnersforhugeinvestmentsinrenew-ableenergyandinthepowergridsystem.Gazprom,whichisfocusedonsecuringitstransitmonopoly

6 AspeechbytheChairmanoftheEasternCommittee,Eckhard

Cordes.8.Handelsblatt-Tagung,March19,2012.http://www.

ost-ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/pm_pdf/Rede-Cordes-Han-

delsblatt-Jahrestagung-Russland.pdf,March29,2012.

andlong-termcontracts,isnotafeasiblepartnerforthispolicy.Furthermore,changesinglobalenergymarkets—mostnotablywithLNGandshalegas—aswell as the liberalization of energy policy by theEuropeanCommissionhavehadastrongimpactonthisrelationship.DuetoGazprom’slackofflexibilityandnewdemands in theGerman energymarket,RussiaislosingBerlinasitsmainenergyadvocateinEurope.TheGermangovernment isalsoscepti-calaboutincreasingitsdependenceononesupplier.ChancellorMerkel rejectedPresidentMedvedev’soffertobuildathirdlinefortheNordStreampipe-lineduringGerman-Russiangovernmentconsulta-tionsinJuly2011.

Inability to sort out priorities – A source of

Germany’s frustrations with Russia

TherearethreeprioritiesforGermancooperationwithRussia:theeconomy,security,andplatformsforthebuildingoftrust.

The modernization partnership Germany’smodernizationpartnershipwithRussialacksbigstrategicprojects,withtheexceptionofNordStream.Itisprimarilyapolicyofsmallstepsand goodwill. While German decision-makerssupportthereformingofRussianpoliticsthrougheconomiccooperation,theRussiansideisinterestedaboveallineconomiccooperationandinvestment.While theGermans support the establishment oftheruleoflawandbetterconditionsforsmallandmedium-sizedcompanies,theRussianeliteisinter-estedinknowledgeandtechnologytransfersandinsecuringtheiraccesstotherevenuesofstatecom-panies.Russiaisadifficultpartneranditisahugechallengetosupportthereformprocessinthecoun-try.ButtheGermanpassionforinfluencingRussiandomesticpolicysometimesleadstoignoranceoftherealities in Russia. President Medvedev’s reformannouncementsafterhiselectionin2008weretakenseriouslyinGermanyandexpectationsranveryhigh.ButtherealityofthePutin-MedvedevtandembeinganintegralpartofthePutinsystemhasbeenignored.This“naivety”istypicaloftheGermanelitesandhasnotalwaysbeenlinkedtoeconomicinterestsbuttothehopeofchanginganddemocratizingRussia.

Oneexampleintheframeworkofthemodernizationpartnershipisthecooperationinareaslikeenergyefficiency and renewable energies. The Russian-


GermanEnergyAgency(RUDEA)isresponsibleforenergycooperationandhassomelighthousepro-jectsinRussia.ButbecauseofthelackofinterestandinvestmentsontheRussianside,aswellasthedifficultinvestmentconditionsinRussia,ithasnotfulfilledexpectations.ThesameistrueforthelegaldialoguewithRussia.Itisverydifficulttogetinfor-mationonthisdialogue,whichshouldnotonlybeanexpert-andelite-drivenproject,butalsoinvolveGermanandRussiansocieties.

Security cooperation in post-Soviet conflictsInthefieldofsecuritycooperation,conflictreso-lutioninthepost-SovietneighbourhoodplaysanimportantrolefortheGermanside.Theso-calledMesebergProcesswassetupbyChancellorMerkelandPresidentMedvedevinJune2010toofferRus-siaanexclusiveplatformofanEU-RussiasecuritycouncilinexchangeforcooperationinsolvingtheTransnistrian conflictwithMoldova. Solving thisconflictwouldhaveapositiveimpactonthemoredifficultethnicconflictsintheSouthCaucasusandwoulddemonstratethatcooperationwithRussiaispossibleinthiscontext.BargainingwithRussiatoreachabreakthroughinconflictresolutionisacon-ceptthatisworthtrying.ButthiswasnotdiscussedwithEUpartnersandthereisnoclearstrategyonthe German side.There are neither benchmarksnor a roadmap, and nearly two years after theprocessbegan, the resultsaremeagre. Insteadofstrengthening instruments of conflict resolutionwithinthecontextofEUneighbourhoodpolicy,theGermangovernmenttriedtostrikeabilateraldealwithRussiawithoutthesignalthatsuccessinthisrespectwouldbeatoppriorityfortheChancellery.TheRussian leadershipneverhad the impressionthatmakingcompromiseswouldbeworthwhileornecessary.

Building trustGermany’s cooperative approach towardsRussiacontradictstheRussianlogicofazero-sumgame.While theGermanpolitical establishment alwaysseeksawin-winsituation,theRussiansideisonlywillingtomakedeals thatare in theirown inter-ests.Oneresultofthisdivergingrelationshipcouldbea“Russification”ofGermaninitiatives.TheSt.Petersburg Dialogue, founded by Vladimir PutinandGerhardSchröderin2001,ismeanttosupportcivilsocietyexchangesbetweenbothcountries.Butitbecameaneventdrivenby theelites,with theGermansideacceptingthattheRussiangovernment

wouldselecttheparticipants,notthecivilsocietyactors.Asaresult,officialsandbusinessrepresenta-tivesfrombothstatesdominatethemeetings.Theresult isnotadialoguebetweensocietiesbut theacceptanceofRussianrulesandthelegitimizationof undemocratic decisions made by the Russianleadership.

Germany’skeyconceptforthecurrentcooperationwith Russia is a trilateral dialogue that includesPoland,withmeetingstakingplaceatthelevelofthe Minister of Foreign Affairs but also increas-inglyatthelevelofotherministries.Thisisaboveallaninstrumentoftrust-building.BecauseofthedifferentapproachesandprioritiesofPolandandGermanyintheirEasternpolicies,itisdifficulttodevelopacommonapproachforanewEU-Easternpolicy.ExpectationsarelimitedontheRussianside.TheRussiansarescepticalaboutanewplatformwithEUmember states in addition to themany com-munication channels they alreadyhavewith theEU.Thiscouldfosterafurtherbureaucratizationofrelations.

Conclusions

ThereturnofVladimirPutinasRussia’spresidentwill not fundamentally change German-Russianrelations.Economic and energy cooperationwillremainthebasis for therelationship.ButPutin’sreturn will heighten the alienation within theGerman-Russianrelationsandfurtherweakenthestrategicpartnership.Alienationmeansanincreas-ing frustrationwith the political situation and adeclineininterestandknowledgeregardingRussiaontheGermanside,whichwilllimitGermany’sroleasRussia’sadvocateintheEU.Germanyislackinginfluencewhen itcomes to theRussiandomesticreformprocessbecausetheRussianeliteshaveonlyalimitedinterestinmodernizingtheircountry.

ThepatternsofGerman-Russianrelationsremainthe samewithGermany settingupnewcoopera-tionprojectswithRussiainthehopeofinfluencingRussianpolitics.ThereisalwaysadesiretochangeRussia through economic cooperation, whichwouldbuildup trustandpresentanopportunityto influencedomestic reforms inRussia.But thisconcepthasfailedduringthelasttenyears.WhiletheGermansidewantstopromoteexamplesofgoodpractice, theRussianelite ismainly interested in


theirownbenefits.DespiteannouncementstothecontrarybythecurrentGermangovernment,thispolicyhasnot fundamentallychanged in the lastthreeyears.

TheRussianelite’sdisinterestinmodernizingtheircountry, which was confirmed with the Putin-Medvedevpresidentialswitch,theongoinglackoftheruleoflaw,andthestate’sinfluenceovertheeconomyhavelimitedtheexpansionofeconomiccooperationbetweenthetwocountries.Asaconse-quence,Russia’sstatusasamarketwith“potential”hasremainedunchanged.Themodernizationpart-nershipwithRussiahasmoreorlessfailedbecauseofthedifferingvisionsofthiscooperation.

WhatGermanyneeds is a realistic assessment ofthecurrentstateofGerman-Russianrelationsanditsinstitutions.Basedonthisevaluation,itneedsadiscussiononwhattheinterestsandgoalsofGer-manyinRussiaandtheotherpost-Sovietcountriesare,andwhatcanrealisticallybeachieved.Atthesametime, incooperationwithPolandandotherinterestedmemberstates(e.g.Finland),GermanyonceagainneedstotaketheleadintheEUontheRussiaandEasternpolicy.

IfGermanywantstointegrateRussiaintoEuropeandintendstosupporttrust-building,itneedsalesselite-dominatedapproachtowardsthebigneigh-bourandamoresociety-orientedexchange.Thisisnotanargumentforafundamentalrefocusingof

Germanpolicyoncivilsocietyonly,butforamorerealisticanalysisoftheinabilityofthecurrentRus-sianelitetomodernizethecountryandfulfillsoci-ety’sdemands.Germanpoliticiansshouldthereforerefocuscooperationonthosegroupsthatarewillingandabletosupportreforms.Germanyhastocoop-eratewiththePutinregime,butitshouldbemoreconsistentinadvocatingfortheruleoflawandanendtoviolationsofdemocraticstandards.OngoingchangesinRussiansociety,whichwereevidencedbythemassproteststhatfollowedtheparliamen-taryelectionsinDecember2011,mayhelptofosterachangeinGermany’sRussiapolicy.

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an alienated partnership · an alienated partnership stefan meister fiia briefing paper 105 • 10...

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