Maisonneuve & Larose

Changing Concepts of Justice and Injustice from the 5th/11th Century to the 8th/14thCentury in Persia: The Saljuq Empire and the IlkhanateAuthor(s): A. K. LambtonSource: Studia Islamica, No. 68 (1988), pp. 27-60Published by: Maisonneuve & LaroseStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595757 .Accessed: 30/12/2010 17:09

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE FROM THE 5th/llth CENTURY TO THE 8th/14th CENTURY IN PERSIA:

THE SALJUQ EMPIRE AND THE ILKHANATE

The Saljuq empire and the Ilkhanate were not monolithic. In both periods there was continuous change in political, economic and social life, sometimes of a local nature and sometimes more widespread. Political unity was fragile and often broke down, and the extent of the power of the central government varied at different times. The ethnic composition of the population and their means of livelihood also underwent change.

The sources for these events in general and for the resulting intellectual change and the changing concepts of justice and injustice in particular are uneven. Formal statements of the juristic position are available and have been discussed by various scholars. There is a copious adab literature, especially for the Saljuq period, setting forth views on kingship and on justice and injustice, a rich poetical literature which touches upon these questions from time to time but from which a coherent and consistent picture is not to be expected, and occasional references to these matters in the works of Sufis. There is little, however, in the nature of reminiscences or autobiographical accounts revealing personal attitudes to the questions of the day, though a number of letters, notably some written by Nizam al-Mulk, al-Ghazali and Rashid al-Din Fadl Allah, have been preserved. For the attitudes of those who wielded military power we have to rely mainly upon the evidence of their actions and accounts written by others, while

A. K. LAMBTON

of the views of the common people almost nothing is recorded. There are references in chronicles and histories to the hardships suffered by the common people on account of outbreaks of plague and other natural calamities, and because of the tyranny of rulers, resulting sometimes in the dispersal of the peasants, but there is little to indicate the personal reactions of the common people to these events. Outbreaks of violence and rioting, which often appear to have been provoked by the injustice of the authorities, are mentioned from time to time, but there is little to show what was the concept of justice and injustice held by those concerned. So far as popular movements affected the views of other classes it would seem that they aroused fear because of the threat such movements offered to the status quo. They strengthen- ed existing prejudices and reinforced the importance attached by the ruling classes to stability and the maintenance of the hierarchical structure of society. The basis of evidence for these various matters is, however, too narrow to permit any but the broadest generalizations.

Cultural uniformity in the central and eastern Islamic world in the 5th/llth and 6th/12th centuries was remarkably widespread. This uniformity is to be seen not only in the Great Saljuq empire but also in the lesser Saljuq states, the Saljuqs of 'Iraq, Syria, Rum and Kirman, and also in the various atabegates. The cultural heritage handed down among them was a living heritage of thought and life, modified by local circumstances but nevertheless retaining a common stamp. This is not to say that all Saljuq states had a common identity or that conditions were the same throughout the 5th/llth and 6th/12th centuries. Nevertheless, there was a broad consensus on what constituted justice and injustice. The basis of the economy under the Great Saljuqs was land. Its development and exploitation required stability, the more so since agriculture largely depended upon irrigation, and because it needed stability it needed the protection of the law. Justice was thus closely connected with law.

The Mongol invasions brought a temporary interruption in many of the patterns of life and the assumptions upon which they rested. For the first time the central and eastern lands of the dar al-isldm fell under non-Muslim rule, and were culturally and politically fragmented in a way which had not happened before. Persia became, for a period (from the reign of Ogedei to the reign of Mongke), part of a vast steppe empire, ruled by a Great

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

Khan residing in Qaraqorum. An extensive system of communi- cations throughout this empire facilitated commercial and cultural

exchange. Qaraqorum became the political and cultural centre linking the Far East and the Near East; and Persia, temporarily at least, looked to Central Asia rather than to the west. The Ilkhanate, founded by Hiilegii, was virtually independent, but close links were maintained first with Qaraqorum and then with Peking until the reign of Ghazan Khan, who become converted to Islam; prior to that all Ilkhans had required and sought legitimization from the Great Khan. Islam, until the reign of Ghazan, ceased to be the religion of the rulers; it lost its pre- eminent place and became merely one religion among others. As a result of the heavy loss of life among the population of Persia during the invasions and the influx of large numbers of Mongols and Turks, the balance in the ethnic composition of the population was altered and in many parts of the country the Turko-Mongol element became dominant. But this was not all. The invaders were nomads and so the balance between the settled and semi- settled elements of the population was also upset. Further, the economy of the Ilkhanate, at least prior to the reign of Ghazan Khan, was based on flocks and herds and rested not upon the protection of the law but upon the sword.

So far as the Mongols looked to a law, it was to the yasa of Chingiz Khan,(1) and to the decisions of a tribal council or

qurillai. The shar'a remained in force among the conquered population, but they were also subject to the decrees and yarlighs issued by the ilkhdn and to interrogation and sentence by the Mongol court, the yarghu. Its decrees, theoretically based on the yasa, appear to have been arbitrary, though evidence was taken and records apparently kept. Confessions were frequently obtain- ed by torture and it is difficult to discern any clearly formulated

principles of justice underlying the decisions of the court. The available evidence is, however, scanty and much of it from hostile sources. The Persian officials of the Ilkhans, in all probability, sought to impose upon their rulers existing concepts of justice, but their freedom of action was restricted. The ill-treatment of the subject population by Mongol officials and their followers and the

usurpation of property (which had always been common but

(1) See further D. O. Morgan, 'The Great 'Ydsd of Chingiz Khan' and Mongol law in the Ilkhanate', BSOAS, XLIX, Part I (1986), 163-76.

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A. K. LAMBTON

became much more widespread in the Ilkhanate than it had apparently been under the Saljuqs) was a denial of theoretical justice.

Neither the jurists nor the writers of mirrors and other literary works which touch upon the theory of government were intellec- tual innovators or men of conspicuous integrity. They were drawn to the courts of rulers by the wealth, power and patronage which the rulers and their officials dispensed. At the same time their motives were probably mixed. While some retired from all participation in public life rather than jeopardize, as they thought, their salvation in the next world, others took office partly in the hope of moderating the violence of their rulers and mitigating the hardship which their fellow-countrymen suffered because of the arbitrary nature of the government. But the means at their disposal were limited. To point to an ideal was often all that they could do, in the face of arbitrary action and injustice; and their praise of justice was perhaps little more than a call for a return to an imaginary Golden Age.

The jurists, philosophers, writers of ethical treaties and adab works and officials of the bureaucracy, under both the Saljuqs and the Ilkhans, were mainly drawn from the same classes. They were largely trained in the madrasas and shared a common background. They represent the "Persian" and not the "Turko- Mongolian" point of view. Because of this the reality is to some extent concealed. Added to this, there is a difficulty of interpre- tation arising from the fact that first writers often seem to have felt it unnecessary to give an authoritative version of basic assumptions which everybody was supposed to know and secondly because the arbitrary and irresponsible nature of political power made downright condemnation of existing practices and theories unsafe. The full case, therefore, is not always stated. On the other hand there is also danger of reading too much into the actual wording of a text. Nevertheless, although hyperbole and a tendency to be carried away by the music of words are common features of Arabic and Persian writing, it must, I think, be assumed, unless there are clear reasons to the contrary, that the writers knew what they were saying, that they chose their words carefully and deliberately and meant their readers to read between the lines.

In asking the question what was the purpose of writers when they discussed justice and theories of rule and whom, if anyone, were they hoping to deceive, a distinction must be drawn between

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different kinds of writing. Common to most writers, whether jurists, philosophers, writers of ethical treatises and adab works, or historians, is a basic desire to confirm the Islamic view of the world and to include circumstances as they saw them within this view. So far as they were intending to deceive, it was their contemporaries rather than posterity that they had in mind. On the one hand they may have wished to assure their readers that conditions were not as bad as they appeared, while on the other, and more importantly, they may have hoped by flattery to gain the ruler's favour and to assure their own position. But there were also some who hoped to moderate the injustices to which their patrons were prone by pointing to the ideal.

The term for justice most commonly used in the literature under discussion is 'adl (and also 'adclat and ma'dilat). Its opposite is zulm and jawr. 'Adl has a wide sweep of meaning and has overtones of moral virtue. It carries the suggestion of, or includes, some of the notions which belong to righteousness. So far as it was a legal notion it must be remembered that the law to which it belonged was a revealed law, not a law enacted by some

assembly.(2) The basis of the conception of justice for Muslims was the keeping of the covenant which God had freely made with his servants. The dar al-isldm was also the dar al-'adl. In other words the territory of Islam was the territory of justice in measure as Quranic prescriptions were observed therein and where there ruled a legitimate authority charged with the duty of exhorting to

righteousness and forbidding evil. If the territory of Islam was

subject to unjust laws, it became the territory of force and

injustice (fisq).(3) In the course of time the concept of justice to some extent lost its exclusive association with Islamic government, but it continued to carry a religious as well as a moral and ethical connotation; and in the popular mind, as least, the connection between injustice and irreligion was strongly felt.

A number of issues are raised by the concept of justice. First there is the issue of righteous and unrighteous government, which in turn raises the question of the duty of disobedience. It is

largely in terms of righteous and unrighteous government that

(2) The Islamic concept of justice is closer to the Aristotelian concept of justice, on which see Sir Ernest Barker, The politics of Aristotle, Oxford, repr. 1952, 362ff., than to modern European concepts.

(3) See further, L. Gardet, La cite musulmane, Paris, 1954, 91ff.

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A. K. LAMBTON

justice and injustice are discussed in works of fiqh by Sunni and Shl'i jurists, though their approach and the conclusions they draw are different. Similarly their approach to the duty of disobedi- ence is different, and in either case is somewhat muted, largely because of a fear of civil disorder.

Secondly there is the issue of leadership and authority and the conflict between the concept of justice as an ideal harmony, in which divine kingship is expressed in royal absolutism, and divine justice reflected in the justice of the ruler on the one hand and the authority of a community of righteous believers expressed by the imcm through a consensus on the other. This issue did not, however, exist for the Shl'is, at least not in the same form, since all authority was vested in the imam.

Thirdly because of the association of the concept of justice with the revealed law, it raises the issue of the financial administration of the state.(4) The revenue from taxation was part of the huquq allah, the claims or rights of God, as opposed to the huquq al-'ibdd, or huqIq insdan, the rights of man. Rules, based on the circumstances of the conquests, were laid down for khardj and jizya and for the expenditure of the revenue according to the source from which it was obtained. Failure to abide by the rules was a form of injustice. The demands which followed from justice were thus sometimes of a concrete nature. Al-Ghazali, in a letter to Fakhr al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk, Sanjar's wazir, after urging upon him the practice of equity and justice, asks him to reduce the additional taxes (mu'un) imposed upon the people of Tis, claiming that the city had been ruined by tyranny and famine.(5)

Fourthly, also because of the association of justice with the law, it raises the issue of equality. All were to be treated equally in the matter of punishment, which was to be meted out exactly according to the penalties laid down by the sharF'a. Anything other than this was injustice. The ruler was further commonly enjoined to treat his subjects as he would wish to be treated himself, which implied equality in his treatment of them. Equality thus consisted in an even-handedness in his actions towards his subjects. Al-Ghazali states that justice consisted in complete impartiality: in treating an unknown man

(4) See further A. K. S. Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam, Oxford, 1981, 55-6.

(5) Fadd'il al-anam, ed. 'Abbas Iqbal, Tehran, AHS 1333, 31.

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and a famous man, or a rich man and a poor man, with complete equality when judging between them.(6) All might be equal before the law of God, but all did not have equal power in vindicating their rights. It was for the ruler, therefore, to see that justice prevailed and to ensure that each was treated equally with others. This consisted chiefly in making sure that the strong did not oppress the weak and that the powerful did not transfer their burdens to the poor and weak. Each was entitled to that treatment which was his due according to the divine law. This was not and did not imply social or economic equality, merely the appropriate treatment of each according to his rank and status in

society. It was a kind of limited "legal" equality and implied equity. Hence the term insdf is used interchangeably with 'adl.

Finally the concept of justice raises the issue of beneficence (ihsdn). The basis for this is the Quranic phrase, 'Verily God enjoins justice and beneficence', which is quoted by many writers. (7)

For the most part, writers started with certain preconceptions: the framework of the world in which they operated was "given". In general they accepted that the aggressive nature of man and his perennial tendency to encroach upon his fellows gave rise to the need for temporal government, whether exercised by the caliph or by the sultan. The existence of injustice in the world, the result of the innate tendency of man to encroach upon his fellows, imposed the need for a restraining influence, an idea for which sanction is found in the Traditions. Al-GhazalT believed that men were incessantly exposed to quarrels and conflict and that they needed a principle of power (sultin) to guide them and to arbitrate in their disputes.(8) Siraj al-Din Urmawi, who wrote

(6) Nas.hat al-muluk, ed. Jalal Humafi, Tehran, AHS 1351, 121. Cf. also a letter from al-Ghazfal to Diya' al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk in which he defines 'adl (justice) as treating the people as he would wish to be treated himself were he in their place (Fadd'il al-andm, 34), and a letter from Nizam al-Mulk to his son Mu'ayyid al-Mulk urging him to be equitable (munsif) in all his dealings with the people (Aqili, Athdr al-wuzard', ed. Mir Jalal al-Din jHusayni Urmawi, Tehran, AHS 1337, 213).

(7) Cf. for example the diplomas issued by Sanjar's diwan for the governor of Balkh and the shihna of the Turkomans in Muntajab al-Din Badi' Atabak Juwayni, 'Alabat al-kalaba, ed. 'Abbas Iqbal, Tehran, AHS 1329, 74, 80-1.

(8) Ihyd' 'ulIm al-d(n, Cairo, n.d., i, 30. See also H. Laoust, La polilique de GazalT, Paris, 1970, 196.

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the Ladt'if al-Hikma in or about 655/1257-8 for the Saljuq ruler of Rum, 'Izz al-Din Kay Ka'fs b. Kay Khusraw, states that there must be a restraining influence (wazi' wa mani'), physical (hissi), religious (shar'[) or intellectual ('aqli), among the people so that injustice would be removed from among them or at least lessened and the order of the world preserved.(9) He interprets the physical influence to be temporal power(10) and states that the well-being of the world would not be secured until there was a sultan with whom the oppressed might take refuge, and he quotes the tradition "Temporal government (sullan) is the Shadow of God upon earth under which every oppressed person takes refuge." Temporal government was, he states, like shade in which men took refuge from the heat of the sun. Thus, just as men fled from the sun into the shade, so the oppressed fled from tyranny to the ruler and there found release by reason of his justice and equity.(1l) This idea of the restraining influence is also found in Ibn Khaldin's Muqaddima, written rather over a century later than the Latd'if al-hikma.(12)

It was the ideal of the Qur'an that the Islamic community should represent on earth the principle of divine justice. Writers and theorists were aware that the contrast between this ideal and the history of the community was at all times stark, and many of them in the Saljuq period, as in earlier times, felt the need to safeguard the consciousness of the divine calling of the community and to account for the evident corruption of the institution of government and the absence of justice in the conduct of affairs. In this connection Sunni jurists were concerned to work out the relationship between the caliph and those who had usurped power. Mawardi, who wrote al-Ahkaim al-sulIdniyya in the early years of Saljuq domination (though he wrote primarily with the irregularities which had prevailed under the Bfyids in mind) led the way. He was followed by the Imam al-Haramayn, al-Ghazali and others.(13) For the jurists the basic qualities of the imam, the

(9) Ed. Ghulam Husayn Yfsufi, Tehran, AHS 1351, 163. (10) I take him to be using the word sultan in its original meaning of temporal

government as well as in its later and more usual meaning of ruler. (11) Lata'if al-hikma, 164-5. (12) See The Muqaddimah, tr. F. Rosenthal, 2nd ed., London, 1967, 3 vols., i,

translator's introduction, lxxiv-lxxv. See also Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam, 171ff.

(13) See further H. A. R. Gibb, 'Al-Mawardi's theory of the caliphate', Islamic

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leader of the community, were 'adala (moral and religious probity) and 'ilm (knowledge of the traditional Muslim sciences necessary to interpret the law). The purpose of his rule was the continuity of Islam and the execution of the sharl'a.

Other than the works of the jurists, the basic exposition of justice in the Saljuq period is that of Nizam al-Mulk in the Siydsal- ndma. This is of particular interest because of his experience in government, first under the Ghaznawids and secondly as wazir to Alp Arslan and later to Malikshah, when the Saljuq empire was at its height. Nizam al-Mulk maintains that the state rested upon justice and right religion, and that of the two the former was of greater importance. "Kingship", he asserts, "remains with un- belief but not with injustice".(14) Quoting a tradition of the prophet, he states, "Justice is the glory of the world and the power of the sulIan (i.e. the temporal government) and in it lies the well- being of the common people ('amma) and the elite (khassa), the army, and the subjects (ra'iyyai)".(l5) The Saljuq sultans were staunch Sunnis. They possessed "right religion". Perhaps it was Nizam al-Mulk's intention to point out that this in itself was not enough and that it must be accompanied by justice. For him justice implied also the threat of punishment (siyisal) and the exercise of coercive force, and a consciousness of this runs through the Siydsat-ndma. He believed that the affairs of the world would be properly ordered only if the scales were equally balanced between justice and punishment-and for such a view he sought the sanction both of the Qur'an and ancient custom. The ruler, he states, was to adopt "the mean" in all affairs and to follow ancient custom and canons of kingship and he was to refrain from introducing evil customs and not to give his consent to the shedding of blood unlawfully.(16) The association of justice and coercive force is found in later writers also, and broadly for the same reasons. One of the causes of injustice was weakness (or

culture, xi, 291-302 (also in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (eds.), Studies on the civilization of Islam, London, 1962, 166-75), H. Laoust, La politique de Gazdlr, and Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam.

(14) Siyasat-nama, ed. C. Schefer, Paris, 1891 (Persian text), 8, idem, ed. H. Darke, Tehran, 1968, 15. See also Lambton, 'The dilemma of government in Islamic Persia: The Siydsat-ndma of Nizam al-Mulk', Iran, xxii (1984), 55-66.

(15) Schefer, 44, Darke, 65. (16) Schefer, 209-10, Darke, 329-30. Darke's ed. reads heresy for the shedding

of blood unlawfully.

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neglect) on the part of the ruler. Al-Ghazali writes, "In these days men are shameless, mannerless and merciless, and if, God forbid, the sultan in their midst should be weak and powerless, the world will undoubtedly become ruined and religion and the world will suffer injury and damage."(17)

The writers of mirrors would appear to have been influenced in many respects by the Sasanian theory of the king as the

representative of God upon earth, who was concerned with orderly and just government. This in turn involved the preservation of equipoise by the maintenance of the social hierarchy. For these writers the sultan was divinely endowed with justice ('adl) and knowledge ('ilm) and his regime identified with justice, seen not so much in terms of the sharc'a as in the harmonious ordering of society. Religion was thus identified with the social order. The jurists defined justice in terms of the shart'a: what was lawful was just and what was unlawful was unjust. The writers of mirrors on the other hand distinguished between what was lawful and unlawful on the one hand and what was just and unjust on the other. They were not the same. Thus, the anonymous author of the Bahr al-fawd'id, which was written between 552/1157-8 and 557/1161-2 and dedicated to Alp Qutlugh Jabugha Ulugh, the atabeg of Arslan Aba, the son of Aq Sonqur, the Saljuq ruler of Aleppo, states that the stability (qiwdTm) of religion and what it was to be a Muslim (musulmdnn) depended upon the 'ulama', who distinguished between what was lawful and unlawful, while the stability of religion and the people (millat) depended upon kings, who distinguished between justice and injustice.(18)

In his Persian mirror, the Nas(hat al-muluk, al-Ghazali makes the importance of justice clear. "The true sultan", he writes, "is he who practises justice".(19) If the king was just the world would be prosperous and the subjects secure, but if the king was tyrannical the world would be laid waste.(20) Although justice was basically desirable in the light of the religious ethic, al-Ghazall

(17) Nasihat al-muluk, 131-2. Cf. also Yfsuf Khass Hajib, Wisdom of royal glory (Kutadgu Bilig), tr. R. Dankoff, Chicago and London, 1983, 142. The

Kutadgu Bilig was written for Tavghach Bughra Khan, the ruler of Kashghar, shortly after the Saljuqs took Nishapfir.

(18) Bahr al-fawd'id, ed. Muhammad Taqi Danish-Pazhiih, Tehran, AHS 1345, 478.

(19) Op. cit., 82. (20) Ibid., 83.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

points out that expediency also demanded the practice of

justice. To bring this point home he states that ancient kings made efforts to increase the prosperity of the world because they realised that the greater material prosperity the more extensive their dominions and the more numerous their subjects. They also knew that the sages of the world had truly spoken when they said that 'religion is made firm by kingship, kingship by the army, the army by wealth and that wealth comes from prosperity and prosperity from justice.' A contrary practice led to the ruin of the kingdom, the flight of the people to other countries, a diminution of the revenue and an empty treasury.(21) Underlying al- Ghazall's thought there is the realisation, born, perhaps, of contemporary circumstances-the violence of Turkish military rule and the intrigues and disorders committed by the Batinis and others-, that power to inspire awe, to ensure order and to inflict punishment were essential if the individual was to go about his business in peace and the people were to have security from one another. To ensure order the ruler required coercive force and this he could only have if he had revenue to pay for it, and revenue could only be obtained from a prosperous country rightly (justly) governed. Moreover, like Nizam al-Mulk, he knew that the country had been won by the sword and could ultimately be held only by the sword.

Ibn Balkhi, writing in south Persia in the reign of Muhammad b. Malikshah (498-511/1104-18) takes a similar view in his account of the pre-Islamic Persian kings-the oldest independent Persian prose history of them which has come down to us. "The kingdom of the Persians', he maintains, "was based on justice and their conduct on equity and liberality. Whenever one of them made his son heir apparent, he enjoined upon him the following maxim: there is no kingdom without an army, no army without wealth, no wealth without material prosperity and no material prosperity without justice."(22) Similarly, he states, "If a king is adorned with religion and his rule is made stable by justice, kingship will not disappear from his house unless, God forbid, some disorder appears in religion or he commits tyranny".(23)

(21) Ibid., 100-1. (22) Fars-ndma, ed. G. Le Strange, London, 1921, 4-5. (23) Ibid., 34.

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The author of the Bahr al-fawai'id, like Ibn Balkhi, accepts the view that justice led to the continuation of the rule of the king. Kingship, he states, depended upon three things, the army, the treasury, and agricultural development and these were to be secured by justice.(24) But he was not only concerned with the results of justice in the world. He states that the sultan was to act justly so that he might gain salvation in the next world. If he committed tyranny, he would be driven from the courts of God.(25) Kingship, further, brought responsibility for the conduct of others. The king was to restrain the tyrannical because he would be called to account on the last day, not only for his own actions but also for their tyranny.(26)

To Afdal al-Din Abf Hamid Ahmad b. Hamid KirmanT, who wrote the 'Iqd al-'ula in 584/1188-9, the prospect of the establish- ment of order by a strong government must have seemed an attractive alternative to the ravages of the lawless bands of Ghuzz who had laid the province of Kirman waste after the fall of

Sanjar.(27) He holds up absolute justice as the ideal and maintains that kings as guardians of that ideal were entitled to absolute obedience. He cites the story of Moses, related in the Traditions and quoted by many other writers before and after him with slight variations,(28) in which justice is associated with "legal" justice, security, effective rule and morality. Moses is said to have complained to God saying, "0 God, how long wilt thou leave Pharaoh in his unbelief and disobedience?" The answer came back, "0 Moses, during his rule he keeps the roads safe; he does not commit injustice when he gives decrees; he does not listen to the words of plaintiffs in the absence of the other party; and he does not look upon the sons and daughters of his subjects with the eye of desire."(29) In another saying, which Afdal al-Din attributes to Anushlrawan, he emphasizes the importance and strength brought by justice in words which will have appealed especially to the people of Kirman. "Let the cities be made strong by justice,

(24) Bahr al-fawa'id, 245. (25) Ibid., 120, 427ff. (26) Ibid., 120. (27) Cf. his description of the decay of Kirman in his time, 'Iqd al-'uld, ed. 'Ali

Muhammad 'Amiri Naini, Tehran, AHS 1311, 76ff. (28) Cf. Bahr al-fawa'id, 432 and Siraj al-Din Urmawi, Laia'if al-hikma, 248. (29) 'Iqd al-'uld, 54.

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which is a wall that will not be washed away by water, burnt down by fire or destroyed by ballistas."(30) Flash floods, which caused much destruction, were a frequent occurrence in Kirman, though it may be that Afdal al-Din had in mind the siege of Bam in or about 571/1175-6 when the attackers sought to breach the walls by the diversion of river water into the moat.(31)

Closely allied to the belief that justice was the basis of kingship was the belief that goodness and prosperity resulted from justice, and evil and temporal disaster from its lack. The Bahr al-fawa'id sets this out clearly.(32) If the ruler acted with justice (or even if he merely resolved upon justice in his heart) blessing and abundance would be found in his kingdom. If, on the contrary, he committed tyranny (or resolved upon injustice in his heart) famine and calamity would result.(33) The same point of view is

expressed by Siraj al-Din Urmawi. He states that if the king followed the path of equity and justice and occupied himself in

putting right his own affairs and those of his subjects, this would manifest itself in security and low prices, and plants and animals would reproduce themselves abundantly, while if the king acted in a contrary sense the reverse would be the case.(34) At the other extremity of the Islamic world, Fakhr-i Mudabbir Mubarakshah puts forward a similar view in the Adab al-harb wa'l-shujd'a, dedicated to Shams al-Din Iltutmish, the sultan of Delhi (607-33/1210-36), and cites as his authority for this Wahb b. Munabbih.(35)

Many writers quote the adage that kingship might endure with unbelief but not with injustice and also the saying attributed to the prophet that the justice of one hour was better than the

worship of sixty years. It may be that this simply reflects the failure of governments to ensure justice in the conduct of affairs. Al-Ghazali in a letter written probably to Sanjar in 503/1109-1110 reminds him that one day's justice of a just sultan was better than the worship of 60 years, and ends "Today affairs have reached

(30) Ibid. (31) Tdrtkh-i Afdal, reconstructed text by Mihdi Bayani, Tehran, AHS 1326, 71.

(32) Bahr al-fawd'id, 481-2. (33) Ibid., 434. (34) Lafd'if al-hikma, 232. (35) Ed. Ahmad Suhayli Khwansari, Tehran, AHS 1346, 64-5.

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A. K. LAMBTON

such lengths that the justice of one hour is equal to the worship of one hundred years".(36)

Siraj al-Din Urmawi is unequivocal on the need to curb injustice if only because it led to a dispersal of the population and therefore to a decline in the revenue. He states that the result of tyranny was ruin and when a country was ruined the following year nothing would be obtained from the tax districts; and because the revenues had dried up the muqla's would have to be paid by the treasury and this would lead to great corruption. For this reason the ruler must not be negligent with regard to the affairs of the tax- collectors(37). If he was vigilant, tyranny would not be practised against the subjects and the country would remain flourishing, the muqla's happy and the army powerful.(38) He also states that if any one of the subjects demanded the redress of a grievance from the ruler, he must be held in honour, for he would then believe that the ruler did not commit injustice or tyranny himself and would not allow anyone else to do so.(39)

Siraj al-Din argues that justice was tantamount to worship, but a worship the benefit of which was general ('dmm) and not personal, and upon which the order of the world depended. To exercise such justice was to exercise the vicegerency of God, and to protect the people from destruction and ruin; and to emphasize the connection between justice and morals, he states that life and chastity were protected by justice, and immoral intercourse and the corruption of the species was thereby prevented. Innumerable matters depended upon the justice of the king. When anyone undertook the duties of leadership (imarat), this was for him worship, and by his actions the order of the world and the well- being of the people (in the public and the private sphere) were achieved.(40) Siraj al-Din then attempts to associate this con- ception of justice with shar't justice also, pointing out that justice was the balance of God, the mean laid down by the sharf'a. This

(36) Fadd'il al-andm, 14. (37) The terms used are nuwwdb and 'ummdl. The latter is the usual term for

tax-collectors. The nd'ib in the 7th/13th century was sometimes used synony- mously with darugha, whose function was broadly to oversee the local administra- tion.

(38) Lata'if al-hikma, 237. (39) Ibid. (40) Ibid., 228-9.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

consisted in exact retribution; anything more or less was tantamount to injustice and tyranny.(41)

Since the true sultan was the just sultan, it follows that justice, so far as it referred to the ruler, comprehended the qualities that made for effective rule. Thus, Siraj al-Din Urmawl states, "The king is king when he has under his control (dar tasarruf-i khwud) the whole of his kingdom, and this will be the case when he is informed of the state of affairs of the kingdom and is aware of the condition of the tax-collectors, wazirs, amirs and those in charge of local administration (nuwwdb) in the whole of the kingdom and is in no way negligent concerning the state of the subjects".(42)

The actions demanded of a just king varied according to circumstances. The author of the Bahr al-fawd'id, who was living on the frontiers of the Islamic world, after stating that the object of kingship was justice and equity, holds it incumbent upon the ruler to undertake every year a raid for the faith. He considers justice to consist above all in gaining victory for Islam, defeating unbelief, carrying on jihad and raids for the faith and publicly proclaiming the customs (shi'ar) of Islam.(42) He admits that ideal justice may be beyond the reach of ordinary men: the king could not attain to the heights reached by Abf Bakr and 'Umar, but he was expected to reach at least the standards of unbelievers such as Aniishiravan in justice, Hatim al-Ta'i in generosity and 'Abbas b. Mirdas in wisdom.(44) This, perhaps, was his way of reminding his patron that Muslims were falling behind non- Muslims in the rectitude of their behaviour.(45)

Siraj al-Din Urmawi, also writing in a frontier situation, states that everything that the king acquired by way of equipment, money or men he must acquire with the intention of using them to overcome the enemies of God and religion, to exalt Islam, to repulse evil from the Muslims and to obtain their interests. Siraj al-Din is, it seems, aware of the perennial abuses of power by the military, for he states, "When he (the sultan) gives money to the army, let him give it because they are the army of Islam through which the victory of religion, the exaltation of Islam and the

(41) Ibid., 229. (42) Ibid., 275-6. (43) Bahr al-fawa'id, 438. (44) Ibid., 317. (45) Cf. ibid., 80.

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confusion of unbelievers is achieved." (46) Like others, he does not separate the actions of the ruler in the temporal sphere from their moral consequences. He continues, "If the king acts with this purpose in mind, he will acquire merit. The intelligent man ought to keep this truth in mind in all his actions, so that his concern may always be to acquire merit in the next world. For example, when he eats food let him do so that he may obtain strength to worship God and when he sleeps let him do so that he may be rested in order (the better) to engage in worship."(47)

The existence of the unjust ruler raises the question of the duty of disobedience. For Sunni jurists the issue was whether the imam acted contrary to the sharf'a or not. Loss of probity by reason of injustice and sin (fisq) led in theory to the forfeiture of the imamate. Some jurists, however, maintained that the imam should be enjoined to return to the good and simply disobeyed in whatever led to a revolt against God. The crucial point was that no means were laid down for depriving an unjust imam of his power and by the 2nd/8th century the prevalent view was that although 'adala was required of the imam, the obligation to obey the imam was not limited to a just imdm.(48) This continued to be generally accepted in later centuries. Abu Yusuf (113-82/731-98) in this connection cites the tradition "if the imam is just, the reward is due to him and gratitude from you. If he is tyrannical, then the burden of sin is his, and it is yours to be patient."(49) Later writers, including those who interpret justice in a general sense, reach very much the same conclusion, namely that rebellion against an unjust ruler is not justified.

The Imami Shli jurists from an early period held rebellion against an unjust, i.e. illegal, government without the authori- zation of the imam to be unlawful.(50) This continued to be the case during the ghayba. Their attitude towards the acceptance of office from unjust rulers was, however, equivocal. Between the government of the just sultan (al-sultain al-'adil), i.e. the imam,

(46) Ibid., 271-2. (47) Ibid., 272. (48) See Lambton, op. cit., 74ff. (49) Ibid., 57. Al-Turtushi, writing in Spain in 516/1122-3, takes a similar

view. He states that the unjust ruler was the punishment meted out by God to the people for their disobedience and was therefore to be endured and they were not to remove him by force. (Sirdj al-muluk, Alexandria, A.H. 1289, 88.)

(50) See W. Madelung, Hisham b. al-flakam, EI2.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

whose government in absolute terms was the only legitimate government, and the tyrannical sultan (al-sulidn al-jd'ir), by whom they meant primarily one of the Umayyad or 'Abbasid caliphs, whose rule they held to be illegitimate, there was a shadowy area in which co-operation with an unjust government was in some circumstances permitted; but this did not give that government more than a kind of derivative or functional legitimacy: in absolute terms it was still illegitimate.(51)

Al-Ghazali, by the time he wrote the Ihya' al-'ulum had apparently come to the conclusion that almost all the property of which the state disposed had been illegally acquired and that rulers were, therefore, unjust. His condemnation of unjust rulers was, however, tempered by his fear of civil war and also by his distrust of the common man. He states, "An evil-doing and barbarous sultan, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would create unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him, exactly as obedience is required to be rendered to those who are placed in command. For in the hadiths regarding the duty of obedience to those invested with command and the prohibition of withdrawing one's hand from assisting them there are expressed definite commands and restraints."(52) In the Nas ihat al-mulik, after deploring the rough and merciless nature of the people of his day, he remarks that the tyranny of a sultan for one hundred years would do less damage than tyranny committed by the people against each other for one year.(53) Al-Ghazall's attitude towards injustice was, thus, modified by the constraints and exigencies of the time and his fear of instability. His paramount concern was for the continuity of Islamic society and this was not possible, in

(51) See further, Lambton, op. cit., 249, 61. For a rather different view see W. Madelung, 'Authority in Twelve Shi'ism in the absence of the imam' in G. Makdisi et al. (eds.), La notion d'autorite au moyen dge, Colloque de la Napouli... 1978, Presse de France, 1982, 163-71.

(52) Ihya' 'ulum al-din, ii, 124, tr. as in H. A. R. Gibb, 'Constitutional organization' in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny (eds.), Law in the Middle East: origin and development of Islamic law, Washington D.C., 1955, i, 19.

(53) Nasihat al-muliik, 131-2. Ibn Jama'a, writing later in different circum- stances considers that the tyranny of a sultan for 40 years was preferable to the subjects (ra'iyyat) being left without a master for a single hour ('Handbuch des Islamischen Staats- und Verwaltungs rechtes von Badr-al-Din Ibn 6ama'ah', text and tr. in H. Kofler, Islamica vi, 1934, 355).

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A. K. LAMBTON

his view, without a duly constituted authority. Hence he refrains from outright rejection of unjust rulers, because this would have left no room for even the vestiges of Islamic government to continue. (54)

The author of the Bahr al-fawd'id states, "We do not consider it obligatory to draw the sword against an unjust sultan. In whatever he does which is contrary to religion and is not sin (masiyai), we consider obedience to him to be obligatory."(55) In another passage he reiterates this view. He writes, "It is not fitting to rebel against unjust kings even if they commit injustice and tyranny. Patience must be shown except when the ruler publicly proclaims innovation (heresy) and summons the people to such." (56)

For Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 606/1209), the last of the great medieval mutakallimun, who wrote after the fall of the Saljuq empire but before the Mongol invasions, justice was the expression of a right order, something which comprehended other values in a harmonious whole. Actual conditions were far removed from the ideal but Fakhr al-Din, like others before him, saw no alternative to acceptance of this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The Saljuq empire had broken up into warring principalities. In the east the Khwarazmshah had emerged as the most powerful ruler. I1 Arslan's death in 568/1172 had been followed by civil war. His son Tekish finally established himself as Khwarazmshah. In 588/1192 the caliph al-Nasir appealed to him for help against Toghril b. Arslanshah, the last of the Saljuqs of 'Iraq, and together they defeated him in 590/1194. But in 592/1196 fighting took place between the Khwarazmshahi army and the caliphal army to the disadvantage of the latter and skirmishes accompanied by much destruction and slaughter continued until Tekish's death in 596/1200. In terms of shar'F justice greater injustice than war against the caliph of God could hardly be imagined. Yet Fakhr al-Din, who wrote the Jdmi' al-'ulum for Tekish, states that it was not permissible even to speak evil of a tyrannical ruler because however tyrannical he might be, the good coming from his

(54) See further, Lambton, op. cit., 110ff. (55) Bahr al-fawa'id, 365. (56) Ibid., 372; but see also ibid., 321.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

existence would be, as a rule, greater than the evil which might come from it.(57)

During the rule of the Khwarazmshahs there was an increase in

arbitrary action by the government and its military forces were notorious for their brutality towards the population. It is not without interest that Nasir al-Din Munshi Kirmani attributes the fall of the Khwarazmshahs to their turning aside from the path of

equity: "unbelief and Islam joined hands and overthrew that house".(58) It is perhaps partly because of the unsatisfactory state of affairs under the Khwarazmshahs that Rawandi, who grew up during the reign of Toghril b. Arslanshah, the last of the Saljuqs of 'Iraq, and was an eyewitness of the occupation of 'Iraq by the troops of the Khwarazmshah, considered the establishment of justice to lie not in abstract terms but in the appointment of just officials. He writes that four persons ensured the stability of the kingdom: (i) a just qddi who shows respect towards God in the execution of the decrees of the sharl'a and is not influenced by praise or blame from the people-the praise of the khawass or the blame of the 'awamm (which perhaps implies that the judgements of qddfs tended to be supported by the former and opposed by the latter); (ii) a sahib dfwdn who obtains justice for the oppressed from the oppressor and for the weak from the strong; (iii) a wise wazir who puts into operation the laws of the public treasury, such as the proper levy of kharij and of jizya from the Jews and does not permit tyranny; and (iv) a chamberlain who reports news accurate- ly and truthfully.(59) The anonymous Trfkh-i shaht, commission- ed by Padishah Khatun, the daughter of Qutlugh Terken, the ruler of Kirman, and probably written about 680/1281, was also familiar with this formulation and rightly attributes it to the caliph al- Mansuir.(60) Rawandi's statement carries the implication that justice in its several senses-shar'f justice and the implement-

(57) Ed. Muhammad Khan Malik al-Kuttab Bambai, lith., Bombay, A.H. 1323, 218.

(58) Simf al-'ula, ed. 'Abbas Iqbal, Tehran, AHS 1328, 5. (59) Rdaha al-sudar, ed. Muhammad Iqbal, London, 1921, 386-7. Rawandi

began the Rahat al-sudir in 599/1202 and dedicated it first to Rukn al-Din

Sulaymanshah, the Saljuq of Rum, who had usurped the throne of his elder brother

Ghiyath al-Din Kay Khusraw in 597/1200-1. After Rukn al-Din's death in 601/1204-5 Rawandi rededicated his book to Ghiyath al-Din (ibid., xix).

(60) Ed. Muhammad Ibrahim Bastani Parizi, Shahinshahi 2535, 8, and see Tabari, pt. 3, 398, Anno 158.

A. K. LAMBTON

ation of the law and the proper administration of the finances, protection of the oppressed and the weak, and vigilance by the ruler based on accurate information-were needed to ensure stability. He also alleges that there was no distinction in his time between an unbeliever and a Muslim, which perhaps accounts for his reference to the levy of jizya which does not appear in Tabari's version in relation to al-Mansfr or in the Tarrkh-i shahi. The conclusion to be drawn from this assertion would seem to be that the quality of justice ought to be expected of a Muslim, but that when Rawandi was writing this expectation was no longer fulfilled.

Najm al-Din Razi (d. 654/1256) and Nasir al-Din Tusi (597-672/ 1201-74) bridged the Khwarazmshahi and Mongol periods. They came from different backgrounds and represent different points of view. Both were important and influenced later writers. The former was a Sunni and a Sifi, the latter an Imami Shii. Both were influenced by the concept of the philosopher king, which Najm al-Din interprets in terms of Sufism and Nasir al-Din in terms of Shi'ism.

Najm al-Din fled from Hamadan before the Mongols in 618/1221 and came to Malatiya and was for a time in the service of Kay Qubad in Qaysari. He describes the just king in the context of the sharl'a. God, he states, had placed obedience to learned and just kings on a par with obedience to Himself and His prophet. Justice and beneficence characterised the ideal king. The king was to free his soul from carnal desires and bring them under the control of the sharf'a. He was to turn his heart to God so that he might become worthy of His grace and favour and be strengthened by divine support; and so that he might be empowered as the deputy of God over His servants, and might approach nearer to God in everything he did, and thus acquire greater honour in the courts of God.(61)

Justice for Najm al-Din was thus a state of mind. The actual dispensation of justice in his exposition was covered by the quality of beneficence, which embraced a number of negative and positive actions. These were to spread equity, to refrain from tyranny and to preserve equality among the subjects, not to empower the

(61) Mirsad al-'ibdd min al-mabda' ila'l-ma'dd, ed. Husayn al-Husayni al- Ni'matallihi, Tehran, AHS 1312, 246-7. For further details on Najm al-Din's life see H. Algar's translation of the Mirsdd al-'ibdd, entitled The path of God's bondsmen from origin to return, New York, 1982, Introduction, 8.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

strong over the weak, and not to place the load of the rich upon the poor; to show courtesy and generosity to the subjects; to treat the strong with civility and to succour the poor and those with large families with alms and daily bread; and to accept responsibility for the welfare of travellers. The remainder of the actions imposed upon the ruler by beneficence hardly concern the dispensation of justice except so far as this is seen in religious and ethical terms- though in a sense because of the connection between public finance and just government they form part of a coherent system. These actions included treating the abstinent and learned with respect and seeing that they had sufficient allowances; stimulating the students of the religious sciences to study; enquiring after them and giving them what they needed by way of allowances; holding the righteous and the servants of God in respect; so acting that the thoughts of the Sfifs and the devout might support him; relieving their needs and consulting them concerning the affairs of the kingdom; respecting the sayyids and seeing that they received the dues to which they were entitled, and giving them, if they could not be given sadaqa,(62) gifts and allowances; associating with darvishes and mystics, giving help to them in a lawful way and ensuring that they were free from anxiety, so that they might occupy themselves with God with collected minds, because the world was made stable by the blessing which derived from their activities. This group had (a right to) a share in the public treasury, which it was incumbent to give them even if they did not demand it because of the loftiness of their religion and high aspirations. (3)

Justice, thus meant full and perfect obedience to God; and beneficence, seen as the dispensation of justice, carried with it wide implications of a public and private nature. The ruler, after the

performance of his obligatory religious duties, was to turn his attention to the affairs of the kingdom, to investigate the condition of the country and the people, and to exert himself in according to the people the rights which they enjoyed as Muslims.

In his personal relations the just ruler would refrain from sin (fisq wa fuqur wa fisad). In public affairs he would not institute bad customs, increase the taxes or farm offices; and false charges would not be trumped up against the people, or mulcts taken from

(62) Some sayyids were not entitled to sadaqa. (63) Ibid., 247.

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A. K. LAMBTON

them or fines without cause; the innocent would not be falsely accused or extraordinary levies made upon them unnecessarily; the inheritance of orphans would not be misappropriated; there would be no improper interference in or usurpation of awqaf and their revenue would not be withheld from those who were entitled to it; and no attempts to abolish the grant of pensions to the religious classes would be made. All these things were probably of common occurrence when Najm al-Din was writing. The benefi- cence of the ruler also involved accessibility; but he was not to allow men of evil conduct into his presence or to make his intimates bold in the commission of acts of tyranny or to encourage them to amass worldly wealth.(64)

Nasir al-Din Tfsi was originally in the service of the Isma'ili governor of Quhistan in eastern Persia and subsequently in Isma'ili employment in Alamut. In 654/1256 when Hiilegii took Alamut and Maymfn Diz, Nasir al-Din entered his service. In the Akhldq-i ndsirf Nasir al-Din looks back to Ibn Miskawaih and al- Farabi, to whom he admits his indebtedness in his third discourse, Siydsat-i mudun (The government of cities, i.e. politics),(65) and to Plato and Aristotle. It is not possible to trace the actual chain of transmission: the gap in time is too great, and in any case many of the ideas found in the writings of Nasir al-Din were part of the common stock of knowledge current in intellectual circles in medieval Islam. The Akhliq-i Ndsirf is dedicated to Nasir al-Din, the governor of Quhistan, and appears to have been in circulation before the Mongol invasion under Hiilegii. A second dedication to Hiilegii was added later. Nasir al-Din, like Fakhr al-Din R5zi considers justice to be the most excellent of qualities and to comprehend all other virtues. He also accepts the traditional view that the material prosperity of the world depended on justice and that tyranny resulted in the ruin of the world.

After discussing justice briefly in abstract terms in the seventh section of his first discourse, Tahdh(b-i akhldq (The correction of dispositions), he states that justice denotes the idea of equality (musdqdt), or equivalence, and is the most perfect of virtues. He then considers justice in respect of matters necessitated by the ordering of daily life and concludes that justice cannot be preserved among men without three things, the Divine Command,

(64) Ibid., 249-251. (65) The Nasirean ethics, tr. G. M. Wickens, London, 1964, 187.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

a human arbitrator and money.(") In his third discourse he gives an account of righteous and unrighteous cities. In the fourth section he discusses the conduct of kings and kingship, dividing government into two kinds, righteous government, i.e. the imamate, and domination (taghallub). In the former the governor holds fast to justice ('addlat), "treating his subjects as friends, filling the city with widespread goods and regarding himself as the master of appetites"; in the latter the governor "holds fast to tyranny (jaur), treating his subjects as servants and slaves, filling the city with general evils, and regarding himself as the hireling of appetites".(67) If justice prevailed the state would endure; if not it would speedily vanish.(6)

Justice, Nasir al-Din holds, demanded first that equipoise should be maintained among the people. He divides them into four classes, the people of the pen, the people of the sword, merchants and cultivators, which is reminiscent of the hierarchical structure of pre-Islamic Persia and the belief of Nizam al-Mulk and others that stability was bound up with the maintenance of the social order. Secondly justice required that the king should determine the rank of each one of the subjects according to their merit and aptitude, and thirdly that he should preserve equality between them in the division of common goods in which matter he should also take into consideration merit and aptitude.(69) Having fulfilled the conditions demanded by justice the king should then show beneficence to the subjects, but not in such a way that the awe in which he was held would be diminished.(70) Nasir al-Din, like earlier writers, was not unmindful of the dangers posed by civil disturbance.

Mongol rule brought changes in the practice of government, but there is little evidence that it brought changes in the theory of government. This may or may not be the case-the sources upon which we must perforce rely for evidence were written by Muslims (not by Mongols). The problem was not the question of the distinctiveness of the ideas of the Mongols and their relationship to Islamic thought, but the political, economic and social effects of

(66) Ibid., 95ff. (67) Ibid., 227. (68) Ibid., 229. (69) Ibid., 232. (70) Ibid., 233.

49

their presence in the ddr al-isldm. The real conflict lay in the relation of the needs and interests of the Mongols to the local population. We do not, therefore, find (and should not, perhaps, expect to find) new formulations of the theory of justice but only allegations of its absence in political, economic and social affairs. Writers do not in general discuss the ideas of the invaders but merely deplore their methods of conquest and the tyranny of their government.

ShiF jurists continue to discuss justice in an absolute sense,(71) but this had little influence on their attitude towards the temporal government. So far as the holding of office on behalf of an unjust sultan and cooperation with an unjust government are concerned, the theoretical basis of the Shri position remained little changed. Najm al-Din Ja'far b. Yahya al-Muhaqqiq (602- 76/1205-1277), like Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tusi (d. 460/1067), holds that the exercise of authority on behalf of a just sultan is permissible and might in some circumstances be obligatory. In the case of unjust sultans, he is equally convinced of the need for co-operation, and like al-Tfsi, has recourse to the principal of Iaqiyya to justify this. He states that tradition permitted the exercise of authority on behalf of an unjust sultan provided that he who did so was certain that he would be safe from the commission of forbidden acts and would be able to enjoin the good and forbid evil. Further, if he was forced to accept office by an unjust imam, it was permissible for him to do so in order to prevent harm (daf'-i madarral), and while doing so to indulge in taqiyya, even if what he was required to do was forbidden, always excepting the case of the killing of Muslims.(72) In practice, dislike and hatred of Sunni government led to a favourable, or at least ambivalent, attitude towards the Mongols among Shris, especially those of southern 'Iraq. Nasir al-Din Tusi, as stated above, accepted office from Hiilegii and was with him during his attack on Baghdad. Later he was head of the observatory built by Abaqa at Maragha and was also placed in charge of the awqif of the empire. Both al-

(71) Cf. Hasan b. Yusuf b. 'All b. al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, al-Bdbu'l-hddi 'ashar, with commentary by Miqdad-i-Fadil al-Hilli (tr. by W. McElwee Miller), London, 1958, 40-53.

(72) Al-Mukhtasar al-ndfi' (tr. from Arabic into Persian, ed. Muhammad Taqi Danishpazhuh), Tehran, AHS 1343, 149-150, Sharayi' al-isldm, ed. 'Abd al-Husayn Muhammad 'All, Najaf, A.H. 1389, ii, 12. See also Lambton, State and government in Medieval Islam, 256.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

Muhaqqiq al-Hilli and al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (648-726/1250-1325) appear to have co-operated with the Ilkhanid government. By the time of the latter the situation had changed: the Ilkhanate had become a Muslim government and so far as it denied the legitimacy of Shil claims to the imamate it was "unjust". The question of cooperation was once more sharpened. Nevertheless Ibn al- Mutahhar was an influential figure at the court of Oljeiti and its reported to have been responsible for the latter's conversion to Imami Shi'ism. It is possible that a detailed comparison of al- Mutahhar was an influential figure at the court of Oljeitii and is emphasis in respect of collaboration with an unjust government.

Writers continued to assert the importance of justice, but there are some slight differences of emphasis. These reflect the uncertainties and insecurities of the time. Right religion no longer played a dominant part as it had under the Saljuqs. The Ilkhans did not become Muslims permanently until the reign of Ghazan Khin (694-703/1295-1304); Tegider (680-3/1281-4) was converted, but died shortly afterwards. Prior to the reign of Ghazan there was thus no point in an appeal to right religion. Also, the attitude of the Mongols towards the division between Sunnis and ShfTs was less sharp than had been that of the Saljuqs. The connection between justice and shar'f law never- theless continued, but even after the conversion of the Mongols it was less marked than had been the case formerly. The inter- dependence of religion and state was recognised as axiomatic,(73) but so also was the separation of shar't law and Mongol law.(74) The need for justice in the conduct of affairs is spoken of in such phrases as bar qanin-i ma'dilal wa yasaq(75) (according to the law of justice and the yasa).

Qashani, in the opening passage of the Tdarkh-i Oljeiti, which he wrote in the reign of Abu Said, Oljeitii's son and successor, makes an effort to reassert the traditional view of kingship and the importance of justice. It reads: "In every period God chooses from among men, in order to assure the stability and unity of the world, the ordering of the affairs of mankind, and the regulation of the economy and politics (tadbir-i mandzil wa mudun), a great

(73) Cf. Muhammad b. Hindushah b. Nakhchivan, Dastir al-kaiib. ed. A.A. 'All- zadeh, ii, Moscow, 1972, 29-30.

(74) Ibid., 30ff., 35. (75) Cf. ibid., 35, 36, 37.

A. K. LAMBTON

king, who has the status of the Shadow of God upon Earth, so that by reason of the awe inspired by his punishment and his display of equity and justice, he keeps [his] many subjects firm and constant in perpetuating his commands and prohibitions and obliges them to perform those things which are approved by the shart'a, such as devotion and worship, so that the truth of the hadith "religion and kingship are twins" is demonstrated".(76)

Ibn Tiqtaqa who wrote the Kitcb al-fakhrf in 701/1302 and dedicated it to Fakhr al-Din 'Isa b. Ibrahim, the malik of Mawsil, included in it a mirror. In this he states that justice and intelligence were among the qualities required by the ruler; he also needed coercive power. Intelligence, for Ibn Tiqtaqa, included resolution (hazm) and was the basis upon which the security of the kingdom rested. By justice the ruler caused the revenue from the taxes to be abundant and the country prosperous, and by coercive power he prevented bloodshed, preserved the wealth of others, protected morals, prevented evil, suppressed wrongdoers and forestalled injustice which led to civil war and disturbance. It was his duty to protect the country, to make the fortifications of the frontier strong, to ensure the security of the roads and to put down the wicked. In return he was entitled to the obedience of his subjects. The kingdom was made fertile by generosity, prosperous by justice and stable by intelligence, and it was protected by bravery and administered by authority (ri'isa).(77)

The Tdrtkh-i shahL, referred to above, was written in Kirman for Padishah Khatun, who had a varied and turbulent life during which she was married to the Ilkhan Abaqa. It is devoted largely to an account of the reign of her mother, Qutlugh Terken Khatun, who ruled Kirman in succession to her husband Qutb al-Din Muhammad, who died in 655/1257. Apart from its value for the history of Kirman, it shows the familiarity of its author with earlier works on the theory of government. It also contains some original insights. The author, who has not been identified, quotes from the Jcawddn Khirad (probably in the version of Ibn Miskawaih), the works of Ibn al-Muqaffa', the Akhldq-i Ndsir( of Nasir al-Din TUsi, and Nasir al-Din's essay on finance written probably for Hiilegii, or possibly for Abaqa. He was also familiar with the Mirsdd al-'ibdd of Najm al-Din Razi, and probably also

(76) Ed. Mahin Hambly, Tehran, 1969, 1-2. (77) Kitib al-fakhrf, Cairo, A.H. 1317, 14, 20, 30, 46, 52.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

with the Jami' al-'ulum of Fakhr al-Din Razi. He seeks sanction for the theories he puts forward in the Qur'an and the Traditions and illustrates the points he wishes to make with stories of the caliphs and others and, when discussing the wazirate, of the Barmakids and Nizam al-Mulk. He was writing for a Muslim patron in an outlying province of the Ilkhanate and was not, therefore, subject to the same constraints as writers, such as Rashid al-Din Fadl Allah, at the centre of the empire.

He states that just and perfect kings succeeded prophets as the deputies (nuwwaib) of the divine institute (nawdmls-i ilhih) and the guardians and protectors of right religion, for "religion was the foundation and kingship the guardian". Kings brought order into the affairs of men and caused them to follow right conduct: the sultan was the Shadow of God upon earth.(78) Having thus laid down the Islamic framework into which to fit his exposition, he follows Nasir al-Din Tfsi, and states that God had created men as civic persons and made their livelihood dependent upon co- operation and the division of labour. Like Nasir al-Din, he considers that the preservation of justice and the maintenance of equity among the people could only be achieved by a divine institute, a just and perfect arbitrator and a silent adjuster and mediator. The divine institute, which was the controlling force of

equality and equilibrium, and that which reconciled deficiency and excess, was the source of unity. The just and perfect arbitrator, who was the lord of commands and prohibitions, was the just king, and the silent adjuster and mediator was a monetary currency (dinar), through which the order and stability of the lower world was achieved, so that each person attained to his proper position. Like Nasir al-Din Tusi, he seeks Quranic sanction for this system, but departs slightly from Nasir al-Din's exposition in that he interprets the divine institute as the Qur'an (not the sharf'a). He also lays greater emphasis on the possession of coercive force by the just king, without which, he maintains, the benefits of a monetary currency and the establishment of equilibrium and equalisation could not be achieved. The foundations of the world rested on temporal rule and coercive power (asds-i dunyd Calat wa imdrat wa siyisat mumahhad wa mu'add migarddnad).(79)

(78) Tarfkh-i shahl, 2-3. (79) Ibid., 2-4.

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A. K. LAMBTON

The author of the Tdarkh-i shiahl discusses the duties of the just king, which has implications for the meaning which he attaches to justice. Unfortunately the text appears to have lacunae at the beginning of this discussion. It seems likely that the omissions concern the treatment of the different classes of people, possibly on the basis of various types of city (following al-Faragi and Nasir al- Din TUsi). The text as published starts with a short passage on the treatment of craftsmen and then goes on to a discussion of the fiscal and economic measures which a just ruler should take-thus implicitly relating justice to the financial administration of the state. It was incumbent upon him to levy dues on the circulation of goods, the fruits of the earth, and the natural increase of flocks and herds, and to spend the proceeds on the public interest, as for example in the provision of troops and the defence of the frontiers. It was also incumbent upon him to keep himself informed about inheritance and what the people of the city acquired (through trade, etc.) and to extract any residue in accordance with the sharC'a and place it in the public treasury, and order the proceeds to be devoted to the livelihood of those whose trade was meagre and those who were in need by reason of illness or some other constraint.(80) It was also incumbent upon the just ruler to fix wages and the hire charged by muleteers, the prices of foodstuffs and garments and other goods from which merchants and tradespeople gained profit or suffered loss, according to rules and regulations which would ensure that they would receive their due reward and that no harm or injustice would be suffered by employers and wholesale merchants (bdrsaldrain) or purchasers so that justice and equity might be observed with regard to both parties. The duties of the muhlasib were to be laid down and lists of goods available for sale in the shops of the merchants with their prices were to be recorded on tablets or on a piece of paper affixed to the wall above the door of the shop, so that the interest of both buyer and seller would be protected. Usury was to be forbidden. (81)

No distinction is made between politics and morals, and the just ruler was required to intervene in moral affairs, to prevent forbidden things such as gambling and immoral actions, and he was to encourage the people of the city to marry several spouses

(80) Ibid., 5. (81) Ibid., 6.

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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

because such action would contribute to the survival of the

species.(82) In short it was for the just king to supervise all the affairs of the kingdom, great and small, and to order all things according to the rule of justice.(83)

The author states in a discussion on justice that it was the most excellent quality of kings and sultans, because justice was the rule of the kingdom of God and without the basis of equity there could be no stability or permanence. Without the guiding hand of justice (mudabbir-i 'adl) stability in the affairs of the kingdom, the ease of the subjects, and the embellishment of the kingdom could not be achieved. The Qur'an and the Traditions, he asserts, bore witness to this, and he repeats the oft-quoted tradition "one hour of justice is better than seventy years of worship" and adds that "on the day of resurrection the just king will rest in the shadow of God while the accounts of the people are being settled". As wise men had said "a just king is better than heavy rain". The just man was beloved of the people even if they did not benefit from his justice and the tyrant was hated by the people even if they did not suffer from his tyranny. Thus, blessings were called down upon Anfishirawan, although he was an unbeliever who worshipped fire, while curses were called down upon Hajjaj, who was a Muslim, born of Muslim parents, and who had known the Companions of the Prophet and the Followers.(84)

At this point the author introduces a passage on the tyranny of the pen, which he asserts to be worse than the tyranny of the sword-a somewhat original interpretation of the meaning of tyranny. The tyranny of the pen, he states, was hidden while the tyranny of the sword was open, and it was easier to put right an evil which was open than one which was hidden. The tyranny of the sword passed quickly but the tyranny of the pen was like a perennial sickness, or like the sparks of a fire which blaze fiercely in the corner of a house and gradually burn up everything. Its heat is not realised until it is blazing so fiercely that it cannot be put out. Concluding, he states, "The evil, corruption, tyranny and injustice which flow towards the people of Kirman from the pens of evil scribes in Kirman at this time is worse than the swords of the

(82) Ibid., 5-6. (83) Ibid., 6. (84) Ibid., 36-7.

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A. K. LAMBTON

Mongols which have made the earth a sea of blood."(85) He promises to explain this in the proper place, but in fact he does not apparently do so and the reader is left in ignorance of what lies behind his description of "the tyranny of the pen".

In another passage the author states that any king who refrained from giving gifts would never achieve his desires. Those versed in practical affairs said that liberality (hurriyyal)(86) was preferable to justice, and he seeks to justify this by a somewhat obscure argument, and concludes that men loved a generous man better than a just man, although the order of the world depended upon justice more than upon liberality.(87) This passage does not follow naturally from the writer's other discussions, and the reason for its inclusion can only be guessed. It is possible, since it is followed (after various stories) by a description of gifts made by Ogedei,(88) that the author wished to praise Ogedei but was not prepared to praise him for his justice or to accord to him the status of a just ruler in the technical sense. This is, perhaps, an illustration of the dilemma of Muslims writing under non-Muslim rule. Or maybe, like Wassaf, he is merely calling attention to the weakness of men (see below).

Rashid al-Din Fadl Allah, wazir and sahib diuwdn to Ghazan and Oljeitii, wrote at the centre of the empire. He seeks, like Qashani, to reassert the traditional view of justice and the importance attached to it. This is to be seen in the text of some of the yarlighs issued by Ghazan Khan and contained in Rashid al-Din's Tdrlkh-i ghazani.(89) The inspiration of these yarlighs is presumably to be attributed at least in part to Rashid al-Din. He also points to the interdependence of good adminis- tration, agricultural development, justice and coercive punishment and also to the need of equipoise in everything. The justice of the ruler, he states, must be like the sun and shine upon the people of the world everywhere.(90) He puts into the mouth of

(85) Ibid., 39. (86) It is clear from the context that the writer is using the term hurriyyal in the

sense of liberality. (87) Tarkh-i shahi, 72-3. (88) Ibid., 74-5. Rukn al-Din b. Khwaja-Juq b. Baraq IHajib received a yarligh

for Kirman from Ogedei and supplanted his cousin Qutb al-Din Muhammad (to whom Qutlugh Terken was married). Qutb al-Din then went with his family and household to the ordu in the hope of dispossessing his cousin.

(89) Ed. K. Jahn, London, 1940, 229. Cf. 257. (90) Ibid., 186.

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Ghazan the statement that God had appointed him (Ghazan) over the people to administer their affairs and to maintain justice and

equality between them.(91) In a letter to his son Shihab al-Din, the governor of Tustar and

Ahwaz, Rashid al-Din interprets justice to be an all-embracing concept comprising a variety of qualities, most of them of an ethical nature. To spread justice and equity was the greatest quality and highest virtue of kings and governors and was incumbent in financial affairs (dar mil), in action and in speech. He then sets out the meaning of justice in these three fields. First, in financial affairs, his son was to distribute to the deserving poor all that he acquired lawfully (az wajh-i halal). To give to the undeserving was prodigality and waste, and in doing so he would be acting unjustly. Secondly, justice in speech consisted in making the tongue the touchstone and measure of truth. He enjoins his son to say what should be said and to keep silence in what should not be said and not to praise anyone except to the extent that he deserved. Thirdly, justice in action lay in enjoining the good and forbidding evil and in protecting the subjects and striving to improve their conditions and to secure their happiness. Negatively it meant that he would not inflict punishment on the innocent, listen to false accusations or defamatory statements, covet the wealth and position of others, allow himself to be influenced by the blame of sinners and corrupt persons or to listen to their advice. Justice meant that he would not fall short in doing God's work, that he would not transgress the limits set by God, and would in all things observe the mean. Further justice demanded that he should order his servants not to transgress their limits because, if they did, they would become bold towards him and covet the goods and positions of other men, trouble persons of high birth (idzdagdn) and stir up sedition, so that great weakness would appear in the affairs of the kingdom and they would incite the people to rebel against him. Lastly, he should not make his inner and outer garment pride, anger, violence, vengeance, false pretences (talbfs), deceit, lying, deviation from righteousness (fisq), avarice, peculation (khiyanat), covetousness, greed, envy, rancour, flattery, hypocrisy, impudence, haughtiness, and cruelty, but that he should make clemency, forgiveness, sincerity, abstinence, generosity, bravery,

(91) Ibid., 198.

A. K. LAMBTON

loyalty, contentment (qand'aI), faithfulness, chastity ('afaf), asceticism, modesty (haya'), humility, faithfulness, compassion, mercy and worship his profession.(92)

The last writer I wish to consider is Wassaf. He was an official in the finance department in Fars and had close experience of the administration of the province and of the flagrant abuses of Ilkhanid rule in the province. In his history, commonly called the Tdarkh-i Wassaf, which he wrote in the reign of Oljeiti, he included a mirror, the Akhldq al-saltana. In view of local circumstances, it is not surprising that he should have regarded justice as of fundamental importance. It was, he states, the foundation of all virtues and the guardian of order in all creation. Without justice the kingdom would not remain stable.(93) He adds, however, a new dimension to justice, beneficence, though he may, perhaps, have been influenced in this by Najm al-Din Razi and Nasir al-Din Tfsi (see above). But the latter's approach was rather different: it was only after the king had carried out the demands of the law of

justice that he was to show beneficence to his subjects.(94) Wassaf states that men, because of their weakness, were not satisfied with mere justice but wished for grace as well. Here, he would seem to have in mind the justice of the jurists, for he states that the just requital of evil was one of the principles of the shart'a and also one of the canons of kingship. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the

king to mete out punishment, but Wassaf believed that justice should be tempered by beneficence.(95) In this connection he may well have had in mind, and wished to lessen, the essentially arbitrary nature of the proceedings of the yarghu, the Mongol court of interrogation. He recognises also the need for a full treasury- another fact which he will have learnt from experience. In his view, justice, prosperity, the happiness of the subjects and a full treasury went together. If the king was concerned simply to amass money, the kingdom would not flourish, the treasury would not be filled and hatred or curses would be the lot of the king.(96) Here, too, Wassaf is, no doubt, speaking from experience.

(92) Muklaabat-i rash_id, ed. Muhammad Shaf', Lahore, A.H. 1364, 112ff.

(93) Tajziyat al-amsar wa tazjiyal al-a'sar, commonly known as the Tadrkh-i Wassaf, ed. N. M. Isfahan!, lith., Bombay, A.H. 1269, 486.

(94) The Nasirean ethics, 233. (95) Tarnkh-i Wassaf, 486. (96) Ibid., 491.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

To sum up, the shar'( theory of justice, laid down in the early centuries of Islam, and associated primarily with moral probity, was supplemented during the Saljuq period by theories deriving from conceptions which had been current (or were believed to have been current) under the pre-Islamic Persian kings. A central core of maxims for which sanction was sought in the Qur'an and the Traditions was evolved and repeated by generations of writers over the centuries. In the light of this body of received wisdom, which had to a great extent, been formulated before the Saljuq period, obedience to the just ruler, the Shadow of God upon earth, was justified as obedience to God and His prophet. Justice did not justify the law; the law justified justice. The purpose of the government of the just ruler was the establishment of conditions in which right religion could be lived and Islamic virtues practised. His task was to maintain the balance of mundane society by giving each group within society its due place and function. The fact that conversely obedience to an unjust ruler must have implied disobedience to God and His prophet receives less attention, similarly the question of the duty of disobedience towards an unjust ruler is seldom discussed. This was because of the fear that disorder might accompany, or result from, attempts to overthrow an unjust ruler-an attitude which also long predates the Saljuq period. Experience had taught men to value stability and to fear that which threatened it. Partly because of this, emphasis is laid on the need for the just ruler to possess coercive force-a requirement which both al-Ghaz5al and Nizam al-Mulk laid down. Increasingly justice came to be seen not in specific terms of shart' justice but ideally as the harmonious relationship of society in a divinely appointed system; and at a lower or more practical level as the maintenance of the different groups of society in their proper station. Nasir al-Din Tfsi interpreted this to mean that each would attain to that perfection which lay within him, but in effect the interpretation of justice as the maintenance of equipoise led not to a harmonious relationship of society but to a continuance of the status quo. How far this interpretation of justice was accepted by the common people (however much they may have acquiesced in it), is a matter for conjecture.

I have given considerable space to two works belonging to the middle of the 7th/13th century, the Mirsdd al-'ibdd of Najm al-Din Razi and the Tdirkh-i shaht, because they seem to me to contain certain insights not found in the other works discussed. As I

59

suggested in an earlier article,(97) part of Najm al-Din's work would appear to be a protest against contemporary practices. More importantly, as a Sfif plr he had a large popular following and hence his views are, perhaps, the nearest we get to what the common people expected of the just ruler. The Tarikh-i shdah is interesting first for the extent to which the author is aware of the traditional theories of justice and the way in which he places the ideas taken from Nasir al-Din Tfsi unreservedly in an Islamic framework, and secondly for the attention which he gives to fiscal and economic justice.

With the breakdown in traditional forms of government after the Mongol invasions, justice is no longer seen as co-extensive with right religion and is even more closely associated than heretofore with coercive power. The question of obedience to unjust rulers ceases to be discussed (except in works of fiqh). The Mongols did not, prior to the reign of Ghazan Khan, recognise the claim of Islam to be the only true religion and the concept that justice derived its justification from conformity with the divine law hence became muted. Finally, with the conversion of the Ilkhans to Islam the hadith "Religion and kingship are twins" again became axiomatic and the association of justice with the shar'a was reasserted.

A. K. LAMBTON

(London)

(97) 'Justice in the medieval Persian theory of kingship', Studia Islamica, xvii (1962), 112. Also in Theory and practice in medieval Persian government, Variorum

Reprints, London, 1980.

60 A. K. LAMBTON