anthropology of religious belief
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Religious Belief
Author(s): Martin SouthwoldSource: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 628-644Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802151.
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RELIGIOUS BELIEF
MARTIN OUTHWOLD
Universityf
Manchester
Those who loyally
ubscribe o a
religionnormally
do believe at
least tsbasic
tenets.
uch
believing
s an
important art
of
religiousbehaviour,
nd we should
understand
nd describe
it more exactly.
To
dismissbelief as a matter
for
psychology
s
an
error,
which rests n
a
fallacy. hough Leach
has
fallen
nto this rror
he has also
pointed
o
a fruitful
pproach.
The
truth f at leastbasicreligious enets s differentromfactual ruth: tmaybe calledsymbolic
truth.
t is
argued
that basic
religious
tenets are
empirically indeterminate, xiomatic,
symbolic,
nd
collective.
From
this
the
mostappropriate ognitive
attitude o
them
can be
inferred: t
is
suggested
hat
religious
belief
may commonly approximate
o this.
Religious
believersdo not ack
rationality
n
believing
enets
which have the
four
haracteristicsoted:
it would
be less
rational o prefer rticles f
faithwhich did not have
them.
I
Justwhat does belief' mean n
a
religious
ontext?
Of all the
problems urrounding ttempts
to conduct anthropological nalysisof religionthis s theone thathas perhapsbeen most
troublesome
and
therefore
he most often
voided, usually by relegating
t
to psychology,
that
raffish utcast
discipline
to which social
anthropologists
re forever
consigning
phenomena they
are unable to deal with
within
the
framework
of a
denatured
Durkheimianism. ut theproblem
will
not go away,
t
s not merely' psychological nothing
social is),
and no
anthropological heory f religion which fails o attack t is worthyof the
name
(Geertz I966: 24-5).
Shortly
fterwards each
produced
n
apt llustration
f this vasion when
he wrote,
n
his paper Virgin birth':
When an
ethnographer eports
hat
members of the X
tribe believe
that.
.
.' he is
giving
a
description f anorthodoxy, dogma, somethingwhich strueof the culture s a whole. But
Professor
piro (and all theneo-Tylorianswho think ike him) desperatelywants to believe
that the
evidence
can tell us
much more
than that-that dogma and ritual must somehow
correspond to the
inner
psychological attitudesof the actors concerned. We need only
consider he customs f
our
own
society
o
see
that his s not
so
(Leach I967: 40).
II
By
these remarks each
appears
to be
saying
that
an ethnographic eport
that
people
believe a certain
roposition eports
heir dherence o a
dogma
andonly hat: tdoesnottell us that hepeoplebelieve-in theordinary ense
of
'hold as
true' -the proposition.Put like this, the contention ppears
implausible,not
to
say perverse.2 each's reference o 'inner psychological
attitudes',
n
place
of the second believe',
serves o obscure this fact. t also
provides
an
argument, lbeit fallacious,
n
support f the contention.And it
Man
(N.S.) 4, 628-44.
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD 629
also
has the effect
f
confounding
wo contentions:
he one
we have
noticed,
which s
wrong,
nd
anotherwhich s
right
nd fruitful.
Let us firstustify ur interpretationf inner psychological ttitudes' s a
paraphrase or believe'.
i) Immediately
fter he
passage ited,
each writes f
women
going through
the Englishmarriage ervice,which
he
briefly
utlines.He
comments:
But
all
this tells me absolutely nothing
about the inner
psychological
state of the
lady
in
question: I cannot nfer rom he ritual itherwhat
she feels r what
she
knows. She
may
be
an outright theist.Alternatively
he
may
believe
that
church
marriage
s essential
or
the
well-beingof her future hildren I967: 40).
2) Leach explainswhat he is trying o say.
... partly I am interested n the problem of method .. how should we interpret
ethnographical tatementsbout palpable untruth?
. .
Why
do all
thesepeople believe
in
somethingwhich is untrue? I967: 44).
Intermittentlyt least,Leach supposes hatwe have to understand eports
that
people
believe
what s
palpably
untruefor
hem:
hat,
hat
s,they
do not
believe,
.e.
hold as true.
3) Spiro interpreted
each's words
as I have: thus he
summarises
each's
argument
s
containing:
... two main theses: the culturalbelief
concerning onception
does not
mean what it
says,
and,even if tdoes,the nativesdo notbelievewhat itsays
I968:
243).
4)
So too did Needham
(I972: 5-7);
thus
n
repudiating
each's
approach
he
states
luntly:
Something
that
s
believed
by nobody
is not a
belief...
(I972: 6).
Now
there
s
a
grain
of truth n this ontentionwhich we
have understood
fromLeach's
words. t does
happen
that
ndividuals
who
publicly dhere
o a
dogma nevertheless,
ore or less
privately,
isbelieve t:
certainly
found
his
among my
Sinhalese
nformants. here can be situationsn
which
a
dogma
is
maintained
n
a
society
ven
though most,conceivablyall,
members f the
societydisbelieve t. But it is mostunlikely hat a competent thnographer
reporting
n such a situationwould
barelyreport
hat
he
people
believe the
dogma:
he
would
surely realise,
nd
report,
hat the
people
maintain the
dogma
but
do
not
believe it.
If
a
competent thnographer eports
hat
his
people
believe
something,
e
surely
means hat
hey
do
believe
t,
.e. hold it as
true
n
some
sense.
Leach
was misled
by
the few
obscure
reports
which
appear
to
say
that
certain
peoples
maintain
dogma
that
opulation
does not
cause
conception:
which,
as
he
argues,
mustbe
palpably
untrue orthem. do
not
wish to take
space
to
re-open
his
hoary ontroversy;
ut t
shouldbe
remarked hat
Leach,
like many otheranthropologists, isreadthe evidence.The principal
ocus
disputandi
as
a
passage by
W. E. Roth
describing group
of
Australian
Aborigines;
t
may conveniently
e consulted n
Spiro I968: 242, citingRoth
I903:
22. Leach seems to
have
supposed
that Roth
reported that these
Aborigines
maintained
hat
opulation
s not a
cause of
conception.But Roth
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630
MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
did not. What he wrote was that heydo not recognise' his onnexion.There
is a subtle distinction etween not recognising fact n certain ontexts
f
discourse, nd denying hat t s a fact. his is similar o the distinction hich
Spiro (I968: 256)
draws between
gnoring
known fact nd
being gnorant
that t
s a
fact.
Malinowski
was indeed more
positive
bout the
Trobrianders,
oth
n his
early eportI9I6) and n hismore onsideredater ccountI932: I53-78).
He reports ategorically
hat heTrobrianders
eniedthat
onception
s
caused
by copulation.
But
he
also makes
it obvious
why they
did. Christian
missionaries
ad
preached
the doctrine nd ideal
of
Paternity' gainst
the
Trobriandethos:
Only during my third xpeditionto New Guinea did I discoverthatthenativeshad been
somewhat exasperatedby having an 'absurdity' preached
at
them,
and
by findingme,
so
unmissionary' s
a
rule, ngaged
n the same futile
rgument I932:
I
59).
What
people say
n
understandable
xasperation ught
not
be
interpreted,
or
reported, s their stablished ogma,
still ess s what
they
believe.
When ethnographerseport
hat heir
eople
believe
something, hey
mean
what
their words
would
naturally
be understood o mean.
They may
be
mistaken
r
confused bout the
facts,
s Malinowski
was, ust
as
theymay
be
wrong
about facts f other
kinds.But
it
does
not
appear
that our
fallibility
concerningbelieving
s of such
an
exceptional
order that
all
ascriptions
f
believing must be discounted.Leach does, however, seem to imply that,
whatever
thnographersmean,
we cannottake
their
reports
s
evidence
that
dogmas
are
believed,
in
the
ordinary
sense
of
the term.
By referring
o
believing
s inner
psychological
ttitudes'
each
suggests
hat t
is,
normally
at
least,
unknowable
because
naccessible.
e
confirmed hatthiswas
indeed
his
mplication
when he
wrote,
n
a
letter eplying
o his
critics:
I claim that he
anthropologist
as
absolutely
no information bout what
is
inwardlyfeltby
any professed
eliever
I 968:
65
5).
On
a
simple nterpretation
his s
plainlyuntrue;
n a
subtler
nterpretation,
whichLeachsurely ntended,trests n a confusion.Whatevermaybe thecase
regarding
vowals of
believing
n
the
first
erson 'I
believe
.
.'),
t s
fallacious
to
supposethatascriptions
f
believingto
a
thirdparty 'he believes . .' or
indeed they believe.. .') necessarily escribe
his inner tate
f
mind, nd are
thereforenwarranted
o
the extent
hathis nner tate
f
mind s
unknown.
I
explain below (p. 633) why this s a fallacy, howing that ascriptions f
believing
to others
re
statements
bout theirobservable
behaviour,
which
ethnographers
an
make,
hould
make,
nd do
make,
for hemost
partreliably
and
informatively.
s
Geertz
said,
to
categorise uestions
bout
believing
as
psychological,
nd thus
beyond
our
competence,
s to shirk
ssues
of
major
anthropological oncern n which we can,andshould,bringourcompetence
to bear.
III
Leach's
unsatisfactory
ormulation
istracts he reader from another, nd
valuable,
contention
hat
an be understood rom
ater
parts
f
his paper. He
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
63I
comes to concede
that n ethnographic eport hat people
believesomething
does imply
that
hey
hold
it
to be true
n
some sense:
the mportant uestion
then s, nwhat sense?
If we are
not
Tylorians
we can
say
what Powell's Trobriand
informants aid.
There are
different indsof truth.Which
is also what good Catholics say
.. (I967: 44).
An alternative
way ofexplaining
beliefwhich isfactually
ntrue
s
to
say
that
t s a
species
of religious
dogma; thetruthwhich it expresses
oes not relate o
the
ordinary
matter-of-fact
world of everyday hingsbut
to metaphysicsI967: 45).
This takes
us right away from the obscurantism
f 'inner psychological
attitudes'.
t
directs
ur
attention
o
the cognitive ttitudes-which,
though
inferential,
re inferable
from
overt
behaviour-appropriate
to truthsof
differentinds. t invites sto examinewhether elieving-holding astrue-
is a more complex and subtle
matter hanwe have sometimes
upposed.
In English
heword true'has
a
wide span
of meaning.Much the ame seems
to
apply
to
parallel
terms
n other
anguages
e.g.
Dinka: Lienhardt
96I:
I
39):
and thismight
ause
an
ethnographer
o
misinterpret
hat
an informant
is sayingwhenhe employs
uch a term.But it is more
important o consider
the
meaning
f our
English
word:
chiefly
ecause his ffects
ow we use true'
and
hence
hold astrue', .e. believe';
and
perhaps
lso because
similar
attern
may
be
present
n
other
anguages.
The
ShorterOxford
EnglishDictionary
lists ixteen
enses nd sub-senses
or
theadjective
true'.
Only one
of these
s
specified s of a statementr belief', nd this s:
'Consistentwith
fact; greeing
with reality;representing
he thing s it s'.
This is
of course
heordinary,r unmarked,
ense f true' n modernEnglish;
I
shall refer o it henceforth
s 'factual truth'.Some of
the other senses, r
something ikethem,might
be applied topropositions,nd
notablyreligious
tenets. nspection uggests
hat themewhichunderlies
most, f not all, senses
is the notion
of
fitting',
whether
n
the direct ense
of
taking
ts
place
in
a
structure, hysical,
ocial,
or
conceptual,
or
in
the derived sense
of
being
'proper', appropriate',
seemly'. Indeed we
say that factuallyrue tatement
'fits hefacts'.)
It is conceivable, hen, hat personwho
describes dogma
as true' might
mean that
t
is
seemly: presumably
most adherentswould
consentto that.
There
are
in
our own society, nd presumably
n others,
ersonswho regard
religious enets
s eyewash,but appropriate
or keeping
the lower orders n
their
properplace.
But
I
assume that
such attitudes, eld exclusively,
re
exceptional;
mostof
thosewho believe
a
tenethold it
to
be true
n
a
stronger
sense
than this.
This was
my experience
n fieldwork
mong
two notably
sophisticated
nd
rational
peoples,
he
Ganda and the
Sinhalese;
nd it is what
I
understand rom
monographs
n
otherpeoples. have
the mpression hat
manySinhaleseheld their enets s true withoutqualification,.e. in a sense
including
factual
truth.This
is
hardly surprising
when one considers
hat
fundamentalistsre common enough
n our own highly ritical ulture.
But
I
also had the
mpression hat
ome peoplewere not fundamentalists,
utheld
their enets s
true
n
a subtler,
more discriminating
ense.
I
regret
hat can report nly mpressions;
did not get
harder acts ecause
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632
MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
I did not at the time grasp
these
ssues.
explore
them now with a view
to
better
research n the
future, y
others nd
by
me. It should
be
possible
to
determine, or representativeampleofpeople,what thecognitive ttitudes
to religious enets eally re;
and it shouldbe done.
Cognitive
attitudes re not
wholly
inner
and
psychological:
we do have information bout
them,
nd
could and
should have
more. There is not a
dichotomy
between mere
adherence
nd fundamentalism:hemost
mportant
ttitudesie between hese
two.
Not
to
get
this
lear s both to demean those
people
whose
believing
we
write
about,
and
also to fail
to
understand
fundamental
spect
of
religious
behaviour.
Just
what does belief mean n a
religious
ontext?'
IV
As I have
indicated,
within
one community
different
ersonsmay
have
different
ognitive
attitudes owards
religious
enets. he
same
person may
have differentttitudes n differentituations
nd contexts
see,
e.g.,
Powell
I956: 277-8 quoted
n
Leach I967: 48 (note
5),
and
of courseEvans-Pritchard
I937 passim).
And there may be differentttitudes
o
different
enets:
hus
among
the Sinhalese found
t
not uncommon
for
people
to
express
dissent
from ome tenets,whereas here
were other enetswhich no one
told me, or
even
showed me,
that
he doubted.
These unquestioned rticles f faithwere,
unsurprisingly,hosewhichare ogicallybasictopractical uddhism:those o
deny
which
would
carry
away
a
large part
of
what is
characteristically
Buddhist.
Thus religious
belief s not
one thing:
t
is a
complex
of
cognitive
ttitudes
which,
am
arguing,
we
should
describe
more
exactly hanwe usuallydo. My
immediatepurpose s to define
cognitive ttitudewhich s mostappropriate
towards at least basic
religious
tenets, nd which
I
sensedwas actually the
attitude
f at
least
my
more sensitive nd thoughtful
nformants.ecause we
anthropologists urselves
are
either unbelievers
or at
best
rather crude
believers,
we find t difficulto
identify his ttitude nd to distinguish
t from
others. ut ifwe cansee whatto look for,we may n fact ind t s as common
as
what
we should
recognise
s
intelligentttitudes o othermatters.
o do so
should lead
to
considerable
evisionof our udgementsof the
rationality f
religiousbelievers:
t
might
even enhance our understandingf the place of
religion
n
our
culture-which,
as Durkheimremarked n the
first age of his
Elementary
orms
f
the
religious
ife,
s an objective of the anthropology f
religion 9 I 5: I-2).
The
tenets
f
Buddhism
an
be broadly rdered long a continuum
anging
from
the most
basic and indispensable
o the most accessory nd optional; as
I have
remarked,
uch
distinctionsre reflected
n
the cognitive
ttitudes f at
least ome Buddhists. or example, tis basicto hold thatrebirth, etermined
by Karma,
s
real;
thatNirvana
s a real
state
ttainable
y
humanbeings;that
the
Buddha and
othershave
attained t; thatthe Buddha's teachingprovides
efficacious
irections
for
attaining t. But it is optional to
hold, e.g., that
participationn rites
s conducive to attainment; hat he services f Buddhist
clergy
re essential t
funeralsnd mortuary eremonies; hat
godlike beings
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MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
633
exist.Similardistinctions
may
be made
among
the tenets f
any
religion
hat
have been subjected o rational nalysis.What I have to say applies
primarily
to more basic tenets,nd may be lesstrueof more accessory enets. seek to
show
that t
leastbasicreligious
enets
re
i)
empiricallyndeterminate, 2) axiomatic,
3) symbolic,
nd 4)
collective.
From these characteristics
e can inferthe appropriate ognitive attitude
towards
them;
and
I
suggest
hat
his
ppropriate
ttitude
ctually
ccurs nd
could
be
identifiedfwe looked for t.
Leach suggested hat
he
truthwhich a
religious ogma expresses
does
not
relate to the ordinary
matter-of-fact orld of
everyday things
but
to
metaphysics'
I967:
45). Let us start from this appropriately ndefinite
characterisation.
ven in that
mode
of
discourse
which s concerned
o describe
and
analyse
the
objective
physical world-i.e.,
in
physics-metaphysical
propositionshave a place.
Here,
a
metaphysical roposition
does not serve
directly
o
describe
he world-rather
it serves o establish framework or
mode of
discoursewithinwhich the world can be
described. ince
it does not
directly escribe heworld
t s not
directly alsifiable;
nd
if
t s not falsifiable
it
is not verifiable
either (i.e.
it cannot
be
sufficiently
onfirmed or
corroborated).
But
if
the
physical
statementsmade within the
mode
of
discourse t founds re
directly alsified,
hen
t
may
be
indirectly
alsified.
Religious tenetsmay be used to founda mode of physicaldiscourse, s
Horton
has
argued (i967; I973, etc.).
But sometimes
t least
they
are so
formulated
hat
hey
annot
be falsifiedven
indirectly:
husfor
xample
the
proposition hatGod exists
eems o be undecidable, irectly
r
indirectly, y
referenceo empirical
vidence. Propositions doctrines, enets, otions, tc.)
which
are so
formulated
hat
they are inherently mmune to
empirical
falsification
r
verification have termed
'empirically indeterminate'
(Southwold I978: 374).
As
theterm indeterminate'
as
been used of
mystical
propositions
n a
slightly ifferentenseby Cooper
(I97 5)
and Salmon
I978),
I
must
clarify. do not use the term indeterminate' n precisely
he senseof
Reichenbach
I944),
which Cooper claims to have taken over. I am not
suggesting,
s
Cooper does,
that
religious
believers
ctually mploy
a
three-
valued logic.
I
do not know of
any language
which
admitsto the
true/false
paradigm third ermof equal weight.Referringo Putnam
I957), Salmon
writes: To
say
a
sentence
s
indeterminatentails hat
he sentence
will never
be
verified
or
falsified'
I978:
448).
I
say
that
basic
religious
tenets
are
objectively
ndeterminate
n this
ense. neither ssert or
deny
that
believers
themselves
recognise
precisely his;
I
find
it '. . .
difficult
r
impossible
to
distinguish
n attitude
f
doubt
or
suspended elief,
.e.
no
assignment
f
truth-
value,
from an
assignment
f the
value indeterminate'
Salmon I978).
This
uncertaintyan bebridgedby saying hatbelievers o nottreat eligious enets
as
factually rue
nor as
factually alse. uch non-assignment
f
true/falsealue
seemsto be described or
the Azande
by
Evans-Pritchard
I937: 8i).
I
argue
that it is
appropriate
for doctrines which
objectively
are
empirically
indeterminate,
nd
maybe
common, ven normal.
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634 MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
Now
although
basic
religious enetsmay
serve o found mode of
physical
discourse, his s not their ole nor even theirprincipalfunction.Religious
discourse ervesrather o interpret,nd shape, ur experience f reality, han
directly
o
describe
reality cf.
Lienhardt 96I:
I48).
It
includes
myths nd
similar imaginative
and evocative forms. It
normally
includes ethical
propositions, hich are of course prescriptive ather han descriptive.ndeed
religious
enets oundmore
than an
reasonably
e includedunder 'mode of
discourse':
theyfound,
for
example,
ethical
conduct,
nd
ritual.
They
found
not ust
a
mode
of discoursebut a
way
of
life, nd one which is socially
established. ince neither rescriptions
or
conduct,
neither
way
of lifenor
a
society,
ave
factual
ruth-value,
t
s
obvious
why religiouslymetaphysical
propositions annotevenindirectly e falsified.ontrary
o the conventional
wisdomconcerning ur own religioushistory, religion omesto be rejected
not as simplyfalsebutrather s inappropriate r unfitting.
V
The relation between a basic tenet and the religion it serves to found
resembles that between an axiom and a theory based on it. Boudon's
observation
s
illuminating:
The epistemologicaldifficulties
aised
by the concept of axiom
did not vanish
until
t was
understood
that
an axiom was not
a
proposition placed
at
the
beginning
of
a
deductive
argumentbecause t
was
untestable-but
rather
proposition
made
untestable
y
its
ocation
at the
beginning
of
the
argument I97I: IO).
We
have
often
sked ourselves
why religionspropound mystical' or,
as
I
prefer o say, mpirically ndeterminate) octrines,
nd
have tended o answer
by disparaging
he
rationality
f
believers.
t
should be evident
hat
religious
tenets
re,
like
axioms, necessarily
ntestablebecause
of
their
place
at the
beginning,
he
foundation,
ot ust of a
deductive
rgument
ut of a
way
of
life.
f
they
were
cast
n
falsifiable
orm
hey
would
be
falsified,
nd
could then
serve heir urposewithgreatdifficultyfatall: what s to serve ffectivelys
an
axiom
for collective
way
of
ifemustbe immune
to
falsification.
e
are
grosslymistaken
when we criticise
therpeoples
s not rational or
holding s
true
tenetswhich
are
mystical,
on-demonstrable:
heir
rationality
would
rather
ail f
they
based their ives
on
tenetswhich
were
not
so.
If we have often
assumed
the
religious
tenetsof othersto
be false-an
assumption
which Evans-Pritchard
mistakenly
uilt into his definition f
mystical
otions
I937:
I
2;
see Southwold
978: 375)-this
has
usually
been
because
we
did not
share,
r
greatly espect,
he
ways
of
ifewhich
they ound;
religious
tenets
n
fact are
normally
not false but
unfalsifiable,mpirically
indeterminate.
By
similar
measure,
the tenets not
only
are
objectively
axiomatic,
n
the senseof
serving
s axioms:
they
lso seem to
believers o be
axiomatic
n the ense f
unquestionable see, .g.,
Evans-Pritchard
956:
9
for
the
way
in
which the
existence f God is taken for
grantedby Nuer).
This
must
be
so:
if the truth f
a
basic tenet s seen
as
a
necessary recondition or
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
635
the religion
for
which
it
is
axiomatic,
hen o consider t
might
not be true
s
to impugnthereligion, he culture
t
orders,
nd hence
the
self hat
s
shaped
by the culture.To doubt is not only to think thatone's thought s wrong
(Evans-Pritchard937: I95),
it
is
to
suppose
hat ne's
elf s
invalid. hose
who can
sincerely
onsideror discuss
he
truth
f basic tenetshave
already
ceased to be
believers,
n the sense f
fully articipating
n the
religious
ife.
VI
I have
suggested
hat
believers, r at leastthemoresensitive
mong them,
show
signs
f
recognising
hat
eligious
enets re neither rue
nor
false;
have
now arguedthatneverthelesshese enets reregarded sunquestionablyrue.
These two positions re consistent
f
we
recognise
hat
the
truth
f
religious
tenets
s
not factual ruth ut
another
kind:
I
shall
call it
symbolic ruth.
Something
like this
was
recognised by
Leach when
he
wrote,
in
the
Introductiono hisPolitical
ystems
f
highlandurma:
In
sum
hen,myviewhere s that itual ction ndbelief re like o be understoods
forms
of
ymbolic
tatementbout he
ocial rder
I954:
I4).
That
formulation equires orrection.
eligiousbeliefs,
r
tenets,
re
certainly
symbolic
of much
more than the social
order.And
symbols ommunicate
n
a way that s much less ike thatoflanguagethanLeach assumed cf Langer
I95
I:
74-7).
But withthese orrections
made,
Leach'sview
is sound.
Religious
tenets
re indeed
symbols,functioning
n
very
much the same
ways
as the
concrete bjects
or actions hat
re
more readily ecognised
s ritual
ymbols;
and
the cts
of
affirming,
ssenting o,
or
even adhering o, uchtenetsreritual
acts, ikeimmolation,
enuflexion,
nd so
forth.
I
offerno exact definition
f ritual symbols or symbolism: ndeed the
category ppears
to be
far from
homogeneous.
But
I
do
outline some basic
distinctions,
ased
argely
n
Langer
95
I
.
In
the mostgeneral ense
Symbols
re
not
proxy
or heir
bjects,
ut
re
vehiclesor
he
onception
f
objectsI95:
I
60: I).
This
formulationwas adopted
by Geertz I966:
5);
and it doubtless nderlies
Barth's characterisation
f ritual acts and
objects
as
'vehicles for
concepts,
understandings,
nd
emotions'
I975:
i
i).
If
we allow
symbols o include
linguistic orms,
n
the
everyday sage of anguage, hen t s essential
hatwe
make
a
distinction f thekind thatLangerterms hatbetween
discursive' nd
'non-discursive'
r
presentational'
ymbolismI95
I:
94-7,
and
passim).
he
former overs the
manner
n which
language
n its
everydayusagesignifies;
the
atter he
different
inds f
meaning
o
be found n
art,music,
itual,myth,
and of coursereligiousbelief. At leastpartofthe distinctions that which
Barth
raws
etween
digital'
nd
analogic'
odes
I975:
ch.
5).
There
eems
too to be a
striking arallel
with the
differentmodes
of
thinking
which
psychologists
nd
neurophysiologistseport
o be
specialised
n the eft nd
the
righthemispheres
f
the
cerebral
ortex
see Sagan
I977:
ch.
7).
Presentational
ymbolismdoes
convey conceptionswhich are, at
one or
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636
MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
more removes, bout
reality. ust ow
it does so isnot easy o
grasp, ut at
east
it
is
clear that tnormally
differs romdiscursive
ymbolism. ome
thingswe
call symbolsseem to signifymuch as metaphors;forotherswe need a less
familiar
model.
Sperberrightly
draws
our
attention o the
term that
the
Ndembu use
to
designate
ymbols:
... theword
chijikijilu,
hichmeansa landmark'. landmarks
not
sign
but an
index
which erves
ognitivelyoorganise
ur
xperience
f
pace.
his
Ndembu
metaphor
eems
muchmore
pposite nd ubtleomethan
he
Western
metaphor
hich
omparesymbols
to words I 975:
3 3)3.
It is
certainly majortaskfor he
anthropology
f
religion
o
describe
nd
analyse
more
fully
and
precisely ust
how
presentational
ymbolism
does
convey conceptions boutreality; nd it sonewhich swell in hand. Formy
present urpose
t
s
necessary either
o
reviewtheresults e
already
have nor
to
anticipate hosewe
may
hope
to
get.
t s
enough,first,
o
acknowledge
hat
ritual
symbols-including
tenets, eliefs,dogmas-do
convey conceptions
about
reality,
nd
hence
may
be
regarded
s true r false.
And
second,
hat
ince
the relationof such a
symbol
to
reality
s
different rom
that
of
discursive
symbolism
everyday
or
scientific
anguage),
this kind of truth s different
fromfactual ruth s we
normally
understandt.
If
people regard a presentational
ymbol-more
especially
a
tenet-as
having
a
'fitting'
r
'appropriate'
relation
o
reality, say
they regard
t
as
'symbolically rue'. Hence there s a senseof believe' which means hold as
symbolically
rue',
nd this
may
be
marked s
believehts'.
t is distinct
rom
'hold as
factually rue',
which
may
be written
s
'believehtF'4-though
the
two
are easily
nd often onfused. seekto
explore
ome
of the
differencesnd
similarities
etweenthese wo
kinds
f
believing.
Cooper
(I975: 252-3)
suggests hat t may
be
unjustified
o
say
that
people
'believe'
magico-religious ropositions
which
theyregard
s
untestable,
nd
which have
some
similarity
with
metaphysical
ropositions.
n
view
of the
wide
variety
f
senses f theword believe', and the
difficulty
f
distinguishing
and
controlling
hem,
think
t
is
prudent
o
try
to avoid
using
the word
altogethern scientificontextscf.Needham
972: I92-3).
But
t
is quite
impractical otry orestrict
he ense fbelief-terms
i.e. theverb believe' and
the noun
belief)
to hold as
factually
rue',
nd
to ruleout their
pplication
o
religious belief.
The
latter
pplication
s a
salient nd
ineradicable
eature
f
English
usage;
what
we have
to
do
is
to
make
sure
hatwe
understand hefacts
that
have
been,
nd
may be,
reported
hrough
he
usage.
VII
The
way
in
which
believehts'
iffers rom
believehtF'
an
bestbe brought
out
by considering
arefullyust what
the attermeans.To
say that person
holds
a proposition s
factually rue s to say
that he
regards t as correctly
describing
ome
part r
aspect f
reality; r thatheholdsthat
he tate faffairs
it
describes
xists
n
reality.Or, better
till, t is to
say that his
proposition s
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MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
637
an
element n his nternalmodel
of
reality y
reference
o
which
he assesses nd
guides
his
transactions ith
reality.
Hence there re four onditionswhichmustbe satisfiedfwe are to sayof
a person,
with sufficient
arrant,
hathe
believeshtF
certain roposition:
i)
There
mustbe some
situationsn which some
sets f acts re consistent ith
(or better,
f
possible, rationally
entailed
by) the
proposition's
being
factually rue,
nd a differentet
of acts re
consistent ith or entailedby)
itsbeingfalse; nd he must ncounter
uch ituations
ufficientlyrequently
to allow us
to
make sufficient
bservations.-Under
acts'
I
include
verbal
acts,
and
notably
those
of
asserting
or
unequivocally
implying the
proposition, nd of avowing
it
as
true/false.
2)
In such
situations
e must
predominantly
o those cts that re consistent
with tstruth ather han hose hat re consistent ith tsfalsity.
a)
To
requireperfect onsistency
f
conduct
with
belief
would
deprive
he
concept
of
use:
normal
people
are not
perfectlyonsistent. ut there s
often nougha clear distinction
etween onductwhich
s
as consistent
with a belief as it is reasonable to
expect,
and that which
is
grossly
inconsistent
ith t.
b) Though
the
relevant cts
ncludeverbal
cts,
hey
hould
f
possible
lso
includenon-verbal cts.As Gombrich I 97I: 4-5) rightly emarks, e
say
a
person
does not
really
believe what he
professes
f
his
non-verbal
acts are seriously nconsistent ith it. There are two good reasons or
this:
i)
If
to
believehtF
proposition s
to
have it
as an element n one's
internalmodel
of
reality, hen all one's reality-oriented
onduct s
potentially elevant n decidingwhether tactually s an element n
thatmodel.
ii) If person s deceiving thers, nd perhaps lso
himself, y simulating
a beliefhe does not
reallyhold,
t s normally asier, nd cheaper, o
do
so
by
verbal
falsehoods han
by
non-verbal retences.
3)
There must be evidence that he
entertains
his
proposition
n association
with theseacts.Philosophers re agreedthata personcannot be held to
believe a
proposition
hat
he has never entertained'
r
considered;
nd as
we have
known inceEvans-Pritchard
I 937)
that
eoplepractise
ituational
selection
of their
beliefs,
we have to establish
that
the
proposition
s
entertained
n
the context
of
the acts
relevant o
believing
t.
One
cannot
infer that a certain
proposition
s believed
merely
from
the fact that
observed conduct
is
consistent
with
it,
since
any
course
of
conduct is
consistent
with
more
than one
proposition Gombrich
I97I)
overlooks
this-see
my
comments
n
Southwold
I978: 366).
Entertainment
f a
propositions mostplainlyestablished
f
the person
expressest n or withhis act: this swhyverbal ssertions r endorsements,
though
unreliable vidence
of
holding
s
true,
re mportant s evidenceof
believing.
t
may
be lessobvious that
ntertainment
s also
established
f
the
actor
denies heproposition s he acts-provided hedoes so spontaneously,
and not
merely
n
replyto a leading question.
f
this
were all, we should
have
the
frustrating
esult hat t
is hardest
o
establish hat
people
believe
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638
MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
just whatthey
do
most
firmly
elieve: forf
a
tenet saxiomatic t tends
o
be
taken
for
granted
rather
han stated
xplicitly.
Hence we must
allow
that f n act scustomary n theculturen question, ndifwe can establish
that t is also
customary o entertain
particular
roposition
n
association
with such acts,then any member
of
the culturedoing that act
may
be
assumed o
entertain hatproposition.
4)
His conduct cannot with
comparable
plausibility
be
explained by
an
alternative ypothesis.
a)
It
may happen
that heevidence
givesequal
support
o
the
ascription
f
several different
eliefs.This is no
problem: people
do
operate
with
alternativechemes f
nterpretation,
nd so to
say
that
person
believes
one
thingneed
not be understood s
precluding
is
believing
omething
else-not even when, abstracted romcontexts, he two beliefs re
logically
nconsistent.
b)
A
person's
onduct
may
be
fully
ccounted
orwithout eferenceo the
belief
by
which he
explains
t.
This does
not n itself how thathe
does
not believe what
he
professes:
t most t
may
show
thathis belief s
not
the cause,
or
theonly
cause,
of his conduct.
c)
The kind of alternative
ypothesis
which
really
calls
in
question
an
ascription
f belief s one that he actor s
deceiving thers,
nd
perhaps
himself.
We can neverbe
certain
hat his
s
not
so;
but we can
often
e
sufficiently
onfident.
ertainty
s
unattainablenempirical cience, nd
especially
n that
concerning
human
behaviour;
the
uncertainty
hat
attends
scriptions
f
belief s not
so
special
s to
place
them
outside
he
normal area of scientificikelihood.
This
analysis erves o make
plain whyit is that
scriptions fbelieving-
statementshat
omeone
other
han neself
elieves omething-do
not require
special
knowledge
of
the nner
mental tate
orpsychological
ttitudes) f the
believer.
t
should
be
evident
hat he
verb believe'
designates relation ather
than a
state:
a
relation, irstly etween
the believerand a
proposition, nd
secondly
from
the
believer
through the
proposition to reality.What is
purported o occur s doubtlessmental n largepart, nd specialpsychological
knowledge
would
doubtless
elp us to assess
ndunderstandt
better. ut such
specialknowledge s not
necessary,ince n
factwe use
believe' in away which
enablesus to
regard
he
mind of
the
believer s a 'black box' (see,
.g.,Ashby
i964:
86sqq.).
The factswe
refer o are
the
nputs
nd
outputs
f
the black
box',
and the relationsbetween
them: we are not
committed o
giving
an
account
ofjust
what goes on within he
black box'.5
VIII
Now since we use believe' for hold as symbolically rue' as well as for
'hold as
factuallyrue',
t
s
implied
that his ame
schema
hould be
applicable
to
ascriptions
f
believinghtS.
n
largepart t
s. But
the rucial
difference
s that
the
first
ondition,
nd
consequently
he
second,
annot
be satisfied,
tically t
least.
Cooper
(I975:
253) points
out that f a
proposition s untestable in my
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
639
terms, mpirically ndeterminate)
t
is hard to see
how behaviour could be
distinguished s consistent ith its truth ather han ts falsity. proposition
is empirically ndeterminatef and only if every state f affairs hich can be
determined s
holding
n
the real
world is
as consistent
ith ts truth s with
itsfalsity.
f
ome
courseof actionwere
objectively
emonstrable s consistent
with
ts
truth,
nd a different
ourse
of
action
demonstrable s consistent
ith
its falsity, hen the differentonsequences f these coursesof action would
provideevidence of thetruth-valuef theproposition, ontrary
o
definition.
This
would
not be so only
if
the two coursesof action had no
discernibly
different
onsequences;
which s
perhaps ommon,
s the ncient
lea, why
do
sinners
prosper...?', bears
witness.
Empirically
we do in
fact
find
that
a
remarkably
wide
range
of kindsof conduct s held to be consistent
ith,
nd
indeed egitimated y,a given religious enet.
Yet it is also clear,and important,
hat
the range
is
usually
not infinite:
within
particular eligious
radition ome kinds
of
conduct
re difficult nd
some
virtually mpossible,
o
legitimate y accepted
enets.
n
Buddhism,
or
example,
it
is difficult
o
legitimate
he
participation
f Buddhist
clergy
n
war:
though
tradition
does,
albeit
reluctantly,
llow the factthat Buddhist
clergy, temporarilydisrobed,
served
in the
army
of
King Dutthagamani
(Gombrich I97I: 29).
It would be
virtually mpossible
to
legitimate
he
service
of a
Buddhist cleric as
general
or
war-leader,
nd
history, think,
records
no instance f this.
This is plainly
an
important
ifference etween
Buddhist nd slamic ocieties-with Christendomallingomewhere etween
thesepoles.
There are certainly mic, hough
not
etic,
riteriawhich
distinguish
arious
kindsof
conduct
as
consistent,
nd
others
s
inconsistent,
ith
believinghts
particular eligioustruth.
n
Sri Lanka, for example, t is maintained hat a
Buddhist ayman
who
believes the Dhamma (the Buddhist doctrines)will
endeavour to
observe
the Five
Precepts.
Hence a man who
regularly
nd
wantonly kills iving beings in breach of the FirstPrecept), r is regularly
drunk
(in
breach
of
the
Fifth),
s
shown
thereby
not
really
to believe the
Dhamma.
But the criteria re characteristicallymprecise.Most Buddhist
laymendeliberatelyake ife:e.g. theyuse nsecticides,nd will killat east he
most dangerous
kind
of
snake
(the
Russell's
Viper);
and in
their
own
judgements,
nd those
of most of their
fellows,
this does not make them
unbelievers.
And
many men,
at
least,
onsider t allowable
to
drink
iquor
in
moderation.
The standards
re not
precisian
but
customary:
those of the
reasonable ather
han he
upright
man
(Gluckman 955: I25-6).
Not
only
s
it
emicallydetermined
what kinds
of
conduct
shall
be held consistent
r
inconsistent ith
religious
elief: t s also
emically
etermined hat
behaviour
is or is not
to be classified s
falling
within hosekinds
of
conduct.
This makes it difficult o argue (as Spiro
I
97
I
does) that customary
behaviour
itself s inconsistent ith
accepted religious enets, hus showing
that hetenets re not
really
believed.When we
perceive
uch
nconsistency
t
is between the
behaviour and what we take to be the meaningof the tenets;
but t
may
be thatwe have
misinterpreted
hat
meaning,
nd
the behaviour s
consistent ith their
propermeaning.Now
if
we take eriously he view that
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640
MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
religious
enets
re ritual
r
presentational'
ymbols,
heirmeaning
annot
be
discovered y
translating
hewords
n which
they
re
expressed,
s ifwe
were
dealing with the ordinarydiscursiveuse of language.The meaning of a
religious enet,
s of
any
other
kind of ritual ymbol,
s theway it
functions
n
shaping,
rdering,
nterpretingxperience;
tsfunctions a landmark'
perhaps:
This can
be discovered nly by
determining
ow it
s n fact elated otheway
of ife
for
which
t serves
ymbolically.
he
significance
f a
symbol,
ike
the
meaning
faword, ies
n
tsuse:
it
can
be determined
nly
byanalysis
f
what
people actually
do,
and cannot
then
be turned
to
udge
what
they
do.
The
anthropologist
must
determine
ow a tenet s
actually mployed
n theway
of
life
n which
it functions:
nd he must
report
his s the
symbolic
meaning
t
actually
bears.
f,
for
example,
he
finds,
s he
will,
thatmost Buddhists
peak
of nirvanaas the summumonum, etso far from activelyendeavouring o
attain hat tate
s
soon
as
possible
hey
ctually ursuegoals
they
cknowledge
as
inconsistent
ith
t,
while
postponing
heir ventual ttainment
f
nirvana
into
the
remote
future:
henthe
conclusion
mustbe
that he doctrines
bout
nirvana
do not
signify
o
them
a
prescription
or
attaining
n immediate
personalgoal,
but
ratherhave
some transformed
eaning
which we
have to
discover.
As Tambiah (I970:
4I-2)
suggests,
piro's rror
erives
rom ssuming hat
the meaning
of
Buddhisttenets an be
known
by
reading
them as
they
are
presented
n the Scriptures.
ven ifwe
allow the rather
argeassumptions
hat
we can know whata tenetmeant nthecontext f the criptural ritings,nd
that his an be
taken n some
defensible ense
shaving
once been
ts tandard
meaning,
t
still
does not
follow that
this s
its
meaning
in
contemporary
practical
Buddhism:
f
practice
s inconsistent
iththatmeaning,
we have to
register
he fact hatpractice
eveals
different eaning,
no doubt
as a result
of
symbolic
ransformation.
It
must,
however,be
said that t
is not only Spiro and
otheroutsiders
who
give
Buddhist enets
meaning
which s inconsistent
ithpractice
n practical
Buddhism:
so,
n
Sri Lanka at east, o many
Buddhists ven
n the
mallworld
of
the villages,
nd theyuse
this nconsistency
o
point
to theunworthiness
f
practice.We should not be surprised hatreligioustenets,ike otherritual
symbols,
ustain
variety
f
meanings.
And we
may
remark hat twould be
a
poor
sort
of
religion
that could only
validate the actual,
without
also
proclaiming
n ideal matched gainst
which
the ctual
canbe seen
to fall hort.
The tension etween
the normative
nterpretations
f Buddhist
doctrines
nd
the
symbolic
meanings hey
bear n the
context f actual ife s
an aspect
f
an
important
ynamic
n
Buddhist ocieties.
utneither his
nor
other eaturesf
Buddhistreligious
ifecan be
correctly
rasped
withoutrecognising
hat
the
doctrines
o have
symbolic
meanings
n actual
ife.
It follows
that assessment f a symbolic
proposition
must be radically
different
rom hatof a
factual
roposition.With a factual roposition,f t is
properly
formulated,
t is relatively
imple
to know
what it means:
the
important
uestion s
whether
t
is true.6
But a symbolic
proposition-and
especially
basic
religious
enet-is,
forthosewho maintain t,
axiomatically
true: the
important
uestion
s,
whatdoes it mean?
For the anthropologist,
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
64I
then, he question s not whetherheybelieve t but how.This throws ight
on
a notable oddity in Christian heology. n the Bible-as among the Nuer
(Evans-Pritchard
956:
9)-the existence f God is taken for granted: t is
axiomatically rue, nd the focus
of
concern s
with
thereligious ignificance
of thisdatum.But formanymodernChristians,s
for
vowed unbelievers, he
significance
s
taken
for
granted,
ut the truth
s
considered
o
be at ssue.
This
is, n effect,o mistake symbolicproposition
s a factual
roposition:
which
may be why the religious esult ends
o
be somewhatprosthetic.
Ix
Sometimes
hings
ecome
symbolic
for
particular
ndividualbut
not for
his fellowsgenerally:we may speak of these as privateand idiosyncratic
symbols. imilarly ropositionsmay acquire diosyncraticymbolic
ruth
or
particularndividuals.
uch
private ymbolisms
hould
not have
a
large place
in
ethnographic eports,
he
primary
oncern
of
which is
to
report
what is
common to
members
of
a
society,
what constitutes
heir culture.
t
seems
likely,moreover,
hat the
greater art
of
the
symbolic
truths hat
a normal
personholds are collective,
n a number f senses nd forvariousreasons.
i)
Most
people
do in fact earn
most of their deas
and
attitudes
rom
thers,
and are
not much nclined
o
be
original
nd
creative.
A
person's ymbolic
truths re therefore,or he mostpart, ikely o be collective
n
the obvious
senseof
having
been
acquired
fromhis culture.
2) They
will therefore e
collective
n a
second obvious
sense,
hatof
being
common to
and
shared
by
the
members f a
community.
Much
of
their
power
as
symbols
derives
from hisfact.
3) Through being
shared
hey cquire
a
kind
of
verisimilitude hich,while
not
being
thetruth f matters
f
fact,
as that aura of
factuality'
hat
Geertz
(I966)
sees
s
fundamental
o
religion
s
a
cultural
ystem.
ur warrant or
saying
hat
omething
xists
s
simply
hat he
hypothesis
hat t does
is
the
most
satisfactory ay
of
accounting
for
a
set of
given experiences.
he
claimthat, .g.,God exists s warranted o the extent hatobserved vents
are bestfitted o that upposition: nd this eems obe so ofsocial events f
members f
society
re
ndeed
acting
on that
upposition. We may prefer
to account
for
theseeventsby thehypothesishatthe actorsbelieve that
God
exists;
but believers annotbe
expected
o
recognise his s a distinct
hypothesiswithout llowing that he beliefmightbe false, nd this, s we
argued
above
(p. 635), is hardlypossiblefor hem.)
4)
It is
not only that, hrough eing shared, eligious enets cquire that ura
of
factuality hich makes
hem
ppear
to
be simply rue: nasmuch s they
are
empirically ndeterminate
his s the
only way they an come to seem
factually rue. As I remarkedn an earlierpaper, The apparent ruth r
falsity
of such
doctrines seems
to
depend wholly
on social factors'
(Southwold I978: 374).
5)
Further, s we have seen, he criteria or reallybelieving ymbolic ruths
are
emic, customary,
nd hence
collective: e.g.
a
man
really
believes the
Dhamma
only
f
he sufficientlyefrains rom aking ife.
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642
MARTIN
SOUTHWOLD
6) Thus symbolic ruths ecome representative
f
membership
f a
group,
community, Church. Not to overload the term symbolic' stillfurther,
I would follow a hint f Nadel's and saythat hey re emblematic'of such
membershipNadel 95
I:
262,
cited
n
Firth
973:
I
74). Theyrepresent
such membership
oth
internally,s expressing
ttachment o the
group
and solidaritywith
fellow
members,
nd
externally
s
identifying
ne
as a
member
of
this group
in
contrast
with outsiders nd with other
groups.
This emblematic unction
s
prominent
n credalaffirmationsn
liturgical
and
other formal
occasions,
nd is
perhaps lways present
n avowals of
believing
a
religious
enet.
We should ask ourselves
how
far
nformants'
avowals of belief o
an
ethnographer
an
safely
e
interpreted
s
conveying
cognitive ttitudes
ather han s
simply sserting roup dentity.
7) Ifthe ymbols re andmarks or rdering world, t s mportanthat hey
be shared
mong
thosewhose nteraction
onstitutes
person's
ocialworld.
8) When symbolic
truths re held
in common
they
can be
acted
upon
collectively hrough ritual; they
serve thus
to alter
as
well as to order
experiencecf.
ienhardt96I:
250, 291).
9)
The awareness
that
symbolic
truths
are
held
in
common,
and their
activation
n
collective itual, vokes,
nd
charges
he
ymbolic
ruths
ith,
the sense
of
strength
hatmen feel
n
the
support
f
their ellows:
Individualsre
weak,
ut ocial
roups
re
trong,
oth n the
rdinary
ecular
ffairs
f
life nd ndealingwith hePowersLienhardt
96I:
247).
i
o) It would seem
that
ymbolic ruths
re
usually,
fnot
nvariably,
ollective
in yet another ense: theirprincipal
references
to collective ffairs nd
concerns,
whether t
be morality
n
the most general sense,
or more
specific ocial orjural values such
as
matrilineal escent.
Thus
it
would seem
that
ymbolicpropositions,
nd the
holding
of
them s
true,
re
eminently
ollective. t
is
of
course ndividuals
who
believehts
hem:
but
they
do so
primarily
n their
apacity
not as individuals
ut as
members
f
a
collectivity.
Because
this s
so,
the fact of
such
believing
s
most
exactly
reported y saying, fthebelievers,theybelieve . . .' inthecollective ather
than the
distributive7
ense.This
is the
germ
of truth n Leach's contention
which
we
began by considering.
As we
have
argued, however, 'they
believe
. . .'
is
normally
lso true
n thedistributive
ensewhich sums
set,of
'he believes
.
. .'
ascriptions;
his s
not,
as
Leach
supposed, xcluded,
but it
would seem to be
secondary
nd derivative.
When,
as
is
all
too
easy,we
interpretthey believe . . .' reports imply in the distributive ense, this
conduces
o
understanding
believe' in the
ense f'hold as factually rue'.This
in
turn eads to those misconceiveddebates about rationalitywhich Leach
(I
954:
I
3) dismissed s mostly scholasticnonsense'.
x
I
have attributed
our
characteristicso
basic religious tenets: they are
empirically ndeterminate,xiomatic, ymbolic, nd collective.These charac-
teristics re
closely
connected.
t is because they are axiomatic that they are
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MARTIN SOUTHWOLD 643
collective, nd because hey re collective hat hey re axiomatic.Their power
as symbols argely erives rom heir eing collective: heir bility s symbols
to sustain variety
of
meaningshelps
to
make them
commonly and
hence
collectively cceptable.
heir
place
as axioms
makes
t
natural hat hey hould
be
empirically ndeterminate; nd,
as we
argued,
t is functional hat
they
should
be,
since f
falsifiable
hey
would be falsified.
heir function s
symbolic
truths lso makes
t
desirable hatthey hould
be
empirically ndeterminate,
lest
question
and
doubts about their
factual ruth onfuse
or
confute heir
symbolicrole.
The logically proper
attitude owards such
propositions,
f
one
maintains
them,
s
that
hey
re
symbolically
ruebut not
factually
rue.This
s
a
difficult
position o maintain xplicitly, hen one's anguage ndconceptual ystem o
notclearlydistinguishetween hese
wo kinds f
truth,
nd do
assume two-
valued logic by
which 'not
factually
rue' is
equivalent
to
'factually
alse'.
Despite this difficulty, do see signs that the cognitive attitudeof more
sensitive elievers s
at
least
mplicitly
lose
to what s
logicallyproper:
and I
urge
that
we
should ook forfirmer
vidence
of this.
I
have
little oubt that
many,
f
not
most, eligious
elievers ake
he
impler
and more robust
iew
that heir enets
re
factually
rue s well as
symbolically
true.This is but
subtly
different
rom
the
appropriate iew,
and
we should
hardly
describe
people
as irrational ecause
they
fail to mark such a difficult
distinction:hemore so since, y definition,nassumptionhat nempirically
indeterminate roposition s factually ruecan never conflictwith empirical
evidence.
They
are
no
more mistaken
r
irrational
n
taking heir enets
o
be
factually rue hanwe are, s we often ave been, n assuming hem o be false;
and
theyhave
far
better xcuse.
NOTES
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
under
believe':
'3.
With clause or
infinitive
hrase:
To hold
it as
true that . .,
to think'.
-Leach
actually
llustrates
hissense n
the
same
sentencewhen
he writes,
But
Professor
Spiro .
.
. desperatelywants to believe that
2
As Needhamn
rgues
I972:
5-7).
3
Sperber
cites
Turner
I969:
I
5
as his
source;
Turner
reports
here
further
ubtleties f
the
Ndembu idiom.-As
Firth
I973: i68)
has
reminded
us,
the
notion
of
a
symbol
as a
landmark
had
earlier
been
employed
byFortes:
Totemic and
other
ymbols re
the
deological
andmarks
that
eep
he
ndividual
n
his ourse'
I945:
I44).
4
I
have made
myself rule
that when
using
subscripts
o
distinguish
ifferentensesof a
word,
a
change to
differentevel
of
distinction
houldbe
marked
by
a
changeof
fount lower
case,
capitals,
numerals,
tc.). Thus
the two
lower-case ettersht'
can
be
understood s
making
one
distinction: he
change to
capitals,S' and
'F',
indicates hatthese
erve
further o
segment
the
sensemarked
by
ht'.
5
It is not
only
Leach who
fails o see
this: the error
s
very
common. Most of
the
problems
with which
Needham
(I972) wrestles rise from
the
fallacious
ssumption hat
belief
must
be
regarded s an innermental tate; nd, sheshows, hefallacyswidespread mongphilosophers.
It
seems to
arise from wo
basic
errors f method:
i) If
one
analyses
sageofthe
noun belief
rather han he
verb
believe' it s far
ess
vident hat
a
relationrather
hana
state s
designated.
2)
Again concentration n
usage
of the noun
obscures he crucial
fact hat
he
semantics f'he
believes' are
significantly
ifferentrom
hoseof
I
believe'. If
the atter s
erroneously
aken
to
be
paradigmatic
for
both,
then
the
way
is
opened
for
indulging
the
favourite
philosophical
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18/18
644 MARTIN SOUTHWOLD
techniqueof
introspection. he results re irrelevant
nd confusing
or
nalysing
scriptions
f
believing to third
parties-i.e.
statements
f the form he believes' or
they
believe'.
These points refarfromobvious,and to that xtentdeserveto be proved. am assuming hat
anthropologists re too little
committed
to
the
philosophical
errorsto
care to see
them
extensively
efuted.
6 And
the
harder t is to get itproperly
ormulated o
as
to make thequestionof its
factual
truth t
least
n
principle
decidable,
he more
ikely
t s to
be
functioning
ot as a factual
ut as
a
symbolicproposition.
'Distributive: referring o
each
individual of
a
class
separately;opposed
to collective '
(Shorter
Oxford
EnglishDictionary).
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