Running head: COMPARING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES1

2COMPARING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Religious Belief and Political Behavior: Comparing Theoretical PerspectivesJoshua C. K. RidenourAnderson University

Religious Belief and Political Behavior: Comparing Theoretical PerspectivesAccording to the recent religious landscape survey conducted by Pew Research, 78% of Americans identify as Christian (Pew, 2008). With a majority this sizeable, it may be surprising to some that talk of a culture war dominates discussions among members of Christian faith. Conventional wisdom suggests that religion in America serves to unite and divide individuals with acerbic efficiency, both within and between faith traditions (see Putnam & Campbell, 2010). For example, questions of President Barack Obamas faith continue to circulate, even as many conservatives were eager to justify Mormonisms controversial inclusion under the umbrella of Christianity (Kilgore, 2012). Fox News annual War on Christmas coverage brings to the attention of its viewers what they believe is an attack on Americas religious history. This division, however, should not be viewed as a recent phenomenon. As early as the 1980s, Robert Wuthnow described the religious division as resulting from growing conflict between religious liberals and religious conservatives on the role of government action, and the emergence of special interest groups to represent the two increasingly polarized camps (1988). Hunter (1991) looked past the political landscape and argued that competing moral visions are at the heart of todays culture war, (p. 43) representing orienting and polarizing impulses towards religious orthodoxy or religious progressivism. According to Hunter, these worldviews provide answers to fundamental questions of truth, purpose, and moral authority. More recently, Shields (2011) has pointed to the tensions between progressive-era and post-war liberals on the one hand, and the religiously orthodox in Catholic and evangelical churches on the other. However, though Shields (2011) notes that cross-denominational alliances are resulting from intra-denominational conflicts (reminiscent of Wuthnows [1988] argument), a similar evolution in liberal critiques is not present. Progressive-era critiques of groups such as the Religious Right were handed down uncritically (p. 650) and fail to accurately capture much of orthodoxy in contemporary American religions. Inconsistencies in the results from survey data, and a general lack of serious investigations of American religions and the religious right on their terms reflect this failure (Bauder, 2011; Olson, 2011; Steensland et al., 2000; Ursic, 2014; Wald, Silverman, & Fridy, 2005; Woodberry, Park, Kellstedt, Regnerus, & Steensland, 2012; Woodberry & Smith, 1998). Pretesting with several measures used to assess religious beliefs revealed feelings of distrust and discomfort with the results, particularly among conservative evangelical populations. If social scientists wish to understand American religious groups on their own terms, an important goal given the populations size, adjusting their measures for this mission will be important. Two prominent theories in the fields of sociology and political science, moral cosmology theory and cultural theory, may serve to better illuminate the intersection of religious beliefs and political behaviors. This paper calls for such an integration and investigation of their respective usefulness to the study of religion and politics.Moral cosmology theoryBorn from the tradition of Hunter (1991), moral cosmology theory posits that underlying orientations of moral orthodoxy and moral modernism drive individuals religious and political beliefs. However, contrary to Hunters tone of cultural war, contemporary moral cosmology argues that ones orientation more subtly influences ones behavior. In a series of articles testing Hunters (1991) claims, Davis and Robinson (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) found general agreement with the theories of orientation, but that most Americans were situated betweenrather than withinthe two extremes. Rather than a war, Davis and Robinson (1996a) found that rigid opposition between the orthodox and progressive perspectives was related primarily to family and gender issues. Little differences existed on matters of racial and economic equality; in fact, the orthodox appeared to be more liberal than the modernists when it came to economic issues (Davis & Robinson, 1996a). Focusing on what they call religious elites, Olson and Carroll (1992) examined the religious and political beliefs of seminary faculty in order to determine the probability of conflict between liberals and conservatives on religious grounds. Though the agendas differed between liberals and conservatives and were linked to religious beliefs, they only partly opposed each other. Similarly, when applied to the general public, liberal and conservative agendas were largely unrelated, and only the conservative social-moral agenda was tied to religion (Olson & Carroll, 1992). Further, the religiously orthodox were not a group dominated by individuals sharing similar affinities and missions. In contrast, orthodox individuals showed no tendency to group themselves to ideological positions, nor were individuals likely to adopt consistent stances on a variety of issues (Davis & Robinson, 1996b). The results from Jelen (1990) further undermine the argument for consistency and polarization among Catholics, evangelicals, and mainline Protestants. While some may attribute this inconsistency as evidence of lower political sophistication and engagement (Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1988), it may be more appropriate to view this as ambivalence in Christian theology toward political involvement. Marsden (1991) pointed to fundamentalist dispensational premillenialism, a recent theological view that true Christians will be rescued in a rapture before the destruction of the world, as removing any Christian duty to transform the world. In contrast, he notes the progressive-era social gospel and the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s. One eschewed political engagement with secular structures, while the other clearly believed governmental efforts were needed to advance components of their faith. Instead of forsaking political efforts for uniquely religious issues, differences in these individuals understandings related back to their fundamental worldviews. Emerson and Smith (2000) reported that for white evangelicals, absent from their accounts is the idea that poor relationships might be shaped by social structures, such as laws, the ways institutions operate, or forms of segregationthey often find structural explanations irrelevant or even wrongheaded (p. 78). In contrast, though black evangelicals interviewed shared similar views about sin and human depravity, they were quick to point to these structural causes and seek opportunities for their reform (Emerson & Smith, 2000). A focus group study by Friesen and Wagner (2012) that included members of seven Christian denominations echoed this sentiment: liberal denominations and churches emphasized justice and Christian love in regards to social justice efforts, while members of the conservative denominations prioritized individual salvation and one-on-one relationship building.The moral cosmology framework captures this ambivalence in Christian theology. Under this theoretical perspective, the religiously orthodoxy believe individuals are members of a community that is ultimately subject to the authority of God (Starks & Robinson, 2007). Moral standards have been handed down through tradition, and everyone is obligated to obey them. This worldview, thus, inclines the community to seek to enforce traditional morality upon its members. Indeed, the moral cosmology framework has demonstrated this link between feelings of communitarianism and religious orthodoxy (Ryle & Robinson, 2006), helping to explain the conservative theology and liberal economic policy of this group (Starks & Robinson, 2007). Those with a modernist view possess an individualistic theology and morality that leads them to adopt more liberal values, while preferring conservative economic policies (Davis & Robinson, 1996b; Starks & Robinson, 2007).Though formalized by Davis and Robinsons (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) series in response to Hunter (1991), the principles of moral cosmology are evident in several studies predating the term. Greeley (1993) and Ellison and Sherkat (1993) found that beliefs reflective of an orthodoxy orientation were predictive of both political attitudes and child-rearing values in a manner consistent with later studies. In particular, Starks and Robinsons (2007) study largely replicated Ellison and Sherkat (1993) using the moral cosmology framework and provided direct support for the role of orthodoxy in parenting styles. Bader and Froese (2005) and Farrell (2011) indicated that orthodox views of God as authoritarian and the source of moral authority are predictive of conservative social values. Brint and Abrutyns (2010) measure of moral traditionalism predicted conservative political beliefs for the American public, over and above the influence of religious commitment, parent-child ideologies, and class and geographical cultures. However, the orientations toward these values do not necessarily translate into sustained political effort. Driskell and Lyon (2011) investigated the influence that particular beliefs have on both civic and political engagement, and determined that beliefs reflecting a moral orthodoxy were predictive of less engagement in both categories. Qualitative evidence from Friesen and Wagner (2012) indicate that those with a socially conservative worldview may consult their beliefs in making political decisions, but Gods still in control, and the outcome matters little in the entirety of Gods plan (p. 241). These beliefs may fuel the depression in their engagement levels.Moral cosmology theory, then, is an attractive option for determining the influence of beliefs upon attitudes and behavior. Indeed, some have already called for conceptualizing religion as a worldview (e.g., Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2011; Peterson, 2001). Even within Christian circles, the characterization of Christianity as a holistic worldview is not new. Schaeffers (1976) How shall we then live? articulated a comprehensive Christian value system. He later published an additional call for Christian action in A Christian manifesto. The manifesto (so termed to draw upon memories of the Communist and Humanist manifestos) outlined his call for a massive movement to combat what he sees as the abolition of truth and morality by the materialistic final reality worldview (1981, p. 20) that stands in stark contrast to the Christian worldview. Chuck Colson and Nancy Pearceys (1999) adaptation How now shall we live? was an updated call for a holistic vision of faith. Genuine Christianity is a way of seeing and comprehending all reality. It is a worldview (p. 15, emphasis in original), they write. In these books, Schaeffer and Colson seek to revitalize Christianity and its power to transform the world. Using Davis & Robinsons (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) moral cosmology theory allows researchers to account for the seeming inconsistencies between orthodoxy and modernism, as well as framing the discussion at the appropriate level of worldview.Cultural theoryWhere moral cosmology theory places its emphasis on the individuals beliefs on moral authority and individual/communitarian theology, cultural theory derives from individuals preferences as oriented by their surrounding culture. Beliefs may play role, then, but the larger cultural surrounding shapes ones choices for preferences to a greater degree. Cultural theory emerged from the intersection of anthropological studies and studies on belief formation and risk perception (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) under the guidance of Aaron Wildavsky (1987). Wildavsky emphasizes the endogenous formation of preferences, driven by social interactions and the values system of which one share and is a part of. Cultural theory rests upon two dimensions: group, assessing the strength of group bonds; and grid, describing the number and variety of societal prescriptions. These two dimensions create a model of four culture types: hierarchical collectivism, a culture with strong social bonds and extensive societal restrictions; competitive individualism, a culture with weak social bonds and few limitations; egalitarianism, characterized by strong group bonds and few societal mandates; and apathetic fatalism, a culture with weak social bonds and many restrictions (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta, & Ripberger, 2014). Though Wildavskys (1987) theory employed a variety of indirect evidence from his previous work with Douglas (1982) and Karl Dake (1990), as well as research on heuristics and decision-making (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991), Gastil, Braman, Kahan, and Slovic (2005) note that little other evidence existed to verify the theory. To remedy the inadequacy, they constructed the Wildavsky heuristic of cultural orientation and measured its predictive ability for a variety of political attitudes. They found considerable support for cultural theory, as it predicted attitudes in the pattern hypothesized, and to a greater degree than even demographic, ideological, and partisan indicators could (Gastil et al., 2005). Cultural theory has since been applied to a variety of theories within political science, demonstrating its broad efficacy (Swedlow, 2014). In a Special Issue of The Policy Studies Journal, cultural theorys relevance was applied to existing theories such as Advocacy Coalition Theory, the Narrative Policy Framework, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Jones, 2014; Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Robinson, 2014), as well as more specific tests of its influence on minipublics (Ney & Verweij, 2014), support for childhood vaccination (Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014), expert credibility and trust (Lachapelle, Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014), and collaborative policy network research (Weare, Lichterman, & Esparza, 2014).Despite this growing body of empirical support for cultural theory, little research has sought to apply it to the study of religion and politics. One exception is Lovelands (2003) study on the cultural orientation influence on switching religions. The findings from his study indicate that childhood socialization, an argument from rational choice theory, does not create lasting religious preferences. Instead, the use of Wildavskys (1987) cultural theory of preference formation was a strong predictor of ones likelihood of switching religions. Other studies examine the link between culture and religion, but do so apart from a cultural theory framework. Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey (1998), for example, tested the role of Southern culture in developing and sustaining religious and found that individuals living in the South are more likely to attend church and believe their faith is important, regardless of whether they had lived their entire life or had moved them from outside the South. In a further demonstration of the power of culture, they found that individuals raised in the South that migrated outside of the South demonstrated a decrease in church attendance and their attached importance to their faith (Smith et al., 1998). Culture, then, may clearly play a role in individuals behaviors and beliefs, and cultural theory offers a well-tested framework to study the relationships between religion and politics. Indeed, Olson (2011) was an attempt to conceptually link cultural theory to other theoretical perspectives. Empirical comparisons of cultural theory and other theories of politics and religion should be pursued.Integration of moral cosmology and cultural theoryAt first glance, moral cosmology and cultural theory may seem be related in their explanations of belief formation and behavior. However, some studies have indicated the two may exert their own influences on religious beliefs. Starks and Robinson (2009) examined the role that moral cosmology and subcultural identity (a subcategory of cultural theory) play in determining cultural and economic beliefs. They found that both have independent effects, sometimes in opposite directions, and neither fully accounts for the other (Starks & Robinson, 2009). Lichterman (2008) offered a useful distinction between the two approaches, referring to the moral cosmology approach as focused upon beliefs, while the subcultural identity approach accounts for differences that may exist between an individuals beliefs and the beliefs of the group with which they identify. One limiting factor of Stark and Robinsons (2009) method, however, is the use of self-identification rather than examining the cultural orientations that underlie ones choice. This is important for several reasons. First, as observed above, religious groups are not internally consistent and may reflect a variety of beliefs and attitudes (Davis & Robinson, 1996b; Jelen, 1990). Additionally, many groups are eager to avoid identifying with particular groups for issues related to poor labeling, unrelated to the actual beliefs of the group. In interviews with what he terms new evangelicals, Markham (2010) found that the most common religious identification was Follower of Christ. One participant says he/she identified this way because the label Christian has gotten so skewed and perverted (p. 14). Determining ones cosmological beliefs and underlying cultural preferences may provide a clearer understanding of these individuals. A further advantage of comparing these theories comes from the interrelated nature of some beliefs and the cultural values that may influence the organization of these beliefs. Belief in a literal Bible is often used as a measure of ones orthodoxy, fundamentalism, or evangelicalism (Bader & Froese, 2005; Franzen, 2013) or as independent variables (Driskell & Lyon, 2011; Greeley, 1993). However, biblical literalism may operate at the individual level, or be reflective of the surrounding communitys value systems and preferences. John Bartkowski (1996) demonstrated the role that an individuals prejudices bring to his reading of the text, while Ronald (2012) argued that even reading alone is influenced by the values of the community surrounding the reader. This effect of the interpretive community, in fact, is attenuated by biblical literalism. Franzen (2013) found that the relationship between Bible reading and conservative values was only present for nonliteralists. For literalists in their sample, the effect of the interpretive community made any effect of Bible reading on their moral and political attitudes negligible.Other effects of beliefs may be masked by the role that culture may play, or vice versa. Measures of intrinsic religiosity are predictive of Mormon social volunteerism, but not predictive of Catholic and non-Catholic Christian volunteerism, a relationship hypothesized to be reflective of the Mormon communitys particular emphasis on the importance of religion (Johnson, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). Religious groups with a distinctive culture, such as Catholic and Episcopal denominations, display a higher rate of retention compared to other denominations (Loveland, 2003). Finally, conservative theological beliefs, including biblical literalism, may be shared among white, black, and Latino Christians, but these beliefs do not reflect a standardized conservative political attitude (McKenzie & Rouse, 2013). Rather, the three groups reflect diverse and at times opposed political beliefs. It is evident that their ethnic and racial backgrounds are influencing the relationship of their religious beliefs to their political attitudes. ConclusionMoral cosmology and cultural theory have both demonstrated an ability to assess the nature of the relationship between religious beliefs and political behavior. More importantly, each has demonstrated its own ability to answer fundamental questions related to how these beliefs are formed; for moral cosmology it lies in the question of how an individual relates to God and his surroundings, and for cultural theory it lies in the question of how culture influences an individuals choice of preferences. Due to the interrelated nature of beliefs and culture, however, an examination of each of these concepts is required in order to better understand the relationship between religion and politics. Fortunately, the literature document suggests the practicality of such an endeavor.ReferencesBader, C., & Froese, P. (2005). Images of God: The effect of personal theologies on moral attitudes, political affiliation, and religious behavior. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 1, 1-24. Retrieved from http://www.religjournal.com/Bartkowski, J. (1996). Beyond biblical literalism and inerrancy: Conservative Protestants and the hermeneutic interpretation of Scripture. Sociology of Religion, 57, 259-272. doi: 10.2307/3712156Bauder, K. T. (2011). Fundamentalism. In A. D. Naselli & C. Hansen (Eds.), Four views on the spectrum of evangelicalism, (pp. 19-49). Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.Colson, C., & Pearcey, N. (1999). How now shall we then live? Chicago, IL: Tyndale House Publishers.Davis, N. J., & Robinson, R. V. (1996a). Are the rumors of war exaggerated? Religious orthodoxy and moral progressivism in America. American Journal of Sociology, 102, 756-787. doi: 10.1086/230996Davis, N. J., & Robinson, R. V. (1996b). Religious orthodoxy in American society: The myth of a monolithic camp. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 35, 229-245. doi: 10.2307/1386553Davis, N. J., & Robinson, R. V. (1996c). Rejoinder to Hunter: Religious orthodoxy: An army without foot soldiers? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 35, 249-251. doi: 10.2307/1386555Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Driskell, R. L., & Lyon, L. (2011). Assessing the role of religious beliefs on secular and spiritual behaviors. Review of Religious Research, 52, 386-404. Retrieved from http://www.rraweb.org/?page_id=147Ellison, C. G., & Sherkat, D. E. (1993). Obedience and autonomy: Religion and parental values reconsidered. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 32, 313-329. doi: 10.2307/1387172Emerson, M. O., & Smith, C. (2000). Divided by faith. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Farrell, J. (2011). The young and the restless? The liberalization of young evangelicals. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50, 517-532. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2011.01589.xFranzen, A. B. (2013). Reading the Bible in America: The moral and political attitude effect. Review of Religious Research, 55, 393-411. doi: 10.1007/s13644-013-0109-2Friesen, A., & Wagner, M. W. (2012). Beyond the three Bs: How American Christians approach faith and politics. Politics and Religion, 5, 224-252. doi: 10.1017/S1755048312000028Gastil, J., Braman, D., Kahan, D. M., & Slovic, P. (2005). The Wildavsky heuristic: The cultural orientation of mass political opinion. Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 107. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.834264Greeley, A. (1993). Religion and attitudes toward the environment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 32, 19-28. doi: 10.2307/1386911Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture wars: The struggle to define America. New York, NY: Basic Books.Jelen, T. G. (1990). Research note: Religious belief and attitude constraint. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 29, 118-125. doi: 10.2307/1287036Jenkins-Smith, H., Silva, C. L., Gupta, K., & Ripberger, J. T. (2014). Belief system continuity and change in policy advocacy coalitions: Using cultural theory to specify belief systems, coalitions, and sources of change. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 484-508. doi: 10.1111/psj.12071Johnson, K. A., Cohen, A. B., & Okun, M. A. (2013). Intrinsic religiosity and volunteering during emerging adulthood: A comparison of Mormons with Catholics and non-Catholic Christians. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 52, 842-851. doi: 10.1111/jssr.12068Johnson, K. A., Hill, E. D., & Cohen, A. B. (2011). Integrating the study of culture and religion: Toward a psychology of worldview. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5, 137-152. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00339.xJones, M. D. (2014). Communicating climate change: Are stories better than just the facts? Policy Studies Journal, 42, 644-673. doi: 10.1111/psj.12072Kiecolt, K. J., & Nelsen, H. M. (1988). The structure of political attitudes among liberal and conservative Protestants. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 27, 48-59. doi: 10.2307/1387401Kilgore, E. (2012, April 20). Why the Christian Right doesnt care that Mitt Romney is a Mormon. The New Republic. Retrieved from http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/102771/romney-mormon-religion-backlash-election-obamaLachapelle, E., Montpetit, ., & Gaucin, J. (2014). Public perceptions of expert credibility on policy issues: The role of expert framing and political worldviews. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 674-696. doi: 10.1111/pjs.12073Lichterman, P. (2008). Religion and the construction of civil identity. American Sociological Review, 73, 83-104. doi: 10.1177/000312240807300105Loveland, M. T. (2003). Religious switching: Preference development, maintenance, and change. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42, 147-157. doi: 10.1111/1468-5906.00168Markham, P. N. (2010). Searching for a new story: The possibility of a new evangelical movement in the U.S. Journal of Religion and Society, 12, 1-22. Retrieved from http://moses.creighton.edu/jrs/Marsden, G. M. (1991). Understanding fundamentalism and evangelicalism. Grand Rapids, MI: William B Eerdman Publishing Co.McKenzie, B. D., & Rouse, S. M. (2013). Shades of faith: Religious foundations of political attitudes among African Americans, Latinos, and whites. American Journal of Political Science, 57, 218-235. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00611.xNey, S., & Verweij, M. (2014). Exploring the contributions of cultural theory for improving public deliberation about complex policy problems. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 620-643. doi: 10.1111/psj.12078Olson, L. R. (2011). The essentiality of culture in the study of religion and politics. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50, 639-653. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2011.01608.xOlson, D. V. A., & Carroll, J. W. (1992). Religiously based politics: Religious elites and the public. Social Forces, 70, 765-786. doi: 10.2307/2579753Peterson, G. R. (2001). Religion as orienting worldview. Zygon, 36, 5-19. doi: 10.1111/0591-2385.00336Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2008). U.S. religious landscape survey: Religious affiliation: Diverse and dynamic. Pew Reseach Center. Retrieved from http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdfPutnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2010). American grace: How religion unites and divides us. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.Robinson, R. (2014). Culture and legal policy punctuation in the Supreme Courts gender discrimination cases. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 555-589. doi: 10.1111/psj.12075Ronald, E. K. (2012). More than alone with the Bible: Reconceptualizing religious reading. Sociology of Religion, 73, 1-22. doi: 10.1093/socrel/srs001Ripberger, J. T., Gupta, K., Silva, C. L., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (2014). Cultural theory and the measurement of deep core beliefs within the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 509-527. doi: 10.1111/psj.12074Ryle, R. R., & Robinson, R. V. (2006). Ideology, moral cosmology, and community in the United States. City & Community, 5, 53-69. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6040.2006.00155.xSchaeffer, F. A. (1976). How should we then live? The rise and decline of Western thought and culture. Grand Rapids, MI: Fleming H. Revell. Schaeffer, F. A. (1981). A Christian manifesto. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books.Shields, J. A. (2011). Framing the Christian Right: How progressives and post-war liberals constructed the religious right. Journal of Church and State, 53(4), 635-655. doi: 10.1093/jcs/csr027Smith, C., Sikkink, D., & Bailey, J. (1998). Devotion in Dixie and beyond: A test of the Shibley thesis on the effects of regional origin and migration on individual religiosity. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37, 494-506. doi: 10.2307/1388056 Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (1991). Reasoning and choice: Explorations in political psychology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Song, G., Silva, C. L., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (2014). Cultural worldview and preference for childhood vaccination policy. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 528-554. doi: 10.1111/psj.12076Starks, B., & Robinson, R. V. (2007). Moral cosmology, religion, and adult values for children. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 46, 17-35. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2007.00338Starks, B., & Robinson, R. V. (2009). Two approaches to religion and politics: Moral cosmology and subcultural identity. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 38, 650-669. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5096.2009.01471.xSteensland, B., Park, J. Z., Regnerus, M. D., Robinson, L. D., Wilcox, W. B., & Woodberry, R. D. (2000). The measure of American religion: Toward improving the state of the art. Social Forces, 79, 291-318. doi: 10.2307/2675572Ursic, E. (2014). Bi the way: Rethinking categories of religious identity. The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society, 3, 29-34. Retrieved from http://religioninsociety.com/publications/journalWald, K. D., Silverman, A. L., & Fridy, K. (2005). Making sense of religion in political life. Annual Review of Political Science, 8, 121-43. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.083104.163853Weare, C., Lichterman, P., & Esparza, N. (2014). Collaboration and culture: Organizational culture and dynamics of collaborative policy networks. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 590-619. doi: 10.1111/psj.12077Wildavsky, A. (1987). Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: A cultural theory of preference formation. The American Political Science Review, 81, 3-22. doi: 10.2307/1960776Wildavsky, A., & Dake, K. (1990). Theories of risk perception: Who fears what and why? Daedalus, 119, 41-60. Retrieved from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/daedWoodberry, R. D., Park, J. Z., Kellstedt, L. A., Regnerus, M. D., & Steensland, B. (2012). The measure of American religious tradition: Theoretical and measurement considerations. Social Forces, 91, 65-73. doi: 10.1093/sf/sos121Woodberry, R. D., & Smith, C. S. (1998). Fundamentalism et al: Conservative protestants in America. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 25-56. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.25Wuthnow, R. (1988). The restructuring of American religion: Society and faith since World War II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.