anti defection and role of speaker

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THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER Author(s): N. S. GEHLOT Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991), pp. 327-340Published by: Indian Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855565Accessed: 27-05-2015 12:05 UTC

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THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND

THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER

N. S. GEHLOT

With the deteriorating political situation in the country the trend of political defections has once again acquired new dimen- sions in our federal set up and it brought to the limelight the loopholes in the Anti-Defection Law, 1985, enacted by the then Rajiv Government with a view of strengthening our political institutions. The political scenario further confirmed the mis* givings and doubts expressed at the time of its passage about the utility of legislation and role of the Speaker in dealing with the cases concerning the scope of the above-mentioned Act, It is now admitted that the Act has failed to achieve its purpose, viz-a-viz checking the unprincipled floor-crossing by our legislators and ensuring governmental stability both at the Centre and in the States of the Indian Union. The old game of the 'Aya Ram and Gaya Ram* has once again made a mockery of our democracy and even of the enactment of the 52nd Constitutional Amend- ment Act, 1985, because retail defections had been outlawed in it while wholesale defections have been legalized under this Act. For example, Mr. Chandra Shekhar with a group of 61 MPs left the Janata Dal, in a bid to oust the V.P. Singh Government and then formed the Janata Dal (S) Government but it did not attract the penalty laid down under the Anti-Defection Law. The game of wholesale defection was termed as a 'split' in the Janata Dal and not political defections because of 1/3 strength of the original party in the Lok Sabha. The operation of 1/3 principle of the Act resulted into the ridiculous formation of a minority Government of the Janata Dal (S) backed by the Con- gress (I).

The Indian Journal of Political Science , Vol. 52, No. 3, July - Sept., 1991. P- 5


328 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Provision of the Anti- Defection Act , 1985

The Rajiv Government creditably introduced the Anti-Defe- ction Bill on January 23, 1985 to fulfil its promise to ban defections through a constitutional amendment. The Bill was given assent by the President on February 15, 1985 and it then became the law of the Constitution. It came into effect on March 1, 1985. The Act added a new Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is, however, pertinent to point out that the Con- stitutional Amendment Bill did not require the ratification of the State Legislature under Article 368 of the Constitution. The Act contains provisions for disqualification of the elected members on the basis of defection. The Act provides that the seat of a member of Parliament/State Assembly Legislature shall fall vacant in the following contingencies:-

(a) If he voluntarily gives up his membership of such political party; or (b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs without obtaining; prior permission of such party and such act has not been condoned by the concerned political party within fifteen days from the date of such voting, or (c) If an Independent member after his election joins any political party; or if a nominated member joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date he took oath as a member of House. But the above mentioned provisions shall not apply in the following cases.

(i) Party Split : The disqualification condition on the ground of defection does not apply when there is a split in the political party and the member concerned belongs to a faction arising out of such split and group consists of not less than 1/3 members of the original party in the House.

(ii) Party Merger : These provisions shall also not apply where two or more political parties have decided to merge by a 2/3 majority of the total strength of the party in the Legislature.

(iii) Resignation of Speaker Deputy Speaker , Chairman Deputy Chairman from Party Membership : The above-mentioned provisions will not apply, when a member of the Lok Sabha/ Vidhan Sabha immediately before his election as a Speaker/


THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER 329

Deputy Speaker or as a Chairman or a Deputy Chairman, resigns from the membership of his party become a non- party entity. These provisions will also not apply to them when they rejoin the parental party or any other political party after ceasing to hold such offices. All the proceedings regarding the decisions on disqualifications of the members of the House under the Tenth Schedule shall be deemed to be the proceedings of Parliament/Legislature under Articles 122 and 212, respectively.

Decision of Cases Relating to Disqualification :

Para 7 of the Act lays down that any question regarding disqualification arising out of defection is to be decided by the Chairman or the Speaker of the House as the case maybe and his decision shall be final. The courts do not have a jurisdiction in such cases. It further mentions that when a question regarding such disqualification arises about the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker, Chairman or Deputy Chairman, the question shall be referred to such members of the House as the House may effect in this behalf.

Rules and Regulations of Defection Law :

The Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, lays down a set of rules and regulations for the Speaker or Chairman, as case may be, and it provides the procedure with regard to expulsion/admission of a member of the House from the party. These rules were framed on December 16, 1985 by the Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985 stipulates that every such petition alleging disqualification should be addressed to the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, containing a concise statement of the material facts against the alleged Member of Parliament (MP), It is provided that the Speaker would seek the reply from the affected party within seven days after receiving the petition from the leader of the parry concerned. The decision of the Speaker in this regard shall be notified in the Official Gazette and forwarded to the Election Commission and the Central Government. Likewise, the state Governments also framed the similar rules and regulations for the application of the disqualification clauses of the Act for their legislators. The Speaker of Kerala obtained the first opportunity to deal with the case of disqualification under the Anti-Defection Law, 1985



against Mr. P. C. Thomas who had quit the Democratic Janata Party in February, 1985 and he rejoined the United Kerala Con- gress. But he was absolved of the allegation of floor- crossing by the state Speaker on the ground that the Anti-Defection came into force on 1st March, 1985.1

Some Serious Flaws and Misgivings of the Act

The anti-defection Act was widely hailed by all the opposition parties, but at the same time it was criticised on some grounds as cited below:-

(a) Neither a public debate on its specific provision had been initiated nor any attempt was made by the Congress (I) Government to seek a consensus of all political parties infavour of it. It was hurriedly enacted to benefit the ruling party alone.

(b) The legislation intended to keep the party-majority as captive with the purpose of supression of dissenting voice within a party. Hence, it would promote an autocratic rule of party causes. It was pointed out that the Act would tarnish the image of the Speaker as there was no provision in it for judicial review of the Speaker's verdict.

(c) It gave unlimited powers to party bosses to issue arbit- rary whips on all kinds of matters and issues other than those relating to the No-Confidence Motion in a Govern- ment, Money Bills and party leadership, taking the support of the anti-party activity against any member of the party* if he did not vote according to the wish of the party bosses.

(d) The legislation would not strengthen the party structure operating in India, because attempts had not been made to uphold the values of factors such as the working of inner democracy within a party and recognition of a party under the Constitutional Law of India. On the other hand, bulk defections under the condition of 1/3 and merger by 2/3 majority has been legitimised. The Act, thus, has set free the activities of leaders like Bhajan Lai, G.M. Shah, Rao Birendra Singh etc. to escape from the clutches of the antidefection provisions and it has left the scope for parties like the Congress (I) to hatch a conspiracy to cause split in other parties, by offering political allurements and rewards.



(e) In the case of party split and party merger, the role of the party organization has been completely ignored and the legislative wing of the party has been given complete freedom of action. Thus, the above-cited Act makes a discrimi- nation between an Independent member and a nominated member. The former cannot join any political party but the latter can join it within six months of his election. However, Independents can change his loyalty in favour or against the Government on crucial occasions.2

In short, eminent Parliamentarians like J P,, Kripalani, Madhu Limaye, Madhu Dandavate and a host of others had expressed their apprehensions about the nefarious intensions of the Act. They had termed it as sinister in character under the garb of the utmost radical move, as it was meant to legitimise the party-despotism or party bosses in the country.3 Doubts were also raised whether the Act would be able to provide political stability at the governmental and the

party levels, while honouring the working of inner party democracy in a party-structure.4 Since the law on defection has not put a ban on defections arising out of the lust for power and it has legalized wholesale defections, as it was pointed out, it could not succeed in its mission to pre- vent the game of wholesale defections which had taken place in our polity during the 1989 90 phase.

Speaker's Role Under The Anti- Defection Law :

The political scenario of instability as was obtained in country after the split of the Janata Dal in November, 1989 also called in question the impartiality and neutrality attached with the office of Speaker.6 Doubts were raised that the Indian Speaker, while handling the situation arising out of the dissident activities

amongst the elected members and the 'split* caused in the Janata Dal, did not act judiciously and impartially. It was alleged by the opposition parties that the role of the Speaker of the Lok Sabhaand the Speakers of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, in granting official recognition to the rebels of the break

away group of the legislators was not a sign of impartiality, especially when they (defectors) had openly flouted the party whip. Their voting behaviour, contrary to the party whip, virtually incurred the disqualification as laid down in the Anti-Defection



Law of 1985. The voice was raised that the Lok Sabha Speaker should have declared them disqualified according to the spirit of the provisions of the Act. Different legislative parties moved their petitions lodging the complaints against the behaviour of the defectors and urged the Speaker to declare them as disqualified under the Anti-Defection Act, 1985.

Our recent experience has shown that Indian Speakers have not acted in an impartial and independent manner in dealing with the disputes of disqualifications of the legislators arising out of the 'split* of a party or violation of the party-whip on Confi- dence Motion and other cases of floor-crossings. The way in which the members of Legislatures changed their party-affiliations with a desire to grab power, has dragged the august body into fresh controversies. They have been alleged to have misused their powers entrusted to them under the Anti-Defection Act, 1985 and they have totally frustrated the very purpose of the Act, while excercising the powers under Para 3 of Tenth Schedule of the Act that recognizes the 'split* in the party caused by 1/3 members of that party and Para 4 that recognizes an elected member as the party- member. They were further alleged to have perverted the spirit of the Act, rendering it so obsolete in our federeal polity, because their role has weakened the party loyalty as well as party discipline.

The manner in which the Lok Sahha Speaker, Mr. Rabi Ray, delivered his rulings relating to the issue of disqualification of the members of the Janata Dal (S), also shocked many. Serious concerns have been expressed and the voice was raised that the Act should be reviewed again in the light of its inherent weaknesses and flaws, providing checks on Speaker's powers to strengthen the political system of India. It was realised that those weaknesses have reduced it to a mockery in our set-up. The Anti-Defection Law was conceived as a measure of electoral reform with explicit purpose of putting a stop to political defections of over-ambitious members of legislatures from one party to another and eradication of the 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram' phase from our political system. The political turn-out that followed with the exit of the V. P. Singh Government at the Centre brought to the lime-light new technicalities of the Act, especially when the issue of status of the break-away group from the Janata Dal was to be determined by the Speaker, as these members had been



expelled from the party in two batches. It was noted with dis- gust how the spirit of the Anti-Defection Law was conveniently ignored by all concerned of the Lok Shbha to suit their conveni- ence of power and how they failed to honour the law of Parlia- ment which had enated it in 1985. Instead, the game undermined our democratic institutions and rendered the second experiment of the National Front Government a failure in our political system.

The Government of Defectors at the Centre :

The National Front Government led by V. P. Singh was voted out of power on November 7, 1990 following the defections of the thirty seven members of the Janata Dal (JD). The list of these members was submitted to the then Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr. Rabi Ray, on November 6, 1991, by its leader, Mr. Chandra Shekhar, informing him about the split in the J.D and the formation of a new political party. On the eve of the Vote of Confidence in the Council of Ministers led by Mr. V. P. Singh, the Speaker declared the twenty five members of the breakaway group of the J. D. as "unattached". Notwithstanding the ruling of the Speaker, the leader of its group, Mr. Chandra Shekhar, staked his claim to form the government at the Centre with the 'outside' support of the Congress (I) and he could successfully form the government at the Centre. The purpose of a split in the Janata Dal, thus, was fulfilled; that is, it was merely a struggle of game for power launched by Mr. Chandra Shekhar and Mr. Devi Lai to grab the power.

A petition on behalf of the J. D. was filed to the Lok Sabha Secretariat for the disqualification of 31 members of the J. D. for defying the party whip and voting against the N. F. Government. This list included all those dissidents who had been expelled from the Janata Dal and who had already been declared 'unattached' by the Lok Sabha Speaker.7 On the other hand, the J. D, dissident leader also filed his petition, urging the Speaker to revoke his order declaring the 25 Janata Dal faction MPs as 'unattached' and appealing to recognize them as a sepa- rate political entity (the Janata Dal - Socialist) in the Lok Sabha under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. His plea was that the breakaway group of 37 Janata Dal constituted the



strength more than 1/3 of the Janata Dal Parliamentary Party as required by the Act. Therefore, the question of application of clauses 6 and 7 of the Anti-Defection Act, 1985 did not arise.8 The issue, according to the leader of the Janata Dal faction, related to the shortcomings of the law.

Meanwhile, the Delhi High Court, on January 8, 1991, directed the Speaker to maintain status quo in respect of the disqualification proceedings against all the 37 MPs of the Janata Dal (S). This order was passed by a full bench of the High Court when a petition seeking the direction of the court was filed by the Janata Dal (S) members, maintaining the ground that there was virtually a split in the Janata Party; all the 37 MPs constituted more than 1/3 of the Janata Dal and they had the right to form a new party.

While reviewing the petitions of the Janata Dal dissidents, the Lok Sabha Speaker announced his decision, on January 11, 1991, disqualifying the eight Janata Dal (S) members including the five Ministers of the Union Cabinet under the Anti- Defection Law on the basis of their voting pattern on November 7 and on November 16, 1990, which was inconsistent. According to the Speaker, these members could not claim that they were not bound by the party whip served to them by the Party High Command to vote in favour of the confidence motion of Mr. V. P. Singh in the Lok Sabha on November 16, 1990. It was treated a case of violation of the party whip and the Speaker, thus, reject- ed their plea that the whip of the Janata Dal did not apply to them in view of the 'Conscience vote' appealed by Mr. V. P. Singh in the Lok Sabha on the same day. The Speaker, however, recognized the 'split' in the Janata Dal and and henceforth treated the group of 54 members as the Janata Dal (S), because it had fulfilled the criterion of 1/3 of the 52nd Constitutional Amend ment Act, 1985.

Supremacy of the Speakar Asserted :

The special session of the Lok Sabha held in January 1991 shall be remembered in the parliamentary history of India on many counts, because the session witnessed many illustrating and unprecedented examples of peculiar nature, which lowered the dignity of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the supremacy of


THE ANTI- DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER 335

the parliament itself. As many as eight members of the Lok Sabha, belonging to the Janata Dal (S), for example, were disqualified en block including the five Union Ministers of the Chandra Shekhar Government by the Speaker, Mr. Rabi Ray, under the Anti-Defection Law. It caused a serious setback to the minority Government headed by Chandra Shekhar. Following the judgement of the Delhi High Court and the inteview of Dr. S. Subramaniam Swamy, the then Union Law Minister, against the ruling of the Speaker, the Speaker's position was put in an embarrassing position. The then Union Law Minister, in his interview, threatened the Speaker to get him arrested if he (Speaker) did not postpone indefinitely the last date for submis- sion of the replies of 37 Janata Dal (S) members, whose disqualification under the Anti-Defection Law had been sought by the Janata Dal. A vociferous protest against the atrocious conduct of the Minister was raised in both the Houses of Parliament on January 2, 1991. The Minister's interview, published in 46Tke Hindustan Times", (New Delhi) dated 27th December, 1990, was taken as a gross contempt of the House committed by the then Union Law Minister. The episode was further described as 'institutional damage to parliamentary democracy5.

Pertinent issues debated in the Lok Sabha related to the dignity of the Speaker's authority and the jurisdiction of the Indian Parliament, as the disqualification case of the MPs versus the judgement of the Delhi High Court in which the dignity and neutrality of the Office of the Speaker was called is questioned, were of serious concerns. There was a general consensus that, under no circumstances, should the Speaker allow the unbecoming conduct of the Union Minister to cloud the judgement of the Speaker and the interview given by the Minister amounted to the violation of the sixth clause of the Anti-Defection Law, which upholds that the Speaker's ruling is 'final'. Consequently, the arrant Minister had to tender his apology in the Lok Sabha on January 14, 1991.

As regards the jurisdiction of the Speaker and the High Court which resulted in a clash between the Delhi High Court and the Speaker's authority on the disqualification issuse, it was a healthy development that it was judiciously averted by modi- fying the affidavit filed by the then Union Government of the Janata Dal (S). The Government declared in the Lok Sabha to

P- 6



uphold the dignity of the House and the Speaker as well.9 And finally, on the question of remaining in office by the five Union Ministers, who had already been disqualified by the speaker in the disqualification case, it was widely viewed as the defiance of Speakers ruling. The Janata Dal (S) was charged in the Lok Sabha of reducing the spirit of the Anti-Defection Act, 1985 that is political stability and public morality, as keeping the Ministers in office amounted to legitimatising defectors under Article 75 (5) of the Constitution of India. The Government's attention was drawn to the specific recommendation of the Defection Committee formed in 1967, which had suggested that defectors should not be given any ministerial birth. Even the opposition parties, namely the Janata Dal, the B. J. P. and the Left parties, in their memorandum to the President of India, urged to sack those Ministers in order to uphold the sanctity of the constitutional law. The controversy lateron ended when the Prime Minister relieved the Union Ministers from their portfolios following the mounting pressure of the Congress (I).

Meanwhile, a full bench of the Delhi High Court revoked its stay order on 11th January, 1991, declaring that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha enjoyed jurisdiction in the matters of disqualification cases of the members of the Lok Sabha. It was a healthy development that during the Lok Sabha debate, the wisdom prevailed and the dignity of the House as well as the authority of the Speaker was maintained. It was, however, unfortunate that the entire embroglio left a bad reflection of the standard of political conduct of a Minister in our Parliamentary history.

Validity of Speaker's Ruling Questioned

Notwithstanding the fact that the Speaker's rulings in the disqualification was widely welcomed, the doubts about the impartiality of the Lok Sabha Speaker were aroused because of Speaker's political affiliation with the party which had elected him as Speaker. The Speaker of Kerala's Legislative Assembly, Mr. V. Radhakrishna, for example, questioned the impartial role played by the Lok Sabha Speaker, as he had not given a chance to the members of the break-away Janata Dal to submit their explanations before declaring them 'unattached'. He should have taken into account the claims and counter-claims of the members of the Janata Dal and its faction before his judgement.


THE ANTI- DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER 337

The corollary of the Speaker's decision was that he should have disqualified the rest of the dissidents in the faction since they did not constitute one- third of the Janata Dal. In this context, a matter of national debate at that time was whether the power to decide upon the petitions regarding political defections under the Tenth Schedule to our Constitution should vest solely with the single individual? The pertinent issue was how to ensure a fair and impartial role of the Speaker in deciding the question of the disqualification of the MPs. It was felt that however perfect a provision may be provided for, when it comes into operation, the Speaker - intentionally or otherwise - might be tempted by his party loyalty, even after his election for this august office while disposing of such petitions of political nature.

Constitutional experts and eminent jurists such as Dr. L. M. Singhvi, K. K. Venugopal and others were of the opinion that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha should not be vested with an absolute and final authority of disqualifying a member on grounds of defection, and to this effect, the Constitution of India should be amended to insert a provision of judicial review of Speaker's ruling by a special Judicial Tribunal constituted for this purpose, consisting of retired judges of the Supreme Court of India to adjudicate the cases of defections.10 In their opinion, a legislator should not be denied the right to seek a judicial review of the judgement given by the Speaker. Likewise, Speaker of the Kerala Legislative Assembly, also called for two important amendments to the Anti-Defection Act, 1985. First, it should apply to all the disqualifications alike - individual or organization. Condoning of defection even if a defecting group has 1/3 strength of the party in the House is against the basic tenet of the parliamentary form of democracy. Secondly, the power to dis- qualify members under the provisions of the 52nd Amendment Act should be vested in the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India or the High Court.

Concluding Observations

The political conditions as prevalent in the country at the time of the passage of the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, warranted the dire need of such an act for maintaining political stability and public morality. But its major drawback was that it was enacted in a hurried manner by the then Union Government of



Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, without seeking the consensus to other political parties, or launching a nation-wide debate on the crucial issues. Consequently, the Act neither could lay a ban on the trend of mass-defections nor did it take into account the possibility of partial role to be played by the Presiding Officers, while dealing with cases of disqualifications falling under the ambit of the Con- stitutional Amendment Act, 1985. It is a matter of deep regret that its inherent flaws and drawbacks, as brought to limelight at the time of debate in the Parliamentary proceedings in 1985, were ignored and which have been, in practical terms, responsible for frustrating the objectives of the Act. These drawbacks have not only weakened the working system of the parliamentary institutions but they have also undermined the party-system in the country. Its flaws have further generated a tug-of-war between the Parliament and the Judiciary, resulting into the flood of petitions in the Court of Law against the decisions delivered by state Speakers from time to time.

The manner in which the wholesale defections took place in the Janata Dal leading to the floating of the new party (Janata Dal-S), or the way in which Speaker exercised his powers in dealing with the disqualification cases arising out of a split in the Janata Dal, has proved these apprehensions correct, as were originally expressed at the time of its passage.

The inherent loopholes in the Act, therefore, should be held responsible for the destabilization of Governments of Non- Congress parties. It is regrettable that the role of the Speaker in handling a split in the party and thereby tackling the disqualification cases of elected members, has rendered the spirit of the Amendment Act, 1985 a mockery in our federal set-up. For its failure, the ruling political party, which had chosen him as Pre- siding Officer of the Legislature, with a view to act in a manner to serve the political purpose of the party in power, should equally be blamed for the political crises the nation has ever faced with. In order to strengthen the working system of our political institutions and the party structure, the following suggestions should be incroporated in the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, so that the unsavoury incidents involving the office of the Speaker could be avoided and wholesale defections check- mated.



First, a fresh country-wide debate should be called for to evolve a national consensus as to how to overcome the trends of defections and how to remove the drawbacks of the Anti-Defec- tion Law, with a view to strengthening our parliamentary democracy. Second, there is an utmost need to have some effective checks on the unlimited powers of the Speaker in dealing with the disqualification cases of elected members. The demand that the Speaker's ruling should be made subject to judicial review by the special tribunal constituted for the purpose should be seriously taken into consideration.

Apart from this, the wholesale defections shall have to be banned under the law, because dissident members in a political party are free to act according to their convictions at the party forum but they must resign and seek fresh mandate from the electorate who have elected them on the label of a particular party. The lacuna as referred to by the Lok Sabha Speaker in his ruling should also be taken into account. It is, however, important to explore the scope of allowing dissidence to function within the organization of a political party, because dissident opinion is one of the important ingredients of democracy and it should be encouraged in our party system. The political party is more important than the individuals in a democratic setup as electors vote for a party and not for candidates. Also, a deterrent provision has to be made placing a ceiling on the size of the Council of Ministers so as to circumscribe the scope of sheilding political rewards to defecting members.

Lastly, there is utmost need to introduce the principle of inner democracy within the organization of a political party in India to eliminate the evils like bossism in the party system. In the absence of inner party elections, the political parties have come into exis- tence on the basis of autocracy, feudalism, religion, casteism and regionalism, which have subverted the virtues of party system, such as dissension, emergence of rival leadership and periodic elections within the organization. These evils have given birth to psychophancy and mental-slavery in the rank and file in the name of loyalty, discipline and ideology. It is regretted that the political parties which have ruled the largest democracy of the world have sofar not honoured the concept of inner-party democracy in their organizations. It is, therefore, suggested that the party system in the country should be recognized under the constitu-



tional law, while making inner party democracy mandatory for all the political parties.

It is, however, important to mention that mere legislative measures cannot cover the entire field. The democratic conven- tions have to be evolved, coupled with some statutory provisions to circumscribe ills of our parliamentary democracy. Loopholes are bound to remain which are to be plugged by the prevalence of healthy traditions. But to cure the disease forever, the people shall have to be educated and trained in the right direction, so- that a healthy and awakened public opinion is generated to punish the culprits and to discourage unprincipled defections. The electorate should be made more vigilant to have a strict watch on the role of their elected members.

NOTES

1. How the game of defections proved a double-edged weapon in the post- 1967 period in making and unmaking governments in our polity, see Subhas G. Kashyap's study: The Politics of Defections , National, Delhi, 1969 and The Politics of Power, National, Delhi, 1974 for a detailed study.

2. Bhatia, Surdarshan., "Politics of Defections," The Hindustan Times , 22-12 - 90. See my Book, Dynamics of Indian Poli' tics, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1986, Chapter 10, p. 159.

3. Siwach, J. R., Dynamics of Indian Government and Politics, Sterling, New Delhi, Und Edn; 1990, p. 653.

4. Dhavan, Rajiv., "Governors, Speakers and Defectors", The Indian Express, May 23, 1990, p. 8.

5. Tharyan, P., "Plugging the loopholes of Anti-Defection Law", The Hindustan Times, 8 - 3-91.

6. Ganeshan, K., "Constitution and Anti-Defection Law" The Indian Expresi, December 16, 1988.

7. On the same day, Mr. Chandra Shekhar announced that he would present a proposal for forming a new Government at the Centre. The Indian Express , New Delhi Edn: November 9, 1990.

8. Bhandari, M. C., "Disqualification: Make it Justifiable", The Hindustan Times'. 19 - 11 - 90.

9. Editorial., 'Parliament is Supreme', The Hindustan Times 11 - 1 - 199 1

10. The Times of India, 6th January, 1991.


Article Contentsp. [327]p. 328p. 329p. 330p. 331p. 332p. 333p. 334p. 335p. 336p. 337p. 338p. 339p. 340

Issue Table of ContentsThe Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991) pp. i-iv, 295-438, i-iiFront MatterTHE FRAGILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: THE MILITARY AS THE ROOT CAUSE [pp. 295-326]THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER [pp. 327-340]THE FORMATION OF THE ALL-INDIA HOME RULE LEAGUE [pp. 341-356]POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR [pp. 357-375]REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIAN POLITY AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS RECONSTITUTION [pp. 376-384]TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POLITICS [pp. 385-395]INDIA AND THE U. S. PRESS: AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN NEWS SOURCES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEATH OF RAJIV GANDHI [pp. 396-405]DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION IN AN INDIAN STATE : KERALA [pp. 406-417]REVIEW ARTICLEMACHIAVELLIAN THEORY OF THE STATE [pp. 418-423]

BOOK REVIEWSReview: untitled [pp. 424-426]Review: untitled [pp. 426-428]Review: untitled [pp. 428-431]Review: untitled [pp. 432-432]Review: untitled [pp. 433-434]Review: untitled [pp. 434-438]

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