appellant’s merit brief world. police are now armed with military grade weaponry, tanks, and other...
TRANSCRIPT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
DONALD F. LEYMAN ) CASE NO. 2015-0367
)
Appellant )
)
v. ) APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY
) COURT OF APPEALS
MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN ) FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
) CASE NO. 14CA93
Appellee )
APPELLANT’S MERIT BRIEF
______________________________________________________________________________
Stephen P. Hanudel (#0083486) Michael DeWine (#0009181)
124 Middle Avenue, Suite 900 William H. Lamb (#0051808)
Elyria, Ohio 44035 Ohio Attorney General’s Office
Phone: (440) 328-8973 441 Vine Street
Fax: (440) 261-4040 1600 Carew Tower
[email protected] Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Phone: (513) 852-3497
Fax: (513) 852-3484
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed April 24, 2015 - Case No. 2015-0367
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………......iv
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1
STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................……………………………………………........3
ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………………….....13
FIRST PROPOSITION OF LAW: The Court of Appeals misapplied
Civ. R. 12(B)(6) and the habeas corpus procedure in ORC Chapter 2725
when it granted the Warden’s motion to dismiss………….……………………………..13
SECOND PROPOSITION OF LAW: In criminal cases, common pleas
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction, subject to statutory exceptions,
over offenses committed by adults in Ohio…………………………………………...…16
THIRD PROPOSITION OF LAW: Subject-matter jurisdiction is an
element of each offense that must be proven by the State of Ohio……………………....16
FOURTH PROPOSITION OF LAW: To establish a common pleas court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, the State must produce sufficient evidence
that the defendant is an adult and an element of the offense occurred in Ohio………….16
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – Generally…………………….………………..….16
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – Criminal Cases………………….…………….….17
Other Types of Jurisdiction……………………………………………………....18
Discussion of Yarbrough………………………………………………….……..19
Analysis of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Leyman’s Case………………..…….21
Previous Court Analyses on Location…………………………………………....25
iii
FIFTH PROPOSITION OF LAW: The lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction is cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings and does not
require showing the lack of another adequate remedy at law…………...…………….…28
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………….....……….32
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………………...…..….35
APPENDIX
Notice of Appeal filed March 3, 2015……………………………………………….…A-1
Judgment Entry of Fifth District Court of Appeals dismissing habeas corpus petition
filed February 27, 2015………………………………………………...……….A-3
Opinion of Fifth District Court of Appeals on dismissal of habeas corpus petition
filed February 27, 2015………………………………………..............………..A-4
Decision of Ninth District Court of Appeals in direct appeal
filed October 5, 2000………………………………………………………..….A-9
Decision of Ninth District Court of Appeals denying application to reopen direct appeal
filed February 18, 2014…………………………………………..……………A-23
Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution…………………………………….A-26
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2725……………………………………………...……..A-27
Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.11………………………………………...………..A-33
Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.12………………………………………………….A-34
Ohio Revised Code Section 2931.03………………………………………………….A-37
Ohio Revised Code Section 2969.25………………………………………………….A-38
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Constitution
Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution………………………………………….……17
Statutes
ORC Chapter 2725……………………………………………………………….13, 14, 15, 29, 32
ORC 2725.04………………………………………………………………………...13, 14
ORC 2725.06………………………………………………………………………….…13
ORC 2725.14……………………………………………………………………...…15, 33
ORC 2725.15…………………………………………………………………………….15
ORC 2901.11……………………………………...………9, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32
ORC 2901.12……………………………………………………………..……….9, 17, 20, 25, 26
ORC 2931.03……………………………………………………………………………...……..17
ORC 2969.25…………………………………………………………………………………….14
Rules
App. R. 26……………………………………………………………………………………..…11
Civ. R. 11…………………………………………………………………………………...……14
Civ. R. 12(B)(6)………………………………………………………………….…..13, 14, 15, 33
Crim. R. 29……………………………………………………………………………….18, 21, 28
Cases
Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540 (2001)………………………………………….....…….29, 31
Click v. Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88 (1962)……………………………………………….………….17
Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149 (1995)…………………………...…….……15, 18, 29-31
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)………………………………………………………..28
v
Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614 (2001)………………………………....30, 31
Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443……………………………………..........14
Leyman v. Bradshaw, 2015-Ohio-751……………………………………………………...……27
Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990)………….16
In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375 (1949)…………………………………………………………..29
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)……………………………………………………………...28
Pegan v. Crawmer, 73 Ohio St. 3d 607 (1995)………………………………………………….13
Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362………………………….…14
Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980……………………….……....16-19, 29-30
Rogers v. State, 87 Ohio St.308 (1913)……………………………………………………….…16
Stahl v. Shoemaker, 50 Ohio St.2d 351 (1977)……………………………………….………….29
State v. Barnecut, 44 Ohio App.3d 149 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. 1988)…………………………...….23
State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86 (2000)……………………………………………………....31
State v. Leyman, 91 Ohio St.3d 1433, 2001-Ohio-232……………………………………………9
State v. Phelps, Cuyahoga App. No. 69157, 1996 WL 532092 (1996)……………………....23-24
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997)…………………………………………………..26
State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087………………….16-22, 25-27, 30-32, 34
State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32 (2001)………………………………………………….…….9-10
State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40 (1995)…………………………………………………….16, 31
State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193 (1996)……………………………..14, 15, 30
State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185 (1995)……………………………………..29
State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan, 2015-Ohio-980……………………………………..…………14
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982)…………………………………………………………….28
vi
Other Sources
A free man: Ricky Jackson to leave prison 39 years after a boy’s lie helped put him behind bars
(Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 18, 2014) http://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/index.ssf/2014/11/a_free_man_ricky_jackson_to_le.html.......................................2
Carlos Berdejo and Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political
Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 Rev. Econ. Stat. 741 (2012)………………………….2
Claire S.H. Lim, James M. Snyder, Jr., and David Stromberg, The Judge, the Politician, and the
Press: Newspaper Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems,
publication forthcoming in American Economic Journal. See
https://lim.economics.cornell.edu/MainManuscript.pdf and
http://lim.economics.cornell.edu/MediaOnlineAppendix.pdf.............................................2
Exonerations hit record high in 2014 (USA Today, January 27, 2015)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/27/exonerations-record-
high/22358511.....................................................................................................................1
Good Kids, Bad City: After 39 Years of Wrongful Incarceration, Ricky Jackson and the
Bridgeman Brothers Walk Free (Cleveland Scene, December 3, 2014)
http://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2014/12/03/good-kids-bad-city-
after-39-years-of-wrongful-incarceration-ricky-jackson-and-the-bridgeman-brothers-
walk-free..............................................................................................................................2
Kern County settles last of molestation conviction lawsuits (Bakersfield Californian - March 15,
2013), http://www.bakersfieldcalifornian.com/local/x365558195/County-settles-last-of-
molestation-conviction-lawsuits..........................................................................................1
Study Puts Exonerations at Record Level in U.S. (New York Times, February 4, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/us/study-puts-exonerations-at-record-level-in-
us.html..................................................................................................................................1
1
INTRODUCTION
This instant habeas corpus appeal arises at an interesting time where public debate has
intensified over the merits of the tough-on-crime movement and aggressive law enforcement of
the last several decades.
The United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the
world. Police are now armed with military grade weaponry, tanks, and other armaments.
However, exonerations are steadily on the rise. The year 2013 was a record year, only to be
broken by 2014.1 2 Time will tell if 2015 sets a new record, but it is not difficult to conclude that
these wrongful convictions are a direct byproduct of the tough-on-crime movement gone awry.
The debate also raises an interesting question about the value of freedom in this country,
which is what habeas corpus was ultimately instituted to protect.
Aggressive law enforcement often targeted child sex abuse cases. In the 1980’s and 90’s,
allegations sprung up nationwide at an alarming rate, including cases of children accusing their
own parents. The accused did not stand a chance in those cases. Nobody thought that children
would possibly lie about such reviled conduct. In particular, in Bakersfield, California in the
1980’s, 27 people were convicted of child sex abuse, yet 25 of those convictions were eventually
overturned based on improper questioning of the children and prosecutorial misconduct.3
For those who are still not convinced that children would falsely testify in court to
convict someone, they need only look to the recent exonerations of Ricky Jackson, Ronnie
1 Study Puts Exonerations at Record Level in U.S. (New York Times, February 4, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/us/study-puts-exonerations-at-record-level-in-us.html
2 Exonerations hit record high in 2014 (USA Today, January 27, 2015)
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/27/exonerations-record-high/22358511
3 Kern County settles last of molestation conviction lawsuits (Bakersfield Californian - March 15, 2013),
http://www.bakersfieldcalifornian.com/local/x365558195/County-settles-last-of-molestation-conviction-lawsuits
2
Bridgeman, and Wiley Bridgeman of Cleveland. All three were convicted and Jackson was
wrongfully imprisoned for a national record 39 years solely based on the false testimony of a 12-
year old boy.4 There are perhaps many emotional and psychological reasons why the 12-year old
boy falsely implicated the three men and then go 39 years without retracting, including refusals
to retract when approached, but it shows that such scenarios are not preposterous anymore.5
The tough-on-crime movement has not only influenced law enforcement and
prosecutorial practices, but judicial decision making too. In particular, in states where judges are
elected, studies have shown tough-on-crime politics to exert noticeable influence on sentencings,
resulting in harsher punishments on defendants. 6 7
Leyman mentions this as a backdrop because it is the proverbial “elephant in the room”
that he feels has significantly impacted the disposition of his post-conviction efforts so far. As it
will be explained in this brief, this Court’s well settled case law on subject-matter jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is strongly in Leyman’s favor. Thus, when Leyman brought to the Fifth
District Court of Appeals’ attention in a habeas corpus action that no evidence was ever
4 A free man: Ricky Jackson to leave prison 39 years after a boy’s lie helped put him behind bars (Cleveland Plain
Dealer, November 18, 2014)
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/11/a_free_man_ricky_jackson_to_le.html
5 Good Kids, Bad City: After 39 Years of Wrongful Incarceration, Ricky Jackson and the Bridgeman Brothers Walk
Free (Cleveland Scene, December 3, 2014)
http://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2014/12/03/good-kids-bad-city-after-39-years-of-wrongful-
incarceration-ricky-jackson-and-the-bridgeman-brothers-walk-free
6 Carlos Berdejo and Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal
Sentencing, 95 Rev. Econ. Stat. 741 (2012).
7 Claire S.H. Lim, James M. Snyder, Jr., and David Stromberg, The Judge, the Politician, and the Press: Newspaper
Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems, publication forthcoming in American Economic
Journal. See https://lim.economics.cornell.edu/MainManuscript.pdf and
http://lim.economics.cornell.edu/MediaOnlineAppendix.pdf
3
produced to implicate the alleged offense to occur in Ohio, it should have been a straightforward
decision for the Fifth District to rule in his favor.
However, once it is known that the alleged offense is rape of a child, what would
otherwise be a straightforward decision based on the law and facts is now more complicated.
Child sex offenses are the most reviled form of criminal conduct in this society because children
are often the most helpless and defenseless of victims. As the previously cited sources suggest,
the focus shifts away from whether the accused actually did it or whether the law was correctly
applied and more toward the passions that demand harsh punishment.
With the judicial system based on popular election, judges are naturally drawn to
consider the political consequences of their decisions. However, it should never be reason to lack
courage to set an innocent man free when the law and facts call for it. Despite the loud tough-on-
crime voices, it is perhaps more outrageous to the people that a man is wrongfully convicted and
incarcerated for a crime he did not commit.
As the upcoming analysis will show, Leyman was convicted solely based on oral
allegations with no medical or physical evidence to substantiate them. Pertinent to the instant
matter before this Court, there is a giant hole in the State’s case, which is the lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Leyman hopes this Court will follow its well settled case law and direct the
Fifth District to do the same and set him free.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1990, Leyman met Marilyn Chapman and began living with her in Hamilton, New
York. She had two children from prior relationships, Michael and Amber. Michael was born in
June 1985 and Amber in September 1988. In 1991, Leyman married Marilyn. In June 1993, with
Marilyn pregnant with Leyman’s child, she decided to move back to her native Medina, Ohio.
4
Michael and Amber went with her and Leyman followed a few months later. In January 1994,
Leyman’s son Jacob was born.
The marriage soon deteriorated as Marilyn had multiple affairs with other men and
ignored caring for Jacob. In April 1995, Leyman moved out and went back to his native
Pennsylvania. In the ensuing divorce proceedings in Medina County, Leyman sought custody of
his son. He stated in court filings and affidavits that Marilyn neglected Jacob, often to Jacob’s
peril, while she had affairs with other men. Marilyn then became angry and withheld visitation,
which prompted a show cause motion from Leyman. In a later incident, Leyman reported
Marilyn to children’s services after Jacob drank contact lens cleaner while Marilyn was in bed
with another man.
Eventually, Leyman and Marilyn agreed to a shared parenting plan, thereby squelching
all pending matters with the domestic relations court. However, in August 1996, Marilyn’s
attorney snuck through a divorce decree that awarded Marilyn full custody of Jacob and only
supervised visitation to Leyman. The judge signed it. The following week, Leyman received it in
the mail from the court.
Leyman then furiously contacted Marilyn demanding to know what happened to the
shared parenting plan they agreed to. Marilyn at first pretended to know nothing. Leyman made
it known to her that he would reopen the case if the matter was not fixed.
In September 1996, Marilyn’s attorney reported to police that Leyman sexually abused
Michael and Amber. The police then talked to Marilyn. In the initial police report, there were no
rape allegations. The children were interviewed a week later, which is when the rape allegations
first surfaced.
5
In November 1996, Leyman went to Medina police to help him obtain visitation with
Jacob. Instead, he was interviewed about the sex abuse allegations. Leyman flatly denied the
allegations and told police that Marilyn was coaching the children.
The case laid dormant until May 21, 1998. On that day, Leyman was indicted in Medina
County for rape of Michael (Count I), gross sexual imposition on Michael (Count II), rape of
Amber (Count III), and gross sexual imposition on Amber (Count IV). The indictment alleged
these acts to occur from fall 1993 through the end of 1995.
As a result of this indictment, Leyman’s freedom came to a sudden and unexpected end
on June 26, 1998 as he clocked out of work on a Friday afternoon in Pennsylvania looking
forward to his weekend. He fought extradition for two months before being transported to
Medina County. Steadfastly maintaining his innocence, Leyman went to trial on February 16,
1999 in Medina County Court of Common Pleas.
In trial, Michael testified about where he, Amber, Marilyn, and Leyman lived together at
various times. For reference, he testified that his birthday was June 19, 1985. Tr. 36. He first
gave two addresses in New York, but did not specify whether he was referring to New York City
or another city in the state of New York. Tr. 39. He then said they lived in Seville, but did not
specify an address or which state. Tr. 39. He then said they lived in Chippewa, but did not
specify an address or which state. Tr. 41. When asked how old he was when he moved from New
York to Medina, Michael replied “Seven, eight.” Tr. 43. He did not remember what grade he was
in. Tr. 43.
Michael testified that at the time of trial, he was living in Medina and provided the
address. Tr. 36. He said he previously lived at another address in Medina. Tr. 41-42. Before that,
he spent six months with his real father in Virginia. Tr. 42-43. Michael recalled that Leyman did
6
not live with him anymore after Leyman and Marilyn divorced, but did not specify exactly where
or when. Tr. 59.
When Michael was asked by the prosecutor what Leyman did to him, he paused. The trial
court then told him, “It’s all right son. We are all here to hear what you’re able to describe. You
go ahead.” Michael then asked, “In what way?” The prosecutor then said, “You know what you
and I have talked about in the past, right?” After Michael replied, “Yes,” the prosecutor said,
“Okay. Tell these people of the jury what Donnie did to you.” Tr. 44-45.
After this push and direction, Michael stuttered and paused. He then said that Leyman put
“his wienie in my butt.” Tr. 45. He did not elaborate much more than that. Michael did not state
when, where, which house, or which room this allegedly happened. He did not specify details as
to the trauma and pain he would have allegedly suffered. No physical or medical evidence was
ever offered to substantiate this allegation.
When Michael was asked to elaborate on whether he was positioned on a floor, bed, or
couch during the alleged rape, he said he and Leyman were “standing up.” Tr. 46. To any
layperson who knows the basics of the human anatomy of an adult and child, this position of
“standing up” during an anal rape was likely impossible. No medical, physical, or scientific
evidence was presented to substantiate Michael’s testimony.
Michael was asked at least six separate times when and where the alleged acts of GSI and
rape occurred. Each time, he answered that he did not know or remember. Tr. 45, 46, 49, 59, 68.
He never specified what room, house, city, or state. He never specified how old he was, what
grade he was in, or the general time of day when the alleged rape occurred.
After Michael could not recall where anything occurred, he was asked generally how old
he was when “this stuff” happened. Tr. 53. He gave a general vague guess, “Six, seven, eight.”
7
Tr. 53. Based on his birthday being in June 1993 and that he moved from New York to Ohio that
same month, it can be assumed that Michael was in New York when he was six and seven and in
Ohio when he was eight. But that did not answer the question of whether the alleged rape
occurred in Ohio. There was nothing specific about what “this stuff” referred to.
Michael was then asked again about the alleged rape. He said he was raped one time. Tr.
58. But again, he did not know when and where the alleged rape occurred. Tr. 59.
Amber next testified. She said that she got sick on a camping trip and that Leyman
brought her home. When asked who transported her home, she initially said her mom, which is
what she said in the interview with police, but then quickly changed her story and said Leyman
took her home. She thought their home was at a motel. She said that Leyman went to the
bathroom, came out with no clothes on, took her clothes off, and had “sex” with her. However,
she could not describe what “sex” was. She further said she laid on top of Leyman. Amber never
specified when this camping trip was.
Amber also claimed that Mr. Leyman put his “ding dong in my vagina.” She strangely
used both a child metaphorical term and a formal adult term in the same sentence. She said there
were four instances of this – once in New York, two in Seville, and once in Medina. She
vaguely said it hurt, but offered no details as to any trauma or pain she may have suffered. No
physical or medical evidence was ever presented to substantiate her claim.
Amber further testified that she saw Michael and Leyman have “sex,” but also said that
Michael did not have a “ding dong.” She said Michael was laying on a shelf with his pants down.
She said this was in New York when she was 3, 4, and 5. In a later post-conviction petition filed
in 2013, Leyman presented an affidavit from an expert who stated that Amber’s recollection of
8
matters occurring at three years old is not credible because that is during the phase of infantile
amnesia.
The State then presented Ashley Carpenter, daughter of Marilyn’s new husband, to testify
about how Michael and Amber revealed the allegations to her.
Marilyn next took the stand. She said she met Leyman in Pennsylvania in 1990 and
started living with him in Hamilton, New York that year. Tr. 140-141. They married in 1991 and
eventually moved to a different address in Hamilton. Tr. 141. In June 1993, Marilyn and the
children moved from Hamilton to Medina, Ohio. Tr. 141. Around August or September 1993,
Leyman followed and moved in with Marilyn and the children in Medina. Tr. 142. They lived at
various places in Medina and Seville. Tr. 143-145. Sometime in 1995, Leyman was not living
with them anymore. Tr. 145.
Dr. Michael Esson, Sandy May of Medina County Children’s Services, and Det. James
Bigam of Medina Police all testified after Marilyn. Dr. Esson said that he examined the children
and diagnosed them with adjustment disorder. On cross examination, he essentially admitted that
just about any stressful event in life can cause adjustment disorder. Sandy May testified about the
interview of the children conducted by her and Det. Bigam on September 11, 1996. Det. Bigam
next testified. His testimony mainly centered on the sequence of events in his investigation.
As for Leyman’s defense, trial counsel first called Rose Fini, Leyman’s divorce attorney
to testify. Her testimony mainly centered around the events in the divorce.
Victoria Perrea next took the stand on Leyman’s behalf. She testified about her training
to provide day care for children and the extensive time she spent with Michael and Amber. She
never noticed anything out of the ordinary. The children never gave any indication that they had
9
been molested. They missed having their family including Leyman. Amber routinely referred to
Leyman as “Daddy.”
The final witness to testify was Dr. Dawn Lord. She testified as an expert witness for the
defense and the only expert to testify in the trial. Her testimony criticized the investigation and
interview process of Medina County Children’s Services. She provided an in depth analysis as to
why she felt the September 1996 interview of Michael and Amber was very leading, suggestive,
and unreliable.
On February 19, 1999, Leyman was found guilty by a jury of raping Michael (Count I),
gross sexual imposition on Michael (Count II), and gross sexual imposition on Amber (Count
IV). He was acquitted of raping Amber (Count III). Leyman received a 7 to 25 year sentence for
Count I, and 18 months each on Counts III and IV. All sentences were run concurrent. Thus, the
only sentence that currently keeps Leyman incarcerated is the 7 to 25 year sentence on Count I.
A direct appeal followed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. In the appeal, Leyman’s
court-appointed appellate counsel, when arguing insufficient evidence, raised the issue of venue
under ORC 2901.12, but not subject-matter jurisdiction under ORC 2901.11.
The Ninth District found that Medina County was an appropriate venue to try the case.
No analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction and whether the State produced sufficient evidence to
prove any of the alleged acts happened in Ohio was ever done.
After the Ninth District affirmed, Leyman appealed, pro se, to this Court for relief. In a 6-
1 decision, this Court declined to take the case. State v. Leyman, 91 Ohio St.3d 1433, 2001-Ohio-
232. The lone dissent, Justice Deborah Cook, stated that under this Court’s decision in State v.
Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32 (2001) a week earlier, she would have reversed Leyman’s rape
10
conviction. In Wells, this Court found insufficient evidence of anal rape when mere contact with
the buttocks was all that occurred.
Leyman then filed a habeas corpus action in United States District Court, Northern
District of Ohio. However, his attorney there also failed to argue insufficient evidence of subject-
matter jurisdiction on the rape and GSI of Michael. Leyman’s attorney mimicked the arguments
made by his appellate lawyer in the Ninth District. In turn, the federal court refused to disturb the
Ninth District’s decision and thereby denied Leyman’s petition.
On October 29, 2013, after his family enlisted counsel, private investigator, and expert to
look into his case, Leyman filed a Post-Conviction Relief Petition and Motion for Leave to File
Motion for New Trial in Medina County. The petition centered on discovery that was not
provided to Leyman before trial, particularly written police reports and complete audio recording
of the interviews of Michael, Amber, and Marilyn. Those items revealed material dates and
discrepancies that Leyman would have found helpful to his defense. In particular, Marilyn
commented in the interview that based on what the children told her, it sounded like “most of it
happened in New York.”
The petition also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly trial counsel’s
failure to fully investigate the facts and elicit critical information from witness Victoria Perrea.
Trial counsel failed to elicit an incident when Marilyn angrily told Perrea that she would avenge
Leyman for him questioning her fitness as a mother during the divorce proceedings. Perrea later
wrote about this incident in a letter to the trial court judge prior to sentencing.
The motion also delved into statements made by Michael and Marilyn to undersigned
counsel and his private investigator in 2012 and 2013 that materially differ from their storyline in
the late 90’s. Michael, who was not very talkative, and with Jacob present, stated that none of the
11
offenses occurred in Ohio, but rather they happened in New York. Leyman strongly disputes
Michael’s contention that any offenses happened at all, but also understands that Michael is not
likely to admit to false testimony that left his half-brother Jacob without a father. Nonetheless,
Michael’s recent statements raise significant questions on subject-matter jurisdiction and the
merits of the allegations based on what was said in the 90’s.
In her statements in 2013, Marilyn affirmed that no offenses occurred with Michael in
Ohio. Her statements also revealed additional factual discrepancies regarding the allegations with
Amber. Marilyn then claimed that Amber was recovering more memories as the case was being
brought up again.
Despite Leyman submitting a detailed analysis and numerous exhibits and affidavits,
including an expert opinion, the Medina County Court of Common Pleas summarily dismissed
the petition/motion in a meager opinion that was shallow in its analysis, misconstrued the facts,
and cited no case law. Leyman appealed this ruling to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, where
it is currently pending.
Also, on October 29, 2013, Leyman filed an application to reopen his direct appeal in the
Ninth District. In the application, Leyman argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective by
failing to argue insufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction of rape and GSI of Michael.
Leyman argued that subject-matter jurisdiction and actual innocence were good causes to excuse
his filing past the 90-day deadline in App. R. 26.
However, on February 18, 2014, the Ninth District summarily dismissed it in a two page
entry. Even though Leyman argued that there was insufficient evidence of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Ninth District applied a manifest weight analysis of venue to deny his
application. It cited no case law and did not recognize any of this Court’s case law on subject-
12
matter jurisdiction.
Leyman then appealed to this Court, but this Court declined to hear the case. He moved
for reconsideration and was denied on September 3, 2014.
On December 4, 2014, Leyman, incarcerated at Richland Correctional Institution in
Richland County, filed a habeas corpus petition in the Fifth District Court of Appeals against
Warden Margaret Bradshaw. Leyman argued that he is illegally detained because the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him of raping
Michael when no evidence was produced to place the alleged rape in Ohio.
In the habeas corpus petition, Leyman supplied the statutorily required documents. In
addition, he submitted the indictment, jury verdict forms, journal entry, and trial transcripts of
Michael and Marilyn’s testimonies as a courtesy to show the strength of his petition. To keep the
petition on point, he only supplied those portions of the transcripts because those were the only
part of the trial when the location issue arose on the alleged rape.
On December 8, 2014, the Fifth District ordered the Warden to respond by December
15th. After obtaining an extension, the Warden filed a motion to dismiss on December 19th.
Leyman responded on December 30th. The Warden responded the following week. On February
27, 2015, the Fifth District granted the Warden’s motion to dismiss, thereby denying Leyman’s
claim.
In its opinion, the Fifth District misconstrued the concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction
and venue in criminal cases and denied Leyman’s petition. The Fifth District criticized Leyman
for not attaching the entire trial transcript, even though the habeas corpus statute provides future
procedural stages for additional evidence to be produced like in any other civil action. Even
13
worse, the Fifth District refused to apply this Court’s well-settled case law on subject-matter
jurisdiction and habeas corpus.
On March 3, 2015, Leyman timely appealed to this Court as a matter of right.
ARGUMENT
FIRST PROPOSITION OF LAW: THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED CIV. R.
12(B)(6) AND THE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE IN ORC CHAPTER 2725 WHEN IT
GRANTED THE WARDEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS.
Habeas corpus under Chapter 2725 of the Ohio Revised Code is a civil action. The Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas corpus proceedings where clearly not inapplicable
under statute. Pegan v. Crawmer, 73 Ohio St. 3d 607, 608-609 (1995). That is, ORC Chapter
2725 first prescribes a basic summary procedure for habeas corpus. The Civil Rules then apply to
the areas not covered by the statute. See Id.
“First, application is by petition that contains certain information. R.C. 2725.04. Then, if
the court decides that the petition states a facially valid claim, it must allow the writ. R.C.
2725.06. […] Issuing the writ means only that a return is ordered and a hearing will be held.” Id.
at 609.
Leyman made his petition alleging the insufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction
and attached the sentencing entry, journal entry, jury verdicts, indictment, requisite affidavits,
and relevant portions of trial transcript showing the insufficient evidence of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Fifth District quickly decided that Leyman’s petition stated a facially valid
claim, allowed the writ, and ordered the Warden to return the writ within a week, which
unprecedentedly fast based on prior habeas cases in the Fifth District. The Warden hastily
14
obtained an extension, only because undersigned counsel did not object. The Warden then filed a
motion to dismiss.
Such a motion falls under Civ. R. 12(B)(6). See Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470,
472, 2008-Ohio-1443, ¶10. In reviewing a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion, a court must accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶5.
In this instance, the Fifth District was required to accept the factual allegations in
Leyman’s petition as true and resolve whether the law provided him a claim to which he could
be granted relief. The Fifth District did not apply this standard.
Leyman’s petition, like any other civil complaint, was a statement of allegations. Like
any other civil case, Leyman did not have to attach any supporting evidence or documentation to
his petition other than what was required by statute or civil rule.
In a habeas corpus case, the only documents required, by civil rule or statute, to be
attached to a complaint/petition are the commitment papers required by ORC 2725.04(D) and
affidavit of civil cases required by ORC 2969.25. ORC 2725.04 also calls for a verification, but
this Court recently said that statutory provisions requiring verifications to complaints are
unenforceable because they conflict with Civ. R. 11. State ex rel. Turner v. Corrigan, 2015-
Ohio-980, ¶18. To be safe, Leyman attached a verification to an amended petition filed the day
after the original petition.
Leyman complied with each of these requirements. He was under no obligation to attach
any additional documents supporting his claim. State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d
193, 196 (1996). As a mere courtesy, he provided the relevant transcript portions to show the
strength of his petition even though he was not required to. However, the Fifth District berated
15
Leyman for not providing the entire transcript, making it sound like he did not provide a
sufficient record for them to conduct their review.8 The Fifth District completely ignored the
statutory procedure in ORC Chapter 2725 that provides a later stage for additional evidence to be
presented.
As long as Leyman provided sufficient allegations in his petition, the Warden was then
required to provide a return containing a sworn statement justifying her detention of Leyman.
See Harris (citing ORC 2725.14 and ORC 2725.15); Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149,
151 (1995). The sworn return would also include all documentation and authority supporting the
Warden’s claim of valid detention. ORC 2725.14(B). In this case, it would mean including the
trial transcript and any other evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction. In other words, the burden is
on the Warden to provide evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction, not on Leyman to prove the
lack thereof.
Instead of filing a return providing evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Warden
filed the standard motion to dismiss that the Ohio Attorney General always uses to respond to
habeas corpus petitions statewide. Based on the foregoing discussion, the Fifth District
misapplied Civ. R. 12(B)(6) and ORC Chapter 2725 in granting the motion.
For the reasons to be explained in the next Propositions of Law, the Fifth District also
misapplied, if not ignored, this Court’s well-settled case law on subject-matter jurisdiction and
habeas corpus.
8 In the direct appeal, when discussing venue and location of the offenses, the Ninth District Court of Appeals did
not reference any other trial testimony than what Leyman provided in his habeas corpus petition.
16
SECOND PROPOSITION OF LAW: IN CRIMINAL CASES, COMMON PLEAS COURTS
HAVE SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION, SUBJECT TO STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS,
OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED BY ADULTS IN OHIO.
THIRD PROPOSITION OF LAW: SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IS AN ELEMENT
OF EACH OFFENSE THAT MUST BE PROVEN BY THE STATE OF OHIO.
FOURTH PROPOSITION OF LAW: TO ESTABLISH A COMMON PLEAS COURT’S
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION, THE STATE MUST PRODUCE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS AN ADULT AND AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE OCCURRED IN OHIO.
Because these three Propositions of Law overlap and interrelate, Leyman will discuss
them together.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – Generally
Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power over a type of case. Pratts v.
Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 87, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶34. Such power is always fixed and
determined by law. Rogers v. State, 87 Ohio St.308 (1913).
Because it concerns the court’s power to adjudicate the merits of a case, subject-matter
jurisdiction may be challenged at any time and can never be waived. Pratts at 83, ¶11. A party’s
failure to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be used to bestow it on a court that has
none. State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46 (1995).
The burden is on the plaintiff to prove subject-matter jurisdiction. Moir v. Greater
Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990); See State v.
Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087. This means that while subject-matter jurisdiction
can be initially invoked via allegation and assertion, it can also be lost if not proven. See Id.
17
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – Criminal Cases
Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution provides that common pleas courts shall
have original jurisdiction over matters prescribed by law. ORC 2931.03 prescribes common
pleas courts to have original jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses. These “crimes and
offenses” are subject to the territorial jurisdiction parameters of ORC 2901.11, which governs
the criminal acts that can be prosecuted in Ohio based on where they occur. In essence, ORC
2901.11, subject to its long arm exceptions, requires an element of an offense to occur in Ohio
for a common pleas court to have subject-matter jurisdiction to convict for that offense. See
Yarbrough at 6-11, ¶34-57.
Therefore, a common pleas court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is over
offenses committed by adults in Ohio. Pratts at 84, ¶13; Yarbrough at 6-11, ¶34-57; ORC
2901.11. If either of those elements are not established or proven by the State, then the common
pleas court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to convict. Thus, any purported conviction is void.
Pratts at 83, ¶11.
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be assumed. See Yarbrough at 8, ¶46. Venue under
ORC 2901.12, a related but different concept that concerns the appropriate location to conduct a
trial, cannot be used to assert subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
While an indictment is used to invoke a common pleas court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
over a criminal matter, there still must ultimately be subject-matter jurisdiction in the first place.
See Click v. Eckle, 174 Ohio St. 88 (1962). An indictment, like any other complaint, is a
statement of allegations that the State must prove. The indictment can allege subject-matter
jurisdiction, like any other element of an offense, to enable the common pleas court to handle
and carry forward with the case. However, the State must ultimately prove subject-matter
18
jurisdiction, like any other element of an offense, for the common pleas court to render a
judgment of conviction over the offense. See Yarbrough at 6-11, ¶34-57.
If the State fails to prove subject-matter jurisdiction, then it is lost. Id. At that point, the
common pleas court must announce its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss the case.
Pratts at 85, ¶21. In a criminal proceeding, this would take place in the form of a Crim. R. 29
acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction after the State rests its case.
If the State produces sufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction, then the issue
would go to the jury like any other element of the offense. This would mean the common pleas
court would have subject-matter jurisdiction, subject to appellate review, to carry forward with
the case and render conviction in the event of a guilty verdict. Unlike other elements of an
offense, however, subject-matter jurisdiction can be reviewed in collateral proceedings in
addition to direct appeal.
Other Types of Jurisdiction
It should be noted that there are two other types of jurisdiction, which are under the
umbrella of subject-matter jurisdiction, but not to be confused with it.
There is personal jurisdiction, which simply requires service of the indictment and
summons on the defendant. There is also jurisdiction over the case, which consists of a common
pleas court’s exercises of jurisdiction in a particular case once it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
Pratts at 83-84, ¶12. Examples include conducting a bench trial with a proper jury waiver or the
assignment of a three judge panel on a death penalty case.
The main difference is that only subject-matter jurisdiction is collaterally reviewable on
habeas corpus in addition to direct appeal because the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders
a judgment void. Gaskins at 151. However, errors in exercises of jurisdiction over a case are
19
merely voidable, meaning they are properly reviewed on direct appeal, not habeas corpus. Pratts
at 85, ¶21.
It should not be forgotten that subject-matter jurisdiction is still a prerequisite to
jurisdiction over a case. Pratts at 83, ¶11. If it is discovered, no matter how early or late, that
there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, then all the exercises of jurisdiction over the case are
void too.
Discussion of Yarbrough
The key territorial component of subject-matter jurisdiction in the instant case was
cogently explained by this Court in Yarbrough. In an opinion authored by the late Chief Justice
Thomas Moyer, this Court unanimously overturned a death penalty conviction because the
aggravated murder did not happen in Ohio.
In Yarbrough, Terrell Yarbrough and an accomplice burglarized, robbed, and kidnapped
two Franciscan University students in Steubenville, Ohio and transported them to Washington
County, Pennsylvania before brutally murdering them in a field.
Yarbrough was indicted in Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas for multiple counts
of aggravated murder and other charges including aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and
kidnapping. The indictment alleged Yarbrough to commit the murders as a “course of criminal
conduct” that involved an element occurring in Jefferson County. Yarbrough at 8, ¶45.
Yarbrough was tried and convicted of all charges in Jefferson County and was given the death
penalty.
On direct appeal to this Court, the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction arose. This Court
held that ORC 2901.11 controlled in determining a common pleas court’s subject-matter
20
jurisdiction over a criminal case based on where the crime occurs. This Court noted that the
language “course of criminal conduct” is nowhere to be found in ORC 2901.11. Id.
This Court also distinguished the concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction under ORC
2901.11 and venue in ORC 2901.12. Id. at 8, ¶46. This Court emphasized that venue merely
concerns where the trial takes place and that subject-matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to venue.
Id. Thus, venue cannot be used to assert subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Further, subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be assumed. Id. at 1, ¶3. This means that the subject-matter jurisdiction has to
be established and proven by the State based on the evidence.
Ultimately, this Court overturned Yarbrough’s aggravated murder convictions and the
death penalty. While it had in large part to do with the specific homicide subsection in ORC
2901.11(B), this Court noted that none of the long arm provisions of the statute could be
construed to permit an Ohio court to have subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 9-10, ¶49, ¶52-55.
The Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas’ subject-matter jurisdiction was invoked
when an indictment was returned against Yarbrough for multiple counts of aggravated murder.
However, that subject-matter jurisdiction was later lost when the State produced no evidence of
any element of the murders to occur in Ohio and that no long arm provision of ORC 2901.11
could apply.
Overall, this Court’s decision in Yarbrough supports the proposition that venue under
ORC 2901.12 applies to an overall set of facts to determine an appropriate location to try the
case whereas subject-matter jurisdiction under ORC 2901.11 applies as an element of each and
every individual offense that the State must prove. Thus, it may be initially appropriate to hold
the trial in a particular location, but during the trial, it still must be established that the court has
21
subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular offense to ultimately convict and sentence for that
offense.
Analysis of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Leyman’s Case
ORC 2901.11 as applied in Yarbrough was substantively the same during the time
periods contained in Leyman’s indictment. The pertinent section is ORC 2901.11(A)(1), which
requires an element of an offense to be committed in Ohio for a court to have subject-matter
jurisdiction.
In this case, the State did not produce any evidence that any element of the alleged rape
or GSI occurred in Ohio. This means the Medina County Court of Common Pleas lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction of Leyman on those offenses. When the
State rested its case, the Medina County Court of Common Pleas should have recognized its lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed those offenses. The procedural vehicle to do that was
through Crim. R. 29, which measures the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. The court could
have invoked Crim. R. 29 from the moment the State rested up until the moment of sentencing.
None of the long arm provisions of ORC 2901.11 can be construed to permit an Ohio
court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the rape and GSI offenses involving Michael. ORC
2901.11(A)(2), in its old form and even as amended, deals with offenses and conspiracies that
begin in Ohio and end up in another state. That does not apply to Leyman because he and
Michael lived in New York before moving to Ohio.
ORC 2901.11(A)(3) does not apply because there is no evidence that Leyman, while in
New York, conspired to commit sex offenses in Ohio. A sex offense can only be committed in
one place at one time. Thus, while in New York, Leyman could not attempt to commit or be
complicit in committing a sex offense in Ohio. ORC 2901.11(A)(4), (5), and (7) do not apply
22
because those issues are not applicable to this case. Lastly, ORC 2901.11(A)(6) does not apply
because there is no evidence that Leyman unlawfully brought Michael to Ohio from New York.
In fact, Michael moved to Ohio with his mother before Leyman followed a few months later.
The only long arm provision that could remotely apply is ORC 2901.11(D), but the
following discussion will show that it cannot. ORC 2901.11(D) states when it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that an offense was committed either in Ohio or another state, but the location
cannot reasonably be determined, then the offense is presumed to occur in Ohio.
First, the indictment alleged Leyman to rape and commit GSI on Michael from fall 1993
through 1995 and specifically alleged the offenses to occur in Medina County, Ohio. The
indictment did not allege the offenses to occur in either Ohio or New York. The indictment did
not invoke ORC 2901.11(D) to presume the offenses to occur in Ohio for purposes of
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Yarbrough at 8-9, ¶47. Instead, on each count, the
indictment relies on ORC 2901.11(A)(1) – that an element of the offense occurred in Ohio – to
invoke subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the analysis of the inapplicability of ORC 2901.11(D)
should end right there. However, for the sake of thoroughness, Leyman will discuss other
reasons why it does not apply.
To invoke ORC 2901.11(D), there has to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an
offense occurred. This means that all other elements of the offense, except only for the location,
must be proven.
As Yarbrough states, ORC 2901.11(D) has been successfully used to assert subject-
matter jurisdiction in cases where it was known when the defendant committed murder and that
the victim was last seen in Ohio, but the body was found in another state. Yarbrough at 9, ¶49. In
23
those cases, all other elements, except only for the location, were proven. However, for the
following reasons, this does not apply to Leyman’s case.
Assuming arguendo that Leyman raped and committed GSI on Michael, not only was the
location never established, the time frame was not established either. Michael did not provide a
time frame as to when the specific act of rape occurred. He failed to do so for the GSI too. When
asked every time when each specific act occurred, he stated he did not know or remember.
When finally asked how old he was when “this stuff” happened, Michael said, “six,
seven, eight.” There was no specificity as to what “this stuff” was. In addition, Michael’s
birthday was June 19, 1985, meaning that the bracketed time frame of the indictment
encompassed when he was eight, nine, and ten. Thus, Michael’s general time frame of when all
acts occurred materially differed from the indictment. Most importantly, he did not specify how
old he was when the rape occurred nor specify how he old he was when the GSI occurred.
In this case, there was a direct correlation between the time frame of the indictment and
when Leyman and Michael were in Ohio. Thus, any thought exercise of the offenses occurring in
either Ohio or New York necessarily results in the conclusion that the offenses occurred either
inside or outside the bracketed timeframes of the indictment.
When there is no evidence of an offense occurring within the bracketed time frame of the
indictment, then that offense must be dismissed based on insufficient evidence. State v.
Barnecut, 44 Ohio App.3d 149, 153 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. 1988). Putting location aside, the time
frame issue alone creates reasonable doubt to prohibit the application of ORC 2901.11(D).
Further, assuming arguendo all other elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the
inability to determine the location of the offense must be reasonable to invoke ORC 2901.11(D).
For example, in State v. Phelps, Cuyahoga App. No. 69157, 1996 WL 532092 (1996), the victim
24
was severely beaten in Cleveland and then transported, while still alive, to Erie, Pennsylvania,
where his body was later found. While the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s finding that
the State presented sufficient evidence that the fatal blow occurred in Cleveland, it also
determined that Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas still had subject-matter jurisdiction
even if such evidence was insufficient.
With all other elements of the crime proven, including time frame, it was reasonable that
the location of the fatal blow could not be determined. The only witnesses to the fatal blow were
unavailable to testify. One was the victim, who was now dead, and the other was the defendant,
who was now protected against compelled self-incrimination. Therefore, it was reasonable that
the State could not produce a witness stating where the fatal blow occurred.
In Leyman’s case, however, no such reasonableness exists. The alleged victim, Michael,
was available to testify and did testify. From his testimony, it appears he was fully conscious and
aware at the times of the alleged rape and GSI. No evidence was presented to suggest he was
impaired in any way. Therefore, there was no reason he could not provide a single shred of
evidence that would enable the inference of when and where each alleged offense occurred.
Michael testified he was raped once. He did not testify to a slew of incidents to which any
particular incident would become lost or confused with others. A single novel, traumatic, and
painful event would stand out in anyone’s mind, including a child. It defies common sense that
Michael could not recall any ounce of particularity of the alleged rape and GSI.
It would not have taken much to establish sufficient evidence of time frame and location,
especially with the two issues tied together in this case. All Michael had to provide was how old
he was, what grade he was in, or any other small detail of when the alleged rape occurred, or any
minimal description of the room of where the alleged rape occurred. At that point, adult
25
testimony could supplement to establish a specific time frame and location. The same goes for
the GSI. However, Michael’s testimony fell way short to provide any inference of when and
where the alleged rape and GSI occurred.
To this end, the inability of the State to ascertain the locations of the alleged rape and GSI
is not reasonable. Therefore, on this ground, the State cannot use ORC 2901.11(D) to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Under any analysis of ORC 2901.11, the State did not produce sufficient evidence to
establish the Medina County Court of Common Pleas to have subject-matter jurisdiction to
convict Leyman of raping and/or committing GSI on Michael. This Court might then wonder
how no other court has found lack of subject-matter jurisdiction up to this point. Leyman will
now explain the other courts’ flawed analyses.
Previous Court Analyses on Location
In Leyman’s direct appeal to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, his appellate attorney
argued the location issue, but failed to argue lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the
attorney argued lack of venue, which was way off point. As previously discussed, this Court has
stated in Yarbrough that the two concepts are distinct and separate. While Yarbrough was not
around at the time of Leyman’s direct appeal, the subject-matter jurisdiction and venue statutes
under ORC 2901.11 and 2901.12 were around.
Because Leyman’s appellate attorney only argued venue, the Ninth District only analyzed
venue under ORC 2901.12 and conducted no analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction under ORC
2901.11. Even then, the Ninth District’s analysis of the location issue missed the mark.
26
For starters, the Ninth District conducted its sufficiency and manifest weight of the
evidence analyses mixed together even though this Court had recently stated in State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) that those concepts were separate and distinct.
On the location issue, the Ninth District, after quoting the venue statute in ORC 2901.12
at length, said, “Michael testified that Defendant committed these acts when he was six, seven,
and eight years old.” There was no specificity as to which offense happened where or when. The
Ninth District then stated that Michael lived in Medina County when he was eight, thus the
evidence was sufficient to support venue and that the jury did not lose its way in finding that
Leyman raped Michael in Medina. In that one breath, the Ninth District performed the most
warped mix of sufficiency and manifest weight analyses on the location of the rape.
The Ninth District essentially held that Michael’s “six, seven, eight” guess was sufficient
to warrant the trial taking place in Medina County Court of Common Pleas and that once the trial
was appropriately held there, the jury’s finding that the rape occurred in Medina County was not
to be disturbed. The Ninth District pointed to no specific evidence to place the rape in Medina
County or to occur when Michael was eight years old. The Ninth District simply assumed the
conclusion.
The Ninth District did what this Court later said in Yarbrough was not allowed based on
the same ORC 2901.11 and 2901.12 statutes. That is, use venue as a means to assert and assume
subject-matter jurisdiction. Yarbrough at 8, ¶46. Ultimately, the Ninth District hid behind the
jury’s verdict, which was based on the assumption of subject-matter jurisdiction.
When Leyman later sought to reopen the direct appeal in 2013 so he could argue
insufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Ninth District stuck to its deeply flawed
analysis rather than admit that it made a grave mistake that cost Leyman years of his freedom.
27
Even though Leyman discussed this Court’s decision in Yarbrough in his application to reopen
the appeal, the Ninth District did not acknowledge Yarbrough whatsoever.
When Leyman moved for a habeas corpus based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Fifth District Court of Appeals made the same grave mistake as the Ninth District and more.
The Fifth District used venue to assert and assume subject-matter jurisdiction. Leyman v.
Bradshaw, 2015-Ohio-751, ¶4, fn. 1. Even though Leyman told the Fifth District that this
Court’s holding in Yarbrough prohibited it from doing that, the Fifth District did it anyway.
The Fifth District later again assumed subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶10. The Fifth
District also downplayed the significance and meaning of this Court’s decision in Yarbrough in
regards to subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶7-8. The Fifth District said that this Court’s holding
in Yarbrough occurred only because it was undisputed that the murder happened in
Pennsylvania, not Ohio.
Essentially, the Fifth District presumed subject-matter jurisdiction in Ohio and placed the
burden on the defendant to show the offense happened elsewhere. This completely contradicts
this Court’s holding in Yarbrough, which was critical of the way the indictment alleged subject-
matter jurisdiction in the first place. It is well settled that the State has the burden to prove each
and every element of an offense as charged in an indictment.
The Fifth District further misstated the facts stating that Leyman and Michael lived in
New York during the indictment period of fall 1993 through 1995. Id. at ¶3. The record shows
that Leyman and Michael moved from New York to Ohio before the indictment period began in
fall 1993.
Even worse, the Fifth District also stated that Leyman was challenging the finding of the
jury, which was not true. Id. at ¶7. From the start, Leyman has argued that the evidence of
28
subject-matter jurisdiction was insufficient, meaning it was so constitutionally deficient that it
should have never even made it to the jury. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982). The challenge has always
been against the Medina County Court of Common Pleas’ refusal to issue a dismissal/acquittal
pursuant to Crim. R. 29 and its false self-proclamation of subject-matter jurisdiction to render a
judgment of conviction.
To avoid tackling the subject-matter jurisdiction issue, both the Fifth and Ninth Districts
merely defer to the jury verdicts, which are based on the assumption of subject-matter
jurisdiction. They do not point to any real evidence or proof of the rape and GSI offenses
occurring in Ohio. Further, deference to the jury verdicts does not remove the responsibility of
the State to produce sufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
For reasons to be explained in the next Proposition of Law, the Fifth District committed
even more errors in it analysis regarding the applicability of habeas corpus. But for now, the
foregoing analysis shows that no sufficient evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction was ever
produced in Leyman’s case. This necessarily prohibited Medina County Court of Common Pleas
from rendering a judgment of conviction on the rape and GSI offenses on Michael, meaning the
convictions on those offenses are void.
FIFTH PROPOSITION OF LAW: THE LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IS
COGNIZABLE IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS AND DOES NOT REQUIRE
SHOWING THE LACK OF ANOTHER ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW.
29
ORC Chapter 2725 governs that anyone who is unlawfully detained may seek a writ of
habeas corpus. If the petitioner shows that his detention does not meet all the requirements of
law, then he is entitled to release.
In Ohio, habeas corpus is typically reserved for challenging the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. See Pratts at 83, ¶8; Stahl v. Shoemaker, 50 Ohio St.2d 351,
353 (1977) (internal citations omitted). That is, a discharge from custody via writ of habeas
corpus is not permitted if the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment of a court that had
subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the judgment. In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375 (1949). Thus,
once subject-matter jurisdiction is established and vested, a court’s errors in its exercise of
subject-matter jurisdiction are not reviewable on habeas corpus. Pratts at 83, ¶8.
Habeas corpus has been expanded to include review of non-jurisdictional errors to which
there is no other adequate remedy at law, such as parole-revocation matters. State ex rel. Jackson
v. McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185 (1995). Thus, generally, when there is an adequate remedy at law
(i.e. a direct appeal) to challenge a sentencing court’s errors, habeas corpus is not available to
relitigate the issue and gain successive appellate reviews. Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540,
548 (2001); State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate, 84 Ohio St.3d 481, 485 (1999). But those are only in
cases where the sentencing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not at issue.
When the sentencing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is at issue in habeas corpus, the
“no other adequate remedy at law” rule does not apply. Pratts at 83, ¶11; Agee at 548; Fryerson
at 485; Gaskins at 151. “Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to
adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. It is a
condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then
any proclamation by that court is void.” Pratts at 83, ¶11. Thus, “when a court’s judgment is
30
void because it lacked jurisdiction, habeas is still an appropriate remedy despite the availability
of appeal.” Gaskins at 151. This necessarily means that res judicata does not apply.
Because Leyman asserts that the Medina County Court of Common Pleas lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction and sentence for rape and GSI of his
former stepson, he does not have to demonstrate the non-existence of other adequate remedies at
law nor exhaust any such remedies that may exist. Of course, Leyman, through the appellate
lawyer that he maintains was ineffective, could have challenged subject-matter jurisdiction on
direct appeal. Prior to filing the instant habeas action, Leyman first tried to reopen the direct
appeal to argue lack of subject-matter jurisdiction even though he was not required to.
Again, subject-matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be challenged at any time.
This is why habeas corpus exists as a collateral extraordinary remedy. It is designed to swiftly
correct the non-jurisdictional acts by a court acting without proper authority to take away a
person’s liberty. This includes an appellate court’s subsequent affirmation of those non-
jurisdictional acts.
As Leyman previously discussed, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is over
offenses committed by adults in Ohio. Pratts at 84, ¶13; Yarbrough at 6-11, ¶34-57; ORC
2901.11. If neither of those elements are established or proven by the State, then the common
pleas court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to convict. Thus, any purported conviction is void.
Pratts at 83, ¶11.
The adult element of subject-matter jurisdiction has been successfully challenged in
habeas corpus proceedings in cases involving juveniles tried as adults. See Harris, Gaskins, and
Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614 (2001). In those cases, this Court held that
the proper bindover procedure from the juvenile court to the general common pleas court was not
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followed. Thus, the juvenile was never rendered as an adult. As a result, the general common
pleas court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the offense to render a judgment of
conviction.
This Court in Gaskins made another important point relevant to the instant case. Gaskins
applied this Court’s prior holding on juvenile-adult bindovers and subject-matter jurisdiction in
Wilson, which was a direct appeal. This Court acknowledged that Wilson was a direct appeal, not
a habeas corpus. Gaskins at 151. However, it did not matter because when a court’s judgment is
void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, habeas corpus is always an available remedy
regardless of the availability of direct appeal. Id.
In Agee, this Court made a cogent point on retroactive application of case law. In that
case, the petitioner challenged his adult status in habeas corpus based on this Court’s direct
appeal holding in State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86 (2000), which was released after the
petitioner’s criminal case was finished. This Court retroactively applied Hanning to the
petitioner’s case because Hanning did not announce a new rule of law, but merely interpreted the
same statute that applied to the petitioner’s criminal case. Agee at 543.
Even though the petitioner in Agee did not prevail on the merits, this Court later granted
habeas relief in Johnson, by retroactively applying Hanning to the petitioner’s case like it did in
Agee. In Johnson, the warden, like the Warden in the instant case, argued that the petitioner had
other adequate remedies at law. Johnson at 616. However, this Court had none of it and
reaffirmed the well settled rule of law that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to
render judgment, habeas corpus is appropriate despite the availability of direct appeal. Id. at 617.
What these cases mean for Leyman is that Yarbrough applies to give him habeas corpus
relief. Even though Yarbrough was a direct appeal that was resolved after Leyman’s criminal
32
case was finished, it interpreted the same ORC 2901.11 statute on subject-matter jurisdiction that
applied to Leyman. Therefore, this Court’s holding and analysis in Yarbrough applies
retroactively to void Leyman’s conviction for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Fifth District went against this Court’s well settled habeas corpus case law at every
turn. The Fifth District completely distorted this Court’s holdings by first assuming subject-
matter jurisdiction, and then concluding that courts can determine their own jurisdiction and that
Leyman needed to show he had no other adequate remedy at law. The Fifth District blatantly
ignored that Leyman is challenging the existence of the subject-matter jurisdiction in the first
place, long before there can be any discussion on a court determining its own jurisdiction or the
existence of other adequate remedies at law.
This Court’s foregoing case law clearly demonstrates that Leyman has a cognizable
habeas corpus claim in challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas to render a judgment of conviction. It does not matter that Leyman had a direct
appeal and could have argued subject-matter jurisdiction on the appeal. Challenges to subject-
matter jurisdiction are always ripe.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth District Court of Appeals was wrong to grant the Warden’s motion to dismiss.
Leyman’s petition for writ of habeas corpus clearly stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Therefore, this Court must reverse the Fifth District, and remand the case for further
proceedings in accordance to this Court’s case law on subject-matter jurisdiction and habeas
corpus, and the procedures in ORC Chapter 2725 and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
Leyman sufficiently alleged in his petition that the State failed to produce sufficient
evidence in trial of the rape and GSI offenses of his former stepson occurring in Ohio. The
33
former stepson, Michael, was asked repeatedly where and when the alleged offenses happened.
He stated he did not know or remember. No other corroborating evidence was presented to
establish location of the alleged offenses. Moreover, the State never produced any sufficient
evidence as to when the alleged offenses happened, which in this case, would have conclusively
led to the location.
The failure to produce evidence of the location of the alleged offenses in this case means
a failure to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Medina County Court of Common
Pleas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction.
Regardless of Leyman’s other available remedies of appeal and his appellate lawyer’s
failure to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction, he has a remedy in habeas corpus, which can be
used to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. Res judicata does not apply to
challenges of subject-matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived.
When Leyman brought this subject-matter jurisdiction challenge to the Fifth District, the
sufficient allegations should have easily survived a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) challenge. Thus, the Fifth
District should have denied the Warden’s motion to dismiss and ordered her to produce a return
in accordance to ORC 2725.14. At that point, the Warden would have been required to produce
sufficient evidence of Medina County Court of Common Pleas having subject-matter
jurisdiction. This would have then alleviated any concerns of the Fifth District regarding the
thoroughness of the record, including the trial transcript.
It is a scary place when one’s freedom can be so easily taken away based on hollow and
bare allegations from children with no medical or scientific evidence, or any other corroborating
evidence, to back them up. However, because the crimes alleged are child sexual offenses, the
passions of the people are easily inflamed. These inflammations, often fanned by the media as
34
well as tough-on-crime politics and vigilantism, rise to such a level to swallow an objective view
of the facts, proper application of the law, and ultimately, the criminal justice system’s ability to
render justice. Unfortunately, even long after cooler heads prevail, the people in the system are
inherently resistant to admitting that a grave mistake was made.
As much as Leyman might understand the passions and politics of the 80’s and 90’s that
contributed to his conviction, it has become very difficult for him to grasp why, in 2015, the
criminal justice system so far has refused to address the insufficient evidence, especially of
subject-matter jurisdiction, in his case.
It is frustrating enough that the parole board has refused to release Leyman because of his
refusal to admit to the offenses and that the Medina County Court of Common Pleas refused to
give his post-conviction petition any consideration. However, it is incomprehensible that the
Fifth and Ninth Districts refuse to apply well settled law on subject-matter jurisdiction and
habeas corpus. Instead, they distort those concepts to avoid the discussion that no evidence was
ever presented to place the alleged rape of Michael in Ohio and the alleged GSI of Michael in
Ohio.
This is what Leyman means by his earlier idiom reference to the “elephant in the room”
when he questions whether the criminal justice system seeks to apply the law and do justice or is
more concerned about how the result of freeing a man convicted of child molestation would be
viewed by the public.
However, despite his frustrations at the failures of the criminal justice system in his case
so far, Leyman still has faith in the system to correct itself. He is very encouraged by this Court’s
prior holdings on subject-matter jurisdiction and habeas corpus. In Yarbrough and other cases
35
cited in this brief, this Court upheld the rule of law over passions. Leyman now prays to this
Court to do the same for him.
Leyman respectfully asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
/s Stephen P. Hanudel________
Stephen P. Hanudel (#0083486)
Attorney for Appellant
124 Middle Avenue, Suite 900
Elyria, Ohio 44035
Phone: (440) 328-8973
Fax: (440) 261-4040
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing Brief was delivered by email to William Lamb,
Assistant Ohio Attorney General at [email protected] on April 24, 2015.
/s Stephen P. Hanudel________
Stephen P. Hanudel
Attorney for Appellant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
DONALD F. LEYMAN ) CASE NO. 2015-0367 ) Appellant ) )
v. ) APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY ) COURT OF APPEALS MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN ) FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ) CASE NO. 14CA93 Appellee )
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S MERIT BRIEF ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
DONALD F. LEYMAN ) CASE NO. ) Appellant ) )
v. ) APPEAL FROM RICHLAND COUNTY ) COURT OF APPEALS MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN ) FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ) CASE NO. 14CA93 Appellee )
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF DONALD F. LEYMAN ______________________________________________________________________________
Stephen P. Hanudel (#0083486) Michael DeWine (#0009181) 124 Middle Avenue, Suite 900 William H. Lamb (#0051808) Elyria, Ohio 44035 Ohio Attorney General’s Office Phone: (440) 328-8973 441 Vine Street Fax: (440) 261-4040 1600 Carew Tower [email protected] Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Phone: (513) 852-3497 Fax: (513) 852-3484 [email protected] COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed March 03, 2015 - Case No. 2015-0367
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Appellant, Donald F. Leyman, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby appeals from
the judgment of the Richland County Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District, Case No.
14CA93, filed February 27, 2015.
This is an appeal of right under S. Ct. Prac. R. 5.01(A)(3) because the case originated in
the Fifth District Court of Appeals, thereby invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Ohio
Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,
/s Stephen P. Hanudel________ Stephen P. Hanudel (#0083486) Attorney for Appellant 124 Middle Avenue, Suite 900 Elyria, Ohio 44035 Phone: (440) 328-8973 Fax: (440) 261-4040
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true copy of the foregoing Notice was delivered by email to William Lamb, Assistant Ohio Attorney General at [email protected] on March 3, 2015. /s Stephen P. Hanudel________ Stephen P. Hanudel Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, ~~, ..... . FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT l..il .:; '.
/ <:.. /
CI'£,/' l;" ; 1I1t// " ~ 1', ' - ..
Ir.y· . '0/
DONALD F. LEYMAN
Petitioner
-vs- JUDGMENT ENTRY
MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN
Respondent Case No. 14 CA 93
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion,
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition is granted.
H . JOHN W. WISE .-- g tJ .. *~ )
HON. W. scon GWIN ;;
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DONALD F. LEYMAN
Petitioner
-vs-
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Case No. 14 CA 93 MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN
Respondent
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:
JUDGMENT:
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:
APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner
STEPHEN P. HANUDEL 124 Middle Avenue Suite 900 Elyria, Ohio 44035
OPINION
Habeas Corpus
Dismissed
For Respondent
WILLIAM H. LAMB ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Vine Street, 1600 Carew Tower Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
" ;-/
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Richland County, Case No. 14 CA 93
Wise, J.
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~1. Petitioner, Donald Leyman, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
wherein he argues he is entitled to immediate release from prison because the court
which convicted him lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case. Respondent has
filed a responsive brief and motion to dismiss based upon the argument that Petitioner
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
~2. "Dismissal under Civ. R. 12(8)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted is appropriate if, after all factual allegations are presumed true and
all reasonable inferences are made in [petitioner's] favor, it appears beyond doubt that
he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in
habeas corpus. State ex rei. Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St.3d 561, 2007-0hio-814, 862
N.E.2d 104, ,-r 5." Keith v. Bobby, 2008-0hio-1443, ,-r 10, 117 Ohio St. 3d 470, 472,884
N.E.2d 1067,1069.
~3. Petitioner was convicted in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas of
raping his stepson. The indictment alleged the incident(s) occurred during the fall of
1993 through 1995. 8ecause the testimony revealed Petitioner and his stepson lived in
New York during part of this time period and because Petitioner claims the victim did not
testify the rape occurred in Medina, Petitioner argues the Medina Court of Common
Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case.
~4. Petitioner challenged his conviction in the Ninth District Court of Appeals
arguing the Medina County Court of Common Pleas was not the proper venue because
of the alleged lack of evidence that the rape occurred in Ohio. The Ninth District
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Richland County, Case No. 14 CA 93 3
addressed the venue claim and affirmed the conviction.1 State v. Leyman, No. 2970-M,
2000 WL 1471062, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2000).
~5. Appellant appealed his conviction to the Ohio Supreme Court, however,
that Court refused to hear the appeal. State v. Leyman, 91 Ohio st. 3d 1433, 741
N.E.2d 895 (2001).
~6. Petitioner primarily relies on the Supreme Court's holding in State v.
Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-0hio-6087 in support of his claim.
~7. In Yarbrough, the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction wherein it
was undisputed that the murder occurred in Pennsylvania and not in Ohio. Here,
Petitioner disputes the findings of the jury and the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The
jury and the Ninth District concluded the evidence was sufficient to establish the rape
occurred in Medina County.
~8. Respondent points out that Yarbrough was not a habeas corpus action.
Rather, it was an appeal, and this fact alone demonstrates Petitioner has or had an
adequate remedy at law to raise his claim by way of an appeal.
~9. "'[H]abeas corpus, like other extraordinary writ actions, is not available
when there is an adequate remedy at law." In re Coleman, 95 Ohio St.3d 284, 2002-
Ohio-1804, 767 N.E.2d 677, at 114, quoting Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d
380, 383, 667 N.E.2d 1194.
1 We note that although the Ninth District did not evaluate the issue in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth District's opinion must necessarily have found subject matter jurisdiction prior to addressing the issue of venue. See e.g. State ex rei. Frinzl v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 75347, 1999 WL 84073, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1999) ("Menue presumes jurisdiction.").
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Richland County, Case No. 14 CA 93 4
~10. '''In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court
having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.' " (Emphasis added.)
**1129 State ex rei. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-0hio-
1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, 118, quoting State ex rei. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410, 2002-
Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522, 1118. This rule applies to habeas corpus cases. Agee v.
Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 751 N.E.2d 1043; Howard v. Catholic Social
Servo of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994),70 Ohio St.3d 141, 145,637 N.E.2d 890." Ross V.
Saros, 2003-0hio-4128, 1114,99 Ohio St. 3d 412, 414, 792 N.E.2d 1126, 1128-29.
~11. Petitioner has not provided this Court with the entire transcript of
proceedings. The Ninth District Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence was
presented to support the jury's verdict which necessarily includes their finding that the
rape occurred in Ohio. The Ninth District Court of Appeals was able to review the entire
transcript and all of the evidence presented at trial. Petitioner wants this Court, without
the benefit of the complete trial transcript, to find there was not sufficient evidence to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. We cannot say Petitioner has established a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction based upon the evidence presented to this Court.
~12. "Pursuant to R.C. 2931.03, the court of common pleas has subject matter
jurisdiction of criminal cases. State V. Mitchell, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 07-CA-17,
2008-0hio-101, 11 32. A common pleas court has original jurisdiction in felony cases
and its jurisdiction is invoked by the return of an indictment. Click V. Eckle, 174 Ohio St.
88,89,186 N.E.2d 731 (1962)." State V. Wilson, 2014-0hio-3286, 111114-15 appeal not
allowed, 2014-0hio-5251, 1l1l14-15, 140 Ohio st. 3d 1522.
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Richland County, Case No. 14 CA 93 5
~13. In this case, Petitioner was charged by a felony indictment filed in the
Medina County Court of Common Pleas. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas
does have subject matter jurisdiction over criminal, felony cases. Based upon the
evidence before us, or lack thereof, and the holding of the Ninth District Court of
Appeals, we cannot and do not find the Medina County Common Pleas Court patently
and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner's case. For this reason, the
motion to dismiss the petition is granted.
By: Wise, J.
Gwin, P. J., and
Farmer, J., concur.
/
I
H N. JOHN W. WISE ().
~). ~~ ->4) HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
~~/ HON. SH~ ARMER
JWW/d 0205
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The COnsTiTuTiOn Of The sTaTe Of OhiO32
which they have agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by any other court of appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of the case to the Su-preme Court for review and final deter-mination.
(C) Laws may be passed providing for the reporting of cases in the courts of appeals.
(1968, am. 1994)
organIzatIon and jurIsdIctIon of common pleas court. §4 (A) There shall be a court of com-mon pleas and such divisions thereof as may be established by law serving each county of the state. Any judge of a court of common pleas or a division thereof may temporarily hold court in any county. In the interests of the fair, impartial, speedy, and sure administra-tion of justice, each county shall have one or more resident judges, or two or more counties may be combined into districts having one or more judges resident in the district and serving the common pleas court of all counties in the district, as may be provided by law. Judges serving a district shall sit in each county in the district as the busi-ness of the court requires. In counties or districts having more than one judge of the court of common pleas, the judg-es shall select one of their number to act as presiding judge, to serve at their pleasure. If the judges are unable be-cause of equal division of the vote to make such selection, the judge having the longest total service on the court of common pleas shall serve as presiding judge until selection is made by vote. The presiding judge shall have such duties and exercise such powers as
are prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court.
(B) The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such origi-nal jurisdiction over all justiciable mat-ters and such powers of review of pro-ceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.
(C) Unless otherwise provided by law, there shall be probate division and such other divisions of the courts of com-mon pleas as may be provided by law. Judges shall be elected specifically to such probate division and to such other divisions. The judges of the probate division shall be empowered to em-ploy and control the clerks, employees, deputies, and referees of such probate division of the common pleas courts.
(1968, am. 1973)
powers and dutIes of supreme court; rules.§5 (A)(1) In addition to all other pow-ers vested by this article in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court shall have general superintendence over all courts in the state. Such general superintend-ing power shall be exercised by the chief justice in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
(2) The Supreme Court shall appoint an administrative director who shall assist the chief justice and who shall serve at the pleasure of the court. The compensation and duties of the admin-istrative director shall be determined by the court.
(3) The chief justice or acting chief justice, as necessity arises, shall as-sign any judge of a court of common pleas or a division thereof temporarily to sit or hold court on any other court
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Chapter 2725: HABEAS CORPUS
2725.01 Persons entitled to writ of habeas corpus.
Whoever is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, or entitled to the custody of another, of which custody suchperson is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of suchimprisonment, restraint, or deprivation.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.02 Courts authorized to grant writ.
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the supreme court, court of appeals, court of commonpleas, probate court, or by a judge of any such court.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.03 Jurisdiction for production or discharge of inmate of institution.
If a person restrained of his liberty is an inmate of a state benevolent or correctional institution, thelocation of which is fixed by statute and at the time is in the custody of the officers of the institution, nocourt or judge other than the courts or judges of the county in which the institution is located hasjurisdiction to issue or determine a writ of habeas corpus for his production or discharge. Any writ issuedby a court or judge of another county to an officer or person in charge at the state institution to compelthe production or discharge of an inmate thereof is void.
Effective Date: 10061994
2725.04 Application for writ.
Application for the writ of habeas corpus shall be by petition, signed and verified either by the party forwhose relief it is intended, or by some person for him, and shall specify:
(A) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty;
(B) The officer, or name of the person by whom the prisoner is so confined or restrained; or, if both areunknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation and the personwho is served with the writ is deemed the person intended;
(C) The place where the prisoner is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
(D) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person shall be exhibited, if it can beprocured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or detention is withoutlegal authority, such fact must appear.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.05 Writ not allowed.
If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer underprocess issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of the judgment or order of a court of record, andthat the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
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the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed. If the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, theperson shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.06 Writ must be granted.
When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is presented, if it appears that the writ ought to issue, a courtor judge authorized to grant the writ must grant it forthwith.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.07 Clerk shall issue writ.
When a writ of habeas corpus is granted, the clerk of the court which granted the writ shall forthwith issuesaid writ under the seal of such court. In case of emergency, the judge who allowed the writ may issue itunder his own hand, and depute any officer or other person to serve it.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.08 Designation of prisoner.
The person to be produced upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be designated by his name, if known, and ifhis name is not known, or is uncertain, such person may be described in any other way so as to makeknown who is intended.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.09 Requisites of writ.
In case of confinement, imprisonment, or detention of a person by an officer, a writ of habeas corpus shallbe directed to him, and command him to have such person before the court or judge designated in thewrit, at a time and place therein specified.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.10 Form of writ when prisoner not in custody of an officer.
In case of confinement, imprisonment, or detention by a person not an officer, the writ of habeas corpusshall be in the following form:
The State of Ohio, __________________County, ss.:
To the sheriff of our several counties, greeting:
We command you that the body of ___________ of by ______________________of___________imprisoned and restrained of his liberty, as it is said, you take and have before______________, a judge of our _________________court, or, in case of his absence or disability, beforesome other judge of the same court, at____________, forthwith to do and receive what our said judgeshall then and there consider __________________ concerning him in his behalf; and summon the said________________ then and there to appear before our said judge, to show the cause of the taking anddetention of the said ___________________________
(Seal) Witness_________________________, at _______________________, this_________dayA-28
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of______________ , in the year_______.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.11 Service of writ.
The writ of habeas corpus may be served in any county by the sheriff of that or any other county or by aperson deputed by the court or judge issuing the writ.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.12 Execution and return of writ.
The officer or person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed shall convey the person imprisoned ordetained, and named in the writ, before the judge granting the writ, or, in case of his absence or disability,before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ. Said officer or person shallmake due return of the writ, together with the day and the cause of the caption and detention of suchperson, according to its command.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.13 Return of writ to another judge.
When a writ of habeas corpus is issued by a court in session, if the court has adjourned when the writ isreturned, it shall be returned before any judge of the same court. When the writ is returned before onejudge, at a time when the court is in session, he may adjourn the case into the court, there to be heardand determined.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.14 Contents of the return.
When the person to be produced under a writ of habeas corpus is imprisoned or restrained by an officer,the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody theprisoner is found shall state, in writing, to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainlyand unequivocally:
(A) Whether or not he has the prisoner in his custody or power or under restraint.
(B) If the prisoner is in his custody or power or under restraint, he shall set forth, at large, the authority,and the true and whole cause, of such imprisonment and restraint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, orother process upon which the prisoner is detained.
(C) If such prisoner was in his custody or power or under restraint, and such custody or restraint wastransferred to another, he shall state particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by whatauthority such transfer was made.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.15 Return must be signed and sworn to.
The return or statement referred to in section 2725.14 of the Revised Code shall be signed by the personwho makes it, and shall be sworn to by him, unless he is a sworn public officer and makes the return in his
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official capacity.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.16 Continuance of cause.
The court or judge to whom a writ of habeas corpus is returned, or the court into which it is adjourned, forgood cause shown, may continue the cause, and, in that event, shall make such order for the safekeepingof the person imprisoned or detained as the nature of the case requires.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.17 Discharge of prisoner.
When the judge has examined the cause of caption and detention of a person brought before him asprovided in section 2725.12 of the Revised Code, and is satisfied that such person is unlawfully imprisonedor detained, he shall forthwith discharge such person from confinement. On such examination, the judgemay disregard matters of form or technicalities in any mittimus or order of commitment by a court or officerauthorized by law to commit.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.18 Prisoner may be committed or let to bail.
When the person brought before a judge under section 2725.12 of the Revised Code is confined ordetained in a legal manner on a charge of having committed a crime or offense which is bailable, the judgemay recommit him or let him to bail. If such person is let to bail, the judge shall require him to enter into arecognizance, with sufficient surety, in such sum as the judge finds reasonable, after considering thecircumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, and conditioned for his appearanceat the court where the offense is properly cognizable. The judge forthwith shall certify his proceedings,together with any recognizance, to the proper court. If the person charged fails to give such recognizance,he shall be committed to prison by the judge.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.19 Mandatory commitment for capital offense.
If a prisoner brought before a judge under section 2725.12 of the Revised Code was committed by ajudge, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with a felony the punishmentfor which is capital, he shall not be removed, discharged, or let to bail.
Effective Date: 01101961
2725.20 Return as evidence or plea.
If a prisoner brought before a judge under section 2725.12 of the Revised Code is in custody under awarrant or commitment in pursuance of law, the return of the writ of habeas corpus is primafacieevidence of the cause of detention. If such prisoner is restrained of his liberty by alleged private authority,the return is only a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody shall be held tomake proof of such facts. Upon the final disposition of a case, the court or judge shall make such order asto costs as it requires.
Effective Date: 10011953A-30
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2725.21 Forfeiture by clerk for refusal to issue writ.
A clerk of a court who refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus, after an allowance of such writ and ademand therefor, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of five hundred dollars.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.22 Failure to obey writ.
No person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed shall neglect or refuse to obey or make return of itaccording to the command thereof, or make a false return, or upon demand made by the prisoner, or byany person on his behalf, refuse to deliver to the person demanding, within six hours after demandtherefor, a true copy of the warrant of commitment and detainer of the prisoner.
Whoever violates this section shall forfeit to the party aggrieved two hundred dollars for a first offense; fora second offense such person shall forfeit four hundred dollars, and, if an officer, shall be incapable ofholding his office.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.23 Persons at large upon writ not to be again imprisoned.
A person who is set at large upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not be imprisoned again for the sameoffense, unless by the legal order or process of the court in which he is bound by recognizance to appear,or other court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense.
No person shall knowingly, contrary to sections 2725.01 to 2725.28 , inclusive, of the Revised Code,recommit, imprison, or cause to be recommitted or imprisoned, for the same offense, or pretendedoffense, a person so set at large, or knowingly aid or assist therein.
Whoever violates this section shall forfeit to the party aggrieved five hundred dollars, notwithstanding anycolorable pretense or variation in the warrant or commitment.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.24 Prisoner shall not be removed from custody of one officer to another.
A person committed to prison, or in the custody of an officer for a criminal matter, shall not be removedtherefrom into the custody of another officer, unless by legal process, or unless the prisoner is delivered toan inferior officer to be taken to jail, or, by order of the proper court, is removed from one place to anotherwithin this state for trial, or in case of fire, infection, or other necessity.
A person who, after such commitment, makes, signs, or countersigns a warrant for such removal contraryto this section shall forfeit to the party aggrieved five hundred dollars.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.25 [Repealed].
Effective Date: 10011953; 2008 HB215 04072009
2725.26 Record of writs.
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proceedings were had, and may be reviewed on appeal as in other cases.
Effective Date: 10011953
2725.27 Recovery of forfeitures limitations.
The forfeitures mentioned in sections 2725.21 to 2725.24 of the Revised Code may be recovered by theparty aggrieved or the executors or administrators of the party aggrieved against the offender or theoffender's executors or administrators by civil action in a court having cognizance thereof.
Actions for violations of sections 2725.21 to 2725.24 of the Revised Code shall be brought within two yearsafter the offense is committed, except in cases of imprisonment of the party aggrieved, when action maybe brought within two years after the delivery of the party aggrieved out of prison, or after death if theparty aggrieved dies in prison.
Effective Date: 10011953; 2008 HB215 04072009
2725.28 Fees and costs.
The fees of officers and witnesses shall be taxed by the judge, on return of the proceedings on a writ ofhabeas corpus, and collected as a part of the original costs in the case. When the prisoner is discharged,the costs shall be taxed to the state, and paid out of the county treasury, upon the warrant of the countyauditor. No officer or person shall demand payment in advance for any fees to which he is entitled by virtueof the proceedings, when the writ is demanded or issued for the discharge from custody of a personconfined under color of proceedings in a criminal case. When a person in custody by virtue or under colorof proceedings in a civil case is discharged, costs shall be taxed against the party at whose instance hewas so in custody. If he is remanded to custody, costs shall be taxed against him.
Effective Date: 10011953
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4/19/2015 Lawriter ORC 2901.11 Jurisdiction for criminal acts.
http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2901.11 1/2
2901.11 Jurisdiction for criminal acts.
(A) A person is subject to criminal prosecution and punishment in this state if any of the following occur:
(1) The person commits an offense under the laws of this state, any element of which takes place in thisstate.
(2) While in this state, the person attempts to commit, or is guilty of complicity in the commission of, anoffense in another jurisdiction, which offense is an offense under both the laws of this state and the otherjurisdiction, or, while in this state, the person conspires to commit an offense in another jurisdiction, whichoffense is an offense under both the laws of this state and the other jurisdiction, and a substantial overtact in furtherance of the conspiracy is undertaken in this state by the person or another person involved inthe conspiracy, subsequent to the person's entrance into the conspiracy. In any case in which a personattempts to commit, is guilty of complicity in the commission of, or conspires to commit an offense inanother jurisdiction as described in this division, the person is subject to criminal prosecution andpunishment in this state for the attempt, complicity, or conspiracy, and for any resulting offense that iscommitted or completed in the other jurisdiction.
(3) While out of this state, the person conspires or attempts to commit, or is guilty of complicity in thecommission of, an offense in this state.
(4) While out of this state, the person omits to perform a legal duty imposed by the laws of this state,which omission affects a legitimate interest of the state in protecting, governing, or regulating any person,property, thing, transaction, or activity in this state.
(5) While out of this state, the person unlawfully takes or retains property and subsequently brings any ofthe unlawfully taken or retained property into this state.
(6) While out of this state, the person unlawfully takes or entices another and subsequently brings theother person into this state.
(7) The person, by means of a computer, computer system, computer network, telecommunication,telecommunications device, telecommunications service, or information service, causes or knowinglypermits any writing, data, image, or other telecommunication to be disseminated or transmitted into thisstate in violation of the law of this state.
(B) In homicide, the element referred to in division (A)(1) of this section includes the act that causesdeath, the physical contact that causes death, the death itself, or any other element that is set forth inthe offense in question. If any part of the body of a homicide victim is found in this state, the death ispresumed to have occurred within this state.
(C)
(1) This state includes the land and water within its boundaries and the air space above that land andwater, with respect to which this state has either exclusive or concurrent legislative jurisdiction. Where theboundary between this state and another state or foreign country is disputed, the disputed territory isconclusively presumed to be within this state for purposes of this section.
(2) The courts of common pleas of Adams, Athens, Belmont, Brown, Clermont, Columbiana, Gallia,Hamilton, Jefferson, Lawrence, Meigs, Monroe, Scioto, and Washington counties have jurisdiction beyondthe north or northwest shore of the Ohio river extending to the opposite shore line, between the extended
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boundary lines of any adjacent counties or adjacent state. Each of those courts of common pleas hasconcurrent jurisdiction on the Ohio river with any adjacent court of common pleas that borders on thatriver and with any court of Kentucky or of West Virginia that borders on the Ohio river and that hasjurisdiction on the Ohio river under the law of Kentucky or the law of West Virginia, whichever is applicable,or under federal law.
(D) When an offense is committed under the laws of this state, and it appears beyond a reasonable doubtthat the offense or any element of the offense took place either in this state or in another jurisdiction orjurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which it took place, the offense or element isconclusively presumed to have taken place in this state for purposes of this section.
(E) When a person is subject to criminal prosecution and punishment in this state for an offensecommitted or completed outside of this state, the person is subject to all specifications for that offensethat would be applicable if the offense had been committed within this state.
(F) Any act, conduct, or element that is a basis of a person being subject under this section to criminalprosecution and punishment in this state need not be committed personally by the person as long as it iscommitted by another person who is in complicity or conspiracy with the person.
(G) This section shall be liberally construed, consistent with constitutional limitations, to allow this statethe broadest possible jurisdiction over offenses and persons committing offenses in, or affecting, thisstate.
(H) For purposes of division (A)(2) of this section, an overt act is substantial when it is of a character thatmanifests a purpose on the part of the actor that the object of the conspiracy should be completed.
(I) As used in this section, "computer," "computer system," "computer network," "information service,""telecommunication," "telecommunications device," "telecommunications service," "data," and "writing"have the same meanings as in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code.
Effective Date: 03301999; 07132005
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4/19/2015 Lawriter ORC 2901.12 Venue of criminal cases.
http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2901.12 1/2
2901.12 Venue of criminal cases.
(A) The trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter,and, except in cases of emergency under section 1901.028, 1907.04 , 2301.04 , or 2501.20 of theRevised Code, in the territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed.
(B) When the offense or any element of the offense was committed in an aircraft, motor vehicle, train,watercraft, or other vehicle, in transit, and it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction theoffense was committed, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction through which the aircraft, motorvehicle, train, watercraft, or other vehicle passed.
(C) When the offense involved the unlawful taking or receiving of property or the unlawful taking or enticingof another, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction from which or into which the property or victim wastaken, received, or enticed.
(D) When the offense is conspiracy, attempt, or complicity cognizable under division (A)(2) of section2901.11 of the Revised Code, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction in which the conspiracy,attempt, complicity, or any of its elements occurred. If an offense resulted outside this state from theconspiracy, attempt, or complicity, that resulting offense also may be tried in any jurisdiction in which theconspiracy, attempt, complicity, or any of the elements of the conspiracy, attempt, or complicity occurred.
(E) When the offense is conspiracy or attempt cognizable under division (A)(3) of section 2901.11 of theRevised Code, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction in which the offense that was the object of theconspiracy or attempt, or any element of that offense, was intended to or could have taken place. Whenthe offense is complicity cognizable under division (A)(3) of section 2901.11 of the Revised Code, theoffender may be tried in any jurisdiction in which the principal offender may be tried.
(F) When an offense is considered to have been committed in this state while the offender was out of thisstate, and the jurisdiction in this state in which the offense or any material element of the offense wascommitted is not reasonably ascertainable, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction in which theoffense or element reasonably could have been committed.
(G) When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense or any element of an offense wascommitted in any of two or more jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdictionthe offense or element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those jurisdictions.
(H) When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in different jurisdictions,the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or anyelement of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the evidence that may be used toestablish the course of criminal conduct, any of the following is primafacie evidence of a course of criminalconduct:
(1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same type or from the same group.
(2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender's same employment, or capacity, orrelationship to another.
(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or chain of events, or in furtherance ofthe same purpose or objective.
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(5) The offenses involved the same or a similar modus operandi.
(6) The offenses were committed along the offender's line of travel in this state, regardless of theoffender's point of origin or destination.
(I)
(1) When the offense involves a computer, computer system, computer network, telecommunication,telecommunications device, telecommunications service, or information service, the offender may be triedin any jurisdiction containing any location of the computer, computer system, or computer network of thevictim of the offense, in any jurisdiction from which or into which, as part of the offense, any writing, data,or image is disseminated or transmitted by means of a computer, computer system, computer network,telecommunication, telecommunications device, telecommunications service, or information service, or inany jurisdiction in which the alleged offender commits any activity that is an essential part of the offense.
(2) As used in this section, "computer," "computer system," "computer network," "information service,""telecommunication," "telecommunications device," "telecommunications service," "data," and "writing"have the same meanings as in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code.
(J) When the offense involves the death of a person, and it cannot reasonably be determined in whichjurisdiction the offense was committed, the offender may be tried in the jurisdiction in which the deadperson's body or any part of the dead person's body was found.
(K) Notwithstanding any other requirement for the place of trial, venue may be changed, upon motion ofthe prosecution, the defense, or the court, to any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter outsidethe county in which trial otherwise would be held, when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot beheld in the jurisdiction in which trial otherwise would be held, or when it appears that trial should be held inanother jurisdiction for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice.
Amended by 130th General Assembly File No. TBD, HB 290, §1, eff. 3/23/2015.
Effective Date: 03301999; 07132005
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4/19/2015 Lawriter ORC 2931.03 Criminal jurisdiction common pleas courts.
http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2931.03 1/1
2931.03 Criminal jurisdiction common pleas courts.
The court of common pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minoroffenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.
A judge of a court of common pleas does not have the authority to dismiss a criminal complaint, charge,information, or indictment solely at the request of the complaining witness and over the objection of theprosecuting attorney or other chief legal officer who is responsible for the prosecution of the case.
Effective Date: 03171998
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4/19/2015 Lawriter ORC 2969.25 Affidavit of inmate of prior actions.
http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2969.25 1/1
2969.25 Affidavit of inmate of prior actions.
(A) At the time that an inmate commences a civil action or appeal against a government entity oremployee, the inmate shall file with the court an affidavit that contains a description of each civil action orappeal of a civil action that the inmate has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court. Theaffidavit shall include all of the following for each of those civil actions or appeals:
(1) A brief description of the nature of the civil action or appeal;
(2) The case name, case number, and the court in which the civil action or appeal was brought;
(3) The name of each party to the civil action or appeal;
(4) The outcome of the civil action or appeal, including whether the court dismissed the civil action orappeal as frivolous or malicious under state or federal law or rule of court, whether the court made anaward against the inmate or the inmate's counsel of record for frivolous conduct under section 2323.51 ofthe Revised Code, another statute, or a rule of court, and, if the court so dismissed the action or appeal ormade an award of that nature, the date of the final order affirming the dismissal or award.
(B) If an inmate who files a civil action in a court of common pleas, court of appeals, county court, ormunicipal court or an inmate who files an appeal from a judgment or order in a civil action in any of thosecourts has filed three or more civil actions or appeals of civil actions in a court of record in this state in thepreceding twelve months or previously has been subject to the review procedure described in this division,the court may appoint a member of the bar to review the claim that is the basis of the civil action or theissues of law that are the basis of the appeal and to make a recommendation regarding whether the claimasserted in the action or the issues of law raised in the appeal are frivolous or malicious under section2969.24 of the Revised Code, any other provision of law, or rule of court.
(C) If an inmate who files a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee seeks a waiverof the prepayment of the full filing fees assessed by the court in which the action or appeal is filed, theinmate shall file with the complaint or notice of appeal an affidavit that the inmate is seeking a waiver ofthe prepayment of the court's full filing fees and an affidavit of indigency. The affidavit of waiver and theaffidavit of indigency shall contain all of the following:
(1) A statement that sets forth the balance in the inmate account of the inmate for each of the precedingsix months, as certified by the institutional cashier;
(2) A statement that sets forth all other cash and things of value owned by the inmate at that time.
Effective Date: 06282002
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