arjan sandhu supervisor...
TRANSCRIPT
Student names:
Julia ZinMoksha MaisuriaArjan Sandhu
University:
The University of Queensland
Department:
School of Architecture
Supervisor name:
Liz Brogden
Department:
School of Architecture
9th i-Rec Student Competition
Emails:
[email protected]@[email protected]
Department postal address:
School of ArchitectureZelman Cowen BuildingThe University of QueenslandBrisbane QLD 4072 Australia
Supervisor email:
Country:
Australia
Telephone number:
Julia Zin: +61 458 601 624Moksha Maisuria: +61 406 729 872Arjan Sandhu: +61 403 556 930
Department phone:
+61 7 3365 3537
Supervisor phone:
+61 405 095 038
Date:
10/05/2019
THE CONTEXT1900-2015
High risk of natural hazards: climate change, earthquakes and flooding1
Looking at context in which Nepal was found to be in, prior to the devastating earthquakes that struck on 25 April and 12 May 2015, approximately 25% of the population live below the pov-erty line. The country had just overcome a decade-long armed conflict amongst it’s people and a vast majority of houses in rural Nepal were self-built1.
We, ‘Blurred Lines’ are a group of young designers and activists, who have chosen to focus on the Nepal Earth-quake of 2015 which affected a community that has yet to recover after 4 years of temporary shelters.We believe in blurring the lines of the roles aide provid-ers and the affected people play, by facilitating a pro-cess, not just providing a product and eliminating the “Us” vs. “Them” dynamic.
The people of Nepal adhere to a unique system of social strati-fication, whereby members are categorized into specific castes. This cast system created significant barriers to even aide distri-bution and spread of information1.There was also a large percentage of female matriarch families, as men were often overseas or in the capital working to earn money. After the disaster, mainly men project managed whilst a majority of women did the labour work1.
WHO WE ARE BACKGROUND
Facilitating a process between the lines and eliminating the “Us” vs.
“Them” dynamic.
2015 NEPAL EARTH QUAKE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
1996-2006: Maoist conflict (Nepalese Civil War) Introduction of the Shelter Cluster system1
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
1990s: tried to improve housing regulations, settlements & land rights through building acts & codesDespite this, vast majority of houses in rural Nepal are self-engineered & self-built1
HOUSING CONDITIONS
25.2% of population is below poverty line1
Significant migration of young men to cities and overseas-Concerns about social and economic vulnerability of women left behind44% of households have at least 1 absentee man12
Caste system with Dalit’s of lowest caste
SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTRODUCTION
Fig. 1. Aerial overview of Chuchepati relief camp (Al Jazeera, 2015)
Fig. 2. Some locals used materials provided by shelter kits to build according to UN Shelter Cluster design (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017)
Fig. 3. Local community participation in some areas (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017)
1. Sokol, B. (2015). Aerial overview of Chuchepati relief camp [Image]. Al Jazeera Media Network. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/AljazeeraImage
2. Global Shelter Cluster (2017), Some locals used materials provided by shelter kits to build according to the UN Shelter Cluster design [Image]. Shelter Projects 2015-2016: Case studies of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlement Responses
3. Global Shelter Cluster (2017), Local community participation in some areas [Image]. Shelter Projects 2015-2016: Case studies of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlement Responses
IMAGE REFERENCES
THE HAZARD
APR - MAY 2015
25 April 2015 magnitude 7.8
12 May 2015 magnitude 7.31
EARTHQUAKE STRIKES
5,065 transitional shelter kits distributed
Shelter Size 16.7sqm
Materials Cost Approx. $200 US
Outcome Indicator 93% of households used the kits to build shelters1
HOUSEHOLDS SUPPORTED
Emergency phase 700, 000Self-recovery phase 600, 000Winterization 244, 1581
RESPONSE OUTPUTS
736, 743 tarpaulins402, 070 blankets484, 765 Cash for Shelters214, 392 CGI Sheet Bundles1
A total of 604, 930 were fully damaged with 288, 856 par-tially damage. This left 886 ,456 affected families and 649, 815 displaced families1.
Two major earthquakes which struck Nepal affected approximately 6 million people. Humanitarian assistance responded to 14 most affected districts through 3 phases:
Emergency relief Supporting self-recovery Winterization1
HOW DID “WE” HELP?
IS IT ENOUGH?
THE DAMAGE
Fig 4. Map of Nepal where the earthquake struck in April and May 2015 (Global Shelter Cluster, 2017).
THE EARTHQUAKE
RESPONSE AREAS
NEPAL
INDIA
KATHMANDU
GORKHA
CHINA
Fig. 5. UN plastic tarps unloaded (Al Jazeera, 2015) Fig. 7. Women and children sit in front of their temporary shelter (Al Jazeera, 2015)
Fig. 6. A family sits in the rubble of their home in the village of Jhankridanda (Al Jazeera, 2015)
4. Global Shelter Cluster (2017), Map of Nepal where the earthquake struck in April and May 2015 [Image]. Shelter Projects 2015-2016: Case studies of Humani-tarian Shelter and Settlement Responses
5. Sokol, B. (2015). Tribhuvahn International Airport in Kathmandu UN plastic tarps are unloaded to be distributed to quake-effected areas [Image]. Al Jazeera Media Network. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/AljazeeraImage
6. Sokol, B. (2015). A family sits in the rubble of their home in the village of Jhankridanda [Image]. Al Jazeera Media Network. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/AljazeeraImage
7. Sokol, B. (2015). Women and children sit in front of their temporary shelter [Image]. Al Jazeera Media Network. Retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/Alja-zeeraImage
IMAGE REFERENCES
THE DISASTER
APR - DEC 2015
Despite Nepal being affected by earthquakes frequently, the country was not prepared for an earthquake of this magnitude, as most households did not have the income to engineer
resilient houses.14
HAZARD + VULNERABILITY
“The poor are more vulnerable to disasters” 11
8 MAY - 3 JUN 2015
25 APR - 30 JUL 2015
8th May 2015 to 3rd June 2015: Inter-agency shelter and settlements vulnerability
assessment1
165 patient referrals to Dept. of PsychiatryMost patients display anxiety issues: 44% stress, 9% anxiety disorder, 18% non-specificThese findings indicate higher
probability rates of PTSD5
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
TRAUMA & MENTAL HEALTH
POST DISASTER SCENARIO
This poses an “acute threat level 1”. According to the NPC, the earthquake resulted in a loss of US$7 Billion5. Addition-ally, an estimated 3.5% of the population fell into poverty by 20165. In combination these indicators continue to damage the wider population, particularly reinforcing existing so-cio-economic inequalities.
This poses an “acute threat level 0”. Existing social ten-sions were further exacerbated after post-earthquake with numerous instances of unequal distribution of aid packag-es and health care among those of lower-caste, with Dalits and Madhesis most severely affected3. These social ten-sions also further hindered relief to the larger population. For example, violence between government parties and the Madhesi groups in the Terai region led to a blockade of the Indo-Nepal border, further worsening the humanitarian crisis and hindering relief efforts3. These social indicators, there-fore, have been identified to cause wide-spread damage to the Nepalese population resulting in numerous victims.
This poses a “manifest threat level 3”. 82.3% of all house-holds were above the threshold for food consumption by September 20158. Additionally, dietary diversity returned to normal levels by September 20158. However, areas of vul-nerability and increased food insecurity do persist, specifi-cally in Sindhupalchok, Gorkha and was more prominent in Dalit households8. These indicators, particularly in vulnera-ble areas, have been identified to cause damage to these communities in the long run.
This poses an “acute threat level 1” as an increased frequen-cy of landslides has been evident post the first earthquake in April 2015, with over 3000 major landslides having been recorded4. These indicators in combination, therefore, con-tinue to cause damage to the affected population.
This poses a “manifest threat level 2”. It was found that gov-ernment health service delivery to affected areas was at a standstill with significantly reduced access to facilities for iso-lated communities, such as Gorkha and Kavre6. However, no major outbreaks of infectious diseases were reported in the six months following the earthquake7. Therefore, the identi-fied health indicators threaten to cause immediate damage to the Nepalese population, especially if left unchecked.
This poses an “acute threat level 1” as political unrest in southern Nepal broke out in September 20151. Political tran-sitioning during this time overshadowed many humanitarian issues that developed after the earthquake. Additionally, a 4-month closure of the Nepal-India border led to shortag-es in fuel and medical supplies1. Therefore, political context substantially hindered relief efforts and continue to disad-vantage the affected population.
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
FOOD
FOOD
Ideal state of security as defined; or state close to ideal with insignificant indication of threats - Secure 6
SECURE 6
LATENT 5
MANIFEST 3
LATENT 4
MANIFEST 2
ACUTE 1
ACUTE 0
Average or just below average state of se-curity; some vague indications of threats, which in total are no threat to an aspect of security; no indicators for negative trends. - Latent 5Below average state of security; some indications of threats, which in total are no threat to an aspect of security in the long-run; accompanied by indicators showing negative trends. - Latent 4Single indicators or a combination of indicators, which in total threaten to cause damage to a population in the long run. - Manifest 3Single indicators or a combination of indicators, which in total threaten to cause immediate damage to a population. - Manifest 2Single indicators or a combination of indicators, which already cause damage to a population. - Acute 1Single indicators or a combination of indi-cators, which already cause wide-spread damage to a population or result in a high number of victims. - Acute 0
THE RESPONSE
MID MAY 2015
Poor coordinations of villages, some poorer people of lower caste were excluded from
distribution of kits1.
93% of households used the materials for constructing temporary shelters within the first month post disaster.
63% followed their own design2
CLUSTER COORDINATION
THE SHELTERS
Govt. of Nepal invested significantly in institutional preparedness and coordination at the sector level. Shelter agencies were partnered with govt. Department of urban development & building
construction1.
Largest for internally displaced persons.Used salvaged materials or non-food items distributed by aid organisations and consecutively replace if more durable materials become
available4
DISASTER STRATEGY
SCATTERED SHELTER SITES
22 MAY - 1 JUN 2015Post disaster needs assessment led by national planning
commission2
From the diagram it can be established that the affected fam-ilies, especially the marginalised groups, have been absent in processes of the creation of the frameworks intended to help them. The PDNA prepared in 2015, led by the National Planning Commission (NPC), forms the basis for the PDRF, with strategies, priorities and financial requirements updated as required. It can also be seen that the National Reconstruc-tion Authority (NRA) was a major stakeholder involved in the dissemination of information and funds after the 2015 earth-quake in Nepal2.
The NRA is an organisation run by the Nepalese govern-ment that was significant in coordinating the reconstruction work following the earthquake. This organisation has a key role in collaborating with non-government and government institutions in order to effectively deliver reconstruction ef-forts. It was found, however, that the NRA was ineffective in achieving this goal3.
The assistance provided focused too heavily on a set design. After about two months, people had recovered to a certain level with whatever resourc-es were available, and they were capable to build contextually better shel-ters than the semi-circular ones promoted by the organization.This indicates a lack of understanding by the top tier stakeholders in the fig-ure below, where there is inadequate feedback or relationship between the affected families and the international or national agencies. As this focus on the national/international level, in particular political relationships has al-ways been a criticism of the past, response by the UN Shelter Cluster had sought to promote the role of Civil Society Organisations by allocating them to key districts1.
Households used the materials for constructing temporary shelters, within the first month of the distribution.
Followed their own design, normally including the use of salvaged materials.
Used the design suggested by the organization.
DISASTER RESPONSE
KEY STAKEHOLDERS
SHELTER STRATEGY SHELTER KITS
Materials in the Shelter Kit• 2 x 9 Corrugated Glavanised Iron (CGI) sheetsShelter toolkit• 1 x Handsaw for timber• 0.5kg roofing nails, galvanized with rubber washer• 1 x Shovel, round point with Y handle• 1 x Hoe, with long handle, large type• 1 x Machete, wooden handle• 1 x Shears, straight for metal sheetMaterials in the NFI kit• 1 x Kitchen Set• 2 x Mattress• 5 x Blanket
THE EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSE
DISASTER + RESPONSE = VULNERABILITY
31 DEC 201531 Dec 2015: Cluster itself
wound down1 Government finally revived NRA and appointed a new CEO, 8
months after the earthquake13
Ministry of Federal Affairs & Local Development & Ministry of Urban Development ran all reconstruction through to Dec.
AUG 2015
SEP 2015
JUL 2015
NOV 2015
Emergency shelter kit distribution completedPrime Minister stepped down from NRA and new CEO appointed
Political unrest following parliamentary change in constitution resulting in blockade.Govn’t disbanded NRA due to lack of legal status.
3 months after the initial earthquake many families were still living in temporary shelters or in their damaged home
NFI (Non-food Items) Distributions and post distribution monitoring complete
PERMANENT RECONSTRUCTION?
2018 - 2019
Govt. stated that houses must complete to plinth level by July 2018 then up to roof by mid January 2019$6750 more than government grant to rebuild house which has left victims in debt.Even though communities rebuilt their houses after the disaster there was insufficient knowledge of making buildings
resilient to future hazards.4
PERMANENT RECONSTRUCTION?
HOW DID THE RESPONSE ENGAGE CERTAIN STAKEHOLDERS?
STRENGTHS OF THE RESPONSE
WEAKNESSES OF THE RESPONSE
DID THE RESPONSE ADDRESS ALL NEEDS?
RESPONSE EVALUATION
• Inconsistent subnational coordination and uneven distribution of response
• Slow subnational coordination• Coordination gaps and high turnover of
cluster and government staff.• Lack of familiarity about cluster roles and
responsibilities amongst coordinators.• Challenges in finding partnerships for lo-
cal organizations to access resources and funding (especially in urban areas).
• Government lead blanket approach caused delays in the response in some districts1.
• Deployment of coordination team in 48hr• Participation of local civil society & affect-
ed people• Localized coordination, close to imple-
menting bodies and responsive to locals• Great impact on response in some areas1
Analysis of the post-earthquake scenario through the radar graph identified the social context of Nepal as being a ma-jor threat to cause wide-spread damage to the recovering population. The response effort, however, was unsuccessful in addressing this contextual issue. The “blanket approach” adopted in earthquake response by the Nepalese commu-nities and local authorities for distribution of shelter kits, cash and non-cash assistance proved inadequate inad-dressing the needs of the most marginalised communities9.
Blanket cash distribution, for example, failed to consider the varying needs of different communities and became a one-size-fits-all solution, severely disadvantaging house-holds with pre-existing vulnerabilities9. Ad-ditionally, negligence in response efforts towards those of low-caste hindered recov-ery for these communities9. The post-earth-quake response and relief effort therefore failed to address the social challenges pres-ent in Nepal, exacerbating inequalities and further entrenching social disadvantage for marginalised communities.
At a national level, Nepal’s parliamentary failure to pass on the bill for the NRA meant that there was actually no overall agency charged with managing the earthquake recovery programs. This lead to delays in housing subsidies and the lack of overcoming logistical challenges in reaching envi-ronmentally remote communities. Therefore, in these areas proper shelter kits were replaced with tarpaulins, blankets, clothes and kitchen materials. Ultimately, emergency cash distributions became the preferred relief item due to these high power, low interest stakeholders3.
At a local level, certain areas such as Gorkha received strong aide response owing to a larger number of NGOs present and connections with the British Army Gorkha Reg-iment. Contrastingly, areas stuck by the second earthquake received less assistance. Another reason for the unequal response may be that high overall statistical percentages of households who received assistance, masked the fact that some districts received more than others, while some areas were in greater need than initially predicted3.
The shelter response required the consid-eration of increased vulnerability of wom-en, as some Nepal communities still prac-tice the isolation of menstruating women. Aspects of hygiene, sanitary items and, psychological stress were paramount. Shel-ter programs need-ed to be aware of child-headed house-holds due to the prac-tice of girls marrying as young as 10 years old. Widows faced persecution and were blamed for the deaths of their husbands. ‘Di-saster risk’ for women became not just about surviving the actu-al natural hazard but their threatened safety by human-made risk of violence and abuse12.
GENDER CONSIDERATIONS
STAKEHOLDERS MAP
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH AND LOGISTICS
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, DEVELOPMENT & LIVELIHOOD SECURITY
REDISTRIBUTION & DECENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWER
2019
What can we do today... ...to set us up for future?2070
COORDINATION OF LOCAL & EXTERNAL SOURCES
TIME LINE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES
NEW RESILIENCE PRACTICES:Targeted needs assessmentLocal leaders of the community, NGOs & external aide providers work together to hold workshops in basic construction and provide a better understanding of recovery processesTeaching of strategies for future resilience
LOCAL INTEGRATION INTO RESILIENCE PRACTICES & POLICIES:Create partnerships between local stakehold-ers, the Government and NGOs.Employment of local professionals in re-sponse and resilience management
TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE & JOBS:Improve transport routes to access remote areas to allow aid to overlooked minority groups such as Dalits and a provide local jobs through these projects.
EMPOWERMENT:Workshops for gender equality, anti-discrimi-nination and sexual health will provide job op-portunities as well as educate the community. Workshops for single-women households to empower them.Policy changes to recognize women’s rights to property.
EDUCATION & WORKSHOPS:Workshops towards equality for the youth and cultural values into the school curriculum.
PLANNINGDESIGNMANAGEMENTFINANCINGTRAININGINFORMATIONCONSTRUCTION
UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE AFFECTED AND CONTEXT OF THE LOCALS REMAINS KEY IN RESPECTING THE NEEDS OF THOSE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS
THE FINDINGS
2019
77% of people are still living in sub standard temporary
shelters14
Govt says it will support and enhance existing capacity to prepare for and respond to future emergencies.Building on lessons learned from the earthquakes, response preparedness activities are also being rolled out to support authorities to enhance existing capacity to respond to future
disasters14.
PERMANENT RECONSTRUCTION?
FUTURE DISASTERS
1. Global Shelter Cluster (2017), Shelter Projects 2015-2016: Case studies of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlement Responses.
2. Daly, P., Ninglekhu, S., Hollenbach, P., Barenstein, J., & Nguyen, D. (2017). Situating local stakeholders within national disaster governance structures: rebuilding urban neighbourhoods following the 2015 Nepal earthquake. Environment and Urbanisation, 29(2), 403-424. doi: 10.1177/0956247817721403.
3. Simkhada, P., Teijlingen, E., Pant, P., Sathian, B., & Tuladhar, G. (2015). Public Health, Prevention and Health promotion in Post-Earthquake Nepal. Nepal Journal of Epidemiology, 5(2), 462-464. doi: 10.3126/nje.v5i2.12826.
4. Khazai, B., Anhorn, J., Brink, S., Girard, T., & Jimee, G.K. et al. (2015). Emergent issues and vulnerability factors in temporary and intermediate shelters following the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. Center for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technolo-gy: Report no. 4 – Shelter Report Following Field Mission, 1-47.
5. London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. (2006). Health interventions in crisis-affected communities of Nepal – Mission report October 2006. Retrieved from https://www.who.int/hac/cri-ses/npl/sitreps/Nepal_health_interventions_report_Oct2006.pdf
6. Asoka, G.V., & Vanitha, A. (2017). Disaster response under One Health in the aftermath of Nepal earthquake, 2015. Journal of Epidemiology and Global Health, 7(1), 91-96. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jegh.2016.03.001
7. Regmi, P., Aryal, N., Pant, P., Teijlingen, E., Simkhada, P., & Devkota, B. (2016). Priority public health interventions and research agendas in post-earthquake Nepal. South East Asia Journal of Public Health, 5(2), 7-12. https://doi.org/10.3329/seajph.v5i2.28307
8. Dartmouth. (2017). Nepal Earthquake Case studies: Caste-based inequality. Retrieved on March 27, 2019 from https://jour-neys.dartmouth.edu/NepalQuake-CaseStudies/caste-based-in-equality/
9. Thorne-Lyman, A. Manohar, S., Shrestha, B., Nonyane, B., & Newpane, S., et al. (2018). Nutritional resilience in Nepal following the earthquake of 2015. Plos One, 13(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205438
10. Government of Nepal National Planning Commission. (2015). Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Retrieved from https://relief-web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PDNA_Executive_Sum-mary_new.pdf
11. Burnell J. & Sanderson D. 2011. Whose reality counts?: Shelter after disaster. Environmental Hazards, 10:3-4, 189-192, DOI: 10.1080/17477891.2011.595581
12. Limbu, S. T. (2017). Women in disaster: Gendered vulnerabil-ities and intersecting identities in the wake of the Nepali earth-quakes. The London School of Economics and Political Science. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2016/04/25/women-in-disaster-gendered-vulnerabilities-and-intersect-ing-identities-in-the-wake-of-the-nepali-earthquakes/
13. Sanderson D. & Ramalingam B. (2015). Nepal Earthquake Response: Lessons for operational agencies. ALNAP Lessons Paper. London: ALNAP/ODI
14. Ojha, H. Baldry, E. & Shrestha, K. (2017). Two years after the earthquake, why has Nepal failed to recover? The Conversation Media Group Ltd. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/two-years-after-the-earthquake-why-has-nepal-failed-to-recov-er-77552
REFERENCES
THE CONCLUSION
NGOs and aide providers sit within a high in-terest and low power position due to the Gov-ernment’s ineffective high power position. The blanket approach by NGOs and aide organisa-tions failed to take into account the needs of dif-ferent affected communities and the context of the disaster situation. As a result, affected locals adapted the kits to suit their needs. This ques-tions the usefulness of the kits in addresses the needs as well as lack of education on the design and construction techniques used locally versus with the kits. This approach supports a one-size-fits-all solu-tion which is inadequate for the social context in Nepal, this posed a threat to social equality and dis-empowers vulnerable communities.
In addition to the affected people, marginalised groups in particular form a part of the low pow-er and high interest people. This is due to the existing discrimination to those of lower caste, women and remotely located people. The threats identified in the previous key find-ings caused by the NRA and the blanket ap-proach posed a threat to these communities, due to the disregards of social and cultural fac-tors.Lack of consideration of these factors, caused further entrenchment of social inequalities and led to the dis-empowerment of a community that was already vulnerable.
From our analysis the Government of Nepal was deemed to be a high power and high interest stakeholder. However, due to shifting priorities towards the new constitution being written at the time, they became a low interest stakehold-er towards recovery efforts. This lack of interest lead to poor establishment of a governing body such as the NRA. Consequently, the lack of coordination within the NRA hindered downstream efforts for high interest and low power groups, such as the affected communities and regional governing bodies. This is due to ambiguous allocation of responsibilities, reduced communication and collaboration between locals and government. Therefore, the NRA was found to cause dis-em-powerment.
2. BLANKET APPROACH TO SHELTER KITS
2. DISCRIMINATION OF MARGINALISED COMMUNITIES
1. GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL: NRA’S LACK OF INTEREST
Since the caste sys-tem is still in place in Nepal, the highly marginalised group called the ‘Dalits’ or “Untouchables,” are members of the low-est social group in the Hindu caste system. Dalit communities are especially vulnerable,and are discriminat-ed against in terms of choices of habitation and access toservices, which results in Dalits living in highly vulnerable places and having beensystematically exclud-ed from relief and rehabilitation efforts following the earth-quake13.
CASTE SYSTEM
INTEREST OF STAKEHOLDERS
INFL
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POW
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HELPFULto achieving the objective
INTE
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HARMFULto achieving the objective
• INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND NGOS• INVOLVING LOCALS THROUGH THE CSO• LOCATION IN RELATION TO INDIA AND CHINA ALLOWS EASY ACCESS OF RESOURCES•.LARGE NEPALESE DIASPORA WITH HIGH IN-TEREST AND ABILITY TO PROVIDE RESOURCES. MEDIA INCREASED INTERNATIONAL AWARE-NESS AND DIASPORA INVOLVEMENT
• MEDIA BEING DETRIMENTAL TO AFFECT-ED PEOPLE BY SPREADING INACCURATE INFORMATION•UNREST AND SUBSEQUENT INDO-NEPAL BOR-DER CLOSURE TO NON-EARTHQUAKE AFFECT-ED AREAS CAUSED SUPPLY SHORTAGES AND SHIFTED FOCUS FROM RECOVERY EFFORTS• BLANKET APPROACH ADOPTED FOR THE DIS-TRIBUTION OF CASH, NON-CASH AND SHELTER KITS EXACERBATED SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, INCREASED VULNERABILITIES AND DID NOT ADDRESS SOCIAL NEEDS.
• AT A NATIONAL LEVEL, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT (NCDM) OBTAINED AND APPROVED DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND COORDI-NATED INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS • NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (NDMA) HELPED BY ACTING AS THE MAIN IMPLEMEN-TATION BODY FOR THE NCDM• AT A LOCAL LEVEL, THE REGIONAL DISASTER MAN-AGEMENT COMMITTEE (RDMC) ENABLED THE REPAIR OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND MONITORED OVERALL DISASTER MANAGEMENT• DISTRICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR LOCAL LEVEL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND ACTIVITIES, RESCUE AND REHABILITATION•MINISTRY OF FEDERAL AFFAIRS AND LOCAL DE-VELOPMENT TOOK OVER RECONSTRUCTION PHASE AFTER THE NRA
• NRA HAD A MAJOR ROLE IN FINANCING, RECON-STRUCTION, DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNICAL RESOURC-ES AND COLLABORATION WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS. HOWEVER, THEIR LACK OF COORDINATION AND DIF-FERING PRIORITIES RENDERED THE NRA INEFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING THIS ROLE. THIS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING HARMFUL AS IT HINDERED DOWNSTREAM RELIEF EFFORTS. • LACK OF CONSISTENT OVERALL ORGANISATION STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT• THE GOVERNMENTS SHIFTING PRIORITIES OR LACK OF PRIORITIES FOR RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE