Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the WestThis page intentionally left blank Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the WestBetween History And GeopoliticsAlla MirzoyanARMENIA, THE REGIONAL POWERS, AND THE WESTCopyright Alla Mirzoyan, 2010.All rights reserved. First published in 2010 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN in the United States a division of St. Martins Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.ISBN: 978-0-230-61866-4Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.Mirzoyan, Alla.Armenia, the regional powers, and the West: between history and geopolitics / Alla Mirzoyan.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 978-0-230-61866-4 (alk. paper)1.Armenia (Republic)Foreign relations.2.World politics1989I.Title.DK687.54.M57 2010327.47590182'1dc222009029520 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan CompanyFirst edition: April 201010987654321Printed in the United States of America.To my parentsThis page intentionally left blank ContentsAcknowledgmentsixIntroduction1Research Landscape4Basic Parameters of Armenias Security Environment9Chapter Outline161Russia: The Indispensable Ally?21Introduction21History and Perceptions22The Battle of the Narratives2519911998: The Deem Reality3019982005: The End of Platonic Love39Conclusion532Turkey: The Other55Introduction55A Glance at History5919911998: The Chimera of Pragmatism6219982005: A Never Ending Story?89Conclusion1063Iran: The Permanent Alternative107Introduction107Careful Engagement108Conclusion1324The West: Ambiguous Modern135Introduction135Armenia and the United States137European Institutions161Conclusion173Conclusion: Ideational Redlines and Structural Dynamics175Notes179Bibliography215Index239viiiCo n t e n t sAcknowledgmentsThisbookrepresentsaculminationofmydoctoraldissertationand research. I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to those whoaccompaniedandinspiredmethroughtheprocessofwritingit. To Mohiaddin Mesbahi, whose near-infinite knowledge of the region, geopoli-tics, and theory has opened for me new horizons of thinking and looking attheworld.ToCharlesMacDonald,whosekeenperspective,kindness, and patience greatly facilitated my transition into the doctoral program. To DamianFernandez,whosepassionandprobingmindforcedmetolook more deeply into my research. To Brian Nelson, whose vitality, humor and wonderfulseminarsinpoliticalandsocialtheoryinspiredmetoventure into new avenues of knowledge. I would also like to thank Antonio Jorge, Nicholas Onuf, and John Clark for their kindness and guidance. Thisresearchcouldnothavebeencompletedwithoutthegener-oussupportfromFloridaInternationalUniversityDissertationYear Fellowship and the Department of International Relations. I would also like to thank IREX Short-Term Travel grants for providing me with an opportunity to travel to Armenia for research.My profound appreciation goes to my friends and family: my brother, Armen, without whose love and support this work would not have been possible;mydearfriendMajidAl-Khaliliwhoseintelligentinsights, wiseadvice,andcontinuoussupporthavebeenindispensable;Rita Sabat whose grace and strong spirit has motivated me; Misak and Goar Sargsians whose kindness and hospitality I will never forget; and Andrew Correa for making me laugh when I most needed it. ThroughoutthisprojectIcouldalwayscountonencouragement,love, andsupportofmyhusbandanddearfriend,AlexanderBarder.Hisintel-ligence and knowledge has been a source of inspiration. This work is forever entwinedwiththebirthofmyson,Robert,whochangedmylife.Most important,Iwouldliketodeeplythankmyparents,RobertandRoza Mirzoyan, for being my guiding light. I dedicate this work to them.This page intentionally left blank IntroductionThis study of Armenias foreign relations is an interpretative analysis that incorporates insights from history, anthropology, and security studies. It puts into practice a multidisciplinary and holistic methodology to illuminate thevariousrelationshipsthathaveemergedbetweenArmeniaandthe regional powers since independence in 1991. To an extent, this approach is dictated by the realities of Armenian foreign policy as a practice that had to meetseveralandoftenconflictingobjectives.Amongthemostimportant ones involved mediating the effects of the Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenias regional position by seeking alignments with the outside actors; enhancing Armenias image on the international arena; serving as a vehicle for the dias-porascampaignforgenociderecognition;synchronizingArmeniasdiplo-macy with Armenias defense needs; defending elites corporate interest.The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been so consequential for Armenias foreign policy that is it often difficult to extrapolate a policy that is not a responsetotheexistingstalemate.Becauseofitscrucialsignificancefor Armeniassecurityenvironment,itrefractsArmeniasownrelationships withtheoutsideworldoftenbecomingthemostimportantsinglevari-able that defines Armenias foreign policy trajectory. This highly charged emotionalspacethattheconflictoccupiesurgestheviewofforeign policymakingasacontinuousexerciseinidentitymaking.Inaddition tobeingadirectconsequenceofawillfulchoiceoftheArmeniansof Nagorno-Karabakh to pursue the cause of self-determination, the conflict is the filter through which all major foreign policy decisions go through. As will be demonstrated later in the book, it forces Armenias leadership to constantly reshape and rearticulate the narrative of Armenian identity. This understanding of Armenian security identity rooted in history, both pre-Sovietandpost-Soviet,andtheregionaldimensionsofitsforeign policy are paramount and can be revealed through the analysis of Yerevans relations with Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the West.By investigating the question of why Armenia has chosen certain strat-egies toward these four centers of power, my goal is to arrive at important conclusions about the change and continuity in Armenias perception of 2Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s ttheworld,aboutthecollectiveinterestformation,and,asaderivative, about how much of identity and emotion is carried over into the politi-cal space. Second, this study of Armenian foreign policy toward regional powersandtheWesthelpstoconceptuallyunderstandtheforeign policiesofsmallstatessuchasArmeniainhighlycomplexconditions, constitutedbydomesticsociopoliticalchallenges,aconflictiveregional environment,andglobalinstability. Thestudyoffoursetsofrelation-ships,placedwithintheirhistoricalcontextandnarratedthroughthe chronologicalunravelingofmaineventssinceArmeniasindependence, allows a dissection of the most substantial challenges and opportunities facingYerevan. Theanalysisof Turkish,Iranian,Russian,andtheU.S. foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus, and Armenia specifically, ontheotherhand,capturesimportantshiftsintheglobalpoliticsand illustrates how the global informs the local and vice versa.WhileIdevotemuchplacetotheroleoftheformativeeventsof Armenianpre-Soviethistory,thepost-Sovietphenomenonisnoless importantinaccountingforthestyleandmentalityoftheprincipal decision-makers. As the name indicates, the term post-Soviet attempts to capture the elusive, the in-between stage of transition, in which the legacy of the old system has direct social and political effects on the cur-rent one. Unlike post-Socialism that marks more global, broader, and muchmorediverseexperience,post-Sovietdelineatesapeculiargeo-graphicalandsociopoliticalbelonging.1FilteredthroughtheArmenian postindependencecontext,thisgeneralpost-Sovietrealityassumesa unique complexity that is impossible to fit into one pattern, particularly when analyzing foreign policy. Some of the most significant elements of Armenias political system are directly linked to its Soviet experience and thelegacyofthecollapse.Amongthemisthehighlyemotionalissue ofNagorno-Karabakh,ahighlymilitarizedculturethathassprungin response to the conflict, social apathy resulting from the economic col-lapseattheendoftheSovietUnion,ageneralsenseofdisorientation, andthesubsequentconcentrationofpowerandwealthinthehands of a few. Despite the presence of such a strong mobilizing issue and a firm sense ofnationalidentity,thecountrysforeignpolicyhasbeencontinuously criticizedforbeinga-national,lackingsubstanceanddirectioninthe faceofgrowingglobalchallenges.2Theforeignpolicydecision-making process was overtaken by a tightly knit group of individuals, which allows sometospeakoftheprivatizationofArmenianforeignpolicyonthe issues of critical importance to the nation as a whole such as Armenian-Turkish relations and Nagorno-Karabakh.3 It is argued that Armenia and the Armenian people find themselves in a systemic crisis embracing the I n t r o d u c t i o n 3political,economic,cultural,moral,ideologicalandsocio-psychological spheres, in the conditions of the de-facto absence of a national state.4 Foreign policy comes to be seen as yet another demonstration of Armenias impotence in the face of the regional and international realities.Anotherimportantdimensionofthisstudyisregionalgeopolitics. Armenia is part of the greater game unraveling in the Southern Caucasus. Within their hierarchy of regional security complexes, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver define the Southern Caucasus as a complicated mini-complex withinalargerRussia-centeredcomplex,theCIS(Commonwealthof Independent States). However, I would argue that the Southern Caucasus could be seen as a separate regional security complex because it has self-containedsecuritydynamicsbasedonenduringpatternsofamityand enmity. Although the authors admit that the relative robustness of the new states has surprised many and conflicts are now driven primarily by the regional actors themselves, they give it only a passing thought: Still, Russianinfluenceremainsverystrong,andCISpoliticstheprimary arena, so the region continues to be a subcomplex within the post-Soviet RSC.5 Considering that no other region within the CIS, with an excep-tionofCentralAsia,hassuchmultiplesecuritydynamicssurrounding the core three countries, this study will look at the Southern Caucasus as a separate analytical unit not connected to the CIS. Its security dynamics are defined both by the internal conflicts and the alignments each coun-try pursues with the outside playersRussia, Turkey, Iran, and the West (United States and Europe).Within the context of the post-9/11 world, small states like Armenia, Georgia,andAzerbaijanhavebeentransformedfrombeingmeresub-jectsofregionalpoliticsintoobjectscapableofaffectingtheinterests ofglobalactors. TheSouthCaucasusseemstobelessremotenowthat theU.S.geopoliticalfocushasbeenzoomedinontotheMiddleEast andAfghanistanandanydevelopmentinapreviouslymarginalregion becomescritical.Itisauniqueregionwithmultiplesecuritydynamics that has evolved from being Russias soft underbelly in the early 1990s into an important component in the geopolitical mosaic of the greater Middle East. This transformation signifies an important cognitive leap in the way the region is perceived externally.Making it more intricate is a virtual absence of a region as an internal-ized reality. The very term Southern Caucasus, defined as consisting of three states, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, it could be argued, is an externallyimposed,Westernlinguisticconstructthatwasadoptedby the eliteoftheregionalstatesintheirforeignpolicyrhetoricbutthat hardly reflects the reality of their views of their immediate environments. This term has mutated from the Soviet-originated Transcaucasus, binding 4Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s ttogether three republics with tumultuous pasts, full of mutual grievances, and unresolved conflicts. Once the structure of the Soviet order dissolved, thesecryogenicallypreservedconflictsexplodedwithanewintensity bringing to the fore issues of historical memory and reckoning. Unsettled scores between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, between ArmeniaandGeorgiaoverJavakhetiaalbeitofalesserintensityand Georgiasinternalethnicconundrummakethebasicparametersofthe regionalenvironmentveryuncertain. Theonlyinstancewhenthethree statesbecomearegioniswhentheyarelinkedtogetherbyagrand geopoliticalmapputforthbytheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion, Turkey,orIran.Russiaisadifferentstory,however,becauseitisused to perceivingtheentireCaucasus,bothSouthernandNorthern,asa single geographical and geopolitical construct that highlights its Russian his toricallegacyandbelonging.Nonetheless,thisstudyusestheterm Southern Caucasus to demarcate it as a separate geopolitical unit, freed of its Russian affiliation.Research LandscapeIronically, it is perhaps because of these complex political realities that the foreignpoliciesofSovietsuccessorstatesareoneofthelesser-explored issuesinthedisciplineofpost-Soviet/Eurasianstudies.Whileavariety ofdomesticissuessuchaselectoralpolitics,domesticsocialissues,and economicdevelopmenthaveoccupiedthemindsofWesternscholars, littleattentionisgiventothewaythesestatesperceiveexternalchal-lengesandadjustthemselvestotheoutsideworld.Partoftheproblem lies in the unproblematized perception of the newly independent states as pawns of the interest of the regional and global power play unleashed as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. There seems to be no doubt inthemindsofscholarsassessingthebehaviorofEurasianstatesthat the decisive factor is their position in the regional and global hierarchy ofpower.6ThisdominantparadigmcontendsthattheformerSoviet republics at large are engaged in reactive policies vis--vis Russia and the West, with some scholars going as far as to state that rather than having aforeignpolicy,theymerelyengageinforeignrelations.7Inaddi-tion,smallerstatessuchasArmeniaarealmostentirelybypassedinthe analysis because their individual voices have been pronounced lost at the crossroads of regional geopolitics. This birds eye view is understandable considering the general preoc-cupation of the literature with mapping out the trajectories of postcom-munist development and transition. For all too long, states like Armenia havebeenseenasapartofalargerformation,beittheSovietUnion, I n t r o d u c t i o n 5theCIS,orincludedintoabroadcategoryofpostcommuniststates. Indigenous works on Armenias relations with the outside do well in illu-minating the Armenian perspective, however, they are either in Russian or Armenian and thus inaccessible to the American audience or cursory intheirattempttoprovideageneraloverviewoftheArmenianforeign policy.8Afoundationalreviewofearlydomesticdebatessurrounding ArmeniasrelationswithRussiaand Turkeycanbefoundintheedited work by Gerard Libaridian, former national security adviser to Armenias firstpresident,LevonTer-Petrosyan.9Althoughpartiallysympathetic tothepresident,aviewnotsharedbymanycontemporaryArmenian scholars,thisaccounttellinglydepictstheworldviewoftheArmenian elitesandthecoreissuessurroundingmajorforeignpolicydecisionsat thedawnofindependence.Mostimportantly,itillustratesaparticular historical narrative of the Armenian history, from which most of Levon Ter-Petrosyans actions on the international fronts were derived. Becausehistorywassoessentialinlayingoutthecognitivemapof the world and in providing instant material and information about the neighborsandthe West,thisbooktapsintotheexistinginterdisciplin-aryliteratureatthejunctureofanthropology,nationalismstudies,and historiography. As R. G. Suny suggests,Identity formation as a process of self-definition and definition of the Other isintimatelyconnectedtothegenerationofthreatperception.National Historiesmaybeinvestigatednotsomuchtodiscovertherealstory behind the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo or the Armenian-Azerbaijani hostility in Karabakh but rather to assess how particular conceptualizations ofnationhoodcontributetonotionsofnationalinterestandthreatsto national security.10Several rich works have been produced in the recent years namely Levon Abrahamians Armenian Identity in a Changing World (2006) and Razmik PanossiansTheArmenians:FromKingsandPrieststoMerchantsand Commissars (2006). Both of these works address an important issue of the identity transformation in changing historical conditions and the fluid-ityofhistoricalnarrativesbuttheydosofromtwodifferentsymbolic andgeographicallocales:Armeniaandthediaspora.Abrahamian,an EasternArmenianandawitnessofthepostindependencepoliticaltur-moil provides insights into the anthropological aspects of the Armenian national movement, and identity dynamics in the post-Soviet period. He ispreoccupiedwiththeinnerworkingsofparticularityinArmenias post-independencecontextandstrivestooutlinethemaincharacteris-ticsoftheArmenianidentity.11Panossian,adiasporanArmenian,casts 6Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s ta broader look at the modern Armenian history and the evolution of the Armenian nationalism within various unique socio-political, geographi-cal, and historical contexts. He argues that in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, [t]hepoliticalideologybehindArmeniannationalismwastheproduct of various influences based on the western, eastern and central points of its source. All these influences had an impact on Armenian thinking and identityindifferentways:theliberalconstitutionalismofthewest,the romantic social movements of the east, the indigenous land-based patrio-tism of Ottoman Armenia. In all three cases, collective identity was recast in terms of nationality rather than an ethno-religious community.12Both of these works have served as starting points for those aspects of this bookthatpertaintothequestionoftheArmeniannationalismandthe Armenianidentity.Abrahamiansdenseanthropologicalresearchprovides thenecessarycontextualgroundthatisuniquelypost-Sovietandthatis imperativeforunderstandingoftheshapeandformofpoliticalauthority in postindependent Armenia, attitudes toward Russia as well as the role of violence, sacrifice, and genocide in the fluid Armenian historical narrative. These works vividly demonstrate that Armenia entered the postCold Warworldwithastrongsenseofnationalidentityandpreconceived notions about the neighbors rooted in history. The existence of Armenian independent statehood in the period preceding the Sovietization greatly contributed to the initial sense of familiarity with the experience of 1991 independenceandthenecessitytoderivelessonsfromit.Suchapast, alongwiththelegacyofthegenocide,theNagorno-Karabakhconflict and an ethnically homogenous composition of the post-Soviet Armenia hasdemarcatedaspacethatwashighlysymbolicandemotionally charged. Within such a space, smallness can turn into grandeur (big talk) and weakness transforms itself into strength. This relational quality of power is emphasized by Papadakis and Starr, who describe it as emanating from relationships between states instead ofacomparisonoftheirrelativelyfixedresources.13Physicalsizeas anobjectivecriterioncannotsufficefordefiningsmallnessasRobert Keohane and Robert Rothstein argue.14 It is rather the perception of the state vis--vis the others, and the psychological dimension of the condi-tionthatmakesastatesmall.Toendowsmallness withcausalpower would leave many questions unanswered. What seem to be missing from these traditional theories are understandings of the motivation/willingness of small stateswhy are small states so active I n t r o d u c t i o n 7and aggressive when their environments would, at least superficially, indicate that they be otherwise.15Thisstatementpointstoasignificantomissioninthefieldoftra-ditionalforeignpolicyanalysis:thedisregardforthesocialcontextof interestformation.Ifaccordingtotherealistschoolpursuitofpower constitutesthecurrencyoftheinternationalsystem,thensmallstates wouldbeconsidered,duetothelackofresourcesandhencepower,as mini-versions of larger states.16 Shifting the focus from the attributive (material) to the relational quality of power would allow locating power in the process of interaction: power comes out of this relation, not from the power holder alone.17 This implies that small states can and do exert pressureonmorepowerfulstates.Muchoftherhetoricofgreatness isoftenexpressedthroughthelanguageofhonorandnationalpride.18 This defiance on the part of small states demonstrates the failure of the propagators of instrumental rationality to capture the complexity of the social world, in which states live in. Most importantly, it urges the foreign policyresearcherstocontextualizeforeignpolicy.As WalterCarlsnaes suggests,Onemustperforcejettisonthepracticeofviewingforeign policy in terms of separate and distinct actors possessing discrete, divis-ible,andcomparableproperties,whosebehaviorcanbeencapsulated inductively in terms of discontinuous events-behavior proceeding serially in temporal increments.19Oneoftheavenuestoescapethestructure-versus-agencyjuxtaposi-tionthatoftendrivestheanalysisofsmallerstatesforeignpolicyisby examiningtheroleofidentityunderstoodhereasasocialpracticeor forms of narratives. This approach draws attention to the role of the agentwithoutmakingthesubjectivistassumptionthatstructuralcon-straints are not equally significant in the reproduction.20 Again, viewing identity as practice highlights its relational quality and the fact that it is mainly about the states self-representation to others; it does not reside inessentialandreadilyidentifiableculturaltraitsbutinrelations,and the question of where and how the borders towards the other should be drawnthereforebecomescritical.21Identitiesareconstructedthrough narrativityrootedinrelationality,whichistheprincipalconditionof socialorder:Whiletherearemanywaysofrepresentingidentitiessymbols,gestures,andsoforthnarrativeisthemostfundamental.22 Within the study of foreign policy, this is what one could also call a story framework, following Sanjoy Banerjees terminology. National identity can be reconstructed as a story with a certain plot structure. It is less like a traditional one-track story and more like an interactive story 8Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s twhose plot has more than one branch or track, and the one taken depends on the action of the reader/player. The story is invoked to interpret situ-ationsandtoproducedecisionsandmotivateactionsinresponse.The favored track of the story is one of the unidirectional historical and moral progression. The disfavored track is one of regression and degeneration.23Consequentially,thelanguageofthenarrativebecomesthecrucial performer or force for the meaningfulness of identity. Language drives policy and takes a life of its own; it is not merely an instrument of com-munication signifying the real world but rather a defining practice. Much has been said about the role of language in the process of securitization, which according to Ole Weaver is a speech act. Attaching the label of securitytoaparticularproblemlegitimizestheextraordinarymeasures usedbythepolicymakers;thus,securitizationisanagentuttering security.24Constructivistapproachestosecuritycanbeappliedtothe study of the interaction between the material and the ideational and the processofcoconstitutionofagencyandstructure.Intermsofsecurity, the notion of coconstitution has two implications: First, a definition of threat is framed in the discourse of security. As Peter Katzenstein argues in the Culture of National Security, a states history, culture, and identity determinethediscourseofsecurity,whichwillbereflectedinsecurity conceptions and policy.25 Second, fixed definitions of security ignore the fluidityofsecurity,theextenttowhichsecurityisconstantlyreconsti-tuted through the changing interests and identities of actors.How patterns of enmity and amity that form the basis of securitization are actualized through a states foreign policy are best understood when lookingattheregionallevel. Thislevelisparticularlyimportantwhen analyzing a small state. As Efraim Karsh suggests, [F]or the small states, subsystemic developments are an absolute.26 Security is relational; oth-ers that constitute the self are most often geographically adjacent. The complexity of the security dynamics and the necessity to include theregionallevelofanalysisintheprocessofconceptualizingforeign policycanbeaddressedbyusingtheanalyticalconceptofregional security complex (RSC). Coined by Barry Buzan in 1983 in his People, StatesandFear,itunderwentmodificationsinthe1998editionto broadenthescopeofsecuritizingagentsinresponsetothedisciplinary trends. In Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security they maintained that regardless of reformulation, the idea remains the same, that substantial parts of securitization and desecuritization processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters.27 Securitycomplexesareconstitutedbyagroupofstates,whosesecurity dynamicsaretightlylinked.Thecrucialelementofthisframeworkis I n t r o d u c t i o n 9thatitisnotintendedtodemonstratetheregionalstatessubjective understandingoftheconstitutionoftheirregionquaregion.Itisnot premisedonaconsensusbythelocalstatesaswhatconstitutesagiven region and who may be included in it. Rather, the authors explain, RSC iscoinedasananalyticalconceptthatreflectsthefactthatregionsare entities distinct from the global and local level and that they are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors.28 Just as in the social world individual psychology might be most influen-tialinexplainingbehaviorinonecase,familystructuresinanother,and nationalsecurityinyetanother,sointheinternationalworld,domestic factors might dominate some security constellations, regional ones others, and global ones yet others. The regional level may or may not dominate, but it will nearly always be in play in some significant sense, and cannot be dropped out of the analysis.29Asamethodologicalconsiderationforthisbook,BuzanandWeavers ownmethodologyforuncoveringtheconceptoftheRSCessentially captures the way, in which an analysis of Armenian foreign policy should proceed. Rather than attempting to fit this case study within a particular theoreticalframework,thegoalis,aswasarticulatedabove,aholistic approach that integrates history, anthropology, and geopolitics at various levelstoformanarrativeofArmeniasforeignpolicysinceinceptionas an independent state. Basic Parameters of Armenias Security EnvironmentHistorical BackgroundArmenians have the dubious distinction of being the victims of what is widelyrecognizedasthefirstgenocideinmodernhistory.Armeniais locatedinaneighborhoodlongshapedbygreatpowermachinations, ethnicconflict,andpoliticalturmoil.Itfallsatthecriticaljuncture between three major regional powersIran, Turkey, and Russia, each of whom played a part in shaping Armenias political destiny throughout its history. Iran, Turkey, and Russia each carry a strong imperial legacy that inevitablytranslatesitselfintoassertive/possessivepoliciestowardand certain expectations from a region that used to be part of their domain. HistoricalArmeniasdivisionbetweentheRussianandtheOttoman Empire determined a particular kind of nationalism that was founded on theideaofliberationof TurkishArmeniafromMuslimrule. Themost 10Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tsignificant impact of this geopolitical reality on the underlying principles oftheArmeniannationalismexpresseditselfinthefactthatfromthe second half of the nineteenth century until the Sovietization of Armenia in 1920, Armenias destiny was continuously seen as dependent on exter-nal support. Originally, given that the issue of political reforms and the protection of non-Muslim minorities by the Sublime Porte was included into the Eastern Question, an expectation that the European (impe-rial) forces ought toand therefore willliberate Armenia(ns) from the Ottoman yoke had become an ingrained element in Armenian collective consciousness.30 Dependence on Russia as a natural Orthodox ally was the most vivid example of this reliance on great powers. An anticipation of external support continued even after the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century and subsequently the genocide of 1915. A power vacuum in the Southern Caucasus caused by Russias abandon-ment of the Ottoman front in early 1918, and with the Ottoman decline, wastemporarilyfilledbytheindependentTranscaucasianFederative Republic,comprisedofGeorgians,Armenians,andAzerbaijanis.This political federation fell apart after lasting slightly over one month because oftheconflictingloyaltiesamongthethreeethnicgroups.Eachgroup was reaching for external powers for support: the Georgians wished to ally themselveswithGermany,AzerbaijaniswiththeOttomanEmpire,and Armenians with the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. TheleadingArmenianparty,Dashnaktsutyun(Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF]), formally announced Armenias inde-pendenceonMay28,1918.ThisnewArmenianstatesituatedona truncated portion of Russian Armenia was a mangled bit of land that, for a lack of a better term [was] called a republic.31 Filled with refugees fleeingfromthegenocide,underthethreatofmassstarvation,and undertheDamoclesswordofTurkishmilitaryoffensive,therepublic was nevertheless able to survive until 1920. The Armenian leadership at the time was hopeful that its neutrality and lack of ties with the Russian Bolsheviks would allow for the possibility of Western support. It became clear soon thereafter, however, that the emotional proclamations of the Allied governments would not be supported with concrete military and economic assistance.TheArmeniangovernmentconsistentlyfollowedaWesternorientation, notoutofanyparticulartrustintheAlliedPowersbutbecauseofthe realizationthatthecherishedgoaloffreedomcouldbeachievedonly withexternalsupport. TheWestalonehadespousedthatcause,atleast inwords.YettheWesternorientationcamewithgreatriskandcost,as I n t r o d u c t i o n 11itlimitedArmeniasoptionsandintensifiedtheantagonismofboththe Turkish nationalists and the Russian Bolsheviks.32ArmenianterritoriesbecamethebargainingchipbetweenAtaturks TurkeyandLeninsRussia,bothdrivenbyasimilarobjectiveofbreak-ing away from their international isolation and consolidating their new regimes.Turkeywasprogressivelyexpandingitsmilitaryoffensiveand underthepretenseofprotectingArmenia,theBolshevikarmymoved tooccupyit.PressuredintosigninganagreementwiththeSovietgov-ernmentonDecember2,1920,Dashnakleaderseffectivelytransferred theirpowerstothenewstateofSovietArmenia.Afewdayslater,the TreatyofAlexandrapol(December5,1920)formallyendedhostilities betweenArmenianandTurkey.Withformalpeaceestablishedatits easternborders, TurkeycouldnowpresstheyoungSovietgovernment to give up territories conquered during the Russian offensive of Anatolia in1916.TheSoviet-TurkishTreatysignedinMarch1921drew newbordersbetweentheBolshevikArmeniaandTurkey,whichleft portions of Anatolia assigned to Armenia by the Treaty of Serves within Turkishterritory.In1923,the TreatyofLausannesolidifiedthesenew borders by effectively putting to rest the Treat of Serves and the aspira-tionsoftheArmeniannationalism.Armenianquestionceasedtoexist as a subject of international law and, with it, vanished from the interna-tional radar.33Internally, the Bolshevik government was reshuffling its alliances with differentethnicgroupsinthequesttodivideandconquer.InJulyof 1921, in order to appease both the Turkish government and Azerbaijans Sovietleadership,theCaucasianBureauoftheRussianCommunist PartyfollowingStalinsdirectivesreverseditsoriginaldecisionof includingtheArmenian-populatedenclavesoftheNagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan regions into Armenia and attached them to Azerbaijan. Thus,theinfamousNagorono-KarabakhAutonomousOblastbecame yetanothertimebombcreatedbytheSovietnationalitiespolicies. Throughoutthefollowingsixty-sixyears,theArmenianpopulationof the oblast never got accustomed to the Azerbaijani rule. This was the case not only because of the various forms of discrimination but also because the Armenian population considered themselves to be distinct from and culturally superior to the Azerbaijanis. Woven together, the loss Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories of the Turkish Armenia fueled the dissident nationalism in Armenia in 1960s and 1970s. So it is not surprising that whenin1987Gorbachevbeganaprocessofliberalization,thefateof the oblast was articulated as one of the most significant grievances of the Armenian population both in Stepanakert and Yerevan. 12Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tTherebirthoftheArmenianquestioninitsKarabakhformwas inessenceapeacefulmovement.However,itcouldnotcoexistwiththe inherent contradiction of Gorbachevs reforms that opened up the system withoutprovidingspaceandmeansforarticulatingnationalaspirations. Anti-ArmenianpogromsreverberatingthroughoutAzerbaijanicitiesin February of 1988 were one of the expressions of dormant intolerance and ethnic tensions hidden behind the faade of orderliness and transparency. This, combined with Moscows anti-Armenian propaganda, fueled frustra-tion, but also reorganized and remobilized the movement through creating apoliticalorganizationknownastheKarabakhCommitteeledbya young orientalist Levon Ter-Petrosyan. On July 12, 1988, in the session of the NKAO (the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) Soviet declared its decision to secede from Azerbaijan and to join Armenia. A year and a half later, on December 1, 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet proclaimed Nagorno-KarabakhsdejurereunificationwithArmenia,alegalpoint which makes it difficult for Armenia to insist that it has no territorial claims over Azerbaijan. However, this legal ruling uneasily coexists with Nagorno-KarabakhslaterdefactodeclarationofindependenceonDecember10, 1991. This declaration became the basis of Levon Ter-Petrosyan position over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Elected as Armenias president in the fall of 1990 and in fear of international isolation, he continuously insisted that the issue was between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan and not between AzerbaijanandArmenia.Thispositionwascomplicatedbythemassive participationofirregularunits,so-calledfedayins,fromArmeniaproper andtheDiasporaalongsidetheregularNagorno-Karabakharmyduring militaryactions.34ThefightinginNagorno-Karabakh,officiallyending in1994throughaRussia-brokeredceasefire,resultedintheArmenian capture of the entire oblast and surrounding six regions inside Azerbaijani territory,includingthecruciallyimportantLachincorridor,constituting the only land link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1994, the status quo remains unaltered despite series of negotiations and initia-tives aimed at a permanent settlement. The main body responsible for the negotiationprocessistheMinskGroupoftheOSCE(Organizationon SecurityandCooperationinEurope)representedbyRussia,France,and the United States. Historical Memory, Identity, and Armenian Strategic ThinkingTheideasharedbymany WesternandSoviethistoriansalikeofasingle purpose in Armenian history, whatever it might be in various accountssurvival,freedom,keepingthefaith,independenceiscloselytiedto anotherunexaminedassumption,thattherehasbeenthroughalltime I n t r o d u c t i o n 13an Armenian spirit, an immutable essence that has always characterized theArmenians. TheveryconstancythatmakesuptheArmeniannature insuchaccountsisareadingbackofthepresentnationalexistenceor consciousness into the whole past.35Armenias security perceptions cannot be analyzed without the intersubjec-tive understanding of the Armenian nationalism, its causes and aspirations. Armenian nationalism is an eclectic phenomenon, combining both primor-dialism and modernism. It stresses the ancientness of the Armenian ethnic-ity as well as the establishment of the Armenian state as its ultimate goal. Itrepresentstheroot-orientedmodelthatdescribesanationconstantly moving forward to the past reenacting essentially the same story.36 At the heart of nationalism is a never-ending process of nation-build-ing and maintaining of boundaries based on the maintenance of national idea and demarcation of the other: central to nationalisms everywhere is the metaphor of nation-as-journey, as something that is ever in-the-mak-ing, but never quite reached.37 As William Bloom suggests, [T]here is thatotherpoliticalrealitythat,inthefaceofcontinuouslychanging political and socio-economic realities (which is the nature of the contem-porarylife),nation-buildingisanon-goingnecessity.38 Therefore,the boundary construction of the political discourse and bracketing of what is an appropriate reading of the past is a prerogative of the state discourse, particularly expressed through its foreign and security policy. The key to creatinganarrativesuccessfulatlegitimizationandmobilizationisthe rearrangementoftimeintoacontinuousprogressiveline.Forinstance, thecontemporarycelebrationoftheindependencedayoftheFirst RepublicofArmeniaonMay28accomplishesthementalintegration of1918and1991intoanuninterruptedexperienceofindependence throughthecollectiveforgettingoftheSoviettime. Theadoptionof the national anthem of the First Republic in 1991 reflects the same trend. An Armenian historian, who contends that history is a strategic resource, assignsstrategicthinkingaleadingroleintheArmenianpositionon Nagorno-Karabakh by stripping history of its pastness. Armenias most significant foe, present-day Turkey is perceived as identical to the Turkey of the past: When we compare the preset situation with the historical record in the region, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerges as an organic extension ofArmenian-Turkishconflictofthe18941923periodratherthan anisolatedhistoricalphenomenon.Amongthestrikingsimilarities between these periods are the same Turkish geostrategic objectives and statepoliciesofestablishingandcontrollingdirectlyandfullyland 14Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tcommunicationamongtheTurkophonepeoplesfromtheBosphorus through Baku to Central Asia.39ThisstatementrevealswhatE.Zerubaveldescribesashomogeniza-tionofhistory.Armeniansrelivehistoryinthepresentday,hencethe permanence of Armenias surroundings is essential: Historical analogies can, of course, be consciously used to influence out-comes. Thisistheusualtaskofpropaganda.Buthistoricalanalogiesdo more. They suggest patterns of understanding and consequently conduct which can elude the conscious control of the decision-maker What can besaidisthatthecapacitytohaveaparticulareventinscribedwithina script of a historical analogy is a forceful device for legitimating that action which is thought to be the lesson of this historical event.40On the other hand, the stereotype of a perpetual victim has been trans-formedtoinformnotonlytheindividualbutalsocollectiveidentities. L.AbrahamianreflectsthatontheoutsetoftheNagorno-Karabakh movement,bothArmeniansandAzerbaijanishadtotransformtheir nationalstereotypes,bothexternalandinternal.41Armenianrevision-ismovertheissueofNagorno-Karabakhisanexpressionofsucha transformation.Creatingwatershedsordividinglinesbetweenvarious historicalperiodshelpstoarticulatedistinctidentities,transformcon-tinuityintodiscontinuitytointernalizechange.Asanystory,collective memory has its punctuation or periodization:Suchritesofseparationarespecificallydesignedtodramatizethesym-bolic transformations of identity involved in establishing new beginnings, especially implying that it is indeed quite possible to turn over a new leaf and be somehow reborn.42This parallel existence of mental periodization and homogenization ofhistoryilluminatesthedynamicnatureofidentityandthemethod-ological usefulness of approaching identity as a narrative, mainly in order tounderstandidentitytransformation.Whetherattemptingtobreak away from the historical burden or to draw parallels with earlier periods, Armenianforeignpolicythinkingishandcuffedtohistory,continu-ouslyengagingwiththepasttoarticulatethenewnationalroadmap. A newspaper columnist finely captures this collective sense of continuous reliving of history as nothing beyond ordinary: OneofthecharacteristicfeaturesoftheArmenianhistory(perhapsnot onlyArmenian),mostvividlyexpressedinthelastfifteenyearsisthat I n t r o d u c t i o n 15itdoesnothaveapastnotasingleprocessandnotasingleeventof national scale receives completion, and today we feel the impactdirect or indirectfrom seemingly far removed events whether it is the adoption oftheChristianityinthefourthcenturyorthelossoftheindependent statehood in the fifth.43It may be argued that the Armenian case is rooted in a more profound condition,towhichJ.Galtungrefersasasyndrome.Speakingof ex-Yugoslavia and South Asia, he suggests that the construction of the Self and the Other in these cases is more compelling, rooted in such higher authorities as God and History, as told and experienced by people, not by professional theologians and historians.44 The building blocksofthesyndromeare:collectiveself;collectiveother;ahis-tory(ofthefuturetime,myths);ageography(ofthefuturespace, land);atranscendentalprincipleofGood(God);atranscendental principleofEvil(Satan).Theseareprimordialarchetypes,relating tobasiccategoriesofthoughtandaction.45Whilenotsoevidentin theofficialhistoriography,andlargelydormant,thesearchetypesare subconsciously present in the public reading of the past, in the popular debates resurfacing more prominently, particularly at the times of crisis, transition,andreevaluation.Theysupplytherhetoric,thelanguage, thepsychologicalmaps,andthetimeframeswithinwhichthenation operates.AsintheArmeniancase,thesyndromeveryofteninvolves atrauma,whichisdefinesthecategoryandthecharacteristicsofthe collective other, and shapes the groups relation toward its immediate neighbors. This is articulated through a highly militaristic discourse surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and is embedded in Armenias geostrategic thinking. Nagorno-Karabakh is not a mere symbol of an independent and rebellious Armenian spirit but is also a part and parcel of the Armenian defenseestablishmentsgeostrategiccalculations.Nagorno-Karabakh servesasabufferprotectingArmeniasextremelyvulnerablesouthern region of Siuinik. Armen Aivazian articulates the Armenian vision of its strategic predicament in the following passage: The borders of Soviet Armenia, drawn in 192023, precluded any possibil-ity of Armenia to be a geopolitically viable state in the event of any future repetition of the collapse of the Russian Empire. Siuinik represents a case of extreme strategic vulnerability. This region is totally lacking in any strategic depth.Itsterritoryextendsforsome50kmbetweenNakhichevanand Azerbaijan, in the two narrowest parts of Meghri and Jermuk, it shrinks to only about 40 km. The threat to Siuinik becomes clear when we consider the ferocity of combined Azerbaijani-Turkish attempts to conquer Siunik 16Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tby force in 191821 with the aim of providing a direct territorial link from Turkey to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkophone Central Asia.46Nagorno-Karabakh signifies the first precedent in modern Armenian his-tory when, instead of relying on external support, Armenians were able to single-handedly resolve their geopolitical predicament, at least for the time being. This fundamentally explains the role of Nagorno-Karabakh intheArmenianpostindependencepoliticalthinkingandtheexisten-tialmeaningitcarriesfortheArmeniandefenseestablishment. Thisis anissuethatismorethanthesumofitstwopartsindependencefor Karabakh and security for Armenia. Chapter OutlineThis book consists of four chapters, each dealing with a set of relation-ships.Eachchapterlaysoutthehistoricalbackgroundandthenmoves intothechronologyandanalysisofthemaineventsaffectingtherela-tionshipsince1991.Chapter1addressesArmenian-Russianrelations since independence. Armenias strategic alliance with Russia is generally presented to be as the essential condition of Armenias security. It is char-acterized by the Armenian elite and majority of public as natural and organic. This chapter seeks to understand what it means for Armenia to be a pro-Russian or Russophile state as it has been referred to by Westernobservers,andwhatitentails.Ithasevenbeencalledastep-childorthewildcardoftheSouthernCaucasusregionbecauseof itscloserelationswithRussia.47Thisisanoversimplifiedconclusion. There has always been a history of mistrust in Armenian expectations of Russiaafter1921becauseofthehistoricalcircumstances. Thischapter discovers three parallel strands within the Armenian perception of Russia: extreme skepticism resurfaced, particularly in the last few years, because of Russias imperial-style policies in the Southern Caucasus; acknowl-edgmentofthenecessitytoremaintiedtoRussiabecauseofArmenias securityneeds;andacceptanceofRussiaasanaturalallybecauseof historico-culturalandreligiouslinks.Allofthesethreepositionsare used by the Armenian leadership to describe and assess the relationship depending on the circumstances and political demands of the day. While from the defense perspective, the elite continues to insist that this alliance istheonlyavailablesecurityguaranteeforArmenia,after1998anew doctrine emerges: labeled as a policy of complementarity, it is aimed at diversifyingArmeniaspoliticalchoices.Thispolicyimpliesdeveloping mutuallypositiverelationswithallpartners,suchasIran,theUnited States, and the European Union. The chapter pays particular attention to I n t r o d u c t i o n 17Russias policies toward the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and in the Caspian region in the context of the evolution of Russian foreign policy since the end of the Soviet Union. Armenias military dependence on Russia is impossible to understand without considering the issue of Armenian-Turkish relations. Chapter 2 analyzes the existing diplomatic deadlock between Turkey and Armenia. Aside from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, this is the most sensitive, nor-mative, and complex issue on the Armenias foreign policy agenda: how doesonegoaboutbuildingarelationshipwithacountrythatisthe political successor of a regime responsible for the genocide and that con-sistently denies its responsibility for the past? How should a possibility of such a relationship be conceptualized considering that Turkeys open sup-port of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and subsequent Turkish embargooftheArmenianborderaccentuatedhistoricalgrievancesand brought to the forefront of the relations the issue of the 1915 genocide? ThechapteranalyzesnumerousfailedattemptsbythefirstArmenian presidenttoestablishadialogueatthecostofsideliningthegenocide issueandsubsequentpresident,RobertKocharyanscarefulmaneuver-ingbetweendiasporasgrowingpressureforthegenociderecognition, Turkishpreconditionsandthegeopoliticalandeconomicnecessityto haveanopenborderwith Turkey.Oneofthekeymethodsofgrasping thedilemmafacingtheArmenianleadershipliesinaddressingtheir understanding of what constitutes the concept of normalcy. For Levon Ter-Petrosyan, it meant transcending historical dependencies and stereo-types, or what he called false ideology. Armenias historical dependence onRussiacouldonlybeavoidedthroughreconciliationwithTurkey, whosethreat,heargued,wasoverexaggerated.ForRobertKocharyan, theformerpresidentofNagorno-KarabakhRepublic,normalcyfor Armenia is its ability to withstand international pressure and safeguard its physical survival through preserving Nagorno-Karabakhs independence. The Turkish continuous policy of linking its relations with Armenia with Yerevans compromise on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue sabotages any pos-sibility of this relationship to improve in the nearest future. This chapter gives much space to the discussion of Turkish geostrategic perceptions of the Southern Caucasus and its domestic debates around Armenia. Chapter 3 addresses Armenian-Iranian relations. As I argue, this is one of the areas of Armenias foreign policy, upon which the entire spectrum ofthepoliticalforcesagrees.Iranisanimportantgeopoliticalpartner, whichprovidesachannelforescapingArmeniasregionalisolation. DespitetherecurringAmericanpressure,theArmenianleadershiphas been firm on its insistence on the necessity to maintain good neighborly relationswiththeIslamicRepublic.Armeniasforeignpolicytoward 18Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tIranshouldbeconsideredbilaterallyandalsowithinthelargerpicture ofArmeniasrelationswiththeMiddleEast,mostimportantlywith Syria and Lebanon. It is, as I argue, one of the foundations of the policy ofcomplementarityandanimportantsemantictoolusedtoillustrate Armenias ability to build positive relations with two antagonists simulta-neously, Iran and the United States. The Iranian policies toward Armenia are as always careful and pragmatic. There is much to consider, includ-ingitstenserelationswithAzerbaijan,increasingU.S.presenceinthe SouthernCaucasus,andRussian-Iranianrelationsinthecontextofthe Caspian Sea. Although Iran has maintained a neutral position through-out the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as some sources argue, Iran has been supportiveoftheideaofpreservingthestatusquoonthegroundand evenaidingtheindependenceofNagorno-Karabakhtopreventatwo-way settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would immediately invite the United States into the region. Iran shares Russian position to an extent that it does not allow for the hostilities to resume at the same time postponing the final settlement of the conflict indefinitely. Chapter4dealswithArmeniasrelationswitharelativelynew geopoliticalpartnerlabeledhereastheWest.Thereasonforsuch generictermisArmenianleadershipsperceptionoftheWestasa monolithpartnerthatiscomposedoftwomainplayers,theUnited States and the European structures. Accordingly, the chapter is divided intotwosectionsdealingwithArmenia-U.S.andArmenia-Europe relations(EuropebeingrepresentedbytheEuropeanUnionandthe Council of Europe). This vector of foreign policy has been presented by the foreign policy elite as part and parcel of policy of complementarity, aimed at transcend-ingEast-WestantagonismandachievingdiversificationofArmenias relationswiththeworld. Theriseofthisdoctrinecanbetracedinthis particular chapter because it coincides with the growing Western under-standing of the Southern Caucasus not simply as an extension of Russias sphere of influence but as a separately standing region with its own secu-rity dynamics and with a potentiality of important geopolitical dividends. This realization has resulted in more assertive policies toward Armenia by theUnitedStatesandEuro-Atlanticstructures.Armeniaisconstantly challenged to adjust its alliance with Russia to the changing global envi-ronment. Yet, the key to the existing balance in the region lies not in the logic of Russian-American relations, extensively discussed in this chapter butintheinternaldynamicsoftheregion,particularlythatofthe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A very interesting aspect of this dimension of Yerevans foreign policy is the illustration of the process of the elite learn-ing. While the American pressure whether in the area of Armenian-Iranian I n t r o d u c t i o n 19relationsortheresolutionprocessesoftheNagorno-Karabakhconflict occasionally causes anxiety among the Armenian elite, they have neverthe-less remained defiant. The reasons for this are two-fold: one, the West is not ready to provide to Armenia with the security guarantees, hence the Armenian elite understands that the pressure is only of a limited nature; two, the Nagorno-Karabakh is a source of strength as much as it is a cause ofvulnerabilitybecauseitgivestheArmenianeliteasenseofcertainty about the boundaries that it cannot transgress. An important role in this confidence is the existence of large Armenian diaspora in the United States andEuropethatfromthedawnofindependencegaveArmeniaacom-parativeadvantageoveritsadversariesintheregion,bothintermsof diplomatic clout and actual policy results.This page intentionally left blank C h a p t e r 1Russia: The Indispensable Ally?Iamspeakingofmistakesthatmayhavecatastrophic,andifyouwill, tragic consequences I am speaking of a great misfortune, happening to usthe wild anti-Russian campaign started by certain circles. The fact in itself is outrageous, and moreover, politically fruitless since there is nothing behind it but a savage desire to instill feelings that are uncharacteristic of Armenians, that are unnatural, and never experienced beforethe feeling of animosity and antipathy towards Russians.1OurtieswithRussiaaresomethinginnateandnaturalforall Armenians, particularly those residing on the territory of the republic and the CIS. Its components are common cultural-spiritual values and traditionalperceptionofRussiaasthemostsignificantregionalally and protector of Armenias security.2Armenian defense doctrine would have to satisfy two essential require-ments: 1) the capacity of Armenia to independently confront and win wars with Azerbaijan, and 2) a defense with at least one external player which would neutralize the Turkish threat. In the foreseeable future, only Russia is interested and willing to assume such a role.3IntroductionThe most striking aspect of the Armenian foreign policy toward Russia aftertheendoftheSovietUnionhasbeenthedisparitybetweenthe officiallanguageusedtocharacterizeitandthesubstantivenormative changesthathaveoccurredsinceindependence.Thischapterargues thatbyplacingitintherealmofnatural,theArmenianrulingelite disguisesthenecessitytoaddressYerevanscurrentstrategicdepen-denceonRussiadespitetheerosionofitsnormativefoundationsand legitimacy. ThediscursivenatureofArmenian-Russianrelationsinthe contextoftheArmenianpost-Sovietpoliticalidentityismostevident 22Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tinitsembeddednessinhierarchicalrelationsofpowerinstitutional-ized by the Soviet system and in a sense that the discourses naturalize representationsofselfandother.Theynormalizeidentities.4 Oneof themajorhiddenelementsinthislanguageofnormalcyistherole of the Armenian ruling elite, which utilizes its relationship with Russia toassureitspoliticallongevity. Thisisconductedinvariouswaysand withvaryingsuccess.AsthestoryofLevon Ter-Petrosyanspresidency demonstrates,Russiaswithdrawalofpoliticalsupportmayhavebeen animportantfactorinhiseventualfall,whileRobertKocharyanhas usedthisrelationshiptoconsolidatehispositionsandtoensurethe statusquointheNagorno-Karabakhstalemate.Thismergerbetween elites strategic and political interests against the background of Russias imperial-likepoliciestowardsmallerstatesintheSouthernCaucasus hasacceleratedtheprocessoftheerosionofRussiaslegitimacyasan indispensable ally among the Armenian political forces and the public. Yet, the Armenian-Russian strategic alliance that constitutes the crux of thisrelationshipcontinuestodefineanddominateArmeniasforeign policyinthecontextofwhatitsleadershipperceivesasaclearlackof other alternatives. The discursive context, against which these two con-siderations interplay, is very reflective of the dynamics of the Armenian politicalidentitysincetheindependencethathasbeencenteredupon thequestionwhetherArmenianshavebeenabletofinallybreakaway fromhistoryortheycontinuouslyreenacttheirpastinthepresentby repeating old political mistakes. History And PerceptionsAlthough Russia began to play a principal role in Armenias destiny fairly recently, compared to Iran and Turkey, from the early nineteenth century onward,itsimpactontheArmenianpoliticalthinkingisunparalleled. Relations with Russia have occupied a central place in the writings of the nineteenthcenturyArmenianpublicintellectualswhocoinednational self-consciousness such as Mikael Nalbandian, Hovhannes Tumanyan, and Khachatur Abovyan. The genocide, the resulting influx of the Armenians totheRussianTranscaucasusandsubsequentlytheestablishmentofthe Bolshevik rule, has reaffirmed the role of Russia as a guarantor of physical survival of the nation.Reliance on Russia occupied a central place in the Armenian national liberationstruggleinthelatenineteenthtoearlytwentiethcentury, which came to be known as the Armenian question. The cornerstone of the struggle was the conception of dependence on the outside powers, particularly Russia for achieving the liberation of the Western Armenian Ru s s i a 23provincesfromtheOttomanyoke.UnliketheOttomanArmenians, Armenians in the Transcaucasus were more secure, socially more mobile, more urbanized, and more exposed to the outside world.5 Their contact withtheWesterncultureoccurredthroughtheRussianintellectual circlesandwasinstrumentalintheemergenceofmodernArmenian national idea. Nineteenth-century Tiflis and Baku became the centers of ArmenianintellectualrenaissanceandabirthplaceofmajorArmenian political parties such as Dashnaktsutyun and Hnchak.Benevolence toward Russia to a large degree was premised upon shared Christian heritage and juxtaposition of the images of barbaric Asiatic Turk andenlightenedEuropeanizedRussian.Inhis1858novel,Woundsof Armenia, the founder of modern Eastern Armenian literature Khachatur Abovyan wrote, Blessed is the day when Russians stepped onto Armenian land.6 These attitudes were reinforced by Russian victory in the Turkish-Russianwarof18771878andtheinclusionofKarsandArdaganinto theRussianEmpire.Traditionally,althougheasternArmenianpolitical partiesweremoreradicalthanwesternones,theirradicalismextended onlytoembracethecauseoftheliberationoftheTurkishArmenia. Armenian contacts with the Russian populism paradoxically strengthened theirsocialconsciousnessandpoliticalawarenessonlyasitpertainedto the conditions of their brethren in the Ottoman Empire.AttheonsetofWorldWarI,itwaswidelyheldthatthefateofthe Armenians in the eastern provinces could only be tied to the Allied, spe-cifically Russian, victory. With the worst massacres of 1915 behind them, Armenians greeted the 1916 Russian advance into Anatolia and the capture of Erzerum, Trabizond, Erzinjan, and the Lake Van region with great exhil-arationandhope.InanarticlepublishedinDecember1917,Armenian intellectualA.ChopanianarguedthatRussiawasArmeniansprimary protector.ItsvictoryinthewarwouldrewardArmeniawithself-rule.7 What Armenians did not expect was Lenins premature Russian withdrawal fromwarandtheabandonmentoftheeasternfront. Theensuingshort-termwithdrawalofRussiafromtheTranscaucasus(19181921)meant that Armenians would face the Turkish march on Transcaucasus alone.8The forced Sovietization of Armenia, achieved as a result of the concert betweenthe TurkishnationalistsandtheBolsheviks,finalizedArmenias new and much smaller boundaries. It is this critical juncture of history that gave rise to two distinct narratives and political perceptions of Russia. On the one hand, the physical preservation of a portion of its historical lands in the small corner of Transcaucasus was imperative for the development of the nation given its prior experiences at the beginning of the century. As one of the leaders of the Dashnak government, Hovhannes Kajaznuni wrote later: From the first day of our statehood we well understood that 24Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tsuchasmall,poor,deprived,andisolatedcountryasArmeniacannot become truly independent and autonomous We should be grateful to Bolsheviks.Bydeposingus,theyifnotsavedhaveputonareliable pathwhatevertheyhaveinherited.9In1921,aftertheSovietizationof Armenia, independent Armenias former ambassador to the United States, Armen Garo still maintained: WithoutRussiasactiveassistance,wewillnothavetheopportunityto half-way realize our national ideal: to have our own homeland, indepen-dent or even semi-independent, where our people will have the chance to liveandwork,awayfromthe Turkishsword.Fromthisperspectiveour red brothers in Yerevan are standing on more realistic ground.10Thispro-Russianstanceremainedtobethecornerstoneofthe Armenian nationalist idea in the diaspora throughout the Soviet period. AfterWorldWarII,theDashnakswereexhilaratedbyStalinsplansto create a cordon sanitaire around the southern border, which included the revisionofthe Turkish-SoviettreatyintheareaofKarsandArdahan.11 This episode as well as the entire history of the Armenian Soviet Socialist RepublicdemonstratesthattheArmeniannationalismcontinuedto centeritselfontheoppositiontotheTurksandbenevolencetoward theRussians.AsR.G.Sunynotes,[T]heArmeniannationalismwas less threatening to the Soviet state, especially since it is the Soviet army thatstoodbetweenArmeniaandtheever-presentpotentialthreatfrom Turkey.12 Thisperceivedthreatandthegratitudeforthenationsulti-mate security resulted in the loyalty to the Soviet state both on the level ofofficialanddissidentnationalism.Thediscriminatorypracticesof theAzerbaijanisinNagorno-KarabakhwereblamedontheAzerbaijani nationalist policies rather than the larger Soviet nationalities policy. Infact,therelativeautonomyinthepracticeofethnicity,beitin education or popular culture, allowed by Moscow, served as a major legiti-mizing factor for the local communists. Moscows ethnic policies designed to secure popular consent and eventual arrival of the new Soviet identity gaveArmeniansaswellasothertitularnationalitiesanopportunityfor material and symbolic reproduction of ethnicity. Historiography became thebackboneofthisprocessandtheinitialbattlesbetweendifferent ethnicgroupsoverthequestionsoforigins,territory,andlegitimacy werewagedintherepublicanAcademiesofSciences.Hence,thefirst stageoftheimpendingconflictbetweenArmeniansandAzerbaijanis overNagorno-Karabakhwasthewarofmemories.13Inthecontextof perestroika, this symbolic war, waged on the pages of the textbooks and academic journals, became increasingly politicized and heated. Ru s s i a 25AmongtheArmenians,thepoliticizationofthediscoursesetwithin thelargercontextofweakeninglegitimacyoftheSovietpropaganda triggeredthemythofunjusttreatmentbyRussia.14Asamizdatpam-phletpublishedin Yerevanin1991resurrectsthevoiceofaprominent DashnakRubenDarbinian,whowroteinApril1920,monthsbefore Armenias Sovietization: Russia is our friend as long as we are its slaves; but it became our enemy, perhaps our most dangerous enemy, when we soughtfreedomandself-rule.15Thistransformationofthenarrative, fromportrayingRussiaasthemainguarantorofArmeniassecurityto its most serious obstacle, was internalized through that myth of unjust treatment. This transformation occurred gradually and painfully in the later stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh movement, and became finalized, as I argue during Robert Kocharyans presidency. The Battle of the NarrativesEasternArmeniasadministrativeaffiliationwiththeRussianempire,an earlierexposuretotheRussianlanguageandculture(comparedtoother titularnationalitiesintheSovietUnion)aswellastheexistenceofa highlyeducatedRussanizedintelligentsiaguaranteedthattheArmenian integrationintotheSovietsystemwouldbemoresuccessfulthanin otherrepublics.Moresignificantlyforsuchprocess,Armeniaspre-Soviet tumultuoushistoryandthenarrativeoftheBolshevikstimelyinterven-tionwasengravedinthepublicawarenessandofficialdom.Forgetting thatArmenianinterestsweresacrificiallambsofferedtofoster Turkish-Soviet relations in 1920s, the Armenians valued the advantages of peaceful development under the Soviet security umbrella. In general, although the Russophiles recognized the big brothers traditional imperial ambitions, coexistence with Russia was deemed as the only viable alternative. For some membersoftheSovietArmenianintelligentsia,therelationshipcarried almostametaphysical,highlyidealizedmeaningasanorganicunionof twoChristiannationsamidthehostile Turkicworld.Somemembersof the early Karabakh movement, such as Zori Balayan invariably stressed the religious and cultural affinity of two peoples. In an open letter to B. Yeltsin hewrote:NowwhenRussiaismakingachoicetowardshersalvation, ChristianKarabakhwillcontinueitsstruggleforitssurvivalasapart of the historic Armenia, included into Russia, and as its reliable outpost. Karabakh issue as a separate issue no longer exists. It has been long resolved and sealed with the blood of Russians and Armenians.16ThistraditionalArmenianloyaltypartlyexplainswhytheleaders oftheNagorno-Karabakhmovementatitsinitialchangessoughta resolution within the Soviet legal framework. Despite the growing anger 26Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tagainst Moscow, Armenians preferred to stay within the peaceful forms ofprotest,expressedinhungerstrikesandpublicrallies.Throughout 19891990, movements leaders headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan insisted onconstitutionalsolution.Later,inhiscapacityastheheadofthe Parliament of the Armenian SSR, he emphasized the necessity of peace-fulsuccessionfromtheUSSR.Thispeacefulresistanceassuredthe supportoftheRussiandemocratsespeciallybyacademicianAndrei Sakhrov, for it was thought to be the precedent for a peaceful legitimate fightagainsttheSovietregime.17SuchprominentRussianliberalsas Timur Gaidar, Valentin Oskotski, Andrey Nuykins, and Galina Nuykins formedtheCommitteeofRussianIntelligentsiaforKarabakh(KRIK). Members of the Soviet Armenian intellectual establishment such as Zori Balayan and Silva Kaputikyan along with young Russian reformist circles engagedinrhetoricalerasingoftheSovietexperiencefromwhatthey heldwasotherwiseuntarnishedhistoryoftheArmenian-Russianrela-tions. KRIK members served as intermediaries between Stepanakert and Moscow,conductingfrequenttripstotheNKAOandcommunicating theArmeniangrievancestothecentralauthorities.Duringoneofsuch trips, Andrey Nuykin addressed a peaceful demonstration in Karabakhs capital, Stepanakert. His speech was subsequently published in Izvestiya newspaper:The 1813 treaty on voluntary entrance of Karabakh into the Russian state wassignednotforalimiteddurationoftime,butforeternity.Itwas ratifiedbyjointlyshedblood. ThedecisionsforcedupontheRussian peopleandthepeopleofKarabakhin1921bytheterroristgovern-ment and criminal party gang can be considered no more legal than the Molotov-RibbentropPact.TheAzerbaijanigovernmentitself,basingits right to independence on the return to 19181920 status, in practice rec-ognizes those decisions as annulled. Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia return to their unbroken ties based on 1813 Treaty. However, Russia too has sinned against her old friends and allies. Its army and military technol-ogywasusedforaruthlessdeportationofArmenianvillages,forterror-izing peaceful residents of Karabakh. And the Russian people, mislead by the deceitful propaganda unfortunately remained as outside observer. This guilt has to be repaired, and the freedom of the long-suffering region has tobesecuredthroughentireRussiandiplomatic,economic,intellectual, andin case of new scaled attempts of genocidemilitary might, multi-plied by her international reputation and moral purity of stated goals.18Symptomaticofhistimes,thespeakerdrawsaseparationbetween the decisions of the Bolshevik government and the traditional orienta-tionoftheRussianpeople. Theimportantunderlyingmessageisthe Ru s s i a 27organic,inevitablenatureofRussian-Armenianties,whichconfirms the historically sanctioned role of Russia in the region and more specifi-cally, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.ThenarrativeofRussiastraditionalroleasadefenderwasseriously challengedinFebruary1988,whenSovietlawenforcementforces failedtoprotecttheArmeniansinAzerbaijanicitiesfromthepogroms organizedbytheAzerbaijanimob.19 Thiswasperceivedasyetanother instancewhenArmeniansweresacrificedforthelargerTurkicinter-estsoftheSovietstate.20Anti-ArmenianpogromsinBakuinJanuary 1990radicalizedthemembersofthemovement.Inoneofhisarticles publishedintheArmenianpress,LevonTer-Petrosyanwrotethatthis incidentbecameadirectproofthatrelianceonRussiaforprotectionis delusional and self-destructive.21 The transformation of the discourse initiated a battle of narratives of Armenian-Russian relations grounded in the general attempt to reevalu-atetheserelationsinhistoricalperspective.22 Thesedebateswerereflec-tiveoftheprocessoftheactualizationofhistorycharacteristicofthe Socialist and postsocialist societies.23 Like in many societies with a similar legacy,inArmeniaittookplaceintwodistinctforms:annihilationof the past and reversibility of events. In both scenarios, real events were viewedthroughtheprismofhistory,andthepastwasmoreorless intentionally mobilized in the present.24 The annihilation of the past was immediately expressed through anti-Russian language policy, a sharp increase in the number of Armenian-language schools and general lack of tolerance for Russianized Armenian intelligentsia, which L. Abrahamian callsapost-factumpolicyofrevengeandreactionagainsttheSoviet states long-term policies of trying to assimilate non-Russian societies into theSovietorderthroughthelocalpromotionoftheRussianlanguage intheformernationalrepublics.25InstitutionalizationofRussianas alinguafrancaintheSovietArmeniawasevidentintheassociationof Russian language with enhanced social prestige. In this context, rejection of Russian signaled a deeper social and paradigmatic transformation. On the level of historiography, this became evident through series of samizdat publications that have appeared in late 80s and early 90s targeted what they labeled as defeatist ideology prevalent in the traditional Armenian political thinking.A point of departure for this rhetoric became the historical reference to the Soviet-Turkish Treaty, which depictedacynical,exploitativeRussiawhichhadbetrayedArmeniasintereststo Turkey whenever expedient, and deliberately exacerbated Armenian fears of Turkey to discourage longings for independence.2628Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tThis narrative glorified the first Armenian republic as the true Armenian state and as a victim of the Soviet imperial designs, and rejected the com-monlyacceptedthesisthatArmeniassecuritywasinfactpreservedasa result of the Sovietization. ThemembersoftheNagorno-KarabakhmovementsuchasRaphael Ishkhanyan,KtrichSardaryan,andVazgenManukyancriticizedthe pastmistakesoftheArmenianpoliticalfiguresandpublicintellectuals whoentertainednaivehopesabouttheRussianprotection.Rafael Ishkhanian castigated the historically adopted strategy of relying on great powers to secure the destiny of the Armenian nation in his 1989 article TheLawofExcludingtheThirdForce.Armeniastraditionalpro-Russian orientation received its share of condemnation.WhotoldyouthatRussiaisthesavioroftheArmenianpeople?Russia itselfhasneversaidthat.This,myfellowcitizens,isyourinvention.It isyouwhohaveplacedyourhopesonthosepowersandarenowdisil-lusioned TheRussiansarerefusingtoacceptyourdefinitionoftheir interests, but you insist on teaching them. It also does not make sense to beenemieswithRussia.NottorelyonRussia,nottomakeplansbased onitspowerdoesnotatallmeantobeenemieswithRussia.Letusbe friends, but let us not rely on them, be fully devoted to them, believe so much that they are our saviors. Let us re-Armenianize Armenia, let us be our own nation.27Following the path of reversibility of events, the official historians of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, on the other hand, scorned this revi-sionism of the Armenian history as dilettantism and demagoguery. The renownedArmenianhistorianM.Nersisyansuccinctlysummarizesthe general consensus among the Armenian historians as follows: [D]espite thedespoticnatureoftheRussianstateandtheimperialpoliciesof theczars,theRussianorientationofArmeniansisahistoricallyjusti-fied necessity, for it sprang from the national interests of the Armenian people.28 He argued that targeting historiography was not only unscien-tific but a-national, as it were the historians who nurtured the national consciousness and prepared the Armenian nation for the calamities of the critically important 1988 events: Hence, there is no justification for the tendency of the Armenian National Movement to juxtapose intellectuals to the national movement. While this signified a growing rift between what was considered political versus what was deemed scientific, both sides were engaging in the debate that erased the separation between the pastandthepresent.WhileLevonTer-Petrosyancastigatedhistoryas afakescience,thescholarlyestablishmentstressedthathistoryserves as an evolving actualization of the national mission. Its study should be Ru s s i a 29basedontherecognitionofnationalneedsandontheknowledgeof national ideology, which is a real concept (Haskatsoutyoun), and it is entirely known scientifically.29This explosive intellectual environment in Armenia in the years pre-ceding and immediately following the independence reveals the thinning borderline between professional historians and the public. The discourse wasfueledbythewarsofmemoriesensuedbetweenArmenianand AzerbaijanihistoriographersaroundthehistoryofKarabakh,inwhich seeminglysuchpurelyscientificdisciplinesasarcheologywerecalledto legitimize each groups claim to the land. These became popular sciences moving far beyond the boundaries of intradisciplinary debates. Everyone becomesahistorian,everyonevoiceshisorheropinionabouthistory, whichtoaverygreatextent,hasbecomepublic,andprofessional historiansarenolongerincontrolofit.30 Theleadersviewofhistory wasrootedinitsreevaluationasa300-year-oldmistakeandinits firmbeliefthatArmeniastrueindependencecouldbesecuredonlyif theArmenianscouldrealisticallyassesstheircapabilities,whichwould translate into more self-reliance: The steps of the Armenian people must be proportionate to the degree of our strength.31 The transformation in the ideology of the Pan-Armenian National Movement went unnoticed amongtheRussianpressandtheelite,atransformationthatwasby farmoredrasticthanimagined. Theremovalofthe Turkishthreatwas deemedastheonlytoolnecessarytoradicallychangeArmeniasdeeply embedded security perceptions and alliance patterns.In this new Armenian elite, connected not with Diaspora but with Armenia itself, educated, holding a guaranteed status, there was a gradual and invis-ible emergence of a new, more realistic psychology, deeply divergent from the psychology of Diaspora and the Dashnak elite of 19181920.32Whenin1991itbecameknownthattheInteriorMinistrysecurity forces,theOMON(OtryadMilitsiiOsobogoNaznacheniya[Special purpose police unit]), were aiding Azerbaijanis in the capture of Armenian villagesinKarabakhandinthemassivedeportationoftheArmenian population as a part of the operation known as Ring (Koltso), the popu-larangeragainstGorbachevspoliciesinevitablyextendedtoRussiansas awhole.ThewidelyheldviewisthattheRussiansstagedtheoperation Ring as a means of retaliation in response to the aggressive anti-Russian rhetoricof Ter-Petrosyansfollowersandtheirrefusaltoparticipateinthe Marchall-UnionreferendumonthefutureoftheSovietUnion.33Levon Ter-PetrosyancalledtheRussianmilitaryoffensiveanundeclaredwar against the Armenian republic.34 Independence came in this disillusionment 30Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tin Moscows intentions, similarly to 1918, when the first republic emerged againstthebackgroundofdeepdisappointmentwiththegreatpowers. Yet, the world in which the third republic emerged was different from that of1918.Itdictatedanewkindoflogic,whichattimesdrewtheyoung Armenian leadership to dangerously disregarding the lessons of history. 19911998: The Deem RealityThroughout19911992,LevonTer-Petrosyanembarkedonthepolicy formulationofArmeniasrelationswiththeoutsideworld.Thepolitical systemthatemergedinArmeniain19901991asaresultofprolonged domesticdebateswasbasedonastrongpresidency,whichgaveTer-Petrosyan enough freedom to carry out important foreign policy decisions. Asamatteroffact,itwasforeignpolicythatdeterminedthepolitical paththatArmeniawouldtake. Theargumentsabouttheneedinstrong leadershipatthetimeofconflict,andintheconditionsofjoint Turkish andAzerbaijanieconomicblockadeshiftedthebalancetowardstronger executive powers. It is also worth to mention that Armenias peculiar politi-calcircumstancesprovideonlyapartialexplanationtotheemergenceof thestrongpresidentialsysteminArmenia.Thestronglegacyofetatism imprinteduponArmenianpoliticalmentalitythroughouttheSoviet periodresultedinadilemma,whichdemandedthatthestateshould preside over its own dismantling.35On foreign policy front, the new elite believed that Pan-Turkism was thebogeymanthattheArmenianCommunistPartyandtheArmenian Revolutionary Federation were using to maintain Armenias dependence on the Soviet Union, and after the latters collapse, on Russia.36 Although theydidnotdenytheinevitabilityofpeacefulandcloserelationswith Russia because of the multiple cultural and economic links, the vision of the new relationship was premised on the principles of self-determination andsovereigntyandnotbecauseofArmeniasdependenceonMoscow. In 1991, Armenia and Russia signed the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation,andMutualAssistance.Pragmatisminjectedintofunda-mentalissuesalsodictatedthattherelationswiththenewdemocratic Russia should remain cordial. Ter-Petrosyans pragmatic leadership played generally a very positive role in enhancing Armenias image internation-allyandinbuildinggoodrelationshipwithYeltsinsadministration.It also became a geopolitical necessity because of the Turkish involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. ThevictoryofstrategicconsiderationsinformulatingArmenias foreignpolicytowardRussiadrawsaborderlinebetweenpassionateand emotionalnationaliststageandtheeraofpragmaticpostnationalist Ru s s i a 31politicsinArmenia,adistinctionthatcoincideswiththetransitionfrom theperiodofinitiationintotheperiodofconsolidationofthenew regimes.37RegardlessofhowmuchtheTer-Petrosyanadministration wishedtochangetheparametersofArmeniasexternalenvironment,the war with Azerbaijan imposed its own logic. Among the preconditions put forth by Ankara for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia was the renunciation of its aggressive policy toward Azerbaijan. Tied to this was the issue of Nakhichevan, the only link connecting Turkey not only with Azerbaijan but also the only portion of a Muslim state of the FSU, with which Turkey is geographically contiguous.38 Securing this link was at the centerofTurkishmilitaryexercisesinMayof1992whenmassivedivi-sions of Turkish army were stationed along the Turkish-Armenian border inresponsetotheproximityofthemilitaryactionstotheNakhichevan region. ThismovesolicitedaharshresponsefromRussiathat,itsinitial foreign policy limbo notwithstanding, was clear about what it considered to be the sphere of its immediate interest. The head of the CIS Joint Armed ForcesMarshalShaposhnikovarticulatedthisvisionwhenhewarned TurkeythatanyinterventionintheArmenian-Azerbaijanconflictcould cause World War III.39 Allthroughout1993,TurkishsupportofAzerbaijanintheconflict throughthesupplyofweaponsandmilitaryspecialists,theimposition ofthe Turkishblockadeoverthetransitofhumanitarianandotheraid toArmeniaoveritsterritoryaswellastheTurkishdiplomaticefforts torenounceArmenianaggressioninternationallydrewallthreemajor regional powersRussia, Turkey, and Iraninto a precarious crisis. The NakhichevancrisisdemonstratedtoMoscowthattherewasaclearpos-sibilityofthemilitaryinterventionintheconflictbyanoutsidepower. ThisthreatenedRussiasdominantpresenceintheregionandindicated thatthereinforcementofitsmilitaryinfluencewasimperative.Italso illustrated the fallacy of the assumptions, on which Levon Ter-Petrosyans policy regarding Turkish-Armenian relations was based. Turkish one-sided position in the conflict against her stated objectives to become a neutral partyintheconflictresolutioneffortsintensifiedthesenseofinsecurity amongArmenians,reinforcedhistoricalperceptionsofTurkeyasan enemy, and only pushed Armenia farther into Russias arms.40 Among theArmenianleadership,theTurkishmenaceexacerbatedthesenseof overwhelming insecurity, and stressed the necessity of forming a military partnership with Moscow. This scenario was anticipated even before the official demise of the Union when the Armenian leadership was anxious abouttheprospectsofanimpendingmilitaryvacuum.41InSeptember 30,1992,anagreementwasreachedwithRussiaaccordingtowhich, Russian border guards would patrol the Armenian-Turkish border. Not all 32Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tof the troops were Russian however. A large percentage of them would be recruited locally and be trained by the remaining Russian command.After1992,thetaskofbuildingastrongviablearmybecamethe numberoneobjectivefacingtheArmenianleadership.OnMay15, 1992, in Tashkent during the signing of the collective security agreement for the CIS, both Armenia and Azerbaijan were promised vast arsenals of Soviet military equipment. Although on paper there was supposed to be parity between the two parties, in reality Azerbaijandue to the bigger quantitiesofRussianmilitaryammunitiononitsterritoryacquired anupperhand.Bakupurchasedmuchoftheweaponsandequipment directly from the Russian divisions stationed there. In order to restore the militarybalance,Ter-PetrosyanpersonallyrequestedRussianassistance from Yeltsin and he was granted his wish:It turned out that there were three times more weapons in Azerbaijan than inArmeniaandwhenwetalkedtotheRussianside,wecametothe conclusionand I managed to get them to agree to thisthat we should becompensatedforthis.AndYeltsinagreedtothisandagreedthatthe balance should be preserved.42Russian policy was characteristically mixed and directed at keeping parity between the two sides. This was dictated by two reasons: one, Russian geo-political interests of maintaining clout with Armenia and Azerbaijan; two, military elites of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia were bound by personal tiesinheritedfromtheSoviettimes. Thecloserelationshipbetweenthe Russian and Armenian defense establishments was of critical importance in establishing the parameters of the relationship at early stages. In fact, it could be argued that Russia foreign policy became largely the prerogative of the Armenian military establishment and has remained such until the presentday.RelationswithRussiawereconductedthroughtheveterans of the Karabakh war who rose to prominence and occupied key defense and national security posts. The war created a situation where the power ministriessoonacquiredafundamentalweightonforeignpolicy.43 Among the most prominent personalities that emerged during those early years was Vazgen Sarkisyan, a strong charismatic military commander who enjoyed enormous influence among both the Karabakh and the Armenian military.AppointedasArmeniasdefenseministerin1992,withbrief change of hats as the interior minister, he remained in that position until 1999.AsothertopleadershipoftheArmenianarmy,Sarkisyanhadan excellentworkingrelationshipwiththeRussiandefenseministerPavel Grachev. Until his assassination in 1999, Sarkisyan was considered to be a pro-Russian figure on the Armenian political landscape. Ru s s i a 33Pavel Grachev had a very Soviet-like and straightforward understanding of Russias security interests in the region, which boiled down to increasing the number of Russian troops, an objective that was met by the Armenian security needs.44 Armenia was chosen as the first country Grachev visited after his appointment as the defense minister, following Turkeys warning tostepinintotheconflicttoprotectNakhichevan.Atthesametime, he never pushed for a complete estrangement from Azerbaijan either, by building good working relations with the Azerbaijani defense ministry. The issue of Russian weapon supplies to Armenia from 1992 through 1994hasbeenanobjectofspeculationsandmuchoftheArmenian successintheNKconflictwasattributedtotheRussianassistance.As R. Hovhannisian suggests, the Armenian military victory in Karabakh in 1992 and the Kelbajar offensive in 1993 could not have been conducted without arms and equipment from external sources.45 The state of legal and illegal weapon purchases is reflective of the utter chaos and disarray thatcharacterizedtheworldofthesepost-Sovietnations. Theinfluxof weaponsafterthecollapsetobothwarringsidesmovedtheconflictto a new level, characterized by an increased violence and destruction. The real scale of the arm supplies by Russia to Armenia was made public in 1997 in General Rockhlins report to the State Duma. According to the general, the estimated supplies amounted to one billion dollars. Although the biggest share of transactions happened in 1995 and 1996, there were massivetransfersbetweenAugust1992andJune1994thatwerecon-ducted from the Russian base in North Ossetia.46 However while Russian military assistance helped Armenia to overcome the gap, it still remains to be determined whether it was the most crucial factor in the Armenian military victories in 19931994.47Asidefromthemilitaryequipment,RussiasuppliedArmeniawith criticalfuel.Earlyin1993,aseriesofmeetingstookplaceinMoscow between Ter-Petrosyan and Boris Yeltsin to negotiate oil and natural gas deliveries to the blockaded republic. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Russia providedlarge-scalecreditpaymentstosupportArmeniasdwindling national budget. This Russian military and economic assistance boosted Armenianself-confidencethroughoutthoseearlyyearsandimposeda basicsecurityumbrellathathadbecomeabsentimmediatelyafterthe collapse.DespitethepressurefromtheNKRsleadershipandfromhis military to take radical steps on the battlefield, Ter-Petrosyan maintained a pragmatic and cautious approach so as not to antagonize Russia. This approachpaidoff;LevonTer-PetrosyanwasrespectedinMoscowand had a good working relationship with Boris Yeltsin.Russias policy toward the region and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict shouldbeconsideredfromthepointofviewofitsstatusasaformer 34Ar me n i a , t h e Re g i o n a l P o we r s , a n d t h e We s tsuperpower.Despitetheinitialdisarrayintheforeignpolicydecision-makinginMoscowfollowingtheendoftheUnion,andtheleading, almost autonomous role that the defense ministry played in conducting relations with local governments, the Russian elite maintained the Soviet mental map of Russian frontiers. As Likhoshestov et al. argue Russia, as one of the most spatial-oriented powers in the world, has overburdened itselfwiththegoalofpreservingitsgeopoliticallegacy.Contraryto Makindersargument,Russiasmainmotivationhasnotbeentostrive forcontinentalleadershipbutratherforanefforttoescapeitsspatial enclosure. Hence, its foreign policy can only be multidirectional due to its geopolitical position. In this paradigm, Russias southern orientation has been of utmost significance.48 WhileArmeniasmilitarydependenceallowedRussiatoanchor itselfintheregion,Azerbaijanpresentedahindrance. Themaincon-tentionbetweenMoscowandBakuwasaroundthelattersrefusalto participateintheCIS.Whilethecollectivesecuritytreatysignedin Tashkentdidnotatthatpointstipulateanyformofbilateralsupport toArmenia,itneverthelessdemarcatedalinebetweenpro-Russian and anti-Russian states in the Southern Caucasus. In its dealings with Azerbaijan, Moscow often used its pro-Armenian position to pressure BakutoendorsetheCISandallowforthestationingoftheRussian base there.ThesituationshiftedinRussiasfavorwiththefallofanopenly pro-Turkish and anti-CIS leader Aboulfaz Elchibey later that year whose regime shattered as a result of the Armenian military victories. This oust has been widely believed to be a Kremlin success. The circumstantial evi-dence includes the timing of the coup, the month of June, during which Elchibey was preparing to sign a multibillion contract with the Western oil companies on the exploitation and the transportation of the Caspian oil. Another red flag was the circumstance of the Russian withdrawal from GanjacitybaseattheendofMay. ThewithdrawingRussianunitsleft behind a large number of arms and ammunition that were subsequently used by the rebels who were stationed in the same city.49 Coincidentally, justafewmonthsintohispresidency,onSeptember7,1993,Heydar AliyevjoinedtheCIS.Again,allegedly,itwasAliyevsreturnandhis subsequent endorsement of the CIS that inspired a large-scale Azerbaijani offensive in December 1993 and caused very intense fighting at the front-line.50 TheultranationalistElchibeywasreplacedbyahighlypragmatic andpoliticallysavvyleaderwhoknewhowtotalktoMoscow.Aliyevs ascendancetopowerinBakumarkedaqualitativechangeinRussian-Azerbaianirelations,anditfitwellwithRussiasownexpectationsfrom the region. Ru s s i a 35In his February 28, 1994, address Yeltsin announced that Russia had avitalinterestintheterritoryoftheformerUSSR. Thissignaledthe emergenceoftheso-calledYeltsindoctrine,whichmarkedashiftaway fromamultilateralapproachthatenvisionedcooperationwiththe West intheregionalpoliticstoRussiasunilateralefforts.51Thispolicywas rootedintheincreasingprominenceoftheEurasianistview,which posited that the integration between the NIS and Russia was a historically inevitableandnaturalprocessthatwouldbebothpoliticalandmilitary incharacter.Someobserverspointedouttothisdevelopmentasthe resumptionofneo-imperialpolicies,wherebyRussianpredominance over the economic infrastructure of the former Union ensures it not only a pivotal position within the CIS but is increasingly being used to inhibit the external orientation of the other states, particularly those of the Asian periphery.52The Caucasus presented a particular challenge with its array of unre-solveddisputes,suchastheonesbetweenGeorgiaandAbkhaziaand ArmeniaandAzerbaijan,andwiththeconflictinChechnya.Whileon theonehand,thesecurityofRussiasborderswouldonlyincreasewith the resolution of these conflicts,