art. 1 - 10 full txt

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/art-1-10-full-txt 1/19

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, andMOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITYAND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,vs.

HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to thePresident, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy ExecutiveAssistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in hiscapacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S.PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, aright recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine

Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable

must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent

public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette

of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative

orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case

dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or

standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absenceof any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or

prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in

question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality toinstitute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"

within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which wequote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal,

corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically

enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use ard enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is

entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in

the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and

praying that judgment be rendered commanding thedefendant, immediately or at some other specified time,

to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of

the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the

defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition

concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public

duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due

course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 caseof Severino vs. Governor General , 3 this Court held that while the general rule

is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in

those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with

the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for

the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79

M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and theobject of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the

people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose

instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any lega

or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen

and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Lega

Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private

individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compe

the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipa

president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court

Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight o

authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a

public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule

in America were otherwise, we think that it would no be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it i

always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular

case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule

because, if under the particular circumstances the

reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not

applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead toerror'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying thegeneral rule insisted upon by counsel for the

respondent. The circumstances which surround thicase are different from those in the United States

inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these

proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen

that it is not the duty of the law officer of the

Government to appear and represent the people in case

of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's lega

personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petitionClearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right

recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were

not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to

conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the SolicitorGeneral, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people

has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a

sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselve

provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the

presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they

are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable fortheir effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days

following the completion of their publication in the

Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court'construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled

that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where thelegislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of

publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the

fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides fothe date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equatesthe effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of

other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached

that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in th

Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity

Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


Section 1. There shall be published in the Official

Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutionsof a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;

[2] all executive and administrative orders and

proclamations, except such as have no general

applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of

the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be

deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents

as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]

such documents or classes of documents as thePresident of the Philippines shall determine from time

to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public

adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions andconduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no

basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would

be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a

constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the

publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the

people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the

debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa — and for the diligent ones,

ready access to the legislative records — no such publicity accompanies thelaw-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people

have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific

contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled:

"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien losreglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines

dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su

potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There

shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used thereinimposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be

enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of

public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a listof what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,

leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be includedor excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general

applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise

impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within

this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular

persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need

not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all

concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public

nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is arule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be

officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice ClaudioTeehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of

instructions which all form part of the law of the land,the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law

demand that the Official Gazette as the official

government repository promulgate and publish the textsof all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the

people may know where to obtain their official and

specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,

which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members

of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this

decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those

presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of thi petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration o

invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to

their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the

past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chico

County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the

Act of Congress, having been found to be

unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative

conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence

affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v

Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & LRy. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear

however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a

determination of unconstitutionality must be taken withqualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to

such a determination, is an operative fact and may have

consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The pascannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration

The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may

have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions o

rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior

determinations deemed to have finality and acted uponaccordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature

both of the statute and of its previous application

demand examination. These questions are among themost difficult of those which have engaged the attention

of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from

numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a

principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be

justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs

Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit saidright had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by

this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to

their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have

consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always beerased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a

principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that o

the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official

Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subjec

matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof

are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that

none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the

government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon

Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of thecontents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the

persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently

recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in theicomment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from

prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been

published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even thoughsome criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the OfficiaGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of genera

application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and

effect.

SO ORDERED.

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt




THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL,LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,SR., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)

resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of

Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No.

07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied

petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsiderationand directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become

final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners'

motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being

verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, evenif the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural

and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny i t.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building

owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied bythe family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents

and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been

warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to theweakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing

facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitionersguilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On

appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of

Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was

received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last

day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for

extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventuallydenied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but

this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of

discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file amotion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their

motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down

in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a

motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the

motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208),this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts,

the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such amotion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the

court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the

extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate

Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated therule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the

operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from

the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's

Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to

June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensionsof time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration

is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension

on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace periodwhich expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be

allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate

Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was

filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace

period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the

grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on Augus

25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counseregarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within

the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should no

be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication othe Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject

decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners

view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions inthe Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their

becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law

practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly wherissues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the

advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publication

as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse

of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liableunder Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a

building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or

partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondent

had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded thewarning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior

negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance,"

which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the

instant petition for lack of merit.

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt



SUPREME COURT

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,vs.

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J .:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were

both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instantcomplaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,

Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano

charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn

Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12

May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,

having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,

Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of thatmarriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another

marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When

respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that

the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he

officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that

Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living

together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of

marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had heknown that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter

not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.

He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for beingdesigned merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the CourtAdministrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross

ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning

that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they

were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadingsthus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for thedismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein

invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the late

Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of hisstaff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and

Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja

and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriageshad been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and

had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.

Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed tosolemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the

Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a

woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least

five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.

The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an

affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he

ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found

no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the

following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband

and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties

must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived

together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to

marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he

had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he hadfound no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to

note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to

before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao

expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in theirmarriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriageis a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage nul

and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late

Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contractinganother marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge o

Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly

stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before

him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective

spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family

Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to liveseparately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not

severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tiemuch less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more whenthe separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of DavidManzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as

husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary

cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tieof a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period o

time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each othe

is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve asa justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage

vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the lawexcuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 othe Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence

integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant

with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed i

simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of

the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby

ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed

upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt




EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,vs.

JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearanceof Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who

are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,

Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondentsleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the

houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant

did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving

instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and evenalienated the affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with

whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn

statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent

caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De

Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro

and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's

claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was

even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by

De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De

Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits

having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went

through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,

1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Uponthe request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another

marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither partyapplied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago,

leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los

Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and

for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriagewas solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.

Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be

invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basisolely of a final judgment declaring such previous

marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does

not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and wa

governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the

Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriageBesides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given

"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquiredrights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly

true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown

any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may

not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive

application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who

may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26

SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right mayattach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial

Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a

mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able tocohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriag

ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any

marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license isnecessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to

correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for

the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these twooccasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness formembership in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as aMetropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De

Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free

of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his

judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no

duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge,

in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of hi judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self

evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on mora

righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary(Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture oall leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any

branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government

owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt




THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.

FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DECARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDADSANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOSII, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriagessolemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases

commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage

cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1

of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary

judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of

nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sumof money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels

of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios

Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION,

Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is

specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,

Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand

Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-

325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot

159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,

Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the

S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot

159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area

of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being

a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137)situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila

Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate

on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on

the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x

containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX

(1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subdde Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la

parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calleDos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cua

se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta

manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manilasituado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.

Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO

CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd

De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la

parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la CalleDos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cua

se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de estamanzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manilasituado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.

Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO

CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to TeofiloThe agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes

Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other lega

heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in

the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of

Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makat

City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered

by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents

Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death

Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co

respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT

Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds oManila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC inMuntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the

parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement

Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes th

remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition

dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters o

the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The

remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitionerand respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreemenexecuted on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_179922_2008.html#fnt1
















7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was

approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994.

Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third andfourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No.

95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes

of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)

recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages.

The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the

required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother

was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with

respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of

respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,

including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be

reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and

exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied thematerial averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the

dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate

Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the

illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial

court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary

damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of

the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted theCertificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the lateTeofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on

the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same

breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner

presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan,certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment thetestimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made

in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch

255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted tothe trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of

collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's)

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's(petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandova

and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, nul

and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is no

the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo

E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the

sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at th

legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parce

of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No

11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds oMakati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said

title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between

plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering th

Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the

name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name

of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of

defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and

ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in

the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of

defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and

ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in

the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff'sevidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages

attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 71996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents

argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. andFelicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposingas follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from iREVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one i

entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment bythe court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in

the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who firs

sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify thegrant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recove

upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on

summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage













7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to

expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify amisinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and

101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of

annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession

of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for

summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly

proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing

safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of

spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death

of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the

marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband

and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is

the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and

more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the

case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court aquo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the

material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage

should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rulesof Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where ananswer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the

material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the

court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment onsuch pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage

or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in thecomplaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring

supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules

on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the

record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee wouldstill not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a

valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,

the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuantto Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the

failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the

marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlosand appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal

as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence tothe contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of theexistence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following

statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then

Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage

license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as

basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo

Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said

marriage license was inadvertently not placed in themarriage contract for the reason that it was the Office

Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract

who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We areof the considered view that the veracity and credibility of theforegoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same

should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary

evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage did not take

place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subjectmarriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured.

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be

emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should beresolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who

disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said

of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellan

Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of theinconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements

Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims

regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the

averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's

brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility o

the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the sameor, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We

find appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was

merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad

Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well bea minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative

filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements

appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding thillegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when

considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of

his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his nameand the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could

have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in

order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to thefiliation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for theinhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied

the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgmenunder the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's

Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof

with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitionerespectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave

reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code

despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are differentfrom that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise

decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the

Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in

accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this HonorableCourt;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and

in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of

origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submitsthat the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in

applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules

of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment andin lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of

origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submit

that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground ospeculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed

misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of thefacts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declaredvoid ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgmen

and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues,

including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action fornullity of marriage.

Our Ruling









7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must beproved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment isallowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rulesof Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails

to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of

the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that

party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for

annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material factsalleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court

governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the

pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the

provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with thetrial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments,

to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules

on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the

record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would

still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment,the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial

court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments

have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even

in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as " Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,"

the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on

the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped

with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took

effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz .:

SEC. 17. Trial . - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conductthe trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations

of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary

judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.(Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v.Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment

of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of itslawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is

not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion

exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunityto present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage

when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.

Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public

prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down

before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public

prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the meritsto prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring

supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor

General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected

in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the

fabrication or suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may befiled solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriagecases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolutenullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The

Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife

(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife tofile a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The

rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petitionfor annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by

compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The

Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file

the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only

question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death

of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the

concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek it

dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects

of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can

decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone

are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directorsand actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can andshould decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds

allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a

demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those

solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages enteredinto during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3

1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse

to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule





































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their

successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, itdoes not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse

under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in

the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages andDeclaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate

heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a

proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a

proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the

regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already

commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within

the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which becameeffective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court

held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages

under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its

application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent

Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FamilyCode, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the

time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring anaction to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring

an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code

cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of

marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the

avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.

For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted anddefended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest inissue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished

from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.

One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of thecourt as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,

the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the

Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the

time the respondents were married, or even in the Family

Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition todeclare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can

demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to

declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-

interest and must be based on a cause of action . Thus, in Niñal v.

Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality tofile the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased

father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

x x x x

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare thenullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of

the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a

remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additionalevidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando

was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which

granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved tha

a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allowrespondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declar

respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced

the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and

exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On th

contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained

which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court musdismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the

ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks lega

personality to file the same.29(Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner isa real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriagein controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their

son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are

transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsoryheirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to theextent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs

These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse

and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants

with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by lega

fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the

Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But

although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit

of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survivewith the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-hal

of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to

the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shalsucceed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the

following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children

excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The

presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of thedeceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there

are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse

the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent .33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate

illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with

respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a





























































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent

dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no

other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegit imate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds

to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the

widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of

his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is

found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the

nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo IIis not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of

marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on

the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not

have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found

to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is

because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adoptedchild35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits todetermine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the

RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brotherof petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondentTeofilo II is proper and in order. There is a n eed to vacate the dispositionof the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA onthe remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This

notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or

assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving

at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted

in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adoptedfrom an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights

arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its

pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the

illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the

guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad

should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a

child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although

the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have

been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of

Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against

the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or

conceived within a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of

action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of moneymust be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis

of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard

to the action on the status and filiation of respondent TeofiloCarlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between

respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate

or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is

strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity omarriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of it

decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits withdispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

















7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt




THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,

vs.

SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courtof the Order dated January 2, 20062of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses

William Sy and Tessie Sy.

The antecedents are as follows —

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,

Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No.

98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 againstWilliam Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check

Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both

of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against aclosed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed

against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP

Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila

(Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for

failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order

dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the

civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No.

98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of theaccused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4

Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22

cases in its Order 5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of

petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order alsodid not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused

respondents.1avvphi1

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,

Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6 for collection of a sum of money with

damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount

ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the

estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.

In the assailed Order 7

dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila,dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil

action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was alreadyimpliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b)

of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied in its

Order 9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue –

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines

in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicableto the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for

bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the

prosecution to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?10

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on

January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgatedon December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective

application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following

exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action

is deemed instituted with the latter —

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused isnecessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;

(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even

more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where thecriminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect

of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civi

liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the right tohave the civil liability litigated in a separate action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civiliability might arise did not exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu andnot ex-delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had underArticle 2912 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor inthe BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases againstrespondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express

reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civi

action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the crimina

action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases .13

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP

Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly institutedand remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonan

with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civiliability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject o

both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution

for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party

without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping.15Prior to th

judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the

complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both

impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of theother .16

The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove theelements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt — where in Criminal Case No

98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the

accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declaredthat the liability of the accused was only civil in nature — produced the lega

effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the

civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 ofthe Civil Code.17

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on

account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner

was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together

with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.

With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity

of the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have

the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may

petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to

prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_174238_2009.html#fnt1




































































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

states –

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall bedeemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such

civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay

in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall

be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or

exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the

amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these

damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the

amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet

commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application

with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing

consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in

1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes

may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive

application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application

of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he

is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,

procedural laws.18

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of

BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of

the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage theseparate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the

reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate

civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance whenseparate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the

criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil

and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated inthe proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a

separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of

res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. Inview of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article

31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.19

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not

cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice

and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.20

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner

would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the P 600,000.00allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of

Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390

(Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy andTessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the

petition for an unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents would

raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civilaction to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner

indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute

her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accusedduring the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly

instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse

pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal thecivil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the

bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a

preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appea

within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the

remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross

mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained todigress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of

their counsel.22 But this rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’

mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day

in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in theclient’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.23 Tested

against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the

exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing

laws and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactmentand jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may no

be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as member

of the Bar .24 Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be

more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to

public scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also public

servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.25 Apparently, the publi prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the prope

procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure

such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BPBlg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to

recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of thcriminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in

court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it

dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was

any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if theloan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount

would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now

conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of atechnicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2)

such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Thisdoctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich

himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking thi principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recours

based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision o

law.26

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a libera

interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties thefullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The

dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be

barred by technicalities.27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as thecomplement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where

courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to

adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent todo so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitledAnita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered

REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.













































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt




FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., PresidingJudge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEIand KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOSOANES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders

dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati

City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion todismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and KamilleOanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a

petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 andentitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimatechildren of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,

leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and

children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.

Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the

meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed asSpecial Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petitionwas a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty.

Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the

petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate

can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1,Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents

should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime

of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground

that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by

private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios

should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters asmandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to

Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claimhad been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of

Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange

for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner,Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any

and all liabilities.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the

Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver

of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was theduly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of

right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also

rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for

certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of theRegional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the

dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack

of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000

and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judgeis hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the

illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming

successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima

Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.

SO ORDERED.10

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence

this petition.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on

certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim

executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate

of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do nohave the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration

as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei inaccordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.

Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered

substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping

and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of thedecisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should

be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum

shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private

respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether privaterespondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

The petition lacks merit.

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non

forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party

Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the

case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher

interest of justice would be served. InSy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruledthat while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum

shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural

lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in th present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an

intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as

compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar

private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid andeffective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which

leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which

legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when itsterms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Releaseand Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. I

merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan fo

her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement ofany and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the

late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically

mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, icannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_163707_2006.html#fnt1




























































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of

private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his propertymay accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may beaccepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardiansmay repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by

judicial authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to

the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to

those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their

wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an

alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protectthe interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release

and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private

respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional

relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there

is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material factnegates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a

mistake or misapprehension of fact.17

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their

successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged

illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently

denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistentto rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they

do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of

private respondents must fail.

Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of

Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that privaterespondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect,

the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was

Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may

be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, exceptin the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of thechild, in which case the latter may file the action before theexpiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document

should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either

or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years fromthe finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors

at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died duringtheir minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four

years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken

away by the passage of the Family Code.19

On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which

superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any

of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and specia

laws.

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the

child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirsshould the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In

these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which

to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimatechildren.

The action must be brought within the same period specified inArticle 173, except when the action is based on the second

paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brough

during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established

by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or anadmission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based

upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or

any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be broughduring the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on

the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their

filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case

as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier offacts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a

full-blown trial.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters

of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on

private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental andcollateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement o

the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir .20 That th

two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim

inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our

jurisprudence.21

As held in Briz v. Briz :22

The question whether a person in the position of the present

plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compe

recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtainulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion

of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always

that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causesof action are present in the particular case. In other words, there i

no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compe

acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a

successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same

plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly

there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compeacknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied

different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x





























7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly

formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and

the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child

having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in

fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the

division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs.

Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and thesame person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of

the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs.

Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs.Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been

thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decreecompelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in

partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who

might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration

of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January

22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming thedenial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25,

2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let

the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt



SUPREME COURT

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the

law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs andcounseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition

for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the

result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a

petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case

No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the

spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.

His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in hiscertificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male butfeels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself

with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted

several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychologicalexamination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to

transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he

underwent sex reassignment surger y2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter

examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction

surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be

married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from

"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s

Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for threeconsecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established.

No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Itsrelevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but

solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible withhis present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the

relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would

be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.

With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a

female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not

his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice

will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the

much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her

[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to

deny the present petition despite due notice and publicationthereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to

interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the

entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"

to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE . 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the

OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that

there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason

of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of

the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is

no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on

the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appealsgranted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and

ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birthcertificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103

and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of SexReassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive

but solely for the purpose of making his birth recordscompatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female

he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for

purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not aright.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this

connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without

judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In

particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Erro

and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil

register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name

or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned

city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordancewith the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and

regulations.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_174689_2007.html#fnt1




















































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and

authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,

therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now

primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent

and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage

of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of

Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless anadministrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently

denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and

procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of firstname are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed

in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,

tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and

continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly

known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex

reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he

thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of

name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not

sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared

purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the

public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or

reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 Inaddition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and

official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice

that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of

petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,

assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the

proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It

was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the

Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,

it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudicehim at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed

petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To SexOn the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal

issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412

of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or

corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by

RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The

correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative

proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048

removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and

corrections in entries in the civil register .23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the

following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistakecommitted in the performance of clerical work in

writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the

civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such asmisspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like

which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the

understanding, and can be corrected or changed only byreference to other existing record or records: Provided,

however, That no correction must involve the changeof nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.(emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sexis not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for

which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of

the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil

status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)

annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void

from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)

acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)

loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of

minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil

Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonableinterpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers thecorrection on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of

the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth

certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including thosecorresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is

necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of

certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children

and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and

deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of

marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, lossor recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiationand changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal

consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a

person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex

reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.

Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or

impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the

sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,

nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities andrelations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
























































7/28/2019 Art. 1 - 10 Full Txt


terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or

illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensiveterm status… include such matters as the beginning and end of

legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family

relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,

adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even

succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a

part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article

413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil

status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment

and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration

of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default

thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such

declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall

be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the

birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or byeither parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the

following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and

nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents

or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil

status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) suchother data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the

facts as they existed at the time of birth .29 Thus, the sex of a person is

determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or

midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is nolaw legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sexmade at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error ,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common

and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The

words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws

concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore beunderstood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative

intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of

peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from afemale"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex

that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to

produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have

undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a

statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the

statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s

and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then issomething alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative

male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body

and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes

the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there isno legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his

birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex BeChanged on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the

principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition wouldcause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the

petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his

male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is aspecial contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its

essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be

a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will

substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family

relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has

undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the

provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies

under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in caseof calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These

laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be

substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court

shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or

insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in

judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not

to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do soto determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly

important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name

and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may befiled, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what

procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person

who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sexto conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the

guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a

person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However,

this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else

The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of

happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument

about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences andorientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of

social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However

the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to beaddressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

























































art. 1 - 10 full txt

Documents