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1 MISOC EFFECTS GROUP

ARTICLES

8 Village Stability Operations

11 The Importance of Ideology in Special Warfare

13 The Recurring Structure and Vulnerabilities of Violent Extremist Ideologies

18 The Gulf Cooperation Council: History and Partnership with SOF

21 How and Why Has Iran Changed Its Rhetoric?

DEPARTMENTS

3 MISOC Commander’s Comments

4 Updates 23 Book Review

DisclaimerINFLUENCE is an authorized, official quarterly command internal newsletter of the Military Information Support Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mis-sion is to promote the professional development of MISO forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork, and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, INFLUENCE, Telephone: DSN 593-3537, commercial (910) 643-3540, or send an e-mail to [email protected]. INFLUENCE reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to INFLUENCE and the authors. By order of the MISOC Commander:

Robert A. WarburgColonel, United States ArmyCommanderMilitary Information Support Operations Command

Left: Group picture taken 4 September 2013 in front of the MEG Academic Week venue, the Airborne & Special Operations Museum

This issue’s cover depicts a word cloud created from a web search for the word ideology. The two articles featured in this issue are distillations of MEG Academic Week

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Mission Provide fully capable Military Information Support forces to Combatant Commanders, U.S. Ambassadors, Theater Special Operations Commands, and other agencies to synchronize plans and execute inform and influence activities across the range of military operations.

Vision The Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC) is the premier inform and influence headquarters in the DOD. It is organized, manned, trained, equipped, and networked to achieve psychological effects and behavior change in select foreign target audiences in support of U.S. objectives. The MISOC deploys scalable formations and capabilities in support of Special Warfare campaigns. MISOC Soldiers are the master practitioners of influence activities in the global information environment.

Submissions INFLUENCE welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Manuscripts should be no longer than 1500 words in length. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address). Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced and in a digital file. Endnotes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th Edition, for endnote style.

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Articles should be written at the unclassified level only. No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles. Material appearing in INFLUENCE is considered to be in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by the author’s copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to INFLUENCE and the authors.

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INFLUENCE

Produced by the MISOC Effects Group

Editor-in-Chief: LTC Robert Cody

Managing Editor: CPT Patrick Lindsey


Since our last issue of INFLUENCE, we have continued to expand our understanding of Ideology. Without having this understanding, ARSOF will be ill-equipped for 2022 and beyond. Violent Extremist Ideology will continue to directly impact global security. We must understand how our enemy thinks before we can create a lasting strategy. As Dr. Gorka states in his article, “We need to bankrupt transnational Jihadist terrorism at its most powerful point; its narrative of global religious war … as long as we continue to deny the existence of the ideology that motivates the enemy, we will continue to fail in identifying those who wish to do us harm before they do so, and as in Syria, we run the even greater risk of empowering those who wish to see our destruction.”

Cassidy Dale, in his article, discusses the common vulnerabilities that exist amongst all ideologies. It is critical that we understand these vulnerabilities for future exploitation. Kinetic operations may defeat our enemies on the battlefield, but it is the defeat of Violent Extremist Ideologies that can minimize the number of enemies that pose a threat to the United States.

As we look forward to 2022 and beyond, we know that our set of requirements will not change, but our resources and political will to conduct large-scale military operations will decrease in an increasingly unstable geo-political environment. In addition to these assumptions, we also know that technology will continue to develop and evolve at an exponential rate, creating several billion individual transmitters capable of independent broadcast capability through current forms and through forms that have yet to be developed. Left unchecked, this technology advancement will provide a ready platform for those who wish to espouse Violent Extremist Ideologies. With this in mind, we have established Social Media Analytics Research Teams. These SMARTs will provide a much needed analytical backbone to our operations so that we can continue to provide the influence support that our nation requires. It is efforts like these that demonstrate that the MISOC is the United States Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) Intellectual Foundry all things Influence – Social Theory – Innovative Organizational Structures, and High-End Future Planning Methodologies. I am extremely proud of the great work that the MISOC is and has been doing to prepare ARSOF to meet the challenges of 2022 and beyond.

COL Robert A. WarburgMISOC (A) Commander

MISOCCommander’s

Comments

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MEG ACADEMIC WEEK By SGT Daniel A. Carter

(USAJFKSWC), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Defense University (NDU), the U.S. Naval War College, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the University of New Haven. By gathering experts from these organizations, the MEG continues to effectively bring together a very diverse and talented community that provides an invaluable knowledge database to the ARSOF community. “Like artillery in combined arms maneuver, regionally expert forces should never be in reserve – even in CONUS, they need to continue to support the fight,” states Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, the USASOC commanding general, in the ARSOF 2022 publication.

The MEG-sponsored experts lectured ARSOF Soldiers on the part that ideology plays in terrorist organizations, their narratives, and social media. Through these lectures, the MEG intends to broaden the ARSOF Soldiers’ capabilities in theater and in CONUS. By increasing their knowledge of ideologies, Soldiers are better able to understand not only the threats that they face today in many operational environments but also the changing environment in which they will be called to operate in the future.

Dr. Sebastian L. v. Gorka, associate professor of Irregular Warfare at the NDU and associate fellow with the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), explains that “conventional war is unlikely to drive the future threats scenarios we will face as a nation. The role of ideology in creating threat groups, recruiting cadre, and justifying extremist violence is key.” Gorka outlined that “ARSOF will need to understand how ideology is used by threat groups, and any conference like this one that focuses on the war of ideas will make our troops better able to [combat] America’s future enemies.”

FORT BRAGG, N.C. (USASOC News Service) — The Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC) Effects Group (MEG) conducted the first ever MEG Academic Week to increase the understanding of ideology within the Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) community to more effectively defeat extremist organizations’ ideologies. This event was held September 3-5 at the Airborne & Special Operations Museum in Fayetteville, N.C.

The MISOC hosted the academic week “to bring a series of experts in ideology into an academic-style forum in order to present their views and thoughts to stimulate higher discussion,” explained Lt. Col. Robert Cody, director of the MEG. “The main purpose of this event [was] to understand ideology and how different ideologies are going to have an impact on how we operate in the future operating environment, and how we must be in position to defeat those narratives or at a minimum counter those narratives — this is important to us [and our mission success],” said Cody. Cody continued to explain that the MISOC is one of several USASOC platforms that have been charged with “operationalizing the CONUS [continental United States] base” in support of forward deployed forces. Operationalizing the CONUS base is one of the priorities outlined in ARSOF 2022, the USASOC strategic framework.

The experts that the MISOC brought in for this event are all part of the MEG’s Community of Interest (COI). The COI regularly addresses issues and conducts case studies in support of theater special operations commands (TSOCs) and other Army and joint special operations formations. Members from the MEG COI that participated in the academic week included uniformed and civilian subject matter experts from the MISOC’s Cultural Intelligence Section (CIS), the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

USASOC PAO

| Dr. Doowan Lee delivers the key note presentation for the first day of Academic Week.

Updates


“Throughout history, we have observed how violent ideologies have been passed down from one generation to the next and have been at the root of terrorist attacks and violence. In order to address the problem, we must first understand the problem and learn to alter the narrative at its earliest stages,” Warburg states. “The MISOC is the focal point for the Department of Defense’s inform and influence activities (IIA). With this responsibility in mind, it is my intent that this event [increased] our understanding of ideology so that we are prepared to defeat the support mechanisms of extremist networks as we look forward to 2022 and beyond.”

Dr. Gorka’s views do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Inform and Influence Activities during Jackal Stone 2012

Exercise JACKAL STONE 12 (JS12) was conducted 13-25 September 2012. It began with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and pre-mission training 13-17 September, with the actual exercise taking place 18-25 September. JS12 included a US/partner nation field training exercise (FTX) that also included operational-level academics training. During Phase II, nine partner nations teamed with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Croatia (portrayed as Freedonia). The partner nations included Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Italy, and Norway. SOCEUR deployed its battle staff to Zemunik Bonji Airbase in Zadar, Croatia, to establish Multi-National Force-Freedonia (MNF-F) to conduct special operations to influence, find, fix, and finish high-value individuals (HVIs) operating within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

The 6th Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne) (MISB[A]) deployed in support of JS12 with two organic elements: a battalion headquarters and a regional military information support operations (MISO) detachment (RMD). Two partner nation psychological operations (PSYOP) officers from Latvia and Slovenia were assigned to form a Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF). (Note: NATO and European countries still use PSYOP to conduct influence operations. CDR USSOCOM

JACKAL STONE 2012 By MAJ Jose R. Reyes

changed the name “PSYOP” to “MISO” in June 2010.)

Upon arrival in Croatia the CPOTF immediately analyzed the campaign plan’s three lines of effort (MA, targeting, and isolate) to determine how influence operations could support them. They developed MISO objectives (MOs) and supporting MISO objectives (SMOs) that drove series development and production. A series is a group of multiple media products (e.g., TV, radio, print) that support each SMO. These series were then displayed on a series execution matrix, which enabled the Coalition Commander to visualize how the series would be executed during the campaign. The series execution matrix was utilized by the Effects Working Group (EWG) and briefed to the staff at the Commander’s plan review. Furthermore, the CPOTF’s assessment of measures of effectiveness provided decision points for the Commander based on how the messages were received and if they needed to be tailored or discontinued.

The CPOTF members exercised how they would conduct operations in the real world. As the RMD did not have organic production capabilities, the detachment utilized reachback to the 3rd MISB (A). This battalion, which is the Military Information Support Operations Command’s (MISOC’s) dissemination battalion, used the product action worksheet (PAW) created by the RMD to develop a specific product. Once completed, the finished product was sent back to the CPOTF to be distributed and disseminated to the target audience (TA) supporting the specific SMO. The RMD produced, distributed, and

The efforts by the MEG to bring these experts together provided sound information and imparted knowledge to ARSOF Soldiers in order to shape and educate them for 2022 and beyond. MEG events such as this one improve ARSOF Soldiers’ ability to understand the unique cultures and ideologies they may be called upon to operate in. Being able to understand unique cultures and ideologies in a theater of operations is a foundational characteristic of every ARSOF Soldier. The MEG Academic Week is part of, and directly supports, USASOC’s Campaign of Learning that is outlined in ARSOF 2022. “ARSOF 2022 is a very important initiative in the development of [SOF] doctrine and preparation for future threat environments,” said Gorka.

The MISOC Commander, Col. Robert Warburg, points out that one just has to look back through history to identify the issues that we may face.

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disseminated 27 products to include TV and radio spots for the exercise. In addition to deliberate planning and execution of influence operations, the CPOTF also created time-sensitive products. For example, the RMD developed various series to provide legitimacy to the government of Freedonia (GOF) and to deter the adversary by immediately releasing products that contained the images of captured or killed enemy combatants. For their hard work, they were recognized by SOCEUR Commander MG Michael Repass.

Throughout the exercise, the CPOTF was fully integrated with the CJ2, CJ35, Joint Effects Group (JEG), and CJ5. It was a critical part of the Targeting Working Group (TWG) and EWG. The CPOTF also provided recommendations to the JEG, supporting it with influence operations to degrade the enemy’s ability to influence the populace and render him ineffective–in line with the isolate LOE. Subsequently, the CPOTF provided messages that bolstered Freedonian Security Forces, thus promoting the GOF’s legitimacy. The CPOTF also allowed the TWG and EWG to refine operations based on these measures of effectiveness.

During the inform and influence effort, elements from the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) teamed with partner nation forces to form three multinational Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs). These three SOTGs, along with the 352nd Special Operations Group (SOG) (as the Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component [CJSOAC]), which provided airlift support to the SOTGs, were tactical control (TACON) to MNF-F. US Special Operations Forces (SOF) led one SOTG, and the other two SOTGs were led by Romanian and Norwegian contingents. From the inception of Phase II of the exercise, the SOTGs were aware of the importance of influence operations during the campaign plan. One of the lessons learned is that the 6th MISB (A) did not have the tactical MISO detachment (TMD) to meet the demand from the SOTGs. The CPOTF immediately had to adapt and sent liaisons from the headquarters section to provide MISO expertise to the SOTGs, but this proved to be not enough.

Overall, Jackal Stone 2012 Met the SOCEUR Commander’s Goals to

•Validate SOCEUR capabilities to conduct specialized military operations in support of the US Department of Defense and the US Country Team. •Assess and enhance interoperability of select SOF partners. •Enhance the SOF network by developing working relationships and a mutual respect between US and partner nation SOF, while sharing doctrinal concepts, training concepts, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). •Support the European (EUCOM) Theater Security

Cooperation and the Commander, SOCEUR Partner Development Plan (PDP) to build SOF capability. •Establish and operate a Special Operations Component Command among regional SOF partners. •Provide command and control to task group-sized tactical elements. •Conduct relevant and realistic training, oriented towards planning and execution using as close to “real world” TTPs and intelligence as possible.

All inform and influence activities were planned, integrated, synchronized, and executed as part of SOCEUR’s campaign plan. In conclusion, the MISO forces proved to be an integral part of this exercise. This capability was critical in order to have the nonlethal effects necessary for a successful campaign. Recommendations for future exercises would be to continue to incorporate a CPOTF or a Military Information Support Task Force (MISTF) to conduct influence operations and to deploy a TMD to provide influence capabilities to the SOTGs.

MAJ Reyes completed the POQC in 2007 and was assigned to 1st PSYOP BN, where he deployed as a MIST OIC to Paraguay, was Company Commander for HSC, and deployed to Kabul AFG with TF-41. After his assignment to SWCS as a Doctrine and Training Officer, he completed his master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. He also was Commander, B Co and XO for 6th MISB (A) and is currently the 4th MISG (A) Training OIC.

Updates


Lithuanian Soldiers listening intently to the target audience analysis overview.

MAJ Duprey presenting an adversary influence class to Latvian Soldiers.

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

Subject Matter Expert Exchange

in Lithuania and Latvia

By CPT James Watson

SSG Johnson delivers instruction on the social media network.

In late July and early August 2013, team 6A41 from the 6th Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne) and elements of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and the European Command (EUCOM) conducted a Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) in Lithuania and Latvia. The purpose of the mission was to enhance partner nation capabilities and interoperability with efforts focused on countering state and nonstate influence. A SMEE is different from a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) in two ways. First, a SMEE focuses on a specific topic that is requested by the host nation, and there is no exchange of shared skills between US Forces and the host nation. The second difference is funding: an approval request for SMEE funding does not have to go to the Secretary of Defense, unlike the request for a JCET.

In Lithuania, the SMEE took place at the General Jonas Zemicka Military Academy in Vilnius. The Lithuanian PSYOP force structure has elements in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the conventional force, both of which have conducted tactical operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Latvia, the training took place at the Kargomuža Military Post in Valmeria. The Latvian PSYOP force is a tactical platoon of the National Guard that reports directly to the Commander of the Latvian National Guard. It is organized into a product design team, a target audience analysis team, a tactical team, and a headquarters team. The production team is capable of producing printed products that are utilized during the team’s crisis response training. The Latvian Special PSYOP platoon has not conducted operations in the Afghanistan or Iraq.

The program of instruction for Lithuania and Latvia utilized the crawl, walk, run technique with each exercise building on the next. The Lithuanian and Latvian forces were presented an overview of target audience analysis, biases in the media, social media, adversary influence, and countering adversary influence. Following each block of instruction, 6A41 provided a

COL Darius, Lithuanian SOF Commander, speaking about the necessity of continued US/Lithuanian relations.

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VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

The United States Army formally implemented Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan after more than half a decade of conflict there. In post-Saddam Iraq, troop surges and a strong central government were both effective at reducing the violence there to a light simmer; but in Afghanistan, the pot continued to boil even though the strategies that had worked so well less than 1,500 miles away in Iraq were repeated.

A course of action for winning in Afghanistan needed to be as unique as the country itself. Area experts took for granted that a strong central government in Iraq was the main factor responsible for the increase in security, however, they did not immediately recognize the necessity of also involving media and influential individuals to affirm that government. In contrast, rural Afghanistan lacks the infrastructure as well as the relationship with government that is needed if any national democratic elections for either the leadership or the constituents are to have any hope of being successful.

VSO were thus initiated as a means to “connect the dots.” Afghanistan is largely made up of many

small, detached villages whose inhabitants do not see any correlation between their lives and the entity of Afghanistan’s central government. In fact, rural Afghans see hardly any reason to even get along with their neighbors, let alone a central government. In Iraq, citizens could connect their livelihoods directly to their executive leadership in Baghdad. In Afghanistan, however, villagers connect their well-being to family relationships and Islam, and drawing a line from Islam and family to government and security is a task perfectly suited for Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

MISO shapes the battlefield to the Army’s advantage by helping media and influential individuals connect the dots of local life to the dots of higher levels of governance. Mission objectives include increasing villager access to pro-government radio and print messages, but in order to lay a firm foundation for receipt of such radio and print messages, MISO personnel needed first to distribute rechargeable radios and promote literacy programs.

Of course, the Afghan Taliban cannot be defeated by words alone. Contrary to the situation in Iraq, troop

experience.

Following each culminating exercise, a seminar conclusion ceremony was conducted during which each participant received a certificate of training. In Lithuania, the Commander of the Lithuanian Special Operations Force, COL Darius Remika, attended the seminar completion ceremony and invited the 6A41 team back for future training opportunities. The Latvian PSYOP Platoon Commander, 1LT Sandris Bloombergs, submitted a recommendation to the Latvian Ministry of Defense for further training opportunities with US MISO forces.

CPT Watson completed the POQC in 2011 and then attended the National Defense University, graduating in 2012. He was first assigned as the 6th MISB (A)Assistant Operations Officer and is currently the 6A40 Detachment Commander.

practical exercise to reinforce the training; homework was assigned and reviewed the next day. There was a 1-day culmination exercise and a seminar completion ceremony. In Lithuania, the culmination exercise consisted of breaking the participants into four groups of four and dividing Vilnius into four sections. Each group was assigned a section of the city and tasked to locate a piece of information and determine if it was information for effect, misinformation, or propaganda; to conduct a source, content, audience, media, and effects (SCAME) approach; and to provide a recommendation on whether it was necessary to counter and, if so, what countering technique would be used when the groups gave the briefing to the class. In Latvia, the culminating exercise was not conducted in a major population area because of transportation and time constraints; instead the groups were provided pieces of information to conduct a SCAME; and to provide a recommendation on whether it was necessary to counter.

Throughout the SMEE, the participants from both countries were attentive and engaging. They would not hesitate to ask questions if they were unclear on a subject. Following each SMEE, the team would conduct an after- action review with the participants. A favorable remark from both groups was they liked using formats that included the Taliban Night Letters and Soviet Propaganda as practical exercises because such methods resonated with their

By SGT Addison Williams

Updates


surges in Afghanistan caused a long-term relative increase in enemy activity rather than the desired and intended decrease. In retrospect, it seems that rural Afghans care as much about who is providing for their security as they do about the level of safety provided. Coalition Forces (CF) quickly opted to apply greater resources to training Afghan security forces (and improve those force’s capabilities) rather than continue to bear the brunt of the fighting.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) units now fortify areas near small villages of interest, while larger conventional units remain positioned nearby and continue to provide overall security against full-scale attacks and prevent the small SOF contingency force from being overpowered. The SOF element then trains and equips locals as policemen who can capably maintain order in their village or other small area. Procedures for mine clearance are also sometimes taught to other locals. To gain popular support and recognition for local police area security efforts, the SOF unit carries out projects like creating schools and health clinics in the area. Coalition Forces attribute any successes achieved to the district, provincial, and national government of Afghanistan and to the local security forces when security matters are involved.

MISO is also responsible for maximizing the potential benefits earned by any project or activity that the SOF element carries out in a village. MISO personnel in VSO use public messages to slowly and persistently reshape the perspectives of villagers in Afghanistan. For example if Civil Affairs troops dig a well, radio messages delivered by MISO operators will likely suggest that villagers thank the District Governor. If the Afghan Local Police (ALP) kill a thug, then MISO may encourage a respected local leader to inform villagers of the wrongs the thug committed, which enhances a positive public perception of the ALP. MISO personnel also combat any negative information dissemination that may hinder the CF cause or bolster insurgent strength.

One Tactical MISO Team (TMT) operating in southern Afghanistan recounted the exponential effects of MISO and VSO as seen through their experience. Before arriving to Afghanistan, this inbound TMT had made contact and coordinated with the outgoing SOF elements. Reports indicated that security was steadily increasing through the efforts of both US and Afghan security forces. On the other hand, participation in government had peaked out at a level lower than hoped, and there was still no successful school or health clinic.

The SOTF Commander wanted to improve on

those shortcomings with no time wasted. The new TMT at first continued the approach used by the team they were replacing, which had been effective in many areas. The live radio show broadcast in Pashto in the nearby villages had the positive effect of helping to increase security and the sharing of news, but had not improved school attendance, which remained at only a handful of students.

The new TMT leader set a novel new goal for the Pashto radio broadcasts. After speaking with the local school teacher and the few students in attendance, the TMT recorded the actual voices of Afghans that other locals would recognize as their neighbors—instead of as outsiders. The teacher and most of the current students were eager to share their enthusiasm with other villagers and volunteered statements for the radio broadcasts. With the help of an interpreter, the TMT created a message that shifted between locals and a narrator and detailed how safe it was going to and from the school, clarified that the core of the curriculum was Islamic, and noted the benefit to families with educated children. Most importantly, the message was created in the villagers’ own words.

Within days, the TMT implemented the broadcast of the completed message—with the usual modest expectations. They could not have been more surprised when the results far exceeded what they had hoped. School attendance increased almost immediately. The TMT visited the school to confirm the Afghan security force’s assessment: the classroom was now entirely full. What had been a class of less than ten students now numbered over fifty. Children were attending from farther away, and the setting was perfect to now also use the school for literacy programs and weekend health clinics.

The TMT made sure to assess what factors had

Left: Team Leader SGT Truong, Middle: AIDO TMT Counterpart, Right: SGT Williams

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influenced this positive outcome. First, direct interviews revealed that locals either had not known or had not believed that the roads were actually now safe enough for children to walk to school without danger. The safety of the roads was, in fact, owed entirely to Afghan and US security forces stationed nearby. TMT assessments also confirmed that locals did not realize that there was so much to be gained from attending school; many had thought of the schools as a place for Western indoctrination, rather than a Muslim education. The tools and bare necessities students received changed the minds of parents. Many of the supplies and humanitarian items provided to students were direct benefits of the Civil Affairs team also working as part of the SOF element. The radio message had brought together these key points and had increased trust in the local government and security forces. Local villager participation in this message was the cornerstone to making the radio broadcast a true village stability operation and not just an independent MISO endeavor. With increased trust in government and security, the TMT could begin the ongoing work of encouraging villager faith in even higher levels of government.

A few weeks later, the school was recognized by the district and provincial levels of government with an official opening ceremony. The TMT also announced this ceremony through its Pashto radio station in order to generate increased public awareness. Attendance was very high and included Afghan villagers, government officials, students, and soldiers. It was easy for participants—both American and Afghan—to see that security was tight, the villagers were happy, and that government officials were successfully meeting the development needs of the people.

In fact, until this time the school’s teacher had been working unpaid for several months. The TMT brought this fact to the attention of the proper officials at the

ceremony and the problem was finally rectified. The simple act of connecting the teacher to the bureaucrats that controlled his salary was enough to improve the conditions for the school, and thus the village.

Not very long after this, the VSO site was considered self-sufficient and secure enough for CF presence to leave the immediate area. Without any further direct oversight from United States forces, one must trust in the work already done and hope for further self-development by the Afghans themselves. However, this action remains a step in the approach to victory.

Village stability operations work in Afghanistan, but may not be the answer to the next major military action. Afghanistan’s brand of VSO appeals to local Afghan populations because it can often give them hope of a fulfilling life after the conflict. Perhaps this nation will always be torn apart by violence, but building schools and clinics and having a competent and dependable local police force are still considered to be positive signs of stability. Removing explosives from the roads means Afghan villagers may live their lives with one less degree of fear. Giving those people something other than violence to think about means that young people may grow up to be something other than fighters. It may take a generation to learn the end results of this approach, but the children in that village school already have a greater chance at prosperity than they did before—a small step in an approach that, in the end, may lead to victory.

SGT Williams completed the POQC in 2012 and was then assigned to A Co, 9th MISB(A), where he deployed in support of OEF XIX as an Assistant Team Leader.

Map of Afghanistan


America’s decision to hold Syria accountable for using chemical weapons against its citizens could have led to another war in the Middle East. Any future action that may be taken against Syria, however, cannot be the result of analysis of just the Bashar al-Assad regime and human rights abuses that occurred within the country. The violence in Syria is inextricably linked to the events that occurred on September 11, 2001; to the attacks on their anniversary in 2012 in Benghazi, Libya, that led to the death of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and his security detail; as well as to the Patriots’ Day bombing in Boston that killed three and wounded well over 200 people. That common factor is jihadi ideology and its direct impact on the national security of the United States. It is a factor that is central to ARSOF’s ability to execute the special warfare mission and is a factor that SOF has not understood properly in the campaigns initiated in the last 12 years.

The year 2013 saw the 12th anniversary of the horrendous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Al-Qa’ida’ s religiously motivated murder of almost 3,000 people on that sunny Tuesday morning led directly to military operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq, which together mark the longest ever military engagement by America since 1776. Whilst the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001, attacks is dead thanks to the courage and audacity of the US military and intelligence community – the war is not over, the enemy is not vanquished, and there remain two disturbing truths that the national security professional and special warfare practitioner should recognize:

•Stunning tactical successes – no matter how numerous – in no way necessarily lead to strategic victory.

•As a nation, we still do not fully understand the nature of the enemy that most threatens us, and thus our strategic response is undermined.

The connective tissue between 9/11, Benghazi,

Boston, and Damascus is indeed an ideology of violent extremism, but a very specific kind. It is a totalitarian and absolutist vision of a future in which only one religion is permitted and all dissenters must be killed or subjugated. Despite what we would wish, the Islamist fighters in Syria are not fighting for a secular state in which all citizens have equal rights regardless of sex, race, ethnicity, or religion. The Tsarnaev brothers in Boston, the terrorists who killed Ambassador Stevens in Libya, and the jihadists in Syria are committed to the victory of a theocratic system in which Islam reigns supreme. This religious aspect of the ideology that drives the threat groups is what our SOF operators must defeat and is what often causes problems for us.

The first aspect stems from a misguided belief that the religious character of the enemy’s ideology should not be discussed and that we need not address it. Instead, we are to use the phrase “violent extremism” to describe our foe and thus to avoid any unnecessary unpleasantness. The second is that even if we could demonstrate clear-headedness on the issue and recognize the religious ideology of al-Qa’ida and its associate movements for what it is – a form of hybrid totalitarianism – we still drastically lack the institutional ability to analyze and comprehend the worldview of the enemy and, therefore, its strategic mindset and ultimate objectives.

Here it is enlightening to look to the past to understand just how great a challenge is posed by the need for our national security establishment to understand its current enemy. It is now well recognized that it was only in 1946, with the authoring of George Kennan’s classified “Long Telegram” (later republished pseudonymously in Foreign Affairs as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”) that America began to understand the nature of the Soviet Union, why it acted the way it did, how the Kremlin thought, and why the USSR was an existential threat to America. Consider now the fact that this document was written three decades after the Russian Revolution and that despite all the scholarship

The Importance

of Ideology in Special Warfare

By Dr. Sebastian L.v. Gorka

12INFLUENCE

and analysis available in the United States, it took more than a generation to penetrate the mind of the enemy and come to a point where a counterstrategy and counternarrative could be formulated. Now add to this the fact that today our enemy is not a European secular nation-state, as was the USSR, but a non-European, religiously informed, nonstate terrorist group, and we see the magnitude of the challenge. Despite initiatives to understand the thought process of our enemy, such as Fort Leavenworth’s Human Terrain System (HTS) and the teams they provide to theater commanders, they still miss the mark on more than one level.

The paradox of al-Qa’ida is that even though we have in the last 12 years been incredibly successful in militarily degrading its operational capacity to directly do us harm, al-Qa’ida has become more powerful in the domain of ideological warfare and other indirect forms of attack. While Osama bin Laden may be dead, the narrative of a religiously motivated global revolution that he embodied is very much alive and growing in popularity. While we have crippled al-Qa’ida’s capacity to execute mass casualty attacks with its own assets on the mainland of the United States, we see that its message has, and holds traction with individuals prepared to take the fight to us individually, as in the instances involving Major Nidal Hasan or the Boston Marathon bombers, and to attack our allies, as with the 21 September 2013 massacre in Nairobi.

Although we have proven our capacity in the last 12 years to kinetically engage our enemy at the operational and tactical levels with unsurpassed effectiveness, we have barely begun to take the war to al-Qa’ida at the strategic level of counterideology. According to Dr. James Kiras of the Air University (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), “We have denied al-Qa’ida the capability to conduct complex devastating attacks on the scale of 9/11, but we now need to transition away from concentrating on dismantling and disrupting al-Qa’ida’s network, to undermining its core strategy of ideological attack.” We need to employ much more the

Figure 1 This infogram illustrates the fact that over 80% of all conflict in thelast 200 years has been irregular in nature (Source: Sebastian L.v. Gorkaand David Kilcullen: “An Actor-Centric Theory of War: Understanding theDifference between COIN and Counterinsurgency,” Joint Forces Quarterly,no. 60 (First Quarter, 2011: 15).

Figure 2 (From: S. Gorka: “The Age of Irregular Warfare: So What?”, Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 58, 2011)

indirect approach made famous by our SOF operators of working “by, with, and through” local allies and to move beyond attacking the enemy directly at the operational and tactical levels to attacking it indirectly at the strategic level. The safety of America’s citizens and our chances of eventual victory depend upon our being able to call the enemy by its proper name: global jihadism.

Osama bin Laden may be dead, but his ideology of global supremacy through religious war is far more vibrant and sympathetic to audiences around the world than it was on the day before the 9/11 attacks more than 12 years ago. We need to guarantee the conditions by which the executive branch is able to finally produce a comprehensive understanding of the enemy threat doctrine that is global jihadism, a document akin to Kennan’s foundational analysis that eventually led to the Truman Doctrine and its exquisite operationalization in Paul Nitze’s plan for containment, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68). Such a document would then directly feed into our PSYOP/MISO and Civil Affairs efforts as well as help our direct action experts better understand the enemy. However, we must understand that the enemy we face today does not function in the same way as the nation-states that have used irregular warfare (IW) against us behaved. Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) explained to us how conventional enemies function in his masterpiece On War. His trinity of government, citizens, and commander, driven by the characteristics of reason, passion, and skill, must be adapted in the age of al-Qa’ida and nonstate threat groups. “Reason” is replaced by “truth,” and passion can drive the commander and strategist just as much as pure skill or objective analysis. (See figures 1 and 2).

We need to bankrupt transnational jihadist terrorism at its most powerful point: its narrative of global religious war. For the majority of the last 12 years, the narrative of the conflict has been controlled by our enemy. Just as in the Cold War, the United States must take active measures to arrive at a position


where it shapes the agenda and the story of the conflict, where we force our enemy onto the back foot to such an extent that jihadism eventually loses all credibility and implodes as an ideology. As long as we continue to deny the existence of the ideology that motivates the enemy, we will continue to fail in identifying those who wish to do us harm before they do so, and as in Syria, we run the even greater risk of empowering those who wish to see our destruction.

Dr. Gorka is a military affairs fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and teaches irregular warfare to the U.S. military and federal law enforcement, including the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). His views do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other government agency. Dr. Gorka welcomes comments to [email protected].

References

1) The seminal work here is Patrick Sookhdeo’s Global Jihad: The Future in the Face of Militant Islam (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2007).

2) For a potential plan of action against the ideology of global jihad, see the key text Katharine Cornell Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo, eds., Fighting the Ideological War: Winning Strategies from Communism to Islamism (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2012).

actions of an enemy who hates or threatens what is good (the Two Camps element). Now is the time (Crisis Point) when violence is necessary to prevent catastrophe (Method). If we stay true to our righteous course (Danger of Contamination), we will achieve victory (Reward). These elements, what they provide to an extremist argument, and what happens when each element is removed are outlined in figure 1.

The Ideologies of Our Three Case Studies at a Glance

By comparing the motivating ideologies of three very different violent extremist actors that are currently active, we identified these six elements. We chose these three ideologies because they have inspired violence in recent years, yet are completely unlike each other religiously and politically.

• We examined the ideologies of al-Qa’ida (a violent offshoot of a form of Islamic fundamentalism), Norway

The Six Rhetorical Elements of Violent Extremist Ideologies

The development of violent extremist ideologies (VEIs) is a recurring human phenomenon that has developed in every age and locale, and such ideologies arise in the same manner regardless of their religious or political origin. That’s the bad news. The good news, however, is that it’s a predictable process, and these ideologies have common vulnerabilities. By learning now about that recurring pattern and the vulnerabilities this presents, we can better undermine the violent extremist ideologies of today and tomorrow.

We at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) found that violent extremist ideologies generally are made up of six rhetorical elements. All six elements must be present for the ideology to function; the removal of one or more of these elements from an extremist ideology collapses its argument and stalls out its ability to persuade people to become violent extremists. When all six elements are present, an extremist ideology asserts the world has gone wrong (what we call the Decline element) because of the

The Recurring Structure and Vulnerabilities of Violent Extremist

IdeologiesBy Mr. Cassidy S. Dale

14INFLUENCE

attacker Anders Breivik (who developed a violent offshoot of a form of Christian nationalism), and ecoterrorist group The Earth Liberation Front (ELF, a violent offshoot of the environmentalist movement).

• These same elements are also at work within, for example, communist revolutionary rhetoric from almost a century ago, as well as that of the Irish Republican Army, but for our study we focused on currently active or recently active extremists.

A quick look at what each of our three-test-case ideologies allege.

• Al-Qa’ida claims that a conspiracy of “Crusaders” and “Zionists” (Christians and Jews who they allege control the United States, Europe, and Muslim countries by proxy) are waging a world war to destroy Islam. Only guerilla violence, they claim, will repel this conspiracy, allow Muslims to govern themselves according to pure Islamic principle, and allow the reestablishment of a caliphate, a strong Islamic empire capable of defending Islam and Muslims.

• Anders Breivik claims that “cultural conservatives”—conservative Christians of Western European cultural

origin—must conduct a guerilla campaign of “self defense” to rescue Western civilization from totalitarian subversion by a conspiracy of communists, neo-Nazis, Muslims, and the “multiculturalists” (liberals) who aid them.

• The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claims that industrial sabotage against corporations and government entities that catastrophically harm the Earth’s ecology will cause them to change their behavior and policies enough for the ecology of the planet—and thus all life on Earth—to be saved. Now let’s look at each of these six elements in action—through direct quotes from extremists’ own statements. Extremists usually must assemble all six elements to successfully construct an extremist argument, ideology, or rationale.

Extremist Use of the Decline Element

Extremists must convince people that whatever world they treasure is now in dire straits or in serious jeopardy. Alternatively, they can piggyback on discontent or fear that already exists in a population. Here is how al-Qa’ida, Breivik, and the ELF declare the problem their extremism seeks to resolve:

Element

Decline

Two Camps

Crisis Point We must act now.

Violence is necessary.

We must stay true to our course.

We will defeat our enemy and achieve what we want as a

movement and as individuals.

Identifies and demonizes an enemy who is to blame for

the decline, and depicts those who resist that enemy as

heroic.

Without Crisis Point, there is no sense that immediate ac-

tion is required.

Without Danger of Contamination, dialogue and compromise with perceived

enemies is allowable to reach goals.

Without Reward, there is no goal to work toward.

Without Method, there is no clearly defined way to resist

the enemy.

Creates a sense of panic — that action must be taken

now to save that world — and implies that all one holds dear

now hangs in the balance.

Provides a motivating image of victory or paradise for the

movement or individual.

Prevents compromise or moderation of extremist

views by depicting them as treason or complicity with the

enemy, or dangerous to the movement’s success, the sal-vation of the world, or one’s

own soul.

Provides the appropriate—even heroic—way to resist.

Without Two Camps, there is no enemy to combat.

Our enemy hates us and all that is good.

Method

Danger of Contamination

Reward

The world has gone wrong. Interprets someone’s worldas decimated or in jeopardy.

Without Decline, an individual sees no need to

rescue the world.

MessageWhat the

Element DoesElement Is Necessary Because

Figure 1: The Structure of Violent Extremist Ideologies


• “[T]he great powers occupied the lands of the Muslims and were the heirs to the Ottoman state. They imposed their laws on the Islamic lands, divided them into mini-states, sucked up their wealth, and plundered their resources … The state of the Islamic lands today can be described as legalized occupation or perhaps veiled occupation.’” – deceased al-Qa’ida second in command Abu Yahya al-Libi, January 15, 2009

• “Multiculturalism is an anti-European hate-ideology designed to deconstruct European cultures and traditions, European identities, European Christendom, and even European nation-states. As such it is an evil ideology created for the sole purpose of the eradication of an entire civilization—the European civilization—popularly known as Western Civilization.’” – Anders Breivik

• “The ELF ideology considers the various social and political problems facing the world today to be mere symptoms caused by a larger overall problem … The only way to stop the symptoms is to identify the main root cause and directly work to abolish it … The ELF realizes the profit motive caused and reinforced by the capitalist society is destroying all life on this planet.” – The ELF

Extremist Use of the Two Camps Element

Next, extremists must lay the blame for that decline at the feet of an enemy, declare themselves the heroes who oppose that enemy, and make clear that these two camps actively oppose each other rather than merely disagree. In the cases of each of our three actors the two camps element is examined:

• “The most important and serious issue today for the whole world is this Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation.”... “This is a war of destiny between infidelity and Islam.” – deceased al-Qa’ida leader Usama bin Ladin, December 28, 2004

• “Many of our political and cultural elites, including politicians, NGO leaders, university professors/lecturers, writers, journalists, and editors know exactly what they are doing. They know that they are contributing to a process of indirect cultural and demographical genocide and they need to be held accountable for their actions. The truth needs to come out. We are in the beginning of a very bloody cultural war, a war between nationalism and internationalism and we intend to win it. Islam WILL be thrown out of Europe … and the Marxist, humanist, and globalist traitors who colluded with the Ummah will be held accountable for their treason.” – Anders Breivik

• “The ELF realizes that the destruction of life is not a mere random occurrence but a deliberate act of violence performed by those entities concerned with nothing

more than pursuing extreme economic gain at any cost.” – The ELF

Extremist Use of the Crisis Point Element

Extremists must also convince people that their world is now in immediate danger, at a critical crossroads, or is in a state of emergency. In the words of each of the three,

• “Muslims today are passing through a critical point and a fateful phase of history, and only the people endowed with trustworthiness, bravery, self-sacrifice, political cunning, and military experience are fit to lead it. These attributes do not exist in those who are in power today.” – deceased al-Qa’ida Propagandist in the Arabian Peninsula Anwar al-Aulaqi, November 8, 2010

• “[I]n only 14 years, by 2025, a majority of our Western European capitals will be Muslim cities, just as Marseille became majority Muslim in 2010! And in only 39 years, by 2050, this will be the fate of our countries as well unless we manage to defeat the ruling Multiculturalist Alliance!” – Anders Breivik

• “At this point in time there exists the immediate need for individuals to step outside of societal law and work to directly stop the destruction of life. By any means necessary.” – The ELF

Extremist Use of Method

Extremists must present violence as the necessary means to resolve the problem their world faces. In their own words,

• “Your brothers and sons, the sons of the two holy mosques, have launched the jihad for the sake of God’s cause to expel the occupying enemy from the country of the two holy mosques … by waging guerilla warfare.” – deceased al-Qa’ ida leader Usama bin Ladin, August 31, 1996

• “The Knights Templar was re-founded in April 2002 in London, England as a Pan-European Crusader Movement, as a European Indigenous Rights Movement, and as a War Crimes Tribunal … The primary objective of the Knights Templar Europe is to seize political and military power from the multicultural elites of Western Europe for the purpose of banishing Islam from Europe and to implement cultural-conservative doctrines.” – Anders Breivik

• “The only way, at this point in time, to stop that continued destruction of life is … to take the profit motive out of killing … Using real direct action in the form of economic sabotage, the ELF is targeting what the greedy entities care about, their pocketbooks. By inflicting as much economic damage as possible, the

16INFLUENCE

ELF can allow a given entity to decide it is in their best economic interests to stop destroying life for the sake of profit.” – The ELF

Extremist Use of the Danger of Contamination Element

Extremists must also present violence as the only viable means to repair their world or end the problem their world faces, and inoculate or insulate their members and supporters from all efforts to dissuade them from belief in the six elements. Oftentimes they present compromise as dangerous to the member’s soul or to the movement, or characterize nonviolent actors as having ‘sold out’ to their enemies and thus risky to listen to.

• “The Prophet left us on the right path, and damned be he who deviates from it.” – deceased al-Qa’ ida leader Usama bin Ladin, January 4, 2004

• “Do not negotiate with them … They do not want good for the nation, but instead conspire against it … Do not consult anyone about killing Americans. Fighting Satan does not need a fatwa.” – deceased al-Qa’ida Propagandist in the Arabian Peninsula Anwar al-Aulaqi, November 8, 2010

• “To Europeans worldwide including European Americans, European Canadians, European Australians, etc.: Submitting to political correctness is the same as condoning the cultural and demographical genocide of your own culture and people. Never surrender to Cultural Marxism!” – Anders Breivik

• “The ELF clearly does not have any faith in the legal system of the state when it comes to protecting life. The state has repeatedly shown itself to care far more for the protection of commerce and profits than that of its own people and the natural environment.” – The ELF

Extremist Use of Reward

Lastly, extremists must cast a vision of a better future that serves as a goal for their movement or themselves as individuals:

• “We seek to expel the invaders from the Muslim lands and establish a Muslim state.” – al-Qa’ ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, March 2, 2008

• “God Almighty informed us that [one who dies defending Islam] moves from this life to a better life, a life [with] no tribulations, no trials, and no fear.” – deceased al-Qa’ ida second in command Abu Yahya al-Libi, January 27, 2008

• “[A modern-day Templar Knight] is a holy Knight fighting for your people and the preservation of Christendom. [A]ll martyrs in protection of

Christendom are granted a place in heaven… Celebrate us, the martyrs of the conservative revolution, for we will soon dine in the Kingdom of Heaven!” – Anders Breivik

• “The ELF [seeks to] stop the destruction of life.” – The ELF

Undermining Each of the Six Elements

The possibilities for negating each of the six elements may be endless — what follows are merely some starting points. Some possibilities for undermining each of the six elements include the following:

• Decline can be undermined by recasting extremists’ current woes as a confluence of world circumstances — political, economic, or otherwise — that aren’t the result of malevolence on anyone’s part but are problems to be solved through constructive processes rather than combat.

• Two Camps can be undermined by recasting whom the good guys and bad guys are — redrawing the lines so that we are on the same side as the majority of a population against an extremist minority — or by complicating extremists’ oversimplification of the struggle by showing how three or four or five factions compete for the fate of their society rather than only two.

• Crisis Point can be undermined by easing the panic that extremists invoke that spurs people to immediate action and by demonstrating that all avenues of recourse or problem solving have not yet been exhausted.

• Method can be undermined simply through highlighting the ineffectiveness of combat to resolve their society’s ills — that it’s simply an unworkable solution that wreaks havoc instead — or that the use of violence victimizes those who extremists claim they fight for.

• Danger of Contamination can be undermined by instilling doubt in the trustworthiness of extremists’ claims about themselves and their claims about their enemy’s malevolence. Undermining this element may involve admitting some wrongdoing on extremists’ adversaries’ part as a means to demonstrate sincerity and thus possible trustworthiness as a partner for dialogue or negotiation.

• Reward can be undermined by illustrating the end result of extremists’ campaigns, perhaps by pointing out how the end result played out elsewhere. This element also can be undermined by instilling doubt in the victory or reward extremists believe they will receive as individuals.


References

1) Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Refuting the Falsehoods of the Rationalization Document,” al-Sahab Media, translation provided by the Open Source Center, GMP20090115342001, January 15, 2009 .

2) All Anders Breivik quotations are from his 12-minute video that summarizes his 1,500-page manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. As of September 19, 2013, the video could be found at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=89a_1311444384 and his manifesto could be found at http://www.fas.org/programs/tap/_docs/2083_-_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf .

3) All quotations from The Earth Liberation Front are from the anonymously authored Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) about The Earth Liberation Front, perhaps the most succinct summation of its ideology. As of September 19, 2013 it could be found at http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/ELF/elf_faq.pdf .

4) Peter Wehner, “The Dialogue of Bullets, the Ideals of Assassination, Bombing, and Destruction,” Ethics & Public Policy Center, n.d., accessed 1 September 2013, http://www.eppc.org.

5) Open Source Center, “Anwar al-Awlaki Discusses Yemen, Addresses Islamic Scholars in Video,” FEA20101109011258, 8 November 2010.

6) Open Source Center, “Bin-Ladin Declares Jihad on Americans,” FTS19960902000438, 2 September 1996.

7) Open Source Center, “Bin Ladin Warns of ‘Grand Plots’ Against Arabs, Criticizes Gulf Rulers,” GMP20040104000216, 4 January 2004.

8) Mujahid Shaykh Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Exoneration,” see http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf.

9) Open Source Center, “Al-Sahab Releases Part II of ‘Winds of Paradise’ Featuring Wills of ‘Martyrs,’” GMP20080129342001, 27 January 2008.

Effective delivery of these messages and to what audiences is better handled by other studies and other authors — here we’re simply talking about structure and themes. However, we offer the following:

•Some elements can be effectively undermined among extremists by speakers who have credibility with them because these speakers do agree with extremists on, perhaps, two other elements. It is critical to understand that belief in some—but not all—of the six elements does not make someone a violent extremist or necessarily a sympathizer. In fact, speakers who agree with extremists on a few elements, but disagree with extremists’ adversaries on the rest, may be the most ardent opponents of extremism.

•Even hardened extremists and supporters may be dissuadable from violent extremism—or at least al-Qa’ida appears to believe they are. Al-Qa’ida senior leaders and spokesmen constantly—in nearly every public statement—work to counter denigrations of the group from Muslim religious leaders and institutions, Muslim community leaders, and even former extremists. Al-Qa’ida figures use these same public statements to inoculate their members and supporters from these dissuasion attempts.

Mr. Dale is an analyst at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

Violent extremist Anders Breivik dressed in a Knights Templar uniform and his 1518 page manifesto “written” in 2011.

18INFLUENCE

The Gulf Cooperation CouncilHistory and Partnership with SOF

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in May 1981. Its overall purpose was to join the six member-nations of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates into a common framework focused on developing coordination, integration, and inter-connection in the effort of unifying the Arab Peninsula. These countries share similar political systems based on Islamic beliefs, joint destiny, and common objectives, and as a result of this, the GCC nations rely on one another not only for economic and political support but for security as well.

The formation of the GCC emphasized the deepening of relations, links, and areas of cooperation among citizens of the member nations, and was an institutional embodiment of historical, social, and cultural realities that exist in the region. Deep religious and cultural ties, as well as geographical proximity, link the member nations and have assisted in the development of interactions between the six GCC countries. The focus of these interactions are highlighted in their charter and “confirm the special relations, common qualities and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam, faith in a common destiny and sharing one goal, and that the cooperation among these states would serve the sublime objectives of the Arab nation.”

Within the GCC charter, there are four listed objectives:

1. To affect coordination, integration, and interconnection between member states in all fields in order to achieve

unity between them.

2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links, and areas of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.

3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:

•Economic and financial affairs •Commerce, customs, and communications •Education and culture •Social and health affairs •Information and tourism •Legislative and administrative affairs

4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, water, and animal resources, in order to establish scientific research and to establish joint ventures and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

Therefore, the formation of the GCC is considered to be not only a continuation, evolution, and institutionalization of prevailing realities, but also a practical answer to the many challenges of security and economic development in the their region.

Understanding that the economic development and prosperity of the various GCC nations can only be achieved within a secure and stable environment, the council developed a unified defense force that is

SGT Lenarz familiarizes SOF Soldiers from Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, and Lebanon with the LRAD system during Eagle Resolve 2013 at Doha Naval Base, Qatar

By CPT Justin Heddleson


responsible for the security of the region from both internal and external threats. The Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) was officially created in 1982, and its development has occurred in parallel with growing military and security cooperation between the six GCC countries. The GCC defined the development of this force in two phases. The first phase set the foundations for military partnership among the GCC nations, and the second phase allowed for the establishment of joint defense responsibilities of the member nations. The PSF is composed of infantry, armor, artillery, and combat support elements from each of the GCC countries; however, at the individual member-state level, analysis reveals specific force and mission characteristics that persist as obstacles to building effective military capability to confront the common threats of the region. Political limitations have been the greatest hindrance to the Peninsula Shield Force's development. As a result, the PSF faces challenges in material readiness, combat system and combat support interoperability, and appropriate manning. Despite its shortcomings, the PSF achieved some success including the establishment of a permanent headquarters staff, yearly exercises, and joint training exercises with other Arab nations and the United States. The Arab Awakening has brought about the rise of political Islam and has forced various members of the GCC to call on support from the PSF to ensure that the uprisings would not disrupt the relative stability in the region. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Lebanese Hezbollah have actively sought to capitalize on opportunities to infiltrate the region presented by the Arab Awakening.

Iran has begun to train Shi’i youth throughout the GCC nations. Iran does not consider the GCC as a unified entity, rather as geographical fragments, and seeks to capitalize on the disenfranchised youth as a means to infiltrate the region and, in doing so, expand their influence throughout the GCC. Because of its sponsorship of political violence outside of its borders, its support for destabilizing groups, and the training it continues to provide to militant groups seeking to upset the regional stability, many see Iran as the single greatest threat to the stability of the GCC nations. These factors, combined with Iran's recent acquisitions of advanced weaponry and their military domination of the strategic gulf entrance and exit points, have forced the GCC Security Council to consider options for dealing with and mitigating the effects of Iran.

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is one of the most well-known terrorist organizations that is operating within the GCC nations. The areas where LH is most active in the GCC nations is in financing and commercial dealings. There have been a number of legislative and policy changes enacted in recent months to allow the governments of the GCC nations to expel LH supporters and financiers from their countries and to bring legal action against financial institutions that maintain dealings

with the terror organization or its affiliates.

The Muslim Brotherhood is another organization that poses serious security concerns to the ruling families of the GCC nations. The Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations are characterized by social and political activities among the lowest strata of society. This leads its doctrine to be more appealing to the disenfranchised masses and provides access to the democratic process, or a version that is strongly influenced by Islamic values, as a legitimate method to exercise political power. This movement is one which, if allowed to run its course, could disrupt the political and economic policies of the GCC and have a de-stabilizing effect on the region. This is viewed as an example of an internal threat, unique in each GCC nation, that has the potential to create disruptions throughout the GCC as a whole and therefore is being confronted by the GCC Security Council.

The primary manner in which the GCC as a whole deals with terrorism is through the development of regional plans and agreements that will provide a framework for counterterrorism efforts across the GCC nations. A recent example of this is the agreement reached during the GCC's 33rd Summit, which calls for cross-border cooperation among the Gulf States on matters of national and collective security. As a result of this agreement, each member state is to treat warrants issued by other states as legally actionable. Further, each state agrees to share information on criminal and security matters. The GCC Security Council also issued a statement dealing with this agreement saying that the GCC nations "will work from a unified understanding of both criminal and financial transaction laws to limit the spread of terrorism and to work against it within their borders and the region as a whole." This statement also reiterates that the GCC considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization. The GCC has expressed its concern over the growth and spread of groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and GCC leaders have contacted the United Nations to establish an international center to combat the rise of terrorism across the world in a more cohesive and

Figure 1. PSYOP NCOs of the Kuwait Country Engagement Team (CET) with students of the

25th Commando Brigade after the conclusion of the five-day MISO period of instruction

20INFLUENCE

coordinated manner.

In support of the GCC's efforts to counter the spread of terrorist groups and their influence in the region, the current MISO support element (MSE) has partnered with host nation special operations forces (SOF) counterparts in order to build partner nation capacity against terror organizations. The MSE has partnered with each available MISO counterpart within the six GCC nations and has conducted various subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) and Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), and has participated with other SOF elements in the conduct of joint combined exchange training (JCETs). The MSE is able to provide training on MISO-specific activities, to include target audience analysis, media analysis, product development and design, and distribution and dissemination techniques. They are responsible for providing training at any level within the host nation security force and provide insight on both the tactical and strategic levels of influence operations. Although every GCC nation does not currently possess a MISO- or PSYOP-specific unit, the opportunity to include influence operations exists within each country, and the host nations will often provide soldiers to receive this training to be used in addition to their specific MOS.

In Kuwait, the MSE participated in a JCET, alongside US Army Special Forces, with the Kuwaiti 25th Commando Brigade in which they presented a comprehensive five-day period of instruction on information dissemination operations (IDO). (See figure 1.) The 10 officers and 10 noncommissioned officers selected for training were instructed on the IDO process and how to apply those concepts at both the tactical and operational levels. Their lessons were applied during the final training exercise conducted at the conclusion of the JCET. This is an example of the growing capability and capacity to conduct IDO by the SOF counterparts within the GCC and the increased effectiveness it may have in the event of conflict in the region.

In April of 2013, the GCC countries came together, alongside many partner nations from the Levant region and US Central Command to conduct the multilateral exercise Eagle Resolve 13, held in Qatar and its surrounding waters. The MSE worked with their MISO counterparts in the Qatar Crisis Management Center, which functioned as their coalition headquarters and included an information operations cell with officers from many of the GCC countries. The MSE helped to plan and conduct IDO at the strategic level with their MISO counterparts and exercised many of the same concepts that the MSE and counterparts had been exchanging and training on in previous engagements. The results from those seven days of working side-by-side demonstrated the effectiveness and importance of IDO to the senior leadership in many of participating countries as they were briefed on the progress of

the information cell throughout the exercise. It also demonstrated the potential impact and effectiveness of the growing network of influence partners throughout the region. (See title photo.)

Although there are many political and social differences to overcome among the GCC nations, it is key that they maintain some form of alliance and strengthen their ties to ensure the continued stability throughout the region. The GCC is a powerful tool for unifying the efforts of the countries of the Gulf region and can provide a strong ally in the region for US and other partner nation cooperation. Through the implementation of training programs and joint efforts, the US involvement in the region will serve to strengthen capabilities and provide the GCC with additional assets to counter the influx and influence of terrorist organizations.

CPT Heddleson completed the POQC in 2012 and was then assigned to B Co, 8th MISB(A). He currently serves as a Detachment Commander and is deployed in support of the GCC mission set.

References

1) See Secretariat General, (2012). Retrieved September 20, 2013, from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/

2) See Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). (2013, January 11). Retrieved September 20, 2013, from Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm.

3) Foundations and Objectives, (2012). Retrieved September 20, 2013, from The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index895b.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=3.

4) Shaheen, K. (2011, March 16). Defensive Shield for the Gulf Since 1982, The National.

5) Steele, A. (2011). “Mirage or Reality: Enabling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Collective Defense,” (paper submitted to Naval War College [Newport, RI], 4 May 2011).

6) Kuffel, G. (2000). The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force. Newport: Naval War College.

7) Trechsel, S. (2006). Counter-Terrorism in the Gulf. Security and Terrorism.

8) Anthony, J. (n.d.). Iran in GCC Dynamics. Middle East Policy, 107-120.

9) Al Arabiya. (2013, July 18). GCC Agreed to Blacklist Hezbollah as Terrorist Group. Ya Libnan.

10) Karasik, T. (2013, August 05). Hezbollah Caught between the GCC and EU. Al Arabiya.

11) Dacrema, E. (2013). New emerging balances in the post-Arab Spring: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulf Monarchies. ISPI.

12) Toumi, H. (2013, September 17). GCC Tightens up on Security. Crossroads Arabia.

13) Foreign Policy Contributor. (2010, December). GCC Call to Tackle Terrorism. Foreign Policy Association.


HOW AND WHY HAS IRANCHANGED ITS RHETORIC?

To understand how and why Iran’s rhetoric has changed, it is necessary to examine the past eight years of the Ahmadinejhad presidency (2005-13). Mahmoud Ahmadinejhad, with his defiant and caustic rhetoric, enjoyed a brief honeymoon with the regime’s hard-liners. Ahmadinejhad’s denial of the Holocaust and his belligerent anti-Zionist rhetoric endeared him to them. During his presidency, the United States and the West were increasingly referred to as the “Global Arrogance.”

Ahmadinejhad purged the government of reformists and technocrats, replaced them with his followers, and then advocated for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members to be incorporated into all sectors of government, the economy, and society. Under Ahmadinejhad’s administration, the IRGC performed the following initiatives:

•Created an extensive space and rocket research and development program •Built up a massive military-industrial complex •Favored IRGC paragovernmental companies over private companies by granting them huge government construction and infrastructure projects (i.e., Khatam al-Anbiya ) •Purchased a major percentage of the telecommunications sector •Pursued and expanded its nuclear program

The Post-2009 Green Movement Election Demonstrations

The post-2009 Green Movement election demonstrations hardened the regime and sparked harsh responses to any criticism or dissent against it, and accelerated and expanded Iran’s Soft War and its persecution of minorities, critics, and political opponents. Censorship and Internet filtering were assisted by the creation of a Basij cyber army.

Politics, Sanctions, and the Economy: 2011-13

Major political rifts and an economic crisis raged up until the presidential election in June 2013. Domestic rhetoric heightened. Ahmadinejhad’s faction was labeled the “Deviant Current” and branded as corrupt and incompetent. Parliament and the president fought each other. Ahmadinejhad’s economic policies and

runaway spending were faulted as tough new U.S. / E.U. sanctions triggered a currency crisis. Threats of an Israeli attack raised anti-U.S. and anti-Zionist rhetoric to a fevered pitch.

The 2012 parliamentary elections fostered rhetoric against the “Seditionists” (reformists) and the “Deviant Current.” As Iranians suffered from hyperinflation, job loss, food scarcity, and medicine shortages, political infighting between Ahmadinejad, members of parliament, and hard-liners became so public and nasty that Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei forbade further fighting. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani appealed to the supreme leader and the nation for unity.

June 2013 Presidential Election

Former presidents Rafsanjani (a pragmatist) and Mohammad Khatami (a reformist) collaborated and met to decide on an election strategy. The Election Committee vetted 8 candidates out of 686, disqualifying Rafsanjani. In the end, the regime insider candidates lost overwhelmingly to Hassan Rouhani (50.6% of the vote). Hard-liners, conservatives, and the world were shocked.

Rouhani’s “Charm Offensive” and Changing Rhetoric

Iran’s new “moderate” president, Rouhani, has domestically and internationally launched a “charm offensive.” “He pledged to improve Iran’s deteriorating economic condition, respect human rights, release political prisoners, and replace Ahmadinejad’s confrontational foreign policy with one of reengagement with the world.” Rouhani is intent on reaching a nuclear agreement, which would result in an end of crippling U.S./E.U. sanctions. Rouhani is not a reformist or a democrat; he is a “centrist” who is fully cognizant that a slow and balanced middle-of-the-road approach must be taken in order to exact change.

Anti-U.S. and anti-Zionist rhetoric at the highest levels has subsided and been toned down. For the first three months of Rouhani’s presidency, references to the United States as the “Global Arrogance” or the “Great Satan” have diminished and increasingly been replaced

By Dr. Mark D. Luce

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HOW AND WHY HAS IRANCHANGED ITS RHETORIC?

by references to “the West.” The supreme leader has adopted a policy of “heroic flexibility.” While rhetoric at the top moderates and IRGC and Basij commanders acquiesce, IRGC and Basij rhetoric is toned down but remains on message.

Rouhani Atmospherics

The following list indentifies the attitudes, policies, and developments that have taken hold since Rouhani’s election as president:

•Iranian ministers opened Facebook accounts en masse. •The IRGC was told to stay out of politics. •Eleven prominent political prisoners were released from prison on 16 September 2013. •Government has initiated moves to reduce the IRGC role in the economy. •The IRGC is branded as a corps of peace and security. •Instead of calling for Israel’s annihilation, Rouhani calls on Israel to divest itself of nuclear weapons. •Two reformist newspapers (Eqbal and Tose’e) that were closed in 2005 have since reopened, rekindling hopes of expanding freedom of the press. •Fifteen out of 18 initial nominees for cabinet posts were approved. •Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani was appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. He was the defense minister (1997-2005) under the former reformist president Mohammad Khatami. •Bijan Zangeneh, the oil minister (he was also reformist president Khatami’s oil minister from 1997 to 2005), is trying to break up IRGC control of a large portion of the oil industry and to increase private company investment and participation. •Rouhani condemned Syrian chemical attacks and remained neutral on placing blame. •Rafsanjani and others have been critical of the Assad regime; this criticism would have been censored or not tolerated by the Ahmadinejhad administration.

Assessment

Iran is changing its rhetoric of radicalism to a rhetoric of compromise and accommodation. The new policy of heroic flexibility will allow Rouhani and his government to negotiate to end international sanctions against Iran.

The supreme leader has approved changes in foreign policy and economic reform by empowering Rouhani. However, it remains unclear how far the Rouhani administration will be able to liberalize press and social media policies as promised or to reverse some articles of the “Law of Hijab and Chastity.”

For now, Iran’s hard-liners have yet to regain their balance or voices. Rouhani’s seasoned and experienced technocratic, reformist ministers are impressive. Many were purged from office by the former administration, along with hundreds of experienced managers from the oil industry. Iranians remain divided on many issues, but unanimously agree that the government has not served them well these past eight years. They are ready and hopeful for change and a return to prosperity.

The bloom is still on the rose, and perhaps criticism of the new administration will be muted as nuclear negotiations begin anew. The stakes are high, with the entire nation counting on economic relief and a return to normalcy.

The coming months will reveal more of Iran’s challenges. Heroic flexibility, as espoused by the supreme leader, has initiated external dialogue and compromise. But what remains unclear is what will become of the Soft War being waged by the Basij, the morals police, and the censors against evil and corrupting foreign influence?

Heroic flexibility allows not only Rouhani and his ministers to negotiate with “the West” but also the commander of the Basij, BG Mohammad Reza Naqdi, to


insist that heroic flexibility could permit the eradication of Israel. Outside of Iran, Rouhani attempts to make peace with the world. Can Iran make peace with itself?

Dr. Luce holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations from the University of Chicago. His specialization is in Islamic Thought and Persian literature, with regional expertise in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. He has lived and worked in the Middle East and South Asia for more than 25 years (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, the U.A.E., Jordan, Yemen, Qatar, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia). His current interests are drivers of conflict, sectarian strife and Iran’s “Soft War.” Dr. Luce is an analyst for the Cultural Intelligence Cell, 8th MISB (A), 4th MISG (A), at Fort Bragg. His languages include Arabic, Persian (Dari, Farsi and Tajik) and Pashtu.

References

1) For a description of Khatam al-Anbiya (Ghorb), see http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2010/06/15/the-dangers-of-doing-business-with-irans-revolutionary-guards/, accessed 23 September 2013.

2) See Monroe Pierce, “Iran and the Soft War,” International Journal of Communication 6 (2012): 2397 – 2415, accessed 23 September 2013, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1654/799.

3) See Pınar Arikan, “Iran After the 9th Islamic Consultative Assembly Elections,” Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), 6 March 2012, accessed 23 September 2013, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/

showArticle.aspx?ID=1636.

4) See Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Ahmadinejad Vs. Ayatollah Khamenei: Iran’s President, Supreme Leader Clash Over Political Authority,” Reuters, 8 February 2013, accessed 23 September 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/08/ahmadinejad-vs-ayatollah-khamenei_n_2647337.html; and Robert Tait, “Ahmadinejad And Larijani Tussle In An Oil Slick,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 May 2011, accessed 23 September 2013, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/24207146.html?displayOptions=2.

5) Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, “Ayatollahs Mesbah Yazdi and Rafsanjani Square Off?” 26 November 2012, accessed 23 September 2013, http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2012/11/845/ayatollahs-mesbah-yazdi-and-rafsanjani-square-off/; and IranPolitik: The Iran Political Analysis Project, “Rafsanjani: The West Is Playing for Time,” 21 June 2012, accessed 23 September 2013, http://www.iranpolitik.com/2012/06/21/news/rafsanjani-west-playing-time/.

6) See http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/25/305337/rafsanjani-safeguard-islamic-republic/, accessed accessed 23 September 2013.

7) Mohsen Milani, “Rouhani’s Foreign Policy: How to Work With Iran’s Pragmatic New President,” Foreign Affairs, 25 June 2013, accessed 23 September 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139531/mohsen-milani/rouhanis-foreign-policy

8) “Heroic Flexibility” is elaborated on in the following article: Arash Karami, “Ayatollah Khamenei’s ‘Heroic Flexibilty,’” 19 September 2013,accessed 23 September 2013, http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/09/2854/khameneis-heroic-flexibilty/.

9) Open Source Center (OSC), “Iranian Commander: ‘Heroic Flexibility’ Means Eradication of Israel,” Document ID: IML2013092354250577, 23 September 2013.

Nirmalya Kumar and Jan-Benedict Steenkamp’s book, “Brand Breakout: How Emerging Market Brands Will Go Global” focuses on the successful strategies that foreign corporations, predominantly Asian ones, have used to build their brands in order to expand their markets into the developed world. In the course of identifying successful strategies, the authors also outline some of the difficulties facing corporations from emerging markets, namely restricted or underdeveloped distribution networks for products, negative perceptions of their political environments, and intellectual property violations that suppress the development of innovative products and brands.

Why branding? Though the authors don’t cover this trend, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of companies (excluding some state-owned utility and energy companies) that make up the Global Fortune 500 heavily work factor branding into their corporate strategy. Kumar and Steenkamp do mention that “Chinese entrepreneurs and executives prefer manufacturing, engineering, and finance – the hard stuff – over all the emotional branding stuff that seems fluffy, if not irrelevant to them. In contrast, it is precisely large investments in such intangibles that drive the business models of global consumer brands like Coca-Cola and Nike.” The authors contend that there are eight paths (see figure 1) for companies to choose from in order to develop their brands in Western markets. They also identify specific models to consider during the various analyses required if a company decides to pursue a certain strategy, as well as the steps that need to be accomplished for the successful implementation of each strategy presented.

Brand Breakout provides PSYOPers a unique perspective in that it presents an Asian view on establishing a solid platform for effective messaging in order to change behavior, particularly purchasing behavior. Kumar and Steenkamp

Details

Nirmalya Kumar and Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp, New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; 272 pages.ISBN: 1137276614$28.00 (hardcover)

Reviewed by:CPT Patrick LindseyMEG Plans Officer

Book Review

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Route

The Asian Tortoise route: Migrating to higher quality and brand premium

• Haier (China)• Pearl River Piano (China)• Wanli (China)

The business to consumer route: Leveraging B2B strength in B2C markets

• ASD (China) • Galanz (China)• Huawei (China)• Mahindra (India)• ZTE (China)

The diaspora route: Following emigrants into the world

• Corona (Mexico)• Dabur (India)• Jollibee (Philippines)• Maybank Islamic (Malaysia)• Mandarin Oriental (China)• Pran (Bangladesh)

The brand acquisition route: Buying global brands from Western multinationals

• Bimbo (Mexico)• Geely (China)• Lenovo (China)• Tata Motors (India)• TCL (China)

The positive campaign route: Overcoming negative country of origin associations

• Chang Beer (Thailand)• Ospop (China)• Roewe (China)• Shanghai Vive (China)• Sheji / Sorgere (China)

The cultural resource route: Positioning on positive cultural myths

• Havaianas (Brazil)• Herborist (China)• Shanghai Tang (China)• Shang Xia (China)

The natural resources route: Branding commodities in four steps

The national champion route: Leveraging strong support from the state

• Café de Colombia (Colombia)• Concha y Toro (Chile)• Forevermark (South Africa)• Habanos (Cuba)• Natura (Brazil)• Premier Cosmetics (Israel)

• China Mobile (China)• Comac (China)• Embraer (Brazil)• Emirates Airlines (Dubai)• Proton (Malaysia)

Some Examples

Figure 1. Eight routes to global brands (Source: Brand Breakout, Kumar and Steenkamp, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

give checklists that can help to determine whether a specific strategy is appropriate and how to then implement that strategy. Not all of the eight routes may be applicable to broader efforts at behavior change. The Business to Consumer, Natural Resources, and National Champion Routes have applications in the marketing realm but may be harder to employ in a MISO approach. The authors provide numerous examples for each strategy, some of which are immediately recognizable to the readers, while others may only resonate with readers of certain ethnic or cultural backgrounds. For a deeper understanding of global branding efforts, look over or read the executive summary available on the MISOC Effects Group (MEG) Portal at https://arsocportal.soc.mil/misoc/hq/g3/meg/default.aspx.


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