artº independende and dependency - i ostner

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Women’s Studies Int. Forum, Vol. 17, Nos. Z/3, pp. 129-139, 1994 Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All rights reserved

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INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCY Options and Constraints for Women Over the Life Course

ILONA OSTNER University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research, D-28334 Bremen 33, Germany

Synopsis-In western countries, social policies emerged to compensate impacts which result from an unequal distribution of bargaining power in modern market economies. Thus, they provide some options to avoid disadvantageous working conditions. However, by counteracting unequal bargaining situations, social policies produce new inequalities. In all western societies, social policies tend to treat women as workers of a special kind. Some treat women as individuals and citizens; others primarily as mothers or wives, as different but equal, or, in contrast, along the principle of “sameness.” In each case, women’s life chances, their life course, and the relationship between independence and dependency are affected in a peculiar way. This article examines the relationship between independence and dependence built into various welfare regimes from a woman’s point of view: Which regime helps best to combine both-a family and paid work?

FREEDOM AND DEPENDENCY

Human beings are inextricably embedded in gender and generational ties. They depend during their lives more or less, for longer or shorter periods, on each other or institutions.

This simple human condition was forgot- ten more than two centuries ago. From their “enlightened” beginning, modern societies, in principle, have promoted a concept of freedom that “solely refers to an immediate relation of men to other men” and, negatively, to violation by men who unduly force their will upon others (Tugendhat, 1992, on Hayek). Modern “man” came into being as the free and independent, timeless and unchanging, thus, bodiless, sexless individual with little or no reminiscence of any past dependence (Pateman, 1989). From that time on, still existing dependencies were either invisibly hid- den in the private sphere or based on free will and/or contract. From a “libertarian liberalist” point of view, the worker entered freely a contract which gave way to an asymmetric and one-sided dependency on those who owned the means of production. “Freedom as contractual freedom” has made it hard to argue in favor of any egalitarian, redistribu- tional justice or in favor of equal op-

portunity policies which grant those less ca- pable to compete, for various historical, bio- graphical or social reasons, “starting gate” or re-entry equality (Forbes, 1991). Those who care for dependents during their life course or who are among those groups ascribed such roles can easily become “laggards” in a competitive market economy.

Modern market economies differ to the extent to which they are based on the idea of individualism and libertarian freedom. While developing, some of these systems are influ- enced by “romantic anti-contractual,” holis- tic, or “solidaristic” and “social catholic” ide- ologies. Such beliefs counterbalanced the market’s tenet of individualism by defining human beings not only in terms of reason but of emotions and corresponding subjectivity; or they designated women and men to be “born debtors” to ancestors or, more generally, to their community or wider society and, correspondingly, as embedded in institutions, for example, in marriage, family, or professional corporations. This has been the case, for instance, for France and Germany. Some countries consider themselves “folks” or “kin’s home” and tie social rights individu- ally to membership based on the idea of kin. This has been the case for the Nordic coun-

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tries. Not surprisingly, the “less individualis- tic” countries have been ready to develop family policies either to support a strong (male) breadwinner or to make both having a family and making a living more compatible.

This article examines briefly the relationship between independence and dependence - being independent, dependent, and depended upon (Pateman, 1988)-built into various welfare regimes from a woman’s point of view: Which regime best reconciles both having a family and gainful employment?

SOCIAL POLICY, DECOMMODIFICATION ,

AND GENDER

In western countries social policies removed, so to speak, some people as well as some needs to some extent from the market-this is what Esping-Andersen (1990) calls “de- cornmodification.” Social policies help to avoid no-choice situations and prisoner’s dilemmas for those who are otherwise dependent on the job market for sustenance and thus enter it with an inherently weaker bargaining position when selling their labor (Goodin, 1988). Social policies that emerge therefore, such as pension schemes, health insurance, and subsidies for families, insti- tutionalize options to avoid disadvantageous working conditions (Langan & Ostner, 1991).

However, by counteracting unequal bargaining situations between dependent labor and employers, social policies have produced new inequalities. In all western societies, social policies tend to treat women as a reserve labor force; sometimes they implicitly or even explicitly hinder women’s labor market participation. Normatively, women rather than men are expected to be (and in fact work as) unpaid or low paid carers and do most of the domestic chores. It is often the case that women who are married or having a consen- sual union are not employed or work part- time, and, moreover, help their male partners to be continuously employed and have a family. Men’s employment chances are aug- mented. The fact that women have been given the “option” to refrain from entering an employment relationship improves career prospects for men: Firms prefer to invest in

human capital of a continuously available labor force. Family policies which decommod- ify women as workers - or put another way - which hinder cornmodification of women’s labor, create new no-choice situations (Okin, 1989; Ott, 1989). Should a woman choose to have a family, and as time goes by and previ- ous conditions change- a child might be born or the male partner promoted in his job -the “marriage contract” soon reveals the one-sidedness of the gender relationship as women become, so to speak, “trapped” in the (optional) role of main caretaker of family obligations: It makes economic sense that women give up a poorer-paying job with fewer career prospects-compared to those of the male partners-and provide the needed care at less cost to the family than hired help.

As it is, in all western countries, it is predominantly women who provide the caring service. This leads to labor market segregation by gender. Most countries developed special policies, subsidies, or schemes for families and, thereby, gendered “life trajec- tories” with very strongly gendered life chances (Millar, 1990). Women are treated as a source of labor (as workers), as a source of a new generation of labor or soldiers (as mothers), and as a source of support for men, children, parents, and so forth (as carers). These roles and their functions are built into women’s life course as normal expecta- tions and, therefore, shape women’s lives. They imply dilemmas and tensions, options as well as constraints, independence and dependencies depending on how firms, governments, unions, and other holders of (predominantly male) power respond to women’s demands and needs (Jenson, 1988, 1989; Langan 82 Ostner, 1991).

Though various welfare regimes produce similar effects, they also affect women’s lives differently. Women’s life chances seem to be attributable to a combination of factors. First, there is the welfare mix: The household, the market, and the firm, the state or the church and its organizations all play different roles in providing goods and services. The welfare mix determines the degree of women’s mobilization for employment and their chances for earning a continuous living while possibly having a family as men typi- cally do. Second, there are national differ-

Independence and Dependency 131

ences in the extent to which women’s participation in the labor market is regarded as desirable, necessary, or as a quasi natural ele- ment of citizenship. Furthermore, whether the focus of welfare is on transfers or services, on individuals or on households, or whether welfare is tax- or insurance-based, it influences the impact the policy may have on women’s lives. Benefits can be given to heads of household, to the working family; sometimes they are means-related or target groups designated as “deserving” or “needy”; sometimes they privilege continuously employed, highly competitive individuals. Some welfare regimes treat women as individuals and citizens; others primarily as mothers or wives who have different obligations from husbands and fathers-and yet which are of comparable worth. Given a certain welfare model, women’s life chances, their life course, and the relationship between independence and dependency are affected in its respective way.

Taking this into consideration as well as many other recent changes, for example, Eu- ropean integration, the transformation of Eastern Europe, Germany’s struggle to come to terms with unification, recent debates on the restructuring of welfare states and on welfare retrenchment, comparative analyses of similarities and differences in welfare tradi- tions can serve to broaden our knowledge about what women can expect from social policies (Center for European Studies, 1988; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Leibfried & Ostner, 1991).

Concepts such as ‘decommodification’ or ‘dependency’ have a gendered meaning that is rarely acknowledged. While Esping-Ander- sen (1990) writes of decommodification as a necessary prerequisite for workers’ political mobilization, the worker he has in mind is male and his mobilization may depend as much on unpaid female household labor. Yet, gender is not systematically integrated into his approach; when women disappear from labor markets, they also disappear from the analysis. Decommodification for women is likely to result in their carrying out unpaid caring work; in other words, ‘welfare dependency’ err the part of adult women is likely to result in the greater independence of another person, young or old. The unequal division of unpaid work thus complicates the

status of dependent/independent, commo- dified/decommodified (Langan dz Ostner, 1991).

Focusing on the degree of decommodification, that is, on options to leave the labor market, Esping-Andersen ( 1990) argues that welfare states can be clustered into three “regimes”: The “liberal,” the “conservative,” and the “social-democratic.” The following briefly elaborates the tenets that underly Esping-Andersen’s “ideal-typical” models from a gender perspective.

WELFARE REGIMES REVISITED

The “liberal” welfare regime is characterized by strictly targeted means-tested benefits and firm-based private insurance schemes. The USA, Canada, and Australia have “liberal” regimes, and there are indications of Britain becoming “liberal” or residual. This model minimizes decommodification by minimizing public welfare schemes. As far as women’s social rights and mobility are concerned, the liberal regime tends to treat women as either gainfully employed individuals or as wives and mothers supported by male breadwinners. Consequently, the position of lone mothers in this model demonstrates above all the limitations of the dichotomous designa- tion of “mother” or “worker” that is particu- larly stressed by the liberal model (Lewis & Ostner, 1992).

“Conservative” regimes, according to Es- ping-Andersen, illustrated by Germany, Aus- tria, Switzerland, France, and Italy, link rights to social status; social policy aims at status maintenance and at perpetuating status differentials. Elements of a traditional corporatism exist. Social security schemes are based on the insurance principle albeit backed by state guarantees; churches exert a powerful influence over social and family life. Social provisions are bifurcated: Social security focuses on male heads of household and grants-derived benefits for wives, widows, and children. State-provided social services are rare. The principle of “subsidiarity” prevails.

Esping-Andersen does not elaborate the principle. It requires that those closest to the need in question, that is, the family or the community, in most cases have to be the first providers of help. In the case of children

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needing care, first the mother, then the more distant family or kin, is expected to provide the care. Only when this capacity is exhausted and/or in need of support will the state inter- vene. Public provision is generally subsidiary in nature. Any intervention of those less close to the person with the problem has to be justified. The principle also implies that a society’s solidarity is welcomed, or sometimes required, to support peculiar care relationships, for example, the mother and child by money transfers and other measures as long as these foster, rather than replace, the parent-child relationship specifically, or the desired aim in general. Supportive family policies, mainly in form of cash transfers and tax reductions, are strongly favored by the public.

Social-conservative social policies have been based on the assumption that individuals are continuously embedded in vertical and horizontal relations-in gender and generation. “Individual relatedness,” even in the form of one-sided personal dependencies, is treated as a fundamental and constitutive human condition for which the dependent has little control. Consequently, policies have predominantly been designed to protect vul- nerable dependents rather than to abolish dependence and to promote the idea of comple- mentarity, for instance of capital and labor, husband and wife. The importance of differentiated roles for women and men (though of comparable value), the interrelatedness of these roles, and a common though less ex- plicit natural subordination of women in social relationships for the sake of the family and the society have been traditionally stressed. Accordingly, family policies should support women to live out their female potential, that is, to live a different but comparable life with different obligations and occu- pations (Ostner, 1994). Not surprisingly, conservative regimes tend to treat women first as wives and/or mothers and secondly as workers.

The major commitment of both “conservative” and “liberal” welfare regimes in the 20th century has been to the development of insurance schemes that work via the labor market. Core welfare programmes have thus been, above all, the prerogative of the regu- larly employed who have been predominantly male.

“Social democratic” regimes provide universal benefits at middle class standards. Blue collar workers enjoy the same rights as white collar employees. All strata are in- cluded in a universal insurance system, although benefits are graduated according to earnings. This model excludes the market as well as the family as service providers and promotes universal solidarity. “All benefit, all are dependent and will presumably feel obliged to pay” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 28). In contrast to the conservative model, the social democratic regime attempts to min- imize family responsibilities and to maximize individual independence. Thus, the state is the main provider of costly care and, thus, facilitates women’s employment.

To sum up, according to Esping-Ander- sen’s (1990) categorization of welfare regimes, the Scandinavian (social democratic) countries and, it may be additionally sug- gested, to some extent Britain, emerged from World War II with a commitment both to universally provided benefits and services based on citizen rights, and to full employment. The “conservative“ countries (Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany) emerged with a commitment to making the state and other wider institutions a compensator of first resort, through social insurance programmes organised so as to maintain strict differentials between occupational groups, and between men as breadwinners and women as wives and mothers. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ operated to ensure that the male worker and his family could live a re- spectable life. A liberalist individualism has not come to the fore until very recently in these states, but very sparingly. The United States, to some extent Canada and Australia, and, by the 198Os, Britain, developed ‘liberal welfare regimes, characterised by means- tested benefits and a residual role for the state. Yet, Esping-Andersen’s grouping of welfare states are both loose and disputed: Australia, for example, is certainly a low welfare spender and operates a variety of tough means tests, but it has had a long-standing commitment to wages-as-welfare, with cen- tralised wage-bargaining machinery that is more reminiscent of postwar Sweden than anywhere else (Lewis & Ostner, 1992). Esping- Andersen situates the Netherlands as a social-democratic welfare state like those of


Scandinavia. But, historically, as a result of competing religious groups, a politics of “democratic pacification” (via “pillariza- tion”: giving each group a political status of its own) emerged in the Netherlands. This led to tolerance and accommodation, mainly in the public sphere, to basic income policies on the one hand, and to a strengthened idea of family privacy and women homemakers, on the other (Lewis & Ostner, 1992). According to Knijn (1991), the Netherlands have, like Germany, a low level of individualization, no equal access to the labor market, the polity and state institutions, and a very low state and market household service profile. Knijn, therefore, groups the Dutch welfare regime together with Germany. The following eluci- dates women’s position in different welfare regimes - options and constraints.

THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL- A FEMINIZED STATE SERVICE ECONOMY

On the face of it, the Nordic countries real- ized an enlightened and comprehensive concept of citizenship. Nevertheless, rights and claims are tightly bound to labor market integration (Bakker, 1988; Becker, 1989; Hernes, 1987,1988; Moen, 1989; Ruggie, 1984, 1988; Schulte, 1990). In principle, women are treated equally to men as individual wage earners and tax payers. In the generous parental leave program, regulations acknowl- edge the fact that individuals have different roles to fulfil, that is, are sometimes parents, fathers or mothers, carers, daughters, or sons. But one is expected to be part of the labor force-at least part-time-to fully benefit from social rights. Citizens who had never been gainfully employed only get low flat rate benefits. To maintain a certain socio-economic status and social entitlements, there is little choice left for parents or carers not to do paid work or of how to arrange family life and employment. To enable everyone to enter employment according to her or his capa- bilities, state services have expanded providing new job opportunities. In a system that ties social rights and claims to labor market participation, however, a full-employment policy assumed prime importance. Not only is the regime strongly based on full-employment and, consequently, on economic

growth, but also on high tax burdens and on public consent, that is to say, on rather shaky conditions. From a gender perspective, a question of interest is who provides what kind of services for whom.

In Scandinavian countries, women do not have to rely on a husband’s income; children or the elderly in need of care no longer depend on family members. State-provided services, and the service sector in general, have offered women job opportunities which have shifted women’s traditional dependencies on their husbands-likewise, children’s dependency on their parents or those of the elderly in need of care-toward dependency on the state. According to Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 202), between 1965 and 1985, women ac- counted for 87% of total health-education- welfare employment. He continues to argue that they left junk-jobs in private industry and entered higher-status and better-paid public employment. Women have become independent earners free to decide whether to stay within an unhappy marriage or family situation or whether to leave such a living condition. Unsurprisingly, through active integration into the labor market, fewer women are married, and their labor force participation is very high, albeit often on a part-time basis that reaches 6 hours per day (Ruggie, 1984, 1988).

Scandinavian societies seem to have developed women’s individualization and independence to its full meaning: individual taxation, laws that promote the “symmetrical” family, marriage as an optional relationship of two independent breadwinners, abolishment of a “wife’s alimony,” no or little widow’s pensions, the freedom to live whatever family form, no statutory family obligations (Ku- lawik, 1992, p. 228). The welfare state became an important provider of child care and also took care of the elderly, whereas caring relationships between the young and the old mainly have taken the form of occasional help and socializing.

Women’s labor force participation - on equal terms with men-usually indicates to what extent a society has “modernized,” that is, become differentiated and individualized. But while expanding, women’s employment has never interfered with men’s jobs and spheres in the Nordic countries. Their labor market integration has gone hand in hand

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with labor market segregation more than in other western societies (Kulawik, 1992; for Germany see Willms, 1983). As mentioned already, in Scandinavian countries, the state is the most important employer for women. Women holding services jobs take care of children and the elderly in need of care; they free (other) women from care obligations and help mothers and daughters earn their own living. Thereby, the gender division of labor remains largely untouched (Kulawik, 1992). As is common in western societies, women who work part-time or are on extended parental leave have to rely on another income. Generally, this employment pattern means a loss in career prospects that cannot be com- pensated for. In contrast-and notwithstanding the rhetoric of “symmetrical relationships”-men can be fathers and stay employed. Loaded down with the antagonistic obligation of paid labor, mothering and unpaid work in the household women can easily become discontent with the limited time available to carry them through. In 1983,84% of the Swedish who worked night shifts were women who had come to terms with having both a family and to earn a living (Kulawik, 1992, p. 229). During my visit to Finland in 1992, many women, most of them mothers, complained to me of being “time- poor.” The segregation of the labor market, the unchanged gender division of work, par- ticularly, of care work, and high living costs contribute to one-earner households’ poverty. Albeit gainfully employed, 37% of Swedish lone mothers had to rely on social assistance in 1985 (Kulawik, 1992, p. 228).

On the whole, the Scandinavian regime seems to have much in common with a traditional, that is, agrarian, society, and extended Gemeinschaft based on group similarities rather than on diversity and individu- ality, with social rights tied to everyone of the actual and future working population, be it child or an elderly person, who belongs to the relatively closed community. And similar to traditional societies, the traditional gender segregation of work and obligations has sur- vived. Nordic societies seem to rather prevent a public-private dichotomy fundamental to other western societies. Instead, it has created an ‘all in the home’ culture which is highly based on social and ethnic homoge- neity.

As mentioned earlier, women are heavily dependent upon the public service sector for gainful employment. Service sector employment may be in danger of being retrenched. Recently, the politics of home care allow- ances has been strengthened which gives families the choice to take care of children and the elderly at home. Yet, in the state’s effort to reduce public spending, a talk of “pushing women out of the labor market” has not come up; to be gainfully employed is still seen as everybody’s normality. Cut-backs mainly concern the level of benefits, for example, of the hitherto rather generous home care allow- ances, not the benefits, in general. However, considering the increase in unemployment, one may ask whether the male breadwinner model will consequently emerge as domi- nant. Along with that of a woman who is the part-time worker, mother, carer and a consumer? As a mass phenomenon this would be something new in these countries.

The Scandinavian model seems to be built on precarious consent. It depends not only on male citizens’ ability and willingness to pay high taxes to finance services traditionally provided by women while doing without women’s readiness to care at home; it is also based on economic growth. These flaws and contingencies notwithstanding, many femi- nists call the Scandinavian model “women friendly.” They reject the mostly American scepticism vis-a-vis a bureaucratic and “ther- apeutic” state and claimant culture. Is the de- fense of the state an unlimited feminist goal (Fraser, 1990)? What is, then, the critical and liberating potential of the Nordic model for women? One answer may be that it relies on an idea of “equality” that takes into account that human beings differ not only from the day of birth but are different while living their lives, growing older, and getting frail or sick.

“ALIKE” OR INVISIBLE: THE “LIBERAL” OR “RESIDUAL” REGIME

The liberal welfare regime perceives “equality” in the strict meaning of abstract iden- tity-of an “either or” dichotomy- with no mediation. Everyone is expected to care inde- pendently for him- or herself and to learn to do so. To be poor or well off is predominantly a matter of one’s own choice or will.


Being alike or the same is therefore closely linked to liberty and to negative civil rights, which guarantee that barriers to one’s free agency will be removed as far as possible. Liberty presupposes liberation, women’s too. The emancipating effects of these ideas are not to be underestimated. Welfare provisions-if there are any-are justified, as long as they do not interfere with this liberalist approach, but, rather, further this exclusively market-related principle. Positive economic or social rights are rudimentary.

Two dualisms underly the liberalist approach: that of “the market” versus “the political” (here the state) and that of “the family” versus “the political” (or the state) (Jenson, 1989). Any family policy (e.g., maternity provisions, or public childcare) is unjustified intervention into privacy. Corre- spondingly, it is not “state business” if workers are concurrently parents. Women are either workers or mothers, and with the latter role then solely inhabitants of the private domestic sphere. According to Nelson (1990), the American two-channel welfare regime gave male workers some private insurance- based provisions, thus promoting a white middle-class-biased notion of the female homemaker while neglecting the needs of working mothers.

Under this system, maternity provisions do not exist, or they are poor, as is the case in the UK. Mothers often have to rely on their male partner’s income or on welfare while caring for small children, on women’s net- works, especially kin, or on cheap services (Gerson, 1983). Yet, in a comparative perspective, it is easier to get a good job and be upwardly mobile for qualified and mobile women in countries which have policies based on the liberal model than in those based on the conservative or state service model. Treating individuals “alike” has limited the gender segregation of the labor market. But, when it comes to reconciling full- time work and a family, women’s life chances become remarkably unequal compared to those of men.

CORPORATIVE SINCE BISMARCK? CONSERVATIVE GERMANY

Societies which fit this model connect social provision and security with social status and

display a policy of maintaining the existing status - for the “haves.” Germany is thought to be the prototype of this model.

The FRG is a “social market economy.” Until now, social policies have secured status (“social closure” in the Weberian sense) by a “from top to bottom strategy” (Leibfried & Tennstedt, 1985)-rather than a minimum status for all. Capital and labor, civil ser- vants, white or blue collar workers as well as men and women are perceived as having dis- tinct status or closed social relationships. Men are the “standard” workers continuously employed and married heads of household. Women are perceived as wives and mothers, who preferably work part-time to be able to combine family and work sequen- tially. Germany developed complex schemes which provide for different status to be treated differently and advantage the numer- ous middle classes. The principle of status maintenance differs very much from uni- versalized worker’s citizenship. Difference comes before equality.

During the 196Os, the German Constitu- tional Court (Supreme Court) maintained that housework and employment are of comparable value; that, therefore, pension schemes should attach some monetary value to women’s unpaid work within the family. In response to the Court’s statement, the 1986 Child-Rearing legislation was passed allocat- ing pension rights to time spent as a caretaker at home. For example, a parent is entitled to draw a pension for child-rearing amounting to about 30 DM per year for each child for 1 year, for children born after 1992, for a max- imum of 3 years (per child), in both cases, provided the parent was the primary carer at home and worked less than 20 hours a week. The policy, albeit gender-neutrally worded, was justified with reference to the overdue equalization of the homemaker and mother’s poor status with that of the privileged career woman (a situation which has rarely existed). West German mothers accepted this legislation eagerly. Criticism has since revolved solely around the national monetary sum that is attached to caring (Ostner, 1994).

(West) German society has been based on a highly dynamic and productive economic sector and on a rather static private domestic sphere: on “dynamic stability.” Gender roles differ very much: There is a division of tasks

between the highly productive and mobile individual, albeit culturally shaped, prefer- wage working husbands and “immobile” ences. The relationship between (personal) wives at home. Both standards are repro- dependence and (economic) independence is duced by diverse social policies. (Western) complex and varies in relation to both the Germany has a relatively low female labor scope and quality of employment opportuni- market participation rate, partly due to a rel- ties for women and men and the quality of atively underdeveloped (consumer) service the marriage. Dependence and independence sector. The majority of women leave the la- are not simply antagonistic. Both raise fun- bor market to care for their small children for damental questions of what is to be perceived at least 2 years per child, utilizing parental as ‘a good life’ which have been answered in leave benefits, and re-enter employment on a accordance with particular cultural beliefs. part-time basis. Women interrupt their work Answers have therefore varied immensely. career for an average of 13 years (Schulz 8z Being gainfully employed and thereby eco- Kirner, 1992). Many male workers often take nomically independent allows a woman/a early retirement because of health problems. spouse to leave a bad marriage. Though, it These female and male employment patterns leaves a working parent, mother, or father to explain the comparatively low activity rate of solve the problem of how to care for the child persons in working age. or the person in need of care in the house-

Built into the German welfare system are hold. For instance, caring can be handed over important incentives for men to get married to the state or dealt with by hiring a care- to a non-working or part-time employed taker. In each case, a specific dynamic of in- wife as well as many barriers for women to dependence is set free. Under certain condi- (re-)enter the labor market on terms equal to tions, a sufficient household income, a men. Because most women work discontinu- ‘breadwinner friendly’ social safety net, ously and only for a total of about 20 years, along with a good and loving marriage or their pensions -derived from employment - partnership, being married to a breadwinner will be small. Unsurprisingly, in most cases, may offer some choice to- wholly or widows’ pensions-derived from the male partly-retreat from the need to earn one’s income- are higher than those based on own living, to be with the child, friends, and the number of years women had spent be- kin or just to enjoy life. Recent survey data ing gainfully employed. As a consequence, (Glatzer & Noll, 1992) on changing attitudes mainly women as sole earners, single moth- toward work and the family highlight the ex- ers, and widows of husbands in low paid jobs tent to which women in western and, increas- risk being dependent on welfare benefits. ingly, in eastern Germany, prefer flexible ar-

German social policies favor women who rangements of both, having a family and manage to get and remain married to a con- being gainfully employed. tinuously employed man, who manage to live a happy marriage and who are content with EAST GERMAN WOMEN AFTER this trajectory. Such circumstances must not UNIFICATION: FROM STATE necessarily mean mere dependency. In a capi- DEPENDENCY TO MARRIAGE talist society, staying at home and living from DEPENDENCY? a husband’s income incorporates the possibil- ity of an independence (however restricted) Anita Pfaff and Juliane Roloff (1990) elabo- via personal dependence. Structural con- rated some crucial differences between West straints, the consequences of discontinuous and former East German policies for women. employment, and non-standard forms of Both governments claimed to support the in- working in a highly competitive market econ- stitutions in and of the family. Men and omy as well as politically produced opportu- women were to exist as equals, as equal part- nity structures constitute institutional and ners in a marriage, and as family members political factors that help explain women’s with equal rights. Each country claimed to work patterns. They define the options for promote better arrangements for reconciling action though they never completely deter- family with work. With the same goal in mine them. Work and life patterns also result mind-equality of women’s and men’s living from women’s choices made on the basis of and working conditions-however, the two

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systems understood the nature and purpose of equality in different ways (Bast & Ostner, 1992).

The young GDR abolished all legal barriers to women’s work, for example, a man’s right to force his wife into or out of the labor market, a legacy of the 1900 German Civil Code, as early as 1950. At the same time they developed child-centered social policies which were to help women to work while having to care for a family. Only women, however, were entitled to these benefits; fathers, in principle, were excluded. Parenthood and, in general, child care became thoroughly feminized, a “women only” task, although the terms “girl” or “boy,” “woman” or “man” disappeared in public speech. GDR policy was concerned with “Werktatige, Erwach- sene, Kinder und Muttis,” that is, with workers, adults, children, and “mummies” (Bast & Ostner, 1992). In contrast, it was not until 1977 that the FRG reformed marriage and family laws. Instead of public child care, women got the above mentioned Child- Rearing Legislation in 1986. Interestingly enough, West Germany has had together with Italy the world’s lowest birth rate (1.3 per woman), whereas the average former East German full-time employed woman had had nearly 2.0 children on average. One can argue that the opportunity costs of more than one child have been very high for West Ger- man women.

In the FRG, the peculiar gendered division of family and work has been supported by a majority in the women’s movement. In contrast to other western societies, questions like “What kind of paid work for women, what kind of work for mothers and how much?” have dominated debates. Most involved in the discourses agree that the baby is best cared for at home in the family and by the family-which means in most cases by the mother. The presence of children at any age did not, however, hinder East German women from being employed. Ninety per- cent of former East German women were mothers, and nearly as many of them were working. State and firms provided child care facilities. Women could claim a monthly “Hausarbeitstag,” a day off work for doing housework. Maternal leave regulations were rather generous. Under the pretence that there was no pronatalist Nazi legacy to come

to terms with in the socialist system, the GDR openly continued a pronatalist family policy. Families including single-parent(mother)- families were supported by the GDR’s policy of preferential treatment in the provision of housing. Children were also of consequence in claiming loans, part-time work, or other subsidies as well as in applying for a reduc- tion of working years before retirement. Nonetheless, most women in East Germany had been gainfully employed for 35 years on average compared to 20 working years in the West German case; nonetheless, both West and former East German women earned on average less than men throughout their working life.

How to assess the GDR’s social policy regime? Interestingly enough, the GDR has to some extent practiced “social closure” like the FRG. It not only provided for different working strata, for the“nomenclatura” differently, actively discriminating against the former “bourgeois” classes and elites (Glatzer & Noll, 1992). It also created the new status and accompanying privileges of the “working mother and homemaker” (Winkler, 1989) and-as a consequence- took away the rights and responsibilities of the male parent. A gendered division of labor was not abolished but rather reinforced by a pronatalist and totalitarian state which took over the husband-father role. The option not to work did not exist for women (nor for men), and in reality to a large extent nor did the option of not being a mother. Firms and the state inter- vened in women’s lives directly. Women became relatively independent of a male’s income or consent in parental affairs, they tried a variety of family forms. Personal independence was, however, counteracted by a state device and control.

Since unification, East German men have regained roles and functions, that of a husband, a father, a breadwinner, and more power in society vis-ii-vis women - provided they are successfully employed. For the time being, women seem to be the main losers, put on the marriage track with little regard for whether there is someone to marry. Re- cent representative survey data (the German ALLBUS), compiled in 1991, on changing attitudes foretell a process of visible acceptance of West German norms among eastern Ger- man women, especially as regards family

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